Titus Livius (Livy), Ab urbe condita, Benjamin Oliver Foster, Ph.D. (Editor), Frank Gardener Moore (Editor), Evan T. Sage, Ph.D. (Editor), Alfred C. Schlesinger, Ph.D. (Editor), 44.35

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[1]

This affair raised the spirits of the Romans. It also brought no little panic to the Macedonians and their king.

[2] At first he tried to hide the report of the event in secret, by sending men to forbid Pantauchus, who was coming from there, to approach the camp.

[3] But now some boys were seen by their relatives being led along with the Illyrian hostages and the more carefully the various details were ¹ concealed, the more easily they leaked out through the garrulity of the king's servants.

[4] About the same time envoys from Rhodes came into camp with the same message about peace which had aroused great wrath in the senators at Rome. They received a much less favourable audience from the council in the camp.

[5] So while some advised that the envoys be thrown into chains, others that they be driven headlong out of camp without an answer, the consul announced that he would make a reply a fortnight later. Meanwhile, to make it clear how much influence the Rhodian peace-makers had succeeded in exerting, he began to hold consultations as to the plan of campaign.

[6] Some, especially the younger, wished to force a way through the bank of the Elpeüs and the fortifications;

[7] a solid formation, they said, attacking in single column would be irresistible to the Macedonians, who had the previous year been driven out of so many forts, ² rather higher and better fortified and held with strong garrisons.

[8] Others advised that Octavius with his fleet should make for Thessalonica and by ravaging the coastal area create a diversion of the king's forces, so that on the appearance of another attack in his rear the king would be pulled about to guard the inner part of his kingdom and be compelled to open a crossing somewhere over the Elpeüs. The consul himself regarded the riverbank as impregnable by nature and by fortification and, besides the fact that artillery had been placed everywhere, he had heard that the enemy employed missile weapons better and with more deadly aim. ³

[9] The whole thought of the Roman commander inclined in a different direction;

[10] and dismissing his council, he summoned the Perrhaebian merchants Coenus and Menophilus, men already known to him for loyalty and wisdom, and secretly inquired what the passes into Perrhaebia were like.

[11] When they said that the terrain was not difficult, but was blocked by the king's guard-forces, ⁴ the consul conceived the hope that the guards could be dislodged if he attacked suddenly by night with a strong force and surprised them; for, he argued, javelins, arrows, and other missiles are useless in the dark when the target cannot be sighted at a distance;

[12] the sword is the weapon used at close quarters in a confused throng, and with that weapon the Roman soldier would win. Planning to use the abovementioned merchants as guides, the consul summoned the praetor Octavius, explained his plans, and ordered him to sail for Heracleum with the fleet and have ten days' cooked rations for a thousand men.

[13] For his own part, he sent Publius Scipio Nasica and his own son Quintus Fabius Maximus ⁵ with five thousand picked

[14] men ⁶ to Heracleum, in order to feign an embarkation for the purpose of the plan mentioned in the council, namely, of ravaging the coastal area of inner Macedonia. Scipio and Fabius were privately informed that food was ready for them at the fleet, ⁷ so that they would not be

[15] delayed. Next, the guides were instructed to arrange the stages of the journey so that they could attack Pythoüs in the fourth watch of the third day. Next day at dawn the consul himself, in order to keep the king from investigating the other projects, joined battle with the enemy's outposts in the middle of the

[16] river-bed. The fight was conducted with light-armed troops on both sides. It was impossible to fight with heavier troops in so rough a stream-bed. The slope of either bank to the bottom was about three hundred paces; between the banks, a space of a little over a mile lay open where the torrent had hollowed it out in varying degrees from place to

[17] place. There the fight took place in sight of the watchers from the walls of both camps, the king on one side, the consul and his legions on the

[18] other. The king's light troops fought better at long range with missiles; at close quarters the Romans were steadier, and better protected by either the cavalry targe or the Ligurian rectangular

[19] shield. ⁸ About noon the consul ordered the recall to be sounded for his

[20] men. So that day the fight was broken off with no small losses to both sides. At sunrise the next day an even sharper fight took place, since their spirits had been roused by the

