James Adam, Commentary on Plato, Republic, ed. James Adam, 7.534A

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[534A] ὅ τι νόησις ‐‐ εἰκασίαν . That is to say, in the Simile of the Line (see Fig. i on p. 65), (1) CB : AC :: EB : DC and (2) CB : AC :: CE : AD. We have already seen that CE : EB :: AD : DC (VI 509 D note); therefore componendo

CE + EB : EB :: AD + DC : DC

i.e. CB : EB :: AC : DC ; therefore alternando CB : AC :: EB : DC. This proves (1), and (2) is proved as follows. Since

CE : EB :: AD : DC ,

therefore invertendo EB : CE :: DC : AD; hence componendo

EB + CE : CE :: DC + AD : AD

i.e. CB : CE :: AC : AD; therefore alternando CB : AC :: CE : AD. I owe this proof to the kindness of a mathematical friend.

τὴν δ’ ἐφ’ οἷς κτλ. Liebhold (who also conjectured καὶ ἔτι νόησις for καὶ ὅ τι νόησις) makes the extraordinary suggestion τὴν δ’ ἐφ’ οἶς ταῦτ’ ἂν διέχῃ ἀναλογίαν καὶ διαίρεσιν ἑκατέρου ( Philol. 1876 p. 372). The text is of course quite sound and= τὴν δὲ <τούτων> ἐφ’ οἷς ταῦτά <ἐστιν> ἀναλογίαν κτλ.: cf. VI 511 E. I cannot agree with Shorey when he says ( Idea of Good etc. p. 235) that Plato “avoids drawing out the proportion εἴδη: objects of διάνοια= σκευαστά etc.: εἰκόνες, because he is aware that the second member is a blank and the fourth is largely fantastic.” Both of these assertions are in my opinion quite wrong, and if they were true, Plato would have refrained from drawing out the proportions between the faculties themselves for exactly the same reasons. See App. I. As it is, we should take Plato at his word. He may well decline to enter on the tedious and unprofitable task of expounding and illustrating in detail the proportions which may be conjectured to obtain between the different objects of our intellectual powers. It would for example lead to no useful result if we tried to establish a proportion between a particular ε<*>δος, one of the five μαθήματα, a particular object of πίστις, and a particular object of εἰκασία. Such attempts would certainly involve us in an endless amount of talk, and would hardly result in anything but a series of barren and pedantic formulae and subdivisions.

ἢ ὅσων . See cr. n. ὅσων is read by a large majority of MSS, and the confusion of ο and ω is common: see Introd. § 5. The construction (as Schneider points out) is ἢ ὅσων λόγων οἱ παρεληλυθότες λόγοι ἡμᾶς ἐνέπλησαν: cf. (with Schneider) παρὰ δόξαν τοῖς νῦν δοκουμένοις VI 490 A. Madvig's ὅσοι has little probability, although it avoids a certain awkwardness.

Commentary on Plato, Republic. James Adam. ed. James Adam. Cambridge. 1926-1929.

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Current edition Perseus

Commentary on Plato, Republic (English) (Plato. The Republic, Vol 1-2. Adam, James, editor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902-1903.)

Editions (1)

Πολιτεία Perseus (Platonis Opera Tomus IV: Tetralogia VIII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905.) — 7.534 focus

