Titus Livius (Livy), Ab urbe condita, Benjamin Oliver Foster, Ph.D. (Editor), Frank Gardener Moore (Editor), Evan T. Sage, Ph.D. (Editor), Alfred C. Schlesinger, Ph.D. (Editor), 32.21

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[1] So the praetor Aristaenus spoke again: "You lack counsel, leaders of the Achaeans, no less than the power of speech; but each one refuses to promote the public interest at the cost of peril to himself.

[2] Perhaps I too should keep silence if I were a private citizen; now I see that, so far as the praetor is concerned, either the ambassadors should not have been granted an audience or they should not be sent away unanswered; but how can I answer except in accordance with your decree?

[3] And since no one of you who have been summoned to this council wishes or dares to say anything in the way of suggestion, let us consider the ambassadors' speeches delivered yesterday as opinions expressed in debate, just as if they had not intended what was to their own interest but recommended what they deemed profitable for us.

[4] The Romans, the Rhodians and Attalus ask for our alliance and friendship, and in the war which they are waging with Philip they think it proper that we should assist them.

[5] Philip reminds us of our alliance with him and of our oath, and now demands that we take our stand with him, now says that he is satisfied if we refrain from taking up arms.

[6] Does it occur to no one why those who are not yet our allies demand more than our ally? This is not, ye Achaeans, the result of Philip's moderation or the Romans' arrogance;¹ fortune both gives and takes away confidence in making demands.

[7] We see no sign of Philip except his ambassador; the Roman fleet lies at Cenchreae, displaying the spoils of the cities of Euboea, we see the consul and his legions marching through Phocis and Locris, separated from us by a narrow stretch of water;

[8] do you wonder why Cleomedon, Philip's delegate, suggested with such hesitation a while ago that we take up arms in the king's cause against the Romans? If, in accordance with that treaty and oath,

[9] respect for which he tried to instil into us, we ask him that Philip protect us both against Nabis and his Lacedaemonians and against the Romans, he will not only find no garrison wherewith to protect us: he will not even find an answer to give us, any more, by Hercules, than Philip did last year;

[10] when, by promising that he would conduct the war against Nabis, he had tried to allure our fighting men away to Euboea, after he saw that we would neither vote him that protection nor consent to be involved in the Roman war, forgetful of that alliance about which he now uses such fine words, he left us to Nabis and the Lacedaemonians to plunder and rob.

[11] And to me, at least, Cleomedon's speech seemed by no means consistent with itself.

[12] He belittled the Roman war, and claimed that the result would be the same as that of the earlier war which they engaged in with Philip.

[13] Why then does Philip, remaining away, ask our aid, rather than, being present in person, defend us, his ancient allies, against both Nabis and the Romans? Defend us, do I say? Why did he permit Eretria and Carystus to be captured in that way? Why so many towns of Thessaly? Why Locris and Phocis? Why² does he now allow Elatia to be besieged? Why did he leave the passes of Epirus and his impregnable position above the Aous river, abandon the defile which he held and retire far into his own kingdom?

[14] It was either under compulsion, or from fear, or by design. If he voluntarily left so many allies to be sacked by the enemy, how can he object if his allies take measures for their own security? If he was afraid, let him excuse also our fear.

[15] If he retired because he was beaten in battle, shall we Achaeans, Cleomedon, sustain the Roman attack which you Macedonians did not resist? Or should we take your word for it that the Romans are not employing in the war greater forces and military power than they did before, or should we rather look at the obvious facts?

[16] Then they aided the Aetolians with their fleet; they waged war with neither consular commander nor consular army;³ at that time the maritime cities of Philip's allies were in fear and terror;

[17] the inland districts were so safe from Roman arms that Philip pillaged the Aetolians even while they asked in vain for Roman aid; but now the Romans have finished the Punic War, which they endured for sixteen years in, as it were, the very heart of Italy, and they have not

[18] sent assistance to the Aetolians, who were carrying on the war, but they themselves, as leaders in the war, have attacked Macedonia by land and sea at once. Now the third consul is here, prosecuting the war with boundless energy.

[19] Sulpicius, meeting the king in Macedonia itself, defeated him and put him to flight, and plundered the richest part of his kingdom; now Quinctius has dislodged him from his camp, though he held the passes of Epirus, relying on the⁴ nature of the country, on his fortifications and on his army, pursued him as he

[20] fled to Thessaly, and captured the royal garrisons and allied towns almost under the king's very eyes.

[21] "Grant that what the Athenians said about the king's cruelty, greed and passion was not true; grant that we are not interested in the crimes against supernal and infernal gods which he committed in the land of Attica, and much less interested in the sufferings of the Ciani and Abydeni, who are far away from us; let us forget, if you will, our own wounds;

[22] let us dismiss from memory the murders and robberies committed at Messene, in the centre of the Peloponnesus, the murder of Chariteles,⁵ his host at Cyparissia, in the course of a feast, in violation of all human and divine justice;

[23] the murder of the two Sicyonians, Aratus the father and the son,⁶ though he had been accustomed to call the unhappy old man even by the name of father; the removal of the son's wife to Macedonia to serve his lust; let the other debaucheries of maids and wives be consigned to oblivion;

[24] assume that our business is not with Philip, from fear of whose cruelty you have all kept silent (for what other explanation is there of your silence when called to deliberate?);

[25] let us consider that our relations are with Antigonus,⁷ that most just and merciful king who served so well the cause of all of us: would he demand that we do what is imposible?

