[109] Pompeius suspected that Octavius had gone to the camp of Taurus for the purpose of attacking Tauromenium, which was the fact. So, directly after supper, he sailed to Messana, leaving a part of his forces at Mylae so that Agrippa might think that he was still there. Agrippa, as soon as his army was sufficiently rested, bestirred himself and set sail for Tyndaris, which had offered to surrender. He entered the town, but the garrison fought valiantly and drove him out. Some other towns espoused his cause and received his garrisons, and he returned that evening. In the meantime, Octavius had sailed from Scylacium to Leucopetra, ¹ having learned for a certainty that Pompeius had gone from Messana to Mylae on account of Agrippa. He was about to cross the straits from Leucopetra to Tauromenium by night, but learning of the sea-fight he changed his mind, thinking that a victor ought not to steal his passage, but to cross with his army boldly by daylight; for he was fully convinced that Pompeius was still confronting Agrippa. Looking down from the mountains upon the sea at daybreak and finding that it was clear of enemies, he set sail with as many troops as the ships could carry, leaving the rest with Messala until the fleet could return to him. Arriving at Tauromenium, he sent messengers to demand its surrender. As his guards were not admitted, he made sail to the river Onobalas and the temple of Venus, and moored his fleet at the shrine of the Archegetes, the god of the Naxians, ² intending to pitch his camp there and attack Tauromenium. The Archegetes is a small statue of Apollo, erected by the Naxians when they first migrated to Sicily.

[110] When Octavius disembarked from his ship he slipped and fell, but arose without assistance. While he was yet laying out his camp, Pompeius made his appearance with a large fleet—an astounding spectacle, since Octavius believed that he had been beaten by Agrippa. Pompeius’ cavalry advanced at the same time, rivalling the fleet in rapidity of movement, and his infantry was seen on the other side. The forces of Octavius were terrified at finding themselves surrounded by enemies on three sides, and Octavius himself was alarmed because Messala could not join him. The cavalry of Pompeius assailed Octavius’ men while they were still fortifying their camp. If his infantry and his naval force had attacked simultaneously with the cavalry, Pompeius might have accomplished greater results, but, being inexperienced in war and ignorant of the panic among the troops of Octavius, and hesitating to begin a battle at the approach of nightfall, one part of his forces stationed themselves at the promontory of Coccynus, ³ while his infantry, deeming it unwise to encamp near the enemy, withdrew to the town of Phœnix. ⁴ Night coming on they went to rest, and Octavius’ soldiers finished their camp, but were incapacitated for battle by toil and want of sleep. They consisted of three legions, and 500 cavalry without horses, 1000 light-armed, and 2000 colonists serving as allies, but not enrolled, besides his fleet.

[111] Octavius placed all of his infantry under charge of Cornificius, and ordered him to drive back the enemy and do whatever the exigencye required. He took ship before daylight and went seaward lest the enemy should enclose him on this side also, giving the right wing of the fleet to Titinius and the left to Carcius, and embarking himself on a liburnica, with which he sailed around the whole fleet, exhorting them to have courage. Having done this he lowered the general’s ensign, as is customary in times of extreme danger. Pompeius put to sea against him, and they encountered each other twice, the battle ending with the night. Some of Octavius’ ships were captured and burned; others spread their small sails and made for the Italian coast, contrary to orders. Those of Pompeius followed them a short distance and then turned against the remainder, capturing some and burning others. Some of the crews swam ashore, most of whom were slaughtered or taken prisoners by Pompeius’ cavalry. Some of them set out to reach the camp of Cornificius, who sent only his light-armed troops to assist them as they came near, because he did not consider it prudent to move his disheartened legionaries against the enemy’s infantry, who were naturally much encouraged by their victory.

[112] Octavius spent the greater part of the night among his small boats, in doubt whether he should go back to Cornificius through the scattered remains of his fleet, or take refuge with Messala. Providence brought him to the harbor of Abala with a single armor-bearer, without friends, attendants, or slaves. Certain persons, who had come down from the mountain to learn the news, found him suffering in body and mind and brought him in rowboats (changing from one to another for the purpose of concealment) to the camp of Messala, which was not far distant. Straightway, and before he had attended to his bodily wants, he despatched a liburnica to Cornificius, and sent word throughout the mountains that he was safe, and ordered all his forces to help Cornificius, and wrote to him that he would send him aid forthwith. After attending to his own person and taking a little rest, he set forth by night, accompanied by Messala, to Stylis, where Carinas was stationed with three legions ready to embark, and ordered him to set sail for Lipara, ⁵ to which place he would shortly follow. He wrote to Agrippa and urged him to send Laronius with an army to the rescue of Cornificius with all speed. He sent Maecenas again to Rome on account of the revolutionists; and some of these, who were stirring up disorder, were punished. He also sent Messala to Puteoli to bring the so-called first legion to Vibo.

