M. Tullius Cicero, De Amicitia, ed. William Armistead Falconer, 48

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[48] quam ob rem si cadit in sapientem animi dolor, qui profecto cadit, nisi ex eius animo exstirpatam humanitatem arbitramur, quae causa est cur amicitiam funditus tollamus e vita, ne aliquas propter eam suscipiamus molestias? quid enim interest motu animi sublato, non dico inter pecudem et hominem, sed inter hominem et truncum aut saxum aut quidvis generis eiusdem? neque enim sunt isti audiendi, qui virtutem duram et quasi ferream esse quandam volunt; quae quidem est cum multis in rebus tum in amicitia tenera atque tractabilis, ut et bonis amici quasi diffundatur et incommodis contrahatur. quam ob rem angor iste, qui pro amico saepe capiendus est, non tantum valet, ut tollat e vita amicitiam, non plus quam ut virtutes, quia non nullas curas et molestias afferunt, repudientur.

14 cum autem contrahat amicitiam, ut supra dixi, si qua¹ significatio virtutis eluceat, ad quam se similis animus applicet et adiungat, id cum contigit, amor exoriatur necesse est.

De Amicitia. M. Tullius Cicero. ed. William Armistead Falconer. London. 1923.

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Current edition Perseus

Laelius De Amicitia (Latin) (Cicero, Marcus Tullius. De senectute; De amicitia; De divinatione. Falconer, W. A., editor. Cambridge, MA. Harvard University Press. London. William Heinemann Ltd. 1923.)

Translations (1)

Laelius on Friendship Perseus (Cicero. De Senectute, De Amicitia, De Divinatione. Falconer, William Armistead, translator. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. London: William Heinemann Ltd. 1923 (printing).) — 48 focus

[48] Wherefore, if distress of mind befalls a wise man (as it certainly does unless we assume that human sympathy has been rooted out of his heart), why should we remove friendship entirely from our lives in order that we may suffer no worries on its account? For when the soul is deprived of emotion, what difference is there—I do not say between man and the beasts of the field, but between man and a stock or a stone, or any such thing? Nor are we to listen to those men¹who maintain that virtue is hard and unyielding and is, as it were, something made of iron; whereas, in many relations of life, and especially in friendship, it is so pliable and elastic that it expands, so to speak, with a friend’s prosperity and contracts with his adversity. Wherefore, that mental anguish of which I spoke and which often must be felt on a friend’s account, has no more power to banish friendship from life than it has to cause us to reject virtue because virtue entails certain cares and annoyances.

14 But, since, as I said before, virtue knits friendship together, if there should be some exhibition of shining virtue to which a kindred spirit may attach and adjust itself, then, when that happens, love must needs spring forth.

Notes on the current edition

De Amicitia

1. si qua M; si quasi Reid; sic quasi GBS; si qua quasi D.

M. Tullius Cicero De Amicitia 48

ed. William Armistead Falconer

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