James Adam, Commentary on Plato, Republic, ed. James Adam, 9.585C

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[585C] ff. 15 ὧδε δὲ κρῖνε κτλ. The following sentences are among the most perplexing in the whole of the Republic, or indeed in the whole of Plato's writings. That the reading of the MSS is corrupt has been admitted by the majority of critics, and will be proved in App. VI, to which I must refer for a full discussion on the text and interpretation of this difficult passage. Here it is possible only to set down what seems to me, after a review of all the conditions of the problem, the least unsatisfactory solution. The emendation in the text, which I printed in my Text of the Republic, has been approved by a critic in Hermathena XXIV p. 252. We have to discover whether food, drink etc. participate in pure Being more than true opinion, knowledge etc.; and the answer is arrived at by the following steps. (1) Which is more—that which is connected with the ever-like, the immortal and Truth, and which is itself of this nature, and found in something of this nature; or that which is connected with the never-like and mortal, and which is itself of this nature (never-like etc.) and found in something of this nature? That which is connected with the ever-like, says Glauco, is more. (2) Then does the Being of the never-like ( ἀεὶ ἀνομοίου= μηδέποτε ὁμοίου) participate in Being at all more than the Being of Knowledge does? Certainly not ( οὖν is strictly illative: if it is true that what is connected with the ever-like is more than what is connected with the never-like, then the Being of the never-like cannot be more than Knowledge is—for Knowledge of course ἔχεται τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου. Knowledge is in short taken as a type of that which ἔχεται τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου). (3) Or has the Being of the never-like more part in Truth than Knowledge has? To this also the answer is no: [for that which is connected with the ever-like—and Knowledge is so—is connected also with Truth: see above τὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου ἐχόμενον—καὶ ἀληθείας]. (4) And if it has less part in truth [as it has], it must also have less part in Being. [This deduces from step (3) the conclusion already implied in (2), and also paves the way for οὐκοῦν ὅλως—μετέχει]. (5) Thus—since what is true of Knowledge is true of all the spiritual γένη, [and since food etc. are of course only particular examples of the ἀεὶ ἀνόμοιον or never-like], universally ( ὅλως) those γένη which are concerned with the care of the body have less part in Being and Truth than those which are concerned with the care of the soul. For a further discussion of this passage and other suggested solutions and emendations see App. VI.

τὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου κτλ . The whole of this passage presupposes, as Grimmelt shews ( de reip. Pl. comp. et unit. pp. 74 ff.), the metaphysical theory of V—VII. With τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου cf. V 479 A and VI 500 C: with ἀθανάτου VI 485 B ( ἐκείνης τῆς οὐσίας τῆς ἀεὶ οὔσης): and with καὶ ἀληθείας VI 508 D. The last two words are rejected by Madvig and Baiter on the grounds that (1) we should expect an adjective, (2) καὶ ἀληθείας has no antithesis expressed, whereas ἀεὶ ὁμοίου and ἀθανάτου have: (3) the words unduly anticipate τί δ); ἀληθείας; below. As I understand the passage, the mention of Truth is necessary— see above—just in view of τί δ); ἀληθείας; and there is little weight in Madvig's first two arguments.

καὶ αὐτὸ κτλ. Is καί here and in καὶ αὐτό again below ‘and’ (Schneider) or ‘both’? The first view is perhaps more likely: for it is more in keeping with the somewhat loose structure of the argument throughout this passage, and καί in D below ( καὶ αὐτό) is most probably ‘and.’

16, 18 ἐν τοιούτῳ (bis). The soul is of the nature of τὸ ἀεὶ ὅμοιον: see VI 490 B, 508 D, and especially Phaed. 79 A ff.: the body on the other hand is never constant, for like everything material πλανᾶται ὑπὸ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς (VI 485 B).