[113] This was the same Messala whom the triumvirs proscribed at Rome, and for the killing of whom money and freedom were offered as rewards. He had fled to Cassius and Brutus, and after their death had delivered his fleet to Antony, in pursuance of an agreement made between them. It seems fitting to recall this fact in honor of Roman magnanimity, inasmuch as Messala, when he had in his power, overwhelmed with misfortune, the man who had proscribed him, saved him and cared for him as his commander. Cornificius was able easily to defend his camp against attack; but, being in danger from want of supplies, he drew his men out for battle and challenged the enemy. But Pompeius did not care to come to an engagement with men whose only hope rested in battle and whom he expected to subdue by famine. Cornificius, having placed in the centre the unarmed men who had escaped to him from the ships, took to the road, grievously exposed to missiles in the open plains from the enemy’s horsemen and in the broken country from the light-armed troops from Numidia in Africa, who hurled darts from long distances and made their escape when charged by their enemies.

[114] On the fourth day, with difficulty, they arrived at the waterless region which they say was formerly inundated by a stream of fire that ran down as far as the sea and dried up all the streams in the district. The inhabitants of the country traverse it only by night, on account of the stifling heat and the dust and ashes with which it abounds. Being ignorant of the roads and fearing ambush, Cornificius and his men did not dare to march through it by night, especially as there was no moon, nor could they endure the daytime, because of suffocation. Moreover, the bottoms of their feet were burned (especially those who had no shoes), as it was now the hottest part of the summer. On account of the tormenting thirst they could not delay. They could no longer charge upon their assailants, but received wounds without any means of defence. When they saw the place of exit from this burned district occupied by enemies, the able-bodied ones, heedless of their sick and barefooted companions, dashed at the defiles with amazing courage and overpowered the enemy with all their remaining strength. When they found the next defiles occupied by hostile forces they gave way to despair and succumbed to thirst and heat. Cornificius aroused them by showing them a spring of water near by; and again they overpowered the enemy, but with heavy loss to themselves. Another body of enemies held possession of the fountain, and now Cornificius’ men lost all courage and gave way completely.

[115] While they were in this state Laronius, who had been sent by Agrippa with three legions, made his appearance a long way off. Although it was not yet plain that he was a friend, still, as they had been all the time hoping for something of this kind, they once more recovered their spirits. When they saw the enemy abandon the water in order not to be exposed to attack on both sides, they shouted for joy with all their strength. When the troops of Laronius shouted in return, they ran and seized the fountain. The leaders forbade the men to drink to excess. Some who neglected this advice died while drinking. In this unexpected manner did Cornificius, and what was left of his army, escape to Agrippa at Mylae. ⁶

[116] Agrippa had just taken Tyndaris, a stronghold full of provisions and admirably situated for naval warfare. Thither Octavius transported his infantry and cavalry. He had in Sicily all together twenty-one legions of the former, 20,000 of the latter, and more than 5000 light-armed troops. The garrison of Pompeius still held Mylae, and all the places from Mylae to Naulochi and Pelorus, and all the coast. These garrisons, in fear of Agrippa, kept fires burning continually, signifying that they would set fire to any ships that should sail against them. Pompeius was also master of the defiles on both sides of the island. The mountain passes in the neighborhood of Tauromenium and around Mylae were fortified by him, and he harassed Octavius when the latter was making a forward movement from Tyndaris, but not coming to an engagement. Believing that Agrippa was moving his fleet against him, Pompeius changed his position to Pelorus, abandoning the defiles around Mylae; and Octavius occupied them and also Mylae and Artemisium, a very small town, in which, they say, were the cattle of the Sun and where Ulysses fell asleep. ⁷

[117] When the report of Agrippa’s movement turned out to be false, Pompeius was troubled that he had lost the defiles, ⁸ and he called to his assistance Tisienus with his army. Octavius sought to intercept Tisienus, but lost his way around Mount Myconium. He passed the night there without tents. There was a heavy rainfall, as often occurs in the autumn, and some of his armor-bearers held a Gallic shield over his head the whole night. Harsh mutterings and prolonged roars from Mount Etna were heard, accompanied by flames which lighted up the camp, so that the Germans sprang from their beds in fear. Others, who had heard what had been related of Mount Etna, would not have been surprised, in presence of these remarkable phenomena, if a torrent of fire had rolled upon them. After this Octavius ravaged the territory of the Abacaenians, ⁹ where Lepidus, who was foraging, met him, and they both encamped near Messana.

