[133] Pompeius, fleeing from Sicily to Antony, stopped at the Lacinian promontory and robbed the rich temple of Juno of its gifts. He landed at Mitylene and spent some time at that place, where his father, when at war with Caesar, had bestowed him with his mother, when he was still a boy, and where his father had recovered him after his defeat. As Antony was now waging war in Media against the Medes and the Parthians, Pompeius decided to intrust himself to Antony on his return. When he heard that Antony had been worsted, and this result was confirmed by the reports, his hopes once more revived, and he fancied that he might succeed Antony if the latter were dead, or share his power if he returned. He was continually thinking of Labienus, who had overrun Asia not long before. While he was in this frame of mind the news reached him that Antony had returned to Alexandria. Scheming with both projects, he sent ambassadors to Antony ostensibly to place himself at the latter’s disposal and to offer himself as a friend and ally, but really to get accurate information about Antony’s affairs. At the same time he sent others secretly to the princes of Thrace and Pontus, intending, if he should not obtain what he desired from Antony, to take flight through Pontus to Armenia. He sent also to the Parthians, hoping that, for the remainder of their war against Antony, they would be eager to receive him as a general, because he was a Roman, and especially because he was the son of Pompey the Great. He refitted his ships and drilled the soldiers he had brought in them, pretending at one time that he was in fear of Octavius, and at another that he was getting ready to assist Antony.

[134] As soon as Antony heard of the coming of Pompeius he designated Titius to take the field against him. He ordered the latter to take ships and soldiers from Syria and to wage war vigorously against Pompeius if he showed himself hostile, but to treat him with honor if he submitted himself to Antony. Then he gave audience to the ambassadors who had arrived, and who addressed him as follows: Pompeius has sent us to you, not because he was without a place of refuge (if he were minded to continue the war) in Spain, a country friendly to him on his father’s account and which espoused his own cause when he was younger, and even now calls upon him for that purpose, but because he prefers to enjoy peace with you, or, if need be, to fight under your orders. He makes these advances now not for the first time, but did so while he was master of Sicily and was ravaging Italy, and when he rescued your mother and sent her to you. If you had accepted these advances, Pompeius would not have been driven out of Sicily (for you would not have provided Octavius with ships against him), nor would you have been defeated in Parthia, in consequence of Octavius, not sending you the soldiers he agreed to send. In fact, you would now be in possession of Italy in addition to your other dominions. As you did not accept the offer at the time when it would have been most advantageous to you, he repeats it now in order that you may not be so often ensnared by Octavius’ words and by the marriage relationship existing between you; for you will remember that, although he is connected by marriage with Pompeius, he declared war against the latter after the treaty had been made, and without excuse. He also deprived Lepidus, his partner in the government, of his share, and divided no part of it with you.

[135] You are now the only remaining one who stands between him and the monarchy that he longs for. He would already have been at blows with you, had not Pompeius stood in the way. Although you ought to have foreseen these things for yourself, Pompeius calls your attention to them out of good-will, because he prefers a candid and magnanimous man to a deceitful, treacherous, and artful one. He does not blame you for the gift of ships which you made to Octavius against him as a matter of necessity, in order to procure soldiers for the Parthian war in exchange, but he reminds you that those soldiers were not sent. In short, Pompeius delivers himself to you with the ships which he still has and his most faithful soldiers, who have not abandoned him even in his flight. If peace is maintained, it will be a great glory to you to have saved the son of Pompey the Great. In case of war, he will be a considerable help to your party in the conflict which is coming, unless, to be sure, it has already come.

[136] When the ambassadors had thus spoken, Antony showed them the orders he had sent to Titius, and said that if Pompeius was truly in this frame of mind he should come in person under the escort of Titius. In the meantime, the messengers who had been sent by Pompeius to the Parthians were captured by Antony’s generals and brought to Alexandria. After Antony had examined each of them he summoned the ambassadors of Pompeius and showed the captives to them. They made excuses for Pompeius even then as a young man in a desperate plight, fearful lest Antony should not treat him kindly, and driven by necessity to make trial even of the bitterest enemies of Rome. They said that he would show his true disposition as soon as he should learn Antony’s, and would then need no other attempt or devices. Antony believed them, being in other respects and at all times of a frank, magnanimous, and unsuspecting nature. ¹

