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Isaeos: Works

Forensic speeches in private causes

SIXTY-FOUR speeches bearing the name of Isaeos—of which fifty were allowed as genuine—and an Art of Rhetoric, are mentioned by the writer of the Plutarchic Life¹. At least the accredited fifty appear to have been extant in the middle of the ninth century². Eleven³, with large part of a twelfth⁴, have come down to us; forty-two more— of which three were suspected by Harpokration—are known from their titles; and we have thus a record of fifty-four imputed, or fifty-one unquestioned, works⁵ .

So far as can now be judged, the orations of Isaeos ⁶ were exclusively forensic⁷. It is a striking fact that only three of them appear to have dealt with Public ⁸ Causes⁹. All the rest were concerned with Private Causes. These may be classified as bearing on (1) ¹⁰ cases of claim to an inheritance; (2) cases of claim to the hand of a heiress; (3) cases of claim to property; (4) cases of claim to the ownership of a slave; (5) an action brought against a surety whose principal had made default; (6) a special plea; (7) appeals from one jurisdiction to another¹¹.

Principal class — the κληρικοί.

In the ancient collection of an orator's works, the largest or the most distinctive class of his speeches stood first. For Antiphon, this class consisted of the speeches in cases of homicide, the φονικοί; and these alone have been preserved,—the last of them (Or. VI. ‘On the Choreutes’) being apparently defective at the end, where the manuscript broke off¹². For Isaeos, this class comprised the speeches in willcases, the κληρικοί: and so, here too, these alone have been saved, with a like defect at the end of the speech (XI.) On the Estate of Hagnias¹³.

In these extant speeches the connexion with the ¹⁴ will-case is sometimes direct, sometimes indirect. From the literary point of view, they belong to one class, the Testamentary. From the Attic legal point of view, they require to be further classified thus:— I. Trials of Claim to an Inheritance ( διαδικασίαι¹⁵). 1. On the Estate of Kleonymos. [Or. I.] 2. On the Estate of Nikostratos. [Or. IV.] 3. On the Estate of Apollodoros. [Or. VII.] 4. On the Estate of Kiron. [Or. VIII.] 5. On the Estate of Astyphilos. [Or. IX.] 6. On the Estate of Aristarchos. [Or. X.] II. Actions for False Witness ( δίκαι ψευδομαρτυριῶν). 1. On the Estate of Menekles. [Or. II.] 2. On the Estate of Pyrrhos. [Or. III.] 3. On the Estate of Philoktemon. [Or. VI.] III. Action to compel the discharge of a Suretyship ( ἐγγύης δίκη). On the Estate of Dikaeogenes. [Or. V.] IV. Indictment of a Guardian for maltreatment of a Ward ( εἰσαγγελία κακώσεως ὀρφανοῦ). On the Estate of Hagnias. [Or. XI.] V. Appeal ( ἔφεσις) from Arbitration to a Dikastery. For Euphiletos. [Or. XII.]

Oldest documents illustrating laws of inheritance

The speeches of Isaeos are the oldest documents ¹⁶ in the world which illustrate with minuteness of detail the workings of a Testamentary Law¹⁷. It has been shown beyond reasonable doubt that the idea of a man's legal existence being prolonged in his heir, or in a group of co-heirs, sprang from the attribution to the individual of that perpetuity which is the characteristic of the family¹⁸. The idea of ¹⁹ continuing the family is that in which the testament begins. Now, in primitive societies, religious rites are the symbols and warrants of the family's continuity. The father of the Indo-European house was its priest as well as its master: the sacrifices which, in life, he offered at the hearth could, after his death, be offered only by the son in whom his personality survived²⁰. These sacrifices were at once the most solemn obligations of his successor and the most sacred pledges of an inviolable succession. What, then, was to happen if there was no heir duly qualified by nearness in blood? To meet ²¹ this case, primitive society invented Adoption, that is, the authorized fiction of kinship. The faculty of adoption was the germ of testamentary power. But there is no proof that any ancient society, except the Roman, got beyond the faculty of adoption to a true power of testation. The Athenian Will ²² was only an inchoate Testament. Permission to execute a will was first given to Athenian citizens by the laws of Solon²³. But it was expressly restricted to those citizens who had no direct male descendants. Those illustrations of Athenian testamentary succession which are supplied by the speeches of Isaeos have one general characteristic of striking interest, and it is in this, more than in the light which they throw on Attic details, that their great and lasting value resides. The Hindoo system of succession shows ²⁴ the primitive religious element completely predominant. When the childless Hindoo adopts a child, it is with a view to ‘the funeral cake, the water, and the solemn sacrifice²⁵.’ The Roman testamentary ²⁶ law of Cicero's time, on the other hand, has broken free of religion; the sacra have passed under the separate jurisdiction of the Pontifical College; the obligation imposed by the Civil Law has become independent of the theological sanction²⁷. The Athenian ²⁸ system belongs essentially to the same stage as the Hindoo system. It has not, like the Roman law of Cicero's time, passed that point of development at which testation proper begins. But, in spirit, the ²⁹ Athenian system, may be regarded as intermediate between the Hindoo and the Roman. The Athenian exercise of adoptive power retains, indeed, as its nominal first principle, the religious continuity of the family. ‘Succour him who is with the dead,’ cries the speaker to the jurors,—‘do not allow him— I beseech you by the gods and the immortal spirits— to be treated with contumely by these men:’ ‘think,’ he exclaims, ‘for what you will become responsible if you are persuaded by Kleon to give a different verdict:—first of all, you will send the worst enemies of Astyphilos to celebrate the rites at his grave.’ It would be an utter mistake to suppose that these pathetic or stately commonplaces are altogether hollow. The sentiment is real enough. But, at the same time, there is a difference between the Hindoo and the Athenian feeling. The Hindoo adopts a son primarily in order that his departed spirit may enjoy higher spiritual benefits than it could enjoy if the offerings at the grave were made by a relative less near than a son³⁰. The Athenian of the days of Isaeos adopted a son primarily because he wished to leave his property to a person who would not otherwise get it. For the Hindoo, that religious motive in which adoption originated is still foremost. For the Athenian of the days of Isaeos, the faculty of adoption, though necessarily associated with religion, is chiefly significant in its civil aspect, as a limited form of testamentary power.

Athenian rules of inheritance.

The following are the chief rules which, at Athens, governed succession and bequest:—

I. When a citizen died leaving sons, they shared the inheritance equally, the eldest having priority of choice.

II. Failing sons and sons' issue, daughters and daughters' issue succeeded³¹ .

III. But a daughter was never, in our sense, an heiress. She was, strictly, a person who went with the estate ( ἐπίκληρος). The heir, properly speaking, was either (1) her nearest kinsman, who was bound to marry her; or (2) that person to whom her father had devised the property on condition of marrying her.

IV. Failing lineal descendants, the succession passed to collateral kinsfolk on the paternal side, as far down as to children of first-cousins³², with a preference to males. Failing these, it passed to the maternal side, with the like limit and preference. It then returned to the paternal side.

V. A man could not disinherit his son. Nor could he separate his estate from his daughter, though he could select the person whom she was to marry.

VI. A childless man might, either during his life or by testament, adopt any Athenian citizen as his son and heir.

VII. Mothers³³ certainly, fathers³⁴ probably, could not inherit from their children. But an inheritance could ascend collaterally; e.g. an uncle could inherit, or could marry the daughter with whom the estate went.

I. Trials of claim to an inheritance ( διαδικασίαι).

I. 1. On the Estate of Kleonymos. [Or. I.]

Polyarchos Kleonymos³⁵ one sister Deinias³⁶ elder claimant³⁷ younger claimant Pherenikos Poseidippos Diocles

Polyarchos left two children, Kleonymos, and the mother of the claimants. On the death of their father the claimants became the wards of their paternal uncle Deinias³⁸. They were heirs-at-law of their maternal uncle Kleonymos (§ 4). But Kleonymos, having quarrelled with Deinias, resolved to spite him by disinheriting his wards. He therefore made a will in favour of some remoter kinsmen,—Poseidippos (§ 4), Diokles (§ 14), Pherenikos and his brothers (§ 45)³⁹. After the death of Deinias, however, Kleonymos relented. He took charge of his nephews; and in his last illness resolved to cancel his will. With this purpose he sent for the magistrate ( ὁ ἀστύνομος § 15); but he died before he had seen him.

The claimants contend that the will had been virtually cancelled, and claim as next of kin ( κατὰ τὴν ἀγχιστείαν, § 6). The defendants rely on the will ( κατὰ διαθήκην ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, § 41). The eldest claimant is the speaker.

Benseler places the speech below 360 B. C., and ⁴⁰ indeed regards it as one of the latest, because hiatus is avoided with a care, foreign, he thinks, to the earlier manner of Isaeos⁴¹. In the case of Or. VIII., at least, as we shall see, this test hardly holds good. This, however, is a much stronger instance, and the speech may safely be referred to the years 360—353.

‘Kleonymos had intended us to be his heirs: now we are ⁴² in court with not only his legacy but our whole fortune at stake. The friends of the defendants recognise our right to at least a share of the legacy; but the defendants themselves, so far from admitting this, seek to deprive us of our very patrimony, on account of alleged debts to Kleonymos (§§ 1—5). We shrink from appearing against kinsmen; the defendants have no such feeling; they have mustered all their forces as against enemies (§§ 6—8).

[Then comes a narrative of the facts, §§ 9—14, supported by witnesses, §§ 15—16.]

‘It is pretended that Kleonymos sent for the magistrate not to cancel but to confirm his will. If, being then on the best terms with us, his nephews, he wished to clinch the wrong which, in a fit of anger, he had once meant to do us, he was mad, and his will ought to be set aside. But that this was not his purpose,—that he meant, not to revise, but to revoke his will,—was shown by the unwillingness of Poseidippos and Diokles to admit the magistrate (§§ 17—24). Besides, a mere correction or addition might have been made on a new tablet; by sending for the original document Kleonymos showed that he desired some substantial alteration (24—26). Not only on grounds of kinship but also on grounds of friendship Kleonymos was more likely to have left his property to us than to the defendants (§§ 27—38). There is always a presumption for claimants by blood as against claimants by will (§§ 41—43). Again, take the test of reciprocal obligation: if Kleonymos had died leaving daughters unprovided for, we, not the defendants, would have been liable to provide for them (§§ 39, 40). Or, if the defendants and we had alike died without issue, Kleonymos would have been heir, not to them, but to us (§§ 44— 47). Either the testator was of unsound mind, or we are the heirs’ (§§ 48—51).

I. 2. On the Estate of Nikostratos [Or. IV.]

grandfather of Nikostratos Thrasymachos Thrasippos Hagnon⁴³ Hagnotheos Nikostratos

Nikostratos, an Athenian citizen, had died abroad, after an absence from Athens of eleven years (§ 8), during part of which he seems to have been doing military service (§§ 18—26.) His first cousins, Hagnon and Hagnotheos, claimed his property as next of kin ( κατὰ γένος). Their claim is disputed by one Chariades, who says that it is his under an express bequest ( κατὰ δόσιν). Chariades had been absent from Athens for seventeen years before the death of Nikostratos (§ 29), and professed to have been intimate with him abroad.

In this speech, a friend (§ 7) of Hagnon and Hagnotheos recapitulates the points of their case. Hagnon (or, as he and his brother were boys, νεανίσκοι § 26, some one for them) had, probably, already spoken. That this speech is the second ( ἐπίλογος) for the defence is clear from the fact that no witnesses are called. There is no ground for supposing, with the author of the Argument, that the speaker was Isaeos⁴⁴. The date is uncertain.

‘Witnesses cannot be brought, nor false statements easily ⁴⁵ refuted, in regard to transactions abroad. But the case of Hagnon and his brother can be proved from what has occurred at Athens. First,—Chariades calls Nikostratos the son of Smikros. Hagnon and his brother claim the property of Nikostratos, son of Thrasymachos. But for this discrepancy, the judges would have had to ask merely, Did or did not Nikostratos leave a will? Clearly Chariades wanted to perplex an issue, otherwise simple, by raising a question of identity (§§ 1—6).

‘Six other persons besides Chariades have put forward, and withdrawn, claims to the inheritance⁴⁶. Chariades himself in the first instance claimed it on the ground of kinship. Then, shifting his ground, he claimed it under a will (§§ — 10). Such claimants, when defeated, ought to be fined, not merely in proportion to their assessed property ( κατὰ τὸ τέλος), but in the whole amount of the estate claimed. A claim under a will which sets aside the natural succession requires scrutiny. Witnesses can prove only the fact of a will, not the identity of one will with another. Then the law requires that the testator should have been of sound mind.

‘Universally the presumption is strong in favour of claimants by kinship as against claimants under a will ( κατὰ δόσιν, §§ 11—18). In this case Chariades was not on such terms with Nikostratos as make the bequest probable. Chariades was not the messmate ( σύσσιτος) of Nikostratos. He was not even in the same company ( τάξις) with him. He did not pay him the last offices (§§ 18—20). The property of persons dying abroad has often been claimed by strangers. On grounds both general and particular the probabilities are in favour of the defendants.