[26] The Peloponnesus is a peninsula, joined to the mainland by the narrow strip of the Isthmus,⁸ exposed and open to attack by sea beyond all else. If one hundred decked⁹ vessels and fifty smaller undecked ships and thirty light Issaean boats begin to plunder our coast and lay siege to the cities lying almost on the shore, we shall of course retire to the inland strongholds, as if we were not consumed with internal war, raging in our very hearts!

[27] When Nabis and the Spartans press on us by land and the Roman fleet by sea, on what ground should I invoke the king's alliance and Macedonian guards? Or shall we with our ownarms defend against the Romans the towns they will besiege?

[28] Nobly did we defend Dymae in the former war! The misfortunes of others furnish us examples in abundance; let us not seek how we may be an, example to others.

Do not, because the Romans come of their own accord to seek our friendship, disdain what you ought to have hoped for and particularly desired.

[29]

Impelled by fear, no doubt, and entrapped in a strange land, because they wish to find shelter under the shadow of your protection, they flee

[30]

to your alliance, that they may hide in your harbours, and secure supplies!

[31]

The sea is in their power; they immediately assume control of whatever lands they visit. What they ask, they can compel; because they wish you spared, they do not permit you to do aught for which you should be destroyed.

[32]

For as to what Cleomedon pointed out to you a while ago, a middle course, as it were, and the safest way to decide, to wit, that you remain neutral and avoid war, that is not a middle course: it is no course at all.

[33]

For, in addition to the fact that you must either accept or reject the Roman alliance, what other course is open except for us, since we have no sure claim to consideration anywhere, to play the part of men who¹⁰ have been merely awaiting the event, with the intention of adapting our counsels to the decision of fortune, and eventually become the prey of the conqueror?

[34]

If what we should all be praying for is voluntarily offered, do not despise the gift.

[35]

It will not always be open to us, as it is to-day, to make a choice; the same opportunity rarely returns, and it tarries but a little while. For a long time you have wished, but not dared, to free yourselves from Philip. Now men have crossed the sea with mighty fleets and armies, to affirm your claims to liberty without trouble or danger on your part.

[36]

If you reject them as allies, you are scarcely sane; but as either allies or enemies you must have them.

Ab urbe condita. Titus Livius (Livy). Benjamin Oliver Foster, Ph.D. (Editor), Frank Gardener Moore (Editor), Evan T. Sage, Ph.D. (Editor), Alfred C. Schlesinger, Ph.D. (Editor). Medford, MA. .

Sponsored by Perseus Project, Tufts University.

Funding provided by The National Endowment for the Humanities.

Current edition Perseus

History of Rome (English) (Foster, Benjamin Oliver; Moore, Frank Gardener; Sage, Evan T.; Schlesinger, Alfred C., translators. Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press; William Heinemann, Ltd., 1919-1959. (Loeb Classical Library))

Editions (3)

Ab urbe condita Perseus (Pars I-IV, Libri I-XL. Editio Stereotypica. Weissenborn, Wilhelm; Mueller, Moritz, editors. Leipzig: Teubner, 1884-1911.) — 32.21 focus

[1] tum Aristaenus praetor rursus: “non magis consilium vobis, principes Achaeorum, deest quam lingua; sed suo quisque periculo in commune consultum non vult. forsitan ego quoque tacerem, si privatus essem; nunc praetori video aut non dandum concilium legatis fuisse,

[2] aut non sine responso eos dimittendos esse; respondere autem nisi ex vestro decreto qui possum? et quoniam nemo vestrum, qui in hoc concilium advocati estis, pro sententia quicquam dicere vult aut audet, orationes legatorum hesterno die uit ut pro sententiis dictas percenseamus perinde ac non postulaverint,

[3] quae e re sua essent, sed suaserint, quae nobis censerent utilia esse.

[4] Romani Rhodiique et Attalus societatem amicitiamque nostram petunt et in bello, quod adversus Philippum gerunt, se a nobis adiuvari aequum censent.

[5] Philippus societatis secum admonet et iuris iurandi et modo postulat, ut secum stemus, modo, ne intersiinus intersimus armis, contentum ait se esse.

[6] nulline venit in mentem, cur, qui nondum socii sunt, plus petant quam socius? non fit hoc neque modestia Philippi neque impudentia Romanorum, Achaei:

[7] fortuna et dat fiduciam postulantibus et demit. Philippi praeter legatum videmus nihil; Romana classis ad Cenchreas stat urbium Euboeae spolia prae se ferens, consulem legionesque eius, exiguo maris spatio diiunctas, Phocidem ac Locridem pervagantis videmus:

[8] miramini, cur diffidenter Cleomedon, legatus Philippi, ut pro rege arma caperemus adversus Romanos, modo egerit?

[9] qui, si ex eodem foedere ac iure iurando, cuius nobis religionem iniciebat, rogemus eum, ut nos Philippus et ab Nabide ac Lacedaemoniis et ab Romanis defendat, non modo praesidium, quo tueatur nos,

[10] sed ne quid respondeat quidem nobis sit inventurus, non hercule magis quam ipse Philippus priore anno, qui pollicendo se adversus Nabidem bellum gesturum cum temptasset nostram iuventutem hinc in Euboeam extrahere,

[11] postquam nos neque decernere id sibi praesidium neque velle illigari Romano bello vidit, oblitus societatis eius, quam nunc iactat, vastandos populandosque Nabidi ac Lacedaemoniis reliquit.