[21] combat. But the Romans received a great many wounds not only from those with whom the fight had been joined, but much more from the large numbers posted on the towers with all sorts of missile weapons and stones. As they came nearer to the enemy's bank, the shots from the engines reached even the rear ranks. After far more severe losses that day, the consul recalled his men somewhat

[22] later. On the third day, he desisted from battle and went down to ⁹ the lower side of the camp as if he were going to attempt the crossing through the spur of the fortifications which ran down to the

[23] sea. What was before Perseus' eyes ... ¹⁰

Ab urbe condita. Titus Livius (Livy). Benjamin Oliver Foster, Ph.D. (Editor), Frank Gardener Moore (Editor), Evan T. Sage, Ph.D. (Editor), Alfred C. Schlesinger, Ph.D. (Editor). Medford, MA. .

Sponsored by Perseus Project, Tufts University.

Funding provided by The National Endowment for the Humanities.

Current edition Perseus

History of Rome (English) (Foster, Benjamin Oliver; Moore, Frank Gardener; Sage, Evan T.; Schlesinger, Alfred C., translators. Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press; William Heinemann, Ltd., 1919-1959. (Loeb Classical Library))

Editions (3)

Ab urbe condita Perseus (Pars I-IV, Libri I-XL. Editio Stereotypica. Weissenborn, Wilhelm; Mueller, Moritz, editors. Leipzig: Teubner, 1884-1911.) — 44.35 focus

[1] quae res Romanis auxit animos. Macedonibus regique eorum haud mediocrem attulit terrorem.

[2] et primo supprimere in occulto famam eius rei est conatus, missis, qui Pantauchum inde venientem adpropinquare castris vetarent.

[3] sed iam et pueri quidam visi ab suis erant inter obsides Illyrios ducti, et quo quaeque accuratius celantur, eo facilius loquacitate regiorum ministrorum emanant.

[4] sub idem tempus Rhodii legati in castra venerunt cum isdem de pace mandatis, quae Romae ingentem iram patrum excitaverant. multo iniquioribus animis a castrensi consilio auditi sunt.

[5] itaque cum alii legatos in vincula coniciendos censerent, alii praecipites sine responso agendos e castris, pronuntiavit consul post diem quintum decimum se responsum daturum.

[6] interim, ut appareret, quantum pacificantium Rhodiorum auctoritas valuisset, consultare de ratione belli gerendi coepit. placebat quibusdam et maxime minoribus natu per Elpei ripam munitionesque vim facere:

[7] confertis et uno agmine impetum facientibus resistere Macedonas non posse, ex tot castellis aliquanto altioribus ac munitioribus, quae validis praesidiis insedissent, priore anno deiectos.

[8] aliis placebat Octavium cum classe Thessalonicam eam petere et populatione maritumae orae distringere copias regias, ut altero ab tergo se ostendente bello circumactus ad interiorem partem regni tuendam nudare aliqua parte transitus Elpei cogeretur. ipsi natura et operibus inexsuperabilis ripa videbatur,

[9] et praeterquam quod tormenta ubique disposita essent, missilibus etiam melius et certiore ictu hostis uti audierat.

[10] alio spectabat mens tota ducis; dimissoque consilio Perrhaebos mercatores Coenum et Menophilum, notae iam sibi et fidei et prudentiae homines, accersitos secreto percunctatur, quales ad Perrhaebiam transitus sint.

[11] cum loca non iniqua esse dicerent, praesidiis autem regiis obsideri, spem cepit, si nocte inproviso valida manu adgressus necopinantis esset, deici praesidia posse:

[12] iacula enim et sagittas et cetera missilia in tenebris, ubi, quid petatur, procul provideri nequeat, inutilia esse; gladio comminus geri rem in permixta turba, quo miles Romanus vincat.

[13] his ducibus usurus praetorem Octavium accersitum, exposito, quid pararet, Heracleum cum classe petere iubet et mille hominibus decem dierum cocta cibaria habere.

[14] ipse P. Scipionem Nasicam, Q. Fabium Maximum filium suum cum quinque milibus delectis militum Heracleum mittit, velut classem conscensuros ad maritumam oram interioris Macedoniae, quod in consilio agitatum erat, vastandam.

[15] secreto indicatum cibaria his praeparata ad classem esse, ne quid eos moraretur. inde iussi duces itineris ita dividere viam, ut quarta vigilia tertio die Pythoum adoriri possent.

