Titus Livius (Livy), Ab urbe condita, Benjamin Oliver Foster, Ph.D. (Editor), Frank Gardener Moore (Editor), Evan T. Sage, Ph.D. (Editor), Alfred C. Schlesinger, Ph.D. (Editor), 30.35

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[1]

At the right moment Laelius and Masinissa, who had pursued the routed cavalry for a considerable distance, returned and dashed into the rear of the enemy's line. That charge of the cavalry finally worsted the enemy.

[2] Many were overpowered and slain in the battle-line, many were scattered in ¹ flight over the open plain all around, and as the cavalry were in complete possession, they perished everywhere. Over twenty thousand of the Carthaginians and their allies were slain on that day.

[3] About the same number were captured, together with one hundred and thirty-two military standards and eleven elephants. Of the victors about fifteen hundred fell.

[4] Hannibal, escaping with a few horsemen in the midst of the confusion, fled to Hadrumetum, ² having tried every expedient both before the battle and during the engagement before he withdrew from the fray.

[5] And even by Scipio's admission and that of all the military experts he had achieved this distinction, that he had drawn up his line that day with extraordinary skill:

[6] the elephants in the very front, that their haphazard charge and irresistible strength might prevent the Romans from following their standards and keeping their ranks, upon which tactics they based most of their hopes;

[7] then the auxiliaries in front of the line of Carthaginians, that men who were brought together from the offscouring of all nations and held not by loyalty but by their pay might have no way of escape open to them;

[8] that at the same time, as they met the first fiery attack of the enemy, they might exhaust them, and if they could do no more, might blunt the enemy's swords by their own wounds;

[9] next in order the soldiers in ³ whom lay all his hopes, the Carthaginians and Africans, that being equal to the Romans in everything else, they might have the advantage in fighting with strength undiminished against the weary and the wounded; then, removed to the last line and separated by an open space as well, the Italic troops, of whom it was uncertain whether they were allies or enemies.

[10] Having produced this as his last masterpiece Hannibal after his flight to Hadrumetum was called away, returning to Carthage in the thirty-sixth year after he had left it as a boy.

[11] Thereupon in the Senate House he admitted that he had been defeated not only in a battle but also in the war, and that there was no hope of safety except in successfully suing for peace.

Ab urbe condita. Titus Livius (Livy). Benjamin Oliver Foster, Ph.D. (Editor), Frank Gardener Moore (Editor), Evan T. Sage, Ph.D. (Editor), Alfred C. Schlesinger, Ph.D. (Editor). Medford, MA. .

Sponsored by Perseus Project, Tufts University.

Funding provided by The National Endowment for the Humanities.

Current edition Perseus

History of Rome (English) (Foster, Benjamin Oliver; Moore, Frank Gardener; Sage, Evan T.; Schlesinger, Alfred C., translators. Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press; William Heinemann, Ltd., 1919-1959. (Loeb Classical Library))

Editions (3)

Ab urbe condita Perseus (Pars I-IV, Libri I-XL. Editio Stereotypica. Weissenborn, Wilhelm; Mueller, Moritz, editors. Leipzig: Teubner, 1884-1911.) — 30.35 focus

[1] in tempore Laelius ac Masinissa, pulsos per aliquantum spatii secuti equites, revertentes in aversam hostium aciem incurrere. is demum equitum impetus perculit hostem.

[2] multi circumventi in acie caesi; multi per patentem circa campum fuga sparsi tenente omnia equitatu passim interierunt.

[3] Carthaginiensium sociorumque caesa eo die supra viginti milia; par ferme numerus captus cum signis militaribus centum triginta duobus, elephantis undecim. victores ad mille et quingentos cecidere.

[4] Hannibal cum paucis equitibus inter tumultum elapsus Hadrumetum perfugit,

[5] omnia et integro proelio et inclinante acie, priusquam excederet pugna, expertus et confessione etiam Scipionis omniumque peritorum militiae illam laudem adeptus, singulari arte aciem eo die instruxisse:

[6] elephantos in prima fronte, quorum fortuitus impetus atque intolerabilis vis signa sequi et servare ordines, in quo plurimum spei ponerent, Romanos prohiberent;

[7] deinde auxiliares ante Carthaginiensium aciem, ne homines mixti ex conluvione conluuione omnium gentium, quos non fides teneret, sed merces,

[8] liberum receptum fugae haberent, simul primum ardorem atque impetum hostium excipientes fatigarent ac, si nihil aliud, vulneribus suis ferrum hostile hebetarent;

[9] tum, ubi omnis spes esset, milites Carthaginienses Afrosque, ut, omnibus rebus aliis pares, eo, quod integri cum fessis ac sauciis pugnarent, superiores essent; Italicos intervallo quoque diremptos, incertos, socii an hostes essent, in postremam aciem summotos.

[10] hoc edito velut ultimo virtutis opere Hannibal cum Hadrumetum refugisset, accitusque inde Carthaginem sexto ac tricesimo post anno, quam puer inde profectus erat,

[11] redisset, fassus in curia est non proelio modo se sed bello victum, nec spem salutis alibi quam in pace impetranda esse.

