Search the Perseus Catalog for:

View: By Section

← Previous Next →

Isokrates: Classification of Works; Scholastic Writings

The state of the text

TWENTY-ONE Speeches or Discourses, and nine Letters, are extant under the name of Isokrates. All these are probably genuine¹. Nor is any lost work, except the ‘Art of Rhetoric,’ known from a definite citation². Suidas speaks of thirty-two discourses³. In the Plutarchic Life, the number given is sixty,—of which only twenty-eight were allowed as genuine by Caecilius and only twenty-five by Dionysios⁴. Photios knew only twenty-one⁵. Dionysios, the strictest, may be taken as also the best canon. If it may be assumed that his collection included ours, we have all but four of those compositions which he thought genuine.

The text of our collection is tolerably perfect. ⁶ The only gaps of any importance are at the end of Oration XIII (Against the Sophists); at the beginning of Oration XVI (‘De Bigis’); and probably at the end of Letters I, VI and IX⁷.

Jerome Wolf's classification.

The writings of Isokrates are arranged differently in different MSS.⁸ The order followed in most modern editions is not that of any one manuscript, but that which was adopted, for the sake of convenience, by Jerome Wolf⁹. His arrangement aims at a fourfold distribution:— Hortatory. I. To Demonikos. II. To Nikokles. III. Nikokles. Deliberative. IV. Panegyrikos. V. Philippos. VI. Archidamos. VII. Areopagitikos. VIII. On the Peace. Epideictic. IX. Evagoras. X. Encomium of Helen. XI. Busiris. XII. Panathenaikos. XIII. Against the Sophists. Forensic. XIV. Plataikos¹⁰. XV. Antidosis. XVI. Against Alkibiades ( περὶ τοῦ ζεύγους ). XVII. Trapezitikos. XVIII. Against Kallimachos. XIX. Aeginetikos. XX. Against Lochites. XXI. Against Euthynus¹¹ .

The principle of this classification seems hardly ¹² the best. ‘Deliberative’ has to be strained in various directions in order to include the Panegyrikos, the Philippos, the Areopagitikos. ‘Epideictic’ applies ill to the essay Against the Sophists. The Antidosis, though thrown for literary purposes into the form of a defence in court, cannot properly be called ‘forensic.’

Another classification.

Setting the six real Forensic Speeches apart, the other writings of Isokrates ought to be classified, not according to accident of form, but by subject-matter. They may be considered as I. Scholastic, II. Political. The whole list will then stand thus:— A. SCHOLASTIC WRITINGS. I. Hortatory Letters or Essays. To Demonikos. [Or. I.] To Nikokles. [Or. II.] Nikokles. [Or. III.] II. Displays. Busiris. [Or. XI.] Encomium on Helen. [Or. X.] Evagoras. [Or. IX.] Panathenaikos. [Or. XII.] III. Essays on Education. Against the Sophists. [Or. XIII.] Antidosis. [Or. XV.] B. POLITICAL WRITINGS. I. On the relations of Greece with Persia. Panegyrikos. [Or. IV.] Philippos. [Or. V.] II. On the internal affairs of Greece. Plataikos. [Or. XIV.] On the Peace. [Or. VIII.] Archidamos. [Or. VI.] Areopagitikos. [Or. VII.]¹³ C. FORENSIC SPEECHES. I. Action for Assault ( δίκη αἰκίας). Against Lochites. [Or. XX.] II. Claim to an Inheritance ( ἐπιδικασία). Aeginetikos. [Or. XIX.] III. Action to recover a Deposit ( δίκη παρακαταθήκης). Against Euthynus. [Or. XXI.] Trapezitikos. [Or. XVII.] IV. Action for Damage ( δίκη βλάβης). On the Yoke of Horses. [Or. XVI.] V. Special Plea ( παραγραφή). Against Kallimachos. [Or. XVIII.] D. LETTERS.—FRAGMENTS.

Scholastic works I. Hortatory letters or essays.

I. 1. To Demonikos

1. To Demonikos [Or. I.]—The person to whom this Letter of Advice is addressed is known only from the Letter itself. Demonikos lived in a monarchical State (§ 36), which may have been Cyprus¹⁴. He was still a youth (§ 44); rich, and of distinguished (§ 49), though not of royal (§ 36), birth¹⁵. His father, Hipponikos, lately dead (§ 2), must have been in some way a well-known man (§ 11).

The date at which the Letter was written cannot ¹⁶ be determined; but it may be assigned conjecturally to about the same time as the two other Hortatory Discourses—the Letter to Nikokles and the Nikokles¹⁷—374—372 B.C.

The Letter consists of three parts: I. ¹⁸ Introduction, §§ 1—12; II. Precepts, §§ 13—43; III. Epilogue, §§ 44—52.

I. There is no greater difference between good and bad men ( σπουδαῖοι—φαῦλοι) than in the durability of their friendships. Isokrates wishes to testify his friendship to Demonikos, and his regard for the young man's late father Hipponikos (§§ 1—2). He does not intend this letter to be a mere stimulus to intellectual exertion ( παράκλησις) but an exhortation to moral excellence ( παραίνεσις §§ 4, 5).

II. The following are the principal heads under which the precepts in §§ 13—43 may be brought:—

1. Duty towards the gods; § 13.

2. Duty towards men; prescribed generally as the obligation to be just (§§ 38, 39) and true (§§ 22, 23); and specially in three chief relations, ( a) as towards the State, §§ 16, 37: cf. § 36: ( b) as towards parents, § 14: ( c) as towards friends, §§ 24—27, 33: cf. § 30.

3. Duty of regulating personal character, in respect ( a) to the use of wealth, §§27, 28, and of pleasures, §§ 17, 32: ( b) to the exercise of body and mind, § 40; and particularly to the acquisition of knowledge, §§ 18, 19; ( c) to demeanour in society, §§ 15, 41, 42, 31.

III. Many of the rules just given will not suit the present age of Demonikos; but by and by he will need them, and this letter will then serve him as a storehouse ( ταμιεῖον) of advice (§ 44). The reward of Herakles, and the doom of Tantalos, are warnings to strive after real nobleness ( τῆς καλοκαγαθίας); and, in so striving, we must seek help from every quarter. ‘For hardly, by this care, may we master the failings of our nature’ (§§ 51—52).

The authenticity of a treatise remarkably ¹⁹ characteristic of its author has, with singular perversity, been questioned both in ancient and in modern times. ‘Feebleness of diction’²⁰ is the trait which the writer of the Greek argument mentions as having been found suspicious in this and like compositions of Isokrates. Alleged peculiarities or solecisms in language, dialect or grammar,—the occurrence, in a few instances, of hiatus,—and defective arrangement of subject-matter, are the tokens of spuriousness which the most recent and most careful sceptic²¹ has discovered. It is needless, here, to examine these objections in detail. It is enough to say that, even if they could all be proved, they would be decisively outweighed by the thoroughly Isokratic stamp of the treatise as a whole, in language, in structure, in spirit. As to external testimony, Dionysios²² and Hermogenes²³ are affirmative witnesses; in Harpokration²⁴ two passages cancel each other.

The distinguishing mark of the Ad Demonicum, ²⁵ viewed as a treatise on morals, is a combination of loftiness and meanness. It is the man of the world who assumes the part of the preacher. Where he gives, in a simple form, the maxims of a somewhat vulgar prudence, he is excellent; it is when he strives to connect them with doctrine that he fails. The morality of the Ad Demonicum is probably at least on a level with the average practical morality of Greece; on the other hand, the higher sentiment which it contains is not affected; but the absence of harmony between them is Isokratic.

I 2. To Nikokles.

2. To Nikokles. [Or. II.]—Nikokles, to whom the Second and Ninth Discourses are addressed and for whom the Third was written, succeeded his father Evagoras as king of the Cyprian Salamis in 374 B.C.

It was probably soon after the accession of ²⁶ Nikokles that Isokrates addressed this speech to him. The opening words have a formality which suggests that the writer is either wholly or almost a stranger; and the tone of the Letter generally implies that Nikokles was young both in years and in office. The intercourse thus opened appears to have become intimate; and it is possible that Nikokles may have been among the pupils of Isokrates²⁷.

‘The usual offerings to a king, Nikokles, are garments, or ²⁸ gold, or bronze, things in which he is richer than the givers: I offer you advice. Private men are schooled by the struggle of life, by the laws, by the poets: kings have little schooling. Hence those frequent disasters which, even in vulgar eyes, balance the pleasures of a royal lot. People fancy that the office of a king, like that of a priest, may be assumed without any special preparation²⁹. In particular crises, you will have the counsel of others: my counsels shall be general (§§ 1—8).

‘First—What is the function of a king? To stay the troubles, to guard the welfare, to raise the greatness of his realm (§ 9).

‘In order to perform this task well, you ought, in the first place, to be intelligent. By converse with the ablest men, and by reading, you must make yourself capable of deciding small questions, and of grappling with great³⁰ (§§ 10—14).

‘Next, you must be the friend of mankind and of your realm (§ 15). Keep the people alike from doing, and from suffering, outrage (§ 16). Let your laws be not only just and consistent, but framed for the settlement, rather than for the raising, of issues (§ 17). Rule the State like your own house, generously but carefully (§ 19). Let your word be held surer than other men's oaths. Honour less those strangers who bring gifts than those who deserve to receive them (§ 22). Be royal, not in severity, but by the recognised supremacy of your wisdom: warlike in knowledge and preparation, peaceful in abstinence from aggression (§ 24). Choose your associates with care, knowing that the many will judge you by them (§ 27). Deem it the most kingly thing of all to be subject to none of your own desires (§ 29). Take it as a sign that you are reigning well if you see your subjects growing richer and better (§ 31). Let your dress be splendid and your life hardy (§ 32): be witty, and be dignified (§ 34). Observe the fates of kings and of private persons; and divine the future from the past (§ 35). Let safety for the State and for yourself be your first object: but, if you are forced into danger, choose a noble death before a life of dishonour. In all things remember your royal office, and be mindful to do nothing unworthy of it (§§ 36, 37). Since your body must die, seek to make the memory of your spirit immortal (§ 37). If you emulate a man's fame, copy his actions (§ 38). Think those wise who can speak well on great questions, not those who can refine on trifles;—and those whose prosperity shows their prudence, or whose resignation proves their philosophy (§ 39).

‘Practical advice must not aim at being novel, and can hardly hope to be amusing (§§ 54—56). Hesiod, Theognis, Phokylides are praised—and neglected: Homer and the dramatists are the poets of the people (§§ 40—49). You, Nikokles, are a king, and ought to think first of what is useful. A good adviser is the most royal of possessions (§§ 40—53). Encourage others to bring you gifts like mine; gifts which, instead of wearing out in use, become more valuable the more they are used’ (§ 54).

Isokrates wrote for the cultivated. His idea of ³¹ an expedition to Asia needed the help of the powerful. On both grounds it was natural that he should cultivate friendly relations with Hellenic kings and tyrants,—with Nikokles of Salamis and Timotheos of Herakleia no less than with Dionysios of Syracuse and Philip of Macedon. In the Antidosis, (where he is answering the imputation of being too much a friend to monarchy,) he quotes the speech which many years ago he had addressed to Nikokles. He claims to have spoken in it ‘freely and worthily of the city’; to have upheld the cause of the people; to have ‘reproved monarchy’ by observing how ill monarchs are usually trained for their duties. The claim is somewhat exaggerated. On the other ³² hand, Isokrates might fairly have taken credit for setting before Nikokles a standard, higher than the common, of the king's duty to the subject. His ideal monarchy is absolute, but it is intelligently and honestly paternal.

I 3 Nikokles.

3. Nikokles or The Cyprians. [Or. III.]—In the last Discourse Isokrates had traced for Nikokles the duty of a king: in this it is Nikokles who sets forth the duty of subjects (§ 11). The piece was no doubt written to order; Nikokles perhaps thinking that the perception of a king's obligations which the former work may have quickened in some Salaminians might be usefully complemented by a sense of their own. Since the prince can appeal ³³ to his people's past experience of him as a ruler (§ 63), the date can hardly be earlier than 372; on the other hand it cannot be later than 355; and may probably be placed between 372 and 365.

I. ‘Some people are hostile to all discussion on the ³⁴ ground that selfish gain, not virtue, is its aim. Why do not those who blame the endeavour to reason well blame also the desire to act rightly? Action, not debate, is the chief instrument of selfishness. It is the faculty of persuading which has civilized life.

‘For a king, the first questions are of the relations between rulers and ruled. Isokrates has traced the duty of a king; I will now attempt to trace the duty of subjects (§ 11). But first I will try to show (1) that monarchy is the best form of government; and (2) that I am entitled, historically and personally, to be your king (§§ 1—13).

II. ‘A Monarchy, as compared with a limited or with a pure Republic, has these advantages:—1. It discriminates the different degrees of merit. Equality is the principle of republics. A Monarchy gives the first place to the best man, the second to the second-best, and so on (§§ 14, 15). —2. It has, more than other forms of government, an insight into the natures and actions of men; merit, wherever it exists, is therefore sure of recognition.—3. It is the mildest of governments; since it is easier to propitiate one man than many (§ 16).—4. Its ministers, being not annual but permanent, learn and discharge their duties more thoroughly and composedly (§§ 17, 18).—5. It is prompt in action. A popular assembly consists of men who are immersed in private affairs, and who meet only to wrangle: in a cabinet there are fewer distractions and delays (§ 19).—6. It has no jealousies. In a Republic there are always at least two parties, each of which hopes that the other will mismanage the country as grossly as possible. A monarch, having no rivals, has no spite (§ 20).—7. It has a more direct interest in good government. Republicans regard themselves as stewards, a monarch regards himself as the owner, of the State (§ 21).—8. It is more effective in war. Secret preparation, striking display, versatile intrigue, are easier for it than for other governments (§ 22).

‘Experience shows that these advantages are not imaginary. In Persia, devotion to Monarchy has been rewarded with unequalled greatness. In Sicily, the absolutism of Dionysios has not only delivered an enslaved country, but has made it the first in Greece. Carthage and Sparta, oligarchies at home, become monarchies in the field. Athens, the most anti-monarchical of States, has generally failed when she sent out a committee of generals, and succeeded when she gave the command to one. Lastly—Is not Zeus monarch of the gods? Whether the gods really live under that form of government or not, the fact of men ascribing it to them proves at least a human sense that it is the best (§§ 22—26).

‘Having shown the advantages of Monarchy, I will show more briefly that I am entitled to be your monarch. First, historically. Teukros, the founder of our house, brought hither the forefathers of the present Cyprians. His throne, lost for a time by his descendants, was regained by my father Evagoras, who put down Phoenician rule at Salamis and restored it to its original kings (§§ 27, 28). Next, personally. At my accession, I found the treasury empty, the State disturbed, Cyprus on bad terms with the rest of Greece and with Persia: and I met all these difficulties without wronging any man (§§ 29—35). Nor have youth (§ 45) and opportunity ever drawn me into licence (§§ 36—46).

III. ‘As the lawful holder, then, of a beneficent power, I may advise with a right to be heard—Let each man do his appointed task carefully and fairly (§ 48).—Do not make haste to be rich (§ 50).—Murmur not at one of my commands, knowing that those who serve me best will best serve their own fortunes.—Let everyone be sure that nothing of which his own conscience is aware will escape me (§ 51).— Form no clubs, hold no meetings, without my knowledge (§ 54).—Guard the present constitution, and desire no sort of change (§ 55).—Be humble to me, and magnificent in the service of the State (§ 56).—Consider that the greatest and surest wealth which you can leave to your children is my favour (§ 58).—Be not jealous, but emulous, of my counsellors (§ 60).—Think my words, laws—and keep them.— In short, be to your king what you wish your subordinates to be to you (§ 62).

‘If you follow this course, while I do not change mine, your prosperity and my power will grow together. Such a hope might well encourage to any toils. But you need not toil at all. You need only to be just and loyal’ (§§ 63—64).

Perhaps the most interesting part of this Discourse is that in which the writer, putting himself at the king's point of view, offers a popular plea for Monarchy as against Republic. Here Isokrates is essentially the professional rhetor—it being distinctive of Rhetoric as an art that, like its counterpart Dialectic, it is equally ready to argue either side of a question³⁵. Isokrates has given us the other side in the Panathenaikos and the Areopagitikos, where he interprets his own ideal—a democracy tempered by a censorship.

II. Displays.

II I. Busiris.