[12] ac mihi quidem minime conveniens inter se oratio Cleomedontis visa est. elevabat Romanum bellum eventumque eius eundem fore, qui prioris belli,

[13] quod cum Philippo gesserint, dicebat. cur igitur nostrum ille auxilium absens petit potius quam praesens nos, socios veteres, simul ab Nabide ac Romanis tueatur? nos dico? quid ita passus est Eretriam Carystumque capi? quid ita tot Thessaliae urbes? quid ita Locridem Phocidemque?

[14] quid ita nunc Elatiam oppugnari patitur? cur excessit faucibus Epiri claustrisque illis inexpugnabilibus super Aoum amnem relictoque, quem insidebat, saltu penitus in regnum abiit? aut vi aut metu aut voluntate.

[15] si sua voluntate tot sociob socios reliquit hostibus diripiendos, qui recusare potest, quin et socii sibi consulant? si metu, nobis quoque ignoscat timentibus; si victus armis cessit, Achaei Romana arma sustinebimus, Cleomedon, quae vos Macedones non sustinuistis?

[16] an tibi potius credamus Romanos non maioribus copiis nec viribus nunc bellum gerere, quam antea gesserint, potius quam res ipsas intueamur?

[17] Aetolos tum classe adiuverunt; nec duce consulari nec exercitu bellum gesserunt; sociorum Philippi maritimae tur tum urbes in terrore ac tumultu erant; mediterranea adeo tuta ab armis Romanis fuerunt, ut Philippus Aietoios Aetolos neqUilquam nequiquam opem — aomanorum Romanorum impioranris implorantis aepopularetur; depopularetur;

[18] nunc autem defuncti bello Punico Romani, quod per sedecim annos velut intra viscera Italiae toleraverunt, non praesidium Aetolis bellantibus miserunt, sed ipsi duces belli arma terra marique simul Macedoniae intulerunt.

[19] tertius iam consul summa vi gerit bellum. Sulpicius in ipsa Macedonia congressus fudit fugavitque regem, partem opulentissimam regni eius depopulatus;

[20] nunc Quinctius tenentem claustra Epiri natura loci, munimentis, exercitu fretum castris exuit, fugientem in Thessaliam persecutus praesidia regia sociasque urbes eius prope in conspectu regis ipsius expugnavit.

[21] ne sint vera, quae Atheniensis modo legatus de crudelitate, avaritia, libidine regis disseruit; nihil ad nos pertineant, quae in terra Attica scelera in superos inferosque deos sunt admissa,

[22] multo minus, quae Ciani Abydenique, qui procul ab nobis absunt, passi sunt;

[23] nostrorum ipsi vulnerum, si vultis, obliviscamur, caedes direptionesque bonorum Messenae in media Peloponneso factas, et hospitem Cyparissiae Charitelen contra ius omne ac fas inter epulas prope ipsas occisum, et Aratum patrem filiumque Sicyonios, cum senem infelicem parentem etiam appellare solitus esset, interfectos,

[24] filii etiam uxorem libidinis causa in Macedoniam asportatam, cetera stupra virginum matronarumrque matronarumque oblivioni dentur;

[25] ne sit cum Philippo res, cuius crudelitatis metu obmutuistis omnes — nam quae alia tacendi advocatis in concilium causa est? — ; cu, cum Antigono, mitissimo ac iustissimo rege et de nobis omnibus optime merito, existimemus disceptationem esse:

[26] num † id postularet facere nos, quod fieri non posset? paene insula est Peloponnesus, angustis Isthmi faucibus continenti adhaerens, nulli ,pertior apertior neque opportunior quam navali bello.

[27] si centum tectae naves et quinquaginta leviores apertae et triginta Issaei lembi maritimam oram vastare et expositas prope in ipsis litoribus urbes coeperint oppugnare, in mediterraneas scilicet nos urbes recipiemus, tamquam non intestino et haerente in ipsis visceribus uramur bello!

[28] cum terra Nabis et Lacedaenonii, Lacedaemonii, mari classis Romana urgebunt, † unde regiam societatem et Macedonum praesidia inploremus? an ipsi nostris armis ab hoste Romano tutabimur urbes, quae oppugnabuntur? egregie enim Dymas priore bello sumus tutati!

[29] satis exemplorum nobis clades alienae praebent; ne quaeramus, quern quem ad mnodum modum ceteris exemplo simus.

[30] nolite, quia ultro Romani petunt amicitiam, id quod optandum vobis ac summopere petendum erat,

[31] fastidire. metu enim videlicet compulsi et deprensi in aliena terra, quia sub umbra vestri auxilii latere volunt, in societatem vestram confugiunt, ut portibus vestris recipiantur, ut commeatibus utantur!

[32] mare in potestate habent; terras, quascunque adeunt, extemplo dicionis suae faciunt. quod rogant, cogere possunt;

[33] quia pepercisse vobis volunt, committere vos, cur pereatis, non patiuntur. nam quod Cleomedon modo tamquam mediam et tutissimam vobis viam consilii, ut quiesceretis abstineretisque armis, ostendebat, ea non media, sed nulla via est.

[34] etenim praeterquam quod aut accipienda aut spernenda vobis Romana societas est, quid aliud quam nusquam gratia stabili, velut qui eventum expectaverimus, ut fortunae applicaremus nostra consilia, praeda victoris erimus?