Ab urbe condita Perseus (Conway, Robert Seymour; Walters, Charles Flamstead; Johnson, Stephen Keymer, editors. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1914-1935. (Oxford Classical Texts)) — 30.35 focus

[1]

in tempore Laelius ac Masinissa pulsos per aliquantum spatii secuti equites, reuertentes in auersam hostium aciem incurrere. is demum equitum impetus perculit hostem.

[2] multi circumuenti in acie caesi, per patentem circa campum fuga sparsi tenente omnia equitatu passim interierunt. Carthaginiensium sociorumque caesa eo die supra uiginti milia:

[3] par ferme numerus captus cum signis militaribus centum triginta duobus, elephantis undecim: uictores ad mille et quingenti cecidere.

[4] Hannibal cum paucis equitibus inter tumultum elapsus Hadrumetum perfugit, omnia et ante aciem et in proelio priusquam excederet pugna expertus,

[5] et confessione etiam Scipionis omniumque peritorum militiae illam laudem adeptus singulari arte aciem eo die instruxisse:

[6] elephantos in prima fronte quorum fortuitus impetus atque intolerabilis uis signa sequi et seruare ordines, in quo plurimum spei ponerent, Romanos prohiberent;

[7] deinde auxiliares ante Carthaginiensium aciem ne homines mixti ex conluuione omnium gentium, quos non fides teneret sed merces, liberum receptum fugae haberent,

[8] simul primum ardorem atque impetum hostium excipientes fatigarent ac, si nihil aliud, uolneribus suis ferrum hostile hebetarent;

[9] tum, ubi omnis spes esset, milites Carthaginienses Afrosque ut omnibus rebus aliis pares eo quod integri cum fessis ac sauciis pugnarent superiores essent; Italicos incertos socii an hostes essent in postremam aciem summotos, interuallo quoque diremptos.

[10] hoc edito uelut ultimo uirtutis opere, Hannibal cum Hadrumetum refugisset accitusque inde Carthaginem sexto ac tricensimo post anno quam puer inde profectus erat redisset,

[11] fassus in curia est non proelio modo se sed bello uictum, nec spem salutis alibi quam in pace impetranda esse.

Ab urbe condita Perseus (Livy in Fourteen Volumes. Foster, Benjamin Oliver; Moore, Frank Gardener; Schlesinger, Alfred C., editors. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1919-1959 (printing).) — 30.35 focus

[1]

In tempore Laelius ac Masinissa pulsos ¹ per aliquantum spatii secuti equites, revertentes in aversam hostium aciem incurrere. is demum equitum impetus perculit ² hostem.

[2] multi circumventi in acie caesi; multi ³ per patentem circa campum ⁴ fuga sparsi tenente omnia equitatu passim interierunt.

[3] Carthaginiensium sociorumque caesa eo die supra viginti milia; par ferme numerus captus cum signis militaribus centum triginta duobus, ⁵ elephantis undecim; victores ad mille et quingenti ⁶ cecidere.

[4] Hannibal cum paucis equitibus inter tumultum elapsus Hadrumetum perfugit, omnia et ante aciem et in proelio, ⁷ priusquam excederet pugna, expertus,

[5] et confessione etiam Scipionis omniumque peritorum militiae illam laudem adeptus, singulari arte aciem eo die instruxisse:

[6] elephantos in prima fronte, quorum fortuitus impetus atque intolerabilis vis signa sequi et servare ordines, in quo plurimum spei ponerent, Romanos prohiberent;

[7] deinde auxiliares ante Carthaginiensium aciem, ne homines mixti ex ⁸ conluvione omnium gentium, quos non fides teneret, sed merces,

[8] liberum receptum fugae haberent, simul primum ardorem atque impetum ⁹ hostium excipientes fatigarent ac, si nihil aliud, volneribus suis ferrum hostile ¹⁰ hebetarent;

[9] tum, ubi omnis spes esset, ¹¹¹² milites Carthaginienses Afrosque, ut, omnibus rebus aliis pares, eo quod integri cum fessis ac sauciis pugnarent superiores essent; Italicos intervallo quoque diremptos, ¹³ incertos socii an hostes essent, in postremam aciem summotos.

[10] hoc edito velut ultimo virtutis opere, Hannibal cum Hadrumetum refugisset, ¹⁴ accitusque inde Carthaginem sexto ac tricesimo post anno quam puer inde profectus erat redisset,

[11] fassus in curia est non proelio modo se sed ¹⁵ bello victum, nec spem salutis alibi quam in pace impetranda ¹⁶ esse.

Translations (2)

History of Rome Perseus (Spillan, D.; Edmonds, Cyrus; McDevitte, William A., translators. London: Henry G. Bohn, 1849-1868. (Bohn's Classical Library)) — 30.35 focus

[1]

Laelius and Masinissa, who had pursued the routed cavalry through a considerable space, returning very opportunely, charged the rear of the enemy's line. This attack of the cavalry at length routed them.