1. Busiris [Or. XI.]—The Busiris and the Encomium on Helen [Or. X.] are slight essays by Isokrates in a province which was not his own. Declamations on subjects taken from epos or from the myths had always a prominent place among the ‘displays’ of ordinary Sophists. Such, for instance, are the Encomium on Helen and the Defence of Palamedes ascribed to Gorgias; the speech of Odysseus Against Palamedes ascribed to Alkidamas; the speeches of Ajax and Odysseus, in the contest for the arms, ascribed to Antisthenes³⁶. The bent of Isokrates, as ³⁷ he himself tells us³⁸, was not towards this kind of composition. He was not, indeed, hostile to it, any more than he was hostile to criticism of the poets and other branches of literary work which employed the Sophists³⁹. The encomia which he depreciates in Or. X. § 12 are encomia on bumble-bees and salt; on the other hand he expressly commends the choice of such a subject as Helen (§ 14); and if he speaks of Busiris as a poor theme (Or. XI. § 22) he clearly means only that it is one which baffles the panegyrist. Yet it is important to note that he comes upon this field of ‘display’ not as a candidate for distinction but merely as a critic. The Busiris and the Encomium on Helen are alike criticisms, in which he first reviews the work of others, and then shows, for the sake of vindicating his right to criticise, how he would have done the work himself.

The Busiris is addressed to Polykrates, who has ⁴⁰ lately been driven by need to become a professed rhetorician. Isokrates has never seen him; but, sympathising with his misfortunes, wishes to help him with advice. Pausanias says that Jason of Pherae preferred Gorgias to Polykrates, although the school of Polykrates had then gained no small repute at Athens⁴¹. Gorgias died about 380 B.C. At some time, then, before 380 Polykrates had made a name at Athens. But the Busiris speaks of him as a beginner; and it is known from Diogenes Laertius that the ‘Accusation of Sokrates’ ⁴² mentioned in § 4 contained an allusion to the rebuilding of the Long Walls by Konon,—i.e. was written later than 393 B. C.⁴³ All the conditions will be satisfied if we suppose that Polykrates published his ‘Accusation of Sokrates’ in 393 or 392, and the ‘Defence of Busiris’ soon after; that he had become a teacher of repute at Athens about 388 B. C.; and that Isokrates wrote the Busiris soon after the appearance of the ‘Defence’ which it criticises,—perhaps in 391 or 390. At this time, ⁴⁴ Polykrates was teaching at Cyprus⁴⁵; he and Isokrates —as the essay tells us—had never met.

Polykrates evidently held a respectable rank among the rhetoricians of his time. He is mentioned by Dionysios in company with Antiphon, Thrasymachos of Chalkedon, Kritias, Theodoros of Byzantium, Anaximenes, Zoilos and Isaeos⁴⁶. He was, however, no favourite of Dionysios, who describes him as ‘empty in practical oratory, frigid and vulgar in the rhetoric of display, and devoid of grace in the subjects which demand it⁴⁷.’ He wrote for the law-courts; and the ‘Accusation of Sokrates’ itself was supposed by some to have been actually spoken at the trial⁴⁸. But ‘display’ was probably his chosen branch. His ingenuity appears from the circumstance that he composed an encomium upon mice⁴⁹, and his versatility from the fact that he praised both Agamemnon⁵⁰ and Klytaemnestra⁵¹.

No weight can be given to the suggestion made ⁵² by the author of the Argument that the real meaning of Isokrates was to attack Polykrates for the ‘Accusation of Sokrates’, and that, deterred by the temper of Athens from doing this openly, he did it under pretext of a criticism upon the ‘Defence of Busiris.’ There is no trace in the piece of any such covert intention; the vindication of Sokrates, so far as it goes, is perfectly frank; and this very frankness defines its place as a secondary topic.

‘Your worth, Polykrates, and the change in your way of ⁵³ life are known to me by report. I have read some of your writings, and would gladly discuss freely with you the whole theory of those studies to which you have given yourself. General precepts, however, shall be reserved until we know each other. In the meantime I send you some special criticisms. Wishing you well, I do not shrink from the risk of giving offence.

‘You put trust in your Defence of Busiris and your Accusation of Sokrates. As to Busiris, you have made his case worse than ever; others accuse him of having immolated strangers; you, of having eaten them. As to Sokrates, your ‘Accusation’ glorifies him; you make him the teacher of Alkibiades,—who is not known to have been his disciple, but who certainly was a remarkable man. Could the dead hear you, you would have the thanks of the philosopher and the hatred of the king. Such, too, is your disregard of consistency that you have described Busiris as emulating the fame of Aeolos and Orpheus, who lived long after him; and who, moreover, were utterly unlike him. I will try to show you briefly how the subject ought to have been handled (§§ 1—9).

‘The father of Busiris was Poseidon; his mother, Libya, daughter of Epaphos the son of Zeus, and earliest queen of the land which bears her name. Not content with his mother's realm, Busiris, after wide conquests, founded a monarchy in Egypt. He saw that that country had the best climate in the world, was the most fertile, and had in the Nile a perpetual barrier against invasion. For other lands, the steward of rains and droughts is Zeus; for Egypt, the Nile. That river is at once their protector and their nourisher, giving them the wealth of a continent with the security of an island (§§ 10—14).

‘Having got a good country, Busiris next sought to give ⁵⁴ it a good government. He divided the population into priests,—craftsmen of various sorts,—and soldiers. In his theory of a really good economy, each kind of work ought to have its permanent workmen. Sparta has taken one hint from this system. She has made her citizens a military caste. But her defect is that she is purely military. Egypt provides at the same time for the protection, and for the prosecution, of industry (§§ 15—20).

‘Nor was mental culture neglected. The priests, having wealth and leisure, developed a science of medicine,—to which it is due that the Egyptians have the best health and the longest lives. Other sciences were cultivated also; and while the elder men were busied with great affairs, the younger studied astrology, logic, geometry.

‘But it is for their reverent worship of the gods that the Egyptians are most admirable. Exaggeration is harmful in most things; but it is good for human life that men should have an even exaggerated idea of the gods' power to reward or punish. To the Egyptian mind this power is so awful that oaths taken in Egyptian temples have a greater sanctity than elsewhere. The Egyptians believe that retribution will follow sin, not bye-and-bye, but instantly. Their priests enjoin upon them a multitude of observances, meant both to strengthen the habit of obedience and to test, by visible proof, their reverence for things unseen.

‘The philosophy of Egypt, and the spirit of its scrupulous ritual, were first brought into Hellas by Pythagoras; who felt sure that, if not requited by the gods, he would at least be esteemed by men. And to this day the silence of his disciples is more admired than the eloquence of others (§§ 21—29).

‘You will perhaps say that I have praised the laws, the piety, the thought of Egypt without proving that these are due to Busiris. It would ill become you to reproach me as illogical; you have yourself said that it was Busiris who distributed the Nile by its seven channels through the land, and who, at the same time, slew strangers on his altars; thus ascribing to him at once the fury of a beast and the faculty of a god. But my account is not merely as reasonable as yours; it has intrinsic probability. The benefits which it imputes to Busiris have not been shown to be due to any one else; and who is more likely to have wrought them than the son of Poseidon and of Libya,—the most powerful man of his time? The falseness of the charges laid against him is seen in this, that they represent him as having been slain by Herakles. Herakles lived four generations⁵⁵ after ⁵⁶ Perseus. Busiris lived two centuries before Perseus (§§ 30—37).

‘But you have had no care for truth—you have followed the blasphemies of the poets, who love to represent the gods as more vicious than men. These blasphemers have often suffered, though less than they deserved; some have become wandering beggars, some blind, some exiles, some foes, of their own kindred: Orpheus, the worst of them, was torn to pieces. Now it is my faith that not the gods only, but their children, are without spot of vice. If the gods have not the wish to make their own sons good, they are worse disposed than men; if they have not the power, they are less able than sophists (§§ 38—43).

‘Much more might be said; but my object is to give hints, not to make a display. You have defended Busiris from the charges against him by admitting them, but arguing that they might be brought against others. How would you yourself like to be defended in this fashion? Or if any of your own friends had acted like Busiris, would you praise him? You will say, perhaps, that you wished merely to set an example of defending difficult causes. But a defence of this kind is futile, and tends also to bring philosophy into disrepute. In future you must choose better subjects, or treat those which you do choose more judiciously. Do not resent the advice of a stranger who has not even the privilege of age; it is not age or intimacy, it is knowledge and goodwill which give the right to advise in such matters' (§§ 44—50).

The subject of the Busiris—so well-worn by ⁵⁷ logographers⁵⁸ and poets—is treated by Isokrates in a very simple manner. He praises the customs, religious and political, of Egypt; and then remarks that Busiris is as likely as another to have been the founder of these. The crimes imputed to the inhospitable king he rejects as blasphemies. But if, as an encomium, the piece has not even the merit of ingenuity, it has a real interest of another kind. It illustrates very strikingly the attitude of Isokrates towards the myths generally. He complains that Busiris has been represented as contemporary with Aeolos and Orpheus; whereas the fathers of the two latter were not born in the time of the former (§ 8). How, he asks, can Busiris have been slain by Herakles, who lived four generations after Perseus, while Busiris lived more than 200 years before Perseus? (§ 37.) He rejects the current legends about Busiris because they shock his religious instinct: not only the gods but the children of the gods must be deemed sinless (§ 41). Thus, like Herodotos, Isokrates accepts the myths as a whole⁵⁹,— distinguishing in history a human and a superhuman race, and regarding the latter as not less real than the former; on the other hand, he applies to the myths not, like Herodotos, a strict historical criticism, but only certain general notions of the becoming.

II. 2. Encomium on Helen.

2. Encomium on Helen. [Or. X.]—In § 14 Isokrates praises ‘the writer on Helen’ for his choice of a subject, but finds one fault with his work—viz. that it is less an encomium than an apology. He then says that he will endeavour to show this writer how the subject ought to have been treated; and that he will avoid topics already handled by others.

It is probable, if not certain, that the allusion ⁶⁰ here is to the Encomium on Helen extant under the name of Gorgias. The criticism of Isokrates exactly applies to this composition, which is, in fact, a defence,—with the apologetic character indeed strongly marked⁶¹. Further, the Isokratic encomium keeps clear of the ground traversed in the encomium ascribed to Gorgias. The chief topics of Isokrates are (1) Theseus, who loved Helen: §§ 18— 38: (2) the preciousness of Helen shown by the choice of Paris and by the expedition against Troy: §§ 39—53: (3) the power of Beauty generally: §§ 54—60: (4) the divinity of Helen: §§ 61—66. The other writer, after some introductory remarks (5) devotes the rest of his composition to the various theories by which Helen's desertion of her home can be explained. She may have been taken to Troy (1) by divine agency: (2) by violence: (3) by persuasion: (4) by love: and, on any of these suppositions, says the writer, is excusable: §§ 6—20. Thus the work attributed to Gorgias answers both conditions of the case. It is called an encomium, while it is really an apology; and its special topics are not the topics of Isokrates.

But was Gorgias indeed the author? After ⁶² censuring Gorgias by name in § 3, it would have been strange if Isokrates had praised him in § 14 without naming him. Besides, the language of § 3 implies that Gorgias is dead; the language of § 14 implies that the unnamed writer is alive. Nor does the so-called encomium bear any distinctive marks of the style of Gorgias. Spengel⁶³ would ascribe it to Polykrates. But then if Polykrates had been the author, Isokrates either would have addressed him, as in the Busiris, or would at least have named him. The author of the Argument rejects the notion that Polykrates is meant; remarking that, instead of Isokrates attacking Polykrates, it was Polykrates who attacked Isokrates for this work: and concludes that the allusion is probably to Anaximenes of Lampsakos; ‘a speech by whom is ⁶⁴ extant which is rather a defence of Helen than an encomium⁶⁵.’ It appears not improbable that Anaximenes may have been the real author of the work ascribed to Gorgias; and that it is Anaximenes of whom Isokrates speaks. But on this point we must be content with conjecture⁶⁶ .

Two indications help to fix the time at which ⁶⁷ Isokrates wrote. 1. From § 3 it may be inferred that Gorgias was dead⁶⁸; and Gorgias died about 380 B.C. 2. In § 1 there is an allusion to the three chief Sokratic sects—the Cynics, the Academy, the Megarics. These sects must have already been mature. The language implies further that Antisthenes, founder of the Cynics—who died in 376 B.C. —is still alive. The Encomium may probably be put about 370 B.C.⁶⁹

‘There are persons who pride themselves on being able ⁷⁰ to treat tolerably some paradoxical thesis;—as that one cannot lie; that courage, wisdom, justice, are the same thing —namely, knowledge; that nothing exists; that the same things are at once possible and impossible. This style of discussion has not even the charm of novelty. Who does not know the paradoxes of Protagoras and Gorgias, of Zenon and Melissos? The experts in this jugglery would do better if they took subjects which had some bearing on practical life. But in fact their only aim is to get money from young men, whom these subtleties amuse. The pupils have an excuse; the teachers have none. Some of the impostors go so far as to maintain that beggars and exiles are more enviable than other men. Preference for such themes is a sure sign of weakness. If a man wishes to prove himself a good athlete, he does not go to a palaestra which he will have all to himself. A panegyrist of bees or of salt⁷¹ has no difficulty in appearing equal to his subject. But it is harder to rise to the height of a great argument. On this ground I give all praise to the writer on Helen—for celebrating one who was brilliant beyond compare in birth, beauty and fame. One point, however, has escaped him—that, while he professes to have written an encomium, he has, in fact, offered a defence. And—lest I seem to be doing what is so easy—blaming the work of others without showing my own—I will myself attempt to speak of Helen, omitting all that has been said by others (§§ 1—15).

‘Of all the children whom Zeus begat, the dearest to him were those of whom Alkmene and Leda were the mothers. Herakles and Helen were both destined by him to deathless life in heaven and deathless fame on earth; but to Herakles he gave strength—to Helen, that beauty which vanquishes the strong (§§ 16—17).

‘Her first lover was Theseus, called the son of Aegeus, but in truth the son of Poseidon. He fell in love with her when she was yet a young girl; and when Tyndareus rejected his suit, bore her away from Lacedaemon toAphidna in Attica.

‘Now the man who thus loved her stands alone in ⁷² completeness of merit, having not some great qualities, but all. Contemporary with Herakles, he rivalled him. Both were athletes in the cause of human life; but with a difference;— the exploits of Herakles redounded more to his own glory— those of Theseus, to the good of others. Many deeds prove his courage and his reverence for the gods. His wisdom and moderation were proved by this,—that he was the first who joined Monarchy to Political Equality; gathered scattered villages into one town; and opened to all its citizens a free career, making their goodwill his bodyguard⁷³ (§§ 18—38).

‘When Theseus descended with Peirithoos to Hades, Helen returned to Sparta. The oath taken by her suitors— that he who won her should, if robbed of her, be helped by the rest—showed their foresight of the strife which she must cause. That foresight proved true, though the private hope of each was baffled. Alexander, son of Priam, was chosen ⁷⁴ umpire of beauty by the goddesses. Hera offered him the sovereignty of Asia,—Athene, victory in war,—Aphrodite, the hand of Helen. He could not tell which goddess was fairest; but he knew which offered the best gift. He chose Helen; desiring not her beauty alone, but to be allied with Zeus. Have those who, looking to the sequel, blamed his choice, a judgment better than that to which gods deferred? Or do they blame him for electing to live with her for whom demigods were content to die? (§§ 39—48).

‘And who would have scorned wedlock with her for whose ⁷⁵ sake all the Hellenes went to war as if Hellas had been ravaged? They regarded the issue as lying, not between Alexander and Menelaos, but between Europe and Asia. The land which held Helen must be most blest. As thought men, so thought the gods. Zeus sent his son Sarpedon, Eos sent her Memnon, Poseidon sent Kyknos, Thetis sent Achilles, to a fate which they foreknew, but which, they deemed, could not be more glorious (§§ 40—53).

‘And naturally: for Helen was endowed beyond compare ⁷⁶ with beauty—the most august, the most honoured, the most divine of all things; the quality for which, if absent, nothing can make up; which, where it is present, wins goodwill at first sight; which makes service sweet and untiring, which makes tasks seem favours; beauty, the profanation of which by those who possess it we deem a crime more shameful than any wrong which they can do to others, while we honour for all their days those who guard it sacred as a shrine (§§ 54—58).

‘Before beauty Zeus himself is humble—approaching it ⁷⁷ by craft often, never with violence; it is beauty which has raised most mortals to the gods (§§ 59—60).

‘Helen's power was proportionate to her supremacy in this gift. She became not only immortal but omnipotent. When her brothers were already the prisoners of Death, she lifted them to heaven; and in token of the change, set in the sky that star to which storm-tost sailors pray. To Menelaos, too, she gave deliverance from earthly troubles, and a place in heaven at her side; and at this day, at Therapnae in Lacedaemon, Helen and Menelaos are worshipped, not as blessed spirits only, but as gods. When Stesichoros blasphemed her, she struck him blind; and when he recanted, gave him back his sight. Some of the Homeridae say, too, that it was Helen who stood by Homer in the night, and bade him sing the War of Troy. Seeing then that she can punish and can reward, let rich men honour her with gifts, wise men with praise (§§ 61—66).

