Titus Livius (Livy), Ab urbe condita, Benjamin Oliver Foster, Ph.D. (Editor), Frank Gardener Moore (Editor), Evan T. Sage, Ph.D. (Editor), Alfred C. Schlesinger, Ph.D. (Editor), 35.28

Search the Perseus Catalog for:

View: By Section

← Previous Next →

[1] Philopoemen, however, was a man of unusual astuteness and experience in leading troops and choosing positions, and not only in war-times but in peace as well he had trained his mind particularly in these arts.

[2] When he was travelling anywhere and had reached a pass difficult to get through, viewing the character of the ground from every angle, when he was travelling alone, he would consider with himself, when he had companions, he would ask them, if the enemy had shown himself at that point, what plan should be adopted if he attacked from the front, what if on this or that flank, what if from the rear;

[3] it was possible to meet him while drawn up in regular array, it was possible to do so in a less orderly formation suited only to the march.

[4] What ground he himself would occupy he would try to determine, by reflecting or by asking questions, or how many troops or what kind of weapons —for this was of the greatest importance —¹ he would use;

[5] where he would put the trains, where the baggage, where the unarmed mass, with how strong guards, and of what sort, he would protect them, and whether it would be better to continue by the way he had intended to go or to return the way he had come;

[6] what place too he would choose for his camp, how much space he would enclose in the fortifications, where there was a suitable water-supply and where were supplies of forage and wood; where, when he moved his camp the next day, would be his safest route, and what would be his order of march.

[7] With such concerns and thoughts he had from boyhood filled his mind, so that now no new subject of consideration faced him at such a crisis.²

[8] And at this time he first of all formed his column, then he sent the Cretan auxiliaries and the cavalry whom they call the Tarentini,³ each leading two horses with him, to the van, and ordering the cavalry to follow he seized a cliff above a stream whence they could get water;

[9] then he threw an armed guard around all the baggage and the assembled throng of camp followers and fortified the camp as the nature of the ground required; it was difficult to pitch tents on the rough and uneven ground. The enemy was about five hundred paces away.

[10] Both sides, using light-armed guards, drew water from the same stream, but before a regular battle had begun, which is the usual occurrence when camps are close together, the night fell. It was clear that on the next day they must fight at the stream in defence of the watering-parties.

[11] At night, in a valley out of sight of the enemy, he placed as large a force of caetrati as the⁴ place could conceal.

Ab urbe condita. Titus Livius (Livy). Benjamin Oliver Foster, Ph.D. (Editor), Frank Gardener Moore (Editor), Evan T. Sage, Ph.D. (Editor), Alfred C. Schlesinger, Ph.D. (Editor). Medford, MA. .

Sponsored by Perseus Project, Tufts University.

Funding provided by The National Endowment for the Humanities.

Current edition Perseus

History of Rome (English) (Foster, Benjamin Oliver; Moore, Frank Gardener; Sage, Evan T.; Schlesinger, Alfred C., translators. Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press; William Heinemann, Ltd., 1919-1959. (Loeb Classical Library))

Editions (3)

Ab urbe condita Perseus (Pars I-IV, Libri I-XL. Editio Stereotypica. Weissenborn, Wilhelm; Mueller, Moritz, editors. Leipzig: Teubner, 1884-1911.) — 35.28 focus

[1] erat autem Philopoemen praecipuae in ducendo agmine locisque capiendis solertiae atque usus, nec belli tantum temporibus, sed etiam in pace ad id maxime animum exercuerat.

[2] ubi iter quopiam faceret et ad difficilem transitu saltum venisset, contemplatus ab omni parte loci naturam, cum solus iret, secum ipse agitabat animo, cum comites haberet, ab his quaerebat,

[3] si hostis eo loco apparuisset, quid, si a fronte, quid, si ab latere hoc aut illo, quid, si ab tergo adoriretur, capiendum consilii foret; posse instructos recta acie, posse inconditum agmen et tantummodo aptum viae occurrere.

