Titus Livius (Livy), Ab urbe condita, Benjamin Oliver Foster, Ph.D. (Editor), Frank Gardener Moore (Editor), Evan T. Sage, Ph.D. (Editor), Alfred C. Schlesinger, Ph.D. (Editor), 37.26

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[1] When Antiochus lost his hope of an alliance with Prusias, he went to Ephesus from Sardis to inspect the fleet which for some months had been equipped and ready, more because he saw that with

[2] his land forces he could not withstand the Roman army and its generals, the two Scipios, than because he had ever tried actual combat by sea with much success or had at this time any great and assured confidence.

[3] There was, however, a reason for hope at the moment, in that he had heard, first, that the larger part of the Rhodian fleet was in the vicinity of Patara and, second, that King Eumenes with all¹ his ships had gone to meet the consul at the Hellespont; an additional stimulant to his spirits was the destruction of the Rhodian fleet at Samos under conditions attained by trickery.

[4] Relying on these circumstances, he sent Polyxenidas with the fleet to try fortune in any sort of engagement and himself led his troops to Notium.

[5] This is a town of Colophon, overlooking the sea, distant from old Colophon about two miles.

[6] And he wished to have the town itself in his hands, being so close to Ephesus that he could do nothing on land or sea which was not observed by the Colophonians, and through them was not immediately known to the Romans, and he had no doubt that when they heard of its siege they would move the fleet from Samos to bear aid to an allied city; this would be the opportunity for Polyxenidas to bring about an engagement.

[7] Therefore he began to lay siege to the city, constructing a line of fortifications down to the sea on each side alike, and in both ran mantlets and an outwork up to the wall and moved battering-rams under shelter.²

[8] Terrified by these misfortunes, the Colophonians sent to Lucius Aemilius the praetor at Samos representatives to beg for the protection of the praetor and the Roman people.

[9] Aemilius, idle at Samos, was chafing under the long delay, thinking of nothing less than that Polyxenidas, twice challenged by him

[10] in vain, would offer the opportunity for battle, and he thought it a disgrace that the fleet of Eumenes should assist the consul in transporting the legions into Asia while he was entangled in aiding the beleaguered Colophon, an operation of indefinite duration.

[11] Eudamus the Rhodian, who also had detained him at Samos, although he wished to leave for the Hellespont, and³ all the others, kept urging him and saying:

[12] how much better it would be either to relieve the allies from siege

[13] or again to defeat the navy already once defeated and to wrest completely from the enemy his mastery of the sea than, abandoning the allies and surrendering to Antiochus the land and sea of Asia, to go off to the Hellespont, where the fleet of Eumenes was sufficient, and run away from his own share in the war.⁴

Ab urbe condita. Titus Livius (Livy). Benjamin Oliver Foster, Ph.D. (Editor), Frank Gardener Moore (Editor), Evan T. Sage, Ph.D. (Editor), Alfred C. Schlesinger, Ph.D. (Editor). Medford, MA. .

Sponsored by Perseus Project, Tufts University.

Funding provided by The National Endowment for the Humanities.

Current edition Perseus

History of Rome (English) (Foster, Benjamin Oliver; Moore, Frank Gardener; Sage, Evan T.; Schlesinger, Alfred C., translators. Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press; William Heinemann, Ltd., 1919-1959. (Loeb Classical Library))

Editions (3)

Ab urbe condita Perseus (Pars I-IV, Libri I-XL. Editio Stereotypica. Weissenborn, Wilhelm; Mueller, Moritz, editors. Leipzig: Teubner, 1884-1911.) — 37.26 focus

[1] Antiochus postquam a spe societatis Prusiae decidit, Ephesum ab Sardibus est profectus ad classem, quae per aliquot menses instructa ac parata fuerat,

[2] visendam, magis quia terrestribus copiis exercitum Romanum et duos Scipiones imperatores videbat sustineri non posse, quam quod res navalis ipsa per se aut temptata sibi umquam feliciter aut tunc magnae et certae fiduciae esset.

[3] erat tamen momentum in praesentia spei, quod et magnam partem Rhodiae classis circa Patara esse et Eumenen regem cum omnibus navibus suis consuli obviam in Hellespontum profectum audierat;

[4] aliquid etiam inflabat animos classis Rhodia ad Samum per occasionem fraude praeparatam absumpta.