‘More than has been said remains untold. Besides the arts, the ideas, the other gains which Greece owes to her and to the Trojan War, it owes its very freedom from the barbarian. Before that time, Greece was a refuge for unlucky foreigners—for Danaos, for Kadmos, for Pelops, for the Karians who settled in the islands. After the war, our race grew strong enough to conquer towns and territory from the alien. If others choose to work out this theme, they will find no lack of matter for past praise of Helen’ (§§ 67—69).

The Encomium on Helen is, as a composition, greatly superior to the Busiris. The effort to adorn an ungrateful theme renders the Busiris constrained and somewhat frigid; here, there is more freedom and more glow. But the principle of the two pieces is the same. Isokrates conceived that dignity and gravity might be added to encomia of the conventional type by connecting with mythical subject-matter some topic of practical interest, political or moral; and he was willing to allow to such topic a greater prominence than its bearing on the special subject could warrant. This purpose is served in the Busiris by the discourse on the institutions of Egypt; in the Helen by the devotion of a large space to the reforms of Theseus.

II. 3. The Evagoras.

3. Evagoras [Or. IX.]—On the occasion of a festival held by Nikokles in memory of his father Evagoras, Isokrates sends this encomium as his tribute. The words in § 78—( πολλάκις σοι διακελεύομαι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν)—have been taken as indicating the Letter To Nikokles, and as showing, therefore, that the Evagoras is later than that work⁷⁸. The scholiast further remarks that, though the speech is an epitaphios, it lacks two regular elements of such a composition— the lament ( τὸ θρηνητικόν) at the beginning and the consolation ( τὸ παραμυθητικόν) at the end; a fact for which he accounts on the supposition that many years had elapsed since the death of Evagoras⁷⁹. Neither this inference nor that drawn from § 78 appears safe. Another, perhaps of greater weight, may however be derived from another circumstance. The death of Evagoras was violent. He was assassinated in 374 B.C. by Thrasydaeos, a eunuch whose master, one Nikokreon, had just fled from Salamis on the detection of a plot against the king's life⁸⁰. Now, §§ 70—72 of this speech are so worded as to imply, without saying, that Evagoras had closed a prosperous life by a happy death⁸¹. If Isokrates had been writing while the memory of the king's death was fresh, could he have written thus? The Letter To Nikokles may, as we saw, be placed in 374 or 373, the Nikokles between 372 and 365. The Evagoras is probably as late as 365; possibly later⁸².

The speech is arranged as follows:—I. Proem, §§ 1—11. II. Evagoras: (1) his lineage and his acquisition of the throne, §§ 12—40: (2) his character, and his domestic reforms, §§ 41—50: (3) his wars, §§ 51—64: (4) general retrospect of his career, §§ 65 —72. III. Hortatory conclusion, §§ 73—81.

I. ‘Seeing you, Nikokles, bringing costly offerings to ⁸³ the tomb of your father,—honouring his obsequies with contests of athletes and of poets, with chariot-races and trireme-races,—I, too, wish to bring my tribute. If the soul of Evagoras is aware of what is done on earth, I believe that nothing could be more grateful to him than the commemoration of his virtues and his trials. The splendour of shows, the rivalry of self-glorifying poets, does not supply this; plain prose, then, shall attempt it. If it were the fashion to extol contemporary, instead of ancient heroes, a double gain would accrue; the panegyrist would be forced to respect truth, and his hearers would be encouraged to effort by the hope of praise. Envy hinders this. But the custom prescribed by envy must be broken through; without innovation there can be no improvement. The task is hard, since prose does not command the graces of poetry; yet it shall be tried whether merit cannot be praised without the help of metre⁸⁴ (§§ 1—11).

II. ‘The descent of Evagoras, well-known though it be, must be mentioned. The house of the Aeakidae, the noblest in Greece, was founded by a son of Zeus, Aeakos, to whom stands the temple in Aegina—a memorial of that intercession with his father by which he once delivered Greece from a sore drought (§ 18). From Aeakos sprang Peleus and Telamon; from Peleus, Achilles; from Telamon, Aias and Teukros. Teukros, after the taking of Troy, founded in Cyprus the town of Salamis and the present dynasty (§§ 12—18).

‘That dynasty has not, however, reigned uninterruptedly. ⁸⁵ A Phoenician exile came of old to Cyprus; won the trust of the king; ousted him, and took his throne⁸⁶. The usurper's descendants still ruled when Evagoras was born. Distinguished in youth by beauty, strength, temperance, in early manhood by courage, wisdom, justice, Evagoras gave uneasiness, but not alarm, to the reigning house. He seemed too brilliant for a private lot, and yet too honest to snatch a royal one. Fortune fulfilled both auguries. It gave him a crown without driving him to a crime. One of the powerful nobles⁸⁷ formed a conspiracy against the despot, and slew him; and sought at the same time to lay hands upon Evagoras, who fled to Soli in Cilicia. He there rallied round him a band of fifty men; landed with them in Cyprus; and, forcing his way the same night into Salamis, attacked the palace. The mass of the inhabitants standing neutral, he succeeded in taking it; expelled the usurpers; and restored the sceptre to his own house⁸⁸ (§§ 19—32).

‘If I were to say no more, the surpassing merit of Evagoras would have been sufficiently proved. No hero of legend or of history ever won kingly power in a manner so brilliant. Take the most famous instance of all—that of the elder Cyrus, who transferred the empire from the Medes to the Persians. Cyrus conquered by his army; Evagoras by his own courage: Cyrus slew his mother's father; Evagoras incurred no guilt’ (§§ 33—40).

‘His use of power was worthy of the manner in which he had gained it. Gifted with great and ready talents, he was at the same time minutely and incessantly diligent. He attended personally to all affairs; knew every citizen; did nothing on hearsay. The love of the gods for him, and his own love of men, were so apparent in his government that strangers visiting Cyprus envied the subjects no less than the king. Enemies found him resistless, friends pliant; he was dignified, but never harsh; consistent in deeds as in words; versatile in taking from every form of constitution its best part; at once a friend of the people, a large-minded statesman, and a far-seeing general (§§ 41—46).’

‘The history of his reign will be found to justify these ⁸⁹ praises. He found the State barbarised by the Phoenicians; ignorant of arts, without commerce, without even a harbour; at enmity with all Hellas⁹⁰. He not only repaired these evils, but acquired territory, built forts, created a fleet, and thus put his city on a par with any in Greece. His civilising influence reached even the barbarian countries adjacent to Cyprus. That island itself became a resort of distinguished settlers from the rest of Greece⁹¹ (§§ 47—50).

‘Foremost among these was Konon. The friendship, ⁹² closer than kinship, which at once sprang up between him and Evagoras was strengthened by the bond of a common sympathy for humiliated Athens. That Persia made the war against Sparta a maritime and not a land war, was due to the joint council of Konon and of Evagoras. They saw that a victory on the Asiatic continent could benefit only the Asiatic Greeks; but that a victory at sea must benefit all Hellas. And so it proved. The battle of Knidos was fought, and the bondsmen of Sparta were freed. Statues of Konon and Evagoras, placed side by side near the statue of Zeus the Deliverer, commemorated the gratitude of Athens (§§ 51—57).

‘Meanwhile Artaxerxes had viewed uneasily the genius ⁹³ and the fortune of Evagoras; and he now seized a pretext for hostilities. Though utterly without material resources, Evagoras, by his own ability and that of his son Pnytagoras, triumphed more marvellously than before. He reduced almost the whole of Cyprus; ravaged Phoenicia; stormed Tyre; threw Kilikia into revolt; filled Persia with mourning and with loathing of the war, until, against all precedent, the Great King made peace before the rebels were in his hands⁹⁴. In a war of less than three years, Persia had stripped Sparta of Empire; after a war of ten years⁹⁵, Persia was compelled to leave Evagoras in full possession of his kingdom (§§ 57—64).

‘Legend celebrates the conquest, by united Hellas, of the town of Troy; but must not that achievement yield to the defeat, by the single city of Salamis, of all Asia? Or where in history is the man who, after winning a throne and civilising a kingdom, won victories which changed the destinies of a race? It is hard to decide whether Evagoras is most admirable for his warfare against Sparta, for his warfare against Persia, for his acquisition, or for his exercise of power.

‘If the gods ever bestowed immortality in reward for virtue, surely it may be deemed that they have given it to Evagoras. During his lifetime, their favour graced him with all gifts of mind and body, with unchanging prosperity, with fame, with years, with noble children (§§ 65—72).

‘Failing powers have not suffered me to praise Evagoras aright; yet a slight tribute, at least, has been offered; and the portrait of a man's character is a better memorial than an image of his body. For you, Nikokles, and for your children, that character should be a spur to excellence. Most men have to take example from strangers; you need not go beyond your own family. I did not forget that you have begun your course well; I exhort you only as bystanders cheer a runner who is winning. Persevere, and you will prove worthy of yourself’ (§§ 73—81).

The Evagoras is professedly an encomium; but the praise which it awards does not, on the whole, appear to be exaggerated. The chief facts known about Evagoras speak for themselves; they show him to have been a man of unusually strong character, and of great abilities both military and political. A memoir of him is valuable not only on this account, but also on account of the peculiar position in which he was placed. Cyprus was divided between Phoenician settlements, such as Citium and Paphos, and later Greek settlements, such as Salamis and Soli. But the bulk of the population was, till long after the time of Evagoras, Phoenician⁹⁶; and continual contact with the non-hellenic East must always have tended to depress the Greek element in Cyprus. Evagoras was the champion of Hellenism against ⁹⁷ barbarism at this out-post; first, as restorer of that Greek civilisation which the Phoenician and Tyrian masters of Salamis had effaced; afterwards, as antagonist of Persia in a War of Independence. Perhaps the most striking passage in the memoir is that which describes how commerce, arts, letters, humane intercourse with the outer world, having become extinct under the rule of the barbarian, speedily sprang into a new life under the rule of the Hellene⁹⁸.

IV 4 Panathenaikos.

4. Panathenaikos [Or. XII.]—Isokrates began the Panathenaikos when he was 94 years of age (§ 3) —i.e. in 342 B.C. A celebration of the Great Panathenaea — mentioned in § 17—fell in Hekatombaeon (July—August) of that year, the third of Olympiad CIX. 3. It was probably the original intention of Isokrates that his speech should be published at this festival, as the Panegyrikos was probably published at Olympia: thus in § 135 he defends himself against the charge of discussing subjects unsuited to a great festal gathering. But this design, if he entertained it, was frustrated. He had written about half the discourse when he fell ill (§ 267); but at last it was completed and published when he was ninety-seven years old (§ 270), i.e. in ⁹⁹ 339. It is thus the latest of his works¹⁰⁰.

The Panathenaikos falls into three parts. I. §§ 1 ¹⁰¹ —34: Introduction. Of these sections only §§ 1—4 are properly introductory. The rest—§§ 5—34—form a parenthetical defence of his ‘philosophy’ generally, in reply to an attack make upon him by some ‘vulgar’ ( ἀγελαῖοι) sophists ‘a little before the Great Panathenaea’ (§ 17).—II. §§ 35—198. The praises of Athens.—III. §§ 199—265. A supplement, in which the author notices certain criticisms upon his work, and rélates the circumstances under which it was composed.

I. ‘In my younger days I used to write, not on legends or remote history, nor in forensic causes, but on practical interests of Athens and Hellas—bringing to bear upon these all the resources of rhetoric. Such subjects and such a style do not now become my ninety-four years; rather it becomes me to speak as all men are apt to think that they could if they would, but as none can without toil.

‘I shall speak of the deeds of Athens and the goodness ¹⁰² of our ancestors. But first I must touch upon a personal matter. All my days I have been misrepresented by obscure and worthless sophists, and misjudged by those who knew me but from hearsay. Health, wealth, a certain repute among the educated have been mine; and yet, in old age, I am discontented. Nature denied me force for action, and gave me but imperfect talents for speech. Strength of voice and firm nerves were denied to me; and at Athens it is more discreditable to lack these than to owe money to the treasury. Not daunted, however, I took refuge in a literary life; and hoped, as the counsellor of Hellenic unity and of war against Asia, to gain more esteem than the speakers who rail against each other in the ekklesia. This hope has failed; I have been praised,—and slighted. It is not strange, indeed, that the public should treat me thus, when the professional sophists, who make their living by plagiarising from me, are my worst enemies. Their slanders never annoyed me until, a few days before the Panathenaea, I learned that a group of them, talking in the Lykeion about Hesiod, Homer and other poets, had spoken of me as scorning all such subjects,—as ignoring all fields of thought, all lines of culture, except my own. I thought that I was safe from a charge of this kind; but I find that I did not overrate the spite which has baulked me of due recognition. Instead of retorting upon the slanderers, or arguing with those whom they influence, I will state in a few words what my notion of culture is. Geometry, astrology, eristic dialogues are good for the young, if only as employing them; but they do not make practical men. By an educated man I understand one who can deal with all that comes upon him day by day; who is honest and mannerly in society; who rules his desires; who is not spoiled by good fortune. So much for culture: my views about the poets shall be set forth at some other time. I have already passed the limits of a preface (§§ 1—34).

II. ‘The beneficence of Athens to Hellas has often ere now been praised by me incidentally; but it has never been, as now, my special themc. I am moved to choose that subject at once by the intemperate censure and by the feeble, or else extravagant, praise bestowed upon our city; also by my own advanced age, which will make failure pardonable and success more creditable (§§ 35—38).

‘As purple or gold is most brilliant when it has a foil, Athens will be best estimated if we place beside her another great city—Sparta (§§ 39—41).

‘The comparison may begin from the Dorian conquest of ¹⁰³ the Peloponnesos. Now our ancestors will be found to have cherished loyally the traditions of the Trojan war—concord with Hellas, and enmity against the barbarian. When the Kyklades, about which there had been disputes in the time of Minos, were at last seized, by the Karians, Athens restored them to the Hellenes¹⁰⁴. She founded cities on either ¹⁰⁵ continent, drove the barbarians from the Asiatic seaboard, and taught the Greek communities how to live. Sparta, meanwhile, careless of agriculture and of all civilising arts, was concentrated upon one selfish object—the conquest of the Peloponnesos; all of which, save Argos, fell under her power. Thus, so far, Athens had been a friend to Hellas; Sparta, only to herself (§§ 42—48).

‘When, later, Xerxes invaded Greece, Sparta, the ruler ¹⁰⁶ of the Peloponnesos, sent but ten triremes to Salamis— Athens sent more than all the other states together. Sparta was represented by Eurybiades, who all but ruined Hellas; Athens, by Themistokles, who saved it (§§ 49—52).

‘Each of the two cities was in turn empress of the sea, ¹⁰⁷ and thereby of the greater part of Hellas. Athens used that power to give to her allies the same form of government which she had herself found best; Sparta used it to impose upon her subjects an unheard-of form of tyranny—the dekarchies, which led to such enormous evils. We held our empire 65 years; when attacked by Greece and Persia combined, we resisted ten years, and afterwards reestablished our power in less time than it had cost to overthrow it. The Spartans kept their empire barely ten years; lost it by a single battle; and have never recovered it. In treating with the Persian king, we forbade him to come west of Halys or Phaselis¹⁰⁸; the Spartans made him master of Hellas (§§ 53—61).

‘Those who reluctantly admit the positive merits of ¹⁰⁹ Athens will perhaps attempt to qualify them by citing her crimes. I do not say that Athens has been faultless; but only that, where she has sinned, Sparta has sinned more. We are accused of having forced our allies to bring their causes to our tribunals. Is not the number of those summoned before our courts smaller than the number of those whom Sparta put to death without trial? We are accused of having taxed our allies. But they paid tribute of their own choice, for their own defence, out of property which we had preserved to them; and, in return, were brought by us out of their forlorn condition to a prosperity as great as that of the Peloponnesians who paid no impost. We are accused of cruelties to Melos, Skione, Torone. If Athens has sometimes been guilty in this respect, the sufferers were petty islands or towns; while the cities which Spartan ambition has made desolate are the greatest in the Peloponnesos, —Messene, which sent Nestor to Troy,—Argos, which sent Agamemnon (§§ 62—73).

‘(Can I pass by Agamemnon without a word of special ¹¹⁰ praise, feeling for him, as I do, the sympathy of one who, like him, has missed his due fame? What element of greatness did Agamemnon lack? The only man who ever was leader of all Hellas, he led it against Asia, with kings for his subalterns; fought, not for his own gain, but for the safety of Greece, against such foreign adventurers as Pelops, Danaos, Kadmos; and, after keeping his army together for ten years by his own ability, took Troy, and quelled the insolence of the barbarians.) §§ 74—87.

