Search the Perseus Catalog for:

Specimen Translationis latinae.

(III 30—36. p. 141—143 huiusce editionis.)

1. 119 r. col. 1

De agenti quidem igitur causa tot · Nunc faciat dici couipendiose autem et de principiis que materialia vocantur dicendum est quod enim ipsa sunt inconprehensibilia facile est considerare ex dissonantia facta de hiis
a dogmaticis pherecides quidem igitur syrus terram dixit esse principium omnium · thales autem millesius aquam · anaximander autem auditor ipsius infinitum · anaximenes autem et diogenes apolloniates aerem ypasinus d. 119 r. col. 2 autem metapontinus ignem exenophanes autem colophonius terram
et aquam oenopides autem chius ignem et aerem · ypporeginus ignem et aquam onoma certus autem in orficis ignem et aquam et terram qui autem circa empedoclem et stoicos ignem aquam terram de materia aquam terram] quidem a quibusdam sine qualitate monstruosa
dicta [a] quam nec ipsi apprehendere affirmant quid oportet et dicere qui vero circa aristotelem perypateticum ignem aerem aquam terram circulariter motum corpus · democritus autem et epicurus · attoma · anaxagoras autem clazomenius similium partes diodorus autem
cui cognomen saturnius minima et indivisibilia corpora · eractides autem ponticus et asclepiades bithinensis inequales magnitudines pictagorici autem numeros · mathematici autem terminos corporum st ato autem qualitates · tanta igitur et ad huc pluri dissonantia facta de materialibus principiis ab eis aut omnibus concedemus positis dissensionibus et aliis etiam aut quibusdam set omnibus quidem non est possibile · Non enim poterimus et hiis qui sunt circa asclepiadem concedere frangibilia
esse elementa dicentibus et talia ex hiis qui circa democritum attoma ipsa esse dicentibus et non qualificata ex hiis que circa omnem sensibilem qualitatem in omiomeriis relinquentibus si autem aliquam opinionem ab aliis proponemus aut [em] simpliciter et sine demonstratione
preferamus · aut cum demonstratione sine quidem igitur demonstratione manifestum est quia veram oportet demonstrationem esse vera aut non utique fol.119 col 1 dabitur non iudicata iudicio vero · verum autem iudicium esse ostenditur per demonstrationem iudicatam. Si quid
ut demonstrationem quidem que prefert aliquam opinionem vera esse demonstretur · oportet iudicium ipsius demonstratum esse · ut autem iudicium demonstretur oportet demonstrationem eius preferre qui per se invicem invenitur modus qui non dimittet procedere rationem demonstratione
quidem semper iudicio indigente demonstrato. iudicio autem demonstratione iudicata · Si autem semper iudicium iudicio iudicare et demonstrationem demonstratione demonstrare voluerit aliquis in infinitum eicietur. Si enim neque omnibus de elementis opinionibus possumus
concedere neque alicui harum desistere convenit de hiis.

Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes. Sextus Empiricus. ed. Hermann Mutschmann. Germany. 2014.

Sponsored by University of Leipzig.

Funding provided by European Social Fund Saxony.

Current edition

Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes. Book III, Lines 30-36. (Latin) (Sextus Empiricus. Sexti Empiricii Opera, Volume 1. Mutschmann, Hermann, translator. Leipzig: Teubner, 1912.)

Editions (1)

Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes First1KGreek (Sextus Empiricus. Sexti Empiricii Opera, Volume 1. Mutschmann, Hermann, editor. Leipzig: Teubner, 1912.) — 3.toc focus

ΠYPPΩΝΕΙΩΝ ΥΠΟΤΥΠΩΣΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΕΙΣ TPIA ΤΟ TPITON.

Τάδε ἔνεστιν ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ τῶν Πυρρωνείων ὑποτυπώσεων.

α′ περὶ τοῦ φυσικοῦ μέρους

β′ περὶ ἀρχῶν δραστικῶν

γ′ περὶ θεοῦ

δ′ περὶ αἰτίου

ε′ εἴ ἐστι τὶ τινὸς αἴτιον

ς′ περὶ ἀρχῶν ὑλικῶν

ζ′ εἰ καταληπτὰ τὰ σώματα

η′ περὶ κράσεως

θ′ περὶ κινήσεως

ι′ περὶ τῆς μεταβατικῆς κινήσεως

ια′ περὶ αὐξήσεως καὶ μειώσεως

ιβ′ περὶ ἀφαιρέσεως καὶ προσθέσεως

ιγ′ περὶ μεταθέσεως

ιδ′ περὶ ὅλου καὶ μέρους

ιε′ περὶ φυσικῆς μεταβολῆς

ις′ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς

ιζ′ περὶ μονῆς

ιη′ περὶ τόπου

ιθ′ περὶ χρόνου

κ′ περὶ ἀριθμοῦ

κα′ περὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ μέρους

κβ′ τί ἐστι φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀδιάφορον

κγ′ εἰ ἔστι τι τούτων φύσει

κδ′ τί ἐστιν ἡ λεγομένη τέχνη περὶ βίον

κε′ εἰ ἔστι τέχνη περὶ βίον

κς′ εἰ γίνεται ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη

κζ′ εἰ διδακτή ἐστιν ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη

¹

κη′ εἰ ἔστι τι διδασκόμενον

κθ′ εἰ ἔστιν ὁ διδάσκων καὶ ὁ μανθάνων

λ′ εἰ ἔστι τις μαθήσεως τρόπος

λα′ εἰ ὠφελεῖ ἡ περὶ τὸν βιὸν τέχνη τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτήν

λβ′ διὰ τὶ ὁ σκεπτικὸς ἐνίοτε ἀμυδρούς ταῖς πιθανότησιν ἐρωτᾶν ἐπιτηδεύει λόγους.

Περὶ μὲν <οὖν> τοῦ λογικοῦ μέρους τῆς λεγομένης φιλοσοφίας ὧς ἐν ὑποτυπώσει τοιαῦτα ἀρκούντως λέγοιτο ἂν·

α′ περὶ τοῦ φυσικοῦ μέρους.

[1] Κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τῆς συγγραφῆς καὶ τὸ φυσικὸν μέρος αὐτῆς ἐπιόντες οὐ πρὸς ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων αὐτοῖς κατὰ τόπον ἀντεροῦμεν, ἀλλὰ τὰ καθολικώτερα κινεῖν
ἐπιχειρήσομεν, οἶς συμπεριγράφεται καὶ τὰ λοιπά. ἀρξώμεθα δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ περὶ ἀρχῶν λόγου.

β′ περὶ ἀρχῶν δραστικῶν.

[1] Καὶ ἐπειδὴ παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις συμπεφώνηται τῶν ἀρχῶν τὰς μὲν ὑλικὰς εἶναι, τὰς δὲ δραστικὰς, ἀπὸ τῶν δραστικῶν τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ λόγου ποιησόμεθα· ταύτας γὰρ καὶ κυριωτέρας
τῶν ὑλικῶν φασιν εἶναι.

γ′ περὶ θεοῦ.

[2] Οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ θεὸν εἶναι δραστικώτατον αἴτιον οἱ πλείους ἀπεφήναντο, πρότερον περὶ θεοῦ σκοπήσωεν, ἐκεῖνο προει- ²³⁴ 119 πόντες, ὅτι τῷ μὲν βίῳ κατακολουθοῦντες ἀδοξάστως φαμὲν εἷναι θεοὺς καὶ σέβομεν θεοὺς καὶ προνοεῖν αὐτούς φαμεν, πρὸς δὲ τὴν προπέτειαν τῶν δογματικῶν τάδε λέγομεν.

Τῶν ἐννοουμένων ἡμῖν πραγμάτων τἀς οὐσίας ἐπινοεῖν ὀφείλομεν, οἷον εἰ σώματά ἐστιν ἢ ἀσώματα. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ εἴδη· οὐ γὰρ ἄν τις ἵππον ἐννοῆσαι δύναιτο μὴ οὐχὶ πρότερον τὸ εἶδος τοῦ ἵππου μαθών. τό τε ἐννοούμενον ἐννοεῖσθαί που ὀφείλει.

[3] ἐπεὶ οὖν τῶν δογματικῶν οἱ μὲν
σῶμά φασιν εἶναι τὸν θεόν, οἱ δὲ ἀσώματον, καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀνθρωποειδῆ, οἱ δὲ οὔ, καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐν τόπῳ, οἱ δὲ οὔ, καὶ τῶν ἐν τόπῳ οἱ μὲν ἐντὸς κόσμου, οἱ δὲ ἐκτός, πῶς δυνησόμεθα ἔννοιαν θεοῦ λαμβάνειν μήτε οὐσίαν ἔχοντες αὐτοῦ ὁμολογουμένην μήτε εἶδος μήτε τόπον ἐν ᾧ εἴη; πρότερον γὰρ
ἐκεῖνοι ὁμολογησάτωσάν τε καὶ συμφωνησάτωσαν, ὅτι τοιόσδε ἐστὶν ὁ θεός, εἶτα ἡμῖν αὐτὸν ὑποτυπωσάμενοι οὓτως
ἂκοπ'θτωσαν ἡμᾶς ἔννοιαν θεοῦ λαμβάνειν. ἐς ὅσον δὲ ἀνεπικρίτως διαφωνοῦσιν, τί νοήσομεν ἡμεῖς ὁμολογουμένως παρ’ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἔχομεν.

[4] ἀλλ’ ἄφθαρτόν τι, φασί, καὶ μακάριον ἐννοήσας, τὸν θεὸν εἶναι τοῦτο νόμιζε. τοῦτο
δέ ἐστιν εὔηθες· ὥσπερ <γὰρ> ὁ μὴ εἰδὼς τὸν οὐδὲ τὰ συμβεβηκότα αὐτῷ ὧς Δίωνι δύναται νοεῖν, οὕτως ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἴσμεν τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ θεοῦ, οὐδὲ τὰ συμβεβηκότα αὐτῷ μαθεῖν τε καὶ ἐννοῆσαι δυνησόμεθα.

[5] χωρὶς δὲ τούτων εἰπάτωσαν ἡμῖν, τί ἐστι τὸ μακάριον, πότερον
τὸ ἐνεργοῦν κατὰ ἀρετὴν καὶ προνοούμενον τῶν ὑφ’ ἑαυτὸ τεταγμένων, ἢ τὸ ἀνενέργητον καὶ μήτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχον μήτε ἑτέρῳ παρέχον· καὶ γὰρ καὶ περὶ τούτου διαφωνήσαντες ἀνεπικρίτως ἀνεννόητον ἡμῖν πεποιήκασι τὸ μακάριον, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τὸν θεόν.

[6] Ἳνα δὲ καὶ ἐπινοῆται ὁ θεός, ἐπέχειν ἀνάγκη περὶ ⁵ 120 τοῦ πότερον ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς δογματικοῖς. τὸ γὰρ εἷναι τὸν θεὸν πρόδηλον μὲν οὔκ ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ προσέπιπτεν, συνεφώνησαν ἂν οἱ δογματικοί, τίς
ἐστι καὶ ποδαπὸς καὶ ποῦ· ἡ ἀνεπίκριτος δὲ διαφωνία πεποίηκεν αὐτὸν ἄδηλον ἡμῖν εἶναι δοκεῖν καὶ ἀποδείξεως δεόμενον.

[7] ὁ μὲν οὖν <ἀποδεικνύων> ὅτι ἔστι θεός, ἤτοι διὰ προδήλου τοῦτο ἀποδείκνυσιν ἢ δι’ ἀδήλου. διὰ προ- δήλου μὲν οὖν οὐδαμῶς· εἰ γὰρ ἦν πρόδηλον τὸ ἀποδεικνύον
ὅτι ἔστι θεός, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἀποδεικνυόμενον πρὸς τῷ ἀποδεικνύντι νοεῖται, διὸ καὶ συγκαταλαμβάνεται αὐτῷ, καθὼς καὶ παρεστήσαμεν, πρόδηλον ἔσται καὶ τὸ εἶναι θεόν, συγκαταλαμβανόμενον τῷ ἀποδεικνύντι αὐτὸ προδήλῳ ὄντι. οὔκ ἐστι δὲ πρόδηλον, ὧς ὑπεμνήσαμεν· οὐδὲ
ἀποδείκνυται ἄρα διὰ προδήλου. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ δι’ ἀδήλου.

[8] τὸ γὰρ ἄδηλον τὸ ἀποδεικτικὸν τοῦ εἶναι θεόν, ἀποδείξεως χρῇζον, εἰ μὲν διὰ προδήλου λέγοιτο ἀποδείκνυσθαι, οὐκέτι
ἄδηλον ἔσται ἀλλὰ πρόδηλον [τὸ εἶναι θεόν]. οὐκ ἄρα ἀποδεικτικὸν αὐτοῦ ἄδηλον διὰ προδήλου ἀποδείκνυται. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ δι’ ἀδήλου· εἰς ἂπειρον γὰρ ἐκπεσεῖται ὁ τοῦτο λέγων, αἰτούντων ἡμῶν ἀεὶ ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ φερομένου
ἀδήλου πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ προεκκειμένου. οὐκ ἄρα ἐξ ἑτέρου δύναται ἀποδείκνυσθαι τὸ εἶναι θεόν.

[9] εἰ δὲ μήτε ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἐστι πρόδηλον μήτε ἐξ ἑτέρου ἀποδείκνυται, ἀκατάληπτον ἔσται εἰ ἔστι θεός.

Ἒτι καὶ τοῦτο λεκτέον. ὁ λέγων εἶναι θεὸν ἤτοι προνοεῖν
αὐτὸν τῶν ἐν κόσμω φησὶν ἤ οὐ προνοεῖν, καὶ εἰ μὲν προνοεῖν, ἤτοι πάντων ἤ τινων. (Epic. fr. 374 Us.) ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν πάντων προυνόει, οὐκ ἦν ἂν οὔτε κακόν τι οὔτε κακία ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ· κακίας δὲ πάντα μεστὰ εἶναι λέγουσιν· οὐκ ἄρα πάντων προνοεῖν λεχθήπροσέπιπτεν ⁶ 121 σεται ὁ θεός.

[10] εἰ δέ τινων προνοεῖ, διὰ τί τῶνδε ⁷ μὲν προνοεῖ, τῶνδε δὲ οὔ; ἤτοι γὰρ καὶ βούλεται
καὶ δύναται πάντων προνοεῖν, ἢ βούλεται μέν, οὐ δύναται δέ, ἢ δύναται μέν, οὐ βούλεται δέ, ἢ οὔτε βούλεται οὔτε δύναται. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν καὶ ἠβούλετο καὶ ἠδύνατο, πάντων ἂν προυνόει· οὐ προνοεῖ δὲ πάντων διὰ τὰ προειρημένα· οὐκ ἄρα
καὶ βούλεται καὶ δύναται πάντων προνοεῖν. εἰ δὲ βούλεται μέν, οὐ δύναται δέ, ἀσθενέστερός ἐστι τῆς αἰτίας δι’ ἣν οὐ δύναται προνοεῖν ὧν οὐ προνοεῖ·

[11] ἔστι δὲ παρὰ τὴν θεοῦ ἐπίνοιαν τὸ ἀσθενέστερον εἷναί τινος αὐτόν. εἰ δὲ δύναται μὲν πάντων προνοεῖν, οὐ βούλεται δέ, βάσκανος ἂν εἶναι νομισθείη.
εἰ δὲ οὔτε βούλεται οὔτε δύναται, καὶ βάσκανός ἐστι καὶ ἀσθενής, ὅπερ λέγειν περὶ θεοῦ ἀσεβούντων ἐστίν. ἄρα προνοεῖ τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ ὁ θεός. εἰ δὲ οὐδενὸς πρόνοιαν ποιεῖται οὐδὲ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ ἔργον οὐδὲ ἀποτέλεσμα, οὐχ ἕξει τις εἰπεῖν, πόθεν καταλαμβάνεται
ὅτι ἔστι θεός, εἴγε μήτε ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ φαίνεται μήτε δι’ ἀποτελεσμάτων τινῶν καταλαμβάνεται. καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἄρα ἀκατάληπτόν ἐστιν εἰ ἔστι θεός.

[12] ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἐπιλογιζόμεθα, ὅτι ἴσως ἀσεβεῖν ἀναγκάζονται οἱ διαβεβαιωτικῶς
λέγοντες εἶναι θεόν· πάντων μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν προνοεῖν λέγοντες κακῶν αἴτιον τὸν θεὸν εἷναι φήσουσιν, τινῶν δὲ ἢ καὶ μηδενὸς προνοεῖν αὐτὸν λέγοντες ἤτοι βάσκανον τὸν θεὸν ἢ ἀσθενῆ λέγειν ἀναγκασθήσονται, ταῦτα δέ ἐστιν
ἀσεβούντων προδήλως.

δ′ περὶ αἰτίου.

[13] Ἲνα δὲ μὴ καὶ ἡμᾶς βλασφημεῖν ἐπιχειρήσωσιν οἱ δογματικοὶ δι’ ἀπορίαν τοῦ πραγματικῶς ἡμῖν ἀντιλέγειν, ⁸ 122 κοινότερον περὶ τοῦ ἐνεργητικοῦ αἰτίου διαπορήσομεν, πρότερον
ἐπιστῆσαι πειραθέντες τῇ τοῦ αἰτίου ἐπινοίᾳ. ὅσον μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν οὐδ’ ἂν ἐννοῆσαί τις τὸ αἴτιον δύναιτο, εἴγε πρὸς τῷ διαφώνους καὶ ἀλλοκότους ἐννοίας τοῦ αἰτίου <ἀποδίδοσθαι> ἔτι καὶ ὑπόστασιν αὐτοῦ πεποιήκασιν ἀνεύρετον διὰ τὴν περὶ αὐτὸ
διαφωνίαν.

[14] οἱ μὲν γὰρ σῶμα, οἱ δὲ ἀσώματον τὸ αἴτιον εἶναί φασιν. δόξαι δ’ ἂν αἴτιον εἶναι κοινότερον κατ’ αὐτοὺς δι’ ὃ ἐνεργοῦν γίνεται τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, οἷον ὧς ὁ ἥλιος ἢ ἡ τοῦ ἡλίου θερμότης τοῦ χεῖσθαι τὸν κηρὸν ἢ τῆς χύσεως τοῦ κηροῦ. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ διαπεφωνήκασιν,
οἱ μὲν προσηγοριῶν αἴτιον εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον φάσκοντες, οἶον τῆς χύσεως, οἱ δὲ κατηγορημάτων, οἶον τοῦ χεῖσθαι. διό, καθάπερ εἶπον, κοινότερον ἂν εἴη τὸ αἴτιον τοῦτο δι’ ὃ ἐνεργοῦν γίνεται τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα.

[15] τούτων δὲ τῶν αἰτίων οἱ μὲν πλείους ἡγοῦνται τὰ μὲν
συνεκτικὰ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ συναίτια, τὰ δὲ συνεργά, καὶ συνεκτικὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν ὡν παρόντων πάρεστι τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα καὶ αἰρομένων αἴρεται καὶ μειουμένων μειοῦται (οὕτω γὰρ τὴν περίθεσιν τῆς στραγγάλης αἴτιον εἶναί φασι τοῦ πνιγμοῦ), συναίτιον δὲ ὃ τὴν ⁹ ἲσην εἰσφέρεται δύναμιν ἑτέρῳ συναιτίῳ πρὸς τὸ
εἶναι τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα οὓτω <γὰρ> ἕκαστον ¹⁰ ἑλκόντων τὸ ἄροτρον βοῶν αἴτιον εἶναί φασι τῆς ὁλκῆς τοῦ ἀρότρου), συνεργὸν δὲ ὃ βραχεῖαν εἰσφέρεται δύναμιν καὶ πρὸς τὸ μετὰ ῥᾳστώνης ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, οἶον ὅταν δυοῖν βάρος
τι βασταζόντων μόλις τρίτος τις προσελθὼν συγκουφίσῃ τοῦτο.

[16] ἔνιοι μέντοι καὶ παρόντα μελλόντων τῶν αἴτια ἔφασαν εἶναι, ὧς τὰ προκαταρκτικά, οἶον τὴν ἐπιτεταμένην ἡλίωσιν πυρετοῦ. τινὲς δὲ ταῦτα
παρῃτήσαντο, ἐπειδὴ τὸ αἴτιον πρός τι ὑπάρχον καὶ πρὸς ¹¹ 123 τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα ὂν οὐ δύναται προηγεῖσθαι αὐτοῦ ὧς αἴτιον. ἐν δὲ τῇ περὶ αὐτῶν διαπορήσει τοιάδε λέγομεν.

ε′ εἴ ἐστι τὶ τινὸς αἴτιον.

[17] Πιθανόν ἐστιν εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον· πῶς γὰρ ἂν αὔξησις γένοιτο, μείωσις, γένεσις, φθορά, καθόλου κίνησις, τῶν φυσικῶν τε καὶ ψυχικῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων ἕκαστον, ἡ τοῦ
παντὸς κόσμου διοίκησις, τὰ ἄλλα πάντα, εἰ μὴ κατά τινα αἰτίαν; καὶ γὰρ εἰ μηδὲν τούτων ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ὑπάρχει, λέξομεν ὅτι διά τινα αἰτίαν πάντως φαίνεται ἡμῖν τοιαῦτα, ὁποῖα οὔκ ἐστιν.

[18] ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντα ἐκ πάντων καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν ἂν ἦν μὴ οὔσης αἰτίας. οἷον ἵπποι μὲν ἐκ
μυῶν, εἰ τύχοι, γεννηθήσονται, ἐλέφαντες δὲ ἐκ μυρμήκων· καὶ ἐν μὲν ταῖς Αἰγυπτίαις Θήβαις ὄμβροι ποτὲ ἐξαίσιοι καὶ χιόνες ἂν ἐγίνοντο, τὰ δὲ νότια ὄμβρων οὐ μετεῖχεν, εἰ μὴ αἰτία τις ἦν, δι’ ἣν τὰ μὲν νότιά ἐστι δυσχείμερα, αὐχμηρὰ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἔω.

[19] καὶ περιτρέπεται δὲ ὁ λέγων
μηδὲν αἴτιον εἶναι· εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς καὶ ἄνευ τινὸς αἰτίας τοῦτό φησι λέγειν, ἄπιστος ἔσται· εἰ δὲ διά τινα αἰτίαν, βουλόμενος ἀναιρεῖν τὸ αἴτιον τίθησιν, ἀποδιδόσθω αἰτίαν δι’ ἣν οὐκ ἔστιν αἴτιον.