‘Certain supporters of Chariades pretend that they are themselves the next of kin to Nikostratos. In that case it is their interest to claim the estate on their own account. If defeated they will be able to try again: whereas, if Chariades once obtains the estate under an alleged will, no claim founded on kinship can afterwards be entertained (§§ 21—26).

‘Lastly:—contrast the antecedents of the parties to the cause. Thrasippos, father of the defendants, was a patriotic citizen, and his sons have always borne a good name. Chariades—who has been absent from Athens for 17 years—has been imprisoned for theft and indicted as a malefactor. Let the judges decide as the evidence and their oaths enjoin’ (§§ 27—31).

I. 3. On the Estate of Apollodoros [Or VII.]

Apollodorus? Eupolis Mneson⁴⁷ Thrasyllos I⁴⁸ mother of the testator Archedamos Apollodorus II⁴⁹ ⁵⁰ ⁵¹ Apollodorus I⁵² one daughter⁵³ mother of the speaker Thrasyllos II⁵⁴ Thrasybulos

Eupolis, Mneson and Thrasyllos were brothers. Mneson died childless. Thrasyllos was killed in the Sicilian expedition, and left his son Apollodoros I. to the guardianship of Eupolis. Eupolis abused the trust. He intercepted, by a pretended will, half of Mneson's property; and also embezzled much of his nephew's patrimony. Apollodoros I. found a friend, however, in his mother's second husband, Archedamos, who supported him in an action against Eupolis. Archedamos died, leaving a daughter who was married and had a son, Thrasyllos II. When Apollodoros lost his only son, he determined to adopt this Thrasyllos as his son and heir.

At the death of Apollodoros, his estate was claimed by his first-cousin, the elder of the two daughters of Eupolis, and wife of one Pronapes. She denied that Thrasyllos II. had been adopted by Apollodoros I. In this speech Thrasyllos defends his right.

The date must be about 353 B. C. For:— ⁵⁵ 1. Apollodoros I., when about to set forth on a campaign to Corinth, made a will, and directed that his daughter, the speaker's mother, should marry one Lakratides (§ 9). The campaign was probably that of Ol. 96. 4, 393 B.C., or Ol. 97. 1, 392 B.C. At this time, then, the speaker's mother was unmarried. Her marriage—not to Lakratides, but to the speaker's father, Archedamos—may be put four or five years later: in 388 or 387 B.C.—2. The speaker, when adopted by Apollodoros, had already been a thesmothetes (§ 34); i. e. was at least thirty. But he cannot have been much more, for he is still a young man (§ 41).—3. Soon after his adoption, he went on a sacred embassy to the Pythian festival (§ 27). The first Pythiad after the speaker had reached the age of thirty was that of Ol. 106. 3, 354 B.C.—4. From §§ 14, 15 it may be inferred that Apollodoros I. did not live long after the adoption; and the contest for the property must have followed soon after his death. The adoption may, then, be placed early in 354; the trial, in 353⁵⁶.

The speaker, Thrasyllos, was adopted by Apollodoros ⁵⁷ during the latter's lifetime. This kind of adoption is always less open to suspicion than adoption under a will. The speaker might have barred the claim of Pronapes by an affidavit ( διαμαρτυρία): but, confident in his cause, he has preferred a direct trial ( εὐθυδικία, §§ 1—4).

Gratitude to Archedamos had prompted Apollodoros to adopt the speaker; who, at the Thargelia, was duly received into the family and the clan (§§ 5—17). Had there been no such adoption, however, the next heir would have been, not the wife of Pronapes, but her nephew, Thrasybulos. The silence of Thrasybulos is evidence to the adoption (§§ 18—26); which was ratified by the demesmen of Apollodoros. At their meeting to choose the officers of the deme ( ἐν ἀρχαιρεσίαις), they placed Thrasyllos on their register ( ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον: §§ 27, 28)⁵⁸.

The wife of Pronapes and her sister had already inherited the property of their brother; but had ignored the obligation to constitute one of their children his representative before the law ( εἰσποιεῖν υἱὸν αὐτῷ, § 31); and thus his line had become extinct ( ἐξηρήμωται ὁ οἶκος, ib.). This would have been warning enough to Apollodoros. He would never have left his property to the wife of Pronapes (§§ 29—32). On the other hand, no one had stronger claims on Apollodoros than the speaker (§§ 33—36).

The public services of Apollodoros and his father, Thrasyllos I., are contrasted with those of Pronapes⁵⁹. The speaker has already served the state as far as his years allowed, and hopes to serve it more (§§ 37—42). Summary: §§ 43—45.

I. 4. On the Estate of Kiron [Or. VIII.]

⁶⁰ ⁶¹ ⁶² Kiron ⁶³ ⁶⁴ the speaker ⁶⁵ ⁶⁶ ⁶⁷ ⁶⁸ Kiron's grandfather

Kiron married his first-cousin, by whom he had one daughter. This daughter was married, first, to Nausimenes; secondly, to another husband by whom she had two sons, of whom the eldest is the speaker.

After the death of his first wife, Kiron married the sister of one Diokles, and had by her two sons, both of whom died young.

At the death of Kiron, his estate was claimed by his daughter's eldest son. But the son of Kiron's brother, instigated by Diokles⁶⁹, set up a counterclaim on two distinct grounds: 1. That Kiron's grandson is illegitimate: 2. That, supposing him legitimate, a brother's son has a better claim than a daughter's son⁷⁰. This speech is the defendant's answer.

The only indication of the date is that the ⁷¹ speaker and his brother were born after the archonship of Eukleides⁷², Ol. 94. 2, 403 B.C. (§ 43). The speech cannot, then, be put before 383 B.C. On the other hand, the speaker's plea of ‘utter inexperience’ (§ 5) implies youthfulness. Now, if he was a young man, the date cannot be much below 383⁷³ , since otherwise it would have been superfluous for him to tell the judges that he was born after 403. The date is probably about 375 B.C.

The speaker denounces the impudence of this attempt ⁷⁴ to defraud himself and his brother,—an attempt which has been organised by Diokles; but expresses his confidence of being able to defeat it (§§ 1—5).

I. First, he will show that his mother was the legitimate daughter of Kiron (§ 6). He states the facts as to Kiron's second marriage (§§ 7—9); and proves, in support of them, that he had challenged the other side to give up Kiron's slaves for torture, which challenge had been refused (§§ 9—14). He and his brother were always treated by Kiron as his nearest kinsmen (§§ 15—17). His mother was treated as Kiron's daughter both by her husband and by the women of Kiron's deme: he and his brother were formally enrolled by Kiron in his phratria (§§ 18—20). Lastly, Diokles himself allowed the speaker and his brother to assist at the funeral of Kiron—thus recognising the relationship (§§ 21—29).

II. Secondly, he will show that, as son of Kiron's daughter, he has a better claim than the son of Kiron's brother. Descent ( γένος) is a nearer tie than collateral kinship ( συγγένεια): descendants ( ἔκγονοι) inherit before collateral relations ( συγγενεῖς). This is illustrated by the law on the maltreatment of parents ( ὁ περὶ κακώσεως νόμος, § 32). According to that law, the obligation to maintain relatives descends lineally. The corresponding right to inherit from relatives must descend lineally too (§§ 30—34).

An account of the property of Kiron and of the intrigues of Diokles (§§ 35—39) is followed by a personal attack on Diokles (§§ 40—42). This attack is resumed in the epilogue; and the speech concludes with the calling of evidence to show that Diokles had been guilty of adultery (§§ 43—46).

I. 5. On the Estate of Astyphilos [Or. IX.]

Thudippos ⁷⁵ Euthykrates Kleon⁷⁶ ⁷⁷ Sister of Hierokles⁷⁸ Theophrastos sister Astyphilos ⁷⁹

Euthykrates and Thudippos were brothers. Thudippos had a son named Kleon. Euthykrates had a son Astyphilos and a daughter. On the death of Euthykrates, his wife married a second husband named Theophrastos, by whom she had a son.

Astyphilos died on military service at Mytilene. As soon as the news of his death reached Athens, Kleon took formal possession of his estate⁸⁰ ( ἐνεβάτευσε, § 3) in the name of his own son, who, as he alleged, had been adopted by Astyphilos, and in evidence of whose claim he produced a will.

Presently the son of Theophrastos—who had been serving abroad—returned to Athens, and claimed⁸¹ the estate of his half-brother Astyphilos. In this speech he contends that the will alleged by Kleon is a forgery.

The date—a difficult point—is probably about ⁸² 369 B.C. Astyphilos (§ 14) ‘first went on a campaign to Corinth—then to Thessaly—then he served through the whole Theban War—in short, wherever he heard of an army being raised, he was off to it with a company ( λοχαγῶν)......and this expedition to Mytilene was his last.’ The allusions to Thessaly⁸³ and Mytilene⁸⁴ cannot be fixed. The others are to the Corinthian War of 394—387 and the Theban War of 378—371⁸⁵ .

Kleon and his son have already been adopted into ⁸⁶ another family; and have thus forfeited their claim as kinsmen to the estate of Astyphilos⁸⁷. Hence they resorted to the fiction of a will: and Hierokles, uncle of the speaker, pretends that this will was left with him. Astyphilos did not even receive the last rites from the man who pretends to have been his adopted son (§§ 1—6).

If Astyphilos had intended such an adoption, he would have called kinsmen or intimate friends as witnesses. But the witnesses now produced are strangers (§§ 7—13). Again, Astyphilos served in many expeditions before that to Mytilene. Is it likely that he should have delayed making his will—if he was going to make one—till just before the last campaign? (§§ 14, 15.) Astyphilos hated Kleon, because Euthykrates had died of injuries received from Thudippos, Kleon's father (§§ 16—21). Hierokles, ungrateful to the speaker's father Theophrastos, has plotted this fraud with Kleon (§§ 22—26). The speaker and Astyphilos were close friends from boyhood; and Theophrastos treated Astyphilos as a son (§§ 27—30). It is unlikely, then, that Astyphilos should have preferred Kleon's son to the speaker. The relatives of Astyphilos have never recognised the alleged adoption by admitting Kleon's son to the family sacrifices (§§ 31—33). Epilogue: §§ 34—37.

I. 6. On the Estate of Aristarchos [Or. x.]

⁸⁸ Aristomenes Aristarchos I Apollodorus sister Kyronides⁸⁹ Xenaenetos mother Demochares mother ⁹⁰ Aristarchos II⁹¹ Xenaenetos II⁹² speaker⁹³ ⁹⁴

Aristarchos I. had two sons and two daughters. Kyronides, the eldest son, was adopted, during his father's lifetime, into the family of his maternal grandfather Xenaenetos I. At the death of Aristarchos I. the property went, therefore, to the second son, Demochares. Demochares died in youth. One of his sisters had died, without issue, before him. The other sister was thus left heiress to her father's estate; and might have been claimed in marriage by one of her near kinsmen. Her nearest kinsmen were, her uncle Aristomenes, brother of Aristarchos I., and his son Apollodoros. Neither of them claimed her hand. Aristomenes, as her guardian, gave her in marriage, with a small dowry, to a stranger: he then put her brother, now his son-in-law, Kyronides in possession of the estate of Aristarchos I.—to which Kyronides had forfeited all right by adoption into the house of Xenaenetos. Kyronides and the daughter of Aristomenes had two sons,—Aristarchos II. and Xenaenetos II. Aristarchos II. was made adopted son of Aristarchos I. in accordance with an alleged will by which the latter left his property to his grandson. At the death of Aristarchos II. his brother Xenaenetos II. was, under his will, declared his adopted son and heir.

The claim of Xenaenetos II. is now opposed by the grandson of Aristarchos I. He claims the estate on behalf of his mother as daughter of Aristarchos I., —not as sister (by adoption) of Aristarchos II.; though, at the preliminary inquiry (§ 2), legal form had required him to describe her in the latter manner.

Aristarchos ‘has been killed in the war,’ ἐν τῷ⁹⁵ πολέμῳ τέθνηκε (§ 22); words which imply both that his death is recent and that the war continues. Now this war is clearly not the Corinthian War (394—387), which, with the peace that closed it, is mentioned as something long past (§ 20). The war in which Aristarchos fell is probably the Theban War of 378—371. The speech may be placed between 377 and 371⁹⁶.

After contrasting his own want of nerve and fluency ⁹⁷ with the practised skill of the adversaries, the speaker explains why the form of his claim is inconsistent with its substance. He has been obliged to describe his mother, not as the daughter of Aristarchos I., but as the sister of Aristarchos II., although he denies the validity of the adoption on which the latter title depends (§§ 1—3).

He relates the facts (§§ 4—7); and then argues that Aristarchos II. could not have been adopted (1) by Aristarchos I., while the latter had a legitimate son, Demochares, living; nor (2) by Demochares, who died before he was competent to adopt; nor (3) by Kyronides, who had passed out of the family; nor (4) by Aristomenes or his son Apollodoros (§§ 8—14).