‘I was saying that the victims of our severity have been insignificant; those of Sparta's illustrious, and, moreover, her own allies against Troy; the Messenians, namely, whom she drove from their country; and the Argives, with whom she is still at war. Plataea, the only city of Boeotia loyal to Hellas in the Persian war, was soon after taken by Sparta, and most of its citizens were put to death, in order to please Thebes. Athens, on the other hand, gave an asylum at Naupaktos to the Messenians, and bestowed her franchise upon the surviving Plataeans (§§ 88—94).—Both Athens and Sparta are accused of having reduced those cities, of whose liberty they professed themselves champions, to vassalage. Now in the early history of Athens there is no instance of her having aimed at ruling a single other city; whereas the policy of Sparta in the Peloponnesos has been from the first aggressive. Down to the time of our disaster at the Hellespont, we had never caused in any city the factions, the bloodshed, the revolution which, under Sparta, became rife everywhere. It was only when the Lacedaemonian power, after having become the first in Greece, began to decline, that two or three of our generals were guilty of imitating in a few cases a policy of which Sparta had set the earliest example.

‘Lastly, there is an offence against Hellas which Sparta has committed, but Athens, never. When most closely pressed by her neighbours, Athens has never forgotten the enmity which all Greeks ought to feel against the barbarian. Sparta used the alliance of the great king to advance her own power in Hellas; and rewarded him by supporting the rebel Cyrus with the forces led by Klearchos. Then, when Persia had defeated the Spartans at Knidos, they conciliated her by giving up the Asiatic Greeks (§§ 95—107).

‘Discreet admirers of Sparta will admit the truth of these criticisms. But those who cannot allow any fault in her will perhaps try to shift the ground of comparison to the relative merits of the Spartan and Athenian Constitutions. They will contrast the temperance and discipline which prevail there with the licence common among us.

‘I hope to show the superiority of the Athenian Constitution—not, ¹¹¹ indeed, in its present form, but in the form which it had under our ancestors; and which they abandoned, not because they were dissatisfied with it, but from necessity. A land-empire is maintained by moderation and strict discipline; a maritime empire requires nautical skill, hands to row the ships, and a certain reckless, piratical spirit. It was plain that in becoming naval, Athens must lose her old decorum and her hold upon the affection of the allies; but even this was better than submitting to the rule of Sparta.

‘The history of our ancestors’ polity must be traced from a time when as yet Oligarchy and Democracy were not; when barbarians and Greeks alike lived under Monarchies. If the savage heroes of other cities have claimed mention, much more do those of Athens deserve it. The horrors of which, in those days, Thebes and Argos were full, have supplied endless material for tragic poets; Athens, meanwhile, had already a noble civilisation. The favour of the gods was shown by this rare blessing—that from Ericthonios to Theseus the line of hereditary kings was unbroken¹¹². Elsewhere I have spoken at length of Theseus, or this would have been a fitting time to celebrate him. It was his glory that he chose work before the mere pleasures of a ¹¹³ kingly lot; and that he shared the government of the city with the people. His successors established a Democracy tempered with Aristocracy. Some regard Aristocracy, like Timocracy, as a distinct type of polity¹¹⁴. I recognise but three distinct types—Oligarchy, Democracy, Monarchy. The principle which selects the best men for office is applicable to any one of these; and, in all alike, insures prosperity. At present we have to consider the application of this principle to Democracy only. If the subject seem to some too grave for such an occasion as this, it will at least interest those whom I most wish to please; though I doubt my own power of doing justice to it.

‘The excellence of the old Democracy was due to the ¹¹⁵ moral discipline to which the people had been subject under the monarchy. They did not forget the lessons learned then; they chose for leaders men friendly to the new system, but characterised by the old virtues of justice and sobriety. Under the presidency of such men, they soon got a thoroughly good code of laws,—compact, fair, useful, and consistent. Officials were chosen by the demes and tribes, and looked upon office as a task, troublesome, indeed, but honourable. The punctual discharge of this task was followed by moderate praise and designation to some fresh labour; the slightest failure in it was infamy and ruin. Office, therefore, was rather shunned than courted in those days; and the people were content with a constitution which, while exempting them from services, gave them sovereign power over their servants. The proof of this contentment is the fact that the constitution remained unchanged for not fewer than 1000 years,—from its origin to the time of Solon and of Peisistratos¹¹⁶. The latter used his demagogic power to make himself a despot. If it is objected that I speak too positively of a remote past, I reply that this is at least a generally credited account (§§ 108—150).

‘The principles of the old polity have been stated; it ¹¹⁷ remains to speak of its results. But a possible objection must first be met. It will, perhaps, be said that both the civil and the military institutions of Athens in the earliest times were borrowed from Lykurgos. The resemblance may be allowed. But it was Sparta that borrowed from us the idea of a Democracy tempered with Aristocracy, and of elective, instead of sortitive, offices. The Areiopagos, again, was the model of the Gerousia (§§ 151—154).

‘As regards military science, too, it can be shown that ¹¹⁸ the Spartans did not practise it earlier, or use it better, than we did. First, however,—in order to appreciate the manner in which our ancestors used their military skill,—it is necessary to remember how both Athens and Sparta dealt with Hellas after the Persian wars. They made peace with Persia, and attacked each other. Argos and Thebes followed their example; and to this day Persia is arbiter of Hellas (§§ 155—160).

‘The rulers of Athens before the Persian war had no aim but the national well-being. They mediated between cities which were at variance; drove the barbarian from the islands and coasts which he had seized; and thus gave the Greeks wealth and security (§§ 161—167). Their military repute may be judged still better from their interference on behalf of Adrastos, when the Thebans, alarmed at their approach, consented to bury the Argive dead (§§ 168—171). (In the Panegyrikos¹¹⁹ the Athenians were spoken of as having prevailed by force; but the more exact account given here proves no less the fame of their arms (§§ 172—174.)

‘Further, compare the early wars of Sparta with those of ¹²⁰ Athens. Immediately after the Dorian conquest, the aristocratic party became predominant in Lacedaemon; and, instead of allowing the people to share the franchise, fixed them to dwell as vassals in outlying villages, subject not only to the burdens of war, but to outrage and death at the caprice of the civic body. The victories of our Athenian ancestors were not of this shameful kind, but were won in three different periods of war against aliens. One period was that of the struggle with Xerxes; another, that of the war for the possession of the Asiatic colonies,—in which no Dorian took part. In the third (the earliest) period, Thracians, Scythians, and Eurystheus with his Peloponnesians, were in turn defeated; and, later, the troops of Dareios were routed at Marathon. Victorious so often, our fathers were yet true to their old, steadfast character; for they knew that the highest soldiership is impossible to immorality (175—198).

III. ‘Here, at its climax, this discourse would naturally ¹²¹ have ended. I will explain how I have been forced to prolong it.

‘It had been written thus far, and I was revising it with three or four of my young pupils. We thought that nothing but a conclusion was wanted; but it occurred to me to ask a friend of oligarchical sympathies, and devoted to Sparta, if he could point out any misstatement which we had over looked. He came; heard, and praised, the greater part of ¹²² the essay; but evidently disliked the criticisms upon the Spartans. ‘If Hellas owes them nothing else,’ he said, ‘it should be grateful to them for this—that they discovered the noblest rules of conduct, which they observe themselves and have taught to others.’—‘All would allow,’ I replied, ‘that piety, justice, prudence, are the best rules of conduct. The Spartans have been settled no more than 700 years in the Peloponnesos. If, then, these rules were first observed at Sparta, were they unknown to Herakles and Theseus, to Minos, Rhadamanthos, Aeakos? Again, discoverers are usually men of more than average intelligence and knowledge; but the Spartans are ignorant of the rudiments of letters. And as for their morality, they train their youth to rob the surrounding country; punishing them if they are found out, and promoting them if they are not.’ ‘By rules of conduct,’ he answered, ‘I did not mean piety, justice, prudence. I meant a manly, warlike training, and loyalty to one common purpose.’ ‘None are so blameable,’ I said, ‘as those who put good things to a bad use. The Spartans employ their warlike science to harass, and their unanimity to divide, the other Greeks’ (§§ 199—228).

‘My opponent was silenced, and went away a wiser man, inasmuch as he had learned the lesson recommended at Delphi. He had learned to know himself—and Lacedaemon. I had my essay written out immediately. But three or four days later new misgivings assailed me. It seemed to me ¹²³ that I had been too supercilious and too bitter in my expressions about Sparta. At last I called a council of friends to decide whether the composition should be burnt or published. It was read to them, and well received. The rest were ¹²⁴ talking it over among themselves, when my original adviser, the partisan of Sparta, addressed me. ‘I suspect,’ he said, ‘that you are not really uneasy about the manner in which you have spoken of the Lacedaemonians, and that you have brought us here only to try us. Your first idea was to extol Athens by comparing it advantageously with Sparta. Then, conscious that you had always been a panegyrist of Sparta, you became afraid of seeming inconsistent. Accordingly, you gave the semblance of censure to what was really praise. You have reproached the Spartans as arrogant, warlike, grasping. Now arrogance is allied to a lofty spirit. It is a warlike, not a peaceful temper which enlarges and guards possessions. Covetousness on a petty scale is, indeed, unpopular, and so defeats its own ends; but the covetousness of nations and despots has results which all the world admires. I am no enemy to the fame of your performance in thus pointing out its covert meaning. The hint will assist intelligent Spartans to perceive that, in accusing their city of having conquered all its great neighbours, you have glorified it; and that, in dwelling upon the faction and bloodshed among its dependents, you have implied the exemption of Sparta from such evils. You are to be congratulated upon the fame which you must win for having made both Athens and Sparta appear admirable;— Athens, to the many; Sparta, to the thoughtful. Do not burn your essay, but publish it, adding the discussion to which it has given rise; and so prove that you are as superior to the ordinary writers for the festivals as Homer to the poets who have copied him.’

‘These remarks were applauded enthusiastically; and all urged me to take the counsel. I thanked my able adviser; but did not tell him how far he had hit, or missed, my real mind (§§ 229—265).

‘My work is finished; a word in conclusion as to the ¹²⁵ circumstances under which it was done. It was begun in the 94th year of my age, and was half-completed, when I was seized with the disorder against which I have been struggling for three years. For a long time I did not allow it to stop my labours; but had at last given in, when friends pressed me not to leave this speech unfinished. I did as they wished, though in my 97th year, and in a state in which few could bear to be listeners, much less writers. This is not said to win indulgence, but simply in order to make the facts known. An acknowledgment is due to those who value instructive and artistic essays above mere displays; and a warning to those who judge rashly what they do not understand’ (§§ 266—272).

Isokrates prefaces the Panathenaikos with the ¹²⁶ remark that both in respect to subject-matter and in respect to style it belongs to a different class from those works which employed his best years. Those works dealt with contemporary politics; this is purely historical: those displayed all the resources of an elaborate rhetoric; this is in a plain, though finished, style. He fears that the Panathenaikos will seem somewhat languid— μαλακώτερος—if compared with its brilliant predecessors: it must be judged, he says, in view of its own special scope.

There is one comparison, however, which can ¹²⁷ hardly be avoided on this plea. The chief topics of the Panathenaikos are embraced in the first half of the Panegyrikos. These are:—1. The early services of Athens to Hellas in founding colonies, and in repelling the barbarians: Panath. §§ 42—48: Panegyr. §§ 34—37. 2. The early wars of Athens: Panath. §§ 175—198: Panegyr. §§ 51—70. 3. Athens in the Persian wars: Panath. §§ 49—52 and 189: Panegyr. §§ 71—74, 85—98. 4. The maritime empire of Athens: Panath. §§ 53—61: Panegyr. § 104, &c. 5. The misdeeds in Hellas of Athens and of Sparta respectively: Panath. §§ 62—107: Panegyr. §§ 100—132. Now, it is not merely in rhetorical brilliancy, it is in point and definiteness of thought, in vigour, in clearness of arrangement, that the Panegyrikos is so greatly superior to the Panathenaikos. The Panegyrikos is the earliest of its author's longer compositions, and the best; the Panathenaikos is the latest, and must be pronounced the weakest. The symptoms of the condition in which the writer then was—‘exhausted both by sickness and by old age’ (§ 268)—are indeed evident in many places. They appear in the diffuse yet incomplete reply to his detractors inserted at the beginning; in the long digression on Agamemnon, closed by the avowal that he knows not whither he is ‘drifting’ (§ 88); in the disorder especially of §§ 155—198; and in the rambling supplement §§ 199—265. This last raises a curious point. Isokrates evidently felt that his vehement censures of Sparta in the Panathenaikos were inconsistent with much in the general tone of his other writings (§ 239). But how far did he seriously mean to hint, as his own, the view which he makes his critic suggest—that these censures were, in their esoteric meaning, praise; since arrogance, aggressiveness, rapacity often win prizes which command [vulgar] admiration? In § 265 he declines to say how far the critic's suggestion had hit or missed his mind. If the critic was in any measure right, then the ingenuity of Isokrates had, indeed, declined.

The Panathenaikos contains, as has been seen, ¹²⁸ little that is not said better in the Panegyrikos; but it has at least one passage of distinctive interest. In §§ 108—154 Isokrates sketches his theory of the early Constitutional History of Athens. The characteristic feature of this theory is that it ignores any Oligarchical period, properly so called, between the Monarchy and the Democracy. The Monarchy is immediately succeeded by a Democracy; a Democracy tempered, indeed, by the principle of preferring the ‘best men’— δημοκρατία ἀριστοκρατίᾳ μεμιγμένη (§ 153). The term ‘oligarchic,’ as applied to the statesmen of this period, was a mere calumny of Peisistratos (§ 143). The elasticity of meaning which Isokrates gave to ‘democracy’ may be illustrated from Areopag. § 61, where he says that the Lacedaemonians are best governed because they are most democratic. It is noticeable, however, that in the Areopagitikos he dates that elder Democracy which he holds up to imitation, only from Solon— ὁ δημοτικώτατος (§ 16); perhaps because that preSolonian democracy which he here extols appeared to him a practically unattainable ideal.

III. Essays on education.

III 1 Against the Sophists.

1. Against the Sophists [Or. XIII.]—As Isokrates himself tells us, this discourse was written at the beginning of his professional life¹²⁹; and it may probably be assigned to the year 391 or 390 B. C.¹³⁰¹³¹ The speech would thus have the character of a manifesto in which, at the outset of his career, the teacher protests against the system adopted by other members of his profession, and declares the principles by which he himself intends to be guided. In its extant form the discourse is plainly imperfect. It breaks off at the point where Isokrates is passing— as he passes in the introductions to the Busiris and the Encomium on Helen—from destructive criticism to positive illustration¹³².

‘If those who undertake to instruct others would only ¹³³ tell the truth, instead of promising more than they can perform, they would not have been in such ill-repute with the non-professional world. As it is, their reckless boasting has brought discredit upon literary studies generally.

‘First, the professors of Eristic Discussion are to blame. ¹³⁴ They assert that their pupils will know how to act under all circumstances, and will, through this knowledge, be happy; thus claiming a prescience which Homer, wisest of poets, denies to the gods,—for he represents them debating. And this precious secret of happiness is sold by its proprietors for three or four minae. Most absurd of all, they do not appear to believe that the persons whom their course of teaching is to inspire with virtue and moderation will be ordinarily honest at the end of it. They take securities from their pupils for the payment of fees. Is it not natural that plain men should look upon such teaching as an imposture? (§§ 1—8.)

‘Next, the teachers of Forensic and Deliberative speaking¹³⁵¹³⁶ are to blame. They say that the art of speaking well on all occasions can be taught as certainly as the alphabet. Would that it were so! As it is not so, such idle talk ought to be stopped. All literary men suffer by the prejudice which it excites. It is surprising that teachers can succeed who assume an analogy between an art depending on fixed rules and the exercise of a creative faculty. The letters of the alphabet are the same for every one. The conditions of a good speech are not precisely the same for any two persons. A speech, to be good, must be wortny of the subject, suitable to the occasion and to the speaker, and in some measure original. All would allow that the art of speaking has often been mastered, both in theory and practice, without professional aid. Talent and experience are the two requisites for success. Instruction can polish, but cannot make, oratorical power. It is not difficult to learn the elements ( ἰδεῶν)¹³⁷ out of which all speeches must be composed. But to combine and temper these elements rightly, and to give to the resulting whole a proper colouring, requires a vigour, an imaginative force, which cannot be communicated; although, where these exist, they will be developed under a teacher who himself possesses them. (§§ 9—18).

‘The pretentious school of sophists which has lately sprung up, however flourishing now, will, I feel sure, be at last reduced to admitting this. As for the sophists before our time who wrote the so-called Arts of Rhetoric, they, too, had their faults. They undertook to teach the mode of conducting law-suits—thus confining their subject to its most ¹³⁸ odious branch, and falling below the Eristics, who at least professed to aim at virtue, whereas these avowed themselves teachers of rapacity. Now the study of practical rhetoric, though insufficient to form a good speaker, might at least have been used to inculcate fairness in argument. Justice cannot be taught; but a spirit of justice may be encouraged and developed by lessons in Deliberative speaking.

