Titus Livius (Livy), Ab urbe condita, Benjamin Oliver Foster, Ph.D. (Editor), Frank Gardener Moore (Editor), Evan T. Sage, Ph.D. (Editor), Alfred C. Schlesinger, Ph.D. (Editor), 30.10

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[1]

From that point, just as they were throwing up an earthwork, the Romans sighted the enemy's fleet making towards Utica from Carthage.

[2] Accordingly work was dropped, marching orders given and the standards hastily set in motion, that the ships, headed towards land and. the besieged city, also in no condition for a naval battle, might not be taken by surprise.

[3] For how could an easily manœuvred fleet, ¹ properly rigged with ship's gear and armed, have been resisted by ships carrying artillery and engines, and either converted now into transports or lying so close to the walls as to make scaling possible as if from an embankment and drawbridges?

[4] Consequently Scipio, on reaching the place, gave those war-ships ² which might have defended the others a place in the rear line near the land, contrary to the usual practice in a naval battle. On the other hand he placed four lines of transports as a bulwark against the enemy.

[5] To prevent the lines from being broken in the confusion of the battle he also held these transports together by placing masts and yards crosswise from ship to ship and lashing them with stout ropes as if by a single cable. In addition he laid down planks above to make a gangway the whole length of the line of ships; and beneath these bridges he left openings where scouting vessels could dash out against the enemy and return in safety.

[6] These preparations having been hastily completed as best the circumstances permitted, about a thousand picked fighting men were placed on board the transports.

[7] A vast number of weapons, chiefly missiles, were assembled, that they might be sufficient for a battle no matter how long-continued. Thus equipped and alert they were awaiting the approach of the enemy.

The Carthaginians, whose first attack, had they ³ made it in good time, would have been overpowering when everything was confused by the mass of men dashing about, were discouraged by their disastrous defeats on the land.

[9] And having in consequence no sufficient confidence on the sea either, where lay their own superiority, after spending the day in sailing slowly, they put in with their fleet about sunset into a harbour called Rusucmon ⁴ by the Africans.

[10] On the next day about sunrise they drew up their ships in the open sea, as if for a regular naval battle and anticipating that the Romans would come out against them.

[11] After keeping their position for a long time and observing no movement on the part of the enemy, then only did they attack the transports.

[12] It was not in the least like a naval battle, but had almost the appearance of ships attacking the walls of a city. The transports were considerably higher.

[13] From their war-ships the Carthaginians generally hurled their weapons to no purpose against a higher position, since they did so leaning backwards, while a hit from the transports above was heavier and from its mere weight had more force.

[14] Scouting vessels and other light craft, which kept dashing out through openings underneath the bridges, were at first themselves sunk by the mere momentum and mass of the war-ships.

[15] Later they interfered with the fighting men as well because, as they mingled with the enemy's vessels, they often compelled the soldiers to withhold their missiles for fear in their uncertain aim they might hit their own men.

[16] Finally poles with an iron hook at the end —grappling-irons ⁵ the soldiers call them ⁶ —began to be thrown from the Carthaginian ships upon the Roman.

[17] Since the crews were unable either to cut off these poles or the chains by which they were hanging when thrown, whenever a warship was propelled astern, dragging a transport grappled by the hook, one might have seen men breaking up

[18] the links by which it had been bound to others, and even several of the vessels being towed away together.

[19] Much after this fashion the bridges in the first line were broken down and hardly enough time was given the fighting men to spring across to the second line of ships.

[20] About sixty transports ⁷ were towed away by the stern to Carthage. Rejoicing for that was excessive, but all the more acceptable because, in the midst of uninterrupted defeats and sorrows, one ray of joy however small had unexpectedly beamed upon them.

[21] In addition it was clear to them that the Roman fleet had narrowly escaped destruction, and would have been destroyed if the captains ⁸ of their own ships had not loitered, and if Scipio had not come to its aid in the nick of time.

Ab urbe condita. Titus Livius (Livy). Benjamin Oliver Foster, Ph.D. (Editor), Frank Gardener Moore (Editor), Evan T. Sage, Ph.D. (Editor), Alfred C. Schlesinger, Ph.D. (Editor). Medford, MA. .

Sponsored by Perseus Project, Tufts University.

Funding provided by The National Endowment for the Humanities.