Xenaenetos II., the defendant, does not, however, rely only on the alleged adoption of Aristarchos II. He says that his father, Kyronides, had already acquired a right to the estate by discharging debts with which it was encumbered. But, the speaker replies, (1) the person liable for these debts was not Kyronides but the speaker's mother⁹⁸: and (2) had the estate really been so encumbered, Aristomenes and Kyronides would not have been in such haste to procure the inheritance for Aristarchos II. (§§ 15—17).

The speaker answers the objection that his claim ought to have been made long ago. His father was deterred from taking proceedings by the fear of losing his wife, whom the next of kin threatened that they would claim at law ( ἐπιδικάζεσθαι), if he claimed the estate. The plaintiff himself has hitherto been prevented by military service, and then by a debt to the Treasury⁹⁹, from bringing an action (§§ 18—21).

The personal worth of Aristarchos II. cannot excuse the fact that the property which he bequeathed was not his own. The holder of disputed lands is bound to produce the mortgager ( θέτης), the seller, or the legal decision under which he occupies¹⁰⁰, Just so the adversaries must prove their title to this estate. Kyronides and his family already possess the property of Xenaenetos I. They now seek to deprive the speaker of his patrimony. As a citizen of good character, public and private, he claims the protection of his rights (§§ 22—26).

II. Actions for False Witness ( δίκαι ψευδομαρτυριῶν).

II. 1. On the Estate of Menekles [Or. II.]

Eponymos¹⁰¹ ¹⁰² brother first sister¹⁰³ second sister Philonides¹⁰⁴ daughter of Philonides Menekles I¹⁰⁵ brother of Menekles I¹⁰⁶ Eleios Menekles II two sons

At the death of Menekles, his estate was claimed by his brother¹⁰⁷. But Menekles had left an adopted son; this son entered a protest that the estate, being his, could not be so claimed ( διεμαρτύρησε μὴ ἐπίδικον εἶναι τὸν κλῆρον, § 2); and produced, as witness, his father-in-law (§ 36) Philonides. The brother of Menekles then brought an indictment for perjury ( γραφὴ ψευδομαρτυρίας) against Philonides. In this speech, Philonides is defended by his son-in-law, the adopted son of Menekles.

The adoption had come about thus. Eponymos, a friend of Menekles, had four children:—the speaker of this speech; another son; and two daughters. The younger daughter was, for about two years (§ 6), the wife of Menekles; but, their marriage proving childless, they separated, and she took a second husband, Eleios. At some later time Menekles became anxious to adopt a son. His brother— the prosecutor in this case—had only one son. Menekles decided, therefore, to adopt one of the two sons of his friend Eponymos (§§ 3—12).

The date is probably about 354 B. C. (1) The ¹⁰⁸ speaker says (§ 6):—‘Having given our sisters in marriage, and being of the full age, we betook ourselves to military service, and went with Iphikrates on an expedition to Thrace.’ This might refer to 389 B. C., when Iphikrates was sent to guard the Hellespont and the regions about it¹⁰⁹. But the tone implies that Athens was not then waging a great war. The reference is more probably to 383 B.C., when Iphikrates began hostilities against Kotys, who had then just got the chief power in Thrace¹¹⁰. (2) The adoption of the speaker by Menekles must have taken place about six years later (cf. §§ 7—19), in 377. (3) Menekles died 23 years after the adoption, § 15— i.e. in 354: and this cause must have soon followed.

After a narrative of the facts (§§ 1—12), it is shown ¹¹¹ (1) by the citation of a law, that a man without male issue can devise his property as he pleases: (2) by witnesses, that Menekles had adopted the speaker in due form, enrolling him among the members of his phratria, his gens, and his deme¹¹² (§§ 13—16). At the desire of Menekles the speaker took a wife, the daughter of Philonides; and was in all respects treated as the son of his adoptive father (§§ 17—18).

The adversaries suggest that Menekles, when he adopted the speaker, was not in his right mind, and was influenced by his wife, the speaker's sister. It is replied that his sister was the wife of Eleios when the adoption took place; that she had two children of her own, in whose favour her influence would rather have been used; and that the speaker was the natural person for Menekles to adopt (§§ 19—22). The prosecutor's real complaint is that Menekles exercised the right of adoption—a right allowed by Greeks and barbarians alike, and one which the prosecutor would have used in a like case (§§ 23—26).

The prosecutor has no reason to be jealous; the speaker has inherited from his adoptive father little but the name of son. Menekles owed about £268 (§ 29) to the son of a deceased creditor ( τῷ ὀρφανῷ, § 27). In order to pay this, he had resolved to sell a certain farm; but his brother, the prosecutor, maliciously laid claim to part of this farm, in order to delay the sale; hoping that thus it would be seized for debt ( κατόχιμον γένηται, § 28), and that Menekles would be forced to resign the whole. Menekles, however, at once sold that part of it to which his right was clear; discharged the debt; and then brought an action against his brother for having interdicted the sale of the whole farm ( δίκην ἀπορρήσεως, § 29). The matter was referred to arbiters; and these decided that Menekles should resign the piece of land claimed by his brother, who thus gained about £40; while property to the value of about £15 was all that remained for the speaker to inherit (§§ 27—37).

The validity of the act of adoption was acknowledged by the prosecutor and his brother themselves; for, on their reconciliation with Menekles, they exchanged the oaths of amity not with Menekles, but with the speaker as his son (§§ 38—40). The speaker would not have resisted the prosecutor's claim—there being, in fact, no property at stake— did he not deem it base to allow the name of his adoptive father's house to perish (§§ 41—43). Briefly recapitulating the points of his case, he implores the judges not to deprive the dead Menckles of the only kinsman who can do the sacrifice at his grave (§§ 44—47).

II. 2. On the Estate of Pyrrhos. [Or. III.]

Lysimenes Chaeron Pylades mother of Pyrrhos maternal grandfather of Pyrrhos Pyrrhos¹¹³ sister of Pyrrhos Nikodemos¹¹⁴ mother of Phile Phile¹¹⁵ Endios¹¹⁶ plaintiff¹¹⁷ ¹¹⁸

Pyrrhos had bequeathed his estate to his adopted son Endios, the elder of his sister's two sons. Endios enjoyed the inheritance for more than twenty years. At his death it reverted, according to law, to his mother, as sister of Pyrrhos¹¹⁹. But her claim was disputed by Xenokles on behalf of his wife Phile. Phile, as this speech asserts, was the illegitimate daughter of Pyrrhos; but Xenokles made an affidavit ( διεμαρτύρησε) of her legitimacy. The brother of Endios, acting as legal representative ( κύριος) of his mother, then brought against Xenokles an action for perjury ( δίκη ψευδομαρτυριῶν, § 4); and gained it. He now brings a like action against Nikodemos— brother of Phile's mother—who had, in the former cause, been a witness for Xenokles. The date is ¹²⁰ uncertain; but the speech cannot, at least, be one of the earliest. Diophantos of Sphêttos (§ 22) was a witness for Demosthenes against Aeschines in 343 B.C.¹²¹: and Dorotheos of Eleusis ( ib.) seems to have been living in 349 B. C.¹²²

The plaintiff states the facts; argues that the proved ¹²³ perjury of Xenokles establishes the perjury of Nikodemos; and cites three documents:—(1) διαμαρτυρία—the affidavit made by Xenokles in the former action: (2) ἀντωμοσία— his own counter-affidavit in that action: (3) μαρτυρία—the evidence then given by Nikodemos (§§ 1—7).

Nikodemos says that his sister was the lawful wife of Pyrrhos. I would ask him these questions:—1. What dowry did he give with his sister to Pyrrhos, the possessor of a property of three talents ( τριταλαντος οἶκος)? 2. Did she leave Pyrrhos before his death? 3. At the death of Pyrrhos, did Nikodemos recover her dowry; or, failing to recover it, bring an action for it, or for the maintenance of the widow ( δίκην σίτου, § 9), against Endios? 4. The sister of Nikodemos had other lovers. Was she ever lawfully betrothed— ἐγγυητή —to any other of them (§§ 8—10)? Evidence to show that she was an ἑταίρα (§§ 11—15).

Her antecedents do not, indeed, prove that Pyrrhos did not marry her. But the story of the betrothal is improbable. According to Nikodemos, it took place in presence of a single witness, Pyretides; whose deposition, taken out of court ( ἐκμαρτυρία, § 18), is adduced. But this deposition is disowned by Pyretides himself; and it is strange that Xenokles should have taken it before two persons only (§§ 16—26). The three maternal uncles of Pyrrhos—Lysimenes, Chaeron, and Pylades—are said to have been present at the betrothal: but this is improbable (§§ 26, 27); and, moreover, they say that the daughter of Pyrrhos was named Kleitarete, not Phile (§§ 30—34)¹²⁴. It is strange, too, if Nikodemos gave no dowry, since a dowry would have bound Pyrrhos more firmly to his sister (§§ 28, 29); or that, if he gave any, he did not record the amount; since no dowry given without specification of value ( ἀτίμητος) can afterwards be recovered¹²⁵ (§§ 35—39).

If Phile was legitimate, there were at least three earlier moments at which her legitimacy ought to have been asserted:—1. When, at the death of Pyrrhos, Endios claimed the estate ( ἐπεδικάζετο). 2. When Endios gave Phile in marriage to Xenokles. Nikodemos, by an information laid before the archon ( εἰσαγγελία), might then have vindicated the rights of the heiress. 3. When, in the first instance, Pyrrhos adopted Endios with a view to making him his heir¹²⁶ (§§ 40—56).

Xenokles and Nikodemos seem to ignore the adoption of Endios by Pyrrhos. Phile ought to have brought an action against Endios within five years of her father's death (§ 58); or, at the death of Endios, have claimed the property as her brother's. On any supposition, the course of procedure has been irregular. A legitimate child does not claim ( ἐπιδικάζεται, § 59) a parent's property, but simply enters upon it ( βαδίζει εἰς τὰ πατρῷα, § 62). This is what Phile should have done. A rival claimant would have opposed her at his peril (§§ 57—62).

Pyrrhos, if he had had a true-born daughter, would have had no motive for adopting Endios. It can be shown that, at the time of his alleged marriage, he neither gave a wedding-feast to his clansmen ( γαμηλίαν εἰσήνεγκε, § 76), nor provided the women of his deme with the means of celebrating the Thesmophoria.—Witnesses: brief recapitulation (§§ 72—80).

If Phile had been legitimate, Endios, as merely the adoptive son of Pyrrhos, must have married her before he could legally take the inheritance (§ 69). And, if Endios and his brother had declined to marry her, the maternal uncles of Pyrrhos at least could not have suffered Phile to marry Xenokles, a stranger in blood: one of them must have married her himself (§§ 63—71).

II. 3. On the Estate of Philoktemon. [Or. VI.]

Mixiades mother of Philoktemon Euktemon¹²⁷ Philoktemon Ergamenes Hegemon wife of Chaereas wife of Phanostratos one daughter Chaerestratos¹²⁸ one brother Dion Akte two sons¹²⁹

Euktemon and his wife, the daughter of Mixiades, had three sons,—Philoktemon, Hegemon and Ergamenes; and two daughters, of whom one married Phanostratos, the other Chaereas. Euktemon, when an elderly man, formed an attachment to a freedwoman named Akte, who managed a lodging-house belonging to him in the Kerameikos. At last he left his home, divorced his wife, and lived altogether there. Akte had two sons,—the children, according to the speaker, of one Dion, a freedman. She persuaded Euktemon to enrol the eldest of these boys in his phratria, as his own son. Philoktemon protested; but was at length induced to consent, on the condition that Akte's son was to inherit only one of Euktemon's farms. Soon afterwards Philoktemon was killed in a battle at Chios, leaving a will by which his nephew, the son of Phanostratos, was declared his adopted son and heir. Several years later (§ 27), Euktemon drew up a will, embodying the terms on which Akte's son had been adopted, as agreed on between himself and Philoktemon, and deposited this with a friend Pythodoros.

About two years later (§ 29), Androkles and Antidoros, kinsmen of Euktemon, conspired with Akte. They persuaded Euktemon to cancel the will deposited with Pythodoros, and to sell his land and house-property. They even alleged that the sons of Akte had been adopted by Ergamenes and Philoktemon; and, as guardians of the youths, called upon the archon to administer their ward's property: but the relations exposed the fraud to the court, and the plot was defeated. Euktemon died at the age of 96. As he left no legitimate sons, nor grandsons by Ergamenes or Hegemon, Chaerestratos, as adopted son of Philoktemon, claimed Euktemon's estate. Chaerestratos was opposed by Androkles and Antidoros. Androkles had at different times put forward two different and inconsistent claims:— 1. That he should receive in marriage, as nearest kinsman, the widow of Chaereas, with 1/5th of Euktemon's estate: 2. That the two sons supposed to be Akte's were legitimate sons of Euktemon by Kallippe, daughter of Pistoxenos; that the will of Philoktemon, adopting Chaerestratos, was a fiction; and that, therefore, the whole estate both of Euktemon and of Philoktemon should go to these sons of Kallippe. On this second ground, Androkles put in a protest ( διαμαρτυρία) against the claim of Chaerestratos. Chaerestratos then indicted Androkles for perjury. The speaker here is supporting the indictment. But his speech contains the whole case. Chaerestratos appears to have been hindered by diffidence, or by a grandson's piety, from saying more than a few prefatory words.