[137] In the meantime Furnius, who was governing the province of Asia for Antony, had received Pompeius when he arrived, as he was behaving quietly; since Furnius had not sufficient force to prevent him and did not yet know Antony’s mind. Seeing Pompeius drilling his troops, he ² mustered a force from the provincials and hastily summoned Ahenobarbus, who had command of an army in the vicinity, and also Amyntas from the other side. They responded promptly, and Pompeius complained against Furnius for regarding him in the light of an enemy when he had sent ambassadors to Antony and was waiting for an answer from him. While he was saying this he was meditating the project of seizing Ahenobarbus, with the connivance of Curius, one of Ahenobarbus’ officers, intending to hold that general as a valuable hostage to exchange for himself in case of need. The treachery was discovered and Curius was convicted before the Romans present and put to death. Pompeius put to death his freedman Theodorus, the only person who was privy to the plan, believing that he had divulged it. As he no longer expected to conceal his projects from Furnius, he possessed himself of Lampsacus by treachery, a city which contained many Italians, colonized there by Gaius Caesar. These Italians he induced to enter his military service by large bounties. Having now 200 horse and three legions of infantry, he attacked Cyzicus by land and sea. He was repulsed on both sides, because there was a force, although not a large one, in Cyzicus, that was guarding some gladiators whom Antony supported there. So Pompeius retired to the harbor of the Achaeans and collected provisions.

[138] Furnius did not begin hostilities, but he continually camped alongside of Pompeius with a large body of horse and prevented his foe from foraging or winning the cities to his side. As Pompeius had no cavalry, he assaulted the camp of Furnius in front and, at the same time, sent a force secretly around to his rear. Furnius accordingly directed his forces against Pompeius’ front attack, but he was driven out of his camp by the force in his rear. Pompeius pursued his men and killed many as they fled over the Scamandrian plain, which was saturated with recent rains. Those who were saved withdrew to a place of safety, as they were not fit for battle. While they were waiting for assistance from Mysia, the Propontis, and elsewhere, the inhabitants, who were distressed by continual exactions, enlisted gladly under Pompeius, especially on account of the reputation he had gained by his victory at the harbor of the Achaeans. While Pompeius was deficient in cavalry, and was thus crippled in procuring supplies, he learned that a troop of Italian horse was coming to Antony, sent by Octavia, who was passing the winter in Athens. So he sent emissaries with gold to corrupt this troop, but Antony’s governor of Macedonia caught these men and distributed their gold to the cavalry.

[139] Pompeius took Nicaea and Nicomedia, from which he obtained large supplies of money, and his strength was augmented in all respects with a rapidity that exceeded his expectations. But Furnius, who was camping not far away from him, was reënforced, at the beginning of spring, first with seventy ships that had come from Sicily, which had been saved from those that Antony had lent to Octavius against Pompeius; for after the close of the war in Sicily Octavius had dismissed them. Then Titius arrived from Syria with 120 additional ships and a large army; and all these had landed at Proconnesus. Pompeius became alarmed and burned his own ships and armed his oarsmen, believing that he could fight to better advantage with all of his forces combined on land. Cassius of Parma, Nasidius, Saturninus, Thermus, Antistius, and the other distinguished men of his party who were still with him as friends, and Fannius, who held the highest rank of all, and Pompeius’ father-in-law, Libo, when they saw that he did not desist from war against superior forces even after Titius, to whom Antony had given entire charge, had arrived, despaired of him, and, having made terms for themselves, went over to Antony.

[140] Pompeius, now deserted by his friends, withdrew to the interior of Bithynia, being reported as making his way to Armenia. One night as he marched out of his camp quietly, Furnius and Titius followed him, and Amyntas joined in the pursuit. After a hot chase they came up with him toward evening, and each encamped by himself around a certain hill without ditch or palisade, as it was late and they were tired. While they were in this state, Pompeius made a night attack with 300 light troops and killed many who were still asleep or springing out of bed. The rest took to disgraceful flight in a state of nudity. It is evident that if Pompeius had made this night attack with his entire army, or if he had followed up energetically the victory he did win, he would have overcome them completely. But, misled by a god, he gave no heed to these opportunities, and he gained no other advantage from the affair than to penetrate farther into the interior of the country. His enemies, having formed a junction, followed him and cut off his supplies, until he was in danger from want. Then he sought an interview with Furnius, who had been a friend of Pompey the Great, and who was of higher rank and of a more trustworthy character than the others.