Διὰ ταῦτα μὲν οὖν πιθανόν ἐστιν εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον·

[20] ὅτι δὲ καὶ τὸ λέγειν μὴ εἶναί τινός τι αἴτιον πιθανόν ἐστι, φανερὸν ἔσται λόγους ἡμῶν ἐκθεμένων ὀλίγους ἀπὸ πολλῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος πρὸς τὴν τούτου ὑπόμνησιν. οἷον γοῦν ἀδύνατόν ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον ἐννοῆσαι πρὶν τὸ ἀπο- ¹²¹³ 123
τούτου τούτου καταλαβεῖν ὧς ἀποτέλεσμα αὐτοῦ· τότε
γὰρ γνωρίζομεν, ὅτι αἴτιόν ἐστι τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος, ὅταν ἐκεῖνο ὧς ἀποτέλεσμα καταλαμβάνωμεν.

[21] ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα τοῦ αἰτίου ὧς ἀποτέλεσμα αὐτοῦ καταλαβεῖν δυνάμεθα, ἐὰν μὴ καταλάβωμεν τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος ὡς αἴτιον αὒτοῦ· τότε γὰρ καὶ ὅτι ἀποτέλεσμά ἐστιν
αὐτοῦ γινώσκειν δοκοῦμεν, ὅταν τὸ αἴτιον αὐτοῦ ὧς αἴτιον αὐτοῦ καταλάβωμεν.

[22] εἰ οὖν, ἴνα μὲν ἐννοήσωμεν τὸ αἴτιον, δεῖ προεπιγνῶναι τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, ἴνα δὲ τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα γνῶμεν, x003E; ἔφην, δεῖ προεπίστασθαι τὸ αἴτιον, ὁ διάλληλος τῆς ἀπορίας τρόπος ἄμφω δείκνυσιν ἀνεπινόητα, μήτε
τοῦ αἰτίου ὧς αἰτίου μήτε τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος ὡς ἀποτελέσματος ἐπινοεῖσθαι δυναμένου· ἑκατέρου γὰρ αὐτῶν δεομένου τῆς παρὰ θατέρου πίστεως, οὐχ ἕξομεν ἀπὸ τίνος αὐτῶν ἀρξόμεθα τῆς ἐννοίας. διόπερ οὐδὲ ἀποφαίνεσθαι δυνησόμεθα, ὅτι ἔστι τὶ τινὸς αἴτιον.

[23] ἵνα δὲ καὶ
ἐννοεῖσθαι δύνασθαι τὸ αἴτιον συγχωρήσῃ τις, ἀκατάληπτον ἂν εἶναι νομισθείη διὰ τὴν διαφωνίαν. οἱ μὲν γάρ φασιν <εἶναι τὶ τινὸς αἴτιον, οἱ δὲ μὴ εἶναι, οἱ δ’ ὃς γάρ φησιν> εἶναι <τὶ> τινὸς αἴτιον, ἤτοι ἀπλῶς μηδεμιᾶς ὁρμώμενος αἰτίας εὐλόγου τοῦτό φησι λέγειν, ἢ διά τινας αἰτίας ἐπὶ τὴν συγκατάθεσιν ταύτην ἰέναι λέξει.
καὶ εἰ μὲν ἁπλῶς, οὐκ ἔσται πιστότερος τοῦ λέγοντος ἁπλῶς μηδὲν εἶναι μηδενὸς αἴτιον· εἰ δὲ αἰτίας λέξει δι’ ἃς εἶναι <τὶ> τινὸς αἴτιον νομίζει, τὸ ζητούμενον διὰ τοῦ παριστᾶν ἐπιχειρήσει· ζητούντων γὰρ ἡμῶν, εἰ ἐστι τὶ τινὸς αἴτιον, αὐτὸς ὡς αἰτίας οὔσης τοῦ εἶναι αἴτιον
αἴτιον εἶναι φησίν.

[24] καὶ ἄλλως, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τοῦ αἰτίου ζητοῦμεν, δεήσει πάντως αὐτὸν καὶ τῆς αἰτίας τοῦ εἶναί τι αἴτιον αἰτίαν παρασχεῖν, κἀκείνης ἄλλην, καὶ ¹⁴ 124 μέχρις ἀπείρου. ἀδύνατον δὲ ἀπείρους αἰτίας παρασχεῖν· ἀδύνατον ἄρα διαβεβαιωτικῶς ἀποφῆναι, ὅτι ἐστὶ τὶ τινὸς αἴτιον.

[25] πρὸς τούτοις ἤτοι ὂν καὶ ὑφεστὼς ἤδη αἴτιον τὸ
αἲτιον ποιεῖ τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, ἢ μὴ ὂν αἴτιον. καὶ μὴ ὂν μὲν οὐδαμῶς· εἰ δὲ ὄν, δεῖ αὐτὸ πρότερον ὑποστῆναι καὶ προγενέσθαι αἴτιον, εἶθ’ οὕτως ἐπάγειν τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα,
ὅπερ ὐπ’ αὐτοῦ ἀποτελεῖσθαι λέγεται ὄντος ἤδη αἰτίου. ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ πρός τι ἐστὶ τὸ αἴτιον καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, σαφὲς ὅτι μὴ δύναται τούτου ὧς αἴτιον προυποστῆναι· οὐδὲ ὂν ἄρα αἴτιον τὸ αἴτιον ἀποτελεῖν δύναται τὸ οὗ ἐστιν αἴτιον.

[26] εἰ
δὲ μήτε μὴ ὂν αἴτιον ἀποτελεῖ τι μήτε ὄν, οὐδὲ ἀποτελεῖ τι· διὸ οὐδὲ αἴτιον ἔσται· ἄνευ γὰρ τοῦ ἀποτελεῖν τι τὸ αἴτιον οὐ δύναται ὧς αἴτιον νοεῖσθαι. ὅθεν κἀκεῖνο λέγουσί τινες· τὸ αἴτιον ἤτοι συνυφίστασθαι δεῖ τῷ ἀποτελέσματι ἢ πρου·φίστασθαι τούτου ἢ <εἶναι> μετὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι <ἀποτέλεσμα>
τὸ μὲν οὖν λέγειν, ὅτι τὸ αἴτιον εἰς ὐπόστασιν ἄγεται μετὰ τὴν γένεσιν τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος αὐτοῦ μὴ καὶ γελοῖον ἠ’. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ προυφίστασθαι δύναται τούτου· πρὸς αὐτὸ γὰρ νοεῖσθαι λέγεται, τὰ δὲ πρός τι φασὶν αὐτοί,

[27] καθὸ πρός τι ἐστίν, συνυπάρχειν καὶ συννοεῖσθαι ἀλλήλοις. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ
συνυφίστασθαι· εἰ γὰρ ἀποτελεστικὸν αὐτοῦ ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ γινόμενον ὑπὸ ὄντος ἤδη γίνεσθαι χρή, πρότερον δεῖ τὸ αἴτιον γενέσθαι αἴτιον, εἶθ’ οὕτως ποιεῖν τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα. εἰ οὖν τὸ αἴτιον μήτε προὑφίσταται τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος αὐτοῦ μήτε συνυφίσταται τούτῳ, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τὸ <τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα>
πρὸ αὐτοῦ γίνεται, μήποτε οὐδὲ ὑποστάσεως ὅλως μετέχει.

[28] σαφὲς δὲ ἴσως ὅτι καὶ διὰ τούτων ἡ ἐπίνοια τοῦ αἰτίου πάλιν περιτρέπεται. εἰ γὰρ τὸ αἴτιον ὡς μὲν πρός τι οὐ δύναται τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος αὐτοῦ προεπινοηθῆναι, ἴνα δὲ ὧς αἴτιον τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος αὐτοῦ νοηθῇ, δεῖ αὐτὸ προ-
¹⁵¹⁶ 125 επινοεῖσθαι τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος αὐτοῦ, ἀδύνατον δὲ προ- επινοηθῆναί τι ἐκείνου οὗ προεπινοηθῆναι [τι] οὐ δύναται,
ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ἐπινοηθῆναι τὸ αἴτιον.

[29] ‘Εκ τούτων οὖν λοιπὸν ἐπιλογιζόμεθα, ὅτι <εἰ> πιθανοὶ
μέν εἰσιν οἱ λόγοι καθ’ οὓς ὑπεμνήσαμεν ὡς χρὴ λέγειν αἴτιον εἷναι, πιθανοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ παριστάντες, ὅτι μὴ προσήκει αἴτιον εἶναί τι ἀποφαίνεσθαι, καὶ τούτων προκρίνειν τινὰς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, μήτε σημεῖον μήτε κριτήριον μήτε
ἀπόδειξιν ὁμολογουμένως ἡμῶν ἐχόντων, ὧς ἔμπροσθεν παρεστήσαμεν, ἐπέχειν ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ τῆς ὑποστάσεως τοῦ αἰτίου, μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναί τι αἴτιον λέγοντας ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν.

ς′ περὶ ὑλικῶν ἀρχῶν.

[30] Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς δραστικῆς τοσαῦτα νῦν ἀρκέσει λελέχθαι· συντόμως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ὑλικῶν καλουμένων ἀρχῶν λεκτέον. ὅτι τοίνυν αὗταί εἶσιν ἀκατάληπτοι, ἄληπτοι, ῥᾴδιον συνιδεῖν ἐκ τῆς περὶ αὐτῶν γεγενημένης διαφωνίας παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς. Φερεκύδης μὲν γὰρ ὁ Σύριος γῆν
εἷπε τὴν πάντων εἶναι ἀρχήν, Θαλῆς δὲ ὁ Μιλήσιος ὓδωρ, ‘Αναξίμανδρος δὲ ὁ ἀκουστὴς τούτου τὸ ἄπειρον, Ἀναξιμένης δὲ καὶ Διογενὴς ὁ ‘Απολλωνιάτης ἀέρα, Ἳππασος δὲ ὁ Μεταποντῖνος πῦρ, Ξενοφάνης δὲ ὁ Κολοφώνιος γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ, Οἰνοπίδης δὲ ὁ ¹⁷ Χῖος πῦρ καὶ ἀέρα, Ἵππων δὲ ὁ ’Ιππων πῦρ καὶ
ὓδωρ, Ὀνομάκριτος δὲ ἐν τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν,.

[31] οἱ δὲ περὶ τόν ‘Εμπεδοκλέα καὶ τοὺς ¹⁸¹⁹ 126 Στωικοὺς πῦρ ἀέρα ὕδωρ γῆν — περὶ γὰρ τῆς τερατολογουμένης ἀποίου παρά τισιν ὕλης, ἣν οὐδὲ αὐτοὶ καταλαμβάνειν διαβεβαιοῦνται, τί δεῖ καὶ λέγειν; οἱ δὲ περὶ Ἀριστοτέλην τὸν Περιπατητικὸν πῦρ ἀέρα ὕδωρ γῆν τὸ
κυκλοφορητικὸν σῶμα,

[32] Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ἀτόμους, Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ ὁ Κλαζομένιος ὁμοιομερείας, Διόδωρος δὲ ὁ ἐπικληθεὶς Κρόνος ἐλάχιστα καὶ ἀμερῆ σώματα, Ἡρακλείδης δὲ ὁ Ποντικὸς καὶ Ἀσκληπιάδης ὁ Βιθυνὸς ἀνάρμους
ὄγκους, οἱ δὲ περὶ Πυθαγόραν τούς ἀριθμούς, οἱ.
δὲ μαθηματικοὶ τά πέρατα τῶν σωμάτων, Στράτων δὲ ὁ φυσικὸς τὰς ποιότητας.

[33] τοσαύτης τοίνυν καὶ ἔτι πλείονος διαφωνίας γεγενημένης περὶ τῶν ὑλικῶν ἀρχῶν παρ’ αὐτοῖς, ἤτοι πάσαις συγκαταθησόμεθα ταῖς κειμέναις στάσεσι καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἢ τισίν. ἀλλὰ πάσαις μὲν οὐ δυνατόν·
οὐ γὰρ δήπου δυνησόμεθα καὶ τοῖς περὶ Ἀσκληπιάδην συγκατατίθεσθαι , θραυστὰ στᾶ εἶναι τὰ στοιχεῖα λέγουσι καὶ ποιά, καὶ τοῖς περὶ Δημόκριτον, ἄτομα
ταῦτα εἶναι φάσκουσι καὶ ἄποια, καὶ τοῖς περὶ Ἀναξαγόραν, πᾶσαν αἰσθητὴν ποιότητα περὶ ταῖς ὁμοιομερείαις ἀπολείπουσιν.

[34] εἰ δέ τινα στάσιν τῶν ἄλλων προκρινοῦμεν, ἤτοι ἁπλῶς καὶ ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως προκρινοῦμεν
ἢ μετὰ ἀποδείξεως. ἄνευ μὲν οὖν ἀποδείξεως οὐ συνθησόμεθα· εἰ δὲ μετὰ ἀποδείξεως, ἀληθῆ δεῖ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι. ἀληθὴς δὲ οὐκ ἄν δοθείη μὴ οὐχὶ κεκριμένη κριτηρίῳ ἀληθεῖ, ἀληθὲς δὲ κριτήριον εἶναι δείκνυται δι’ ἀποδείξεως κεκριμένης.

[35] εἰ τοίνυν, ἴνα μὲν ἡ ἀπόδειξις ἡ
προκρίνουσά τινα στάσιν ἀληθὴς εἶναι δειχθῇ , δεῖ τὸ κριτήριον τήριον αὐτῆς ἀποδεδεῖχθαι, ἵνα δὲ τὸ κριτήριον ἀποδειχθῇ, δεῖ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν αὐτοῦ προκεκρίσθαι, ὁ διάλληλος εὑρίσκεται τρόπος, ὃς οὐκ ἐάσει προβαίνειν τὸν λόγον, τῆς μὲν ἀποδείξεως ἀεὶ κριτηρίου δεομένης ἀποδεδειγμένου, τοῦ
κριτηρίου δὲ ἀποδείξεως κεκριμένης.

[36] εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ τὸ κριτήριον ²⁰ 127 κριτηρίῳ κρίνειν καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἀποδείξει ἀποδεικνύναι βούλοιτό τις, εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκβληθήσεται. εἰ τοίνυν μήτε πάσαις ταῖς περὶ στοιχείων στάσεσι δυνάμεθα συγκατατίθεσθαι
μήτε τινὶ τούτων, ἐπέχειν προσήκει περὶ αὐτῶν.

[37] Δυνατὸν μὲν οὖν ἴσως ἐστὶ καὶ διὰ τούτων μόνων ὑπομιμνῄσκειν τὴν τῶν στοιχείων καὶ τῶν ὑλικῶν ἀρχῶν ἀκαταληψίαν· ἴνα δὲ καὶ ἀμφιλαφέστερον τοὺς δογματικοὺς ἐλέγχειν ἔχωμεν, ἐνδιατρίψωμεν συμμέτρως τῷ τόπῳ.
καὶ ἐπεὶ πολλαὶ καὶ σχεδὸν ἄπειροί τινές εἰσιν αἱ περὶ στοιχείων δόξαι, καθὼς ὑπεμνήσαμεν, τὸ μὲν πρὸς ἐκάστοιχείων λέγειν εἰδικῶς νῦν παραιτησόμεθα διὰ τὸν χαρακτῆρα τῆς συγγραφῆς, δυνάμει δὲ πρὸς πάσας ἀντεροῦμεν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἣν ἂν τις εἴπῃ περὶ στοιχείων στάσιν, ἤτοι ἐπὶ σώματα
κατενεχθήσεται ἢ ἐπὶ ἀσώματα, ἀρκεῖν ἡγούμεθα ὐπομνῆσαι, ὅτι ἀκατάληπτα μέν ἐστι τὰ σώματα, ἀκατάληπτα
δὲ τὰ ἀσώματα· διὰ γὰρ τούτου σαφὲς ἔσται, ὅτι καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖά ἐστιν ἀκατάληπτα.

ζ′ εἰ καταληπτὰ τὰ σώματα.

[38] Σῶμα τοίνυν λέγουσιν εἶναί τινες ὃ οἷόν τε ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν. ὅσον δὲ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ ἀκατάληπτόν
ἐστι τοῦτο. τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἴτιον ἀκατάληπτόν ἐστι, καθὼς ὑπεμνήσαμεν· μὴ ἔχοντες δὲ εἰπεῖν εἰ ἔστι τι αἴτιον, οὐδὲ εἰ ἔστι τι πάσχον εἰπεῖν δυνάμεθα· τὸ γὰρ πάσχον πάντως ὑπὸ αἰτίου πάσχει. ἀκαταλήπτου δὲ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ αἰτίου καὶ τοῦ πάσχοντος, διὰ ταῦτα ἀκατάληπτον ἔσται καὶ τὸ
σῶμα.

[39] τινὲς δὲ σῶμα εἶναι λέγουσι τὸ τριχῇ διαστατὸν μετὰ ἀντιτυπίας. σημεῖον μὲν γάρ φασιν οὗ ²¹²²²³²⁴ 128 μέρος οὐθέν, γραμμὴν δὲ μῆκος ἀπλατές, ἐπιφάνειαν δὲ μῆκος μετὰ πλάτους· ὅταν δὲ αὕτη καὶ βάθος προσλάβῃ καὶ ἀντιτυπίαν, σῶμα εἷναι, περὶ οὗ νῦν ἐστιν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος, συνεστὼς ἔκ τε μήκους καὶ
πλάτους καὶ βάθους καὶ ἀντιτυπίας.

[40] εὐμαρὴς μέντοι καὶ ὁ πρὸς τούτους λόγος. τὸ γὰρ σῶμα ἤτοι οὐδὲν παρὰ ταῦτα εἶναι λέξουσιν ἢ ἕτερόν τι παρὰ τὴν συνέλευσιν τῶν προειρημένων. καὶ ἔξωθεν μὲν τοῦ μήκους τε καὶ τοῦ πλάτους καὶ τοῦ βάθους καὶ τῆς ἀντιτυπίας οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη τὸ
σῶμα· εἰ δὲ ταῦτά ἐστι τὸ σῶμα, ἐὰν δείξῃ τις, ὅτι ἀνύπαρκτά ἐστιν, ἀναιροίη ἂν καὶ τὸ σῶμα· τὰ γὰρ ὅλα συναναιρεῖται τοῖς ἑαυτῶν πᾶσι μέρεσιν. ποικίλως μὲν οὖν ἔστι ταῦτα ἐλέγχειν· τὸ δὲ νῦν ἀρκέσει λέγειν, ὅτι εἰ ἔστι τὰ πέρατα, ἤτοι γραμμαί εἰσιν ἢ ἐπιφάνειαι ἢ σώματα.

[41] εἰ μὲν
οὖν ἐπιφάνειάν τινα ἢ γραμμὴν εἶναι λέγοι τις, καὶ τῶν προειρημένων ἕκαστον ἤτοι κατὰ ἰδίαν ὑφεστάναι δύνασθαι λεχθήσεται ἢ μόνον περὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις σώμασι θεωρεῖσθαι. ἄλλα καθ’ ἑαυτὴν μὲν ὑπάρχουσαν ἤτοι γραμμὴν ἢ ἐπιφάνειαν ὀνειροπολεῖν ἴσως εὔηθες. εἰ δὲ περὶ τοῖς σώμασι
μασι θεωρεῖσθαι λέγοιτο μόνον καὶ μὴ καθ’ ἑαυτὸ ὑπεστάναι τούτων ἕκαστον, πρῶτον μὲν αὐτόθεν δοθήσεται τὸ μὴ ἐξ αὐτῶν γεγονέναι τὰ σώματα (ἐχρῆν γάρ, οἶμαι, ταῦτα πρότερον ὑπόστασιν καθ’ ἑαυτὰ ἐσχηκέναι, καὶ οὕτω συνελθόντα
πεποιηκέναι τὰ σώματα),

[42] εἶτα οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς καλουμένοις σώμασιν ὑφέστηκεν. καὶ τοῦτο διὰ πλειόνων μέν ἐστιν ὑπομιμνῄσκειν, ἀρκέσει δὲ νῦν τὰ ἐκ τῆς ἁφῆς ἀπορούμενα λέγειν. εἰ γὰρ ἅπτεται ἀλλήλων τὰ παρατιθέμενα
σώματα, τοῖς πέρασιν αὐτῶν, οἷον ταῖς ἐπιφανείαις, ψαύει ἀλλήλων. αἱ οὖν ἐπιφάνειαι ὅλαι μὲν δι’ ὅλων ἀλλήλαις οὐχ ἑνωθήσονται κατὰ τὴν ἁφήν, ἐπεὶ σύγχυσις ἔσται ἡ ἁφὴ καὶ ὁ χωρισμὸς τῶν ἁπτομένων διασπασμός· ὅπερ οὐ ²⁵²⁶²⁷ 129
θεωρεῖται.

[43] εἰ δὲ ἄλλοις <μὲν> μέρεσιν ἡ ἐπιφάνεια ἂπτεται τῆς τοῦ παρατιθεμένου αὐτῇ σώματος ἐπιφανείας, ἄλλοις δὲ συνήνωται τῷ σώματι οὗ ἐστι πέρας, <οὐκ ²⁸ ἀβαθής, διαφόρων τῶν αὐτῆς μερῶν νοουμένων κατὰ βάθοε, ²⁹ τοῦ μὲν τοῦ παρατιθεμένου ἁπτομένου, τοῦ δὲ καθ’ ³⁰ ὃ συνήνωται τῷ σώματι οὗ ἐστι πέρας>. οὐκ ἄρα περὶ σώματι θεωρῆσαι δύναταί τις μῆκος καὶ πλάτος ἀβαθές, ὅθεν οὐδὲ ἐπιφάνειαν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δύο ἐπιφανειῶν
καθ’ ὑπόθεσιν παρατιθεμένων ἀλλήλαις κατὰ τὰ πέρατα αὐτῶν εἰς ἃ λήγουσι, κατὰ τὸ λεγόμενον αὐτῶν μῆκος εἶναι, τουτέστι κατὰ γραμμάς, αἱ γραμμαὶ αὗται, δι’ ὧν ἅπτεσθαι λέγονται ἀλλήλων αἱ ἐπιφάνειαι, οὐχ ἑνωθήσονται μὲν ἀλλήλαις (συγχυθεῖεν γὰρ ἄν)· εἰ δὲ
ἑκάστη αὐτῶν ἄλλοις μὲν μέρεσι τοῖς κατὰ πλάτος ἅπτεται τῆς παρατιθεμένης αὐτῇ γραμμῆς, ἄλλοις δὲ συνήνωται τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ ἧς ἐστι πέρας, οὐκ ἔσται ἀπλατής, ὅθεν οὐδὲ γραμμή. εἰ δὲ μήτε γραμμὴ ἔστιν ἐν σώματι μήτε ἐπιφάνεια, οὐδὲ μῆκος ἢ πλάτος ἢ βάθος ἔσται ἐν σώματι.