It is now fifty-two years since the Athenian ¹³⁰ armament sailed for Sicily in the archonship of Arimnestos (§ 14). Arimnestos was archon Ol. 91. 1—from July, 416 B. C., to July, 415. The expedition sailed in May, 415. The date is therefore Ol. 104. 1, 364—3.

The inner chronology requires attention. ¹³¹ Philoktemon, when trierarch, was killed in battle ‘near ( περί) Chios’ § 27. Dobree suggests the battle of Arginusae, 406 B. C.¹³² Sir William Jones suggests one of the engagements which followed the revolt of Chios in 412 B.C.¹³³ Now, the elder of Akte's two sons is said (§ 14) to be, in 363, ‘not more than twenty.’ But this was the boy whose admission into Euktemon's phratria had been opposed by Philoktemon (§ 22). ‘Not more than twenty’— οὔπω ὑπὲρ εἴκοσιν ἔτη—sounds suspicious. But, on the other hand, we can hardly suppose that the youth was fortythree or forty-nine. Neither 406 nor 412 B. C., therefore, is admissible. What, then, was this fight ‘near Chios’? In the latter part of 390 B. C. Thrasybulos the Steirian was sent out with forty ships against Teleutias. He went first to the Hellespont: then to Lesbos: then, descending the coast of Asia Minor, ‘he brought over some of the cities, and, plundering money for his soldiers from those which did not come over, he hastened to Rhodes¹³⁴.’ May it not have been then—early in 389—in some skirmish near Chios, that Philoktemon was killed? Akte's eldest son was therefore, in 363, really about 27. The annals of the speech will stand thus:—

460 B. C.? Birth of Euktemon.

415. The speaker goes with Phanostratos¹³⁵ on the Sicilian expedition (§ 1).

389. Death of Philoktemon.

378. ‘Long after’ Philoktemon's death ( ὕστερον χρόνῳ) Phanostratos sails as trierarch with Timotheos (§ 27).

376. Two years later (§ 29), Euktemon is persuaded to cancel the will deposited with Pythodoros in 378.

364? Death of Euktemon, aged 96 (§ 18).

363. This trial.

After explaining that he appears as a friend of ¹³⁶ Chaerestratos and his father Phanostratos, the speaker shortly states the case. He calls witnesses to prove that Philoktemon had made a will in favour of Chaerestratos, and cites a law to show that he was entitled to do so (§§ 1—9).

Androkles and Antidoros pretend that the two youths, their clients, are legitimate sons of Euktemon by his second wife, Kallippe. This story is refuted (§§ 10—16). These youths are the sons of a freedwoman named Akte—as she said, by one Dion. The eldest of them was, indeed, enrolled by Euktemon among his phratores; but after opposition¹³⁷, and under conditions (§§ 17—26). The various intrigues by which Akte and her accomplices sought to obtain Euktemon's property are related in detail¹³⁸ (§§ 27—42).

Androkles has at different times made two assertions:— 1. That his clients were legitimate sons of Euktemon: 2. That they were adopted sons of Philoktemon and Ergamenes. Now this alleged adoption would exclude them from succession to Euktemon's estate. The law forbids an adopted son to return ( ἐπανιέναι) into the family out of which he was adopted; though, if he leave a legitimate son, that son may so return (§ 44). Again:—Androkles has claimed in marriage the widow of Chaereas, with one-fifth of her father Euktemon's estate. But this claim is inconsistent with the heirship of his clients (§§ 43—61). Epilogue (§§ 62—65).

III. Action to compel the discharge of a Suretyship ( ἐγγύης δίκη).

III. 1. On the Estate of Dikaeogenes. [Or. v.]

Dikaeogenes I Menexenos I wife of Proxenos wife of Polyaratos wife of Democles wife of Kephisodon wife of Theoopompos Dikaeogenes II¹³⁹ Dikaeogenes III Harmodios speaker one sister one brother wife of Protarchides Menexenos II one sister Kephisodotos one brother ¹⁴⁰

Dikaeogenes, son of Menexenos—who, for distinction from his grandfather, of the same name, we call Dikaeogenes II.—had four sisters. These, when he died childless, shared among them two-thirds of his estate. The other third went to his first-cousin, Dikaeogenes III., son of his uncle Proxenos, in accordance with a will produced by Proxenos, in which the deceased declared Dikaeogenes III. to be his adopted son, and heir to one-third of his estate ( υἱὸς ποιητὸς ἐπὶ τρίτῳ μέρει τῆς οὐσίας, § 6).

Twelve years later (§ 7), Dikaeogenes III. alleged that this first will was invalid. Under a second will, he said, he was heir, not to a third only, but to the whole of the estate. He gained his cause. The sisters of the testator were deprived of their shares, and the whole was transferred to Dikaeogenes III.

Ten years more elapsed (§ 35). Meanwhile the nephews of the testator had grown up. They now resolved to seek redress for their mothers and themselves. They began by bringing an action against one Lykon, who had been called by Dikaeogenes III. as a witness to the second will. Lykon was convicted of perjury.

The state of things was now this:—Dikaeogenes III. had himself declared the first will—which gave him 1/3rd—to be invalid. The judges of Lykon had declared the second will—which gave him all—to be false. Accordingly, the nephews (with the exception of Menexenos II., who had deserted their cause) now sued Dikaeogenes III. for the whole estate. One Leochares interposed a protest ( διαμαρτυρία) that their claim was inadmissible. They indicted Leochares for perjury. Leochares was certain to be convicted. Dikaeogenes III. therefore made a compromise. He was to keep his original one-third, and leave his adversaries in secure¹⁴¹ possession of the other two-thirds. Leochares and Mnesiptolemos became his sureties for the performance of this engagement.

Leochares is now sued (by an ἐγγύης δίκη) to ¹⁴² discharge his liability as surety, since his principal Dikaeogenes III. has made default. The speaker, son of Polyaratos (§ 5), is one of the nephews of the testator, and is supported by his first cousin Kephisodotos (§ 2).

The question of the date—a most difficult and, ¹⁴³ for the chronology of Isaeos, a most important question—turns mainly on one point. Dikaeogenes II., when commanding the Paralos, was killed in battle ‘at Knidos’ (§§ 6, 42). Does this refer to the sea-fight off Knidos in 412 B. C.; or to the more famous battle in 394 B. C. ? If to the former, then the date of the speech is about 390 B. C. —earlier, by at least 12 years, than any other Isaean work of which we can approximately fix the time. If to the latter, then the date is about 372 B. C. The former view is the more probable. The annals will then stand thus:—

412 B. C., Ol. 92. 1. Dikaeogenes II. killed in the sea-fight off Knidos¹⁴⁴. First will produced, making Dikaeogenes III. heir to one-third of the estate.

400 B. C. Twelve years (§ 7) after the first will, Dikaeogenes III. alleges a second will, which makes him heir to the whole estate; and gains his cause. Meanwhile Athens had suffered calamity, sedition, and civil strife¹⁴⁵ ( ib.: i.e. the defeat at Aegospotami, the tyranny of the Thirty, and the Anarchy).

393 B.C. Lechaeum, the western port of Corinth, is taken (§ 37) by the Lacedaemonians in the second year of the Corinthian War (394—387 B. C.).

390 B. C. Ten years (§ 35) after the establishment of the second will, Dikaeogenes III. is sued by the testator's nephews. A great war is still going on, in which—while he has never served—‘Olynthians and islanders are dying ( ἀποθνήσκουσι) for this land in battle with the enemy’: § 46¹⁴⁶ .

It is true that, in the Olynthian War of 382— 379 B. C., Olynthians were, in a sense, fighting the battle of Athens. It is also true that, in 374 B. C., war had been renewed between Athens and Sparta; and that the mention of ‘islanders’ might be explained by the fact that Corcyra was a centre of the hostilities. But the πόλεμος of § 46 cannot well cover the whole intermittent struggle against Sparta. Clearly it refers to the Corinthian War (394—387 B. C.)¹⁴⁷ .

The speaker defines his case by quoting his own affidavit ¹⁴⁸ ( ἀντωμοσία, § 1). He then refers to a register ( ἀπογραφή) of the property left by his uncle, to prove that Dikaeogenes III. has not refunded the due amount, and that Leochares has therefore not discharged his suretyship ( τὴν ἐξεγγύην ἀπέδωκεν, §§ 1—4).

A narrative of the facts above stated follows—stress being laid on the conduct of Dikaeogenes III. to his own cousins, one of whom he made a sort of servant to his brother Harmodios (§§ 5—18).

Dikaeogenes had covenanted, not only to resign his claim to two-thirds of the estate, but to give the plaintiffs undisputed possession of them. He now pretends that he had agreed only to resign his claim. This would mean nothing, as he had already sold these two-thirds to other persons. He was bound to refund the price to the purchasers, and to explain that he could not warrant ( βεβαιοῦν) their ownership. So far from doing this, he had allowed the plaintiffs to incur the cost of an unsuccessful attempt to eject ( ἐξάγειν) one of these purchasers (§§ 19—24). To prove that Leochares was surety for Dikaeogenes, it is shown that Leochares had, on that very pretext, induced Protarchides, the husband of one of his nieces, to resign some property (§§ 25—27).

The plaintiffs have made fair allowance for the improvement of the property by Dikaeogenes III.; and arbitrators, half of whom were chosen by him, have recognised the justice of their claim (§§ 28—34). Dikaeogenes deserves no sympathy on the ground of patriotism. His public services have been ill done; and he has paid no war-tax ( εἰσφορά). Once, indeed, after Lechaeum was taken, he promised a subscription; but he never paid it, and his name was posted as a defaulter at the statues of the Eponymi (§§ 35—38).

His private and public life is contrasted with that of the speaker's ancestors—whose great-grandfather, Dikaeogenes I., fell fighting for Athens at Eleusis¹⁴⁹; as his grandfather Menexenos fell at Spartolos¹⁵⁰, and his uncle, Dikaeogenes II., at Knidos. Nor can the defendant take credit for his ancestors Harmodios and Aristogeiton. He renounced them, and the privileges which their descendants enjoy— maintenance at the Prytaneion, places of honour ( προεδριῶν), freedom from taxes—in order to be adopted by his cousin¹⁵¹ (§§ 39—47).

IV. Indictment of a Guardian for maltreatment of a Ward ( εἰσαγγελία κακώσεως ὀρφανοῦ).

¹⁵²

On the Estate of Hagnias. [Or. XI.]— Theopompos, the speaker and defendant, possesses the estate of Hagnias. Half of this estate is claimed from Theopompos on behalf of his own nephew, the son of Stratokles. The form of the prosecution is an Information for maltreatment ( εἰσαγγελία κακώσεως); the son of Stratokles being considered as an orphan whom his uncle, Theopompos, has wronged¹⁵³.

Buselos Hagnias Eubulides I Stratios I Habron Kleokritos Polemon Phylomache I sister of Stratios II second husband Philagros Phanostratos Charidemos one sister, married with a daughter Hagnias¹⁵⁴ Glaukon Glaukos Eubulides II Phylomache II¹⁵⁵ Eubulides III Stratios II two sons Stratokles Theopompus¹⁵⁶ prosecutor four sisters Makartatos

Before it came into the possession of Theopompos, the estate of Hagnias had been the object of other claims. It is from the history of these former claims that the complexity of the case arises.

Failing lineal heirs, Attic law called collateral kinsfolk to the succession in this order:—

(1) brothers, being sons of the same father as the deceased:

(2) such brothers' children, males and females having an equal right:

(3) sisters by the same father:

(4) such sisters' children, males and females having an equal right:

(5) first-cousins ( ἀνεψιοί) on the paternal side, males being preferred to females:

(6) children of such first-cousins ( ἀνεψιαδοῖ), with a like preference.

In default of the above, the succession reverted to the maternal side, and the next heirs were

(7) brothers born of the same mother as the deceased: and so on.

Reference to the accompanying table of the Buselidae will show that Philagros married his own paternal first-cousin Phylomache I. Their son, Eubulides II., was thus the paternal first-cousin of Hagnias, being sister's son of the father of Hagnias.

I. Hagnias died, leaving his estate to his sister's daughter. At her death, it was claimed by Glaukon, son of the mother of Hagnias by a second marriage. Glaukon's claim was contested by Eubulides II., and, on the death of Eubulides, by his daughter Phylomache II. The will alleged by Glaukon was declared false, and the estate was adjudged to Phylomache II.

This decision was just. Phylomache, as the daughter of a paternal first-cousin, had a better claim in kinship than any living relative of Hagnias. Glaukon, of course, had no claim until the paternal kinsfolk should be exhausted.

II. Phylomache's possession of the estate was, however, contested (1) by the mother of Hagnias, who, as sister of Stratios II., was second cousin of her own son: (2) jointly by Stratios II. and the brothers Stratokles and Theopompos—all three likewise second cousins of Hagnias. Stratios II. and Stratokles died before the case came on. Theopompos then claimed the whole estate for himself. He succeeded. The estate was taken from Phylomache II. and adjudged to Theopompos—though only by three or four votes¹⁵⁷ .