[2] Many of them, being surrounded, were slain in the field; and many, dispersed in flight through the open plain around, were slain on all hands, as the cavalry were in possession of every part. Of the Carthaginians and their allies, above twenty thousand were slain on that day; about an equal number were captured, with a hundred and thirty-three military standards, and eleven elephants.

[3] Of the victors as many as two thousand fell.

[4] Han- nibal, slipping off during the confusion, with a few horsemen, came to Adrumetum, not quitting the field till he had tried every expedient both in the battle and before the engagement; having, according to the admission of Scipio, and every one skilled in military science, acquired the fame of having marshalled his troops on that day with singular judgment.

[5] He placed his elephants in the front, in order that their desultory attack, and insupportable violence, might prevent the Romans from following their standards, and preserving their ranks, on which they placed their principal dependence.

[6] Then he posted his auxiliaries before the line of Carthaginians, in order that men who were made up of the refuse

[7] of all nations, and who were not bound by honour but by gain, might not have any retreat open to them in case they fled;

[8] at the same time that the first ardour and impetuosity might be exhausted upon them, and, if they could render no other service, that the weapons of the enemy might be blunted in wounding them.

[9] Next he placed the Carthaginian and African soldiers, on whom he placed all his hopes, in order that, being equal to the enemy in every other respect, they might have the advantage of them, inasmuch as, being fresh and unimpaired in strength themselves, they would fight with those who were fatigued and wounded. The Italians he removed into the rear, separating them also by an intervening space, as he knew not, with certainty, whether they were friends or enemies.

[10] Hannibal, after performing this as it were his last work of valour, fled to Adrumetum, whence, having been summoned to Carthage, he returned thither in the six and thirtieth year after he had left it when a boy;

[11] and confessed in the senate-house that he was defeated, not only in the battle, but in the war, and that there was no hope of safety in any thing but in obtaining peace.

History of Rome Perseus (Volumes 1-2. Roberts, Canon, Rev, translator. London, New York: J. M. Dent and Sons; E. P. Dutton and Co., 1912.) — 30.35 focus

[1]

Laelius and Masinissa, who had followed up the defeated cavalry a considerable distance, now returned from the pursuit at the right moment and attacked the enemy in the rear. This at last decided the action.

[2] The enemy were routed, many were surrounded and killed in action, those who dispersed in flight over the open country were killed by the cavalry who were in possession of every part. Above 20,000 of the Carthaginians and their allies perished on that day and almost as many were made prisoners.

[3] 132 standards were secured and 11 elephants. The victors lost 1500 men. Hannibal escaped in the melee with a few horsemen and fled to Hadrumetum.

[4] Before quitting the field he had done everything possible in the battle itself and in the preparation for it. Scipio himself acknowledged and all experienced soldiers agreed that Hannibal had shown singular skill in the disposition of his troops.

[5] He placed his elephants in front so that their irregular charge and irresistible force might make it

[6] impossible for the Romans to keep their ranks and maintain the order of their formation, in which their strength and confidence mainly lay.

[7] Then he posted the mercenaries in front of his Carthaginians, in order that this motley force drawn from all nations, held together not by a spirit of loyalty but by their pay, might not find it easy to run away.

[8] Having to sustain the first onset they might wear down the impetuosity of the enemy, and if they did nothing else they might blunt his sword by their wounds. Then came the Carthaginian and African troops, the mainstay of his hopes.

[9] They were equal in all respects to their adversaries and even had the advantage inasmuch as they would come fresh into action against a foe weakened by wounds and fatigue. As to the Italian troops, he had his doubts as to whether they would turn out friends or foes and withdrew them consequently into the rearmost line.

[10] After giving this final proof of his great abilities, Hannibal fled, as has been stated, to Hadrumetum. From here he was summoned to Carthage, to which city he returned thirty-six years after he had left it as a boy.

[11] He told the senate frankly that he had lost not a battle merely but the whole war, and that their only chance of safety lay in obtaining peace.

Notes on the current edition

Ab Urbe Condita With An English Translation, books 1-10, 21-45, with periochae 11-20

1. B.C. 202

2. His base (Sousse), xxix. 1. His ships were there. The distance from Zama is greatly exaggerated by Nepos Hann. 6. 3 (300 miles, he says), while Appian Pun. 47 makes it even 375. Both claim that he covered the distance in two days and two nights. In reality Zama Regia is about 90 miles due west of Hadrumetum. Naraggara would be ca. 170 Roman miles from that seaport, if the shorter and less rugged southerly route was taken. Every probability, however, favours the supposition that the battle was fought much nearer to Sicca Veneria, and not more than 120 miles from Hadrumetum; cf. p. 547 ff.

3. B.C. 202

Titus Livius (Livy) Ab urbe condita 30.35

Benjamin Oliver Foster, Ph.D. (Editor), Frank Gardener Moore (Editor), Evan T. Sage, Ph.D. (Editor), Alfred C. Schlesinger, Ph.D. (Editor)

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