[16] ipse postero die, ut detineret regem ab circumspectu rerum aliarum, prima luce medio in alveo cum stationibus hostium proelium commisit; pugnatumque utrimque est levi armatura. nec gravioribus armis in tam inaequali alveo pugnari poterat.

[17] descensus ripae utriusque in alveum trecentorum ferme passuum erat; medium spatium torrentis alibi aliter cavati paulo plus quam mille passus patebat.

[18] ibi in medio spectantibus utrimque ex vallo castrorum hinc rege, hinc consule cum suis legionibus pugnatum est.

[19] missilibus procul regia auxilia melius pugnabant; comminus stabilior et tutior aut parma aut scuto Ligustico Romanus erat.

[20] meridie fere receptui cani suis consul iussit. ita eo die diremptum proelium est haud paucis utrimque interfectis.

[21] sole orto postero die inritatis certamine animis etiam acrius concursum est. sed Romani non ab iis tantum, cum quibus contractum certamen erat, sed multo magis ab ea multitudine, quae disposita in turribus stabat, omni genere missilium telorum ac saxis maxime volnerabantur.

[22] ubi propius ripam hostium subissent, tormentis missa etiam ad ultimos perveniebant. multo pluribus eo die amissis consul paulo serius recepit suos.

[23] tertio die proelio abstinuit, degressus ad imam partem castrorum, veluti per devexum in mare bracchium transitum temptaturus.

[24] Perseus, quod in oculis erat .

Ab urbe condita Perseus (Livy in Fourteen Volumes. Foster, Benjamin Oliver; Moore, Frank Gardener; Schlesinger, Alfred C., editors. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1919-1959 (printing).) — 44.35 focus

[1]

quae res Romanis auxit animos. Macedonibus regique eorum haud mediocrem attulit terrorem.

[2] et primo supprimere in occulto famam eius rei est conatus, missis, qui Pantauchum inde venientem adpropinquare castris vetarent.

[3] sed iam et pueri quidam visi ab suis erant inter obsides Illyrios ducti, et quo quaeque accuratius celantur, ¹ eo ² facilius loquacitate regiorum ministrorum emanant.

[4] sub idem tempus Rhodii legati in castra venerunt cum isdem de pace mandatis, quae Romae ingentem iram patrum excitaverant. ³ multo iniquioribus animis a castrensi consilio auditi sunt.

[5] itaque cum alii legatos in vincula coniciendos censerent, ⁴ alii praecipites sine responso agendos e castris, ⁵ pronuntiavit consul ⁶ post diem quintum decimum se responsum daturum.

[6] interim , ut appareret quantum pacificantium Rhodiorum auctoritas valuisset, consultare de ratione belli gerendi coepit. placebat quibusdam et maxime minoribus ⁷ natu per Elpei ripam munitionesque vim facere:

[7] confertis et uno agmine impetum ⁸ facientibus resistere Macedonas non posse, ex tot castellis aliquanto altioribus ac munitioribus, quae validis praesidiis insedissent, priore anno deiectos.

[8] aliis placebat Octavium cum classe Thessalonicam petere et populatione maritumae orae distringere copias regias, ut altero ab tergo se ostendente bello circumactus ad interiorem partem regni tuendam nudare aliqua parte transitus Elpei cogeretur. ipsi natura et operibus inexsuperabilis ripa videbatur,

[9] et praeterquam quod tormenta ubique disposita essent, missilibus etiam melius et certiore ictu hostis uti audierat.

[10] alio spectabat mens tota ⁹ ducis; dimissoque consilio Perrhaebos mercatores Coenum et Menophilum, notae iam sibi et fidei et ¹⁰ prudentiae homines, accersitos secreto percunctatur, quales ad Perrhaebiam transitus sint.

[11] cum loca non iniqua esse dicerent, praesidiis autem regiis ¹¹ obsideri, spem cepit, si nocte inproviso improvise valida manu adgressus necopinantis esset, deici praesidia posse: iacula enim et sagittas et cetera missilia in tenebris,

[12] ubi quid petatur procul provideri nequeat, inutilia esse; gladio comminus geri rem in permixta turba, quo miles Romanus vincat.