[141] Taking a position where a river flowed between them, Pompeius said that he had sent ambassadors to Antony, and he added that, being in need of provisions meanwhile, and nobody supplying him, he had done what he had done. If you have fought against me, he continued, by Antony’s direction, Antony has misconceived his own interests in not foreseeing the coming war. If you are anticipating Antony’s intentions, I protest and implore you to wait for the embassy that I sent to Antony or to take and bring me to him now. I will surrender myself to you alone, Furnius, asking merely your pledge that you will conduct me to him in safety. He spoke thus because he had confidence in Antony as a man of generous nature, and he apprehended merely that something might happen to him on the journey. Furnius replied to him as follows: If you wished to surrender yourself to Antony you ought to have done so in the beginning, or else have waited quietly at Mitylene for his answer. But if you desired the war you should have done as you have done. Why is it necessary to recount your deeds to one who knows them? If now you repent, do not bring us, generals, into collision with each other, but surrender yourself to Titius, to whom these matters have been intrusted by Antony. The pledge which you ask from me you can ask from him. He has been ordered by Antony to put you to death if you wage war, but, if you surrender yourself, to send you to him in an honorable manner.

[142] Pompeius was angry with Titius as an ingrate, in that he undertook to wage this war against him, for he had once been taken prisoner and spared by Pompeius. Besides being angry he considered it beneath his dignity to be in the power of Titius, who was not of noble birth. Moreover he suspected Titius, either because he was acquainted with his character and did not consider him trustworthy, or because he was conscious of some old injury done to him previous to the benefaction above mentioned. Again he offered to surrender himself to Furnius, and begged that he would receive him. When the latter refused he said that he would surrender to Amyntas. Furnius said that Amyntas would not receive him, because that would be an insult to the one whom Antony had intrusted with this whole business; and so the interview ended. The opinion prevailed in the camp of Furnius that, for want of other resources, Pompeius would deliver himself up to Titius on the following day. When night came Pompeius left the customary fires burning, and the trumpets giving the usual signal at intervals through the night, while he quietly withdrew from the camp with a well-prepared band, who had not been previously advised whither they were to go. He intended to go to the sea-shore and burn Titius’ fleet, and perhaps would have done so had not Scaurus deserted from him and communicated the fact of his departure and the road he had taken, although ignorant of his design. Amyntas, with 1500 horse, pursued Pompeius, who had no cavalry. When Amyntas drew near, Pompeius’ men passed over to him, some privately, others openly. Pompeius, being almost entirely deserted and afraid of his own men, surrendered himself to Amyntas without conditions, although he had scorned to surrender to Titius with conditions.

[143] Thus was Sextus Pompeius captured. He was the last remaining son of Pompey the Great, and had been deprived of his father when very young and of his brother while still a stripling. After their death he concealed himself for a long time and practised robbery secretly in Spain until he had collected a large following, because he made himself known as Pompey’s son. Then he practised more open robbery. After the death of Gaius Caesar he carried on war vigorously and collected a large army, together with ships and money, took islands, became master of the western sea, brought famine upon Italy, and compelled his enemies to make peace on such terms as he chose. Of most importance was the aid that he rendered to the proscribed in Rome exposed to utter destruction, rescuing many of the nobility who were, at this later time, safe at home by means of him. But stricken with mental aberration, he never pursued an aggressive policy against his foes, although fortune offered him many opportunities; he only defended himself. After such a career Pompeius was taken prisoner.

[144] Titius brought Pompeius’ soldiers into Antony’s service and put Pompeius himself to death at Miletus in the fortieth year of his age. This he did either on his own account, angry at some former insult, and ungrateful for the subsequent kindness, or in pursuance of Antony’s order. Some say that Plancus, not Antony, gave this order. They think that Plancus, while governing Syria, was authorized by letters to sign Antony’s name in cases of urgency and to use his seal. Others think that it was written by Plancus with Antony’s knowledge, but that the latter was ashamed to write it on account of the name Pompeius, and because Cleopatra was favorable to him on account of Pompey the Great. Still others think that Plancus, being cognizant of these facts, took it upon himself to give the order as a matter of precaution, lest Pompeius, with the coöperation of Cleopatra, should breed dissension between Antony and Octavius. ³

[145] After the death of Pompeius Antony made a new expedition to Armenia, and Octavius made one against the Illyrians, who were plundering Italy, some of whom had never been subject to the Romans, while others had revolted during the civil wars. Since these Illyrian affairs are not very well known to me, and are not of sufficient length to make a book by themselves, and have no suitable place to be treated elsewhere, I have recorded them above (beginning with the time when Illyria was acquired by the Romans and bringing them down to the end), and added them to the history of the neighboring Macedonia.