ἡ οὖν ἀεὶ ἀνομοίου κτλ. These words have already been discussed: but it should here be remarked that the insertion of τοῦ before the adjective (Ast, Madvig etc., both here and in μηδέποτε ὁμοίου above) is not necessary. On the connexion between ἐπιστήμη, οὐσία and ἀλήθεια see especially Theaet. 186 C , D.

Commentary on Plato, Republic. James Adam. ed. James Adam. Cambridge. 1926-1929.

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Current edition Perseus

Commentary on Plato, Republic (English) (Plato. The Republic, Vol 1-2. Adam, James, editor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902-1903.)

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Πολιτεία Perseus (Platonis Opera Tomus IV: Tetralogia VIII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905.) — 9.585 focus

[585]
θαυμάζοις ἂν οὖν εἰ καὶ οἱ ἄπειροι ἀληθείας περὶ πολλῶν τε ἄλλων μὴ ὑγιεῖς δόξας ἔχουσιν, πρός τε ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην καὶ τὸ μεταξὺ τούτων οὕτω διάκεινται, ὥστε, ὅταν μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ 585a λυπηρὸν φέρωνται, ἀληθῆ τε οἴονται καὶ τῷ ὄντι λυποῦνται, ὅταν δὲ ἀπὸ λύπης ἐπὶ τὸ μεταξύ, σφόδρα μὲν οἴονται πρὸς πληρώσει τε καὶ ἡδονῇ γίγνεσθαι, ὥσπερ πρὸς μέλαν φαιὸν ἀποσκοποῦντες ἀπειρίᾳ λευκοῦ, καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄλυπον οὕτω λύπην ἀφορῶντες ἀπειρίᾳ ἡδονῆς ἀπατῶνται;
μὰ Δία, ἦ δʼ ὅς, οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον, εἰ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει.
ὧδέ γʼ οὖν, εἶπον, ἐννόει· οὐχὶ πεῖνα καὶ δίψα καὶ τὰ 585b τοιαῦτα κενώσεις τινές εἰσιν τῆς περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἕξεως;
τί μήν;
ἄγνοια δὲ καὶ ἀφροσύνη ἆρʼ οὐ κενότης ἐστὶ γῆς περὶ ψυχὴν αὖ ἕξεως;
μάλα γε.
οὐκοῦν πληροῖτʼ ἂν ὅ τε τροφῆς μεταλαμβάνων καὶ ὁ νοῦν ἴσχων;
πῶς δʼ οὔ;
πλήρωσις δὲ ἀληθεστέρα τοῦ ἧττον ἢ τοῦ μᾶλλον ὄντος;
δῆλον ὅτι τοῦ μᾶλλον.
πότερα οὖν ἡγῇ τὰ γένη μᾶλλον καθαρᾶς οὐσίας μετέχειν, τὰ οἷον σίτου τε καὶ ποτοῦ καὶ ὄψου καὶ συμπάσης τροφῆς, ἢ τὸ δόξης τε ἀληθοῦς εἶδος καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ νοῦ καὶ 585c συλλήβδην αὖ πάσης ἀρετῆς; ὧδε δὲ κρῖνε· τὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου ἐχόμενον καὶ ἀθανάτου καὶ ἀληθείας, καὶ αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον ὂν καὶ ἐν τοιούτῳ γιγνόμενον, μᾶλλον εἶναί σοι δοκεῖ, ἢ τὸ μηδέποτε ὁμοίου καὶ θνητοῦ, καὶ αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ ἐν τοιούτῳ γιγνόμενον;
πολύ, ἔφη, διαφέρει τὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου.
ἡ οὖν ἀεὶ ὁμοίου οὐσία οὐσίας τι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπιστήμης μετέχει;
οὐδαμῶς.
τί δʼ; ἀληθείας;
οὐδὲ τοῦτο.
εἰ δὲ ἀληθείας ἧττον, οὐ καὶ οὐσίας;
ἀνάγκη. 585d
οὐκοῦν ὅλως τὰ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος θεραπείαν γένη τῶν γενῶν αὖ τῶν περὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς θεραπείαν ἧττον ἀληθείας τε καὶ οὐσίας μετέχει;
πολύ γε.
σῶμα δὲ αὐτὸ ψυχῆς οὐκ οἴει οὕτως;
ἔγωγε.
οὐκοῦν τὸ τῶν μᾶλλον ὄντων πληρούμενον καὶ αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ὂν ὄντως μᾶλλον πληροῦται ἢ τὸ τῶν ἧττον ὄντων καὶ αὐτὸ ἧττον ὄν;
πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
εἰ ἄρα τὸ πληροῦσθαι τῶν φύσει προσηκόντων ἡδύ ἐστι, τὸ τῷ ὄντι καὶ τῶν ὄντων πληρούμενον μᾶλλον μᾶλλον 585e ὄντως τε καὶ ἀληθεστέρως χαίρειν ἂν ποιοῖ ἡδονῇ ἀληθεῖ, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἧττον ὄντων μεταλαμβάνον ἧττόν τε ἂν ἀληθῶς καὶ βεβαίως πληροῖτο καὶ ἀπιστοτέρας ἂν ἡδονῆς καὶ ἧττον ἀληθοῦς μεταλαμβάνοι.
ἀναγκαιότατα, ἔφη.