[5] his fretus, Polyxenida cum classe ad temptandam omni modo certaminis fortunam misso, ipse copias ad Notium ducit. id oppidum Colophonium, mari imminens, abest a vetere Colophone duo ferme milia passuum.

[6] et ipsam urbem suae potestatis esse volebat, adeo propinquam Epheso, ut nihil terra marive ageret, quod non subiectum oculis Colophoniorum ac per eos notum extemplo Romanis esset,

[7] et hos audita obsidione non dubitabat ad opem sociae urbi ferendam classem ab Samo moturos; eam occasionem Polyxenidae ad rem gerendam fore.

[8] igitur operibus oppugnare urbem adgressus, ad mare partibus duabus pariter munitionibus deductis, utrimque vineas et aggerem muro iniunxit et testudinibus arietes admovit.

[9] quibus territi malis Colophonii oratores Samum ad L. Aemilium, fidem praetoris populique Romani implorantes, miserunt.

[10] Aemilium et Sami segnis diu mora offendebat, nihil minus opinantem quam Polyxenidam, bis nequiquam ab se provocatum, potestatem pugnae facturum esse,

[11] et turpe existimabat Eumenis classem adiuvare consulem ad traiciendas in Asiam legiones, se Colophouis Colophonis obsessae auxilio, incertam finem habituro, alligari.

[12] Eudamus Rhodius, qui et tenuerat eum Sami cupientem proficisci in Hellespontum,

[13] cunctique instare et dicere: quanto satius esse vel socios obsidione eximere vel victam iam semel classem iterum vincere et totam maris possessionem hosti eripere, quam desertis sociis, tradita Antiocho Asia terra marique in Hellespontum, ubi satis esset Eumenis classis, ab sua parte belli discedere.

Ab urbe condita Perseus (Livy in Fourteen Volumes. Foster, Benjamin Oliver; Moore, Frank Gardener; Schlesinger, Alfred C., editors. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1919-1959 (printing).) — 43.23 focus

[1]

Rex cum non ¹ minore vexatione iumentorum hominumque quam venerat in Macedoniam rediit; Appium tamen ab obsidione Phanotes fama ducentis ad Stratum Persei summovit.

[2] Cleuas cum praesidio impigrorum iuvenum insecutus sub radicibus prope inviis montium ² ad mille hominum ex agmine impedito occidit, ad ducentos cepit.

[3] Appius superatis angustiis in campo quem Meleona vocant stativa dierum paucorum habuit. interim Cleuas assumpto Philostrato, qui quingentos ex ³ Epirotarum gente habebat, in agrum Antigonensem transcendit. ⁴ Macedones ad depopulationem profecti;

[4] Philostratus⁵ cum cohorte sua in insidiis loco ⁶ obscuro consedit. in palatos populatores cum erupissent ab Antigonea armati, ⁷ fugientes eos persequentes effusius in vallem insessam ab hostibus praecipitant.

[5] ibi ad mille ⁸ occisis, centum ferme captis, et ubique prospere gesta re prope stativa Appi castra movent, ne qua vis sociis suis ab Romano exercitu inferri possit.

[6] Appius nequiquam in his locis terens tempus, dimissis Chaonum Thesprotorumque ⁹ et si qui alii Epirotae erant praesidiis, cum Italicis militibus in Illyricum regressus, per Parthinorum ¹⁰ socias urbes in hiberna militibus divisis, ¹¹ ipse Romam sacrificii causa redit.

[7] Perseus ex Penestarum gente mille pedites, ducentos equites revocatos Cassandream, praesidio ut essent, misit.

[8] Ab Gentio eadem adferentes redierunt. nec deinde alios atque alios mittendo temptare eum destitit, cum appareret, quantum in eo praesidii esset, nec tamen impetrare ab animo posset, ut impensam in rem maximi ad omnia momenti faceret.