[35] nolite, si, quod omnibus votis petendum erat, ultro offertur, fastidire. non, quem ad modum hodie utrumque vobis licet, sic semper liciturum est; nec saepe nec diu eadem occasio erit.

[36] liberare vos a Philippo iam diu magis vultis quam audetis. sine vestro labore et periculo qui vos in libertatem vindicarent, cum magnis classibus exercitibusque mare traiecerunt.

[37] hos si socios aspernamini, vix mentis sanae estis; sed aut socios aut hostes habeatis oportet.”

Ab urbe condita Perseus (Livy in Fourteen Volumes. Foster, Benjamin Oliver; Moore, Frank Gardener; Schlesinger, Alfred C., editors. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1919-1959 (printing).) — 30.21 focus

[1]

Romam per eosdem dies et Magonem et Hannibalem profectos adlatum est. cuius duplicis gratulationis minuit laetitiam et quod parum duces in retinendis iis, cum id mandatum ab senatu esset, aut animi aut virium habuisse videbantur,

[2] et quod solliciti erant, omni belli mole in unum exercitum ducemque inclinata quo evasura esset res.

[3] per eosdem dies legati Saguntini venerunt conprensos cum pecunia adducentes Carthaginienses qui ad conducenda auxilia in Hispaniam traiecissent.

[4] ducenta et quinquaginta auri, octingenta pondo argenti in vestibulo curiae posuerunt.

[5] hominibus acceptis et in carcerem conditis, auro argentoque reddito gratiae legatis actae, atque insuper munera data ac naves quibus in Hispaniam reverterentur.

[6] mentio deinde ab senioribus ¹ facta est segnius homines bona quam mala sentire; transitu in Italiam Hannibalis quantum terroris pavorisque esset ²³ meminisse. quas deinde clades, quos luctus incidisse! visa castra hostium e muris urbis;

[7] quae vota singulorum universorumque fuisse! quotiens in conciliis voces manus ad caelum porrigentium ⁴ auditas,

[8] en umquam ille dies futurus esset quo vacuam hostibus Italiam bona pace florentem visuri essent!

[9] dedisse tandem id deos ⁵ sexto decimo demum anno, nec esse qui deis grates agendas censeat; adeo ne advenientem quidem gratiam homines benigne accipere, nedum ut praeteritae 10 satis memores sint. conclamatum deinde ex omni parte curiae est uti referret P. Aelius praetor; decretumque ut quinque dies circa omnia pulvinaria supplicaretur, victumaeque maiores immolarentur centum viginti.

[10] iam dimisso Laelio legatisque Masinissae cum Carthaginiensium legatos de pace ad senatum venientes Puteolis visos, inde terra venturos adlatum esset, revocari C. Laelium placuit, ut coram eo de pace ageretur.

[11] Q. Fulvius Gillo, legatus Scipionis, Carthaginienses Romam adduxit. quibus vetitis ingredi urbem hospitium in Villa Publica, senatus ad aedem Bellonae datus est.

Ab urbe condita libri, erklärt von M. Weissenborn Perseus (Weissenborn, W.; Müller, H. J., editors. Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1873-1883.) — 32.21 focus

[1]

tum Aristaenus praetor rursus: 'non magis consilium vobis, principes Achaeorum, deest ¹ quam lingua; sed suo quisque periculo in commune consultum non vult. forsitan ego quoque tacerem, si privatus essem; nunc praetori video aut non dandum concilium legatis fuisse, aut non sine responso eos dimittendos esse;

[2] respondere autem nisi ex vestro decreto qui possum? et quoniam nemo vestrum, qui in hoc concilium advocati estis, pro sententia quicquam dicere vult aut audet, orationes legatorum hesterno die ut pro sententiis dictas percenseamus,

[3] perinde ac non postulaverint, quae e re sua essent, sed suaserint, quae nobis censerent utilia esse.

[4] Romani Rhodiique et Attalus societatem amicitiamque nostram petunt et in bello, quod adversus Philippum gerunt, se a nobis adiuvari aequum censent.

[5] Philippus societatis secum admonet et iuris iurandi et modo postulat, ut secum stemus, modo, ne intersimus armis, contentum ait se esse.

[6] nulline venit in mentem, cur, qui ² nondum socii sunt, plus petant quam socius? non fit hoc neque modestia Philippi neque impudentia Romanorum, Achaei:

[8] miramini, cur diffidenter Cleomedon, legatus Philippi, ut pro rege arma caperemus adversus Romanos, modo egerit?

[10] non hercule magis quam ipse Philippus priore anno, qui pollicendo se adversus Nabidem bellum gesturum cum temptasset nostram iuventutem hinc in Euboeam extrahere,

[11] postquam nos neque decernere id sibi praesidium neque velle illigari Romano bello vidit, oblitus societatis eius, quam nunc iactat, vastandos populandosque Nabidi ac Lacedaemoniis reliquit.

[12] ac mihi quidem minime conveniens inter se oratio Cleomedontis visa est. elevabat Romanum bellum eventumque eius eundem fore, qui prioris belli, quod cum ³ Philippo gesserint, dicebat.

[13] cur igitur nostrum ille auxilium absens petit potius quam praesens nos, socios veteres, simul ab Nabide ac Romanis tueatur? nos dico? quid ita passus est Eretriam Carystumque capi? quid ita tot Thessaliae urbes? quid ita Locridem Phocidemque?