[13] his ducibus usurus praetorem Octavium accersitum, exposito quid pararet Heracleum ¹² cum classe petere iubet et mille hominibus decem dierum cocta ¹³ cibaria habere. ipse P.

[14] Scipionem Nasicam, Q. Fabium Maximum filium suum cum quinque milibus ¹⁴ delectis militum Heracleum mittit, velut classem conscensuros ad maritumam oram interioris Macedoniae, quod in consilio agitatum erat, vastandam.

[15] secreto indicatum cibaria his praeparata ad classem esse, ne quid ¹⁵ eos moraretur. inde iussi duces itineris ita dividere viam, ut quarta vigilia tertio die Pythoum adoriri possent.

[17] descensus ripae utriusque in alveum trecentorum ferme passuum erat; medium spatium torrentis alibi aliter cavati paulo plus quam mille passus patebat.

[18] ibi in medio spectantibus utrimque ex vallo castrorum hinc rege, ¹⁶ hinc consule cum suis legionibus pugnatum est.

[19] missilibus procul regia auxilia melius pugnabant; comminus stabilior et tutior aut parma aut scuto Ligustico Romanus erat. meridie fere receptui cani suis consul iussit.

[20] ita eo die diremptum proelium est haud paucis utrimque interfectis.

[21] sole orto postero die irritatis certamine animis etiam acrius concursum coneursum est. sed Romani non ab iis ¹⁷ tantum, cum quibus contractum certamen erat, sed multo magis ab ea multitudine quae disposita in turribus stabat omni genere missilium telorum ac saxis maxime volnerabantur.

[22] ubi propius ripam hostium subissent, tormentis missa etiam ad ultimos perveniebant. multo pluribus eo die ¹⁸ amissis consul paulo serius recepit suos.

[23] tertio die proelio abstinuit, degressus ¹⁹ ad imam partem castrorum, ²⁰ veluti per devexum in mare bracchium transitum temptaturus.

[24] Perseus , quod in oculis erat ....

Ab urbe condita libri, erklärt von M. Weissenborn Perseus (Weissenborn, W.; Müller, H. J., editors. Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1873-1883.) — 44.35 focus

[1]

Roma norum esse; quae res Romanis auxit animos, Macedonibus regique eorum haud mediocrem attulit terrorem.

[2] et primo supprimere in occulto famam eius rei est conatus missis, qui Pantauchum inde venientem adpropinquare castris vetarent.

[3] sed iam et pueri quidam visi ab suis erant inter obsidis Illyrios ducti, et quo quaeque accuratius celantur, eo facilius loquacitate regiorum ministrorum emanant.

[4] sub idem tempus Rhodii legati in castra venerunt cum iisdem de pace mandatis, quae Romae ingentem iram patrum excitavere.

[5] multo iniquioribus animis a castrensi consilio auditi sunt. itaque cum alii alii praecipites sine responso agendos castris, pronuntiavit post diem quintum decimum se responsum daturum.

[6] interim, ut appareret, quantum pacificantium Rhodiorum auctoritas valuisset, consultare de ratione belli gerendi coepit.

[7] placebat quibusdam et maxime minoribus natu per Elpei ripam munitionesque ¹ vim facere: confertis et uno facientibus resistere Macedonas non posse, ex tot castellis aliquanto altioribus ac munitioribus, quae validis praesidiis insedissent, priore anno deiectos.

[9] ipsi natura et operibus inexsuperabilis ripa videbatur, et praeterquam quod tormenta ubique disposita essent, missilibus etiam melius et certiore ictu hostis uti audierat.

[11] cum loca non iniqua esse dicerent, praesidiis autem regiis obsideri, spem cepit, si nocte ² inproviso valida manu adgressus necopinantis esset, deici praesidia posse:

[12] iacula enim et sagittas et cetera missilia in tenebris, ubi, quid petatur, procul provideri nequeat, inutilia esse; gladio comminus geri rem in permixta turba, quo miles Romanus vincat.

[13] his ducibus usurus, praetorem Octavium accersitum exposito, quid pararet, Heraclium cum classe petere iubet et mille hominibus decem dierum cocta cibaria habere.