[44]
εἰ δέ τις σώματα εἶναι λέγοι τὰ πέρατα, σύντομος ἔσται ἡ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀπόκρισις. εἰ γὰρ τὸ μῆκος σῶμα ἐστίν, δεήσει τοῦτο εἰς τὰς τρεῖς αὐτοῦ μερίζεσθαι διαστάσεις, ὧν ἑκάστη σῶμα οὖσα πάλιν αὐτὴ διαιρεθήσεται εἰς διαστάσεις ἄλλας τρεῖς, ἇί ἔσονται σώματα, καὶ ἐκεῖναι εἰς
ἄλλας ὁμοίως, καὶ τοῦτο μέχρις ἀπείρου, ὡς ἀπειρομέγεθες γίνεσθαι τὸ σῶμα εἰς ἄπειρα μεριζόμενον· ὃπερ ἄτοπον· οὐδὲ σώματα ἄρα εἰσὶν αἱ προειρημέναι διαστάσεις. εἰ
δὲ μήτε σώματά εἰσι μήτε γραμμαὶ ἢ ἐπιφάνειαι, οὐδὲ εἷναι νομισθήσονται.

[45] ‘Ακατάληπτος δέ ἐστι καὶ ἡ ἀντιτυπία. αὕτη γὰρ ³¹³² 130 εἴπερ καταλαμβάνεται, ἀφῇ καταλαμβάνοιτο ἄν. ἐὰν οὖν δείξωμεν, ὅτι ἀκατάληπτός ἐστιν ἡ ἁφή, σαφὲς ἔσται ὅτι
οὐχ οἷόν τέ ἐστι καταλαμβάνεσθαι τὴν ἀντιτυπίαν. ὅτι δὲ ἀκατάληπτός ἐστιν ἡ ἁφή, διὰ τούτων ἐπιλογιζόμεθα. τὰ ἁπτόμενα ἀλλήλων ἤτοι μέρεσιν ἀλλήλων ἅπτεται ἢ ὅλα ὅλων. ὅλα μὲν οὖν ὅλων οὐδαμῶς· ἑνωθήσεται γὰρ οὕτω καὶ οὐχ ἅψεται ἀλλήλων. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ μέρεσι μερῶν· τὰ γὰρ
μέρη αὐτῶν ὡς μὲν πρὸς τὰ ὅλα μέρη ἐστίν, ὡς δὲ πρὸς τὰ μέρη ἑαυτῶν ὅλα. ταῦτα οὖν τὰ ὅλα, <ἅ> ἐστιν μέρη, ὅλα μὲν ὅλων οὐχ

[46] ἅψεται διὰ τὰ προειρημένα, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ μέρεσι μερῶν· καὶ γὰρ τὰ τούτων μέρη ὡς πρὸς τὰ ἑαυτῶν μέρη ὅλα ὄντα οὔτε ὅλα ὅλων ἅψεται οὔτε μέρεσι
μερῶν. εἰ δὲ μήτε κατὰ ὁλότητα μήτε κατὰ μέρη γινο- μένην ἁφὴν καταλαμβάνομεν, ἀκατάληπτος ἔσται ἡ ἁφή. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἡ ἀντιτυπία. ὅθεν καὶ τὸ σῶμα· εἰ γὰρ οὐδέν ἐστι τοῦτο παρὰ τἀς τρεῖς διαστάσεις καὶ τὴν ἀντιτυπίαν, ἐδείξαμεν δὲ ἀκατάληπτον τούτων ἕκαστον,
καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἔσται ἀκατάληπτον.

Οὕτω μὲν οὖν, ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἐννοίᾳ τοῦ σώματος, ἀκατάληπτόν ἐστιν, εἰ ἔστι τι σῶμα·

[47] λεκτέον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο εἰς τὸ προκείμενον. τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν φασιν εἶναι αἰσθητά, τὰ δὲ νοητά, καὶ τὰ μὲν τῇ διανοίᾳ καταλαμβάνεσθαι, τὰ
δὲ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, καὶ τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις ἁπλοπαθεῖς εἶναι, τὴν δὲ διάνοιαν ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν αἰσθητῶν καταλήψεως ἐπὶ τὴν κατάληψιν τῶν νοητῶν ἰέναι. εἰ οὖν ἔστι τι σῶμα, ἤτοι αἰσθητόν ἐστιν ἤ νοητόν. καὶ αἰσθητὸν μὲν οὔκ ἐστιν· κατὰ γὰρ συναθροισμὸν μήκους καὶ βάθους
καὶ πλάτους καὶ ἀντιτυπίας καὶ χρώματος καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν καταλαμβάνεσθαι δοκεῖ, σὺν οἶς θεωρεῖται· αἱ δὲ αἰσθήσεις ἁπλοπαθεῖς εἶναι λέγονται παρ’ αὐτοῖς.

[48] <....> εἰ δὲ ³³³⁴
εἷναι λέγεται τὸ σῶμα, δεῖ τι πάντως ὑπάρχειν ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων αἰσθητόν, ἀφ’ οὗ ἡ τῶν σωμάτων νοητῶν ὄντων ἔσται νόησις. οὐδὲν δὲ ἔστι παρὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὸ ἀσώματον, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἀσώματον αὐτόθεν νοητόν ἐστι,
τὸ δὲ σῶμα οὐκ αἰσθητόν, ὡς ὑπεμνήσαμεν. μὴ ὄντος οὖν ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων αἰσθητοῦ τινος ἀφ’ οὗ ἡ νόησις ἔσται τοῦ σώματος, οὐδὲ νοητὸν ἔσται τὸ σῶμα. εἰ δὲ μήτε αἰσθητόν ἐστι μήτε νοητόν, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστι, λεκτέον ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ μηδὲν εἷναι τὸ σῶμα.

[49]
διὰ ταῦτα οὖν ἡμεῖς ἀντιτιθέντες τοὺς κατὰ τοῦ σώματος λόγους τῷ φαίνεσθαι δοκεῖν] ὑπάρχον τὸ σῶμα, συνάγομεν τὴν περὶ τοῦ σώματος ἐποχήν.

Τῇ’ δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἀκαταληψίᾳ συνεισάγεται καὶ τὸ ἀκατάληπτον εἶναι τὸ ἀσώματον. αἱ γὰρ στερήσεις τῶν
ἕξεων νοοῦνται στερήσεις, οἶον ὁράσεως τυφλότης καὶ ἀκοῆς κωφότης καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων παραπλησίως. διόπερ ἴνα στέρησιν καταλάβωμεν, δεῖ τὴν ἕξιν ἡμᾶς προκατειληφέναι, ἧς λέγεται στέρησις εἶναι ἡ στέρησις· ἀνεννόητος γάρ τις ὢν τῆς ὁράσεως οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο λέγειν, ὅτι ὅρασιν ὅδε οὐκ
ἔχει, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ τυφλὸν εἶναι.

[50] εἰ οὖν στέρησις σώματός ἐστι τὸ ἀσώματον, τῶν δὲ ἕξεων μὴ καταλαμβανομένων ἀδύνατον τὰς στερήσεις αὐτῶν καταλαμβάνεσθαι, καὶ δέδεικται ὅτι τὸ σῶμα ἀκατάληπτόν ἐστιν, ἀκατάληπτον ἔσται καὶ τὸ ἀσώματον. καὶ γὰρ ἤτοι αἰσθητόν ἐστιν ἢ νοητόν.
εἴτε δὲ αἰσθητόν ἐστιν, ἀκατάληπτόν ἐστι διὰ τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ζῴων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ τῶν περιστάσεων καὶ παρὰ τἀς ἐπιμιξίας καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν προειρημένων ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν δέκα τρόπων Ι36–163)· εἴτε νοητόν, μὴ διδομένης αὐτόθεν τῆς τῶν
αἰσθητῶν καταλήψεως, ἀφ’ ἧς ὁρμώμενοι τοῖς νοητοῖς έπιβάλλειν δοκοῦμεν, οὐδὲ ἡ τῶν νοητῶν αὐτόθεν κατάληψις δοθήσεται, διόπερ οὐδὲ ἡ τοῦ ἀσωμάτου.

[51] ὅ τε φάσκων καταλαμβάνειν τὸ ἀσώματον ἤτοι αἰσθήσει τοῦτο παραστήσει ³⁵ καταλαμβάνειν ἢ διὰ λόγου. καὶ αἰσθήσει μὲν οὐδαμῶς,
ἐπειδὴ αἱ μὲν αἰσθήσεις κατὰ ἐπέρεισιν καὶ νύξιν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι δοκοῦσι τῶν αἰσθητῶν, οἷον ἡ ὅρασις, ἐάν τε κατὰ ἔντασιν γίνηται κώνου, ἐάν τε κατὰ εἰδώλων ἀποκρίσεις τε καὶ ἐπικρίσεις, ἐάν τε <κατ᾿> ἀκτίνων ἢ χρωμάτων
ἀποχύσεις, καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ δέ, ἤν τε ὁ πεπληγμένος ἀήρ, ἤν τε τὰ μόρια τῆς φωνῆς φέρηται περὶ τὰ ὦτα καὶ πλήττῃ τὸ ἀκουστικὸν πνεῦμα ὥστε τὴν ἀντίληψιν τῆς φωνῆς ἀπεργάζεσθαι. ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ ὀδμαὶ τῇ ῥινὶ καὶ οἱ χυμοὶ αὖ τῇ γλώττῃ προσπίπτουσιν, καὶ τὰ τὴν ἁφὴν κινοῦντα
ὁμοίως τῇ ἁφῇ.

[52] τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα ἐπέρεισιν τοιαύτην ὑπομένειν οὐχ οἷά τέ ἐστιν, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο τῇ αἰσθήσει <ταῦτα> καταλαμβάνεσθαι. ἀλλ᾿ οὐδὲ διὰ λόγου. εἰ μὲν γὰρ λεκτόν ἐστιν ὁ λόγος καὶ ἀσώματος, ὡς οἱ Στωικοί φασιν (fr. ΙΙ 166 Α.), ὁ λέγων διὰ λόγου καταλαμβάνεσθαι τὰ ἀσώματα
τὸ ζητούμενον συναρπάζει. ζητούντων γὰρ ἡμῶν, εἰ δύναταί τι ἀσώματον καταλαμβάνεσθαι, αὐτ’ ὃς ἀσώματόν τι λαβὼν ἁπλῶς διὰ τούτου τὴν κατάληψιν τῶν ἀσωμάτων ποιεῖσθαι θέλει. καίτοι αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος, εἴπερ ἀσώματός ἐστι, τῆς τῶν ζητουμένων ἐστὶ μοίρας.

[53] πῶς οὖν ἀποδείξει τις,
ὅτι πρότερον τοῦτο τὸ ἀσώματον καταλαμβάνεται (φημὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον); εἰ μὲν γὰρ δι’ ἄλλου ἀσωμάτου, κἀκείνου ζητήσομεν τὴν ἀπόδειξιν τῆς καταλήψεως, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου· εἰ δὲ διὰ σώματος, ζητεῖται καὶ περὶ τῆς καταλήψεως τῶν σωμάτων· διὰ τίνος οὖν δείξομεν, ὅτι καταλαμβάνεται
τὸ σῶμα τὸ εἰς ἀπόδειξιν τῆς καταλήψεως τοῦ ἀσωμάτου λόγου λαμβανόμενον; εἰ μὲν διὰ σώματος, εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκβαλλόμεθα· εἰ δὲ δι᾿ ἀσωμάτου, εἰς τὸν διάλἒντασιν ³⁶ 132 ληλον τρόπον ἐκπίπτομεν. μένοντος οὖν οὕτως ἀκαταλήπτου
τοῦ λόγου, εἴπερ ἀσώματός ἐστιν, οὐκ ἂν δύναιτό τις λέγειν δι’ αὐτοῦ καταλαμβάνεσθαι τὸ ἀσώματον.

[54] εἰ δὲ σῶμά ἐστιν ὁ λόγος, ἐπεὶ καὶ περὶ τῶν σωμάτων διαπεφώνηται,
πότερον καταλαμβάνεται ἢ οὔ, διὰ τὴν λεγομένην συνεχῆ ῥύσιν αὐτῶν, ὧς μηδὲ τὴν ‘τόδε’ δεῖξιν ἐπιδέχεσθαι, μηδὲ εἶναι νομίζεσθαι, παρὸ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων’ (Theaet. p. 152 E) γινόμενα μέν, ὄντα δὲ οὐδέποτε καλεῖ τὰ
σώματα, ἀπορῶ πῶς ἐπικριθήσεται ἡ περὶ τοῦ ἀσωμάτου διαφωνία, μήτε σώματι μήτε ἀσωμάτῳ ταύτην ὁρῶν ἐπικρίνεσθαι δυναμένην διὰ τἀς μικρῷ πρόσθεν εἰρημένας ἀτοπίας. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ λόγῳ δυνατόν ἐστι καταλαμβάνειν τὰ ἀσώματα.

[55] εἰ δὲ μήτε αἰσθήσει ὑποπίπτει μήτε διὰ λόγου
καταλαμβάνεται, οὐδ’ ἂν ὅλως καταλαμβάνοιτο.

Εἰ τοίνυν μήτε περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τοῦ σώματος μήτε περὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων οἷόν τέ ἐστι διαβεβαιώσασθαι, καὶ περὶ τῶν στοιχείων ἐστὶν ἐφεκτέον, τάχα δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν μετὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα, εἴγε τούτων τὰ μὲν σώματα, τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα,
καὶ περὶ ἀμφοτέρων ἠπόρηται. πλὴν ἀλλὰ τῶν τε δραστικῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ τῶν ὑλικῶν διὰ ταῦτα ἐφεκτῶν οὐσῶν ἄπορός ἐστιν ὁ περὶ ἀρχῶν λόγος.

η′ περὶ κράσεως.

[56] Ἱνα δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παραλίπῃ τις, πῶς ἄρα καὶ γίνεσθαί φασι τὰ συγκρίματα ἐκ τῶν πρώτων στοιχείων, μήτε
θίξεως καὶ ἁφῆς ὑπαρχούσης μήτε κράσεως ἢ μίξεως ὅλως; ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἡ ἁφή, μικρῷ πρόσθεν ὑπέμνησα (§ 45–46), ὅτε περὶ τῆς ὑποστάσεως τοῦ σώματος διελεγόμην· ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ ὁ τρόπος τῆς κράσεως ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ὐπ’ αὐτῶν δυνατός ἐστι, διὰ βραχέων ἐπιστήσω.
πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ λέγεται περὶ κράσεως, καὶ σχεδὸν ἀνήνυτοι περὶ τοῦ προκειμένου σκέμματός εἰσι παρὰ τοῖς δογματιτόδε ³⁷ 133 κοῖς στάσεις· ὅθεν εὐθέως ἅμα τῇ ἀνεπικρίτῳ διαφωνίᾳ καὶ τὸ ἀκατάληπτον τοῦ σκέμματος συνάγοιτ᾿ ἄν. ἡμεῖς δὲ νῦν τὴν πρὸς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀντίρρησιν παραιτησάμενοι διὰ τὴν πρόθεσιν τῆς συγγραφῆς, τάδε λέξειν ἐπὶ
τοῦ παρόντος ἀποχρώντως ὑπολαμβάνομεν.

[57] Τὰ κιρνάμενα ἐξ οὐσίας καὶ ποιοτήτων συγκεῖσθαι φασίν. ἤτοι οὖν τἀς μὲν οὐσίας αὐτῶν μίγνυσθαι φήσει τις, τὰς δὲ ποιότητας μηδαμῶς, ἢ τὰς μὲν ποιότητας ἀναμίγνυσθαι, μηκέτι δὲ τὰς οὐσίας, ἢ μηθέτερον ἀναμίγνυσθαι
θατέρῳ, ἢ ἀμφότερα ἑνοῦσθαι ἀλλήλοις. ἀλλ᾿ εἰ μὲν οὔτε αἱ ποιότητες οὔτε αἱ οὐσίαι ἀναμίγνυνται ἀλλήλοις, ἀνεπινόητος ἔσται ἡ κρᾶσις· πῶς γὰρ μία αἴσθησις ἀπὸ τῶν κιρναμένων γίνεσθαι συμβήσεται, εἴγε κατὰ μηδὲν τῶν προειρημένων μίγνυται ἀλλήλοις τὰ κιρνάμενα;

[58] εἰ δὲ αἱ μὲν ποιότητες ἁπλῶς παρακεῖσθαι λεχθεῖεν ἀλλήλαις, αἱ δὲ οὐσίαι μίγνυσθαι, καὶ οὕτως ἄτοπον ἂν εἴη τὸ λεγόμενον· οὐ γὰρ κεχωρισμένων τῶν ποιοτήτων τῶν ἐν ταῖς κράσεσιν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα, ἀλλ᾿ ὡς μιᾶς ἀπὸ τῶν
κιρναμένων ἀποτελουμένης αἰσθανόμεθα. εἰ δὲ τὰς μὲν ποιότητας μίγνυσθαι λέγοι τις, τὰς δὲ οὐσίας μηδαμῶς, ἀδύνατα λέξει· ἡ γὰρ τῶν ποιοτήτων ὑπόστασις ἐν ταῖς οὐσίαις ἐστίν, διόπερ γελοῖον ἂν εἴη λέγειν, ὧς αἱ μὲν ποιότητες χωρισθεῖσαι τῶν οὐσιῶν [καὶ] ἰδίᾳ μίγνυνταί που
ἀλλήλαις, ἄποιοι δὲ αἱ οὐσίαι χωρὶς ὑπολείπονται.

[59] λείπεται λέγειν, ὅτι καὶ αἱ ποιότητες τῶν κιρναμένων καὶ αἱ οὐσίαι χωροῦσι δι’ ἀλλήλων καὶ μιγνύμεναι τὴν κρᾶσιν ἀποτελοῦσιν. ὃ τῶν προειρημένων ἐστὶν ἀτοπώτερον’ ἀδύνατος γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τοιαύτη κρᾶσις. οἶον γοῦν ἐὰν δέκα κοτύλαις
ὕδατος κωνείου χυλοῦ κοτύλη μιχθῇ, παντὶ τῷ ὕδατι συνανακίρνασθαι ἂν λέγοιτο τὸ κώνειον· εἰ γοῦν καί τι βραχύτατον μέρος τοῦ μίγματος λάβοι τις, εὑρήσει πεπληρωμένον αὐτὸ τῆς τοῦ κωνείου δυνάμεως.

[60] εἰ δὲ ἐπιμίγνυται τὸ κώνειον παντὶ μέρει τοῦ ὕδατος καὶ παρεκτείνεται
αὐτῷ ὅλον ὅλῳ κατά τε τὴν τῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ τῶν ποιοτήτων ³⁸ 134 ωὐτῶν δι’ ἀλλήλων δίοδον, ἴν’ οὕτως ἡ κρᾶσις γένηται, τὰ δὲ παρεκτεινόμενα ἀλλήλοις καθ’ ἅπαν μέρος τὸν ἴσον ἐπέχει τόπον, διὸ καὶ ἴσα ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, ἴση ἔσται ἡ κοτύλη
τοῦ κωνείου ταῖς δέκα κοτύλαις τοῦ ὕδατος, ὡς εἴκοσι κοτύλας ὀφείλειν εἶναι τὸ μῖγμα ἢ δύο μόνας, ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇδε τῇ ὑποθέσει τοῦ τρόπου τῆς κράσεως· καὶ κοτύλης πάλιν ὕδατος ταῖς εἴκοσι κοτύλαις ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ τῆς
ὑποθέσεως ἐπεμβληθείσης τεσσαράκοντα κοτυλῶν ὀφείλει τὸ μέτρον εἶναι ἢ πάλιν δύο μόνων, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὴν κοτύλην εἴκοσι κοτύλας ἐνδέχεται νοεῖν, ὅσαις παρεκτείνεται, καὶ τὰς εἲκοσι κοτύλας μίαν, ἡ συνεξισοῦνται.

[61] δυνατὸν
δὲ οὕτω κατὰ μίαν κοτύλην ἐπεμβάλλοντα καὶ ὁμοίως συλλογιζόμενον συνάγειν, ὅτι αἱ εἴκοσιν ὁρώμεναι τοῦ μίγματος κοτύλαι δισμύριαί που καὶ πρὸς ὀφείλουσιν εἶναι ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ ὑποθέσει τοῦ τρόπου τῆς κράσεως, αἱ δὲ αὐταὶ καὶ δύο μόναι· ὅπερ ἀπεμφάσεως ὑπερβολὴν οὐκ ἀπολέλοιπεν.
οὐκοῦν ἄτοπός ἐστι καὶ αὕτη ἡ ὑπόθεσις τῆς κράσεως.

[62] εἰ δὲ οὔτε τῶν οὐσιῶν μόνων μιγνυμένων ἀλλήλαις οὔτε τῶν ποιοτήτων μόνων οὔτε ἀμφοτέρων οὔτε οὐθετέρου δύναται γίνεσθαι κρᾶσις, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν οἷόν τέ ἐστιν ἐπινοεῖν, ἀνεπινόητος ὁ τρόπος τῆς τε
κράσεως καὶ ὅλως τῆς μίξεως ἐστίν. διόπερ εἰ μήτε κατὰ θίξιν παρατιθέμενα ἀλλήλοις τὰ καλούμενα στοιχεῖα μήτε ἀνακιρνώμενα ἢ μιγνύμενα ποιητικὰ τῶν συγκριμάτων εἷναι δύναται, ἀνεπινόητός ἐστιν ἡ κατὰ τούς δογματικούς φυσιολογία καὶ ὅσον ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ.

θ′ περὶ κινήσεως.

[63] Πρὸς δὲ τοῖς προειρημένοις ἦν ἐπιστῆσαι τῷ περὶ τῶν κινήσεων λόγῳ, καὶ ὧς ἀδύνατος ἂν εἶναι νομισθείη ἡ κατὰ τοὺς δογματικοὺς φυσιολογία. πάντως γὰρ κατά τινα κίνησιν τῶν τε στοιχείων καὶ τῆς δραστικῆς ἀρχῆς ὀφείλει γίνεσθαι τὰ συγκρίματα. ἐὰν οὖν ὐπομνήσωμεν, ὅτι μηδὲν ³⁹ 135 εἶδος κινήσεως ὁμολογεῖται, σαφὲς ἔσται ὅτι καὶ διδομένων
καθ’ ὑπόθεσιν τῶν προειρημένων ἀπάντων μάτην ὁ καλούμενος φυσικὸς λόγος τοῖς δογματικοῖς διεξώδευται.