‘That I may not seem to be complaining of what others undertake to do, and myself, at the same time, undertaking what is impossible, I will give the reasons which have led me to this view’...... (§§ 19—22: Conclusion wanting).

Isokrates was, and called himself, a sophist¹³⁹, that is, a professional teacher of philosophy and rhetoric; though he distinguished himself from the ἀγελαῖοι σοφισταί, the common herd of the profession. Who, then, are those sophists whom in this ¹⁴⁰ speech he condemns; and what was the extent of his disagreement from them?

Three classes of teachers are censured. (1) The ¹⁴¹ Eristics,— οἱ περὶ τὰς ἐρίδας διατρίβοντες (§ 2). Their chief characteristic, as described by Isokrates, is that they profess to impart, for a small fee, absolute knowledge ( ἐπιστήμη, § 3), which will enable its possessor to act rightly under all circumstances; virtue being included in the knowledge so taught (§ 6). In this description, the sarcasm upon knowledge, and the preference given to intelligent opinion (§ 8), would seem to reflect upon the Sokratics; just as elsewhere Isokrates speaks of ‘Eristic dialogues’ with apparent reference to the Platonic dialogues¹⁴²—ignoring that distinction between Dialectic and Eristic on which Plato insists in the Philebos and the Euthydemos¹⁴³. It may be questioned whether here Isokrates means Plato, as he certainly does in a later work, the Encomium on Helen; but at least there must be a reference to the minor Sokratics, and especially to Eukleides¹⁴⁴.

(2) The second class of teachers blamed by ¹⁴⁵ Isokrates are the professors of ‘Political Discourse’, that is, of Practical Rhetoric, Deliberative and Forensic¹⁴⁶. Now it was the professed aim of Isokrates, no less than of Protagoras¹⁴⁷, to impart a practical training for the active duties of a citizen. The clue to the meaning of the censure pronounced here is to be found in that passage of the Antidosis where Isokrates defines the scope of his ‘philosophy’¹⁴⁸. He there says that three things go to form a first-rate public speaker—nature, discipline, experience. Of these, natural aptitude is by far the most important; experience ranks next; instruction, παιδεία, is of least moment; for without one, at least, of the other qualifications it can do little. At the same time all persons, whatever their capacity, who have been properly taught, will bear the stamp of a uniform scientific method¹⁴⁹. What, then, he means to censure in the professors of whom he speaks here is not their pretension to a scientific method of teaching Practical Rhetoric; it is the unlimited efficacy which they claimed for instruction, independently of nature or experience. They promised unconditionally to make anyone a good speaker: this promise Isokrates denounces as imposture ( ἀλαζονεία § 10).

(3) Besides these two classes—the Eristics and ¹⁵⁰ the teachers of Political Discourse, who are described as of recent growth—a third class of sophists is condemned by Isokrates. This consists of ‘those who lived before our time and wrote the so-called Arts of Rhetoric.’ Here, again, the limits of the censure must be noted. Isokrates himself probably wrote an ‘Art;’ at any rate, some of his extant precepts on rhetorical composition might certainly have had a place in such a treatise. It is not the attempt to reduce the theory of Rhetoric to a system which he is condemning here. He is complaining that the earlier writers of Arts devoted themselves entirely to the least noble branch, the Forensic. They professed to teach men ‘political discourse’; but really ‘they undertook to be teachers of meddlesomeness and greed’ (§ 20), whereas the Eristics at any rate aim at imparting virtue. The writers on Rhetoric primarily meant are, no doubt, Korax and Tisias—perhaps also Antiphon. Such treatises as those of Gorgias, Thrasymachos of Chalkedon, and Polos, however unsatisfactory in other respects they might seem to Isokrates, were probably less liable to the particular censure passed here. It may be presumed that they dealt, not with Forensic Rhetoric exclusively, but with Rhetoric in all its branches, especially the Epideictic. The complaint of Isokrates is in one aspect perfectly just. It is repeated by Aristotle; who remarks that the earlier writers of Arts almost confined themselves to Forensic Rhetoric just because they had not a really scientific method, and therefore preferred that field in which chicanery ( τὸ κακοῦργον) had the freeest scope¹⁵¹ .

The Speech Against the Sophists ought to be ¹⁵² read along with the Speech On the Antidosis, written some thirty-five years later, when his career was drawing to a close. Taken together, they express his whole educational and literary creed. There is a thorough harmony between the principles of the two essays; but there is likewise a difference between their points of view. In the earlier discourse, Isokrates is concerned solely in distinguishing himself from false brethren. In the later, he is not only defending himself, but vindicating the entire profession to which he belonged, from the criticism of laymen.

III. 2. On the Antidosis.

2. On the Antidosis [Or. XV.] The discourse was written when Isokrates had completed his 82nd year (§ 9), i.e. later than midsummer¹⁵³, 354 B. C.; and alludes to the fine imposed upon Timotheos (§ 129), who was now dead (§ 101). Timotheos was brought to trial about midsummer, 354, and died at Chalkis later in the same year. This speech may probably, then, be placed in the first half of 353 ¹⁵⁴ B. C. The latest work of Isokrates quoted in it is the Speech On the Peace (§ 66), which belongs probably to the earlier half of 355 B. C. Isokrates had lately been called upon to undertake the trierarchy, or to make exchange of properties ( antidosis) with his challenger. The case had come to a trial; the trierarchy had been imposed upon Isokrates, and he had discharged it (§ 5). Vexed, however, by the general prejudice against his pursuits to which he felt that the verdict had been due, he determined to publish an Apologia—a discourse ‘which should be an image of his mind ¹⁵⁵ and life’ (§ 7). This he throws into the form of a speech made in court against one Lysimachos (§ 14), who, by working on popular prejudice, is seeking to cast the burden of the trierarchy upon him. Much of the discourse is not, he allows, in the forensic style (§ 10); yet, by the concluding allusion to a verdict (§ 323), he aims, in a measure, at sustaining the fiction to the end.

It is known that, in 355 B. C.¹⁵⁶, Isokrates had ¹⁵⁷ really been challenged to an exchange of properties by one Megakleides; and, being unable through illness to appear in court, had been represented by his adopted son Aphareus, whose speech on the occasion is quoted by Dionysios¹⁵⁸. Now this is probably the trial to which Isokrates refers as having been decided against him. It must have taken place at least a year before the date of this discourse, since it is implied that the public service had now been discharged (§ 5). Lysimachos is a fictitious person who stands for the Megakleides of the real trial¹⁵⁹.

‘If this speech were an ordinary specimen of the Forensic ¹⁶⁰ or Epideictic class, it would need no preface. As it is of a new kind, its origin must be explained. I had long known that some of the sophists slandered my pursuits, and represented me as a writer of speeches for the law-courts. They might as well have called Pheidias a doll-maker, Zeuxis or Parrhasios a sign-painter. Believing that I had made it clear that my subjects are not private disputes but the greatest and highest questions, I supposed such idle calumnies to be powerless. Now, however, at the age of 82, I have discovered that they influence the general public. A person who had been called upon to serve as trierarch challenged me to exchange properties with him, or else to take the duty. A lawsuit followed. The plaintiff dwelt upon the evil tendency of my writings, upon my wealth and the number of my pupils; and the court imposed the trierarchy upon me. The expense I bore with equanimity; but I wish to correct the prejudices which led to such a verdict. This discourse is ¹⁶¹ meant as an image of my mind and life. It is cast into the form of a defence in an imaginary trial. It contains some things that might be said in a lawcourt; some, unsuited to such a place, but illustrative of my philosophy; some, which may profit young men anxious to learn; some, taken from my former writings and introduced here in harmony with a special purpose. The resulting whole must not be judged as representing any one class of speech, but as made up of several distinct elements brought in with several distinct aims. It ought to be read, not continuously, but part by part. (§§ 1—13.)

‘The worst knave is he who brings against another ¹⁶² charges to which he himself is liable. Lysimachos, delivering a composed speech, has dwelt most of all upon the insidious skill of my compositions. Do not be swayed by calumny; remember the oath taken yearly by judges that they will hear impartially accuser and accused. Ere now Athens has regretted a hasty verdict; and it would be shameful that Athenians, reputed in all else the most merciful of the Greeks, should be rashly cruel in their own law-courts. No one of you, the judges, can tell that he will not be the next victim of Lysimachos. A good life is no protection from such men; they show their power upon the innocent in order to be bribed by the guilty. Never till this day have I been brought before judge or arbitrator; now, if you will hear me, I hope to prove my real character.—Read the indictment. [ Indictment.] (§§ 14—29)

‘Here, in the indictment, he charges me with corrupting ¹⁶³ the youth by teaching them to be tricky litigants. In his speech, on the other hand, he represents me as the most wonderful of men;—as one among whose pupils have been public speakers, generals, kings, despots. He thinks that I shall be envied on the latter account, and detested on the former. Dismiss prejudice, and decide upon the merits of the case. That my literary skill has not been used for bad purposes, appears from the fact that I have no enemies. If I had, they would have profited by this trial to appear against me. This skill itself, if it has been well used, is a claim to esteem. The difference between me and a writer of lawspeeches will appear if you compare our modes of life. Men ¹⁶⁴ frequent the places from which they draw their subsistence. Those who subsist by your litigation almost live in the lawcourts. No one has ever seen me in a council-chamber, at the archon's office, before judges, before arbitrators. Pettifoggers thrive at home; my prosperity has always been found abroad. Is it probable that Nikokles of Cyprus, sovereign judge among his people, should have rewarded me for aiding him to become a pleader? No mere writer of law-speeches has ever had pupils; I have had many. But it is not enough to show that my line of work has not been this. I will shew you what it has been. (§§ 30—44.)

‘First, it must be remembered that there are as many branches of prose as of poetry. Some prose-writers have spent their lives in tracing the genealogies of the Heroes. Others have been critics of the poets. Others have compiled histories of wars. Others have woven discussions into dialogues. My work has lain in yet another field,—in the composition of discourses bearing upon the politics of all Hellas, and fitted for recitation at Panhellenic ¹⁶⁵ gatherings. Such discourses evidently stand nearer to poetry than to forensic rhetoric. Their language is more imaginative and more ornate; there is greater amplitude, more scope for originality, in the thoughts which they strive to express. They are as popular as poems; and the art of writing them is much studied. Unlike forensic speeches, they deal with matters of universal interest; they have a lasting value, independent of any special occasion. Besides, he who is a master of these could succeed also in a law-court; but not vice versa. At these I have worked; and have got by them a reputation better than law-courts could give. (§§ 45—50.)

‘I am ready to impose the severest terms upon myself. ¹⁶⁶ Punish me, not merely if my writings are proved harmful, but if they are not shown to be matchless. It is not necessary here to argue on probabilities. My writings are themselves the facts in question. Samples of them shall be shown to you, and you shall judge for yourselves. The discourse from which the first sample shall be taken was written when Sparta was at the head of Greece and Athens in a low estate. It seeks to rouse Hellas against Persia; and disputes the claim of Sparta to sole leadership.—(Begin at the mark in the margin, and read them the passage about the hegemony.) [ Here is read an Extract from the Panegyrikos, §§ 51—99.] ¹⁶⁷ (§§ 51—59.)

‘Is the writer of this a ‘corrupter of young men,’ or their inciter to noble daring? Does he deserve punishment; or is he to be thanked for having so praised Athens and your ancestors that former writers on the same theme feel remorse, and intending ones, despair? (§§ 60—61.)

‘Some who, themselves unable to create, can only criticise, will say that this is ‘graceful’ (they could not bring themselves to say ‘good’); but that praise of the past is less valuable than censure of present mistakes. You shall hear, then, part of another speech in which I assume this office of censor. Its immediate subject is the peace with Chios, Rhodes and Byzantium; it goes on to show the drawbacks to a maritime supremacy; and ends by addressing to Athens exhortation, censure and advice.—(Begin there, and read this extract to them.) [ Here is read an Extract from the Speech On the ¹⁶⁸ Peace, §§ 25—56: §§ 132¹⁶⁹ ff. to the end.] (§§ 62—66.)

‘You have now heard parts of two discourses; a short passage from a third shall be read, in order that you may see how the same tendency goes through all that I have written. Here, addressing Nikokles of Cyprus, I did not aim at regular composition, but merely strung together a number of detached precepts upon government. It is not for their literary merit, but simply as showing the spirit of my dealing with princes as well as with private men, that they are quoted here. One who so boldly advised a king to care for his people, would surely be no less frank in the popular cause ¹⁷⁰ under a Democracy.—I begin by blaming the usual neglect of special preparation by a monarch; and then urge Nikokles to regard his office as a task calling for serious labour. [ Here is read an Extract from the Discourse To Nikokles, §§ 14— 39.] (§§ 67—72.)

‘This shall be the last of these long extracts; but I reserve the right of referring in detail to my own writings whenever it can be useful. I offered just now to bear any penalty, not ¹⁷¹ merely if it could be shewn that my writings were harmful, but unless it could be shewn that they were incomparable. That boast has been justified. What attempt could be holier or more righteous than the attempt to praise our ancestors worthily of their exploits; what theme nobler than his who urges Hellenes to unite against barbarians? Good laws are allowed to be the greatest blessings to human life. Yet these benefit only the individual city; my discourses profit all Hellas. It is easier to be a legislator than to be a competent adviser of Athens and Hellas. The legislator, in an advanced stage of civilisation, is often little more than a compiler; the thoughts of an effective speaker must be his own. Teachers of moral philosophy differ from each other and from the world as to what is virtue; the virtue which I inculcate is recognised by all. Those theorists seek only to draw disciples to themselves; my object is to impress a public duty upon Athens. The alleged vices of my teaching are disproved by the affection of my pupils; who, at the end of three or four years, have left me with regret. Lysimachos has accused me, without a shadow of proof, of corrupting them; but I will refute him formally. (§§ 74—92.)

‘You know my writings; you shall now hear who have ¹⁷² been my associates from childhood, and the evidence of my contemporaries shall prove the statement. Among my friends in youth were Eunomos, Lysitheides, Kallippos; afterwards Onetor, Antikles, Philonides, Philomelos, Charmantides¹⁷³. All these were crowned with golden crowns for their services to Athens. Whether you suppose me to have been their adviser and teacher, or merely their companion, my character is vindicated. If it is not, what would it have been if among my intimates had been such a man as Lysimachos? Some will perhaps say that I am citing good men whom I barely knew, but keeping out of sight the rascals who were my pupils. I am ready to waive all credit for honourable friendships, and to bear the full discredit of any which can be shown to have been disreputable. (§§ 93—100.)

‘The general charge against me in the indictment—that ¹⁷⁴ of corrupting my associates—has been sufficiently answered. But special stress has been laid upon my friendship with Timotheos; and, since the interests which he long controlled were so great, especial pains have been taken to slander him. I, therefore, who am supposed to have been his adviser and teacher, cannot be silent. If he is shown to have been a bad man, let me share the blame. If he is proved to have been incomparable as a general and as a citizen, let the honour be his alone. Now, in the first place, no general ever took so many and such important cities. Corcyra, important in regard to the Peloponnesos,—Samos, for Ionia,—Sestos and Krithôtê, for the Hellespont,—Potidaea, for Thrace,—were taken by him with slender resources. He forced Lacedaemon into the present peace¹⁷⁵, the most advantageous ever concluded by Athens. In a word, he took 24 towns at a smaller outlay than the single siege of Melos cost our fathers. These exploits were achieved at a time when we were weak and our enemies strong. By what qualities did Timotheos achieve them? He was not of the ordinary type of your generals,— neither of a robust frame, nor trained in the camps of mercenaries. But he knew against whom, and with whose aid, to make war; how to form, and to use, a force suitable for each attempt; how to bear privations, and to remedy them; how to win for Athens the trust and the love of Greece. A general who, like Lysander, has one brilliant success is less great than one who for years deals wisely with ever-varying difficulties. Yet Timotheos was brought to trial for treason; and, although Iphikrates took the responsibility for what had been done, Menestheus for what had been spent, they were acquitted, while Timotheos was fined in an unheard-of sum¹⁷⁶. Ignorance, envy, excitement, go far to explain this result; but it must be owned that the character of Timotheos contributed to it. He was no anti-democrat, ¹⁷⁷ no misanthrope, not arrogant; but his unbending loftiness of mind made him liable to seem all this. Against my advice, he refused to conciliate the speakers who sway the ekklesia and those who direct the opinion of private circles. These men made it their business to frame falsehoods about him— falsehoods which, had I space, I could bring you to see and hate. But I must go back to my own case. (§§ 101—139.)