Ab urbe condita libri, erklärt von M. Weissenborn Perseus (Weissenborn, W.; Müller, H. J., editors. Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1873-1883.) — 37.26 focus

[1]

Antiochus postquam a spe societatis Prusiae decidit, Ephesum ab Sardibus est profectus ad classem, quae per aliquot menses instructa ac parata fuerat,

[2] visendam, magis quia terrestribus copiis exercitum Romanum et duos Scipiones imperatores ¹ videbat sustineri non posse, quam quod res navalis ipsa per se aut temptata sibi umquam feliciter aut tunc magnae et certae fiduciae esset.

[3] erat tamen momentum in praesentia spei, quod et magnam partem Rhodiae classis circa Patara esse et Eumenen regem cum omnibus navibus suis consuli obviam in Hellespontum profectum audierat;

[4] aliquid etiam inflabat animos classis Rhodia ad Samum per occasionem fraude praeparatam absumpta.

[6] et ipsam urbem suae potestatis esse volebat, adeo propinquam Epheso, ut nihil terra marive ageret, quod non subiectum oculis Colophoniorum ac per eos notum extemplo Romanis esset,

[7] quos audita obsidione non dubitabat ad opem sociae urbi ferendam classem ab Samo moturos;

[8] eam occasionem Polyxenidae ad rem gerendam fore. igitur operibus oppugnare urbem adgressus, ad mare partibus duabus pariter munitionibus deductis, utrimque vineas et aggerem muro iniunxit et testudinibus arietes admovit. quibus territi malis Colophonii oratores Samum ad L. Aemilium ,

[9] fidem praetoris populique Romani implorantes, miserunt.

[10] Aemilium et Sami ² segnis diu mora offendebat, nihil minus opinantem quam Polyxenidam, bis nequiquam ab se provocatum, potestatem pugnae facturum esse,

[11] et turpe existimabat Eumenis classem adiuvare consulem ad traiciendas in Asiam legiones, se Colophonis obsessae auxilio, incertam finem habituro, adligari.

[12] Eudamus Rhodius , qui et tenuerat eum Sami cupientem proficisci in Hellespontum, cunctique instare et dicere,

[13] quanto satius esse vel socios obsidione eximere vel victam iam semel classem iterum vincere et totam maris possessionem hosti eripere, quam desertis sociis, tradita Antiocho Asia terra marique in Hellespontum, ubi satis esset Eumenis classis, ab sua parte belli discedere.

Translations (2)

History of Rome Perseus (Spillan, D.; Edmonds, Cyrus; McDevitte, William A., translators. London: Henry G. Bohn, 1849-1868. (Bohn's Classical Library)) — 37.26 focus

[1]

Antiochus, after he lost the hope of an alliance with Prusias, went from Sardis to Ephesus, to review the fleet which was fitted out, and lay there ready, for several months;

[2] rather because he saw it impossible, with his land forces, to make any stand against the Roman army and its commanders, the two Scipios, than that his naval force by itself had ever been tried by him successfully, or afforded at this juncture any great or well-grounded confidence.

[3] Yet there was an incentive to hope on the present occasion; for he had heard that a large portion of the Rhodian fleet was at Patara, and that king Eumenes had gone to the Hellespont, with all his ships, to meet the consul. Besides, the destruction of the Rhodian fleet at Samos, on an opportunity prepared by treachery, inspired some degree of confidence.

[4] Relying on these things, he sent Polyxenidas with orders to try, at all events, the fortune of a naval engagement; while he himself marched his land forces to Notium.

[5] This town, which belongs to Colophon, stands close to the sea, and is distant about two miles from Old Colophon.

[6] He wished to get this city into his power, because it was so near to Ephesus that nothing could be done there, on sea or land, that was not open to the view of the Colophonians, and, through them, instantly made known to the Romans; and he had no doubt that the latter, having heard of the siege, would bring their fleet from Samos to the relief of an ally, which would give Polyxenidas an opportunity of coming to action.

[7] He therefore began to lay regular siege to the city, making his approaches at the same time on the two sides next the sea; in both places he joined his engines and mounds to the wall, and brought up the rams under covered galleries.

[8] By which dangers the Colophonians being terrified, sent en- voys to Lucius Aemilius, at Samos, imploring the protection of the praetor and people of Rome.