Translations (1)

Republic Perseus (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 5-6. Shorey, Paul, translator. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1935-37 (printing).) — 9.585 focus

[585] Would it surprise you, then, said I, if similarly men without experience of truth and reality hold unsound opinions about many other matters, and are so disposed towards pleasure and pain and the intermediate neutral condition that, when they are moved in the direction of the painful, 585a they truly think themselves to be, and really are, in a state of pain, but, when they move from pain to the middle and neutral state, they intensely believe that they are approaching fulfillment and pleasure, and just as if, in ignorance of white, they were comparing grey with black,¹ so, being inexperienced in true pleasure, they are deceived by viewing painlessness in its relation to pain? No, by Zeus, he said, it would not surprise me, but far rather if it were not so. In this way, then, consider it.² Are not hunger and thirst and similar states inanitions or emptinesses³ 585b of the bodily habit? Surely. And is not ignorance and folly in turn a kind of emptiness of the habit of the soul? It is indeed. And he who partakes of nourishment⁴ and he who gets, wisdom fills the void and is filled? Of course. And which is the truer filling and fulfillment, that of the less or of the more real being? Evidently that of the more real. And which of the two groups or kinds do you think has a greater part in pure essence, the class of foods, drinks, and relishes and nourishment generally, or the kind of true opinion,⁵ 585c knowledge and reason,⁶ and, in sum, all the things that are more excellent⁷? Form your judgement thus. Which do you think more truly is, that which clings to what is ever like itself and immortal and to the truth, and that which is itself of such a nature and is born in a thing of that nature, or that which clings to what is mortal and never the same and is itself such and is born in such a thing? That which cleaves to what is ever the same far surpasses, he said. Does the essence of that which never abides the same partake of real essence any more than of knowledge? By no means. Or of truth and reality? Not of that, either. And if a thing has less of truth has it not also less of real essence or existence? Necessarily. And is it not generally true 585d that the kinds concerned with the service of the body partake less of truth and reality than those that serve the soul? Much less. And do you not think that the same holds of the body itself in comparison with the soul? I do. Then is not that which is fulfilled of what more truly is, and which itself more truly is, more truly filled and satisfied than that which being itself less real is filled with more unreal things? Of course. If, then, to be filled with what befits nature is pleasure, then that which is more really filled with real things 585e would more really and truly cause us to enjoy a true pleasure, while that which partakes of the less truly existent would be less truly and surely filled and would partake of a less trustworthy and less true pleasure. Most inevitably, he said.

James Adam Commentary on Plato, Republic 9.585C

ed. James Adam

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