ι′ περὶ τῆς μεταβατικῆς κινήσεως.

[64] Φᾶσί τοίνυν οἱ δοκοῦντες ἐντελέστερον περὶ κινήσεως διειληφέναι (Aristot. Cat. p. 15 a 13) ἐξ εἴδη ταύτης ὑπάρχειν, τοπικὴν μετάβασιν, φυσικὴν ⁴⁰ μεταβολήν, αὔξησιν, μείωσιν, γένεσιν, φθοράν.
ἡμεῖς οὖν ἑκάστῳ τῶν προειρημένων εἰδῶν τῆς κινήσεως κατ’ ἰδίαν ἐπιστήσομεν, ἀπὸ τῆς τοπικῆς μεταβάσεως ἀρξάμενοι. ἔστιν οὖν αὕτη κατὰ τοὺς δογματικοὺς καθ’ ἣν τόπον ἐκ τόπου μετέρχεται τὸ κινούμενον ητοι
καθ’ ὁλότητα ἢ κατὰ μέρος, <καθ’> ὅλον μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν περιπατούντων, κατὰ μέρος δὲ ὧς ἐπὶ τῆς περὶ κέντρῳ κινουμένης σφαίρας· ὅλης γὰρ αὐτῆς μενούσης ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ τὰ μέρη τούς τόπους ⁴¹ ἀμείβει.

[65] τρεῖς δέ, οἶμαι, γεγόνασιν αἱ ἀνωτάτω περὶ κινήσεως
στάσεις. ὁ μὲν γὰρ βίος καί τινες τῶν φιλοσόφων εἶναι κίνησιν ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, μὴ εἶναι δὲ Παρμενίδης τε καὶ Μέλισσος καὶ ἄλλοι τινές, μὴ μᾶλλον δὲ εἷναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἔφασαν οἱ σκεπτικοί· ὅσον μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς φαινομένοις δοκεῖν εἶναι κίνησιν, ὅσον δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ
λόγῳ μὴ ὑπάρχειν. ἡμεῖς οὖν ἐκθέμενοι τὴν ἀντίρρησιν τῶν τε εἶναι κίνησιν ὑπολαμβανόντων καὶ τῶν μηδὲν εἷναι κίνησιν ἀποφαινομένων, ἐὰν τὴν διαφωνίαν εὑρίσκωμεν ἰσοσθενῆ, μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι κίνησιν λέγειν ἀναγκασθησόμεθα ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις.

[66] ἀρξώμεθα δὲ
ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπάρχειν αὐτὴν λεγόντων.

⁴²⁴³⁴⁴⁴⁵ 136

Οὗτοι δὴ τῇ ἐναργείᾳ μάλιστα ἐπερείδονται· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἔστι, φασί, κίνησις, πῶς μὲν ἀπὸ ἀνατολῶν ἐπὶ δυσμὰς ὁ ἥλιος φέρεται, πῶς δὲ τἀς τοῦ ἔτους ὥρας
ποιεῖ, παρὰ τοὺς πρὸς ἡμᾶς συνεγγισμοὺς αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς ἀφ᾿ ἡμῶν ἀποστάσεις γιγνομένας; ἢ πῶς νῆες ἀπὸ λιμένων ἀναχθεῖσαι καταίρουσιν ἐπὶ λιμένας ἄλλους πάμπολυ τῶν προτέρων ἀφεστῶτας; τίνα δὲ τρόπον ὁ τὴν κίνησιν ἀναιρῶν πρόεισι τῆς ⁴⁶ οἰκίας καὶ αὖθις ἀναστρέφει; ταῦτα δὴ τελέως
ἀναντίρρητα εἶναι. διὸ καὶ τῶν κυνικῶν τις ἐρωτηθεὶς <τὸν> κατὰ τῆς κινήσεως λόγον οὐδὲν ἀπεκρίνατο, ἀνέστη δὲ καὶ ἐβάδισεν, ἔργῳ καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐναργείας παριστάς, ὅτι ὑπαρκτή ἐστιν ἡ κίνησις.

Οὗτοι μὲν οὖν οὕτω δυσωπεῖν ἐπιχειροῦσι τούς τῆς
ἐναντίας αὐτοῖς στάσεως ὄντας·

[67] οἱ δὲ τὴν ὕπαρξιν τῆς κινήσεως ἀναιροῦντες λόγοις ἐπιχειροῦσι τοιούτοις. εἰ κινεῖταί τι, ἤτοι ὑφ’ ἑαυτοῦ κινεῖται ἢ ὑφ’ ἑτέρου. ἀλλ᾿
εἰ μὲν ὑφ’ ἑτέρου, <. . . . . . . . . >. τὸ γὰρ λεγόμενον ὑφ’ ἑτέρου κινεῖσθαι ἤτοι ἀναιτίως κινηθήσεται ἢ κατά τινα αἰτίαν. ἀναιτίως μὲν οὐδέν φασι γίνεσθαι· εἰ δὲ κατά τινα αἰτίαν κινεῖται, ἡ αἰτία, καθ᾿ ἣν κινεῖται, κινητικὴ αὐτοῦ γενήσεται,
ὅθεν εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπίπτει κατὰ τὴν μικρῷ πρόσθεν εἰρημένην ἐπιβολήν.

[68] ἄλλως τε καὶ εἰ τὸ κινοῦν ἐνεργεῖ, τὸ δὲ ἐνεργοῦν κινεῖται, κἀκεῖνο δεήσεται κινοῦντος ἑτέρου, καὶ τὸ δεύτερον τρίτου, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου, ὡς ἄναρχον γίνεσθαι τὴν κίνησιν· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. οὐκ ἄρα πᾶν τὸ
κινούμενον ὑφ᾿ ἑτέρου κινεῖται. ἀλλ᾿ οὐδὲ ὑφ᾿ ἑαυτοῦ. ἐπεὶ <γὰρ> πᾶν τὸ κινοῦν ἤτοι προωθοῦν κινεῖ ἢ ἐπισπώμενον ⁴⁷⁴⁸⁴⁹ 137 ἢ ἀνωθοῦν ἢ ἐνθλῖβον, δεήσει τὸ ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν κατά τινα τῶν προειρημένων τρόπων ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν.

[69] ἀλλ᾿ εἰ μὶν προωστικῶς ἑαυτὸ κινεῖ, ἔσται ἐξόπισθεν ἑαυτοῦ, εἰ δὲ ἐπισπαστικῶς, ἒμπροσθεν, εἰ δὲ ἀνωστικῶς, ὑποκάτω, εἰ
δὲ ἐνθλιπτικῶς, ἐπάνω. ἀδύνατον δὲ αὐτό τι ἑαυτοῦ ἐπάνω εἶναι ἢ ἔμπροσθεν ἢ ὑποκάτω ἢ ὀπίσω· ἀδύνατον ἄρα ὑφ᾿ ἑαυτοῦ τι κινεῖσθαι. εἰ δὲ μήτε ὑφ᾿ ἑαυτοῦ τι κινεῖται μήτε ὑφ᾿ ἑτέρου, οὐδὲ κινεῖταί τι.

[70] εἰ δέ τις ἐπὶ τὴν ὁρμὴν καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν καταφεύγοι, ὑπομνηστέον
αὐτὸν τῆς περὶ τοῦ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν διαφωνίας, καὶ ὅτι ἀνεπίκριτος αὕτη καθέστηκεν, κριτήριον ἡμῶν τῆς ἀληθείας ἄχρι νυν οὐχ εὑρηκότων.

[71] Ἒτι κἀκεῖνο λεκτέον. εἰ κινεῖταί τι, ἤτοι ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπῳ κινεῖται ἢ ἑν ᾧ οὐκ ἔστιν. οὔτε δὲ ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν·
μένει γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ, εἴπερ ἐν αὐτῷ ἔστιν· οὔτε ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν· ὅπου γάρ τι μὴ ἔστιν, ἐκεῖ οὐδὲ δρᾶσαί τι οὐδὲ παθεῖν δύναται. οὐκ ἄρα κινεῖταί τι. οὗτος δὲ ὁ λόγος ἔστι μὴν Διοδώρου τοῦ Κρόνου, πολλῶν δὲ ἀντιρρήσεων τετύχηκεν, ὧν τὰς πληκτικωτέρας πληκτικωτέρας ⁵⁰ διὰ τὸν τρόπον τῆς συγγραφῆς ἐκθησόμεθα μετὰ
τῆς φαινομένης ἡμῖν ἐπικρίσεως.

[72] φασὶν οὖν τινες, ὅτι δύναταί τι ἐν ᾡ ἔστι τόπω κινεῖσθαι· τἀς γοῦν περὶ τοῖς κέντροις περιδινουμένας σφαίρας ἐν
τῷ αὐτῶ μενούσας τόπω κινεῖσθαι. πρὸς οὓς μεταφέρειν χρὴ τὸν λόγον ἐφ’ ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν τῆς σφαίρας, καὶ ὑπομιμνῄσκοντας, ὅτι ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ μηδὲ κατὰ μέρη κινεῖται, συνάγειν ὅτι μηδὲ ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπῳ κινεῖταί τι.

[73] τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ
ποιήσομεν καὶ πρὸς τούς λέγοντας, ὅτι τὸ κινούμενον δυεῖν ἔχεται τόπων, τοῦ τε ἐν ᾧ ἔστι καὶ τοῦ εἰς ὃν φέρεται. πευσόμεθα γάρ αὐτῶν, πότε φέρεται τὸ κινού- ⁵¹⁵²⁵³⁵⁴ 138 μένον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπου εἰς τὸν ἕτερον, ἆρα ὅτε
ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τόπῳ ἔστιν ἢ ὅτε ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ. ἀλλ’ ὅτε μὲν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τόπῳ ἒστιν, οὐ μετέρχεται εἰς τὸν δεύτερον· ἔτι γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ ἐστιν· ὅτε δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τούτῳ, οὐ μετέρχεται ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ.

[74] πρὸς τῷ καὶ συναρπάζεσθαι τὸ ζητούμενον· ἐν ᾦ γὰρ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ ἐνεργεῖν
ἐν αὐτῷ δύναται· οὐ γὰρ δήπου φέρεσθαι εἴς τινα τόπον συγχωρήσει τις ἐκεῖνο ἁπλῶς ὃ μὴ δίδωσι κινεῖσθαι.

[75] τινὲς μέντοι κἀκεῖνο φασίν· τόπος λέγεται διχῶς, ὁ μὲν ἐν πλάτει, οἷον ὡς ἐμοῦ ἡ οἰκία, ὁ δὲ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν, ὧς λόγου χάριν ὁ περιτετυπωκώς μου τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν
τοῦ σώματος ἀήρ. λέγεται οὖν ἐν τόπῳ κινεῖσθαι τὸ κινούμενον οὐκ ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ κατὰ πλάτος. πρὸς οὓς ἔνεστιν ὑποδιαιροῦντας τὸν ἐν πλάτει τόπον λέγειν, ὅτι τούτου ἐν ᾧ μὲν ἔστι κυρίως τὸ κινεῖσθαι λεγόμενον σῶμα, ὧς ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν αὐτοῦ
τόπῳ, ἐν ᾧ δὲ οὐκ ἒστιν, ὧς ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς μέρεσι τοῦ κατὰ πλάτος τόπου· εἶτα συνάγοντας, ὅτι μήτε ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπῳ κινεῖσθαί τι δύναται μήτε ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν, ἐπιλογίζεσθαι, ὅτι μηδὲ ἐν τῷ κατὰ πλάτος καταχρηστικῶς λεγομένῳ τόπῳ κινεῖσθαί τι δύναται· συστατικὰ γάρ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ τό τε ἐν ᾧ ἔστι
πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν καὶ ἐν ᾧ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν οὐκ ἔστιν, ὧν ἐν οὐθετέρῳ κινεῖσθαί τι δύνασθαι δέδεικται.

[76] Ερωτητέον δὲ κἀκεῖνον τὸν λόγον. εἰ κινεῖταί τι, ἤτοι κατὰ τὸ πρότερον <πρότερον> κινεῖται ἢ κατὰ
μεριστὸν διάστημα· οὔτε δὲ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον δύναταί τι κινεῖσθαι, οὔτε κατὰ τὸ ἄθρουν μεριστὸν διάστημα, ὡς δείξομεν· οὐδὲ κινεῖταί τι ἄρα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον οὐκ ἐνδέχεταί τι κινεῖσθαι,
αὐτόθεν δῆλον. εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἰς ἄπειρον τέμνονται τά σώματα καὶ οἱ τόποι καὶ οἱ χρόνοι οἷς κινεῖσθαι λέγεται ⁵⁵⁵⁶⁵⁷ τὰ σώματα, οὐ γενήσεται κίνησις, ἀδυνάτου ὄντος τοῦ πρῶτόν τι ἐν ἀπείροις εὑρεθῆναι, ἀφ’ οὗ πρώτου κινήσεται τὸ κινεῖσθαι λεγόμενον.

[77] εἰ δὲ εἰς ἀμερὲς καταλήγει τὰ προειρημένα, καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν κινουμένων ὁμοίως τὸ
πρῶτον ἀμερὲς τοῦ τόπου τῷ πρώτῳ ἑαυτοῦ ἀμερεῖ μετέρχεται χρόνῳ, πάντα τὰ κινούμενα ἔστιν ἰσοταχῆ, οἷον ὁ ταχύτατος ἵππος καὶ ἡ χελώνη· ὅπερ τοῦ προτέρου ἐστὶν ἀτοπώτερον. οὐκ ἄρα κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον γίνεται ἡ κίνησις. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸ ἄθρουν μεριστὸν διάστημα.

[78] εἰ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν φαινομένων, ὥς φασιν, μαρτυρεῖσθαι τὰ ἄδηλα χρή, ἐπεί, ἴνα τις ἀνύσῃ σταδιαῖον διάστημα, δεῖ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἀνύσαι τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ σταδίου μέρος καὶ τὸ δεύτερον δεύτερον καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὁμοίως, οὕτω καὶ πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον
κινεῖσθαι προσήκει, ἐπεί τοί γε εἰ ἀθρόως διιέναι τὸ κινούμενον λέγοιτο πάντα τὰ μέρη τοῦ τόπου ἐν ᾧ κινεῖσθαι λέγεται, ἐν πᾶσιν ἅμα ἔσται τοῖς μέρεσιν αὐτοῦ, καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν ψυχρὸν εἴη μέρος, τὸ δὲ θερμὸν τοῦ δι’ οὗ ποιεῖται τὴν κίνησιν, ἢ τὸ μέν, εἰ τύχοι, μέλαν, τὸ δὲ
λευκὸν ὥστε καὶ χρώζειν τὰ ἐντυγχάνοντα δύνασθαι, τὸ κινούμενον ἔσται θερμόν τε ἅμα καὶ ψυχρὸν καὶ μέλαν καὶ λευκόν· ὅπερ ἄτοπον.

[79] εἶτα καὶ πόσον ἀθρόως διέξεισι τόπον τὸ κινούμενον, εἰπάτωσαν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀόριστον τοῦτον εἶναι φήσουσιν, προσδέξονταί τι κινεῖσθαι διά πάσης
τῆς γῆς ἀθρόως· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο φεύγουσιν, ὁρισάτωσαν ἡμῖν τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ τόπου. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν ἐπιχειρεῖν ὁρίζειν τὸν τόπον, οὗ πλέον διάστημα οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸ ἀκαριαῖον δυνήσεται διελθεῖν τὸ κινούμενον ἀθρόως,
πρὸς τῷ ἀποκληρωτικὸν καὶ προπετὲς ἢ καὶ γελοῖον ἴσως εἶναι, εἰς τὴν ἀρχῆθεν ἀπορίαν ἐμπίπτει· πάντα γὰρ ⁵⁸⁵⁹⁶⁰ 140 ἔσται ἰσοταχῆ, εἴγε ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ὁμοίως κατὰ περιωρισμένοηυς
τόπους τὰς μεταβάσεις τῶν κινήσεων ποιεῖται.

[80] εἰ δὲ φήσουσιν, ὅτι μικρὸν μέν, οὐ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν δὲ περιωρισμένον τόπον ἀθρόως κινεῖται τὸ κινούμενον, ἐνέσται ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν σωριτικὴν ἀπορίαν ἀεὶ τῷ ὑποτεθέντι μεγέθει ἀκαριαῖον προστιθέναι μέγεθος τόπου. εἰ μὲν γὰρ
στήσονταί που τοιαύτην ποιουμένων ἡμῶν συνερώτησιν, πάλιν εἰς τὸν ἀκριβῆ περιορισμὸν καὶ τὴν τερατείαν ἐκείνην ἐμπεσοῦνται· ἐμπεσοῦνται· εἰ δὲ προσήσονται τὴν παραύξησιν, ἀναγκάσομεν αὐτοὺς συγχωρεῖν ἀθρόως τι δύνασθαι κινη- θῆναι διὰ τοῦ μεγέθους τῆς γῆς ἀπάσης. ὥστε οὐδὲ <κατὰ>
ἄθρουν μεριστὸν διάστημα κινεῖται τὰ κινεῖσθαι λεγόμενα.

[81] εἰ δὲ μήτε κατὰ ἄθρουν μεριστὸν τόπον μήτε κατὰ τὸ πρότερον <πρότερον> κινεῖταί τι, οὐδὲ κινεῖταί τι.

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καὶ ἔτι πλείω τούτων φασὶν οἱ τὴν μεταβατικὴν κίνησιν ἀναιροῦντες. ἡμεῖς δὲ μήτε τοὺς
λόγους τούτους μήτε τὸ φαινόμενον, ᾧ κατακολουθοῦντες εἰσάγουσι τὴν ὑπόστασιν τῆς κινήσεως, δυνάμενοι διατρέπειν, πειν, ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἀντιθέσει τῶν τε φαινομένων καὶ τῶν λόγων, ἐπέχομεν περὶ τοῦ πότερον ἔστι κίνησις ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν.

ια′ περὶ αὐξήσεως καὶ μειώσεως.

[82] Τῷ δὲ αὐτῷ χρώμενοι λογισμῷ καὶ περὶ αὐξήσεως
τε καὶ περὶ μειώσεως ἐπέχομεν· ἡ γὰρ ἐνάργεια δοκεῖ τὴν ὑπόστασιν αὐτῶν εἰσάγειν, ἣν οἱ λόγοι διατρέπειν δοκοῦσιν. ἢ θέασαι γοῦν· τὸ αὐξόμενον ὂν καὶ ὑφεστὼς εἰς μέγεθος ἐπιδιδόναι προσήκει, ὡς εἲγε ἑτέρῳ προσθέσεως γενομένης ἕτερον ηὐξηκέναι τις λέγοι, ψεύσεται. ἐπεὶ τοίωυν
ἡ οὐσία οὐδέποτε ἕστηκεν, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ῥεῖ τε καὶ ἑτέρα ἀνθ’ ἑτέρας ἐπεισκρίνεται, τὸ ηὐξηκέναι λεγόμενον οὐκ ἔχει τὴν προτέραν οὐσίαν καὶ μετὰ ταύτης ἄλλην τὴν προστεθεῖσαν ἀλλ’ ὅλην ἑτέραν.

[83] ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ, λόγου ⁶¹ χάριν, ξύλου τριπήχεος ὄντος δεκάπηχυ ἕτερον ἀγαγών τις
ηὐξηκέναι τὸ τρίπηχυ λέγοι, ψεύσεται διὰ τὸ ὅλον ἕτερον εἶναι τοῦτο ἐκείνου, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ παντὸς τοῦ αὔξεσθαι λεγομένου, τῆς προτέρας ὕλης ἀπορρεούσης καὶ ἑτέρας ἐπεισιούσης, εἰ προστίθεται τὸ προστίθεσθαι λεγόμενον,
οὐκ ἂν αὔξησίν τις εἴποι τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ἀλλ’ ἐξ ὅλου ἑτεροίωσιν.

[84] ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς καὶ περὶ τῆς μειώσεως λόγος· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὑφεστὼς ὅλως πῶς ἄν μεμειῶσθαι λέγοιτο; πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, εἰ ἡ μὲν μείωσις γίνεται κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν, ἡ δὲ αὔξησις κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, οὐδὲν δέ ἐστιν οὔτε
ἀφαίρεσις οὔτε πρόσθεσις, οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ἡ μείωσις οὐδὲ ἡ αὔξησις ἔστι τι.

⁶²

ιβ′ περὶ ἀφαιρέσεως καὶ προσθέσεως.

[85] Ὅτι δὲ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀφαίρεσις, ἐντεῦθεν ἐπιλογίζονται. εἰ ἀφαιρεῖταί τι ἀπό τινος, ἤτοι τὸ ἴσον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ἀφαιρεῖται ἢ τὸ μεῖζον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐλάσσονος ἢ τὸ ἔλασσον ἀπὸ τοῦ μείζονος. κατὰ οὐδένα δὲ τῶν τρόπων τούτων ἀφαίρεσις
γίνεται, ὡς παραστήσομεν· ἀδύνατος ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ ἀφαίρεσις. ὅτι δὲ κατ’ οὐδένα τῶν προειρημένων τρόπων ἡ ἀφαίρεσις γίνεται 5 δῆλον ἐντεῦθεν. τὸ ἀφαιρούμενον ἀπό τινος ἐμπεριέχεσθαι χρὴ πρὸ τῆς ἀφαιρέσεως τοι ἀφ’ οὗ ἀφαιρεῖται.

[86] οὔτε δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ περιέχεται,
οἶον τά ‘ἐν τοῖς ἕξ· μεῖζον γὰρ εἶναι δεῖ τὸ περιέχον τοῦ περιεχομένου καὶ τὸ ἀφ’ οὗ ἀφαιρεῖταί τι τοῦ ἀφαιρουμένου, ἴνα μετὰ τὴν ἀφαίρεσιν ὑπολείπηταί τι· τούτῳ γὰρ διαφέρειν δοκεῖ τῆς παντελοῦς ἄρσεως ἡ ἀφαίρεσις· οὔτε τὸ μεῖζον ἐν τῷ μικροτέρῳ, οἷον τὰ ἓξ
<ἐν> τοῖς πέντε· ἀπεμφαίνει γάρ.