Current edition Perseus

History of Rome (English) (Foster, Benjamin Oliver; Moore, Frank Gardener; Sage, Evan T.; Schlesinger, Alfred C., translators. Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press; William Heinemann, Ltd., 1919-1959. (Loeb Classical Library))

Editions (3)

Ab urbe condita Perseus (Pars I-IV, Libri I-XL. Editio Stereotypica. Weissenborn, Wilhelm; Mueller, Moritz, editors. Leipzig: Teubner, 1884-1911.) — 30.10 focus

[1] inde, cum maxime vallum Romani iacerent, conspecta classis hostium est Uticam a Carthagine petens.

[2] igitur omisso opere pronuntiatum iter, signaque raptim ferri sunt coepta, ne naves in terram et obsidionem versae ac minime navali proelio aptae opprimerentur.

[3] qui enim restitissent agili et nautico instrumento aptae et armatae classi naves tormenta machinasque portantes et aut in onerariarum usum versae aut ita adpulsae muris, ut pro aggere ac pontibus praebere ascensus possent?

[4] itaque Scipio, postquam eo ventum est, contra quam in navali certamine solet, rostratis, quae praesidio aliis esse poterant, in postremam aciem receptis prope terram,

[5] onerariarum quadruplicem ordinem pro muro adversus hostem opposuit, easque ipsas, ne in tumultu pugnae turbari ordines possent, malis antemnisque de nave in navem traiectis ac validis funibus velut uno inter se viuculo uinculo inligatis conprendit tabulasque superinstravit,

[6] ut pervium in totum navium ordinem esset, et sub ipsis pontibus intervalla fecit, qua procurrere speculatoriae naves in hosted hostem ac tuto recipi possent.

[7] his raptim pro tempore instructis mille ferme delecti propugnatores onerariis imponuntur, telorum maxime missilium, ut quamvis longo certamini sufficerent, vis ingens congeritur.

[8] ita parati atque intenti hostium adventum opperiebantur. Carthaginienses, qui,

[9] si maturassent, omnia permixta turba trepidantium primo impetu oppressissent, perculsi terrestribus cladibus atque inde ne mari quidem, ubi ipsi plus poterant, satis fidentes, die segni navigatione absumpto sub occasum solis in portum — Rusucmona Afri vocant — classem adpulere;

[10] postero die sub ortum solis instruxere ab alto naves velut ad iustum proelium navale et tamquam exituris contra Romanis.

[11] cum diu stetissent, postquam nihil moveri ab hostibus viderunt, tum demum onerarias adgrediuntur.

[12] erat res minime certamini navali similis, proxime speciem muros oppugnantium navium.

[13] altitudine aliquantum onerariae superabant; ex rostratis Poeni vana pleraque, utpote supino iactu, tela in locum superiorem mittebant; gravior ac pondere ipso libratior superne ex onerariis ictus erat.

[14] speculatoriae naves ac levia alia navigia, quae sub constratis pontium per intervalla excurrebant, primo ipsae tantum impetu ac magnitudine rostratarum obruebantur;

[15] deinde et propugnatoribus quoque incommodae erant, quod permixtae cum hostium navibus inhibere saepe tela cogebant metu, ne ambiguo ictu suis inciderent.

[16] postremo asseres ferreo unco praefixi — harpagones vocant — ex Punicis navibus inici in Romanas coepti.

[17] quos cum neque ipsos neque catenas,

[18] quibus suspensi iniciebantur, incidere possent, ut quaeque retro inhibita rostrata onerariam haerentem unco traheret, scindi videres vincula, quibus alis innexa erat, seriem etiam simul plurium navium trahi.

[19] hoc maxime modo lacerati primi quidem ordinis pontes, et vix transiliendi in secundum ordinem navium spatium propugnatoribus datum est.

[20] sexaginta ferme onerariae puppibus abstractae Carthaginem sunt: maior quam pro re laetitia, sed eo gratior, quod inter adsiduas clades ac lacrimas unum quantumcumque ex insperato gaudium adfulserat cum eo,

[21] ut appareret haud procul exitio fuisse Romanam classem, ni cessatum a praefectis suarum navium foret et Scipio in tempore subvenisset.