[4] quem locum ipse capturus esset, cogitando aut quaerendo exequebatur, aut quot armatis, aut quo genere armorum — plurimum enim interesse — usurus; quo impedimenta, quo sarcinas, quo turbam inermem reiceret;

[5] quanto ea aut quali praesidio custodiret, et utrum pergere, qua coepisset ire, via, an ear, eam, qua venisset, repetere melius esset;

[6] castris quoque quem locum caperet, quantum munimento amplecteretur loci, qua opportuna aquatio, qua pabuli lignorumque copia esset; qua postero die castra moventi tutum maxime iter, quae forma agminis esset.

[7] his curis cogitationibusque ita ab ineunte aetate animum agitaverat, ut nulla ei nova in tali re cogitatio esset.

[8] et tum omnium primum agmen constituit; dein Cretensis auxiliares et quos Tarentinos vocabant equites, binos secum trahentis equos, ad prima signa misit et iussit equitibus subsequi super torrentem,

[9] unde aquari possent, rupem occupavit; eo impedimenta omnia et calonum turbam collectam armatis circumdedit et pro natura loci castra communivit; tabernacula statuere in aspretis et inaequabili solo difficile erat.

[10] hostes quingentos passus aberant. ex eodem rivo utrique cum praesidio levis armaturae aquatic aquati sunt; et priusquam, qualia propinquis castris solent,

[11] contraheretur certamen, nox intervenit. postero die apparebat pugnandum pro aquatoribus circa rivum esse. nocte in valle a conspectu hostium aversa, quantam multitudinem locus occulere poterat, condidit caetratorum.

Ab urbe condita Perseus (Livy in Fourteen Volumes. Foster, Benjamin Oliver; Moore, Frank Gardener; Schlesinger, Alfred C., editors. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1919-1959 (printing).) — 30.28 focus

[1]

inter haec simul spes simul cura in dies crescebat, nec satis certum constare apud animos ¹ poterat utrum gaudio dignius ² esset Hannibalem post sextum decimum annum ex Italia decedentem vacuam possessionem eius reliquisse populo Romano, an magis metuendum quod incolumi exercitu in Africam transisset:

[2] locum nimirum, non periculum mutatum; cuius tantae dimicationis vatem, qui nuper decessisset, Q. Fabium haud frustra canere solitum graviorem in sua terra futurum hostem Hannibalem quam in aliena fuisset.

[3] nec Scipioni aut cum Syphace, inconditae barbariae rege, cui Statorius semilixa ducere ³ exercitus solitus sit, aut cum socero eius Hasdrubale, fugacissimo duce, rem futuram aut cum ⁴ tumultuariis exercitibus ex agrestium semermi turba subito conlectis,

[4] sed cum Hannibale, prope nato in ⁵ praetorio patris, fortissimi ducis, alito atque educato inter arma, puero quondam milite, vixdum iuvene imperatore,

[5] qui senex vincendo factus Hispanias, Gallias, Italiam ab Alpibus ad fretum monumentis ingentium rerum complesset. ducere⁶ exercitum aequalem stipendiis suis, duratum omnium rerum patientia quas vix fides fiat homines passes, perfusum miliens cruore Romano, exuvias non militum tantum, ⁷ sed etiam imperatorum portantem.

[6] multos occursuros Scipioni in acie qui praetores, qui imperatores, ⁸ qui consules Romanos sua manu ⁹ occidissent, muralibus vallaribusque insignes coronis, pervagatos capta castra, captas urbes Romanas.

[7] non esse hodie tot fasces magistratibus populi Romani, quot captos ex caede imperatorum prae se ferre posset Hannibal.

[8] has formidines agitando animis ipsi curas et metus augebant, etiam quod, cum adsuessent per aliquot annos bellum ante oculos aliis atque aliis in Italiae partibus lenta spe in nullum propinquum debellandi finem gerere, erexerant omnium animos Scipio et Hannibal, velut ad supremum certamen comparati duces.