[87] διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ ἔλασσον ἐν τῷ μείζονι. εἰ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἓξ περιέχεται τὰ πέντε ὧς ἐν πλείοσιν ἐλάσσονα, καὶ ἐν τοῖς πέντε περισχεθήσεται τὰ τέσσαρα καὶ ἐν τοῖς τέτταρσι τὰ τρία καὶ ⁶³⁶⁴ 141
ἐν τοῖς τρισὶ τὰ δύο καὶ ἐν τούτοις τὸ ἔν. ἔξει οὖν τὰ ἓξ πέντε τέσσαρα τρία δύο ἔν, ὧν συντεθέντων γίνεται ὁ πεντεκαίδεκα ἀριθμός, ὃς ἐν τῷ ἓξ περιέχεσθαι συνάγεται διδομένου τοῦ τὸ ἔλασσον ἐν τῷ μείζονι περιέχεσθαι.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ πεντεκαίδεκα τῷ ἐν τῷ ἐξ ἐμπεριεχομένῳ ὁ τριακοωτακαιπέντε ἀριθμὸς περιέχεται καὶ κατὰ ὑπόβασιν ἄπειροι. ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ λέγειν ἀπείρους ἀριθμοὺς ἐμπεριέχεσθαι τῷ ἓξ ἀριθμῷ· ἄτοπον ἄρα καὶ τὸ λέγειν,
ὅτι ἐν τῷ μείζονι περιέχεται τὸ ἔλασσον.

[88] εἰ οὖν χρὴ τὸ ἀφαιρούμενον ἀπό τινος περιέχεσθαι ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἀφ’ οὗ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι μέλλει, οὔτε δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ περιέχεται οὔτε τὸ μεῖζον ἐν τῷ μικροτέρῳ οὔτε τὸ μικρότερον ἐν τῷ μείζονι, οὐδὲ ἀφαιρεῖταί τι ἀπό τινος.

Καὶ μὴν εἰ ἀφαιρεῖταί τι ἀπό τινος, ἢ ὅλον ἀπὸ ὅλου ἀφαιρεῖται ἢ μέρος ἀπὸ μέρους ἢ ὅλον ἀπὸ μέρους ἤ μέρος ἀπὸ ὅλου.

[89] ὅλον μὲν οὖν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι λέγειν ἤτοι ἀπὸ ὅλου ἢ ἀπὸ μέρους ἀπεμφαίνει προδήλως. λείπεται δὴ λέγειν τὸ μέρος ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἤτοι ἀπὸ ὅλου ἢ ἀπὸ μέρους·
ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄτοπον. οἷον γοῦν, ἳνα ἐπὶ ἀριθμῶν στήσωμεν τὸν λόγον τοῦ σαφοῦς ἕνεκα, ἔστω δεκάς, καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης ἀφαιρεῖσθαι λεγέσθω μονάς. αὕτη οὖν ἡ μονὰς οὔτε ἀπὸ ὅλης τῆς δεκάδος ἀφαιρεῖσθαι δύναται οὔτε ἀπὸ τοῦ λειπομένου μέρους τῆς δεκάδος, τουτέστι
τῆς ἐννεάδος, ὧς παραστήσω· οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ἀφαιρεῖται.

[90] εἰ γὰρ ἡ μονὰς ἀπὸ ὅλης ἀφαιρεῖται τῆς δεκάδος, ἐπεὶ ἡ δεκὰς οὔτε ἕτερόν τί ἐστι παρὰ τὰς δέκα μονάδας οὔτε τις τῶν μονάδων ἀλλ’ ἡ συνέλευσις πασῶν τῶν μονάδων, ἀπὸ ἑκάστης μονάδος ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ὀφείλει ἡ μονάς, ἴνα ἀπὸ
ὅλης ἀφαιρῆται τῆς δεκάδος. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ μονάδος οὐδὲν δύναται ἀφαιρεῖσθαι· ἀδιαίρετοι γάρ εἰσιν αἱ μονάδες, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀφαιρεθήσεται ἡ μονὰς ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος οὕτως.

[91] εἰ δὲ καὶ δοίη τις ἀπὸ ἑκάστης τῶν μονάδων ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὴν μονάδα, δέκα ἕξει μέρη ἡ μο - ⁶⁵⁶⁶ νᾶς, δέκα δὲ ἔχουσα μέρη δεκὰς ἔσται. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπεὶ
δέκα ἕτερα μέρη ἀπολέλειπται, ἀφ’ ὧν ἀφῄρηται τὰ τῆς μονάδος λεγομένης δέκα μέρη, ἔσται τὰ δέκα εἴκοσι. ἂτοπον δὲ λέγειν τὸ ‘ὲν δέκα εἶναι καὶ τὰ δέκα εἴκοσι καὶ τὸ ἀδιαίρετον κατὰ αὐτούς διαιρεῖσθαι. ἄτοπον ἄρα τὸ λέγειν
ἀπὸ ὅλης τῆς δεκάδος ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὴν μονάδα.

[92] ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπολειπομένης ἐννεάδος ἀφαιρεῖται ἡ μονάς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀφ’ οὗ τι ἀφαιρεῖται οὐ μένει ὁλόκληρον, ἡ δὲ ἐννεὰς μετὰ τὴν ἀφαίρεσιν ἐκείνης τῆς μονάδος ὁλόκληρος μένει. καὶ ἄλλως, ἐπεὶ ἡ ἐννεὰς οὐδέν ἐστι παρὰ τὰς ἐννέα μονάδας, εἰ μὲν ἀπὸ ὅλης αὐτῆς λέγοιτο ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἡ μονάς, ἐννεάδος ἀφαίρεσις ἔσται, εἰ δὲ ἀπὸ μέρους τῶν ἐννέα, εἰ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ὀκτώ, τὰ αὐτὰ ἄτοπα ἀκολουθήσει, εἰ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐσχάτης μονάδος, διαιρετὴν εἶναι φήσουσι
τὴν μονάδα, ὅπερ ἄτοπον.

[93] οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐννεάδος ἀφαιρεῖται ἡ μονάς. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἀπὸ ὅλης τῆς δεκάδος ἀφαιρεῖται μήτε ἀπὸ μέρους αὐτῆς, οὐδὲ μέρος ἀπὸ ὅλου ἢ μέρους ἀφαιρεῖσθαι δύναται. εἰ οὖν μήτε ὅλον ἀπὸ ὅλου τι ἀφαιρεῖται μήτε μέρος ἀπὸ ὅλου μήτε ὅλον ἀπὸ
μέρους μήτε μέρος ἀπὸ μέρους, οὐδὲ ἀφαιρεῖταί τι ἀπό τινος.

[94] ‘Αλλὰ καὶ ἡ πρόσθεσις τῶν ἀδυνάτων εἶναι παρ’ αὐτοῖς ὑείληπιαι. τὸ γὰρ προστιθέμενον, φασίν, ἤτοι ἑαυτῷ προστίθεται ἢ τῷ προυποκειμένῳ ἢ τῷ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν συνεστῶτι· συνεστῶτι· τούτων δὲ οὐδέν ἐστιν ὑγιές· οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ προστίθεταί τι τινί. οἷον γοῦν ἔστω τι τετρακοτυλιαῖον πλῆθος, καὶ προστιθέσθω κοτύλη. ζητῶ τίνι προστίθεται· ἑαυτῇ μὲν γὰρ οὐ δύναται, ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν προστιθέμενον ἕτερόν ἐστι τοῦ ᾧ προστίθεται, οὐδὲν δὲ ἑαυτοῦ ἕτερόν ἐστιν.

[95] ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τῷ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, τοῦ τετρακοτυλιαίου καὶ τῆς κοτύλης· πῶς γὰρ ἂν προστεθείη τι τῷ μηδέπω ὄντι; καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ τῷ τετρακοτυλιαίῳ καὶ τῇ κοτύλῃ μίγνυται ⁶⁷⁶⁸ 143 ἡ κοτύλη ἡ προστιθεμένη, ἑξακοτυλιαῖον ἔσται πλῆθος
ἀπὸ τοῦ τετρακοτυλιαίου καὶ τῆς κοτύλης καὶ τῆς προστιθεμένης κοτύλης.

[96] εἰ δὲ μόνῳ τῷ τετρακοτυλιαίῳ προστίθεται ἡ κοτύλη, ἐπεὶ τὸ παρεκτεινόμενόν τινι ἴσον ἐστὶν ἐκείνῳ ᾧ παρεκτείνεται, τῷ τετρακοτυλιαίῳ πλήθει ἡ κοτύλη
παρεκτεινομένη διπλασιάσει τὸ τετρακοτυλιαῖον ὧς γίνεσθαι τὸ πᾶν πλῆθος ὀκτὼ κοτυλῶν· ὅπερ οὐ θεωρεῖται. εἰ οὖν μήτε ἑαυτῷ προστίθεται τὸ προστίθεσθαι λεγόμενον μήτε τῷ προυποκειμένῳ μήτε τῷ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τούτων,
παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστιν, οὐδὲ προστίθεται οὐδὲν οὐδενί.

ιγ′ περὶ μεταθέσεως.

[97] Τῇ’ δὲ τῆς προσθέσεως καὶ τῆς ἀφαιρέσεως καὶ τῆς τοπικῆς κινήσεως ὑποστάσει συμπεριγράφεται καὶ ἡ μετάθεσις (αὕτη γὰρ ἀπό τινος μέν ἐστιν ἀφαίρεσις τινὶ δὲ
πρόσθεσις μεταβατικῶς),

ιδ′ περὶ ὅλου καὶ μέρους.

[98] Καὶ τὸ ὅλον δὲ καὶ τὸ μέρος. κατὰ μὲν γὰρ συνέλευσιν καὶ πρόσθεσιν τῶν μερῶν τὸ ὅλον γίγνεσθαι δοκεῖ, κατ’ ἀφαίρεσιν δέ τινος ἤ τινων παύεσθαι τοῦ ὅλον εἶναι. καὶ ἄλλως δέ, εἰ ἔστι τι ὅλον, ἤτοι ἕτερόν ἐστι παρὰ τὰ
μέρη αὐτοῦ ἢ αὐτὰ τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ <τὸ> ὅλον ἐστίν.

[99] ἕτερον μὲν οὖν τῶν μερῶν οὐδὲν φαίνεται τὸ ὅλον εἶναι· ἀμέλει γοῦν ἀναιρουμένων τῶν μερῶν οὐδὲν ὑπολείπεται, ἴνα ἕτερόν τι παρὰ ταῦτα λογισώμεθα τὸ ὅλον. εἰ δὲ αὐτὰ τὰ μέρη τὸ ὅλον ἐστίν, ὄνομα ἔσται μόνον τὸ ὅλον καὶ
προσηγορία κενή, ὑπόστασιν δὲ ἰδίαν οὐχ ἔξει, καθάπερ οὐδὲ διάστασίς ἐστί τι παρὰ τὰ διεστῶτα οὐδὲ δόκωσις παρὰ τὰ δεδοκωμένα. οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι ὅλον.

[100] ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ⁶⁹⁷⁰ 144 μέρη. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι μέρη, ἤτοι τοῦ ὅλου ταῦτά ἐστι μέρη ἢ ἀλλήλων ἢ ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστον. οὔτε δὲ τοῦ ὃλου, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ ἔστι τι παρὰ τὰ μέρη (καὶ ἄλλως τὰ μέρη οὕτως
ἔσται μέρη ἑαυτῶν, ἐπεὶ ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν συμπληρωτι- κὸν εἶναι λέγεται τοῦ ὅλου), οὔτε ἀλλήλων, ἐπεὶ τὸ μέρος ἐμπεριέχεσθαι δοκεῖ ἐν ἐκείνῳ οὗ ἐστι μέρος, καὶ ἄτοπόν ἐστι λέγειν τὴν χεῖρα, εἰ τύχοι, ἐν τῷ ποδὶ περιέχεσθαι.

[101] ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ἕκαστον ἑαυτοῦ μέρος ἔσται· διὰ γὰρ τὴν περιοχὴν
ἔσται τι ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον. εἰ οὖν μήτε τοῦ ὅλου μήτε ἑαυτῶν μήτε ἀλλήλων μέρη ἐστὶ τὰ λεγόμενα εἶναι μέρη, οὐδενός ἐστι μέρη. εἰ δὲ μηδενός ἐστι μέρη, οὐδὲ ἔστι μέρη· τὰ γὰρ πρός τι ἀλλήλοις συναναιρεῖται.
Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἄλλως εἰρήσθω κατὰ παρέκβασιν, ἐπειδὴ ἅπαξ ὅλου καὶ μέρους ἐπεμνήσθημεν.

ιε′ περὶ φυσικῆς μεταβολῆς.

[102] ‘Ανυπόστατον δὲ εἶναι λέγουσί τινες καὶ τὴν καλουμένην φυσικὴν μεταβολήν, λόγοις ἐπιχειροῦντες τοιούτοις. εἰ εἰ μεταβάλλει τι, ἤτοι σῶμά ἐστι τὸ μεταβάλλον ἤ ἀσώματον· ἑκάτερον δὲ τούτων ἠπόρηται· ἄπορος ἄρα ἔσται καὶ ὁ περὶ τῆς μεταβολῆς λόγος.

[103] εἰ μεταβάλλει τι, κατά τινας ἐνεργείας αἰτίου καὶ πάσχον μεταβάλλει. <.....> διατρέπεται
γὰρ ἡ τοῦ αἰτίου ὑπόστασίς· ᾧ τὸ πάσχον συμπεριτρέπεται μὴ ἔχον ὑπὸ ὅτου πάθῃ. οὐδὲ μεταβάλλει τι ἄρα.

[104] εἰ μεταβάλλει τι, ἤτοι τὸ ὂν μεταβάλλει ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν. τὸ μὲν οὖν μὴ ὂν ἀνυπόστατόν ἐστι καὶ οὔτε πάσχειν τι οὔτε δρᾶν δύναται, ὥστε οὐδὲ μεταβολὴν ἐπιδέχεται. εἰ
δὲ τὸ ὂν μεταβάλλει, ἤτοι καθὸ ὄν ἐστι μεταβάλλει ἢ ⁷¹⁷² 145 καθὸ μὴ ὄν ἐστιν.

[105] καθὸ μὲν οὖν μὴ ὄν ἐστιν, οὐ μεταβάλλει· ταβάλλει· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐκ ὄν ἐστιν· εἰ δὲ καθὸ ὄν ἐστι μεταβάλλει, ἕτερον ἐστι τοῦ ὃν εἶναι, τουτέστιν οὐκ ὂν
ἔσται. ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ λέγειν τὸ ὂν οὐκ ὂν γίνεσθαι· οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ τὸ ὂν μεταβάλλει. εἰ δὲ μήτε τὸ ὂν μεταβάλλει μήτε τὸ μὴ ὄν, παρὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὐδὲν ἔστι, λείπεται λέγειν ὅτι οὐδὲν μεταβάλλει. ἔτι καὶ ταῦτά φασί τινες.

[106] τὸ μεταβάλλον ἔν τινι χρόνῳ μεταβάλλειν ὀφείλει· οὔτε δὲ
ἐν τῷ παρῳχηκότι Χρόνῳ μεταβάλλει τι οὔτε ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι, λοντι, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐν τῷ ἐνεστῶτι, ὡς δείξομεν· οὐκ ἄρα μεταβάλλει τι. ἐν μὲν οὖν τῷ παρεληλυθότι ἢ μέλλοντι χρόνῳ οὐδὲν μεταβάλλει· τούτων γὰρ οὐθέτερος ἐνέστηκεν, ἀδύνατον δέ ἐστι δρᾶν τι ἢ πάσχειν ἐν τῷ μὴ ὄντι
καὶ ἐνεστηκότι χρόνῳ. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ἐν τῷ ἐνεστῶτι.

[107] ὁ γὰρ ἐνεστὼς χρόνος ἴσως μὲν καὶ ἀνύπαρκτός ἐστιν, ἵνα δὲ τοῦτο νῦν ὑπερθώμεθα, ἀμερής ἐστιν· ἀδύνατον δέ
ἐρτιν <ἐν> ἀμερεῖ χρόνῳ νομίζειν τὸν σίδηρον, εἰ τύχοι, τῆς σκληρότητος εἰς μαλακότητα μεταβάλλειν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων μεταβολῶν ἑκάστην γίνεσθαι· παρατάσεως γὰρ αὗται φαίνονται χρῄζειν. εἰ οὖν μήτε ἐν τῷ παρεληλυθότι
χρόνῳ μεταβάλλει τι μήτε ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι <μήτε ἐν ἐνεστῶτι, οὐδὲ> μεταβάλλειν τι ῥητέον.

[108] πρὸς τούτοις, εἰ ἔστι τις μεταβολή, ἤτοι x003E; αἰσθήσεις ἁπλοπαθεῖς εἰσιν, ἡ δὲ μεταβολὴ συμμνημόνευσιν ἔχειν δοκεῖ τοῦ τε ἐξ οὗ μεταβάλλει καὶ εἰς ὃ μεταβάλλειν λέγεται· εἰ δὲ νοητή ἐστιν,
ἐπεὶ περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τῶν νοητῶν ἀνεπίκριτος γέγονε παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς διαφωνία, καθάπερ ἤδη πολλάκις ὑπεμνήσαμεν, οὐδὲν ἕξομεν λέγειν οὐδὲ περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τῆς μεταβολῆς.

⁷³⁷⁴

ις′ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς.

[109] Συμπεριτρέπεται μὲν οὖν καὶ ἡ γένεσις καὶ ἡ φθορὰ τῇ προσθέσει καὶ τῇ ἀφαιρέσει καὶ τῇ φυσικῇ μεταβολῇ
χωρὶς γὰρ τούτων οὔτε γένοιτο ἄν τι οὔτε φθαρείη, οἷον γοῦν ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος φθειρομένης , ὧς φασίν, ἐννεάδα γίνεσθαι συμβαίνει κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν μονάδος, καὶ τὴν δεκάδα ἀπὸ τῆς ἐννεάδος φθειρομένης κατὰ πρόσθεσιν τῆς μονάδος, καὶ τὸν ἰὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ χαλκοῦ φθειρομένου κατὰ
μεταβολήν. ὥστε ἀναιρουμένων τῶν προειρημένων κανήσεων ἀναιρεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν φθορὰν ἴσως ἀνάγκη. οὐδὲν δὲ ἧττόν τινες κἀκεῖνα φασίν.

[110] εἰ ἐγεννήθη Σωκράτης, <ἤτοι> ὅτε οὐκ ἦν Σωκράτης ἐγένετο ἢ ὅτε ἦν ἤδη Σωκράτης. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν ὅτε ἦν ἤδη γεγενῆσθαι
λέγοιτο, δὶς ἂν εἴη γεγενημένος· εἰ δὲ ὅτε οὐκ ἦν, ἅμα καὶ ἦν Σωκράτης καὶ οὐκ ἦν. ἦν μὲν τῷ γεγονέναι, οὐκ ἦν δὲ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν.

[111] καὶ εἰ ἀπέθανε Σωκράτης, ἤτοι ὅτε ἔζη ἀπέθανεν ἢ ὅτε ἀπέθανεν. καὶ ὅτε μὲν ἔζη, οὐκ ἀπέθανεν, ἐπεὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἂν καὶ ἔζη καὶ
ἐτεθνήκει· ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ὅτε ἀπέθανεν, ἐπεὶ δὶς ἂν εἴη τεθνηκώς. οὐκ ἄρα ἀπέθανε Σωκράτης. τοῦτον δὲ τὸν λόγον
οἷόν τέ ἐστιν ἐφ’ ἑκάστου τῶν γίνεσθαι ἢ φθείρεσθαι λεγομένων ἱστάντα ἀναιρεῖν τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν φθοράν.

[112] ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ οὕτω συνερωτῶσιν. εἰ γίνεταί τι, ἤτοι τὸ ὂν γίνεται ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν. οὔτε δὲ τὸ μὴ ὂν γίνεται· τῷ γὰρ
μὴ ὄντι οὐδὲν συμβεβηκέναι δύναται, ὥστε οὐδὲ τὸ γίνεσθαι. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν. εἰ γὰρ γίνεται τὸ ὄν, ἤτοι καθὸ ὄν ἐστι γίνεται ἢ καθὸ οὐκ ὄν ἐστιν. καθὸ μὲν οὖν οὐκ ὄν ἐστιν, οὐ γίνεται. εἰ δὲ καθὸ ὄν ἐστι γίνεται, ἐπεὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἕτερον ἐξ ἑτέρου φασὶ γίνεσθαι, ἕτερον
ἔσται τοῦ ὄντος τὸ γινόμενον, ὅπερ ἐστὶν οὐκ ὄν. τὸ ἄρα γινόμενον οὐκ ὂν ἔσται, ὅπερ ἀπεμφαίνει.

[113] εἰ οὖν ⁷⁵⁷⁶⁷⁷⁷⁸⁷⁹ 147 μήτε τὸ μὴ ὂν γίνεται μήτε τὸ ὄν, οὐδὲ γίνεταί τι. κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ οὐδὲ φθείρεται. εἰ γὰρ φθείρεταί τι,
ἤτοι τὸ ὂν φθείρεται ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν. τὸ μὲν οὖν οὐκ ὂν οὐ φθείρεται· πάσχειν γάρ τι δεῖ τὸ φθειρόμεν·ον. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν. ἤτοι γὰρ μένον ἐν τῷ ὂν εἶναι φθείρεται ἢ μὴ μένον. καὶ εἰ μὲν μένον ἐν τῷ ὂν εἶναι, ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ ἄμα καὶ ὂν καὶ οὐκ ὄν·

[114] ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐ φθείρεται καθὸ μὴ
ὄν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καθὸ ὄν ἐστιν, καθὸ μὲν ἐφθάρθαι λέγεται, ἕτερον ἔσται τοῦ ὄντος καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ὄν, καθὸ δὲ μέ- νον ἐν τῷ εἶναι φθείρεσθαι λέγεται, ὂν ἔσται. ἄτοπον ’δε τὸ λέγειν τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ ὂν καὶ οὐκ ὄν· οὐκ ἄρα μένον ἐν τῷ εἶναι φθείρεται τὸ ὄν. εἰ δὲ οὐ μένον ἐν
τῷ εἶναι τὸ ὂν φθείρεται, ἀλλ’ εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι περιίσταται πρῶτον, εἶθ’ οὕτως φθείρεται, οὐκέτι τὸ ὄν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ὂν φθείρεται· ὅπερ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ὑπεμνήσαμεν. εἰ οὗν μήτε τὸ ὂν φθείρεται μήτε τὸ μὴ ὄν, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστιν, οὐδὲ φθείρεταί τι.