[14] quid ita nunc Elatiam oppugnari patitur? cur excessit faucibus Epiri claustrisque illis inexpugnabilibus super Aoum amnem relictoque, quem insidebat, saltu penitus in regnum abiit?

[15] aut vi aut metu aut voluntate. si sua voluntate tot socios reliquit hostibus diripiendos, qui recusare potest, quin et socii sibi consulant? si metu, nobis quoque ignoscat timentibus; si victus armis cessit, Achaei Romana arma sustinebimus, Cleomedon, quae vos Macedones non sustinuistis?

[16] an tibi [potius] credamus Romanos non maioribus copiis nec viribus nunc bellum gerere, quam antea gesserint, potius quam res ipsas intueamur?

[17] Aetolos tum classe adiuverunt; nec duce consulari nec exercitu bellum gesserunt; sociorum Philippi maritimae tum urbes in terrore ac tumultu erant; mediterranea adeo tuta ab armis Romanis fuerunt, ut Philippus Aetolos nequiquam opem Romanorum implorantis depopularetur;

[18] nunc autem defuncti bello Punico Romani, quod per sedecim annos velut intra viscera Italiae ⁴ toleraverunt, non praesidium Aetolis bellantibus miserunt, sed ipsi duces belli arma terra marique simul Macedoniae intulerunt.

[19] tertius iam consul summa vi gerit bellum. Sulpicius in ipsa Macedonia congressus fudit fugavitque regem, partem opulentissimam regni eius depopulatus;

[21] ne sint vera, quae Atheniensis modo legatus de crudelitate, avaritia, libidine regis disseruit; nihil ad nos pertineant, quae in terra Attica scelera in superos inferosque deos sunt admissa,

[22] multo minus, quae Ciani Abydenique, qui procul ab nobis absunt, passi sunt; nostrorum ipsi vulnerum, si vultis, obliviscamur, caedes direptionesque bonorum Messenae in media Peloponneso factas,

[23] et hospitem Cyparissiae Charitelen contra ius omne ac fas inter epulas prope ipsas occisum, et Aratum patrem filiumque Sicyonios, cum senem infelicem parentem etiam appellare ⁵ solitus esset,

[24] interfectos, filii etiam uxorem libidinis causa in Macedoniam asportatam, cetera stupra virginum matronarumque oblivioni dentur;

[25] ne sit cum Philippo res, cuius crudelitatis metu obmutuistis omnes — nam quae alia tacendi advocatis in concilium causa est? —; cum Antigono, mitissimo ac iustissimo rege et de nobis omnibus optime merito, existimemus disceptationem esse:

[26] num id postularet facere nos, quod fieri non posset? paene insula est Peloponnesus, angustis Isthmi faucibus continenti adhaerens, nulli apertior neque opportunior quam navali bello.

[28] mari classis Romana urgebunt, unde regiam societatem et Macedonum praesidia inplorem? an ipsi nostris armis ab hoste Romano tutabimur urbes, quae oppugnabuntur? egregie enim Dymas

[29] priore bello sumus tutati! satis exemplorum nobis clades ⁶ alienae praebent; ne quaeramus, quem ad modum ceteris exemplo simus.

[30] nolite, quia ultro Romani petunt amicitiam, id quod optandi vobis ac summopere petendum erat, fastidire.

[31] metu enim videlicet compulsi et deprensi in aliena terra, quia sub umbra vestri auxilii latere volunt, in societatem vestram confugiunt, ut portibus vestris recipiantur, ut commeatibus utantur! mare in potestate habent;

[32] terras, quascunque adeunt, extemplo dicionis suae faciunt. quod rogant, cogere possunt; quia pepercisse vobis volunt, committere vos, cur pereatis, non patiuntur.

[33] nam quod Cleomedon modo tamquam mediam et tutissimam vobis viam consilii, ut quiesceretis abstineretisque armis, ostendebat, ea non media, sed nulla via est.

[35] non, quem ad modum hodie utrumque vobis licet, sic semper liciturum est;

[36] nec saepe nec diu eadem occasio erit. liberare vos a Philippo iam diu magis vultis quam audetis. sine vestro labore et periculo qui vos in libertatem vindicarent, cum magnis classibus exercitibusque mare traiecerunt.

[37] hos si socios aspernamini, vix mentis sanae estis; sed aut socios aut hostes habeatis oportet.'

Translations (2)

History of Rome Perseus (Spillan, D.; Edmonds, Cyrus; McDevitte, William A., translators. London: Henry G. Bohn, 1849-1868. (Bohn's Classical Library)) — 32.21 focus

[1]

Then the praetor, Aristaenus, again spoke as follows: —

Chiefs of Achaea, you are not more at a loss for advice, than you are for words; but every one is unwilling to promote the interest of the public at a risk of danger to himself.

[2]

Were I in a private character, perhaps I too should be silent; but, as praetor, it is my duty to declare, that I see evidently, either that an audience of the council ought not to have been accorded to the ambassadors, or that they ought not to be dismissed from it without an answer. Yet how can I give them an answer, unless by a decree of yours?

[3]

And, since not one of you who have been called to this assembly either chooses or dares to make known his sentiments, let us examine (as if they were opinions proposed to our consideration) the speeches of the ambassadors delivered yesterday;

[4]

supposing the speakers not to have required what was useful to themselves, but to have recommended what they thought most conducive to our advantage.