This was manifestly unjust. Phylomache II. was the daughter of the first cousin of Hagnias. Theopompos was son of the first cousin of Hagnias's father¹⁵⁸. The claim even of Glaukon was, therefore, better than the claim of Theopompos. On the other hand, the son of Stratokles, as son of the second cousin of Hagnias, had still less than Theopompos any natural claim on the estate. His case rested solely on the alleged covenant between his father and Theopompos.

Theopompos gained this cause. Long afterwards¹⁵⁹ , ¹⁶⁰ his son Makartatos was sued by Eubulides III., son of Phylomache, for the estate of Hagnias. The pseudodemosthenic speech Against Makartatos cites (§ 31) a deposition ( μαρτυρία) stating that Phylomache obtained the estate from Glaukon in the archonship of Nikophemos—i.e. in Ol. 104. 4, 361 B.C. The Depositions and Laws quoted in the Demosthenic speeches are now usually held to be, in a large measure, interpolations¹⁶¹. But that this particular deposition in the speech Against Makartatos is spurious, or that, if it is so, it is incorrect, is unproved; whereas the authenticity of the law quoted in § 57 of the same speech has recently been confirmed¹⁶². If we allow about two years between the first and the second trial, the speech On the Estate of Hagnias will belong to 359 B. C.¹⁶³

Theopompos reads the law for the succession of collateral ¹⁶⁴ kinsfolk to an estate; and shows that the son of Stratokles is excluded (§§ 1—7).

He then relates the previous history of the estate—the dispossession of Glaukon by Phylomache, and of Phylomache by himself—and comments on the claim made, simultaneously with his own, by the mother of Hagnias (§§ 8—19).

He next refutes three assertions made by the prosecutor:—

1. First—that, in the action against Phylomache, there had been a bargain between Theopompos and his deceased brother Stratokles for the division of the estate. Such a bargain, Theopompos answers, would have been aimless. It would not have given them two chances instead of one; since, being related in the same degree to Hagnias, they were claimants on the same ground, and must win or lose together (§§ 20—23).

2. Secondly—that Theopompos had agreed to give his nephew half the estate (§§ 24—35).

3. Thirdly—that Theopompos is rich and his nephew poor; and that Theopompos, not content with defrauding his nephew, has failed to dower his nieces, the four daughters of Stratokles (§§ 36—39). In reply, Theopompos details the property left by Stratokles (§§ 40—43), and his own (§§ 44—46). He ends by challenging his nephew to halve with him the total of their joint properties (§§ 47—50).— Conclusion wanting.

V. Appeal ( ἔφεσις) from Arbitration to a Dikastery.

For Euphiletos. [Or. XII.]

For Euphiletos. [Or. XII.]—This speech—or rather fragment¹⁶⁵—is the only extant specimen of its author's work which is not concerned with the law of inheritance. It belongs to a case of Appeal ( ἔφεσις) from the decision of demesmen to an ordinary heliastic jury¹⁶⁶.

Every Attic deme from time to time revised the ¹⁶⁷ register of its members ( ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον)¹⁶⁸. At such revision, the name of each member was subjected to a separate scrutiny ( διαψήφισις). If the voting decided that he was to be struck off the register ( ἀποψηφίζεσθαι)—in other words, that he was not a true-born citizen—he had an appeal to a law-court,—at peril, however, of being sold as a slave and having his goods confiscated if the decision on the appeal went against him.

Euphiletos, son of Hegesippos (§ 12) by a second wife, had been struck off the register of the deme of Erchia on the ground that he was illegitimate. He then brought an action against the deme, represented by its demarch or president, and the issue was referred to one of the Public Arbitrators. The case was pending for two years; and during that time nothing was proved against the legitimacy of Euphiletos. A second Arbitration—in which the deme was represented by a new president—had the same result¹⁶⁹. Redress being still refused, Euphiletos has now appealed to an ordinary court. The speaker is the son of Hegesippos by his first wife, and is therefore half-brother of Euphiletos, who was thirteen years his junior (§ 11). The extant part of the speech opens after the facts have been stated and the witnesses called. Dionysios seems to connect this cause ¹⁷⁰ with a general revision of deme-lists throughout Attica¹⁷¹. The only such general revision of which we know belongs to the year of Archias, Ol. 108. 3, 346 B.C. On this view, the speech would fall in 343,—ten years later than any other work of Isaeos known to us. Probably, however, the revision meant in the speech was not general, but merely local and ordinary. In that case, we have no clue to the date.

All the kinsmen of Euphiletos have now borne witness ¹⁷² to his legitimacy,—his father—his brother, the speaker— the husbands of the speaker's sisters—his uncle: friends, too, have testified: and all these are trustworthy (§§ 1—6). How could any member of the deme prove his legitimacy better? (§§ 7—8). Further, the mother of Euphiletos has offered to take an oath; and his father and the speaker are ready to do the same (§§ 9—10). The arbitrators to whom the case was formerly referred gave it for Euphiletos (§ 11). As a different decision would have told against him, so ought their actual decision to be taken as evidence that his name has been removed from the register by a conspiracy¹⁷³ (§ 12).

Character of the collection

There is perhaps no Attic writer, certainly no ¹⁷⁴ orator, of whom it is more true than of Isaeos that his work, to be understood, must be viewed as a whole. The monotony of subject in his extant ¹⁷⁵ speeches is seldom relieved by such picturesque glimpses of Attic life as abound in Lysias. Such monotony might certainly be forgiven to a series of illustrations so valuable for a province of ancient law, showing, as they do, how the practice of Adoption worked in a society now developed beyond the conceptions in which that limited testation begins, though not yet arrived at the ideas embodied in the civil law of Rome. If, however, we turn from ¹⁷⁶ matter to form, the character of the speeches is not monotony but variety. In the first, the second and the ninth oration, we have reproduced, in no slight measure, the dignified and austere pathos of Antiphon. In the seventh and twelfth, there is much of the êthos, the attractive simplicity and winning grace of Lysias; while in the third, the sixth, the eighth, and the eleventh, on the other hand, this moral charm is hardly less conspicuous by its absence. Excellences of narrative are prominent in the second, the fifth, the sixth and the seventh speech. Argument excludes everything else in the third. The fourth oration surprises us with something like the lighter humour of Lysias, if only in a single gleam¹⁷⁷. ¹⁷⁸ But, of the twelve, there are three which stand out from all the rest, and which, taken together, symbolize their author's place in the progress of Athenian oratory. The fifth is Lysian, the eleventh is Demosthenic, the eighth is distinctively Isaean. The fifth recalls Lysias by the graceful and persuasive management of the narrative—for here argument has a subordinate part—by the general simplicity of the language, and not less by the skill which, in the epilogue, indulges itself with pointed and lively antithesis. The eleventh, renouncing everything like a semblance of artlessness, glorying, rather, in technical power, pours a torrent of indignation and contempt on an adversary who is in the wrong; and, alone among the speeches of Isaeos, has the stamp of Demosthenes in this, that from beginning to end it is the outcome of a single impulse. But the eighth oration is Isaeos himself; it is the very image of his faculty, displaying its several sides at their best, the old plainness with the modern force, artistic narrative with trenchant proof; and these, too, in the right proportions, for here the logical division dominates the rhetorical, and the department in which Isaeos was an imitator yields to that in which he was a master.

Fragments.

A hundred and seventy-two fragments of Isaeos, or notices of phrases or words used by him, have been collected by Sauppe¹⁷⁹. Of these, 128 represent 42 speeches of known title. Three of the 42 were, however, suspected by Harpokration¹⁸⁰. Three others, and only three, are represented by fragments which are at all considerable. In each case it is Dionysios who has preserved the extract in his comparison of Isaeos with Lysias¹⁸¹ .

1. Against the Demesmen, concerning the Farm¹⁸² ( πρὸς τοὺς δημότας περὶ τοῦ χωρίου: VII. in Sauppe, III. in Scheibe). This is the proem of a speech in which the plaintiff claims back from the men of his deme—perhaps that of Sphettos¹⁸³—a farm which he had just pledged to them—probably as security for some land of the deme which he had rented¹⁸⁴. In form, the action would be either an Action for Ejectment ( ἐξούλης δίκη) or a Trial of a claim to property ( διαδικασία). The avoidance of hiatus suggests a ¹⁸⁵ work later than 360 B.C.

2. Defence of a Guardian against his Wards¹⁸⁶ ( ἐπιτροπῆς ἀπολογία: X. in Sauppe, VI. in Scheibe). Dionysios has given us two fragments of this lost speech¹⁸⁷. Its title is a point which has illustrated ¹⁸⁸ the ingenuity of critics. Sauppe identifies it with the lost speech Against Diophanes¹⁸⁹. More probably, however, it is to be identified with that Against Hagnotheos. The latter is mentioned by Dionysios ( Isae. c. 14), though not in connection with either of the fragments. Now the first fragment (c. 8) begins with these words:— ἐβουλόμην μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, μὴ λίαν οὕτως ἀγνοηθέντα πρὸς χρήματ’ ἔχειν αἰσχρῶς. Schömann, whom Sauppe follows, was for altering ἀγνοηθέντα to ἀπονοηθέντα. Dobree saw that the corrupt word concealed a proper name. He suggested Ἀγλαοσθένη: it was reserved for Cobet to give Ἁγνόθεον¹⁹⁰.

Another puzzle remains. Harpokration quotes ¹⁹¹ a speech of Isaeos, ἐξούλης Καλυδῶνι πρὸς Ἁγνόθεον ἀπολογία¹⁹², and elsewhere another, πρὸς Καλυδῶνα ἐπιτροπῆς¹⁹³—the latter also as πρὸς Καλυδῶνα simply. Combining these notices, Scheibe¹⁹⁴ infers that Isaeos wrote (1) For Hagnotheos, a πρὸς Καλυδῶνα ἐπιτροπῆς: (2) For Kalydon, a πρὸς Ἁγνόθεον ἐξούλης. Blass vindicates the loyalty of our orator by suggesting that Harpokration is to be emended; that we should read, s. v. Κεφαλῆθεν, πρὸς Καλυδῶνα ἐξούλης (not ἐπιτροπῆς, for which ἐπιστολῆς is a variant), and s. v. ἐπισημαίνεσθαι, ἐν τῇ ἐξούλης πρὸς Καλυδῶνα ἀπολογίᾳ, ( καὶ ἐν τῇ) πρὸς Ἁγνόθεον¹⁹⁵. It would follow that Kalydon and Hagnotheos have nothing whatever to do with each other, and have been brought into relation by no depravity except that of a text. The character of the two fragments, especially in regard to the êthos, suggests a comparsion with Oration XI.

3. For Eumathes: an Assertion of a Slave's¹⁹⁶ Freedom ( ὑπὲρ Εὐμάθους εἰς ἐλευθερίαν ἀφαίρεσις: XVI. in Sauppe, XII. in Scheibe). Eumathes had been the slave of Epigenes, but had received his liberty from his master.

On the death of Epigenes, one of his heirs, Dionysios, acting for the rest¹⁹⁷, claimed Eumathes as a slave. Xenokles came forward and asserted Eumathes to be a freedman. Dionysios then brought against Xenokles an action¹⁹⁸ for this assertion ( ἐξαιρέσεως δίκη). In this speech Xenokles defends himself, and reasserts the freedom of Eumathes.

The speaker says that he was trierarch in the ¹⁹⁹ archonship of Kephisodotos²⁰⁰ (Ol. 105. 3, 358 B.C.); and mentions a sea-fight in which he was engaged. This was probably the battle at Chios in the first year of the Social War—357 B.C.—in which Chabrias was killed. The speech For Eumathes may probably be referred to 356 B.C.

4. Lastly, Dionysios has briefly analysed, though without quoting extracts, a speech ‘Against Aristogeiton and Archippos on the Estate of Archepolis²⁰¹.’ The speaker is the brother of the deceased Archepolis. Aristogeiton had already taken possession of the estate. The speaker had summoned him to make restitution ( εἰς ἐμφανῶν κατάστασιν). Aristogeiton had then entered a special plea ( παραγραφή), asserting that the property was his under a will: and it was at the hearing of the special plea that this speech was delivered. The issue ( ἀμφισβήτησις) was thus twofold,—(1) whether the will is genuine, (2) whether Aristogeiton was justified in taking possession before a legal decision. Isaeos first dealt with (2); and then, in a narrative, showed that the will was fictitious. The speech is cited by Dionysios as an example of Isaean arrangement. One characteristic is the treatment of the second issue in a discussion prefixed to the narrative ( προκατασκευή): another is the artistic division of the narrative itself into sections, with the proofs subjoined to each.

The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeos. Sir Richard C. Jebb. London. 1876.

Sponsored by Perseus Project, Tufts University.

Funding provided by National Endowment for the Humanities.

Current edition Perseus

The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeos (English) (The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeos. Jebb, Richard Claverhouse, author. London: Macmillan, 1876.)