[14] ipse P. Scipionem Nasicam , Q. Fabium Maximum filium suum cum quinque milibus delectis militum Heracleum mittit, velut classem conscensuros ad maritumam oram interioris Macedoniae, quod in consilio agitatum erat, vastandam.

[15] secreto indicatum cibaria his praeparata ad classem esse, ne quid eos moraretur. inde iussi duces itineris ita dividere viam, ut quarta vigilia tertio die Pythoum ³ adoriri possent.

[16] ipse postero die, ut detineret regem ab circumspectu rerum aliarum, prima luce medio in alveo cum stationibus hostium proelium commisit, atque pugnatum utrimque est levi armatura; nec gravioribus armis in tam inaequali alveo pugnari poterat.

[17] descensus ripae utriusque in alveum trecentorum ferme passum erat; medium spatium torrentis alibi aliter cavati paulo plus quam mille passus patebat.

[18] ibi in medio spectantibus utrimque ex vallo castrorum hinc rege, hinc consule cum suis legionibus pugnatum est.

[19] missilibus procul regia auxilia melius pugnabant; comminus stabilior et tutior aut parma aut scuto Ligustino Romanus erat.

[20] meridie fere receptui cani suis consul iussit. ita eo die diremptum proelium est haud paucis utrimque interfectis.

[22] ubi propius ripam hostium ⁴ subissent, tormentis missa etiam ad ultimos perveniebant. multo pluribus eo die amissis consul paulo serius recepit suos.

[23] tertio die proelio abstinuit, degressus ad imam partem castrorum, veluti per devexum in mare bracchium transitum temptaturus.

[24] Perseus, quod in oculis erat

Translations (2)

History of Rome Perseus (Spillan, D.; Edmonds, Cyrus; McDevitte, William A., translators. London: Henry G. Bohn, 1849-1868. (Bohn's Classical Library)) — 44.35 focus

[1]

which event greatly raised the spirits of the Romans, and struck no small degree of terror into the Macedonians and their king.

[2] At first, Perseus endeavoured to suppress the intelligence, and sent messengers to Pantauchus, who was on his way from that country, forbidding him to come near the camp; but some of his people had already seen certain boys, carried away among the Illyrian hostages; and it is certain that the more pains there are used to conceal any circumstances the more readily they are divulged, through the gossiping disposition of the attendants of kings.

[3] About this time, ambassadors came to the camp from Rhodes, with the same message which had excited so much resentment in the Roman senate. They were now heard by the council in the camp with much greater indignation than at Rome; some even advised that they should be instantly driven out of the camp without any reply; but the consul said, that he would give them an answer in fifteen days.

[4] Meanwhile, to show how far the influence of the Rhodians as mediators extended, he began to consult on the plan of carrying forward the war. Some, particularly the older officers, advised to force their way across the Enipeus, and through the enemy's works.

When they should advance in close order and make an assault, the Macedonians,

they said,

would never be able to withstand them. They had been, last year, beaten out of many fortresses much higher and better fortified, which they had occupied with much stronger garrisons.

[5] Others recommended, that Octavius, with the fleet, should sail to Thessalonica; and, by committing depredations on the seacoast, to divide the king's forces; so that when, on the appearance of another enemy behind him, he should turn about to protect the interior part of the kingdom, he would be forced to leave a passage over the Enipeus open in some place or other.

[6] The consul himself was of opinion, that the nature of the bank, and the works erected on it, presented insuperable difficulties; and, besides its being every where furnished with engines, he had been informed, that the enemy were remarkable for using missile weapons with uncommon skill, and with a very certain aim. The consul's full conviction leaned quite another way; as soon, therefore, as the council broke up, he sent for Schœnus and Menophilus, Perrhaebian merchants, whom he knew to be men of probity and good sense, and examined them in private about the nature of the passes leading into Perrhaebia.

[7] They told him, that the places themselves were not difficult; but that they were occupied by parties of the king's troops; from which he conceived hopes of being able to beat off those parties, by making a sudden attack with a strong force in the night, when they were off their guard.

[8] For he considered that

javelins, and arrows, and other missile weapons, were useless in the dark, when one cannot see at a distance what to aim at; but that, when combatants closed together in a throng, the business must depend on the sword, in which the Roman soldier was superior.