[5]

The Romans, the Rho- dians, and Attalus, request an alliance and friendship with us; and they demand to be assisted by us in the war in which they are now engaged against Philip. Philip reminds us of our league with him, and of the obligation of our oath; he requires only, that we declare ourselves on his side; and says, he will be satisfied if we do not intermeddle in the operations of the war.

[6]

Does not the reason occur to the mind of any one of you, why those, who are not yet our allies, require more than he who is?

[7]

This arises not from modesty in Philip, nor from the want of it in the Romans. It is fortune, which, while it bestows confidence to requisitions on one side, precludes it on the other. We see nothing belonging to Philip but his ambassador: the Roman fleet lies at Cenchreae, exhibiting to our view the spoils of the cities of Eubœa.

[8]

We behold the consul and his legions, at the distance of a small tract of sea, overrunning Phocis and Locris.

[9]

You were surprised at Philip's ambassador, Cleomedon, showing such diffidence yesterday in his application to us to take arms on the side of the king against the Romans. But if we, in pursuance of the same treaty and oath, the sacredness of which he inculcated on us, were to ask of him, that Philip should protect us, both from Nabis and his Lacedaemonians, and also from the Romans, he would be utterly unable to find, not only a force with which to protect us, but even an answer to return.

[10]

As much so in truth as was Philip himself, who endeavoured, by promises of waging war against Nabis, to draw away our youth into Eubœa;

[11]

but finding that we would neither decree such assistance to him, nor choose to be embroiled in a war with Rome, forgot that alliance on which he now lays such stress, and left us to Nabis and the Lacedaemonians to be spoiled and plundered. Besides, to me the arguments of Cleomedon appeared utterly inconsistent.

[12]

He made light of the war with the Romans; and asserted, that the issue of it would be similar to that of the former, which they waged against Philip.

[13]

If such be the case, why does he, at a distance, solicit our assistance; rather than come hither in person, and defend us, his old allies, both from Nabis and from the Romans? Us, do I say? Why, on this showing, has he suffered Eretria and Carystus to be taken? Why so many cities of Thessaly? Why Locris and Phocis? Why does he at pre- sent suffer Elatia to be besieged?

[14]

Did he, either through compulsion, or fear, or choice, quit the straits of Epirus, and those impregnable fastnesses on the river Aous; and why, abandoning the pass which he was occupying, did he retire altogether into his own kingdom? If of his own will he gave up so many allies to the ravages of the enemy, what objection can he make to these allies consulting for their own safety?

[15]

If through fear, he ought to pardon the like fear in us. If he retired defeated by force of arms, let me ask you, Cleomedon, shall we, Achaeans, be able to withstand the Roman arms, which you, Macedonians, have not withstood? Are we to give credit to your assertion, that the Romans do not employ, in the present war, greater forces or greater strength than they did in the former, rather than regard the facts themselves?

[16]

In the first instance, they aided the Aetolians with a fleet; they sent not to the war either a consul as commander, or a consular army.

[17]

The maritime cities of Philip's allies were in terror and confusion; but the inland places were so secure against the Roman arms, that Philip ravaged the country of the Aetolians, while they in vain implored succour from those arms.

[18]

Whereas, in the present case, the Romans, after bringing to a final conclusion the Punic war, which they had supported for sixteen years in the bowels, as it were, of Italy, sent not auxiliaries to the Aetolians in their quarrels, but, being themselves principals, made a hostile invasion on Macedonia with land and sea forces at once. Their third consul is now pushing forward the war with the utmost vigour.

[19]

Sulpicius, engaging the king within the territory of Macedonia itself, has overthrown and put him to flight; and afterwards despoiled the most opulent part of his kingdom.

[20]

Then, again, when he was in possession of the strait of Epirus, where, from the nature of the ground, his fortifications, and the strength of his army, he thought himself secure, Quinctius drove him out of his camp; pursued him, as he fled into Thessaly; and, almost in the view of Philip himself, stormed the royal garrisons and the cities of his allies.

[21]

Supposing that there were no truth in what the Athenian ambassadors mentioned yesterday, respecting the cruelty, avarice, and lust of the king; supposing the crimes committed, in the country of Attica, against the gods, celestial and infernal, concerned us not all;

[22]

that we had less to complain of than what the people of Cius and Abydos, who are far distant from us, have endured: let us then, if you please, forget even our own wounds;

[23]

let the murders and ravages committed at Messena, and in the heart of Peloponnesus, the killing of his host Garitenes, at Cyparissia, almost in the very midst of a feast, in contempt of laws divine and human; the murder of the two Aratuses of Sicyon, father and son, though he was wont to call the unfortunate old man his parent; his carrying away the son's wife into Macedonia for the gratification of his vicious appetites, and all his violations of virgins and matrons;

[24]

—let all these, I say, be consigned to oblivion.

[25]

Let us suppose our business were not with Philip, through dread of whose cruelty you are all thus struck dumb; for what other cause could keep you silent, when you have been summoned to a council? Let us imagine that we are treating with Antigonus, a prince of the greatest mildness and equity, to whose kindness we have all been highly indebted; would he require us to perform what at the time was impossible?

[26]

Peloponnesus is a peninsula, united to the continent by the narrow passage of an isthmus particularly exposed and open to the attacks of naval armaments. Now, if a hundred decked ships, and fifty lighter open ones, and thirty Issean barks, shall begin to lay waste our coasts, and attack the cities which stand exposed, almost on the very shore; shall we then retreat into the inland towns, as if we were not afflicted with an intestine war, though in truth it is rankling in our very bowels?