Ab urbe condita Perseus (Conway, Robert Seymour; Walters, Charles Flamstead; Johnson, Stephen Keymer, editors. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1914-1935. (Oxford Classical Texts)) — 30.10 focus

[1]

inde cum maxime uallum Romani iacerent, conspecta classis hostium est Uticam ab Carthagine petens.

[2] igitur omisso opere pronuntiatum iter signaque raptim ferri sunt coepta ne naues in terram et ad obsidionem uersae ac minime nauali proelio aptae opprimerentur:

[3] qui enim restitissent agili et nautico instrumento aptae et armatae classi naues tormenta machinasque portantes et aut in onerariarum usum uersae aut ita adpulsae muris ut pro aggere ac pontibus praebere adscensum possent?

[4] itaque Scipio, postquam eo uentum est, contra quam in nauali certamine solet rostratis quae praesidio aliis esse poterant in postremam aciem receptis prope terram,

[5] onerariarum quadruplicem ordinem pro muro aduersus hostem opposuit, easque ipsas, ne in tumultu pugnae turbari ordines possent, malis antennisque de naue in nauem traiectis ac ualidis funibus uelut uno inter se uinculo inligatis comprendit,

[6] tabulasque superinstrauit ut peruium in totum nauium ordinem esset, et sub ipsis pontibus interualla fecit qua procurrere speculatoriae naues in hostem ac tuto recipi possent.

[7] his raptim pro tempore instructis, mille ferme delecti propugnatores onerariis imponuntur; telorum maxime missilium ut quamuis longo certamine sufficerent uis ingens congeritur.

[8] ita parati atque intenti hostium aduentum opperiebantur. Carthaginienses, qui, si maturassent, omnia permixta turba trepidantium primo impetu oppressissent,

[9] perculsi terrestribus cladibus atque inde ne mari quidem ubi ipsi plus poterant satis fidentes, die segni nauigatione absumpto sub occasum solis in portum—Rusucmona Afri uocant— classem adpulere.

[10] postero die sub ortum solis instruxere ab alto naues uelut ad iustum proelium nauale et tamquam exituris contra Romanis.

[11] cum diu stetissent postquam nihil moueri ab hostibus uiderunt, tum demum onerarias adgrediuntur.

[12] erat res minime certamini nauali similis, proxime speciem muros oppugnantium nauium. altitudine aliquantum onerariae superabant;

[13] ex rostratis Poeni uana pleraque, utpote supino iactu, tela in locum superiorem mittebant; grauior ac pondere ipso libratior superne ex onerariis ictus erat.

[14] speculatoriae naues ac leuia alia nauigia, quae sub constratis pontium per interualla excurrebant, primo ipsae tantum impetu ac magnitudine rostratarum obruebantur;

[15] deinde propugnatoribus quoque incommodae erant quod permixtae cum hostium nauibus inhibere saepe tela cogebant metu ne ambiguo ictu suis inciderent.

[16] postremo asseres ferreo unco praefixi—harpagones uocat miles —

[17] ex Punicis nauibus inici in Romanas coepti. quos cum neque ipsos neque catenas quibus suspensi iniciebantur incidere possent, ut quaeque retro inhibita rostrata onerariam haerentem unco traheret,

[18] scindi uideres uincula quibus aliis innexa erat, seriem aliam simul plurium nauium trahi.

[19] hoc maxime modo lacerati [quidem] omnes pontes et uix transiliendi in secundum ordinem nauium spatium propugnatoribus datum est.

[20] sexaginta ferme onerariae puppibus abstractae Carthaginem sunt. maior quam pro re laetitia, sed eo gratior quod inter adsiduas clades ac lacrimas unum quantumcumque ex insperato gaudium adfulserat,

[21] cum eo ut appareret haud procul exitio fuisse Romanam classem ni cessatum a praefectis suarum nauium foret et Scipio in tempore subuenisset.

Ab urbe condita Perseus (Livy in Fourteen Volumes. Foster, Benjamin Oliver; Moore, Frank Gardener; Schlesinger, Alfred C., editors. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1919-1959 (printing).) — 30.10 focus

[1]

inde , cum maxime vallum Romani iacerent, conspecta classis hostium est Uticam a Carthagine petens.