‘I hardly know how to arrange the topics on which it remains for me to speak; perhaps it will be best to take each as it occurs. But here I am checked by the warning of a ¹⁷⁸ friend,—which you shall hear. ‘If you describe your blameless life,’ he said, ‘you will only provoke jealousy. That you should have so written as to deserve public gratitude, and that your intimates should have been men whom Athens delighted to honour; that, till now, you should have been a stranger to lawsuits; that, while seeking no public emoluments, you should have enrolled yourself and your son among the twelve hundred who pay the war-tax and bear the public services; that you and he should thrice have discharged the trierarchy, and performed the other services at a greater cost than the laws enjoin; that you should receive presents from abroad, and avoid all display at home—these things will but irritate your judges.’ When my friend said this, it seemed to me that it would be strange if any reasonable men could object to my bearing the city's burdens and yet declining its rewards. I decline its rewards not from arrogance, but from preference for a quiet life. It is not because I am very rich that I take so large a share of its burdens. No sophist has ever made a great fortune. Gorgias ¹⁷⁹ of Leontini, who passed much time in Thessaly when it was the richest part of Greece—whose life was spent in seeking wealth from city to city, and who had no family burdens— left only 1000 staters. The income of a sophist must not be judged by that of a popular actor. Compare me, if you will, with the most successful men in my own profession; and you will find that I have been at once a thrifty householder and a liberal citizen. (§§ 140—158.) Things have changed at Athens since I was a boy. Then wealth was not only dignified but safe, and every one affected to be richer than he was. Now it is more dangerous to be suspected of wealth than of ¹⁸⁰ the worst crime. When my fortune was wrecked in the Peloponnesian war, and I resolved to repair it by teaching, I hoped that success in my new profession would bring credit and respect. It has brought, however, only envy and slander. Lysimachos, who lives by the informer's trade, is accuser—I, who have not preyed on you, but have prospered through the gratitude of men whom I had saved, stand in danger. Our ancestors made Pindar their public friend (proxenos), and ¹⁸¹ voted him 10,000 drachmas¹⁸² because he bore witness that Athens is the stay of Hellas. It would be hard if I, who have given her praise ampler and nobler than that, should not be allowed even to end my days in peace. (§§ 159—166.)

‘The indictment has now been answered. But from the first I have foreseen that I should have to combat, not merely the charges against myself, but the prejudice against these studies generally. Reflection, however, assured me that among you I should find fairness, and that the cause of Philosophy could be satisfactorily defended. In the fact of the prejudice against it there is nothing strange. Athens is large and populous. Public opinion here is irregular ¹⁸³ and vehement as a winter-torrent. It sweeps down all men and all things that it chances to seize. This has befallen my studies. But you must decide calmly. Remember that it is not my case alone which is at issue, but the education of our youth—upon which the future of Athens must depend. If Philosophy is a bad thing, it should be absolutely banished; if it is a good thing, it should be encouraged, and its detractors should be silenced. I wish that this accusation had been brought against me (if it was to be brought) at a time when I could have pleaded the cause of philosophy with the vigour of a younger man. However, I will try to set before you, as well as I can, its nature—its power—its relation to other sciences—the benefits which it is able to confer—and the degree in which I profess to impart them. If the style of the defence is singular, pardon it to the difficulty of the subject. (§§ 167—179.)

‘What Gymnastic is for the body, Philosophy is for the ¹⁸⁴ mind. In the one as in the other, the pupil learns first the technical rudiments, and then how to combine them. The physical and the mental training will alike improve natural powers. But the master of the palaestra cannot make a great athlete, nor the teacher of Philosophy a great speaker. To make the latter, three things are needed—capacity, training, and practice. Capacity—which includes intellect, voice, and nerve—is the chief requisite. Practice, however, can by itself make a good speaker. Training is by far the least important of the three. It may be complete, and yet may be rendered useless by the absence of a single quality— nerve. (§§ 180—192.)

‘Do not suppose that my claims are modest only when I ¹⁸⁵ address you, but larger when I speak to my pupils. In an essay published when I first began to teach, the excessive pretensions of some teachers are expressly blamed.—This passage will explain my view.

[ Here is read an Extract from the Essay Against the Sophists, §§ 14—18.]

You see, then, that at the outset as at the close of my career, in safety as in danger, I have held this language.

‘This, I well know, will not satisfy those against whose prejudices I am contending. Much more must be said before they can be converted or refuted. Their prejudice utters itself in one of two assertions:—that the system of the sophists is futile; or that it is effectual, but immoral. (§§ 193—198.)

‘Those who say that it is futile try it by a standard ¹⁸⁶ which they apply to none of those arts in which they believe. They demand that all its disciples shall become finished speakers in a year. The success of the sophists is, in fact, equal to that of any other class of teachers. Some of their pupils become powerful debaters; others become competent teachers; all become more accomplished members of society, better critics, more prudent advisers. And what proves the training to be scientific, is that all bear the stamp of a common method. These who despise such culture assume that practice, which develops every other faculty, is useless to the intellect; that the human mind can educate the instincts of horses and dogs, but cannot train itself; that tame lions and learned bears are possible, but not instructed men. (§§ 199—214.)

‘Others maintain that Philosophy has an immoral ¹⁸⁷ tendency, and hold it responsible for the faults of a few who pervert it. I am not going to defend all who say that they are sophists, but only those who say so truly. And first—What are ¹⁸⁸ the objects which tempt men to be dishonest? I answer that the object is always one of three things—pleasure, profit, or honour. Could it be pleasant, profitable, or honourable for a sophist that his pupils should be known as rascals? It may perhaps be replied that men do not always calculate; that a margin must be left for intemperate impulse. But, even if a sophist indulged such impulses in himself, it could be no more for his pleasure than for his interest to encourage them in his pupil. Are the strangers who come from Sicily, from the Euxine and other quarters to the rhetorical schools of Athens brought hither by the desire to become knaves? Or, if that were their wish, could they not find teachers at home? But the whole tenor of their life among us proves them honest men. Again, if power in discourse is in itself a corrupting thing, all those who have possessed it, and not some only, ought to have been tainted by it. Yet the best ¹⁸⁹ statesmen of our generation and of the last were those who had most studied oratory. To go back to old times, Solon, Kleisthenes, Themistokles, Perikles, were all distinguished orators: Solon was even called one of the Seven Sophists. Perikles studied under Anaxagoras of Klazomenae, and under Damon¹⁹⁰, who was the ablest Athenian of his time (§§ 215—236).

‘But I can point out the places in which may be found ¹⁹¹ those who are really liable to the charges falsely brought against the sophists. Read the tablets, giving notice of lawsuits, which are published by the Thesmothetae, by the Eleven, and by the Forty¹⁹². Among the names of wrongdoers and of false accusers which figure there will be found those of Lysimachos and his friends,—not mine, nor that of any member of our profession. Were we really corrupters of youth, our accusers would have been the fathers and relatives of those whom we corrupted,—not such men as Lysimachos, whose interest it is that Athens should be demoralised. Just now I spoke of the hostility which some educated men feel towards our art. That hostility, I venture to hope, will have been disarmed by these plain statements. But there is, I think, a jealousy which is even more widely spread. It is ¹⁹³ because all ambitious men wish to be able speakers, but are too indolent to work for that end, that they dislike those who are ready to go through the necessary toil. It is strange that, while Athenians reproach the Thebans and others with neglecting culture, they should revile their fellow-citizens for seeking it; that the goddess of Persuasion should be honoured with yearly sacrifice, while those who wish to share her power should be regarded as desiring something evil; that bodily training should be esteemed, while mental training— to which Athens owes her place in Hellas—is slighted (§§ 237—257).

‘If a man used his inherited wealth, his skill as a hoplite or as an athlete, in doing harm to his fellow-citizens, he would be punished, though the founders of his fortune, the teachers of his skill, might be praised. The gods have given ¹⁹⁴ us speech—the power which has civilised human life; and shall we not strive to make the best use of it? (§§ 251—257.)

‘Lysimachos and such as he are not the only enemies of Rhetoric. It is attacked also by the professors of Eristic. ¹⁹⁵ Instead of retorting their reproaches, I wish simply to aid you in estimating their studies relatively to ours. Eristic discussion, like Astrology or Geometry, seems to me not to deserve the name of Philosophy, since it has no practical bearing; but, rather, to be a good preparation for Philosophy. Schoolboys are trained to work and to think accurately by grammar and literary study; Philosophy forms a more manly discipline of the same sort for young men. But no one should allow his mind to be dried up by barren subtleties, or to drift into such speculations as those with which the Ionic physicists juggled (§§ 258—269).

‘Having said what Philosophy is not, I musttry to explain ¹⁹⁶ what (as I think) it is. My view is very simple. A wise man is one who can make a good guess (knowledge being impossible) as to what he ought to say and do. A philosopher, a lover of wisdom, is one who spends his time in the pursuits by which he may best gain such perception. And what are these pursuits? My answer will probably shock you; but I should be ashamed to betray the truth for the sake of peace in the fraction of life remaining to me. Well, then, I hold ¹⁹⁷ that there is no communicable science of Virtue or Justice; but that a man ambitious of speaking well, of persuading others, and (in the true sense) of gain, will incidentally become more virtuous and more just. Desirous of speaking ¹⁹⁸ with applause, he will occupy himself with the noblest themes, and dwell upon the worthiest topics of these. Desirous of persuading, he will strive to be just, since nothing is so persuasive as a character which is felt to be upright. Desirous of real gain, he will seek the approval of the gods and the esteem of his fellow-citizens. It is only by a perversion of language that the ‘desire of gain’ has been associated with knavery; as ‘wittiness’ with buffoonery, and ‘philosophy’ with the mystifications of the elder sophists. This conception of philosophy as something unpractical—this tendency to discourage all systematic training for affairs— has its result in the lives of our youth. Their occupations ¹⁹⁹ are to cool wine in the Enneakrunos,—to drink in taverns,— to gamble, —to haunt the music-schools. The informers do not molest those who foster these pursuits. They attack us, who discourage them; and say that youths who spend on their education a tithe of what others spend on vice, are being corrupted (§§ 270—290).

‘Power of speaking, when simply natural, is admired; it ²⁰⁰ is strange, then, that blame should be cast upon the attempt to cultivate it. When acquired by labour, the faculty is more likely to be used discreetly than when it is an accident of genius. Athenians, of all men, ought not to despise culture. It is cultivated intelligence which distinguishes ²⁰¹ men from beasts, Hellenes from barbarians, Athenians from Hellenes. Athens is regarded as the teacher of all who can speak or teach others to speak; the greatest prizes, the best schools, the most constant practice are supplied by her. For her to disown the study of eloquence would be as if Sparta laid disabilities on military education or the Thessalians on skill in horsemanship. In athletic prowess, Athens has many rivals; in culture, none. Her intellectual culture is what ²⁰² most commands the admiration of foreigners; as the prevalence of informers is the one blot to which they can point. You ought to punish those who bring disgrace upon you, and honour those who do you credit. Miltiades, Themistokles, Perikles, became great by the pursuits which these informers vilify. Remembering this, strive to keep the lawcourts pure for the citizens generally; and honour the ablest and most cultivated among them as the truest guardians of the democracy (§§ 291—309).

‘The length of my defence has already passed due limits; ²⁰³ but there are still a few words that I would say to you. It is bitter to me to see the informer's trade prospering better than the cause of education. Would our ancestors have ²⁰⁴ looked for this? Solon, eldest of the Sophists, was put by them at the head of the State; against informers they appointed not one mode of procedure only but many,—indictment before the Thesmothetae, impeachment before the Senate, plaint to the Assembly. And informers are worse now than they were then. Their audacity has grown with ²⁰⁵ the licence of those demagogues to whom our fathers entrusted the protection of the Athenian empire; who, by reproaching our most distinguished citizens as oligarchs and partisans of Sparta, made them such,—who harassed, and so estranged, our allies,—who brought Athens to the verge of slavery. Time is failing me; I must cease. Others conclude by committing their cause to the mercy of their judges and the entreaties of their friends; I appeal to my past life. The gods, who have protected it hitherto, will protect it now. Your verdict, whatever it may be, will be for my good. Let each of you give what sentence he will’ (§§ 310—323).

The speech On the Antidosis falls into two main divisions. In §§ 1—166 Isokrates defends himself. In §§ 167—323 he defends his Art—‘the discipline of discourse’, ἡ τῶν λόγων παιδεία (§ 168). His own practice, as described in the first part, agrees with his theory, as set forth in the second. What that theory was—what Isokrates claimed, or did not claim to do—and how he was distinguished from his brother ‘sophists’—it has been attempted to explain in a former chapter²⁰⁶.

The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeos. Sir Richard C. Jebb. London. 1876.

Sponsored by Perseus Project, Tufts University.

Funding provided by National Endowment for the Humanities.

Current edition Perseus

The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeos (English) (The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeos. Jebb, Richard Claverhouse, author. London: Macmillan, 1876.)

Notes on the current edition

The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeos

1. As to the questions raised in the cases of Or. XVII, XVIII, XXI, see below.

2. These, indeed, have been supposed to be lost:—(1) An ἐπιτάφιος Γρύλλου [Gryllos, Xenophon's son] was written, according to Hermippos ap. Diog. L. II. 55, by Isokrates; but this probably refers to Isokrates of Apollonia: see Sauppe O. A. II. 227. The same explanation applies to the case of (2) a Μαυσώλου ἐγκώμιον ascribed to our Isokrates in the Plutarchic Life, which Jerome Wolf follows (p. 684, ed. of 1570). Suidas expressly ascribes this ἐγκώμιον to the Apolloniate. (3) From Arist. Rh. II. 19 it has been quite needlessly assumed—as by Benseler de Hiatu p. 56—that there was a λόγος πρὸς Εὔθυνον distinct from the extant πρὸς Εὐθύνουν [Or. XXI]. But see Sauppe O. A. II. 227. (4) From the Philippos [Or. IV] § 81, Wolf, l. c., assumes a lost ‘oratio ad Dionysium.’ But the allusion—even if it does not refer to the first of the extant epistles—evidently does not warrant any definite inference. As regards the ‘Art of Rhetoric,’ see below.

3. S.V. Ἰσοκράτης.

4. [Plut.] vit. Isocr. § 20.

5. Phot. cod. 159, οὕτω μὲν καὶ τοσούτους ἔγνωμεν Ἰσοκράτους λόγους, ἕνα καὶ εἴκοσιν ὄντας. In 260,— φέρονται δὲ αὐτοῦ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ξ/ (60), &c.—The statement is simply a transcription from the Plutarchic Life

6. Text.

7. In the case of each of the three Letters, another explanation is possible—that they are merely prefaces, προπεμπτικά, to essays or pamphlets sent along with them or after them.

8. A table showing the arrangement in the Urbino MS, and in six other manuscripts, is given by Baiter and Sauppe Or. Att. Vol. I, preface to the Text of Isokrates, p. iv.

9. For Wolf's own account of this classification, see p. 684 of his edition of 1570.

10. The Plataikos is an appeal to the Athenian ekklesia. Wolf gives its forensic vehemence of tone as his reason—a strange reason—for classing it as forensic.

11.

With this elassification according to form, it is worth while to compare that of Photios (cod. 159): — I. συμβουλευτικοί: To Demonikos, To Nikokles, Nikokles, On the Peace, Panegyrikos, Areopagitikos, Plataikos, Archidamos, Philippos. II. ἐγκώμια: Busiris, Helen, Evagoras, Panathenaikos. III. δικανικοί: Antidosis ( δικανικός τις εἶναι δοκεῖ), and then the real Forensic Speeches, omitting, no doubt by an oversight, the περὶ τοῦ ζεύγους,—which is wanted to make up the 21. The κατὰ τῶν σοφιστῶν is characterized merely as κατηγορία τῶν ἀντιπολιτευομένων αὐτῷ σοφιστῶν.

A stricter classification according to form would be:— I. Deliberative: Philippos, Archidamos, Plataikos, Areopagitikos, On the Peace: II. Forensic: Or. XVI—XXI: III. Epideictic: Evagoras, Panegyrikos, Panathenaikos, Busiris, Helen, Against the Sophists, Antidosis: IV. Hortatory: To Demonikos, To Nikokles, Nikokles.

12. Objections to it.

13. Benseler (German Translation of Isokrates, vol. I, Life p. 16) thus arranges the speeches aceording to subject-matter: — I. Relating to War with Persia: Panegyrikos, Philippos. II. Relating to internal feuds of Greece: Plataikos, Archidamos, On the Peace. III. Concerning Athens and her Constitution: Areopagitikos, Panathenaikos. IV. Cyprian Discourses: Evagoras, To Nikokles, Nikokles, To Demonikos. V. Writings against the Sophists: Against the Sophists, Busiris, Helen. VI. An Apology for his Life: Antidosis. VII. Forensic Speeches soon after the time of the Thirty. Against Kallimachos, Against Lochites, Against Enthynus. VIII. Three other Forensic Speeches:— Aeginetikos, On the Yoke of Horses, Trapezitikos.

14. The author of the Greek argument says:— Ἱππόνικός τις, ὡς ἔχει ὁ πολὺς λόγος, Κύπριος μὲν ἦν τῷ γένει, Ἰσοκράτους δὲ φίλος τοῦ σοφιστοῦ. The λόγος was founded probably on the fact that three other treatises of Isokrates were connected with Cyprus.