[9] eis quoque quibus erat ingens in Scipione ¹⁰ fiducia et victoriae spes, quo magis in propinquam eam imminebant animis, eo curae intentiores erant. ¹¹

[10] haud dispar habitus animorum Carthaginiensibus erat, quos modo petisse pacem, intuentes Hannibalem ac rerum gestarum eius magnitudinem, paenitebat, modo,

[11] cum respicerent bis sese acie victos, Syphacem captum, pulsos se Hispania, pulsos Italia, atque ea omnia unius virtute et consilio Scipionis facta, velut fatalem eum ducem in exitium suum natum horrebant.

Ab urbe condita libri, erklärt von M. Weissenborn Perseus (Weissenborn, W.; Müller, H. J., editors. Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1873-1883.) — 35.28 focus

[1]

erat autem Philopoemen praecipuae in ducendo agmine locisque capiendis solertiae atque usus, nec belli tantum temporibus, sed etiam in pace se ad id maxime exercuerat.

[2] ubi iter quopiam faceret et ad difficilem transitu saltum venisset, contemplatus ab omni parte loci naturam, cum solus iret, secum ipse agitabat animo, cum comites haberet, ab his quaerebat,

[3] si hostis eo loco apparuisset, quid, si a fronte, quid, si ab latere hoc aut illo, quid, si ab tergo adoriretur, capiendum consilii foret; posse instructos derecta acie, posse inconditum agmen et tantummodo aptum viae occurrere.

[4] quem locum ipse capturus esset, cogitando aut quaerendo exequebatur, aut quot ¹ armatis, aut quo genere armorum — plurimum enim interesse — usurus; quo impedimenta, quo sarcinas, quo turbam inermem reiceret;

[5] quanto ea aut quali praesidio custodiret, et utrum pergere, qua coepisset ire, via, an eam, qua venisset, repetere melius esset;

[7] his curis cogitationibusque ita ab ineunte aetate animum agitaverat, ut nulla ei nova in tali re cogitatio esset.

[8] et tum omnium primum agmen constituit; dein Cretensis auxiliares et quos Tarentinos vocabant equites, binos secum trahentis equos, ad prima signa misit, et iussit equitibus subsequi super torrentem, unde aquari possent, rupem occupavit;

[9] eo impedimenta omnia et calonum turbam collectam armatis circumdedit et pro natura loci castra communivit;

[10] tabernacula statuere in aspretis et inaequabili solo difficile erat. hostes quingentos passus aberant. ex eodem rivo utrique cum praesidio levis armaturae aquati sunt; et priusquam, qualia propinquis ² castris solent, contraheretur certamen, nox intervenit.

[11] postero die apparebat pugnandum pro aquatoribus circa rivum esse. nocte in valle a conspectu hostium aversa, quantam multitudinem locus occulere poterat, condidit caetratorum.

Translations (2)

History of Rome Perseus (Spillan, D.; Edmonds, Cyrus; McDevitte, William A., translators. London: Henry G. Bohn, 1849-1868. (Bohn's Classical Library)) — 35.28 focus

[1]

Philopœmen was possessed of an admirable degree of skill and experience, in conducting a march, and choosing his station; having made these points his principal study, not only in times of war, but likewise during peace.

[2] Whenever he was making a journey to any place and came to a defile where the passage was difficult, it was his practice, first, to examine the nature of the ground on every side. When journeying alone, he meditated within himself; if he had company, he asked them,

If an enemy should appear in that place, what course ought he to adopt, if they should attack him in front;

[3]

what, if on this flank, or on that; what, if on the rear; for he might happen to meet them while his men were formed with a regular front, or when they were in the loose order of march, fit only for the road.

[4] He would proceed to examine, either in his own mind, or by asking questions,

What ground he himself would choose; what number of soldiers, or what kind of arms (which was a very material point) he ought to employ; where he should deposit the baggage, where the soldiers' necessaries, where the unarmed multitude;

[5]

with what number and what kind of troops he should guard them, and whether it would be better to prosecute his march as intended, or to return back by the way he came; what spot, also, he should choose for his camp; how large a space he should enclose within the lines;

[6]

where he could be conveniently supplied with water; where a sufficiency of forage and wood could be had; which would be his safest road on decamping next day, and in what form the army should march?

[7] In such studies and inquiries he had, from his early years, so frequently exercised his thoughts, that, on any thing of the kind occurring, no expedient that could be devised was new to him.