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὡς ἐν ὑποτυπώσει καὶ περὶ τῶν κινήσεων ἀρκέσει λελέχθαι, οἶς ἕπεται τὸ ἀνύπαρκτον εἶναι καὶ ἀνεπινόητον τὴν κατὰ τοὺς δογματικοὺς φυσιολογίαν.

ιζ′ περὶ μονῆς.

[115] Ἑπομένως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν μονῆς ἠπόρησάν τινες λέγοντες, ὅτι τὸ κινούμενον οὐ μένει,
πᾶν δὲ σῶμα διαρκῶς κινεῖται κατὰ τἀς τῶν δογματικῶν
ὑπολήψεις, ῥευστὴν εἶναι λεγόντων τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ ἀεὶ διαφορήσεις τε καὶ προσθέσεις ποίου μένην, ὧς τὸν μὲν Πλάτωνα (cf. ’ξ 54) μηδὲ ὄντα λέγειν τὰ σώματα ἀλλὰ γινόμενα μᾶλλον καλεῖν, τὸν δὲ Ἡράκλειτον
ὀξείᾳ ποταμοῦ ῥύσει τὴν εὐκινησίαν τῆς ἡμετέρας ὕλης ἀπε ικάζε ἱν. οὐδὲν ἄρα σῶμα μένε.

[116] γε μὴν λεγόμενον μένειν συνέχεσθαι δοκεῖ ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ αὐτό, τὸ δὲ συνεχό- ⁸⁰⁸¹ 148 μένον πάσχει· οὐδὲν δὲ ἔστι πάσχον, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ αἴτιον, ὧς ὑπεμνήσαμεν· οὐδὲ μένει τι ἄρα. ἐρωτῶσι δέ τινες καὶ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον.. τὸ μένον πάσχει, τὸ δὲ πάσχον κινεῖται·
τὸ ἄρα μένειν λεγόμενον κινεῖται· εἰ δὲ κινεῖται, οὐ μένει.

[117] ἐκ δὲ τούτων φανερόν ἐστιν, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸ ἀσώματον ἐνδέχεται μένειν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ μένον πάσχει, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν σωμάτων ἐστὶν ἴδιον, εἶπερ ἄρα, καὶ οὐχὶ ἀσωμάτων , οὐδὲν δὲ ἀσώματον οὔτε πάσχειν δύναται οὔτε μένειν, οὐδὲν
ἄρα μένει.

[118] Τοσαῦτα μὲν καὶ περὶ μονῆς εἰρήσθω. ἐπεὶ δὲ εκαστον τῶν προειρημένων οὐκ ἄνευ τόπου ἤ χρόνου ἐπινοεῖται, μετιτέον ἐπὶ τὴν περὶ τούτων σκέψιν· ἐὰν γὰρ ταῦτα δείξῃ τις ἀνυπόστατα, ἀνυπόστατον ἔσται καὶ διὰ
ταῦτα ἐκείνων ἕκαστον. ἀρξώμεθα δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ τόπου.

ιη′ περὶ τόπου.

[119] Τόπος τοίνυν λέγεται διχῶς, κυρίως καὶ καταχρηστικῶς, καταχρηστικῶς μὲν ὡς] ὁ ἐν πλάτει, ὧς ἐμοῦ ἡ πόλις, κυρίως δὲ ὁ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν κατέχων, ὑφ’ οὗ περιέχομαι πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν. ζητοῦμεν οὖν περὶ τοῦ τόπου <τοῦ>
πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν. τοῦτον δὲ οἱ μὲν ἔθεσαν, οἱ δὲ ἀνεῖλον, οἱ δὲ ἐπέσχον περὶ αὐτοῦ.

[120] ὧν οἱ μὲν ὑπάρχειν αὐτὸν φάσκοντες ἐπὶ τὴν ἐνάργειαν καταφεύγουσιν. τίς γὰρ ἄν, φασί, λέξειε μὴ εἶναι τόπον ὁρῶν τὰ μέρη τοῦ τόπου, οἶον τὰ δεξιὰ τὰ ἀριστερά, τὰ ἄνω τὰ κάτω, ἔμπροσθεν ⁸² ὀπίσω, καὶ ἄλλοτε ἀλλαχοῦ γιγνόμενος, βλέπων
τε, ὅτι ἔνθα ὁ ὑφηγητὴς ὁ ἐμὸς δ’ διελέγετο, ἐνταῦθα ἐγὼ νῦν διαλέγομαι, ’μαι, τόπον τε διάφορον καταλαμβάνων τῶν κούφων φύσει καὶ ⁸³⁸⁴
τῶν φύσει βαρέων,

[121] ἔτι καὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἀκούων λεγόντων ‘ἤτοι μὲν γὰρ πρῶτα χάος ἐγένετο ’. εἶναι γάρ φασι χάος τὸν τόπον ἀπὸ τοῦ χωρητικὸν αὐτὸν εἷναι τῶν ἐν αὐτᾷ γινομένων. μένων. εἴγε μὴν ἔστι τι
σῶμα, φασίν, ἔστι καὶ ὁ τόπος· ἄνευ γὰρ τούτου ⁸⁵ οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ σῶμα. καὶ εἰ ἔστι τὸ ὑφ’ οὗ καὶ τὸ ἐξ οὗ, ἔστι καὶ τὸ ἐν ᾧ, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὁ τόπος· τὸ δὲ πρῶτον ἐν ἑκατέρῳ· τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον ἐν ἀμφοτέροις.

[122] οἱ δὲ ἀναιροῦντες τὸν τόπον οὔτε τὰ μέρη τοῦ τόπου διδόασιν εἶναι· μηδὲν γὰρ εἷναι τὸν τόπον
παρὰ τὰ τούτου μέρη, καὶ τὸν συνάγειν πειρώμενον, ὅτι ἔστιν ὁ τόπος ἐκ τοῦ τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ ὧς ὄντα λαμβάνειν, τὸ ζητούμενον δι’ ἑαυτοῦ κατ’ κατασκευάξειν βούλεσθαι. ὁμοίως δὲ ληρεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἔν τινι τόπῳ γίνεσθαί τι ἢ γεγονέναι φάσκοντας, ὅλως μὴ διδομένου τοῦ τόπου. συναρπάζειν
15 δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὕπαρξιν μὴ διδομένην αὐτόθεν· καὶ τὸ ἐξ οὗ καὶ τὸ ὑφ’ οὗ δείκνυσθαι ἀνύπαρκτα παραπλησίως τῷ τόπῳ.

[123] τόν τε Ἡσίοδον μὴ ἀξιόχρεων εἷναι κριτὴν τῶν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν. καὶ οὕτω διακρουόμενοι τὰ εἰς κατασκευὴν φερόμενα τοῦ εἶναι τόπον, ἤδη καὶ
ποικιλώτερον κατασκευάζουσιν, ὅτι ἀνύπαρκτός ἐστι, ταῖς ἐμβριθεστέραις εἶναι δοκούσαις τῶν δογματικῶν στάσεσι περὶ τοῦ τόπου προσχρώμενοι, τῇ τε τῶν Στωτκῶν καὶ τῇ τῶν Περιπατητικῶν, τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

[124] Οἱ Στνικοί (Stoic. fr. II 505 A.) φασι κενὸν μὲν
εἶναι τὸ οἶόν τε ὑπὸ ὄντος κατέχεσθαι μὴ κατεχόμενον ⁸⁶ δέ, ἢ διάστημα ἔρημον σώματος, ἢ διάστημα ἀκαθεκτούμενον ὑπὸ σώματος, τόπον δὲ ⁸⁷⁸⁸⁸⁹ 149 διάστημα ὑπὸ ὄντος κατεχόμενον καὶ ἐξισαζόμε- νον τῷ κατ’ ἔχοντι αὐτόν, νῦν ὂν καλοῦντες τὸ σῶμα, χώραν δὲ διάστημα κατὰ μέν τι κατεχόμενον ὑπὸ σώματος κατὰ δέ τι ἀκαθεκτούμενον,
ἐνίων χώραν εἰπόντων εἶναι τὸν τόπον τοῦ μεγάλου
λοῦ σώματος, ὡς ἐν μεγέθει τὴν δ’ διαφορὰν εἶναι τοῦ τε τόπου καὶ τῆς χώρας.

[125] λέγεται οὖν, ὅτι ἐπειδὴ διάστημα ὑπὸ σώματος κατεχόμενόν φασιν εἶναι τὸν τόπον,
πῶς καὶ λέγουσιν αὐτὸν εἶναι διάστημα; πότερον τὸ μῆκος τοῦ σώματος ἢ τὸ πλάτος ἢ τὸ βάθος μόνον ἢ τὰς τρεῖς διαστάσεις; εἰ μὲν γὰρ μίαν διάστασιν, οὐκ ἐξισάζεται ὁ τόπος τῷ οὗ τόπος ἐστίν, πρὸς τῷ καὶ μέρος
τοῦ περιεχομένου τὸ περιέχον εἶναι, ὃ παντάπασιν ἀπεμφαίνει.

[126] εἰ δὲ αἱ τρεῖς διαστάσεις, ἐπεὶ οὔτε κενὸν ὑπόκειται ἐν τῷ λεγομένῳ τόπῳ οὔτε ἄλλο σῶμα διάστασιν ἔχον, μόνον δὲ τὸ ἐν τόπῳ λεγόμενον εἶναι σῶμα οὐ συνέστηκεν ἐκ τῶν διαστάσεων ἔστι γὰρ τοῦτο μῆκος καὶ
πλάτος καὶ βάθος καὶ ἀντιτυπία, ἣ δὴ συμβεβηκέναι λέ- γεται ταῖς διαστάσεσι ταῖς προειρημέναις) , αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα ἔσται ἑαυτοῦ τόπος, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ περιέχον καὶ περιεχόμενον, ὅπερ ἀντ’ ὀπὸν. οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τις διάστασις τόπου ὑποκειμένου. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ ἔστι τι ὁ τόπος.

[127] ἐρωτᾶται
δὲ καὶ οὗτος ὁ λόγος. ἐπεὶ διπλαῖ αἱ διαστάσεις οὐ θεωροῦνται καθ’ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν τόπῳ εἶναι λεγομένων, ἀλλ’ ‘ὲν μῆκος καὶ ‘ὲν πλάτος καὶ ὲν βάθος, πότερον μόνου τοῦ σώματός εἰσιν αἱ διαστάσεις αὗται ἢ μόνου τοῦ τόπου ἢ ἀμφοτέρων; ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν μόνου τοῦ τόπου, οὐχ ἔξει τὸ
σῶμα ἴδιον μῆκος οὐδὲ πλάτος οὐδὲ βάθος οὐθέν, ὥστε οὐδὲ σῶμα ἔσται τὸ σῶμα, ὅπερ ἄτοπον.

[128] εἰ δὲ ἀμφοτέρων, ἐπεὶ τὸ κενὸν οὐδεμίαν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει παρὰ τἀς διαστάσεις, εἰ αἱ διαστάσεις αἱ τοῦ κενοῦ ὑπόκεινται ἐν τῷ σώματι συστατικαὶ οὖσαι αὐτοῦ τοῦ σώματος, τὰ τοῦ κενοῦ
συστατικὰ καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἔσται συστατικά. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τῆς ἀντιτυπίας οὐκ ἔστι διαβεβαιώσαμόνον ⁹⁰ 50 δθσι, καθάπερ ἔμπροσθεν ὑπεμνήσαμεν (§ 45 sq.)· μόνων δὲ τῶν διαστάσεων φαινομένων κατὰ τὸ λεγόμενον
σῶμα, αἴπερ εἰσὶ τοῦ κενοῦ καὶ αἱ αὐταὶ τῷ κε νῷ, κενὸν ἔσται τὸ σῶμα· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. εἰ δὲ μόνου τοῦ σώματός εἰσιν αἱ δια- στάσεις, οὐδεμία ἔσται διάστασις τόπου, διόπερ οὐδὲ ὁ τόπος. εἰ τοίνυν κατ’ οὐδένα τῶν προειρημένων τρόπων εὑρίσκεται
τᾶι τόπου διάστασις, οὐδὲ ἔστιν ὁ τόπος.

[129] πρὸς τούτοις λέγεται, ὅτι ὅτε ἔπεισι τῷ κενῷ τὸ σῶμα καὶ γίνεται τόπος, ἤτοι ὑπομένει τὸ κενὸν ἢ ὑποχωρεῖ ἢ φθείρεται. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν ὑπομένει, τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται καὶ πλῆρες καὶ κενόν· εἰ δὲ
ὑποχωρεῖ κινούμενον μεταβατικῶς ἢ φθείρεται μεταβάλλον, σῶμα ἔσται τὸ κενόν· σώματος γὰρ ἴδιά ἐστι ταῦτα τὰ πάθη. ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν κενὸν καὶ πλῆρες, ἢ ὅτι σῶμά ἐστι τὸ κενόν. ἄτοπον ἄρα τὸ λέγειν οἷόν τε εἷναι τὸ κενὸν ὑπὸ σώματος κατασχεθῆναι καὶ γενέσθαι
τόπον.

[130] διὰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ τὸ κενὸν ἀνυπόστατον εὑρίσκεται, εἴγε μὴ δυνατόν ἐστιν αὐτὸ κατασχεθῆναι ὑπὸ σώματος καὶ γενέσθαι τόπον· ἐλέγετο γὰρ κενὸν εἶναι ὃ οἷόν τε ὑπὸ σώματος κατασχεθῆναι. συμπεριτρέπεται δὲ τούτοις καὶ ἡ χώρα· εἴτε γὰρ ὁ μέγας τόπος ἐστὶ χώρα,
συμπεριγράφεται τῷ τόπῳ, εἴτε ἡ κατὰ μέν τι ὑπὸ σώματος κατεχομένη, κατὰ δέ τι κενὴ διάστασις, ἀμροτέροις συναναιρεῖται.

[131] Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καὶ ἔτι πλείω πρὸς τὴν στάσιν τῶν Στωικῶν περὶ τοῦ τόπου λέγεται· οἱ δὲ Περιπατητικοί (cf. Aristot. ο Phys. 212 a6 φασιν εἷναι τόπον τὸ πέρας τοῦ περιέχοντος, καθὸ περιέχει, ὡς ἐμοῦ τόπον εἶναι τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν τοῦ ἀέρος τὴν περιτετυπωμένην τῷ ἐμῷ σώματι. ἀλλ’ εἵπερ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὁ τόπος, τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἔσται καὶ οὐκ ἔσται. ὅτε γὰρ μέλλει ἔν τινι τόπῳ γίνεσθαι
τὸ σῶμα, καθὸ μὲν οὐδὲν δύναται γενέσθαι ἐν τῷ μὴ ὑπάρ- ⁹¹⁹²⁹³ 151 χοντι, δεῖ προυπάρχειν τὸν τόπον, ἵνα οὕτως ἐν αὐτῷ γένηται τὸ σῶμα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἔσται ὁ τόπος πρὶν ἐν αὐτῷ γενέσθαι τὸ ἐν τῷ τόπῳ σῶμα. καθὸ δὲ περιτυπουμένης τῆς τοῦ περιέχοντος ἐπιφανείας τῷ περιεχομένῳ ἀποτελεῖται, οὐ δύναται ὑποστῆναι ὁ τόπος πρὸ τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ γενέσθαι τὸ σῶμα, καὶ
διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔσται τότε. ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν καὶ εἶναί τι καὶ μὴ εἶναι· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ τόπος τὸ πέρας τοῦ περιέχοντος, καθὸ περιέχει.

[132] πρὸς τούτοις, εἴ ἐστί τι ὁ τόπος, ἤτοι γεννητός ἐστιν ἢ ἀγέννητος. ἀγέννητος μὲν οὖν οὔκ
ἐστιν· περιτυπούμενος γάρ, φασίν, τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ σώματι ἀποτελεῖται. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ γεννητός· εἰ γάρ ἐστι γεννητός, ἤτοι ὅτε ἐν τόπω ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμα, τότε γίνεται ὁ τόπος ἐν ᾧ ἤδη λέγεται εἶναι τὸ ἐν τόπῳ, ἢ ὅτε οὔκ ἐστιν ἐν αὐτῷ.

[133] οὔτε δὲ ὅτε ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστιν ἔστι γὰρ ἤδη τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ σώματος ὁ τόπος) οὔτε ὅτε οὔκ ἐστιν ἐν αὐτῷ, εἴγε περιτυποῦται μέν, ὡς φασίν, τῷ περιεχομένῳ τὸ περιέχον καὶ οὕτω γίνεται τόπος, τῷ δὲ μὴ ἐν αὐτῷ ὄντι οὐδὲν δύναται περιτυπωθῆναι. εἰ δὲ μήτε ὅτε ἐν τόπῳ ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμα,
μήτε ὅτε οὔκ ἐστιν ἐν αὐτῷ, γίνεται ὁ τόπος, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἐπινοεῖν, οὐδὲ γεννητός ἐστιν ὁ τόπος. εἰ δὲ μήτε γεννητός ἐστι μήτε ἀγέννητος, οὐδὲ ἔστιν.

[134] κοινότερον δὲ καὶ ταῦτα δύναται λέγεσθαι. εἴ ἐστί τι ὁ τόπος, ἤτοι σῶμὰ ἐστιν ἢ ἀσώματον· ἑκάτερον δὲ τούτων
ἀπορεῖται, ὡς ὑπεμνήσαμεν· καὶ ὁ τόπος ἄρα ἐστὶν ἄπο- ρος. ὁ τόπος πρὸς ἰῷ σώματι νοεῖται, οὗ ἐστι τόπος· ἄπορος δέ ἐστιν ὁ περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τοῦ σώματος λόγος· καὶ ὁ περὶ τοῦ τόπου ἄρα. ὁ τόπος ἑκάστου ἀίδιος μὲν οὔκ ἐστιν, γίνεσθαι δὲ λεγόμενος ἀνυπόστατος εὑρίσκεται
γενέσεως μὴ ὑπαρχούσης.

[135] Ἔνεστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πλείω λέγειν. ἀλλ’ ἵνα μὴ τὸν λόγον μηκύνωμεν, ἐκεῖνο ἐπακτέον, ὅτι τοὺς σκεπτικοὺς ἐντρέπουσι μὲν οἱ λόγοι, δυσωπεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐνάργεια. διόπερ οὐθετέρῳ προστιθέμεθα ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ
τῶν δογματικῶν, ἀλλ’ ἐπέχομεν περὶ τοῦ τόπου.

⁹⁴

ιθ′ περὶ χρόνου.

[136] Τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ πάσχομεν καὶ ἐν τῇ περὶ τοῦ χρόνου ζητήσει· ὅσον μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς φαινομένοις δοκεῖ τι εἶναι ὁ χρόνος, ὅσον δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ λεγομένοις
μένοις ἀνυπόστατος φαίνεται. χρόνον γὰρ εἶναί φασιν οἱ μὲν διάστημα τῆς τοῦ ὅλου κινήσεως ὅλον δὲ λέγω τὸν κόσμον), οἱ δὲ αὐτὴν τὴν κίνησιν τοῦ κόσμου, Ἀριστοτέλης δέ, ἤ ὥς τινες Πλάτων’, ⁹⁵ ἀριθμὸν τοῦ ἐν κινήσει προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου,
Στράτων δέ, ἤ ὥς τινες Ἀριστοτέλης,

[137] μέτρον κινήσεως καὶ μονῆς, Ἐπίκουρος (p. 126, 12 Us.) δέ, καθὼς Δημήτριος ὁ Λάκων φησί, σύμπτωμα συμπτωμάτων, παρεπό μένον ἡμέραις τε καὶ νυξὶ ⁹⁶ καὶ ὥραις καὶ πάθεσι καὶ ἀπαθείαις καὶ κινήσεκαὶ
καὶ μοναῖς.

[138] κατ’ οὐσίαν τε οἱ μὲν σῶμα αὐτὸν ἔφασαν εἶναι, ὡς οἱ περὶ τὸν Αἰνησίδημον μηδὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν διαφέρειν τοῦ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ πρώτου σώματος), οἱ δὲ ἀσώματον . ἤτοι οὖν πᾶσαι αἱ στάσεις αὗταί εἰσιν ἀληθεῖς, ἢ πᾶσαι ψευδεῖς, ἢ τινὲς μὲν ἀληθεῖς, τινὲς
δ’ ἑ ψευδεῖς· οὔτε δὲ πᾶσαι ἀληθεῖς ὑπάρχειν δ’ δύνανται μάχονται γὰρ αἱ πλεῖσται) οὔτε πᾶσαι ψευδεῖς εἶναι δοθήσονται ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν.

[139] καὶ ἄλλως· εἰ δοθείη ψεῦδος μὲν εἶναι τὸ σῶμα εἶναι τὸν χρόνον, ψεῦδος δὲ καὶ τὸ ὅτι ἀσώματός ἐστιν, αὐτόθεν δόθη ἔται ἡ τοῦ χρόνου
ἀνυπαρξία· παρὰ γὰρ ταῦτα οὐδὲν εἶναι δύναται ἕτε- ρον. οὔτε τίνες μέν εἰσιν ἀληθεῖς, τίνες δὲ ψευδεῖς δυνατὸν καταλαβεῖν διά τε τὴν ἰσοσθενῆ διαφωνίαν καὶ τὴν ἀπορίαν τὴν κατὰ <τὸ> κριτήριόν τε καὶ τὴν ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἕξομεν περὶ χρόνου διαβεβαιώσασθαι.

[140]
εἶτα, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἄνευ κινήσεως ἢ καὶ μονῆς ⁹⁷⁹⁸⁹⁹ 153 ὁ χρόνος ὑφεστάναι δοκεῖ, τῆς κινήσεως ἀναιρουμένης, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῆς μονῆς, ἀναιρεῖται ὁ χρόνος. οὐδὲν δέ ἧττον καὶ τάδε φασί τινες κατὰ τοῦ χρόνου. εἰ ἐστί <τι>

[141] χρόνος, ἤτοι πεπέρασται ἢ ἄπειρός ἐστιν. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν πεπέρασται, ἀπό τινος χρόνου ἤρξατο καὶ εἰς τινα χρόνον
λήξει· διὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἦν ποτε χρόνος, ὅτε οὐκ ἦν χρόνος πρὸ τοῦ ἄρξασθαι αὐτόν), καὶ ἔσται ποτὲ χρόνος ὅτε οὐκ ἔσται χρόνος μετὰ τὸ λῆξαι αὐτόν)· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. οὐ τοίνυν πεπέρασται ὁ χρόνος.