[2] igitur omisso opere pronuntiatum iter signaque raptim ferri sunt coepta, ne naves in terram et obsidionem versae ac minime navali proelio aptae opprimerentur:

[3] qui enim restitissent agili et nautico ¹ instrumento aptae et armatae classi naves tormenta machinasque portantes et aut in onerariarum usum versae aut ² ita adpulsae muris ut pro aggere ac pontibus praebere ascensum ³ possent?

[4] itaque Scipio, postquam eo ventum est, contra quam ⁴ in navali certamine solet, rostratis quae praesidio aliis esse poterant ⁵ in postremam aciem receptis prope terram terrain ,

[5] onerariarum quadruplicem ordinem pro muro adversus hostem opposuit, easque ipsas, ne in tumultu pugnae turbari ordines possent, malis antemnisque de nave in navem traiectis ac validis funibus velut uno inter se vinculo inligatis conprendit, tabulasque superinstravit, ⁶

[6] ut pervium in totum navium ⁷ ordinem esset, ⁸ et sub ipsis pontibus intervalla fecit, qua procurrere speculatoriae naves in hostem ac tuto recipi possent.

[7] his raptim pro tempore instructis mille ferme delecti propugnatores onerariis imponuntur; telorum maxime ⁹ missilium, ut quamvis longo certamini ¹⁰ sufficerent, vis ingens congeritur.

[8] ita parati atque intenti hostium adventum opperiebantur.

Carthaginienses , qui, si maturassent, omnia ¹¹ permixta turba trepidantium primo impetu oppressissent, ¹²

[9] perculsi terrestribus cladibus atque inde ne ¹³ mari quidem, ubi ipsi plus poterant, satis fidentes, die segni navigatione absumpto sub occasum solis in portum—Rusucmona Afri vocant—classem adpulere.

[10] postero die sub ortum solis instruxere ab alto naves velut ad iustum proelium navale et tamquam exituris contra Romanis.

[11] cum diu stetissent, postquam nihil moveri ab hostibus viderunt, tum demum onerarias adgrediuntur.

[12] erat res minime certamini navali similis, proxime speciem muros oppugnantium navium. altitudine aliquantum onerariae superabant;

[13] ex rostratis Poeni vana pleraque, utpote supino iactu, tela in locum superiorem mittebant; gravior ac pondere ipso libratior superne ex onerariis ictus erat.

[14] speculatoriae naves ac levia alia ¹⁴ navigia, quae sub constratis pontium per intervalla excurrebant, primo ipsae tantum ¹⁵ impetu ac magnitudine rostratarum obruebantur;

[15] deinde propugnatoribus quoque incommodae erant, quod permixtae cum hostium navibus inhibere saepe tela cogebant metu ne ambiguo ictu suis inciderent.

[16] postremo asseres ferreo unco praefixi—harpagones vocat ¹⁶¹⁷ miles ¹⁸ —ex Punicis navibus inici in Romanas coepti.

[17] quos cum neque ipsos neque catenas quibus suspensi iniciebantur incidere possent, ut quaeque retro inhibita rostrata onerariam haerentem unco traheret, scindi videres vincula quibus aliis ¹⁹ innexa erat,

[18] seriem etiam ²⁰ simul plurium navium trahi.

[19] hoc maxime modo lacerati primi quidem ordinis ²¹ pontes, et vix transiliendi in secundum ordinem navium spatium propugnatoribus datum est.

[20] sexaginta²² ferme onerariae puppibus abstractae Carthaginem sunt. Maior quam pro re laetitia, sed ²³ eo gratior quod inter adsiduas clades ac lacrimas unum quantumcumque ex insperato gaudium adfulserat,

[21] cum eo ut appareret haud procul exitio fuisse Romanam classem, ni cessatum a praefectis suarum navium foret et Scipio in tempore subvenisset.

Translations (2)

History of Rome Perseus (Spillan, D.; Edmonds, Cyrus; McDevitte, William A., translators. London: Henry G. Bohn, 1849-1868. (Bohn's Classical Library)) — 30.10 focus

[1]

From this place the Romans, while diligently employed in raising a rampart, descried the fleet of the enemy, on its way to Utica from Carthage.

[2] Desisting from their work, therefore, orders for marching were given, and the troops began to move with the utmost haste, lest the ships which were turned towards the land, and occupied with the siege, and which were far from being in a condition for a naval battle, should be surprised and overpowered.