[8] On this occasion, he first ordered the army to halt; then sent forward to the van the auxiliary Cretans, and the horsemen called Tarentines, each leading two spare horses; and, ordering the rest of the cavalry to follow, he seized on a rock which stood over a rivulet, from which he might be supplied with water.

[9] Here he collected together all the baggage with all the suttlers and followers of the army, placing a guard of soldiers round them; and then he fortified his camp, as the nature of the place required. The pitching of tents in such rugged and uneven ground was a difficult task. The enemy were distant not more than five hundred paces.

[10] Both drew water from the same rivulet, under escorts of light troops; but, before any skirmish took place, as usual between men encamped so near to each other, night came on. It was evident, however, that they must, unavoidably, fight next day at the rivulet, in support of the watering parties.

[11] Wherefore, during the night, Philopœmen concealed, in a valley remote from the view of the enemy, as great a number of targeteers as the place was capable of hiding.

History of Rome Perseus (Volumes 1-2. Roberts, Canon, Rev, translator. London, New York: J. M. Dent and Sons; E. P. Dutton and Co., 1912.) — 35.28 focus

[1]

Philopoemen possessed exceptional skill in the conduct of a march and the selection of positions; he had made these the objects of special attention in peace as well as in war.

[2] It was his habit, when he was travelling and had come to a mountain pass difficult to traverse, to study the ground in all directions. If he was alone he would think the matter over, if he were accompanied he would ask those with him what they would do if an enemy showed himself there, what tactics they would employ according as the attack was made upon their front, or on either flank or on their rear;

[3] the enemy in battle order might possibly come upon them whilst they were deployed for action or possibly whilst they were in column of march, unprepared for attack.

[4] He used to think out for himself and question others as to some position which he intended to secure, what numbers and what weapons-for these differed considerably-he ought to employ; where he ought to deposit the baggage and the soldiers' kits; where the non-combatants ought to be placed; what ought to be the strength and nature of the baggage guard;

[5] and whether it would be better to go forward or for the army to retrace its steps.

[6] He used also to consider very carefully the sites he ought to select for his camp, the amount of ground to be enclosed, the supply of water, fodder and wood, the safest route to take on the morrow and the best formation in which to march. He had exercised his mind on these problems from earliest manhood to such an extent that there was no device for meeting them with which he was not familiar.

[7] On the present occasion he first of all halted the column, and then sent up to the front the Cretan auxiliaries and the so-called Tarentine horse, and the rest of the cavalry were ordered to follow them.

[8] He then took possession of a rock which overhung a mountain torrent, so that he might have a water supply. Here he collected the camp-followers and the whole of the baggage and surrounded them with a guard.

[9] His entrenchments were such as the nature of the position allowed, and the setting up of the tents on such rough and uneven ground presented considerable difficulty.

[10] The enemy were half a mile distant, both sides watered at the same stream under the protection of the light infantry, and as usually happens when the camps are near one another, night intervened before the forces engaged. It was quite certain, however, that there would be a battle between the detachments who were guarding

[11] the water-carriers, and in view of this Philopoemen during the night posted in a valley out of the enemy's view as large a force of his caetrati as the ground would conceal.

Notes on the current edition

Ab Urbe Condita With An English Translation, books 1-10, 21-45, with periochae 11-20

1. B.C. 192

2. It would be interesting to know where Livy found this account of Philopoemen's self-administered course in minor tactics. Plutarch ( Philop. iv-v) tells practically the same story, and adds that Evangelus and the histories of Alexander's campaigns were his favourite reading, but that he preferred terrain exercises to map problems (to use the current technical terminology) and literary descriptions of battles.

3. Whatever the origin of the name, these troops did not come from Tarentum in Italy.

4. B.C. 192

Titus Livius (Livy) Ab urbe condita 35.28

Benjamin Oliver Foster, Ph.D. (Editor), Frank Gardener Moore (Editor), Evan T. Sage, Ph.D. (Editor), Alfred C. Schlesinger, Ph.D. (Editor)

Search the Perseus Catalog for:

Current edition Perseus

Notes on the current edition

Stable identifiers