1. §§ 1—3. ( Proem.) The accused is so crafty that even an imperfect proof against him ought to be accepted: a proof complete in all its parts is hardly to be looked for.—It is not to be supposed that the accuser would have deliberately incurred the guilt of prosecuting an innocent person.

[Here a narrative of the facts would naturally follow; but as this is a mere practice-speech, it is left out, and the speaker comes at once to the proofs—first, those derived from argument on the circumstances themselves (the ἔντεχνοι πίστεις)—then, the testimony of the slave (which represents the ἄτεχνοι.)]

2. § 4. The deceased cannot have been murdered by robbers; for he was not plundered.

3. Nor in a drunken brawl; for the time and place are against it.

4. Nor by mistake for some one else; for, in that case the slave would not have been attacked too.

5. §§ 5—8. It was therefore a premeditated crime and this must have been prompted by a motive of reveng or fear.

6. Now the accused had both motives. He had lost much property in actions brought by the deceased, and was threatened with the loss of more. The murder was the only means by which he could evade the lawsuit hanging over him. [Here follows a curious argument in a circle.] And he must have felt that he was going to lose the lawsuit, or he would not have braved a trial for murder.

7. § 9. The slave identifies him.

8. §§ 9—11. ( Epilogue.) If such proofs do not suffice no murderer can ever be brought to justice, and the State will be left to bear the wrath of the gods for an unexpiated pollution.

1. §§ 1—4. (Proem.) The accuser deserves the pity of the judge, for he is the most unlucky of men. In death, as in life, his enemy hurts him still. It is not enough if he can prove his own innocence; he is expected to point out the real culprit. The accuser credits him with craft. If he was so crafty, is it likely that he would have exposed himself to such obvious suspicion?

2. §§ 5—6. The deceased may have been murdered by robbers, who were scared off by people coming up before they had stripped him.

3. Or he may have been murdered because he had been witness of some crime.

4. Or by some other of his numerous enemies; who would have felt safe, knowing that the suspicion was sure to fall on the accused, his great enemy.

5. § 7. The testimony of the slave is untrustworthy, since, in the terror of the moment, he may have been mistaken; or he may have been ordered by his present masters to speak against the accused. Generally, the evidence of slaves is held untrustworthy; else they would not be racked.

6. § 8. Even if mere probabilities are to decide the case, it is more probable that the accused should have employed some one else to do the murder, than that the slave should, at such a time, have been accurate in his recognition.

7. § 9. The danger of losing money in the impending lawsuit could not have seemed more serious to the accused than the danger, which he runs in the present trial, of losing his life.

8. §§ 10—13. ( Epilogue.) Though he be deemed the probable murderer, he ought not to be condemned unless he is proved to be the actual murderer.—It is his adversary who, by accusing the innocent, is really answerable for the consequences of a crime remaining unexpiated.—The whole life and character of the accused are in his favour, as much as those of the accuser are against him.—The judges must succour the ill fortune of a slandered man.

1. § 1. (Proem.) The defendant has no right to speak of his ‘misfortune:’ it is his fault. The first speech for the prosecutor proved his guilt; this shall overthrow his defence.

2. § 2. Had the robbers been scared off by people coming up, these persons would have questioned the slave about the assassins, and given information which would have exculpated the accused.

3. Had the deceased been murdered because he had been witness of a crime, this crime itself would have been heard of.

4. § 3. His other enemies, being in less danger from him than the accused was, had so much less motive for the crime.

5. § 4. It is contended that the slave's testimony is untrustworthy because it was wrung from him by the rack. But, in such cases as these, the rack is not used at all. [Nothing is said about the hypothesis that the slave may have been suborned by his masters.]

6. § 5. The accused is not likely to have got the deed done by other hands, since he would have been suspected all the same, and could not have been so sure of the work being done thoroughly.

7. § 6. The lawsuit hanging over him—a certainty— would have seemed more formidable to him than the doubtful chance of a trial for murder.

8. §§ 7—8. (Notice of a few topics touched on by the defendant at the beginning and end of his speech.)—The fear of discovery is not likely to have deterred such a man from crime: whereas the prospect of losing his wealth—the instrument of his boasted services to the State—is very likely to have driven him to it.—When the certain murderer cannot be found, the presumptive must be punished.

9. §§ 9—11. ( Epilogue.) The judges must not acquit the accused—condemned alike by probabilities and by proofs—and thereby bring bloodguiltiness on themselves. By punishing him, they can take the stain of murder off the State.

1. §§ 1—3. (Proem.) He is the victim of cruel malignity. Though bound only to clear himself, it is demanded of him that he shall account for the crime.

2. §§ 4—5. Suppose that robbers did the murder, but were scared, before they had taken their booty, by people coming up. Would these persons, as it is contended, have remained to make inquiries? Coming on a bloody corpse and a dying man at dead of night, would they not rather have fled in terror from the spot?

3. § 6. Suppose that the deceased was slain because he had been witness of a crime:—the fact of such crime not having been heard of, does not prove that it did not take place.

4. § 7. The slave, with death from his wounds close at hand, had nothing to fear if he bore false testimony.

5. § 8. But the accused can prove a distinct alibi. All his own slaves can testify that on the night in question— the night of the Diïpolia—he did not leave his own house.

[The assertion of the alibi has been reserved till this point, because now the prosecutor cannot reply.]

6. § 9. It is suggested that he may have committed the crime to protect his wealth. But desperate deeds, such as this, are not done by prosperous men. They are more natural to men who have nothing to lose.

7. § 10. Even if he were the presumptive murderer, he would not have been proved the actual: but, as it is, the probabilities also are for him. On all grounds, therefore, he must be acquitted, or there is no more safety for any accused man.

8. §§ 11—12. ( Epilogue.) The judges are entreated not to condemn him wrongfully, and so leave the murder unatoned for, while they bring a new stain of bloodguiltiness on the State.

A tolerably full analysis of this First Tetralogy has been given, because it is curious as showing the general line of argument which a clever Athenian reasoner, accustomed to writing for the courts, thought most likely to succeed on either side of such a case. It will be seen that, though other kinds of evidence come into discussion, the contest turns largely on general probabilities ( εἰκότα)—a province for which Antiphon had the relish of a trained rhetorician, and on which he enlarges in the speech On the Murder of Herodes ² . As regards style, in this as in the other Tetralogies the language is noble throughout, rising, in parts of the speeches of the accused, to an austere pathos ³ ; it is always concise without baldness, but somewhat over-stiff and antique. There is also too little of oratorical life; at which, however, in short speeches written for practice, the author perhaps did not aim.