[3] For how could ships, carrying engines and machines, and either converted to the purposes of transports, or brought up to the walls so as to afford the means of mounting up, in lieu of a mound and bridges, resist a fleet, with nothing to impede its movements, furnished with every kind of naval implement, and prepared for action.

[4] Scipio, therefore, contrary to his usual practice in naval engagements, drew the ships of war, which might have been employed in defending the rest, into the rear, and formed them into a line near the land; opposing to the enemy a row of transports, four deep, to serve as a wall;

[5] and, lest these same transports should be thrown into disorder during the confusion of the battle, he bound them together by placing masts and yard-arms across them, from one vessel to the other; and, by means of strong ropes, fastened them together, as it were, by one uninterrupted bond.

[6] He also laid planks upon them, so as to form a free passage along the line, leaving spaces under these bridges of communication by which the vessels of observation might run out towards the enemy, and retreat with safety. Having hastily made these arrangements, as well as the time would permit, he put on board the transports about a thousand picked men, to keep off

[7] the enemy, with a very large store of weapons, particularly missiles, that they might hold out, however long the contest lasted. Thus prepared, and on the watch, they waited the approach of the enemy.

[8] The Carthaginians, who, if they had made haste, would, on the first assault, have surprised their adversaries while every thing was in a state of confusion, from the hurry and bustle attending the preparations, were so dismayed at their losses by land, and thereby

[9] had lost so much confidence even in their strength by sea, in which they had the advantage, that, after consuming the day, in consequence of the slow rate at which they sailed, about sun-set they put in to a harbour which the Africans call Ruscino.

[10] The following day, at sun-rise, they drew up their ships towards the open sea, as for a regular naval battle, and with the expectation that the Romans would come out to engage them.

[11] After they had continued stationary for some time, and saw that no movement was made on the part of the enemy, then, at length, they attacked the transports.

[12] The affair bore no resemblance to a naval fight, but rather had the appearance of ships attacking walls. The transports had considerably the advantage in respect of height;

[13] and as the Carthaginians had to throw their weapons upward, against a mark which was above them, most of them failed of taking effect; while the weapons thrown from the transports from above fell with increased force, and derived additional impetus from their very weight.

[14] The vessels of observation, and even the lighter kind of barks, which went out through the spaces left under the flooring, which formed a communication between the ships, were at first run down by the mere momentum and bulk of the ships of war;

[15] and afterwards they proved a hinderance to the troops appointed to keep the enemy off; for as they mixed with the ships of the enemy, they were frequently under the necessity of withholding their weapons for fear, by a misdirected effort, they

[16] should fall on their friends.

[17] At length, beams with iron hooks at their ends, called harpoons, began to be thrown from the Carthaginian upon the Roman ships; and, as they could not cut the harpoons themselves, nor the chains suspended by which they were thrown upon their ships, as each of the ships of war of the enemy, being pulled

[18] back, drew with it a transport, connected with it by a harpoon, you might see the fastenings by which the transports were joined together rent asunder, and in another part a series of many vessels dragged away together.

[19] In this manner chiefly were all the bridges of communication torn to pieces, and scarcely had the troops who fought in front time to leap to the second line of ships.

[20] About six transports were towed away to Carthage, where the joy felt was greater than the occasion warranted; but their delight was increased from the reflection, that, in the midst of so many successive disasters and woes, one event, however trifling, which afforded matter of joy, had unexpectedly occurred;

[21] besides which, it was manifest that the Roman fleet would have been well nigh annihilated, had not their own commanders been wanting in diligence, and had not Scipio come up to its assistance in time.

History of Rome Perseus (Volumes 1-2. Roberts, Canon, Rev, translator. London, New York: J. M. Dent and Sons; E. P. Dutton and Co., 1912.) — 30.10 focus

[1]

Whilst the Romans were busily engaged in intrenching they saw the hostile fleet sailing from Carthage to Utica.

[2] They at once ceased work, orders were given to march, and the army made a rapid advance, fearing lest the ships should be caught with their prows turned shorewards for siege operations, in utter unreadiness for a naval battle.

[3] "How" they asked themselves, "can a mobile and fully armed fleet in perfect sailing order be successfully resisted by ships loaded with artillery and war machines, or converted into transports, or brought up so close to the walls as to allow of scaling parties using them instead of an agger and gangways?"