He resolved to employ those two men as guides; and, sending for the praetor Octavius, explained to him what he intended, ordering him to sail directly with the fleet to Heracleum, and to have in readiness, there, ten days' provisions for one thousand men. He then sent Publius Scipio Nasica, and Quintus Fabius Maximus, his own son, with five thousand chosen men, to Heracleum, as if they were to embark in the fleet, to ravage the coast of the interior parts of Macedonia, as had been proposed in the council. He told them, in private, that there were provisions prepared for them on board, so that they should have no delay.

[9] He then ordered the guides to divide the road in such a manner that they might attack Pythium at the fourth watch on the third day. He himself, on the day following, in order to withdraw the king from the observation of other matters, attacked his advanced guards as soon as it was light in the middle of the channel of the river, where the fight was maintained by the light infantry on both sides, for the bottom was so uneven, that heavy arms could not be used.

[10] The slope of each bank was three hundred paces long, and the breadth of the channel, which was of various depths, somewhat more than a mile. In this middle space the fight was carried on, while the king on one side, and the consul with his legions on the other, stood spectators on the ramparts of their camps.

[11] At a distance, the king's troops had the advantage in fighting with missile weapons; but in close fight the Roman soldier was more steady, and was better defended, either with a target or a Ligurian buckler. About noon, the consul ordered the signal of retreat to be given, and thus the battle ended for that day, after considerable numbers had fallen on both sides.

[12] Next morning at sun-rise, the fight was renewed with greater fury, as their passions had been irritated by the former contest; but the Romans were wounded, not only by those with whom they were immediately engaged, but much more by the multitudes that stood posted in the towers, with missiles of every sort, particularly stones; so that whenever they advanced towards the enemy's bank, the weapons thrown from the engines reached even the hindmost of their men. The consul, having lost far more men on that day, somewhat later called off his men.

[13] On the third day he declined fighting, and moved down to the lowest side of the camp, as if intending to attempt a passage through an intrenchment which stretched down to the sea. Perseus, who did not extend his cares beyond the objects that lay before his eyes, ¹

History of Rome Perseus (Volumes 1-2. Roberts, Canon, Rev, translator. London, New York: J. M. Dent and Sons; E. P. Dutton and Co., 1912.) — 44.35 focus

[1]

This incident raised the spirits of the Romans and produced considerable alarm amongst the Macedonians and their king.

[2] At first he tried to stifle the report by sending to Pantauchus, who was on his way to the camp, to forbid him from entering it; but some boys, who were being taken away amongst the Illyrian hostages, had been seen by their friends.

[3] So the greater the pains taken to conceal the details, the more easily did they leak out through the love of gossip in the king's Court.

[4] Just after this the envoys from Rhodes arrived at the Roman camp bringing with them the same demand for peace which had so roused the ire of the Roman senate. They received a much more hostile hearing from the council of war in the camp.

[5] Some thought they ought to be driven helter-skelter out of the camp; the consul said he would give them an answer in a fortnight's time. Meanwhile, to make it clear how far the influence of the Rhodians extended in their efforts to bring about peace, he began to discuss the plan of operations with his council.

[6] Some, mainly the younger officers, were for crossing the Elpeus and storming the opposite bank and the defensive works above it.

[7] After their expulsion the year before from their forts, which were on higher ground, better fortified and strongly held, they thought the Macedonians would be unable to stand a general attack made in full force. Others were of opinion that Octavius ought to take his fleet to Thessalonica and devastate the coast.

[8] By thus menacing his rear they would compel the king to divide his forces and march away to protect the interior of his kingdom, thus leaving the passage of the river in some direction open. The consul considered the river bank insurmountable, owing to its steepness and the works which defended it, especially as artillery was in position everywhere, and he had heard that the enemy used their missile weapons more skillfully, and with a surer aim.

[9] The consul had quite made up his mind to adopt another course, and the council broke up. There were two Perrhaebian traders, Coenus and Menophilus, whose honesty and sagacity he knew he could trust.

[10] He sent for them and questioned them privately about the routes leading into Perrhaebia. They told him that the country was not difficult; it was held by detachments of the king's troops.