[27]

When Nabis and the Lacedaemonians by land, and the Roman fleet by sea, shall press us, whence must I implore the support due from the king's alliance, whence the succours of the Macedonians?

[28]

Shall we ourselves, with our own arms, defend, against the Roman forces, the cities that will be attacked? Truly, in the former war, we defended Dymae excellently well! The calamities of others afford us abundant examples; let us not seek how we may render ourselves an example to others.

[29]

Do not, because the Romans voluntarily desire your friendship, contemn that which you ought to have prayed for, nay, laboured with all your might to obtain.

[30]

But, it is insinuated, that they are impelled by fear, in a country to which they are strangers; and that, wishing to shelter themselves under your assistance, they have recourse to your alliance in the hope of being admitted into your harbours, and of there finding supplies of provisions.

[31]

Now, at sea they are absolute masters; and instantly reduce to subjection every place at which they land. What they request, they have power to enforce.

[32]

Because they wish to treat you with tenderness, they do not allow you to take steps that must lead you to ruin. Cleomedon lately pointed out, as the middle and safest way, to remain inactive, and abstain from taking up arms.

[33]

But that is not a middle way; it is no way at all. For, besides the necessity of either embracing or rejecting the Roman alliance, what other consequence can ensue from such conduct, than that, while we show no steady attachment to either side, as if we waited the event with design to adapt our counsels to fortune, we shall become the prey of the conqueror?

[34]

Contemn not then, when it is spontaneously offered to your acceptance, what you ought to have solicited with your warmest prayers. The free option between the two, which you have this day, you will not always have.

[35]

The same opportunity will not last long, nor will it frequently recur. You have long wished to deliver yourselves out of the hands of Philip, although you have not dared to make the attempt. Those have now crossed the sea, with large fleets and armies, who are able to rescue you to a state of freedom, without any trouble or danger to yourselves.

[36]

If you reject such persons as allies, you can scarcely be of sane mind; but you must unavoidably have to deal with them, either as allies or as enemies.

History of Rome Perseus (Volumes 1-2. Roberts, Canon, Rev, translator. London, New York: J. M. Dent and Sons; E. P. Dutton and Co., 1912.) — 32.21 focus

[1]

Then Aristaenus resumed: "Leaders of the Achaeans, you are not lacking in counsel any more than you are in the power of speech, but each of you is unwilling to endanger his own safety in consulting for the safety of all.

[2] Possibly I, too, should keep silence, were I only a private citizen, but as it is, I see that either the president ought not to have introduced the envoys into the council, or after he had introduced them they ought not to be dismissed without some reply being made to them. But how can I give them any reply except in accordance with the decree which you make?

[3] And since none of you who have been summoned to this council is willing or has the courage to express his opinion, let us examine the speeches which the envoys delivered yesterday as though they were made by members of this council, let us regard them

[4] not as making selfish demands in their own interest, but as recommending a policy which they believe to be advantageous to us.

[5] The Romans, the Rhodians and Attalus all ask for our alliance and friendship and consider that it is only just and right that we should give them assistance in the war they are waging against Philip.

[6] Philip, on the other hand, reminds us of the fact that we are his allies and have pledged our oath to him. At one time he demands our active support, at another he assures us that he is content for us to remain neutral. Has it not occurred to any one why those who are not yet our allies ask more from us than those who are our allies?

[7] This is not due to excess of modesty in Philip or to the lack of it in the Romans. It is the fortune of war which imparts confidence to the demands of one side and takes it away from those of the other. As far as Philip is concerned we see nothing belonging to him except his envoy.

[8] As for the Romans, their fleet lies at Cenchreae, laden with the spoils of the cities of Euboea, and we see the consul with his legions overrunning Phocis and Locris which are only separated from us by a narrow strip of sea.

[9] Do you wonder why Philip's envoy, Cleomedon, spoke in so diffident a tone when he urged us to take up arms against the Romans on behalf of his king?

[10] He impressed upon us the sanctity of the same treaty and oath, but if we were to ask of him, by virtue of the same treaty and oath, that Philip should defend us from Nabis and the Lacedaemonians, he would not be able to find a force adequate for our protection or even an answer to our request, any more than Philip himself could have done last year.

[11] For when he attempted to draw our fighting-men away into Euboea by promising that he would make war on Nabis, and saw that we would not sanction such an employment of our soldiers or allow

[12] ourselves to be involved in a war with Rome, he forgot all about the treaty which he is now making so much of, and left us to be despoiled and wasted by Nabis and the Lacedaemonians.

[13] To me, indeed, the arguments that Cleomedon used appeared inconsistent with each other. He made light of a war with Rome and said that the issue would be the same as that of the former war. If so, then why does Philip keep away and ask for our assistance instead of coming in person and protecting us from Nabis and the Romans? 'Us,' do I say? Why, if this be so, did he allow Eretria and Carystus to be taken? why, all those cities in Thessaly?

[14] why, Locris and Phocis? Why is he allowing Elatea to be attacked now? Why did he evacuate the passes leading into Epirus and the unsurmountable barriers commanding the river Aous? And when he had abandoned them, why did he march off into the heart of his kingdom?

[15] If he deliberately left his allies to the mercies of their enemies how can he object to these allies taking measures for their own safety? If his action was dictated by fear he must pardon us for our fears. If he retreated because he was worsted shall we Achaeans, Cleomedon, withstand the arms of Rome when you Macedonians could not withstand them?