15. Referring to § 36, Mr Sandys ( Ad. Dem. and Panegyr. p. xxxi) observes that it disproves the statement of Tzeztes that Demonikos was son of Evagoras king of Cypins; and the statement of Porphyrogenitus that Demonikos himself ruled the island.

16. Date.

17. I have given my reasons above ( Life of Isokr.) for believing that his stay at Chios was from the autumn of 404 to the autumn of 403 B. C. Mr Sandys, inchning to Sauppe's view that Isokrates was at Chios from 393 to about 388 B. C., ascribes to the local lonic influence (cf Herod. I. 142) certam forms which occur in the Ad Demonicum: viz. θαρσαλέως (§ 7), συνειδήσεις (§ 16). Now the form θαρσαλέως, though Ionic, is, as Mr Sandys observes, early Attic too; and in Antid. § 121, two good MSS. ( Urb. and Vat.) read θαρσήσουσι ( Introd. XXXIV). If, again, εἰδήσω is more Ionic than Attie, it is at any rate used by Aristotle ( Magn. Mor. I. i. 3, 18, Sandys, note to § 16).

18. Analysis.

19. Genuineness of the Letter needlessly doubted

20. ἔγραψε πολλοὺς λόγους, ὧν εἰσὶν αἱ παραινέσεις, εἰ καί τινες ἠβουλήθησαν αὐτὰς μὴ εἶναι αὐτοῦ διὰ τὸ ἀσθενὲς τῆς φράσεως. Auct. Argum. ad init. As Mr Sandys shows, in his first note on the Argument, its date cannot be earlier than the fourth century A. D.

21. Dr G. E. Benseler, in the preface to his edition of Isokrates, Leipsic, 1851. His objections, and those of earlier crities, are examined, and (in my judgment) disposed of, by Mr Sandys, in his Introduction to the Speech, pp. xxxii—xxxviii.

22. Dionys. Ars Rhet. V. 1.

23. Hermog. περὶ μεθὀδου δεινότητος 25.

24. Harpokration, s. VV. ἐπακτὸς ὅρκος, gives the Ad Demonicum to Isokrates of Apollonia. Elsewhere, s. v. παράκλησις, quoting some words from § 5, he adds, Ἰσοκράτης παραινέσεσιν,—where in the absence of definition, we must understand the Athenian.

25. Its general stamp.

26. Date.

27. Cp. Antid. [XV.] § 30, οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἰδιώτας φησί μου γεγενῆσθαι μαθητάς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ῥήτορας καὶ στρατηγοὺς καὶ βασιλέας καὶ τυράννους.

28. Analysis.

29. § 6. τὴν βασιλείαν, ὥσπερ ἱερωσύνην, παντὸς ἀνδρὸς εἶναι νομἰζουσιν .

30. § 13. παρασκεύαζε σεαυτὸν τῶν μὲν ἐλαττόνων κριτήν, τῶν δὲ μειζόνων ἀγωνιστήν.

31. Claim made for the Nikokles in the Antidosis

32. how far just.

33. Date.

34. Analysis.

35. τἀναντία συλλογίζεται, Ar. Rhet. I. 1.

36. See above, p. 55, note 1.

37. Purpose of the ‘Busiris’ —merely illustrative.

38. Panath. § 1.

39. Cf. Antid. § 45. In Panath. §§ 19 ff. he shows how much he had been nettled by the charge of depreciating all kinds of literary work except his own.

40. Polykrates.

41. Paus. VI. 17, 9, Ἰάσων ἐν Θεσσαλίᾳ τυραννήσας, Πολυκράτους οὐ τὰ ἔσλατα ἐνεγκαμένου διδασκαλείου τοῦ Ἀθήνησι, τούτου τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐπίπροσθεν Γοργίαν ὁ Ἰάσων ἐποιήσατο. Here τυραννήσας can hardly refer to the ταγεία, for Jason was not tagos till about 374 B. C.: cf. Curtius IV. 445.

42. His ‘Accusation of Sokrates.’

43. Diog. Laert. II. 5. 39, Φαβωρῖνος δέ φησιν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν ἀπομνημονευμάτων μὴ εἶναι ἀληθῆ τὸν λόγον τὸν Πολυκράτους κατὰ Σωκράτους· ἐν αὐτῷ γάρ, φησι, μνημονεύει τω—ν ὑπὸ Κόνωνος τειχῶν ἀνασταθέντων, ἃ γέγονεν ἔτεσιν ἓξ τη—ς τοῦ Σωκράτους τελευτῆς ὕστερον.

44. Date of the ‘Busiris.’

45. γράφει πρὸς Πολυκράτη τινὰ σοφιστήν, Ἀθηναῖον μὲν τῷ γένει, σοφιστεύοντα δὲ νῦν ἐν Κύπρῳ. Others—who believe that in 391 Isokrates was at Chios—suggest, though without sufficient ground, that the auctor argum. has invented this statement to account for Isok. and Polyk. being strangers (Spengel Συν. Τεχν. p. 75).

46. With Antiphon, Thrasymachos, Kritias and Zoilos, Isae. c. 20: with Antiphon, Theodoros, Isaeos, Zoilos and Anaximenes, Dem. c. 8.

47. Isae. c. 20: κενὸς μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς, ψυχρὸς δὲ καὶ φορτικὸς ἐν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς, ἄχαρις δὲ ἐν τοῖς χαριεντισμοῦ δεομένοις. By τὰ ἀληθινά, as opposed to τὰ ἐπιδεικτικά, Dionysios seems to mean the treatment of practical questions either in Forensic or in Deliberative speaking. Demetrios, περὶ ἑρμ. § 120 (in Walz, Rhet. IX. 54), makes the want of earnestness the great defect of Polykrates. ἔπαιζε γάρ, οὐκ ἐσπούδαζε, καὶ αὐτὸς τῆς γραφη—ς ὁ ὄγκος παίγνιόν ἐστι—a passage which Spengel ingeniously compares with the Ἑλένης μὲν ἐγκώμιον ἐμὸν δὲ παίγνιον of [Gorg.] Helen Enc. § 21, in support of his view that Polykrates wrote that piece; but the point is not a very strong one.

48. Diog. Laert. II. 5, 39 notices this tradition, but contradicts it on the authority of Favorinus: see p. 94, n. 2. Cf. Quint. II. 17, 4 ( Polycrates) composuisse orationem, quae est habita contra Socraten, dicitur. By the auctor argum. Polykrates is described as καὶ σοφιστὴς καὶ λογογράφος .

49. Arist. Rhet. II. 24.

50. Demetr. περὶ ἑρμ. § 120, in Walz's Rhet. IX. p. 54.

51. Quint. II. 17, 4.

52. Fancied motive of the piece.

53. Analysis.

54. Civilisation of Egypt.

55. i.e. about 130 years: cf. Herod. II. 142, γενεαὶ...τρεῖς ἀνδρῶν ἑκατὸν ἔτεά ἐστι .

56. Chronology of the Heroes.

57. Remarks.

58. See §§ 37, 38— λογοποιῶν—ποιητῶν. By λογοποιοί here, as in Philipp. § 109 ( οὔτε τῶν ποιητῶν οὔτε τῶν λογοποιῶν), &c., are meant the chroniclers who were called λογογράφοι before the latter word got its forensic meaning. So Herod. V. 125 calls Hekataeos λογοποιός Cf. Verg. Geo. III. 5.

59. For example, he treats as historical the list of kings from Kekrops to Theseus, Panath. §§ 12 ff.; the adventures of Herakles, Archid. § 18, cf. Philipp. § 111; the divine origin of Aeakos;—the battle of Peleus with the Centaurs and his marriage with Thetis, Evag. 14—16, &c.

60. The Encomium ascribed to Gorgias.

61. See, for example, § 2 of the [ Τοργίου] Ἑλένης ἐγκώμιον (printed in Sauppe's Orat. Att. II. 132), where the writer declares at the outset that his object is ἐλέγξαι τοὺς μεμφομένους Ἑλένην. And at the conclusion (§ 21) he says— ἀφεῖλον τῷ λόγῳ δύσκλειαν γυναικός, κ.τ λ.

62. Question of its authorship.

63. Spengel, συναγωγὴ τεχνῶν, pp. 74, 75.

64. Was Anaximenes the author?

65. See this ὑπόθεσις in Benseler's edition of Isokrates, vol. I. p. lx.

66. Blass ( Att. Bereds. p. 66) thinks it unlikely that Anaximenes is the writer meant by Isokrates. The author of the Argument notices also the view that Gorgias is the writer alluded to. This, Blass thinks, shows that an Encomium of the kind described was then extant under the name of Gorgias; and this, he argues, can hardly be other than the Encomium which we possess. But, then, is it not singular that, while the author of the Argument mentions the fact of such a work by Anaximenes existing, and cites this fact in support of the theory that Anaximenes is meant, he does not say that there is any work by Gorgias to which a reference can be supposed? If he had known of any Encomium by Gorgias corresponding to the description of Isokrates, he would surely have mentioned it, as he mentions the Encomium by Anaximenes. I am strongly inclined to believe that the speech extant under the name of Gorgias was known to the writer of the Greek Argument only as the work of Anaximenes.

67. Date.

68. Spengel, συν. τεχν. p. 74. Among ‘Protagoras and the sophists of that day’ Gorgias is mentioned as he ‘ who presumed to say,’ &c.: § 3.

69. Thompson, Phaedr., Appendix II. p. 175. The references are thus marked:—(1) Cynics. ‘Those who have grown grey,—where the tense, καταγεγηράκασιν, suggests that Antisthenes was alive—‘in asserting that it is impossible to lie,’ &c.—alluding to the Cynic paradoxes. (2) Academy. ‘Those who hold that Valour, Wisdom, Justice are the same thing,’ &c. (3) Megarics. ‘Those who pass their time in disputes ( ἔριδας) which can serve no purpose but that of giving trouble to their pupils'— the Eristic.

70. Analysis.

71. Cf. Plat. Symp. 177 B, ἀλλ’ ἔγωγε ἤδη τινὶ ἐνέτυχον βιβλ’ίῳ ἀνδρὸς σοφοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐνῆσαν ἅλες ἔπαινον θαυμάσιον ἔχοντες πρὸς ὠφέλειαν· καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα συχνὰ ἴδοις ἂν ἐγκεκωμιασμένα. Besides his encomium on mice (Ar. Rhet. II. 24) Polykrates wrote in praise of χύτραι and ψῆφοι (Menander rhetor, p 611 Ald.).

72. Theseus.

73. § 37. For the Isokratic view of Theseus, cf. note on Panathen. § 126.

74. Paris.

75. The war of Troy.

76. The power of beauty

77. and of Helen.

78. The scholiast who wrote the argument to Or. 9 takes this view (Sauppe, O. A. II. p. 8): and so Dr O. Schneider, Isocr. Ausgewahlte Reden, Part I. p. 31.

79. See the scholium on Or. 9. § 1 (Sauppe, O. A. II. p. 9).

80. Cf. Grote, c. 76, vol. X. p. 32.

81. § 71, κάλλιστα κτησάμενος τὴν βασιλείαν ἐν ταύτῃ διετέλεσε τὸν βίον...τοσοῦτον δ’ ἐβίω χρόνον ὥστε μήτε τοῦ γήρως ἄμοιρος γενέσθαι μήτε τῶν νόσων μετασχεῖν τῶν διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἡλικίαν γιγνομένων.

82. The Evagoras cannot, of course, be later than 353, since in 353—which may be assumed as the date of the Antidosis—Nikokles is no longer alive: Antid. § 67. We get no help, then, from § 8, in which this speech is said to be the first encomium of the kind ever written in prose. This only shows the speech to be earlier than 351 B. C. (Schäfer: Clinton, 352), in which year Artemisia proposed a contest of prose ἐγκώμια in honour of Mausolos (above, p. 11).

83. Analysis.

84. § 11. Isokrates appears to mean that the ἐγκώμια recited at banquets, in honour of living victors at the games, &c., or at funeral festivals in honour of the dead, had hitherto always been in verse. Prose encomia on mythical or other subjects had, of course, long been in vogue as exercises with the Sophists,—such as the Helenae encomium and the Busiris of Isokrates himself.

85. How Evagoras won the throne.

86. § 19. κατὰ μὲν ἀρχὰς οἱ γεγονότες ἀπὸ Τεύκρου τὴν βασιλείαν εἶχον· χρόνῳ δ’ ὕστερον ἀφικόμενος ἐκ Φοινίκης ἀνὴρ φυγάς, κ.τ.λ. When Evagoras was born, the descendants ( ἔκγονοι) of this man were ruling: § 21.Isokrates conceived the Phoenician usurper as having seized the throne at some time—he did not know at precisely what time— long after the first establishment of the Teukrid dynasty; but also long before the birth of Evagoras. A succession of Phoenician kings had reigned over Salamis in the mean time. This is intimated not only in §§ 19—21, but also in § 47, where Salamis is described as having been barbarised διὰ τὴν Φοινίκων ἀρχήν.At the time of the Ionian revolt (500 B.C.) Salamis was governed by Greek princes (Her. v. 104— 114);—the appearance in whose family of the Phoenician name Siromos (Hiram) may perhaps be accounted for, as Professor Rawlinson suggests, by intermarriage. Mr Grote would place the dispossession of the Greek dynasty by the Phoenician usurper about 450 B.C. (c. 76: vol. X. p. 21). This seems very probable. But to my mind the words of Isokrates convey the notion that he, at any rate, imagined the Phoenician usurpation to have taken place much earlier.

87. § 32. εἷς γὰρ τῶν δυναστευόντων ἐπιβουλεύσας τόν τε τύραννον ἀπέκτεινε, κ.τ.λ. By οἱ δυναστεύοντες here Isokrates seems to mean the great men of Salamis. The slayer of the Phoenician usurper was Abdêmon—a Citian, according to Theopompos (frag. 111): a Tyrian, according to Diodoros (xiv. 98). Mövers, thinks that he may have been a native of Citium who had migrated from Salamis to Tyre (Grote, X. p. 22, note 1).

88. The date of the restoration of the Teukrid dynasty by Evagoras cannot be exactly determined. At his death in 374 B. C. he was οὐ γήρως ἄμοιρος (§ 71). Andokides is said to have visited Cyprus just after the fall of the Four Hundred, which took place in the autumn of 411 B.C., and to have found Evagoras reigning at Salamis: [Lys.] in Andoc. § 28. Mr Grote concludes that Evagoras began to reign ‘about 411 or 410 B. C.’ (411 B. C. is probably the latest year we can take)— justly observing that ‘he must have been a prince not merely established, but powerful, when he ventured to harbour Konon in 405 B. C., after the battle of Aegospotami.’ (vol. X. p. 25).

89. His reforms in Cyprus.

90. § 47. The disposition of Phoenicians in Cyprus towards Hellenic visitors at this period is strikingly illustrated, as Mr Grote observes (X. p. 22 n.) by [Lys.] in Andoc. § 26: μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἔπλευσεν ( Ἀνδοκίδης) ὡς τὸν Κιτιέων βασιλέα, καὶ προδιδοὺς ληφθεὶς ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ἐδέθη, καὶ οὐ μόνον θάνατον ἐφοβεῖτο ἀλλὰ τὰ καθ’ ἡμέραν αἰκίσματα, οἰομένος τὰ ἀκρωτήρια ζῶντος ἀποτμηθήσεσθαι.

91. The years 413—405 were years of great distress for Athens; and, after 405, cases of banishment and confiscation were numerous in every city where there was a Spartan dekarchy. Thus the early years of the reign of Evagoras coincided with a period when such a refuge as Salamis was likely to attract the greatest number of settlers. See Grote, X. p. 26.

92. His friendship with Konon.

93. His war with Persia.

94. § 64. 396—394 B. C. Isokrates considers the war between Persia and Sparta as having virtually begun in 396 B.C.—in which year Agesilaos took the command in Asia, and Konon took the chief command of the Persian fleet. He considers that Persia took away the empire ( ἀφείλετο τὴν ἀρχήν) of Sparta by the victory of Knidos in 394.This is, of course, a rhetorical exaggeration; for though it is true that the maritime power of Sparta was crushed at Knidos, the Spartan ἀρχή in Hellas lasted till Leuktra. The three years' war spoken of here is called ὁ πόλεμος ὁ περὶ Ῥόδον in Panegyr. § 142.

95. § 64. Probably 385—376 B. C. The date of the war is discussed in a note on Panegyr. § 134.

96. See Professor Rawlinson's note (8) on Herod. v. 104.

97. The Cyprian Salamis an out-post of Hellas.

98. §§ 47—50.