Notes on the current edition

The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeos

1. [Plut.] Vit. Isaei, καταλέλοιπε δὲ λόγους ἑξήκοντα τέσσαρας, ὧν εἰσι γνήσιοι πεντήκοντα, καὶ ἰδίας τέχνας. This is the only definite mention of the Art of Rhetoric: though Dionysios ad Ammaeum I. 2 speaks generally of ‘Theodektes, Philiskos, Isaeos, Kephisodoros, Hypereides, Lykurgos, Aeschines,’ as being παραγγελμάτων τεχνικῶν συγγραφεῖς as well as speakers. Blass ( Att. Ber. II. 458) suggests that it may have been a collection of commonplaces.

2. The words of Photios ( cod. 263) are: ἀνεγνώσθησαν Ἰσαίου διάφοροι λόγοι, οὗτοι δέ, ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, εἰς δ/ καὶ ξ/ (64) συναριθμοῦνται. τούτων δὲ οἱ τὸ γνήσιον μαρτυρηθέντες ν/ (50) κατ αλείπονται μόνον. Both the ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν and the συναριθμοῦνται as opposed to καταλείπονται seem clearly to imply that 64 were not then ( circ. 850 A.D.) extant. The last sentence may obviously be rendered in two ways:—(1) ‘Of this number, those which, being attested as genuine, are extant are only 50’; —implying that others not so attested were extant. (2) ‘Of this number, only those 50 which have been attested as genuine are extant.’ I prefer the latter version.

3. The Second Oration (‘On the Estate of Menekles’) was first discovered in the Laurentian Library in 1785, and was first edited by Robert Tyrwhitt in that year. In the MSS. known before that date all was wanting from the words ἢ ἐκείνῳ in Or. I. § 22 to ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ τὸ πρᾶγμα εἰς ὑμᾶς ἀφῖκται in Or. II. § 47. These concluding words of Or. II. had, as Tyrwhitt notices (p. 21), been wrongly tacked on to the imperfect first part of Or. I. In the Translation of Isaeos by Sir William Jones (1779) we find this arrangement followed. The last paragraph of Or. I. in his Translation [‘To conclude; since this cause...conformably to the laws’] is a version of ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ.. ψηφίσασθε, the concluding words, in reality, of Or. II.,—which oration was then, of course, unknown to him. In Or. I. all from μὴ ποιήσαντες in § 22 to the end was first found by Mai in the Ambrosian Library at Milan and published by him in 1815.

4. The large fragment of the ὑπὲρ Εὐφιλήτου preserved by Dionysios ( de Isae. 17) is printed as Or. XII. by recent editors, as by Baiter and Sauppe in their Oratores Attici, and by Scheibe in his edition of Isaeos (Teubner, 1860).

5. For the titles and probable subjects of the lost speeches see Sauppe's digest of the Fragments of Isaeos, Or. Att. II. pp. 228— 244. It will be seen that Sauppe reckons 44 lost speeches. He supposes a lost speech κατ’ Ἀριστοκλέους, his No. IV., which Blass, rightly, I think, identifies with the κατὰ Στρατοκλέους (XL. in Sauppe). Further, Sauppe reckons the ὑπὲρ Εὐφιλήτου—already printed in his Vol. I. with the Orations—among the Fragments also, as No. XVII. Omitting, then, No. IV. and No. XVII., we get a total of 42. Blass reckons 43 lost speeches ( Att. Ber. II. 459 ff.). But I agree with Sauppe in thinking that the πρὸς Ἀνδοκίδην ἀποστασίου (No. 30 in Blass) was the work of Lysias, to whom Harpokration twice assigns it, and that the ascription of it to Isaeos by Pollux was a carelessness or at least a mistake: see Sauppe Or. Att. II. 174.The three lost speeches to which Harpokration adds εὶ γνήσιος are: 1. κατὰ Στρατοκλέους [ s. v. ὑπερήμεροι, if indeed, as seems probable, κατ’ Ἀριστοκλέους there is a false reading for κατὰ Στρατοκλέους: the latter, it must be owned, is mentioned by Harpokr. without suspicion s. v. ὀθνεῖος]: 2. κατὰ Μεγαρέων: 3. πρὸς Εὐκλείδην τὸν Σωκρατικόν.

6. Speeches of Isaeos wholly forensic

7. The titles of the lost speeches confirm the statement of Dionysios ( Isae. 2)— γένους λόγων ἑνὸς ἀσκητὴς ἐγένετο, τοῦ δικανικοῦ. Yet one conceivable exception should be noticed—the speech thrice cited by Harpokration ( s. vv. Ἀλκέτας, Ἐπικράτης, πέπλος) under the title περὶ τῶν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ ῥηθέντων. But this too was probably forensic —being concerned with a παραπρεσβείας γραφή, possibly arising out of the negotiations regarding Amphipolis in 358 B.C.: cf. Sauppe II. 238.

8. and almost wholly Private.

9. 1. Κατὰ Διοκλέους ὔβρεως (VIII. in Sauppe): 2. περὶ τῶν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ ῥηθέντων (XXVII.): 3. περὶ τῶν ἀποφάσεων (II.). [Possibly the ὰποφάσεις or reports made by the Areiopagos to the ekklesia: see Deinarchos Or. I. §§ 53 ff.] The doubt as to the authenticity of the κατὰ Μεγαρέων has already been noticed.

10. Their subjects.

11. (1) κληρικοί: (2) ἐπικληρικοί: (3) διαδικασίας [properly a general term, including will-cases]: (4) ἀποστασίου: (5) ἐγγύης: (6) ᾶντωμοσία [as= παραγραφή]: (7) ἔφεσις.

12. Vol. I. p. 64.

13. That Or. XI. is imperfect seems certain from § 44 of that speech.

14. The κληρικοί classified by legal form.

15. Such a claim was ἐπιδικασία (Or. XI. § 15, τὴν ἐμὴν ἐπιδικασίαν): the trial of claims, διαδικασία.

16. Peculiar interest of these speeches.

17. It is scarcely necessary to except, with Sir W. Jones ( Commentary, p. 165), the Aeginetikos of Isokrates (Or, XIX. 394-3 B.C.)— which throws no light on legal points.

18. Maine's Ancient Law, ch. VI. on ‘The Early History of Testamentary Succession.’

19. Origin of testation.

20. See Cox's Hist. of Greece, Vol. I. pp. 14 ff.

21. The Faculty of Adoption.

22. Athenian law of succession.

23. Grote, c. XI. vol. III. 186.

24. The Hindoo system.

25. Maine, l.c. p. 192.

26. The Roman.

27. Gaius II. § 57, in speaking of the case where Roman law allowed possession to be taken of a vacant inheritance by the usucaptive title called pro herede, suggests this explanation—

quod voluerunt veteres maturius hereditates adiri, ut essent qui sacra facerent: quorum illis temporibus summa observatio fuit; et ut creditores haberent a quo suum consequerentur

— showing how far back in the past the old religious feeling was to him.

28. Relation of the Athenian to these, in form:

29. in spirit.

30. Isae. Or. II. § 47: IX. § 36. See the Tagore Law Lectures for 1870, by Mr Herbert Cowell, (formerly Tagore Law Professor,) Lect. IX., On the Rite of Adoption, pp. 208 f. The original idea, that the son, by performing funeral rites, delivers the father from torment, has been partly lost sight of; but it is still held that the son can thus admit the father to some particular heaven which no other sacrificer could open to him.

31. Cf. Ar. Av. 1651—1666.

32. It has sometimes been held (as by Sir W. Jones in his Commentary, p. 191) that second cousins were in the succession. Now the law, as quoted with perhaps intentional ambiguity in Or. XI. § 2, said μέχρι ἀνεψιῶν παίδων: meaning that A, B's son, is in the succession to C, if B and C were ἀνεψιοί, first-cousins. But the quibbling speaker there makes it mean that A is in the succession, not only to C, but to C's son. Hence the fallacy.

33. Of the relationship between mother and son it is said expressly (Or. XI. § 17)— ὃ συγγενέστατον μὲν ἦν τῇ φύσει πάντων, ὲν δὲ ταῖς ἀγχιστεἰαις (degrees recognised by the law) ὁμολογουμένως οὐκ ἔστιν.

34. Cf. C. R. Kennedy in the Dict. Ant. s. v. Heres, p. 595 a.

35. deceased

36. guardian of claimants, deceased

37. the speaker

38. From § 9, it is clear that Deinias was not the brother of Kleonymos. In § 4 it is expressly said that Kleonymos was the son of Polyarchos.

39. Scheibe seems right in assuming that Diokles and Poscidippos are not brothers of Pherenikos. It is by an oversight that the author of the Greek Argument has included among the defendants Simon, named as a friend of Deinias in § 31,—where αὐτῷ = Φερενίκῳ.

40. Date.

41. Bens. De hiatu, p. 192.

42. Analysis.

43. These brothers are the defendants, for whom a friend perorates, against one Chariades.

44. Ἰσαῖος οὖν ὁ ῥήτωρ, says the author of the Argument—and the οὖν is very characteristic of his airy assumptions— ὡς συγγενὴς ὢν τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἅγνωνα, λέγει συνηγορῶν αὐτοῖς. He has taken his συγγενής simply from § 1, where the word ἐπιτήδειοι may, of course, mean ‘relations,’ as it does in § 18, but seems rather to mean merely ‘friends’:—Hagnon and Hagnotheos are my ἐπιτήδειοι, the speaker says, ‘ as their father was before them. ’ Schömann (p. 269) remarks that the author's authority may have been Didymos, whose commentaries on Isaeos are mentioned by Harpokr. S.V. γαμηλία—a flattering supposition, I fear.

45. Analysis.

46. The passage in § 7 still offers an exercise to the ingenuity of critics. No sooner was the large property of the deceased Nikostratos sent home, than everyone shaved his head,—all Athens went into mourning for its relative. τίς γὰρ οὐκ ἀπεκεἰρατο, ἐπειδὴ τὼ δύο ταλάντω ἑξάκις ἤλθετον; The ἑξάκις is the puzzle. I. Reiske would understand εἰς κρίσιν with ἤλθετον: ‘when the two talents came six times into dispute’. but (1) the grief would have been counterfeited before the contest: and (2) the ellipse of εἰς κρίσιν is utterly impossible. II. Schömann suggests, ἐπειδὴ τὼ δύο ταλάντω ἐξέκεισθον—i.e. ‘as soon as the two talents were announced for competition’— ἐκκεῖσθαι referring to notice given by the magistrates that claimants of the estate should come forward. III. Valcknär, ἐξ Ἄκης—which Scheibe, adopting his emendation, properly writes ἐξ Ἀκῆς. The Phoenician town Ἀκή is mentioned by Harpokration. The emendation is one of those which, when confirmed by the evidence of facts, are certain, but which, in the absence of such evidence, are only brilliant.May not ἑξἀκις be simply a marginal gloss by some one who, having counted up the claimants (other than Chariades) enumerated in §§ 8, 9, found that their number was six? The annotator may either, like Reiske, have taken ἤλθετον to mean ‘were contested’ and have meant his note for that word; or he may have mentally supplied his verb.

47. deceased

48. deceased

49. deceased

50. wife of Pronapes

51. wife of Aeschines

52. testator

53. deceased

54. speaker, adopted son of Apollodorus I

55. Date.

56. The allusion in § 38 to the discharge of the trierarchy by companies instead of individuals ( οὐκ ἐκ συμμορίας τὴν ναῦν ποιησάμενος ὥσπερ οἱ νῦν) would alone prove the speech to be later than 358 B C.

57. Analysis.

58. From §§ 26—28 it appears that ratification by the deme was necessary before enrolment by the γεννῆται and φράτορες could entitle the adopted person even to family rights; see Schäfer Dem. u. seine Zeit, III. ii. 27.

59. In § 39 it is said that Pronapes ἀπεγράψατο μὲν τίμημα μικρόν, ὡς ἱππάδα δὲ τελῶν ἄρχειν ἠξίου τὰς ἀρχάς, ‘returned his income as small, but claimed to hold magistracies, as if he paid the tax of a knight’—showing that the names, at least, of the Solonian classes were kept up. Schömann suggests that the offices for which the census of a knight was required may have been such as were concerned with the administration of the public money (p. 373).

60. Kiron's aunt

61. Kiron's mother

62. first wife of Kiron

63. Kiron's brother

64. wife of Nausimenes and of a second husband who is father of the children

65. one brother, § 37

66. second wife of Kiron, sister of Diokles

67. two sons, both deceased

68. claimant against the speaker

69. This Diokles of Phlya is the same against whom Isaeos wrote the lost speeches, κατὰ Διοκλέους ὕβρεως (possibly in the γραφή mentioned at § 41 of our speech), and πρὸς Διοκλέα περὶ χωρίου: fragments VIII. and IX. in Sauppe O.A. II. p. 230 ff. Diokles was ‘surnamed Orestes’ (§ 3, cf. § 44)—a nickname for any violent character, borrowed from the robber mentioned by Aristophanes—not without an Euripidean allusion. See Acharn. 1166,

εἶτα κατάξειέ τις αὐτοῦ μεθύων τῆς κεφαλῆς Ὀρέστης μαινόμενος

70. ‘According’—says the author of the Greek Argument—‘ to the well-known law ( κατὰ τὸν νόμον ἐκεῖνον) which prescribes that descendants in the male line shall be preferred to descendants in the female line.’ The writer was evidently thinking of Or. VII. § 20. But (1) the reference there is to ἀνεψιαδοῖ: (2) the question here is between lineal and collateral kinship. The nephew's claim on this second ground was baseless.