[142] εἰ δὲ ἄπειρός ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ τὸ μέν τι αὐτοῦ λέγεται παρῳχηκός, τὸ δὲ ἐνεστώς, τὸ δὲ
μέλλον, ὁ μέλλων καὶ ὁ παρῳχηὼς ἤτοι εἰσὶν ἢ οὐκ εἰσίν. ἀλλ’ εἰ οὐκ εἰσίν, μόνου τοῦ ἐνεστῶτος ὑπολειπομένου, ὅς ἐστιν ἀκαριαῖος, πεπερασμένος ἔσται ὁ χρόνος καὶ ἀκολουθήσουσιν αἱ ἀρχῆθεν ἀπορίαι· εἰ δὲ ὁ παρῳχηκὼς ἔστι
καὶ ὁ μέλλων ἔστιν, ἐνεστὼς ἔσται ἑκάτερος αὐτῶν. ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ λέγειν ἐνεστῶτα τὸν παρωχηκότα καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον· οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ἄπειρός ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἄπειρος μήτε πεπερασμένος, οὐδὲ ἔστιν ὅλως
χρόνος.

[143] πρὸς τούτοις, εἰ ἔστιν ὁ χρόνος, ἤτοι μεριστός ἐστιν ἢ ἀμέριστος· ἀμέριστος μὲν οὖν οὔκ ἐστιν· διαιριῖται γὰρ εἰς τε τὸν ἐνεστῶτα καὶ εἰς τὸν παρωχηκότα καὶ εἰς τὸν μέλλοντα, ὡς αὐτοί φασιν. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ μεριστός. ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν μεριστῶν καταμετρεῖται ὑπό τινος ἑαυτοῦ
μέρους, καθ’ ἕκαστον μέρος τοῦ μετρουμένου γινομένου τοῦ μετροῦντος, ὡς ὅταν δακτύλῳ πῆχυν μετρῶμεν. ὁ δὲ χρόνος οὐ δύναται καταμετρεῖσθαι ὑπό τινος ἑαυτοῦ μέσους. εἰ γὰρ ὁ ἐνεστὼς λόγου χάριν καταμετρεῖ τὸν παρῳχημένον, ἔσται κατὰ τὸν παρωχηκότα καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
παρῳχηκώς, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ὁμοίως μέλλων. καὶ ὁ μέλλων εἰ καταμετροίη τοὺς ἄλλους , ἐνεστὼς ἔσται καὶ παρῳχηκώς, καὶ ὁ παρῳχηκὼς παραπλησίως μέλλων ἔσται καὶ ἐνεστώς· ὅπερ ἀπεμφαίνει. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ μεριστός ¹⁰⁰¹⁰¹¹⁰² 154
ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἀμέριστος μήτε μεριστός, οὐδὲ ἔστιν.

[144] ὅ τε χρόνος λέγεται τριμερὴς εἷναι, καὶ τὸ μὲν παρῳχηκώς, τὸ δὲ ἐνεστώς, τὸ δὲ μέλλων. ὧν ὁ μὲν παρῳχηκὼς καὶ ὁ μέλλων οὐκ εἰσίν· εἰ γὰρ εἰσὶ νῦν ὅ τε παρῳχηκὼς καὶ ὁ μέλλων χρόνος, ἔσται ἐνεστὼς ἑκάτερος αὐτῶν.
ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ὁ ἐνεστώς· εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν ὁ ἐνεστὼς χρόνος, ἤτοι ἀμέριστός ἐστιν ἢ μεριστός. ἀμέριστος μὲν οὖν οὔκ ἐστιν· ἐν γὰρ τῷ ἐνεστῶτι χρόνῳ λέγεται τὰ μεταβάλλοντα μεταβάλλειν, οὐδὲν δὲ ἐν ἀμερεῖ χρόνῳ μεταβάλλει, οἷον ὁ σίδηρος εἰς μαλακότητα ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον. ὥστε
οὔκ ἐστιν ἀμέριστος ὁ ἐνεστὼς χρόνος.

[145] ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ μεριστός· εἰς ἐνεστῶτας μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἂν μερισθείη , ἐπεὶ διὰ τὴν ὀξεῖαν ῥύσιν τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ ἀνεπινοήτως ὁ ἐνεστὼς εἰς παρωχηκότα μεταβάλλειν λέγεται· ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ εἰς παρῳχηκότα
καὶ μέλλοντα· ἔσται γὰρ οὕτως ἀνύπαρκτος, τὸ· μέν τι μηκέτι ὂν ἔχων μέρος ἑαυτοῦ, τὸ δὲ μηδέπω ὄν.

[146] ὅθεν οὐδὲ τέλος τοῦ παρῳχημένου καὶ ἀρχὴ τοῦ μέλλοντος εἷναι δύναται ὁ ἐνεστώς, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἔσται καὶ οὐκ ἔσται.
ἔσται μὲν οὖν] ὡς ἐνεστώς, οὐκ ἔσται δὲ ἐπεὶ μὴ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ τὰ μέρη. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ μεριστός ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἀμέριστός ἐστιν ὁ ἐνεστὼς μήτε μεριστός, οὐδὲ ἔστιν. μὴ ὄντος δὲ τοῦ ἐνεστῶτος μηδὲ τοῦ παρῳχημένου μηδὲ τοῦ μέλλοντος, οὐδέ ἐστί τι χρόνος· τὸ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνυπάρκτων
συνεστὼς ἀνύπαρκτόν ἐστιν.

[147] Λέγεται κατὰ τοῦ χρόνου κἀκεῖνος ὁ λόγος. εἰ ἔστι χρόνος, ἤτοι γενητός ἐστι καὶ φθαρτὸς ἢ ἀγένητος καὶ ἄφθαρτος. ἀγένητος μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄφθαρτος οὔκ ἐστιν, εἴγε αὐτοῦ τὸ μὲν παρῳχηκέναι λέγεται καὶ μηκέτι εἶναι,
τὸ δὲ μέλλειν καὶ μηδέπω εἶναι.

[148] ἀλλ' οὐδὲ γενητὸς καὶ φθαρτός. τὰ γὰρ γινόμενα ἔκ τινος ὄντος γίγνεσθαι δεῖ ¹⁰³¹⁰⁴¹⁰⁵¹⁰⁶ 155 καὶ τὰ φθειρόμενα εἴς τι ὂν φθείρεσθαι κατὰ τὰς τῶν δογματικῶν αὐτῶν ὑποθέσεις. εἰ οὖν εἰς τὸν παρῳχημένον φθείρεται, εἰς οὐκ ὂν φθείρεται, καὶ εἰ ἐκ τοῦ μέλλοντος γίνεται, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντος γίνεται· οὐθέτερος γὰρ αὐτῶν
ἔστιν. ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ λέγειν τι ἐξ οὐκ ὄντος γίνεσθαι ἤ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν φθείρεσθαι. οὐκ ἄρα γενητὸς καὶ φθαρ- τός ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἀγένητος καὶ ἄφθαρτός ἐστι μήτε γενητὸς καὶ φθαρτός, οὐδὲ ὅλως ἔστιν.

[149] Πρὸς τούτοις, ἐπεὶ πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον ἐν χρόνῳ γίγνεσθαι
δοκεῖ, εἰ γίνεται ὁ χρόνος, ἐν χρόνῳ γίνεται. ἤτοι οὖν αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ γίνεται ἢ ἕτερος ἐν ἑτέρῳ. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ, τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἔσται καὶ οὐκ ἔσται. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐν ᾡ τι γίγνεται τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ γιγνομένου ὀφείλει προυπάρχειν , ὁ γιγνόμενος ἐν ἑαυτῷ χρόνος, εἰ
μὲν γίνεται, οὐδέπω ἔστιν, εἰ δὲ ἐν ἑαυτῷ γίνεται, ἤδη ἔστιν. ὥστε οὐδὲ γίνεται ἐν ἑαυτῷ.

[150] ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἕτερος. εἰ γὰρ ὁ ἐνεστὼς ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι γίγνεται, μέλλων
ἔσται ὁ ἐνεστώς, καὶ εἰ ἐν τῷ παρῳχηκότι, παρῳχηκώς. τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ λεκτέον καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων χρόνων. ὥστε οὐδὲ ἕτερος χρόνος ἐν ἑτέρῳ γίνεται χρόνῳ. εἰ δὲ μήτε αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ γίνεται μήτε ἕτερος ἐν ἑτέρῳ, οὐδὲ γενητός
ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος. ἐδείκνυτο δέ, ὅτι οὐδὲ ἀγένητός ἐστιν. μήτε οὖν γενητὸς ὢν μήτε ἀγένητος οὐδ’ ὅλως ἔστιν· ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν ὄντων ἤτοι γενητὸν ἤ ἀγένητον εἶναι προσήκει.

κ′ περὶ ἀριθμοῦ.

[151] Επεὶ δὲ ὁ χρόνος δοκεῖ μὴ ἄνευ ἀριθμοῦ θεωρεῖσθαι,
οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄτοπον καὶ περὶ ἀριθμοῦ βραχέα διεξελθεῖν. ὅσον μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῇ συνηθείᾳ καὶ ἀδοξάστως ἀριθμεῖν τι φαμὲν καὶ ἀριθμὸν εἶναί τι ἀκούομεν· ἡ δὲ τῶν δογματικῶν περιεργία καὶ τὸν κατὰ τούτου κεκίνηκε λόγον.

¹⁰⁷¹⁰⁸ 156

[152] αὐτίκα γοῦν οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ Πυθαγόρου καὶ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς εἷναι λέγουσιν. φασὶ γοῦν, ὅτι τὰ φαινόμενα ἔκ τινος συνέστηκεν , ἁπλᾶ δὲ εἶναι δεῖ τὰ στοιχεῖα· ἄδηλα ἄρα ἐστὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα. τῶν δὲ ἀδήλων τὰ μέν ἐστι σώματα, ὡς οἱ ἀτμοὶ καὶ οἱ ὄγκοι, τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα,
ματα, ὧς σχήματα καὶ ἰδέαι καὶ ἀριθμοί. ὧν τὰ μὲν σώματά ἐστι σύνθετα, συνεστῶτα ἔκ τε μήκους καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους καὶ ἀντιτυπίας ἢ καὶ βάρους (cf. Epic. 276 Us.). οὐ μόνον ἄρα ἄδηλα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀσώματά ἐστι τὰ στοιχεῖα.

[153] ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄσωμάτων ¹⁰⁹ ἕκαστον ἐπιθεωρούμενον ἔχει τὸν ἀριθμόν· ἢ
γὰρ ἔν ἐστιν ἢ δύο ἢ πλείω. δι’ ὧν συνάγεται, ὅτι τὰ στοιχεῖα τῶν ὄντων εἰσὶν οἱ ἄδηλοι καὶ ἀσώματοι καὶ πᾶσιν ἐπιθεωρούμενοι ἀριθμοί. καὶ οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλ’ ἤ τε μονὰς καὶ ἡ κατὰ ἐπισύνθεσιν τῆς μονάδος γινομένη ἀόριστος δυάς, ἧς κατὰ μετουσίαν αἱ κατὰ μέρος γίγνονται
δυάδες δυάδες.

[154] ἐκ τούτων γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους γίνεσθαι ἀριθμούς, τούς ἐπιθεωρουμένους τοῖς ἀριθμητοῖς, καὶ τὸν κόσμον κατασκευάζεσθαι λέγουσιν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ
σημεῖον τὸν τῆς μονάδος ἐπέχειν λόγον, τὴν δὲ γραμμὴν τὸν τῆς δυάδος δύο γὰρ σημείων μεταξὺ θεωρεῖσθαι ταύτην), τὴν δὲ ἐπιφάνειαν τὸν τῆς τριάδος ῥύσιν γὰρ εἶναί φασι τῆς γραμμῆς εἰς πλάτος ἐπ’ ἄλλο σημεῖον ἐκ πλαγίου
κείμενον), τὸ δὲ σῶμα τὸν τῆς τετράδος· ἐπανάστασιν γὰρ γίγνεσθαι τῆς ἐπιφανείας ἐπί τι σημεῖον ὑπερκείμενον.

[155] καὶ οὕτω τά τε σώματα καὶ ὅλον τὸν κόσμον ἐνειδωλοποιοῦσιν, ὅντινα καὶ διοικεῖσθαί φασι κατὰ ἁρμονικοὺς λόγους, τόν τε διὰ τεσσάρων, ὅς ἐστιν ἐπίτριτος, ὡς ἔχει
πρὸς τὰ ἕξ τὰ ὀκτώ, καὶ τὸν διὰ πέντε, ὅς ἐστιν ἡμιόλιος, ὧς ἔχει πρὸς τὰ ἕξ τὰ ἐννέα, καὶ τὸν διὰ πασῶν, ὅς ἐστι διπλάσιος, ὧς ἔχει πρὸς τὰ ἕξ τὰ δώδεκα.

[156] ταῦτά τε οὖν ¹¹⁰¹¹¹¹¹²¹¹³ 157 ὀνειροπολοῦσιν, καὶ ὅτι ἕτερόν τι ἐστὶν ὁ ἀριθμὸς παρὰ τὰ ἀριθμητὰ κατασκευάζουσι, λέγοντες ὅτι εἰ τὸ ζῷον κατὰ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ λόγον ἐστίν, εἰ τύχοι, ἔν, τὸ φυτόν, ἐπεὶ μή ἐστι
ζῷον, οὐκ ἔσται ἕν· ἔστι δὲ καὶ <τὸ> φυτὸν ἔν· οὐκ ἄρα ζῷον, <ὡς ζῷον>, ἔν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ κατά τι ἕτερον ἐπιθεωρούμενον ἔξωθεν αὐτῷ, οὗ μετέχει ἕκαστον καὶ γίνεται δι’ αὐτὸ ἔν. καὶ εἰ τὰ ἀριθμητά ἐστιν ὁ ἀριθμός, ἐπειδὴ ἄωθρωποί εἰσιν οἱ ἀριθμητοὶ καὶ βόες, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ ἵπποι,
ἄνθρωποι καὶ βόες καὶ ἵπποι ἔσται ὁ ἀριθμός, καὶ λευκὸς ἀριθμὸς καὶ μέλας καὶ γενειήτης, εἰ τύχοιεν τοιοῦτοι ὄντες οἱ μετρούμενοι.

[157] ταῦτα δέ ἐστιν ἄτοπα· οὐκ ἄρα τὰ ἀριθμητά ἐστιν ὁ ἀριθμός, ἀλλ’ ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει παρὰ ταῦτα, καθ’ ἣν καὶ ἐπιθεωρεῖται τοῖς ἀριθμητοῖς καὶ
ἔστι στοιχεῖον.

Oὕτως οὖν ἐκείνων συναγαγόντων , ὅτι ἀριθμὸς οὔκ ἐστι τὰ ἀριθμητά, παρεισῆλθεν ἡ κατὰ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἀπορία. λέγεται γάρ, ὅτι εἰ ἔστιν ἀριθμός, ἤτοι αὐτὰ τὰ ἀριθμητά ἐστιν ὁ ἀριθμὸς ἢ ἕτερόν τι παρὰ ταῦτα ἔξωθεν·
οὔτε δὲ αὐτὰ τὰ ἀριθμητά ἐστιν ὁ ἀριθμός, ὧς ἀπέδειξαν οἱ Πυθαγορικοί, οὔτε ἕτερόν τι παρὰ ταῦτα, ὡς ὑπομνήσομεν· οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁ ἀριθμός.

[158] ὅτι δὲ
οὐδὲν ἔξωθέν ἐστι παρὰ τὰ ἀριθμητὰ ὁ ἀριθμός, παραστήσομεν ἐπὶ τῆς μονάδος τὸν λόγον στήσαντες εὐσήμου διδασκαλίας ἕνεκεν. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τι καθ’ ἑαυτὴν ἡ μονάς, ἧς μετέχον ἕκαστον τῶν μετεχόντων αὐτῆς γίνεται ἔν, ἤτοι
μία ἔσται αὐτὴ ἡ μονὰς ἢ τοσαῦται ὅσα τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτῆς ἐστιν. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν μία ἐστίν , πότερον ὅλης αὐτῆς μετέχει ἕκαστον τῶν μετέχειν αὐτῆς λεγομένων ἢ μέρους αὐτῆς; εἰ μὲν γὰρ πᾶσαν ἔχει τὴν μονάδα, εἰ τύχοι, ὁ εἰς ἄνθρωπος , οὐκέτι ἔσται μονὰς ἧς μεθέξει ὁ εἶς ἵππος
¹¹⁴¹¹⁵¹¹⁶ 158 ἢ ὁ εἷς κύων ἤ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ὃ λέγομεν εἶναι ἕν, ὧσπερ καὶ πολλῶν ὑποτεθέντων γυμνῶν ἀνθρώπων,

[159] ἑνὸς δὲ ὄντος ἱματίου καὶ τοῦτο ἑνὸς ἀμφιασαμένου, γυμνοὶ μενοῦσιν οἱ λοιποὶ καὶ χωρὶς ἱματίου. εἰ δὲ μέρους αὐτῆς
μετέχει ἕκαστον, πρῶτον μὲν ἕξει μέρος τι ἡ μονάς, καὶ ἄπειρά γε ἔξει μέρη, εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται· ὅπερ ὅπερ εἶτα ὡς τὸ μέρος τῆς δεκάδος, οἷον ἡ δυάς, οὔκ ἐστι δεκάς, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ μέρος τῆς μονάδος ἔσται μονάς, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ μεθέξει τι τῆς μονάδος. ὥστε οὔκ ἐστι μία ἡ
μονὰς ἧς μετέχειν λέγεται τὰ κατὰ μέρος.

[160] εἰ δὲ ἰσάριθμοι τοῖς ἀριθμητοῖς, ἐφ’ ὧν λέγεται τὸ ἔν, αἱ μονάδες εἰσίν, ὧν κατὰ μετοχὴν ἕκαστον τῶν κατὰ μέρος λέγεται ἕν, ἄπειροι ἔσονται αἱ μετεχόμεναι μονάδες. καὶ αὗται ἤτοι μετέχουσιν ἔπαωαβεβηκυίας μονάδος ἢ μονάδων ἰσαρίθμων
αὐταῖς καὶ διὰ τοῦτό εἰσι μονάδες) ἢ οὐ μετέχουσιν, ἀλλὰ χωρίς τινος μετοχῆς μονάδες εἰσίν.

[161] <...> εἰ μὲν γὰρ χωρὶς μετοχῆς μονάδες εἶναι δύνανται αὗται, δυνήσεται καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἕκαστον χωρὶς μονάδος μετοχῆς ‘ὲν εἶναι, καὶ αὐτόθεν περιτρέπεται ἡ καθ’ ἑαυτὴν θεωρεῖσθαι λεγομένη ὁ μονάς. εἰ δὲ ἀπὸ μετοχῆς κἀκεῖναι μονάδες εἰσίν, ἤτοι μιᾶς μετέχουσι πᾶσαι ἢ μία ἑκάστη ἰδίας. καὶ εἰ μὲν πᾶσαι μιᾶς, ἤτοι κατὰ μέρος ἑκάστη ἢ ὅλης λεχθήσεται
μετέχειν, καὶ μένουσιν αἱ ἀρχῆθεν ἀτοπίαι·

[162] εἰ δὲ ἑκάστη ἰδίας, καὶ ἐκείνων τῶν μονάδων ἑκάστῃ μονάδα ἐπιθεωρεῖσθαι δεῖ, καὶ ταῖς ἐπιθεωρουμέναις ἐκείναις ἄλλας, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου. εἰ οὖν ἵνα καταλάβωμεν, ὅτι εἰσί τινες
καθ’ ἑαυτὰς μονάδες, ὧν κατὰ μετοχὴν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἕν, δεῖ κατειληφέναι ἀπειράκις ἀπείρους νοητὰς μονάδας, ἀδύνατον δὲ καταλαβεῖν ἀπειράκις ἀπείρους μονάδας νοητάς, ἀδύνατον ἄρα ἐστὶν ἀποφήνασθαι, ὅτι εἰσί τινες νοηταὶ μονάδες καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ‘ὲν
κατὰ μετοχὴν ἰδίας μονάδος γινόμενον ἔν.

[163] ἄτοπον ἄρα τὸ λέγειν, ὅτι τοσαῦταί εἰσιν αἱ μονάδες ὅσα τὰ μετέχοντα ¹¹⁷ 159 αὐτῶν. εἰ δὲ μήτε μία ἐστὶν ἡ καθ’ ἑαυτὴν λεγομένη μονὰς μήτε τοσαῦται ὅσα τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτῆς ἐστιν, οὐδὲ ἔστιν ὅλως μονὰς καθ’ ἑαυτήν. ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἀριθμῶν ἕκαστος καθ’ ἑαυτὸν ἔσται· χρῆσθαι γὰρ ἔνεστιν
ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν ἀριθμῶν τῷ λόγῳ παραδειγματικῶς νῦν ἐπὶ τῆς μονάδος ἠρωτημένῳ. ἀλλ’ εἰ μήτε καθ’ ἑαυτόν ἐστιν ὁ ἀριθμός, ὧς ὑπεμνήσαμεν, μήτε αὐτὰ τὰ ἀριθμητὰ ὁ ἀριθμός ἐστιν, ὧς οἱ ἀπὸ Πυθαγόρου παρέστησαν, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστι, λεκτέον μηδὲ εἷναι
ἀριθμόν.