[11] Hearing this he thought that by a sudden night attack delivered in force, when the enemy were not expecting it, they could be dislodged and driven back. Javelins and arrows and other missiles were useless in the dark, when it was impossible to see what to aim at; it was in close hand-to-hand fighting with the sword, in the melee of battle, that the Roman soldier was victorious.

[12] He decided to take these men as guides, and sent for Octavius, to whom he explained his plans, and he gave him instructions to sail to Heracleum and have in readiness ten days' rations for 1000 men.

[13] P. Scipio Nasica and Q. Fabius Maximus, his own son, were sent overland to Heracleum with 5000 select troops, as though they were going on board the fleet to devastate the Macedonian coast-the scheme which had been advocated in the council.

[14] They were privately informed that, to avoid any delay, there was food ready for these troops on board the fleet. The two guides were then ordered so to regulate the length of each day's march as to allow of an attack being made on Pythium in the fourth watch of the third day.

[15] To prevent the king from directing his attention elsewhere, the consul, at dawn on the following day, commenced an action with the enemy's outposts in the middle of the river-bed, and the fighting was kept up by the light infantry on both sides; heavier troops could not possibly fight on such uneven ground.

[16] From the top of each bank down to the river-bed was about 300 paces; the actual channel of the river between the banks, which varied in depth, was over a mile wide.

[17] There in mid-channel the fight went on, the king watching it from his intrenchments on the one side and the consul from the rampart surrounded by his legionaries on the other.

[18] As long as they were not in touch and could use their missiles the king's men fought at an advantage, but when it came to close fighting the Roman was more steady and better protected, whether by the shield or the Ligurian buckler.

[19] About noon the consul ordered the retreat to be sounded, so the action was broken off for that day with a not inconsiderable number killed on both sides.

[20] The next day the conflict was renewed at sunrise with even greater bitterness, as their passions had been roused by the previous contest.

[21] But the Romans were wounded, not only by those with whom they were actually fighting, but to a much greater extent by the missiles of every kind which were discharged by the multitude of assailants posted on the turrets, and especially by the huge stones from the ballistae. Whenever they got nearer to the bank held by the enemy the discharges from the catapults reached even the hindmost. After losing far more on that day, the consul recalled his men somewhat later than the day before.

[22] On the third day he abstained from fighting and went down to the lowest part of the camp, as if to attempt a passage through that part of the enemy's line, which was carried down to the sea.

[23] . . .

Notes on the current edition

Ab Urbe Condita With An English Translation, books 1-10, 21-45, with periochae 11-20

1. B.C. 168

2. This is contrary to the picture given by Livy above, chs. iv-vii, and seems to be inserted to show that the speakers estimated the situation incorrectly.

3. B.C. 168

4. Plutarch, Aemilius xv and xvi. 1, says that the passes were not guarded at this time, but that Perseus sent a force after hearing that Romans, under Nasica, were on the march to Pythium. Plutarch cites Polybius and Nasica himself for the story of the dislodging of the Macedonians.

5. As explained by Plutarch, Aemilius xv, this was the elder of Aemilius' sons by his first wife; the younger became Scipio Africanus the Younger, cf. below, xliv. 1-2. After divorcing his wife, remarrying, and having two more sons(for whom see below, XLV. xl. 7), Aemilius gave the older pair in adoption. Fabius was about eighteen at this time; his adoption had taken place about ten years before.

6. Plutarch, following Nasica and correcting Polybius, lists three thousand Italians (

special troops

— e)kto\s ta/cews = extraordinarii ?), five thousand of the

left wing

(= sinistra ala, i.e. cavalry?), 120 cavalry, and 200 mixed Thracians and Cretans.

7. B.C. 168

8. This is based on Polybius XXIX. 14. 4; the Ligurian shield was long and light, according to Diodorus V. 39. 7.

9. B.C. 168

10. Judging from Plutarch, Aemilius xvi, the lost four sheets told of the success of Nasica in clearing the pass, Perseus' fright and retreat, and his subsequent resolve to make a stand at Pydna; also of the joining of Nasica with Paulus and the overtaking of the Macedonians.

Titus Livius (Livy) Ab urbe condita 44.35

Benjamin Oliver Foster, Ph.D. (Editor), Frank Gardener Moore (Editor), Evan T. Sage, Ph.D. (Editor), Alfred C. Schlesinger, Ph.D. (Editor)

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