[16] You tell us that the Romans are not in greater strength or employing greater forces in this war than in the last one; are we to take your word for it, rather than look at the actual facts?

[17] On that occasion they only sent their fleet to help the Aetolians; they did not put a consul in command nor did they employ a consular army. The maritime cities belonging to Philip's allies were in a state of consternation and alarm, but the inland districts were so safe from the arms of Rome that Philip laid waste the land of the Aetolians while they were vainly imploring the Romans for help.

[18] Now, however, the Romans have brought the war with Carthage to a close, that war which for sixteen years they have had to endure, whilst it preyed, so to speak, on the vitals of Italy, and

[19] they have not simply sent a detachment to aid the Aetolians, they have themselves assumed command of the war and are attacking Macedonia by land and sea. Their third consul is now conducting operations with the utmost energy.

[20] Sulpicius met the king in Macedonia itself, routed him, put him to flight, and ravaged the richest part of his realm, and now, when he was holding the passes which form the key of Epirus, secured as he thought by his positions, his fortified lines and his army,

[21] Quinctius has deprived him of his camp, pursued him as he fled into Thessaly, stormed the cities of his allies and driven out his garrisons almost within sight of Philip himself.

[22] Suppose there is no truth in what the Athenian delegate has said about the king's brutality and greed and lust, suppose that the crimes committed in Attica against all the gods, supernal and infernal, do not concern us, still less the sufferings of Chios and Abydos, which are a long way off;

[23] let us forget our own wounds, the robberies and murders at Messene in the heart of the Peloponnesus, the king's assassination of his host almost at the banquet-table, the deaths of the two Arati of Sicyon, father and son-the king was in the habit of speaking of the hapless old man as though he were his father-the abduction of the son's wife into Macedonia as a victim to Philip's lusts, and

[24] all the other outrages on matrons and maids-let all these be consigned to oblivion.

[25] Let us even imagine that we have not to do with Philip whose cruelty has struck you dumb (for what other reason can there be for you who have been summoned to the council keeping silence?), but with Antigonus, a gentle and just-minded monarch who has been the greatest benefactor to us all. Do you suppose that he would demand of us that we should do what cannot possibly be done?

[26] The Peloponnesus, remember, is a peninsula connected with the mainland by the narrow strip of land called the Isthmus, open and exposed above all to a naval attack.

[27] If a fleet of 100 decked ships and 50 undecked ships with lighter draught, and 30 Isaean cutters should begin to ravage our coast and attack the cities which stand exposed almost on the shore, we should, I suppose, withdraw into the inland cities just as if we were not caught by the flames of a war within our frontiers which is fastening upon our vitals. When Nabis and the Lacedaemonians are pressing us by land and the Roman fleet by sea, from what quarter am I to appeal to our alliance with the king and implore the Macedonians to help us?

[28] Shall we protect with our own arms the threatened cities against the Romans? How splendidly we protected Dymae in the last war! The disasters of others afford ample warning to us, let us not seek how we may become a warning to others.

[29] Because the Romans are asking for your friendship voluntarily, take care that you do not disdain what you ought to have desired and done your best to obtain.

[30] Do you imagine that they are entrapped in a strange land and driven by their fears into wishing to lurk under the

[31] shadow of your assistance and seek the refuge of an alliance with you in order that they may have the entry of your harbours and make use of your supplies? The sea is under their control, whatever shores they visit they at once bring under their dominion, what they deign to ask for they can obtain by force.

[32] It is because they wish to spare you that they do not allow you to take a step which would destroy you.

[33] As to the middle course which Cleomedon pointed out as the safest, namely, that you should keep quiet and abstain from hostilities, that is not a middle course, it is no course at all.

[34] We have either to accept or reject the proferred alliance with Rome; otherwise we shall win the gratitude of neither side, but like men who wait upon the event, leave our policy at the mercy of Fortune, and what is this but to become a prey of the conqueror? What you ought to have sought with the utmost solicitude is now spontaneously offered; beware lest you scorn the offer.

[35] Either alternative is open to you today, it will not be open always. The opportunity will not long remain, nor will it often recur. For a long time you have wished rather than ventured to free yourselves from Philip. The men who would win your liberty for you without any risk or effort on your part have crossed the seas with mighty fleets and armies.

[36] If you reject their alliance you are hardly in your right senses, but you will be compelled to have them as either friends or enemies."

Notes on the current edition

Ab Urbe Condita With An English Translation, books 1-10, 21-45, with periochae 11-20

1. B.C. 198

2. B.C. 198

3. In 211 B.C. (XXVI. xxiv. 10) the Romans sent a fleet to the east, but their land forces there were inconsiderable until 205 B.C. (XXIX. xii. 2). A consular army had as its nucleus, normally, two Roman legions; the forces assigned to inferior commanders were largely or wholly made up of Latin allies.

4. B.C. 198

5. This crime seems to be unmentioned elsewhere.

6. See Plutarch's life of Aratus, 52, 54 and elsewhere, and Polyb. VIII. xiv.

7. Philip's predecessor on the Macedonian throne; he supported the Achaean against the Aetolian League.

8. The Isthmus of Corinth.

9. B.C. 198

10. B.C. 198

Titus Livius (Livy) Ab urbe condita 32.21

Benjamin Oliver Foster, Ph.D. (Editor), Frank Gardener Moore (Editor), Evan T. Sage, Ph.D. (Editor), Alfred C. Schlesinger, Ph.D. (Editor)

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