71. Date.

72. Observe the argument which, in § 43, is founded upon this fact. Diokles, says the speaker, imperils not only our fortune but our citizenship. If our mother was not a citizen, neither are we citizens: ‘ for we were born after the archonship of Eukleides.’ This alludes to the law carried in 403 by Aristophon the Azenian,—that the son of a citizen shall be illegitimate, if his mother (as well as father) was not a citizen: ὃς ἂν μὴ ἐξ ἀστῆς γένηται, νόθον εἶναι (Athen. XIII. 577 B).

73. On account of the avoidance of hiatus, Benseler would put Or. VIII (with I, VII, and XI) below 360 B C.: De hiatu 192. But, as Blass points out (II. 523), the large use of this oration made by Demosthenes in the two Speeches Against Aphobos would of itself forbid us to go below 363.

74. Analysis.

75. father of Thudippos

76. defendant

77. Son of Kleon, alleged to be adopted son and heir of Astyphilos

78. married first to Euthykrates, then to Theophrastos

79. claimant and speaker

80. Direct possession could thus be taken only (1) by children or grandchildren of the testator: (2) by an adoptive son who had been adopted during the lifetime of the testator. A son adopted by will had, like remoter kinsfolk, to put in a claim to the inheritance ( ἐπιδικάζεσθαι) Kleon therefore must have appealed to the will, not to prove the adoption, but merely to prove that the adopted son was also the heir.

81. By the form of παρακαταβολή (Schöm. p. 404) in the strict sense —literally ‘deposit of security for costs.’ The term ἀμφισβητεῖν was used of any claimant in a willcase: παρακαταβάλλειν was properly said of one who (as here) asserted his right to the whole estate.

82. Date.

83. From about 395 to 374 dynastic feuds were rife in Thessaly: see Thirlwall c. 38, v. p. 65. Jason of Pherae kept a large standing army of mercenaries.

84. I can, however, conjecture the occasion of this expedition to Mytilene. In 373 Timotheos was named commander of the fleet which was to help Corcyra. Not being able to man his fleet at Athens, he went on a cruise in the Aegean, to get men and money from the allies (Xen. H. VI. ii. 12 Grote x. 199). Now we know that, in 390 at least, Mytilene was the only Lesbian town not favourable to Sparta (Xen. H. IV. viii. 28). A levy of troops and money on Lesbos might easily give the laconising towns of the island a pretext for attacking the one notoriously philathenian town. The expedition in which Astyphilos was killed may have been sent to support Mytilene. Does not the phrase in § 1, οἱ εἰς Μιτυλήνην στρατιῶται, imply a succour?

85. Dobree ( Adv. I. 305) puts the speech in 374— 1 B.C.; but does not give his reasons Weissenborn (Ersch and Gruber's Encycl. p. 300) puts it about 369 B.C. Blass ( Att. Ber. II. 525) says, ‘some time after 371 at earliest.’Schömann's view is widely different, and as, I think, indefensible. He puts the speech in 390 B C., ‘or not much later,’ and holds that (1) The Theban War means the invasion of Boeotia by Sparta in 395, when Athens helped Thebes, and Lysander was killed at Haliartos: (2) The expedition to Thessaly refers to 394, when Agesilaos marching through Thessaly, routed the Thessalian allies of Thebes, who may have been supported by Athenians: (3) The expedition to Mytilene is the visit of Thrasybulos and his fleet in 390— 389 B.C.I should object:—(1) that the order in § 14,— Corinth, Thessaly, Theban War, which the context shows to be chronological, is thus changed to Theban War, Thessaly, Corinth: (2) that the phrase τὸν Θηβαικὸνπόλεμον ἅπαντα clearly implies more than a single campaign: (3) that in 394 it is very unlikely that Astyphilos or an Athenian force should have met Agesilaos in Thessaly, since the allied forces, including Athenians, were waiting for Agesilaos in Boeotia: (4) that Mytilene—as Blass has observed—was never the immediate object of Thrasybulos: cf. Xen. H. IV. viii. 25.

86. Analysis.

87. Had Kleon and his son not been thus adopted into another family, their claim to the estate of Astyphilos would have been better than that of the speaker. Of collateral kinsfolk, the law called to the succession, first, kinsfolk on the father's side down to the ἀνεψιῶν παίδας (or ἀνεψιαδοῦς), i.e. children of the children of a father's brother or a father's sister; secondly, in default of such, kinsfolk on the mother's side—a son of the same mother by another marriage ranking first among these. See Or. VII. § 20, and Schömann, p. 405.

88. father

89. adopted by Xenaetos 1

90. daughter who died young

91. adopted by Aristarchos I

92. defendant, adopted by Aristarchos II

93. claimant

94. two sisters

95. Date.

96. Schömann refers the specch to 384 at latest. For (1) he takes the war of § 22 to be the Corinthian (2) he takes the πολὺς χρύνος of § 18 to be the interval between the death of Aristarchos— say in 388—and the bringing of the action. Now this interval could not exceed five years, since that was the limit ( προθεσμία, praescriptio) set by the law to the time within which an estate could be claimed when its holder was not the first heir, but that heir's successor. Here Xenaenetos II. was the heir of Aristarchos II., who was the heir of Aristarchos I. The estate of Aristarchos I must therefore be claimed from Xenaenetos within five years from the death of Aristarchos II. But it could have been claimed from Aristarchos II. at any time while he lived. The πολὺς χρόνος of § 18 means, however, as I think with Blass, the time during which Aristarchos had wrongfully possessed the estate.

97. Analysis.

98. A petitio principii—that she was the ἐπίκληρος.

99. A citizen who, on any account whatsoever, owed money to the Treasury, suffered total suspension of civic rights until the debt was paid. Cf. Isokr. Antid. § 10, ἀτιμότεροι...τῶν ὀφειλόντων τῷ δημοσίῳ.

100. § 24. ὥσπερ τῶν ἀμφισβητησίμων χωρίων δεῖ τὸν ἔχοντα ἢ θέτην ἢ πρατῆρα παρέχεσθαι ἢ καταδεδικασμένον φαίνεσθαι. Here θέτης= ὁ θείς, the mortgager (the mortgagee being ὁ θέμενος): and καταδεδικασμένος ‘having got a verdict’ against the opposing claim.

101. deceased

102. speaker, adopted son of Menekles 1, advocate of Philonides

103. wife of Leukolophos

104. defendant

105. deceased

106. prosecutor, has one son

107. The author of the Argument says, ἀδελφῶν ἀμφισβητησάντων. The source of his mistake is plain. Throughout, the prosecutors are spoken of in the plural; and in § 38 we read, ἀμφότεροι οὗτοι. But § 21 shows that Menekles had but one brother. The plural, and the ἀμφότεροι, mean this brother and his son, the nephew of Menekles.

108. Date.

109. Xen. Hellen. IV. viii. § 34.

110. See Schäfer, Dem. u. seine Zeit, III. Append. p. 142.

111. Analysis

112. § 16, φράτορας—ὀργεῶνας—δημότας. ὀργεῶνες has generally been taken as= γεννῆται. Schömann has an ingenious note, ( Isae. pp. 208 f.,) in which he contends that ὀργεῶνες, here, at least, mean an inner circle of γεννῆται, connected, not merely by a civil or conventional tie (such as he thinks that of the γεννῆται to have often been), but by a tie of real blood-relationship. Possibly, however, ὀργεῶνες, the sharers of common ὄργια, may have been the members of a sacred brotherhood, independent of any civil or gentile tie.

113. deceased

114. defendant

115. illegitimate daughter of Pyrrhos, wife of Xenokles

116. adopted son of Pyrrhos, deceased

117. the speaker

118. Scheibe, in his stemma (p. xix.), makes Lysimenes, Chaeron and Pylades paternal uncles of Pyrrhos. Blass points out that §§ 71, 30 and 32 show them to have been mateinal uncles ( Att. B. II. 502).

119. A mother had no succession to her son's property. It was because no legitimate children, nor brothers, nor brother's children of Pyrrhos were living, that his sister, the mother of Endios, inherited. Cf. [Dem.] in Leoch. § 68. The brother of Endios could not claim the estate, because the adoption of Endios by Pyrrhos cancelled the natural right of succession. ‘We,’ in this speech—when it does not (as in § 2) mean the speaker and Endios—means the speaker and his mother.

120. Date.

121. Dem. de Falsa Legat. § 198.

122. [Dem.] in Neaer. § 39.

123. Analysis.

124. As to the naming-day ( δεκάτη), when, on the tenth day after the child's birth, the father acknowledged it by naming it, cf. [Dem.] Boeot. II. § 28, &c.

125. § 35, ἐάν τίς τι ἀτίμητον δῷ: i.e., as Schömann says, comparing Demosth. Euerg. p. 1156, μὴ ἐν προικὶ τετιμημένον, not valued, with a view to restitution ( ἀποτίμημα) by the husband on the dissolution of the marriage.

126. § 42. οὔτε γὰρ διαθέσθαι οὔτε δοῦναι οὐδενὶ οὐδὲν ἔξεστι τῶν ἑαυτοῦ ἄνευ τῶν θυγατέρων, ἐάν τις καταλιπὼν γνησίας τελευτᾷ: ‘Since a man can neither make an heir by adoption ( διαθέσθαι), nor bequeath any part of his property to any one, irrespectively of ( ἄνευ) such legitimate daughters as he may leave behind him.’ Schömann (p. 250), quoting Bunsen, de iure hered. p. 55, observes that διαθέσθαι is properly said of him ‘qui aliquem heredem simul et filium instituit,’ while δοῦναι is of course the general term; though διαθέσθαι and διαθήκη are often used of any testament.

127. deceased

128. adopted son of Philoktemon and client of the speaker

129. clients of Androkles (the defendant) and Antidoros

130. Date.

131. Allusion in § 27.

132. Advers. I. 298.

133. Xen. Hellen. v. viii. § 30.

134. So far as I know, the objection to the views of Dobree and of Sir W. Jones regarding the time and occasion of Philoktemon's death has not before been noticed. I should prefer to my own suggestion any which gave a later year, while keeping a distance above 378 B. C. sufficient for the ὕστερον χρόνῳ of § 37. But I can find no place for hostilities ‘near Chios,’ in which Athenians were likely to have been engaged, between 389 B. C. and the siege of Chios by Chares in 357.

135. In § 1 the vulgate has ὅτε γὰρ εἰς Σικελίαν ἐξέπλει τριηραρχῶν Χαιρέστρατος. For Χαιρέστρατος read Φανόστρατος. This, Reiske's emendation approved by Dobree ( Adv. I. 298) and Scheibe (p. xxix.), is, I think, certain. Plainly the Sicilian expedition of 415 B. C. is meant; and Chaerestratos, who is still a young man (§ 60), would thus be made, like the speaker, upwards of seventy. Two MSS. give Μενέστρατος—a mere error: cf. Schöm. p. 323. H. Weissenborn proposed to alter Σικξλίαν into Θεσσαλίαν or Μακεδονίαν. The replacement of Φανόστρατος makes this needless.

136. Analysis.

137. § 22. At first the phratores did not receive him, ἀλλ’ ἀπηνέχθη τὸ κουρεῖον, ‘ the victim was taken away:’ i. e. Euktemon was not allowed to offer the sheep which he had brought with him for sacrifice on the κουρεῶτις, or third day of the Apaturia, when new phratores were enrolled.

138. § 36. While Euktemon still lived, the archon was asked by the conspirators to let ( μισθοῦν) the house-property, as if their clients were orphans. When the archon and the guardian of an orphan let the orphan's estate, the person to whom it was let was required to mortgage as security a piece of ground or other real property. This was called ἀποτίμημα, and on it were set up slabs ( ὅροι), bearing the orphan's name.

139. testator

140. In § 26, according to the vulgate, Dikaeogenes III. betroths to Protarchides τὴν ἀδελφὴν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ. The context favours the emendation of H. Weissenborn, adopted by Scheibe, τὴν ἀδελφιδῆν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ: but this cannot have been the speaker's sister.—Reiske proposed τὴν ἀδελφὴν τὴν ὲμαυτοῦ: Schomann, τὴν ἀδελφὴν τὴν τούτου (Kephisodotos) or τὴν τοῦ—, supposing the brother's name lost.—For a complete table of the House of Menexenos I. see Schäfer, Demosthenes und seine Zeit, III, Part 2, p. 212.

141. ἀναμφισβήτητα, § 18 (= καθαρὰ καὶ ἀνέπαφα, Argum.), ‘freed from all claims;’—whereas, in fact, he sold these two-thirds to other persons.

142. Form of the Cause.

143. Date.

144. Thuc. VIII. 42; cf. Cox, H. Gr. II. 453: (for we must think of this sea-fight, in which the Athenians lost six ships, rather than of the unsuccessful attack on Knidos noticed in c. 35, which does not seem to have been attended with any loss). The Paralos, it may be observed, is heard of soon afterwards as being with the army at Samos; Thuc. VIII. 74, 411 B C.