99. Date.

100. The ἤδη ἀπειρηκώς of § 268 tallies with the παντάπασιν ἀπειρηκώς of the Third Letter (§ 4)— written in 338.

101. Analysis.

102. A personal vindication.

103. Athens contrasted with Sparta.

104. § 43. The relations of the Karians to Minos are thus described by Herodotus (I. 171):

τὸ γὰρ παλαιὸν ἐόντες Μίνω τε κατήκοοι καὶ καλεόμενοι Λέλεγες εἶχον τὰς νήσους, φόρον μὲν οὐδένα ὑποτελέοντες, ὅσον καὶ ἐγὼ δυνατός εἰμι μακρότατον ἐιξικέσθαι ἀκοῆ·| οἱ δὲ, ὅκως Μίνως δέοιτο, ἐπλήρουν οἱ τὰς νέας

. See, as an excellent commentary on Herodotos, Curt. Hist. Gr. bk. I. c. iii. vol. I. pp. 71 ff. tr. Ward. Cf. Clinton F. H. I. p. 39. ‘It seems, however, that at the death of Minos the Karians retained, or at least recovered, possession of the Kyklades; and that they were not finally expelled till the time of the Ionian colonies; for Isocrates and Plutarch [ de exil. p. 603 B] describe them as possessing the Kyklades after the return of the Heraklidae into Peloponnesos, and ascribe their expulsion to the Athenians.’ Clinton thinks that the words of Isokr. in this passage refer ‘to the Ionic migration, when the colonists seized upon the Kyklades’. ib. p. 39, note g.

105. Services to Civilization

106. Services against Persia

107. The two Empires.

108. § 59. See Panegyr. § 115 note Areop. § 80 note.

109. The faults of Athens compared with those of Sparta.

110. (Digression—Agamemnon.)

111. Athenian Constitution.

112. § 126. As Mr Clinton observes ( F. H. vol. I. c. 2, p. 61), Isokrates considers Ericthonius properly as the first of the Attic kings. And it is probable, though not certain, that he regarded Theseus as the last. See § 130: περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Θησέως ἀρετῆς νῦν μὲν ὡς οἷόν τ’ ἦν ἀνεμνήσαμεν ˙ περὶ δὲ τῶν παραλαβόντων τὴν τῆς πόλεως διοίκησιν ἣν ἐκεῖνος παρέδωκεν οὐκ ἔχων τίνας ἐπαίνους εἰπὼν ἀξίους ἂν εἴην εἰρηκώς......κατεστήσαντο γὰρ δημοκρατίαν. This would naturally mcan that, on the death of Theseus, a Democracy was established. And such an interpretation is in perfect harmony with Helen. Encom. § 36— ὥσθ’ ὁ μὲν (Theseus) τὸν δῆμον καθίστη κύριον τῆς πολιτείας, οἱ δὲ μόνον αὐτὸν ἄρχειν ἠξίουν, ἡγούμενοι πιστοτέραν καὶ κοινοτέραν εἶναι τὴν ἐκείνου μοναρχίαν τῆς αὐτῶν δημοκρατίας. It was not monarchy, but his monarchy, which they preferred: on his death, then, they would have the democracy.

113. Theseus.

114. § 131. Isokrates denies that ἀριστοκρατία and ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν τιμημάτων πολιτεία are to be reckoned ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις. See, on the other hand, Plato Polit. § 291 D, where the three types of government (as popularly conceived) are said to be:—1. Monarchy, subdivided into ( a ) βασιλεία, constitutional monarchy, ( b) τυραννίς, unconstitutional: 2. ‘The rule of the few,’ ἡ τῶν ὀλίγων δυναστεία, subdivided into ( a) ἀριστοκρατία, the good term, ( b ) ὀλιγαρχία, the bad. 3. Democracy: of which the good sort and the bad are called by the same name. In Aristotle ( Politics III. vi.— viii) we have three normal ( ὀρθαί) types—1. μοναρχία, 2. ἀριστοκρατία, 3. πολιτεία (Republic): and three corresponding perversions ( παρέκβασεις)—1. τυραννίς: 2. ὀλιγαρχία. 3. δημοκρατία.

115. The Old Democracy.

116. § 148 οὐκ ἐλάττω χιλίων ἐτῶν. The Constitution spoken of here must be that δημοκρατία just mentioned (§ 147)— δημοκρατία ἀριστοκρατίᾳ χρωμένη (§ 131)—which succeeded the Monarchy. There would be no point in the passage if in αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία he meant to include the Monarchy. We are driven, then, to infer that the Isokratean date for the close of the Monarchy is 1560 B. C.—some 500 years earlier than the date assigned by the commoner tradition to Kodros, and about 400 earlier than that assigned to Theseus, whom (as was remarked above) Isokrates seems to have regarded as the last king. (In the Encom. Helen. Isokr. himself makes Theseus a lover of Helen.) But, in the vagueness of the legends about early Attica, a writer—especially a rhetorical writer—was at liberty to take almost any round number that suited his purpose.

117. Mutual Political Lessons.

118. Military Science.

119. § 58.

120. Early wars of Athens and of Sparta.

121. Epilogue.

122. Conversation with a friendly critic.

123. New misgivings.

124. The critic as a comforter.

125. Conditions under which the work was written.

126. Remarks

127. The Panathenaikos compared with the Panegyrikos.

128. Isokrates on Early Athens.

129. ὅτ’ ἠρχόμην περὶ ταύτην εἶναι τὴν πραγματείαν: Antid. § 193. He wrote it ἀκμάζων (opposed to παυόμενος τῆς φιλοσοφίας), ib. § 195.

130. Sauppe would place it in, or about, 388 B.C. But a passage in the Gorgias has been taken, and no doubt rightly, as alluding to a phrase in the κατὰ σοφιστῶν. Gorg. p. 463 A, δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι ( ἡ ῥητορικὴ) ὦ Γοργία, εἶναι τί ἐπιτήδευμα τεχνικὸν μὲν οὐ, ψυχῆς δὲ στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φύσει δεινῆς προσομιλεῖν τοῖς ἄνθρώποις. Cf. κατὰ σοφιστ. § 17, ταῦτα δὲ πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας δεῖσθαι καὶ ψυχῆς ἀνδρικῆς καὶ δοξαστικῆς ἔργον εἶναι. It can scarcely be doubted that Plato's στοχαστικός is a sarcasm upon δοξαστικός as used by Isokrates. Now, the composition of the Gorgias is probably to be placed in the interval between 395 and 389. The κατὰ σοφιστῶν, then, is probably earlier than 389. Sanneg ( de Schol. Isokr. p.7) puts it in Ol. 96 (396—393 B. C.).

131. Date.

132. Busir. [Or. XI.] § 9: Helenae Encom. [Or. X.] § 15. In both these places the transition is marked by the very same phrase which in the κατὰ σοφιστῶν introduces the concluding sentence of § 22:— ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῦ ‘but lest I seem (to be criticizing others while unable to do better myself).’ The lost part of the κατὰ σοφ. contained that exposition of the author's own principles to which these words led up.

133. Analysis.

134. Teachers of ‘Eristic.’

135. § 9 πολιτικοὶ λόγοι. See below, p. 131, n. 4.

136. Teachers of Rhetoric.

137. For this use of ἰδέα, see above, p. 39, note 4.

138. Writers of ‘Arts.’

139. It is true that Isokrates often speaks with contempt of ‘sophists’; but these are ‘vulgar’ sophists ( ἀγελαῖοι σοφισταἱ, Panath. § 18): ‘obscure and worthless sophists’ ( σοφισταὶ ἀδόκιμοι καὶ πονηροί, ib. § 5); or persons who claimed the honourable name of sophist without having any real title to it— τοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντας τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ φάσκοντας εἶναι σοφιστάς, Helen. Encom. § 9: so τῶν φασκὁντων εἶναι σοφιστῶν ἄλλο δὲ τι πραττόντων, Antid. § 215: and τῶν προσποιουμένων εἶναι σοφιστῶν, ib. § 221.It is in reference to these vulgar, these sham sophists, that Isokrates describes himself as ἀνομοίως ζῶντα καὶ τοῖς σοφισταῖς καὶ τοῖς ἰδιώταις, Antid. § 148.On the other hand, he distinctly calls himself a σοφιστής in the general sense of that term, as describing a man who followed a certain profession; who gave literary, and in particular rhetorical, instruction for pay. The whole of §§ 167—269 of the Antidosis—his Apology for his life—is devoted to answering ἡ κοινὴ περὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν διαβολή (§ 168). In § 157 he says — referring to exaggerated reports about his own wealth— that it is a mistake to suppose that a sophist's business is as lucrative as an actor's. And in refuting the charge, laid against himself and others, of corrupting the youth, he says, with evident allusion to the distinction attained by many of his own pupils—‘It is a sophist's noblest and greatest reward if some of his pupils prove themselves men of high character, sensible men, men respected by their fellow-citizens’— σοφιστῇ μισθὸς κάλλιστός ἐστι καὶ μέγιστος, ἢν τῶν μαθητῶν τινες καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ καὶ φρόνιμοι γένωνται καὶ παρὰ τοῖς πολιταῖς εὐδοκιμοῦντες ( Antid. § 220).

140. Definition of the censures.

141. (1) The ‘Eristics.’

142. τοὺς διαλόγους τοὺς ἐριστικοὺς καλουμένους οἷς οἱ μὲν νεώτεροι μᾶλλον χαίρουσι τοῦ δέοντος, τῶν δὲ πρεσβυτέρων οὐδείς ἐστιν ὅστις ἂν ανεκτοὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι φήσειεν: Panath. § 29. This is undoubtedly an allusion to the popularity of the Platonic (and, generally, of the Sokratic) dialogues, as Dr Thompson points out (Appendix II, Phaedr. Append. II. p. 176).

143. See, e.g., Phileb. p. 17 A: Euthyd. p. 278 E, and ad fin. Cf. Arist. περὶ σοφ. ἐλέγχ. c. 11, οἱ μὲν οὖν τῆς νίκης αὐτῆς χάριν τοιοῦτοί (i.e. unsound reasoners) ἐριστικοὶ ἄνθρωποι καὶ φιλέριδες δοκοῦσιν εἶναι· οἱ δὲ δόξης χάριν τῆς εὶς χρηματισμόν, σοφιστικοί.

144. Thompson l.c. p. 177; Spengel, Isokrates und Platon, p. 15. On the other hand, Mr H. Sidgwick ( Journal of Philology, vol. IV. no. 8, p. 292, ‘The Sophists’,) thinks that the Platonists are included.

145. (2) The Teachers of Rhetoric.

146. This was the proper sense of πολιτικὸς λόγος: see Vol. I. p. 90. But Isokrates considered as πολιτικοὶ λόγοι only those discourses (whether, in form, Deliberative or not) which treated what he called political subjects (above p. 41). He regards Forensic speeches as merely sham πολιτικοί. cf. § 20, &c. — ἐκεῖνοι δ’ ἐπὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς λόγους παρακαλοῦντες ...... πολυπραγμοσύνης καὶ πλεονεξίας ὑπέστησαν διδάσκαλοι εἶναι.

147. Cf. Plat. Protag. 318 E: where Protagoras undertakes to teach εὐβουλία περὶ τῶν οἰκείων, and power τὰ τῆς πόλεως καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν.

148. Antid. §§ 186—191

149. Antid. § 205.

150. (3) Writers of ‘Arts.’

151. Arist. Rhet. I. 1, § 10.

152. Relation of this Discourse with the ‘Antidosis’.

153. Cf. Clinton, Fast. Hellen. s. ann. 436 & 354.

154. Date.

155. Form of the discourse.

156. The date is fixed by Dionys. De Dinarch. c. 13— ἐπὶ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ Τιμοθέου ζῶντος, κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τῆς μετὰ Μενεσθέως στρατηγίας— i e. the last campaign of the Social War, in the spring of 355 B.C.

157. The fiction based on fact.

158. Dionys. De Dinarch. 13: De Isocr. 18.

159. See § 8, εἰ δ’ ὑποθείμην συκοφαντήν τινα. It was evidently through taking Lysimachos to be a real person that the pseudoPlutarch was led into stating that Isokrates had had two lawsuits ( ἀγῶνες) about the trierarchy ( Vitt. X. Oratt.). Isokrates and his adopted son Aphareus were among the 1200 richest citizens ( συντελεῖς), and had thrice borne the trierarchy as well as other leiturgies (§ 145). The Aphareus mentioned as a past trierarch by Dem. ( Agst. Euergos and Mnesippos § 31) is probably this one: Schäfer, Dem. III. Append. v. p. 197.

160. Analysis.

161. Motive and nature of this piece.

162. Appeal to the Court.

163. Isokrates has been conversant,

164. not with Forensic Rhetoric,

165. but with Panhellenic Politics.

166. Achallenge.

167. (1) Quotation from the ‘Panegyrikos’.

168. (2) Quotation from the Speech ‘On the Peace.’

169. After the words καθεστάναι πολιτείαν in § 133 is introduced a sentence which does not occur in our text of the De Pace, but which is a paraphrase of the opening words of § 136 of that speech.

170. (3) Quotation from the Discourse ‘To Nikokles’.

171. Comments.

172. His friends have been good men.

173. Eunomos is perhaps identical with the Eunomos who commanded an Athenian fleet in 388 B.C. ( Xen. Hellen. v. i. §§ 5—9 ), and with the Eunomos mentioned by Lysias as sent on a mission to Sicily ( de bon. Arist. §§ 19 ff.) 2. Lysitheides is named by Dem. adv. Callipp. § 14, as a friend of lsokrates and Aphareus; and in Mid. § 157, along with Kallaeschros, as among the wealthiest citizens. 3. Kallippos is perhaps identical (as Sauppe thinks) with the person against whom Demosthenes wrote Or. LII. 4. Onetor, the brother-in-law of Aphobos: Dem Oratt. XXX. & XXXI. 5. Antikles, unknown. 6. Philonides, unknown: unless he is the Φιλωνίδης Μελιτεύς against whom Lysias wrote his speech in a trial βιαίων (Sauppe Att. Oratt. II. 208), and whom the comic poets ridiculed (Bergk Rell. Com. Att. pp. 400 ff.). 7, 8. Philomelos, Chirmantides, unknown.

174. Timotheos.

175. § 109. ταύτην αὐτοὺς ἠνἅγκασε συνθέσθαι τὴν εἰρήνην—i.e. the Peace of Kallias, 371 B.C. The victories of Timotheos had, by weakening Sparta, led up to this peace; although it cannot properly be represented as the direct result of them.

176. The sum was 100 talents—i.e. about £24,000: Deinarch. in Demosth. § 14.

177. Why Timotheos was condemned.

178. A friend's counsel.

179. The wealth of Sophists exaggerated.

180. The new dangers of riches.

181. Pindar and Athens.

182. About £400—not an illiberal douceur, even if we adopt that version of the story which represents the poet as having been heavily fined for this panegyric by his fellow-countrymen, and the Athenians as merely reimbursing him with 100 per cent. interest— διπλῆν αὐτῷ τὴν ζημίαν ἀπέδοσαν, [Aeschin.] Ep. IV. Pindar's words were

αἵ τε λιπαραὶ καὶ ἰοστέφανοι καὶ ἀοίδιμοι

(Ελλάδος ἔρεισμα, κλειναὶ )Αθᾶναι, δαιμόνιον πτολίεθρον

( Frag. 46, ed. Donaldson, p. 346)

183. Public Opinion at Athens.

184. Analogy of Philosophy to Gymnastic.

185. Proof that Isokr. has always discountenanced false claims.

186. The Sophistic system is (1) effectual,

187. and (2) not immoral.

188. What motive has a Sophist for being dishonest?

189. The best statesmen have been orators.

190. Damon, the musician, is mentioned as a master of his art in Cic de Orat. III. xxxiii. § 132, and was said to have taught Perikles. (Plat. Per. c. 4). Plato's high estimate of him appears from the Laches, p. 180 D, where Nikias says that Sokrates has lately recommended to him a teacher of music for his sons—‘Damon, a pupil of Agathokles—amost accomplished musician, and not merely that, but in every respect a desirable companion for young men at their age.’

191. The real corrupters are the sycophant.

192. § 237 οἱ τετταράκοντα—judges who went circuit through the Attic demes ( δικασταὶ κατὰ δήμους), deciding cases of αἰκία and βιαίων and δίκαι in which not more than ten drachmas were at stake: Smith, Dict. Anlt. s. v.

193. How men worship ‘Persuaston’ at Athens.

194. Speech— man's noblest gift

195. The true place of ‘Eristic’ in education.

196. Philosophy is the art of conjecturing what should be done.

197. Virtue cannot be taught.

198. But the philosopher will be virtuous.

199. Young Athens.

200. The culture of eloquence

201. distinctive of Athens.

202. Her alory and her shame.

203. Epilogue.

204. Ancient respect for culture. Solon.

205. The demagogues.

206. Ch. XIII. p. 36.

Sir Richard C. Jebb The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeos 2.15