[4] Under the circumstances Scipio abandoned the usual tactics. Bringing the warships which could have protected the others into the rearmost position close inshore, he lined up the transports in front of them four deep to serve as a wall against the enemy's attack.

[5] To prevent the lines from being broken by violent charges he laid masts and yard-arms from ship to ship and secured them by stout ropes which bound them together like one continuous chain.

[6] He then fastened planks upon the top of these, so making a free passage along the whole line, and under these bridges the despatch-boats had room to run out against the enemy and retire into safety. After making these hurried arrangements as complete as time would allow, he placed about 1000 picked men on board the transports and an

[7] immense quantity of missile weapons, so that however long the fighting went on there might be enough. Thus ready and eager, they waited for the enemy.

[8] If the Carthaginians had moved more rapidly they would have found hurry and confusion everywhere, and they might have destroyed the fleet in the first onset.

[9] They were, however, disheartened by the defeat of their land forces, and now they did not feel confidence even on the sea, the element where they were strongest. After sailing slowly all through the day they brought up towards sunset at a harbour called by the natives Rusocmon.

[10] The following day, they put out to sea in line of battle, expecting the Romans to come out and attack them.

[11] After they had been stationary for a long time and no movement on the part of the enemy was visible, they at last commenced an attack on the transports.

[12] There was nothing in the least resembling a naval action, it looked almost exactly as if ships were attacking walls.

[13] The transports were considerably higher than their opponents, and consequently the missiles from the Carthaginian vessels, which had to be hurled from below, were mostly ineffective; those from the transports thrown from above fell with more force, their weight adding to the blow.

[14] The despatch-boats and light vessels which ran out through the intervals under the plank gangways were many of them run down by the momentum and bulk of the warships, and in

[15] time they became a hindrance to those fighting on the transports, who were often obliged to desist for fear of hitting them while they were mixed up with the enemy's ships.

[16] At last the Carthaginans began to throw poles with grappling-hooks

[17] at the end-the soldiers call them harpagones-on to the Roman ships, and it was impossible to cut away either the poles or the chains by which they were suspended.

[18] When a warship had hooked one of the transports it was rowed astern, and you would see the ropes which fastened the transports one to another give way, and sometimes a whole line of transports would be dragged off together.

[19] In this way all the gangways connecting the first line of transports were broken up, and there was hardly any place left where the defenders could spring back into the second line.

[20] Six transports were towed off to Carthage. Here the rejoicing was greater than the circumstances of the case warranted, but what made it all the more welcome was the fact that the

[21] Roman fleet had narrowly escaped destruction, an escape due to the Carthaginian commander's slackness and the timely arrival of Scipio. Amid such continual disasters and mourning this was an unhoped-for cause of congratulation.

Notes on the current edition

Ab Urbe Condita With An English Translation, books 1-10, 21-45, with periochae 11-20

1. B.C. 203

2. Not mentioned again in the account of the battle. They would be perfectly helpless if the barrier of transports should be broken through. No figures are given here by Polybius, whose text breaks off abruptly after XIV. x. Appian, recording a different attack upon Scipio's naval base, has 100 Carthaginian war-ships against 20 Roman triremes; Pun. 24 fin.

3. B.C. 203

4. West of the Promontory of Apollo, it was inside the bay but had no real harbour. Its modern successor is Porto Farina.

5. Exaggerated boathooks. Cf. Vol. VII. p. 149 and note; Caesar B.G. VII. lxxxi. 1; Bell. Hisp. xvi. 2; Curtius IV. ii. 12; Vegetius II. 25; IV. 44 (in the navy); Zonaras IX. xii. 10.

6. B.C. 203

7. On the voyage across from Lilybaeum he had 400 transports; XXIX. xxvi. 3. Their number by this time may have been considerably increased.

8. Cf. XXI. lxi. 4; XXXVI. xliv. 1; magistri navium in XXIX. xxv. 7. The admiral was a Hamilcar according to Appian Pun. 24. Cf. Laelius as praefectus classis, XXVI. xlviii. 7; XXIX. xxv. 10.

Titus Livius (Livy) Ab urbe condita 30.10

Benjamin Oliver Foster, Ph.D. (Editor), Frank Gardener Moore (Editor), Evan T. Sage, Ph.D. (Editor), Alfred C. Schlesinger, Ph.D. (Editor)

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