145. Note the language of § 7:— ἐκέκτητο ἐκαστος δωδεκα ἔτη ἃ ἔλαχε· καὶ ἐν τοσούτῳ χρόνῳ οὐσῶν δικῶν οὐδεὶς αὐτω—ν ἠξίωσε τὰ πεπραγμένα εἰπεῖν ἀδίκως πεπρᾶχθαι, πρὶν δυστυχησάσης τῆς πόλεως καὶ στάσεως γενομένης κἀγῶνος οὑτοσὶ πεισθεὶς...ἠμφισβήτει.This does not say that the στάσις was going on at the time when the false claim was made. No doubt a slip of three years would not be impossible for what Schömann calls ‘oratoria magis quam historica fides’; but the apology is not needed here.

146. Schömann would boldly alter Ὀλύνθιοι to Κορίνθιοι. Sir W. Jones (p. 159) actually proposed Ὀπούντιοι. But the context itself defends Ὀλύνθιοι. The meaning is:—‘You, an Athenian, have not served, while aid has been coming to Athens in this crisis from the uttermost parts of her confederacy.’ The great city of Olynthos, as well as the insular allies, doubtless furnished some troops in the course of a seven years' war which held all Greece in suspense.

147. I long held that 372 B.C. was the date, and that the difficulties could be overcome, (1) by referring στάσις to the strife of factions at Athens between the partisans of Sparta and the partisans of the Theban patriots in 382 B. C. (see Xen. Hellen. v. iv. 19)—the year in which the Kadmeia was seized, and in which Athens, stripped of nearly all her possessions abroad and nearly destitute of allies, might be said δυστυχῆσαι (cf. Boeckh, Publ. Econ. I. 417): (2) by explaining Ὀλύνθιοι...καὶ νησιῶται ἀποθνήσκουσι of the Olynthian War, 382—379, and of the renewed hostilities in 374 between Athens and Sparta, of which Corcyra was a centre. But στάσις most naturally refers to the Anarchy.The consideration, however, which, for me, has finally turned the scale in favour of 390 is one which, so far as I know, has not been noticed—the tone of §§ 37, 38. Clearly the details set forth there are comparatively recent. They could not have been used thus effectively after 21 years. The great war of § 46 must be identical with the great war of § 37—the Corinthian. [For 391, 390 or 389 are Schäfer, Dem. u. s. Z. I. 255, cf. III. App. 211: Blass, Att. Ber. II. 508 ff.: Schömann, Isae. 290 ff.: Weissenborn, Ersch and Gruber's Encycl. II. xxiv. 295. For 372 are Benseler, De hiatu, p. 186; and (on second thoughts) Dobree, Adv. I. 297. Krüger— who takes 384—381—would have been for 372 if he had not overlooked the 10 years of § 35.]

148. Analysis.

149. § 42, ὅτε ἡ ἐν Ἐλευσῖνι μάχη ἐγένετο. This battle at Eleusis has been referred (1) by Palmer, ap. Schöm. p. 342, to Ol. 80. 4, 457 B.C., when there were hostilities in the Megarid between the Athenians and the Corinthians: (2) by Reiske to Ol. 83. 4, 445 B.C., when the Lacedaemonians, invading Attica under Pleistonax, advanced to Elcusis; Thuc. I. 114. But on neither occasion is a battle at Eleusis recorded.Read, with Dobrce, ἐν Ἁλιεῦσι. Having made a descent on the coast of Argolis, the Athenians were defeated by the Corinthians and Epidaurians at Halicis, Ol. 80. 4, 457 B.C.. Thuc. I. 104.

150. § 42. φυλαρχῶν ( ἀπέθανε) τῆς Ὀλυνθίας ἐν Σπαρτώλῳ, as Scheibe rightly follows Palmer in reading. In Ol. 87. 4, 429 B C; when the Athenians were defeated by the Chalkidians at Spartolos on the Chalkidic peninsula: Thuc. II. 79. The vulgate Ὀλυσίας was actually taken by Sir W. Jones with φυλαρχῶν—‘ captain of the Destructive cohort.’ Reiske's Ὀδρυσίας, Ὀδυσσείας (the latter as name of a cohort) were not much better. Thuc. (II. 79) mentions Spartolos as belonging to the Βοττιαῖοι. But now, in 389, it had come under the control of Olynthos: cf. Xen. Hellen. v. 2. 11.

151. Scheibe (praef. XXVIII.) says ‘videtur deesse epilogus’: but, as Blass rightly remarks, the rather abrupt ending is Isaean and does not prove that anything has been lost.

152. IV. On the Estate of Hagnias. [Or. XI]

153. The εἰσαγγελία κακώσεως was a special form of the γραφὴ κακώσεως. Any Athenian citizen might lay before the archon an Information regarding alleged wrong done to parents, women, or orphans; might address the court without limit of time; and. if defeated, suffered no fine. There was no fixed penalty for κάκωσις: but as, in some cases, it might be ἀτιμία, Theopompos speaks of himself here as κινδυνεύων ὑπὲρ τοῦ σώματος (§ 35). He observes that the adversary, instead of prosecuting him by this form of γραφή, ought properly to have sued him for the estate in a δίκη (§§ 28, 32, 35).

154. testator

155. wife of Sositheos

156. speaker and defendant

157. [Dem.] adv. Macart. § 10.

158. The artifices by which Theopompos got this decision in his favour are noticed in the speech Against Makartatos §§ 29 f. Compare § 10 of our speech, where Theopompos calls himself ἀνεψιοῦ παῖς of Hagnias—a quibble meant to mislead inattentive judges, as it implies that the father of Theopompos was first cousin, not of Polemon, but of Hagnias himself.

159. [Dem.] adv. Macart. § 67.

160. Date.

161. See the introduction to the text of Demosthenes by Baiter and Sauppe, Or. Att. I. vi.

162. By an inscription published in the Hermes, II. 28, by U. Köhler: see Blass, Att. Ber. II. 531 note.— Schäfer ( Dem. u. s. Z. III. App. 234) rejects the μαρτυρία: Dobree adopts it ( Adv. I. 309, ‘post archontem Nicophemum’).

163. To 360, according to Clinton sub ann., Schömann, p. 452, and Scheibe, p. xliii.: but I agree with Blass that we want a longer interval.In § 48 it is said that people still remember how Makartatos, brother-in-law of Theopompos, fitted out a trireme and sailed to Krete,—thereby causing some alarm at Athens lest the peace with Lacedaemon should be disturbed. Schäfer (l.c.) observes that this points to a time before the revival of the Athenian power at sea in 378 B.C. But the incident may well have been 20 years past. Nothing can be fixed by the embassy of Hagnias in § 8. Harpokration ( s. v. Ἁγνίας) adds that Hagnias was seized and put to death by the Lacedaemonians. This, as Blass says (II. 531), may have been in the Theban War, 378 —371 B.C.

164. Analysis.

165. Preserved by Dionysios de Isaeo, c. 17. As the most recent editors of Isaeos—Baiter and Sauppe in their Oratores Attici, and Scheibe in the Teubner series —print this large extract as Oration XII., instead of placing it among the fragments, it seemed best, for convenience of reference, to follow that example.

166. Schömann (p. 479) understands the appeal to be made by the demesmen from the decisions of the Arbitrators; but here I should agree rather with the author of the Greek Argument and with Dionys. de Isaeo, c. 14, by the latter of whom this speech is described as ἡ ὑπὲρ Εὐφιλήτου πρὸς τὸν Ἐρχιέων δῆμον ἔφεσις.

167. Revision of deme-registers.

168. The earliest recorded instance of such a revision belongs to 445 B.C. (Plut. Pericl. c. 37). Schömann (p. 478), on the other hand, would date the practice from a law of Demophilos passed in 419 B.C., therein following Harpokration s.v. διαψήφισις, whose notice, however, refers, not to 419, but to 346 B C.

169. That there were two distinct Arbitrations is clear: see § 11, τῆς προτέρας διαίτης—κατεδιῄτησαν ἀμφότεροι. But two questions occur: 1. How could an issue once tried by arbitration be submitted to a second arbitration? Schömann's explanation seems probable—In the former arbitration, Euphiletos was acquitted in the absence, perhaps through illness, of his adversary, who died soon afterwards (§ 11); and the new demarch, on the ground that judgment had gone by default, applied for a second hearing ( ἀντίληξις τῆς μὴ οὔσης)—which could be done within ten days after the first decision: Pollux VIII. 60—2. Public arbitrators held office for one year only. How then shall we explain δύο ἔτη τοῦ διαιτητοῦ τὴν δίαιταν ἔχοντος, § 11? To read τῶν διαιτητῶν...ἐχόντων would be a rough remedy. Schömann suggests that, as the cause could not be decided within the year, the arbitrator was specially reappointed for a second year (p. 481).

170. Date.

171. De Isae. c. 16: but in ἐγράφη νόμος he may be referring only to the original institution of the rule.

172. Analysis.

173. § 12. ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ συστάντων. This is well illustrated by the Demosthenic speech (Or. LVII.) in a similar cause—that Against Eubulides (345 B.C.?) who is accused by Euxitheos of having intrigued to remove his name from the register of the deme— Cf. Schäfer, Dem. u. s. Z. III. App. 262 f.

174. Remarks.

175. Character of the Collection as regards matter:

176. and as regards form

177. Or. IV. § 7, relating how many persons became mourners for the deceased Nikostratos—‘when the two talents arrived.’

178. The typical Spceches — V., XI., VIII.

179. Or. Att. II. 228—244.

180. Viz. 1. κατὰ Στρατοκλέους, 2. πρὸς Εὐκλείδην τὸν Σωκρατικόν, 3. κατὰ Μεγαρέων:—IV., XV. and XXVIII in Sauppe.

181. Dionysios compares 1. Isaeos Against the Demesmen with Lysias Against Archebiades:—De Isaeo, c. 10: 2. Isaeos, Defence of a Guardian, with Lysias Against the Sons of Hippokrates:—ib. c. 8. 3. Isacos For Eumathes with Lysias For Pherenikos:—ib. c. 5.— See vol. I. pp. 313 f.

182. 1 Against the Demesmen.

183. It is s.v. Σφηττός that Harpokr. names the speech.

184. As Schömann suggests (p. 491), referring to Boeckh, Publ. Econ. II. 337.

185. Date.

186. 2. Defence of a Guardian.

187. For the first fragment, see Dionys. Isae. c. 8: for the second, ib. c. 12. Schömann, Sauppe, Scheibe and Blass agree in referring both fragments to the same speech.

188. Its title.

189. Harpokration, s.v. παρηγγύησεν, quotes Isaeos ἐν τῇ πρὸς Διοφάνην ἐπιτροπῆς ἀπολογίᾳ. The fact that the guardian is represented by Dionysios as ὑπὸ τῶν ἀδελφιδῶν κρινομένῳ ( De Isae. c. 8) is, of course, no objection, as Diophanes might have represented the rest; but the identification seems unsafe.

190. Schömann, Isae. 488: Dobree, Adv. I. 311: Cobet, Var. Lect. 271.

191. Its relation with the πρὸς Καλυδῶνα.

192. s. v. ἐπισημαίνεσθαι .

193. s. v. Κεφαλῆθεν: cf. s. vv. Ἀνθεμόκριτος, ἀφ’ Ἑστίας μυεῖσθαι, κ τ.λ.

194. Praef. p. xlvii.

195. Att. Ber. II. 538.

196. 3. For Eumathes

197. Harpokration s. v. ἄγοι cites these words of Dionysios (as quoted by Xenokles in our speech)— ἔβλαψέ με Χενοκλῆς ἀφελόμενος Εὐμάθην εἰς ἐλευθερίαν, ἄγοντος ἐμοῦ εἰς δουλείαν κατὰ τὸ ἐμὸν μέρος. Schömann (p. 485) points out the inference.

198. In such an action the jury could inflict what fine they pleased (i.e. it was τιμητή); and half the τίμημα went to the treasury: cf. [Dem.] Against Theokrines (LVIII.) § 21.

199. Date.

200. In one place, Dionysios has ἐπὶ Κηφισοδώρου ἄρχοντος ( De Isaeo, c. 5); in another, ἐπὶ Κηφισοδότου ἄρχοντος ( ib. c. 7). The latter is now adopted by Sauppe and Scheibe. Kephisodoros was archon in Ol. 103. 3, 366 B.C., a year which gives no probable clue to the sea-fight. Kephisodotos was archon in Ol. 105. 3, i.e. from July 358 to July 357; and the battle at Chios may, as Clinton suggests, have fallen within his year. But I would observe that it is only the beginning of the speaker's trierarchy which must have fallen within it.

201. Dionys. Isae. c. 15. Sauppe shows by a comparison of 3 fragments ( Or. Att. II. 229) that Westermann and Weissenborn err in supposing a speech πρὸς Ἄρχιππον distinct from that πρὸς Ἀριστογείτονα.

Sir Richard C. Jebb The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeos 2.21