[9] His lying so long inactive at Samos offended Aemilius, thinking nothing more improbable than that Polyxenidas, whom he had twice challenged in vain to fight, should ever offer him battle;

[10] and he considered it as dishonourable, that the fleet of Eumenes should assist the consul in conveying the legions into Asia, that he should be fettered by bearing to the besieged Colophon an assistance destined to have an uncertain end.

[11] Eudamus, the Rhodian, (who had before prevailed upon him to stay at Samos, when he wished to go to the Hellespont,)

[12] with all the other officers, pressed him to comply, representing

how much more eligible it would be, either to relieve confederates

[13]

from a siege, or to vanquish that fleet which he had vanquished before, and to take from the enemy the entire possession of the sea, than, deserting his allies, and delivering Asia to Antiochus by land and sea, to depart from his own part of the war to the Hellespont, when the fleet of Eumenes was sufficient for that station.

History of Rome Perseus (Volumes 1-2. Roberts, Canon, Rev, translator. London, New York: J. M. Dent and Sons; E. P. Dutton and Co., 1912.) — 37.26 focus

[1]

Now that he had lost all hope of securing Prusias as an ally, Antiochus left Sardis for Ephesus in order to inspect the fleet which had been fitted out and in readiness for several months.

[2] It was the impossibility of offering an effective resistance to the Roman army with the two Scipios in command rather than any naval successes in the past or any well-grounded confidence he felt at the time which made him interest himself in his fleet. For the moment, however, there were some things to encourage him.

[3] He had learned that a large part of the Rhodian fleet was at Patara and that Eumenes had gone with all his ships to the Hellespont to meet the consul. The destruction of the Rhodian fleet at Samos, as the result of treachery, also did something to raise his spirits.

[4] These considerations led him to send Polyxenidas with his fleet to try the chances of battle at all hazards, whilst he himself led his forces to Notium.

[5] This place belongs to Colophon and is about two miles distant from it and overlooks the sea. He wanted to get Colophon itself into his power, for it was so near Ephesus that he could take no action by sea or land which was not visible to the people of Colophon who at once informed the Romans.

[6] When once the Romans heard that Notium was besieged he felt sure that they would bring up their fleet from Samos to help their ally, and this would give Polyxenidas his opportunity.

[7] Accordingly he commenced the siege of the city in regular form; his lines were extended equally in two directions down to the sea; on both sides he carried the agger and the vineae up to the walls and the battering-rams with their shelters were placed in position.

[8] Appalled at these dangers the people of Colophon sent to L. Aemilius at Samos to implore him for his own honour and the honour of Rome to come to their assistance.

[9] Aemilius was chafing under his protracted inactivity at Samos, the last thing he was expecting was that Polyxenidas, after being twice challenged by him in vain, would give him an opportunity of fighting.

[10] He also felt it a humiliation to be tied and bound to the assistance of besieged Colophon whilst the fleet of Eumenes was helping the consul to transport his legions to Asia.

[11] Eudamus, who had kept him at Samos, now with all the other officers urged him to go to Colophon.

[12] They pointed out how much more satisfactory it would be to relieve their friends or inflict

[13] a second defeat upon a fleet which had been worsted once, and so wrest the command of the sea from the enemy, than it would be if he were to abandon his allies, desert his proper sphere of action by sailing to the Hellespont and so leave Asia at the mercy of Antiochus both by sea and land.

Notes on the current edition

Ab Urbe Condita With An English Translation, books 1-10, 21-45, with periochae 11-20

1. B.C. 190

2. The testudo is ordinarily a temporary device, formed by the overlapping shields of an attacking column in close formation; here it is a portable roof to cover a battering-ram and its crew.

3. B.C. 190

4. Again we see the perplexities which lack of communications and of satisfactory liaison between army and navy caused Aemilius. He probably had no instructions from the consul as to the co-operation he expected or from the senate as to his general policy. The multiplicity of possible lines of action resulted in his adopting none of them and in exposing him to pressure from his allies.

Titus Livius (Livy) Ab urbe condita 37.26

Benjamin Oliver Foster, Ph.D. (Editor), Frank Gardener Moore (Editor), Evan T. Sage, Ph.D. (Editor), Alfred C. Schlesinger, Ph.D. (Editor)

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