[118] As there had been many skirmishes throughout Sicily, but no general engagement, Octavius sent Taurus to cut off Pompeius’ supplies by first capturing the towns that furnished them. Pompeius was so much inconvenienced by this that he decided to stake everything on a great battle. Since he feared the enemy’s infantry, but had confidence in his own ships, he sent and asked Octavius if he would allow the war to be decided by a naval engagement. Octavius, although he dreaded all naval encounters, which until now had turned out badly for him, considered it base to refuse, and, accordingly, accepted the challenge. A day was fixed by them, for which 300 ships were put in readiness on either side, provided with missiles of all kinds, with towers and whatever machines they could think of. Agrippa devised one called the harpago, a piece of wood five cubits long bound with iron and having rings at the extremities. To one of these rings was attached the harpago, an iron claw, to the other numerous ropes, which drew the harpago by machine power after it had been thrown by a catapult and had seized the enemy’s ships.

[119] When the appointed day came the rival shouts of the oarsmen were first heard, accompanied by missiles thrown by machines and by hand, such as stones, firebrands, and arrows. Then the ships dashed against each other, some striking amidships, others on the prows, others on the beaks, where the blows are most effectual in discomposing the crew and rendering the vessel useless. Others broke the opposing line by sailing through it, at the same time discharging arrows and javelins; and the small boats picked up those who fell overboard. There was a struggle of soldiers while the sailors put forth their strength and the pilots their skill and their lung-power. The generals cheered their men, and all the machines were brought into requisition. The harpago achieved the greatest success. Thrown from a long distance upon the ships, as it could be by reason of its lightness, it clutched them, especially when the ropes pulled on it from behind. On account of the iron bands it could not be easily cut by the men whom it attacked, and those who tried to cut the ropes were prevented from reaching them by its length. As this apparatus had never been known before, the enemy had not provided themselves with scythe-mounted poles. One thing seemed advisable in this unexpected emergency, and that was, to back water and draw the ship away; but as the enemy did the same the force exerted by the men was equal on both sides, and the harpago did its work.

[120] Accordingly, when the ships were drawn together, there was every kind of fighting, the men leaping upon each other’s decks. It was no longer easy to distinguish an enemy from a friend, as they used the same weapons for the most part, and nearly all spoke the Latin tongue, and the watchwords of each side were divulged to the other while they were mingled together. Hence arose many and divers frauds and lack of confidence on both sides on the part of those using the same watchword. They failed to recognize each other completely, and meanwhile the fighting and the sea were a confused medley of corpses, clashing arms, and crashing ships. They left nothing untried except fire. This they abstained from, after their first onset, because they were locked together. The foot-soldiers of each army on the land beheld this sea-fight with apprehension and eagerness, believing that their own hope of safety was bound up in it. They could not distinguish anything, however sharply they might look, but merely a long-drawn-out line of 600 ships, and an alternation of cries and groans now on one side and now on the other.

[121] Judging from the colors of the towers, which constituted the only difference between them, Agrippa with difficulty made out that Pompeius’ ships had sustained the greater loss, and he cheered on those who were close to him as though they were already victors. Then he drove at the enemy and pressed upon them without ceasing, until he overpowered those nearest him. They then lowered their towers and turned their ships in flight toward the straits. Seventeen of them, which were in advance, made their escape thither. The rest were cut off by Agrippa and some were pursued and driven aground. The pursuers ran aground with them in the rush, and either pulled off those that had come to a standstill or set fire to them. When the Pompeian ships that were still fighting saw what had befallen these, they surrendered to their enemies. Then the soldiers of Octavius who were in the ships raised a shout of victory and those on the land gave an answering shout. Those of Pompeius groaned. Pompeius himself, darting away from Naulochi, hastened to Messana, giving no orders to his infantry in his panic. Accordingly Octavius received the surrender of Tisienus on terms agreed upon, and of the cavalry besides, who were surrendered by their officers. Three of Octavius’ ships were sunk in the fight. Pompeius lost twenty-eight in this way, and the remainder were burned, or captured, or run aground, and stove in pieces, except the seventeen that escaped.

[122] Pompeius learned of the defection of his infantry while on the road, and changed his costume from that of a commander to that of a private citizen, and sent orders to Messana to put on shipboard everything possible. All preparations to this end had been made long before. He summoned Plennius from Lilybaeum in haste, with the eight legions he had, intending to take flight with them. Plennius hastened to comply with this order, but as other friends, garrisons, and soldiers were deserting, and the enemy’s fleet was moving into the straits, Pompeius did not wait for Plennius in his well-fortified city, but fled, with his seventeen ships, from Messana to Antony, whose mother he had saved in similar circumstances. After his departure Plennius arrived at Messana and occupied the place. Octavius himself remained in the camp at Naulochi, but he ordered Agrippa to lay siege to Messana, which the latter did, in conjunction with Lepidus. Plennius sent envoys to treat for peace. Agrippa wanted to wait till morning for the arrival of Octavius, but Lepidus granted terms, and, in order to conciliate the soldiers of Plennius to himself, allowed them to join the rest of the army in plundering the city. They had asked for nothing but safety, and now, finding unexpected gain in addition, they plundered Messana the whole night, in conjunction with the soldiers of Lepidus, and then ranged themselves under his standards.