[534]
ἀρκέσει οὖν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὥσπερ τὸ πρότερον, τὴν μὲν πρώτην μοῖραν ἐπιστήμην καλεῖν, δευτέραν δὲ διάνοιαν, τρίτην 534a δὲ πίστιν καὶ εἰκασίαν τετάρτην· καὶ συναμφότερα μὲν ταῦτα δόξαν, συναμφότερα δʼ ἐκεῖνα νόησιν· καὶ δόξαν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, νόησιν δὲ περὶ οὐσίαν· καὶ ὅτι οὐσία πρὸς γένεσιν, νόησιν πρὸς δόξαν, καὶ ὅτι νόησις πρὸς δόξαν, ἐπιστήμην πρὸς πίστιν καὶ διάνοιαν πρὸς εἰκασίαν· τὴν δʼ ἐφʼ οἷς ταῦτα ἀναλογίαν καὶ διαίρεσιν διχῇ ἑκατέρου, δοξαστοῦ τε καὶ νοητοῦ, ἐῶμεν, ὦ Γλαύκων, ἵνα μὴ ἡμᾶς πολλαπλασίων λόγων ἐμπλήσῃ ἢ ὅσων οἱ παρεληλυθότες. 534b
ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔμοιγʼ, ἔφη, τά γε ἄλλα, καθʼ ὅσον δύναμαι ἕπεσθαι, συνδοκεῖ.
ἦ καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἑκάστου λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐσίας; καὶ τὸν μὴ ἔχοντα, καθʼ ὅσον ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ λόγον αὑτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ διδόναι, κατὰ τοσοῦτον νοῦν περὶ τούτου οὐ φήσεις ἔχειν;
πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ἦ δʼ ὅς, φαίην;
οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὡσαύτως· ὃς ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ διορίσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων ἀφελὼν τὴν 534c τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν, καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν μάχῃ διὰ πάντων ἐλέγχων διεξιών, μὴ κατὰ δόξαν ἀλλὰ κατʼ οὐσίαν προθυμούμενος ἐλέγχειν, ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ἀπτῶτι τῷ λόγῳ διαπορεύηται, οὔτε αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν φήσεις εἰδέναι τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα οὔτε ἄλλο ἀγαθὸν οὐδέν, ἀλλʼ εἴ πῃ εἰδώλου τινὸς ἐφάπτεται, δόξῃ, οὐκ ἐπιστήμῃ ἐφάπτεσθαι, καὶ τὸν νῦν βίον ὀνειροπολοῦντα καὶ ὑπνώττοντα, πρὶν ἐνθάδʼ ἐξεγρέσθαι, εἰς Ἅιδου 534d πρότερον ἀφικόμενον τελέως ἐπικαταδαρθεῖν;
νὴ τὸν Δία, ἦ δʼ ὅς, σφόδρα γε πάντα ταῦτα φήσω.
ἀλλὰ μὴν τούς γε σαυτοῦ παῖδας, οὓς τῷ λόγῳ τρέφεις τε καὶ παιδεύεις, εἴ ποτε ἔργῳ τρέφοις, οὐκ ἂν ἐάσαις, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἀλόγους ὄντας ὥσπερ γραμμάς, ἄρχοντας ἐν τῇ πόλει κυρίους τῶν μεγίστων εἶναι.
οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη.
νομοθετήσεις δὴ αὐτοῖς ταύτης μάλιστα τῆς παιδείας ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, ἐξ ἧς ἐρωτᾶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἐπιστημονέστατα οἷοί τʼ ἔσονται; 534e
νομοθετήσω, ἔφη, μετά γε σοῦ.

Translations (1)

Republic Perseus (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 5-6. Shorey, Paul, translator. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1935-37 (printing).) — 7.534 focus

[534] “Are you satisfied, then,” said I, “as before,¹ to call the first division science, 534a the second understanding, the third belief,² and the fourth conjecture or picture-thought—and the last two collectively opinion, and the first two intellection, opinion dealing with generation and intellection with essence, and this relation being expressed in the proportion³: as essence is to generation, so is intellection to opinion; and as intellection is to opinion, so is science to belief, and understanding to image-thinking or surmise? But the relation between their objective correlates⁴ and the division into two parts of each of these, the opinable, namely, and the intelligible, let us dismiss,⁵ Glaucon, lest it involve us in discussion many times as long as the preceding.” 534b Well, he said, “I agree with you about the rest of it, so far as I am able to follow.” “And do you not also give the name dialectician to the man who is able to exact an account⁶ of the essence of each thing? And will you not say that the one who is unable to do this, in so far as he is incapable of rendering an account to himself and others, does not possess full reason and intelligence⁷ about the matter?” “How could I say that he does?” he replied. “And is not this true of the good likewise⁸—that the man who is unable to define in his discourse and distinguish and abstract from all other things the aspect or idea of the good, 534c and who cannot, as it were in battle, running the gauntlet⁹ of all tests, and striving to examine everything by essential reality and not by opinion, hold on his way through all this without tripping¹⁰ in his reasoning—the man who lacks this power, you will say, does not really know the good itself or any particular good; but if he apprehends any adumbration¹¹ of it, his contact with it is by opinion, not by knowledge; and dreaming and dozing through his present life, before he awakens here 534d he will arrive at the house of Hades and fall asleep for ever?¹²” “Yes, by Zeus,” said he, “all this I will stoutly affirm.” “But, surely,” said I, “if you should ever nurture in fact your children¹³ whom you are now nurturing and educating in word,¹⁴ you would not suffer them, I presume, to hold rule in the state, and determine the greatest matters, being themselves as irrational¹⁵ as the lines so called in geometry.” “Why, no,” he said. “Then you will provide by law that they shall give special heed to the discipline that will enable them to ask and answer¹⁶ questions in the most scientific manner?” 534e “I will so legislate,” he said, “in conjunction with you.”

James Adam Commentary on Plato, Republic 7.534A

ed. James Adam

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