[164] Πῶς δὲ καὶ γίνεσθαί φασιν ἐκ τῆς μονάδος τὴν δυάδα οἱ ἔξωθέν τι δοκοῦντες εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμὸν παρὰ τὰ ἄρμ’ ὅτε γὰρ συντίθεμεν μονάδα ἑτέρᾳ μονάδι, ἤτοι προστίθεταί τι ταῖς μονάσιν ἔξωθεν, ἢ ἀφαιρεῖταί τι
ἀπ’ αὐτῶν, ἢ οὔτε προστίθεταί τι οὔτε ἀφαιρεῖται. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν οὔτε προστίθεταί <τι> οὔτε ἀφαιρεῖται, οὐκ δυάς. οὔτε γὰρ χωρὶς ἀλλήλων οὖσαι αἱ μονάδες εἶχον τὴν δυάδα ἐπιθεωρουμένην αὐταῖς κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον αὐτῶν λόγον, οὔτε νῦν τι αὐταῖς ἔξωθεν προσγέγονεν,

[165] ὥσπερ οὐδὲ
ἀφῄρηται κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν. ὥστε οὐκ ἔσται δυὰς ἡ σύνθεσις τῆς μονάδος πρὸς τὴν μονάδα, μήτε ἀφαιρέσεως μήτε προσθέσεως ἔξωθέν τινος γινομένης. εἰ δὲ ἀφαίρεσις γίνεται, οὐ μόνον οὐκ ἔσται δυάς, ἀλλὰ καὶ μειωθήσονται
αἱ μονάδες. εἰ δὲ προστίθεται αὐταῖς ἔξωθεν ἡ δυάς, ἴνα ἐκ τῶν μονάδων γένηται δυάς, τὰ δύο δοκοῦντα εἶναι τέσσαρα ἔσται· ὑπόκειται γὰρ μονὰς καὶ ἑτέρα μονάς, αἷς προστιθεμένης ἔξωθεν δυάδος ὁ τέσσαρα ἀριθμὸς
ἀποτελοῖτο ἄν.

[166] ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀριθμῶν τῶν κατὰ σύνθεσιν ἀποτελεῖσθαι λεγομένων. εἰ οὖν μήτε κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν μήτε κατὰ πρόσθεσιν μήτε ἄνευ ἀφαιρέσεως καὶ προσθέσεως γίγνονται οἱ σύνθετοι λεγόμενοι εἶναι ἀριθμοὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐπαναβεβηκότων , ἀσύστατός
ἐστιν ἡ γένεσις τοῦ κατ’ ἰδίαν καὶ παρὰ τὰ ἀριθμητὰ ¹¹⁸¹¹⁹ 160 εἶναι λεγομένου ἀριθμοῦ. ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ ἀγένητοι τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες οἱ κατὰ σύνθεσιν ἀριθμοί, δηλοῦσιν αὐτοὶ συντίθεσθαί τε αὐτοὺς καὶ γίγνεσθαι φάσκοντες ἐκ τῶν ἐπαναβεβηκότων,
, οἷον τῆς τε μονάδος καὶ δυάδος τῆς ἀορίστου.

[167] οὐκοῦν οὐχ ὑφέστηκε κατ’ ἰδίαν ὁ ἀριθμός. εἰ δὲ μήτε κατ’ ἰδίαν ὁ ἀριθμὸς θεωρεῖται μήτε ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμητοῖς ἔχει τὴν ὑπόστασιν , οὐδὲ ἔστι τι ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὅσον ἐπὶ ταῖς περιεργίαις ταῖς ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν εἰσενηνεγμέναις.
τοσαῦτα μὲν καὶ περὶ τοῦ φυσικοῦ καλουμένου τῆς φιλοσοφίας μέρους ἀρκούντως ὧς ἐν ὑποτυπώσει λελέχθω.

κα′ περὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ μέρους τῆς φιλοσοφίας.

[168] Λείπεται τὸ ἠθικόν, ὅπερ δοκεῖ τὴν διάκρισιν τῶν τε καλῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀδιαφόρων καταγίγνεσθαι. ἵνα
οὖν κεφαλαιωδῶς καὶ περὶ τούτου διαλάβωμεν , περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀδιαφόρων ζητή- σωμεν, τὴν ἔννοιαν ἑκάστου προεκθέμενοι.

κβ′ περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἅδ’ ιαφόρων.

[169] Φᾶσίν οὖν οἱ Στωικοὶ (Stoic. fr. III 75 A) ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ὠφέλειαν ἢ οὐχ ἕτερον ὠφελείας, ὠφέλειαν
μὲν λέγοντες τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν σπουδαίαν πρᾶξιν, ¹²⁰ ξιν, οὐχ ἕτερον δὲ ὠφελείας τὸν σπουδαῖον καὶ τὸν φίλον. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετή πως ἔχον ἡγεμονικὸν καθεστηκυῖα καὶ ἡ σπουδαία πρᾶξις ἐνέργειά τις οὖσα κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἄντικρύς ἐστιν ὠφέλεια, ὁ δὲ
σπουδαῖος ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ φίλος οὐχ ἕτερος ὠφελείας.

[170] μέρος μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σπουδαίου ἐστὶν ὠφέλεια, τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν αὐτοῦ ὑπάρχουσα· τὰ δὲ ὅλα οὔτε τὰ αὐτὰ τοῖς μέρεσιν εἶναι λέγουσιν οὐ γάρ
ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος χείρ), οὔτε ἕτερα παρὰ τὰ ¹²¹ μέρη οὐκ ἄνευ γὰρ τῶν μερῶν ὑφέστηκεν). διόπερ οὐχ ἕτερα τῶν μερῶν τὰ ὅλα λέγουσιν. ὅθεν ¹²²¹²³¹²⁴ 161 τὸν σπουδαῖον ὅλον ὄντα ὧς πρὸς τ’ ὁ ἡγεμονικὸν ἑαυτοῦ, ὅπερ ἔφασαν ὠφέλειαν, οὐχ ἕτερον ὠφελείας εἷναι λέγουσιν. ἐντεῦθεν καὶ τριχῶς τὸ ἀγαθόν φασι λέγεσθαι.

[171] καθ’ ἕνα μὲν γὰρ τρόπον φασὶν εἷναι
ἀγαθὸν τὸ ὑφ' οὗ ἔστιν ὠφελεῖσθαι, ὃ δὴ ἀρχικώτατόν ἐστι καὶ ἀρετή, καθ’ ἕτερον δὲ καθ’ ὃ συμβαίνει ὠφελεῖσθαι, ὧς ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ αἱ κατ’ ἀρετὴν πράξεις, κατὰ τρίτον δὲ τρόπον τὸ οἷόν τε ὠφελεῖν, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ <τὴν> κατὰ ἀρετὴνν ¹²⁵ πρᾶξιν καὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον καὶ τὸν φίλον, θεούς τε
καὶ σπουδαίους δαίμονας, ὧς τὸ μὲν δεύτερον σημαινόμενον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐμπεριληπτικὸν εἶναι τοῦ πρώτου σημαινομένου, τὸ δὲ τρίτον τοῦ δευτέρου καὶ τοῦ πρώτου.

[172] τινὲς δέ φασιν (Stoic. fr. III 73 Arn.) ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸ δι’ ἑαυτὸ αἱρετόν, ἄλλοι δὲ ¹²⁶ τὸ συλλαμβάνον πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ τὸ συμπληρωτικόν· ¹²⁷ εὐδαιμονία δέ ἐστιν, ὡς οἱ Στωικοί φασιν,
εὔροια βίου.

Τοιαῦτα μέν τινα εἰς τὴν ἔννοιαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ λέγεται.

[173] εἴτε δὲ τὸ ὠφελοῦν εἴτε τὸ δι’ ἑαυτὸ αἱρετὸν εἴτε τὸ συνεργοῦν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἀγαθόν τις εἶναι λέγοι, οὐχὶ τί ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθὸν παρίστησιν, ἀλλά τι τῶν συμβεβηκότων
αὐτῷ λέγει. ὅπερ ἐστὶ μάταιον. ἤτοι γὰρ μόνῳ τῷ ἀγαθῷ συμβέβηκε τὰ προειρημένα ἢ καὶ ἑτέροις. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν καὶ ἑτέροις, οὔκ ἐστι χαρακτηριστικὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κοινοποιούμενα· εἰ δὲ μόνῳ τῷ ἀγαθῷ, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τούτων νοεῖν τὸ ἀγαθόν·

[174] ὧς γὰρ ὁ ἀνεννόητος ἵππου
οὔτε τὸ χρεμετίζειν τί ἐστιν οἶδεν, οὔτε διὰ τούτου δύναται εἰς ἔννοιαν ἐλθεῖν ἵστιν εἰ μὴ πρότερον πρότερον χρεμετίζοντι ἐντύχοι, οὕτω <καὶ> ὁ διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι ¹²⁸¹²⁹¹³⁰
ἰδ’. ζητῶν τί ἐστιν ἀγαθόν, οὐ δύναται γινώσκειν τὸ ἰδίως αὐτῷ καὶ μόνῳ ὑπάρχον, ἴνα δι’ αὐτοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ νοῆσαι δυνηθῇ. πρότερον γὰρ δεῖ μαθεῖν τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν, εἶθ’ οὕτω συνεῖναι ὅτι ὠφελεῖ καὶ ὅτι
δι’ αὑτὸ αἱρετόν ἐστι καὶ ὅτι εὐδαιμονίας ποιητικόν.

[175] ὅτι δὲ τὰ προειρημένα συμβεβηκότα οὔκ ἐστιν ἱκανὰ μηνῦσαι τὴν ἐπίνοιαν καὶ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, δηλοῦσιν ἔργῳ οἱ δογματικοί. ὡς μὲν γὰρ ὠφελεῖ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὅτι αἱρετόν ἐστι, παρὸ καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἴρηται τὸ οἱονεὶ ἀγαστόν (Plat.
Cratyl. 412 C), καὶ ὅτι εὐδαιμονίας ἐστὶ ποιητικόν, πάντες ἴσως συγχωροῦσιν· ἐρωτώμενοι δί, τί ἐστιν ᾧ ταῦτα συμβίβηκεν, εἰς ἄσπειστον ἐμπίπτουσι πόλεμον, οἱ μὲν ἀρετὴν λέγοντες, οἱ δὲ ἡδονήν, οἱ δὲ ἀλυπίαν, οἱ δὲ ἄλλο τι. καίτοι εἰ ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων ὅρων ἐδείκνυτο τί ἐστι τὸ
ἀγαθὸν αὐτό, οὐκ ἂν ἐστασίαζον ὡς ἀγνοουμένης τῆς τούτου φύσεως.

[176] Οὕτω μὲν οὖν διαφέρονται περὶ τῆς ἐννοίας τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ οἱ δοκιμώτατοι δοκοῦντες εἶναι τῶν δογματικῶν· ὁμοίως δὲ διηνέχθησαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, λέγοντες (Stoic. fr.
III 77 Arn.) κακὸν εἶναι βλάβην ἢ οὐχ ἕτερον βλάβης, ¹³¹ οἱ δὲ τὸ δι’ ἑαυτὸ φευκτόν, οἱ δὲ τὸ κακοδαιμονίας ποιητικόν. δι’ ὧν οὐχὶ τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ κακοῦ, ἀλλά τινα τῶν συμβεβηκότων ’ίσως αὐτῷ φάσκοντες εἰς τὴν προειρημένην ἐμπίπτουσιν ἀπορίαν.

[177] Τὸ δὲ ἀδιάφορόν φασι (Stoic. fr.III 122 Arn.) λέγεσθαι
μὲν τριχῶς, καθ’ ἕνα μὲν τρόπον πρὸς ὃ μήτε ¹³² ὁρμὴ μήτε ἀφορμὴ γίνεται, οἶόν ἐστι τὸ ἀρτίους εἶναι τούς ἀστέρας ἢ τὰς ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς τρίχας· καθ’ ἕτερον δὲ πρὸς ὃ ὁρμὴ μὲν ἢ ἀφορμὴ γίνεται, οὐ μᾶλλον δὲ πρὸς τόδε ἢ τόδε, οἶον ἐπὶ δυεῖν τετραδράχμων ἀπαραλλάκτων, ὅταν ¹³³¹³⁴¹³⁵¹³⁶ 162 δέῃ τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν αἱρεῖσθαι· ὁρμὴ μὲν γὰρ ¹³⁷ γίνεται πρὸς τὸ αἱρεῖσθαι τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν, οὐ
μᾶλλον δὲ πρὸς τόδε ἢ τόδε· κατὰ τρίτον δὲ τρόπον φασὶν ἀδιάφορον εἷναι τὸ μήτε πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν μήτε πρὸς κακοδαιμονίαν συμβαλλόμενον,
ὧς ὑγίειαν πλοῦτον· ᾧ γὰρ ἔστιν ὁτὲ μὲν εὖ, ὁτὲ δὲ κακῶς χρήσασθαι, τοῦτο ἀδιάφορον εἶναί φασιν, περὶ οὗ μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς διαλαμβάνειν λέγουσιν.

[178] τίνα μέντοι καὶ περὶ ταύτης τῆς ἐννοίας δεῖ φρονεῖν,
δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἡμῖν περί τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν.

Oὕτω μὲν οὖν σαφές ἐστιν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπέστησαν ἡμᾶς τῇ ἐννοίᾳ τῶν προειρημένων ἑκάστου· οὐδὲν δὲ ἀπεικὸς πεπόνθασιν ἐν ἀνυποστάτοις τάχα πράγμασι σφαλλόμενοι. ὅτι γὰρ οὐδὲν τῇ φύσει ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ ἀδιάφορον,
ἐντεῦθέν τινες ἐπιλογίζονται.

κγ′ εἰ ἔστι τι φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀδιάφορον.

[179] Τὸ πῦρ φύσει ἀλεαῖνον πᾶσι φαίνεται ἀλεαντικόν, καὶ ἡ χιὼν φύσει ψύχουσα πᾶσι φαίνεται ψυκτική, καὶ πάντα τὰ φύσει κινοῦντα ὁμοίως πάντας κινεῖ τοὺς κατὰ φύσιν, ὧς φασίν, ἔχοντας. οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν λεγομένων ἀγαθῶν
πάντας κινεῖ ὡς ἀγαθόν, ὡς ὑπομνήσομεν · οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι φύσει ἀγαθόν. ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲν τῶν λεγομένων ἀγαθῶν πάντας ὁμοίως κινεῖ, δῆλον, φασίν.

[180] ἵνα γὰρ τοὺς ἰδιώτας παρῶμεν, ὧν οἱ μὲν εὐεξίαν σώματος ἀγαθὸν εἷναι νομίζουσιν, οἱ δὲ τὸ λαγνεύειν, οἱ δὲ τὸ ἀδηφαγεῖν , οἱ δὲ οἰνοφλυγίαν,
οἱ δὲ τὸ χρῆσθαι κύβοις, οἱ δὲ πλεονεξίαν, οἱ δὲ καὶ χείρωτινὰ ¹³⁸ τούτων, αὐτῶν τῶν φιλοσόφων τινὲς μὲν τρία γένη φασὶν εἷναι ἀγαθῶν, ὧς οἱ Περιπατητικοί (Div. Aristot. 1[5])· τούτων γὰρ τὰ μὲν εἷναι ψυχὴν ὧς τἀς ἀρετάς, τὰ δὲ περὶ σῶμα ὧς ὑγίειαν καὶ τὰ ἐοικότα, τὰ δὲ ἐκτὸς ὧς φίλους, πλοῦτον,

[181]
¹³⁹¹⁴⁰¹⁴¹ 163
τά παραπλήσια. οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς τριγένειαν μὲν καὶ αὐτοί φασιν (III 96 Arn.) εἷναι ἀγαθῶν· τούτων γὰρ τὰ μὲν εἷναι περὶ ψυχὴν ὡς τὰς ἀρετάς, τὰ δὲ ἐκτὸς ὡς τὸν σπουδαῖον καὶ <τὸν> φίλον, τὰ δὲ οὔτε περὶ ψυχὴν οὔτε ἐκτός, οἷον ¹⁴² τὸν σπουδαῖον ὧς πρὸς ἑαυτόν· τὰ μέντοι περὶ
σῶμα [ἤ ἢ ἐκτός], ἅ φασιν οἱ ἐκ τοῦ Περιπάτου ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, οὔ φασιν ἀγαθά. ἔνιοι δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἠσπάσαντο ὧς ἀγαθόν, τινὲς δὲ κακὸν αὐτὴν
ἄντικρυς εἶναί φασιν, ὥστε καί τινα τῶν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ἀναφθέγξασθαι ' μανείην μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθείην.

[182] εἰ τοίνυν τὰ μὲν φύσει κινοῦντα πάντας ὁμοίως κινεῖ, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς λεγομένοις ἀγαθοῖς οὐ πάντες ὁμοίως κινούμεθα,
οὐδέν ἐστι φύσει ἀγαθόν. καὶ γὰρ οὔτε πάσαις ταῖς προεκκειμέναις στάσεσι πιστεύειν ἐνδέχεται διὰ τὴν μάχην οὔτε τινί. ὁ γὰρ λέγων, ὅτι τῇδε μὲν πιστευτέον τῇ στάσει, τῇδε δὲ οὐδαμῶς, ἐναντιουμένους τοὺς παρὰ τῶν ἀντιδοξούντων λόγους αὐτῷ ἔχων, μέρος γίνεται <τῆς> διαφωνίας,
καὶ τοῦ κρινοῦντος αὐτὸς δεήσεται διὰ τοῦτο μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἑτέρους κρινεῖ. μήτε οὖν κριτηρίου ὄντος ὁμολογουμένου μήτε ἀποδείξεως διὰ τὴν ἀνεπίκριτον καὶ περὶ τούτων διαφωνίαν, εἰς τὴν ἐποχὴν καταντήσει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐχ ἔξει διαβεβαιοῦσθαι, τί ἐστι τὸ φύσει ἀγαθόν.

[183] Ἔτι κἀκεῖνο λέγουσί τινες, ὅτι ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἤτοι τὸ αἱρεῖσθαι αὐτὸ ἢ ἐκεῖνο ὃ αἱρούμεθα. τὸ μὲν οὖν αἱρεῖσθαι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐσπεύδομεν τυχεῖν ἐκείνου ὃ αἱρούμεθα, ἵνα μὴ ἐκπέσωηεν τοῦ ἔτι αὐτὸ αἱρεῖσθαι, οἷον εἰ ἀγαθὸν ἦν τὸ ἀντιποιεῖσθαι
ποτοῦ, οὐκ ἂν ἐσπεύδομεν ποτοῦ τυχεῖν· ἀπολαύσαντες γὰρ τούτου τῆς ἀντιποιήσεως αὐτοῦ ἀπαλλαττόμεθα. καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πεινῆν ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐρᾶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων. οὐκ ἄρα τὸ αἱρεῖσθαι δι’ αὐτὸ αἱρετόν ἐστιν, εἰ μή γε καὶ ὀχληρόν· καὶ γὰρ ὁ πεινῶν σπεύδει μετα- ¹⁴³¹⁴⁴ 164 σχεῖν τροφῆς, ὅπως ἀπαλλαγῇ τῆς ἐκ τοῦ πεινῆν ὀχλήσεως,
καὶ ὁ ἐρῶν ὁμοίως καὶ ὁ διψῶν.

[184] ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τὸ αἱρετόν ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθόν. τοῦτο γὰρ ἤτοι ἔξωθέν ἐστιν ἡμῶν ἢ περὶ ἡμᾶς. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν ἔξωθεν ἡμῶν, ἤτοι ποιεῖ περὶ ἡμᾶς ἀστείαν κίνησιν καὶ ἀποδεκτὸν κατάστημα καὶ ἀγαστὸν πάθος, ἢ οὐδαμῶς ἡμᾶς διατίθησιν. καὶ εἰ μὲν οὔκ
ἐστιν ἡμῖν ἀγαστόν, οὔτε ἀγαθὸν ἔσται οὔτε ἐπάξεται ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὸ αἱρεῖσθαι αὐτὸ οὔτε ὅλως αἱρετὸν ἔσται. εἰ δὲ γίνεταί τι περὶ ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐκτὸς προσηνὲς κατάστημα
καὶ ἀσμενιστὸν πάθος, οὐχὶ δι’ ἑαυτὸ αἱρετὸν ἔσται τὸ ἐκτός, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν περὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπ’ αὐτῷ γινομένην διάθεσιν·

[185] ὥστε οὐ δύναται τὸ δι’ αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν ἐκτὸς εἶναι. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ περὶ ἡμᾶς. ἤτοι γὰρ περὶ σῶμα εἶναι
λέγεται μόνον ἢ περὶ ψυχὴν μόνην ἢ περὶ ἀμφότερα. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν περὶ σῶμα μόνον, ἐκφεύξεται τὴν γνῶσιν ἡμῶν· ψυχῆς γὰρ αἱ γνώσεις εἶναι λέγονται, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἄλογον εἶναί φασιν ὅσον ἐφ’ ἑαυτῷ. εἰ δὲ καὶ μέχρι τῆς ψυχῆς διατείνειν λέγοιτο, τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀντιλήψει καὶ τῷ ταύτης
ἀγαστῷ πάθει δοκοίη ἂν αἱρετὸν εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ κρινόμενον ὧς αἱρετὸν τῇ διανοίᾳ κρίνεται κατὰ αὐτοὺς καὶ οὐκ ἀλόγῳ σώματι.

[186] λείπεται λέγειν, ὅτι περὶ ψυχὴν μόνην τὸ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν. καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ἐξ ὧν οἱ δογματικοὶ λέγουσιν ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν. ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ τάχα μὲν καὶ ἀνύπαρκτός ἐστιν· εἰ ’δε
καὶ ὑπάρχει, ὅσον ἐφ’ οἷς λέγουσιν οὐ καταλαμβάνεται, καθὼς ἐπελογισάμην ἐν τῷ περὶ κριτηρίου λόγῳ (ΙΙ 31 — 33). πῶς δ’ ἂν θαρροίη τις ἐν ἐκείνῳ τι γίνεσθαι λέγειν, ὃ μὴ καταλαμβάνει;

[187] ἴνα δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παραλείπωμεν, πῶς ἄρα καὶ λέγουσιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ ἀγαθὸν γίνεσθαι; εἰ γοῦν
ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν ἡδονῇ τίθεται τὸ τέλος καί φησι τὴν ψυχήν, ἐπεὶ καὶ πάντα, ἐξ ἀτόμων συνεστάναι, ¹⁴⁵¹⁴⁶ 165 πῶς ἐν ἀτόμων σωρῷ δυνατὸν ἡδονὴν γίγνεσθαι καὶ συγ- κατάθεσιν ἢ κρίσιν τοῦ τόδε μὲν αἱρετὸν εἶναι καὶ ἀγαθόν,
τόδε δὲ φευκτὸν καὶ κακόν, ἀμήχανον εἰπεῖν.

κδ′ τί ἐστιν ἡ λεγομένη τέχνη περὶ βίον.
¹⁴⁷

[188] Πάλιν οἱ Στωικοὶ (Stoic. fr. II 96 Arn.) περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγαθά φασιν εἶναι τέχνας τινὰς, τὰς ἀρετάς· τέχνην δὲ εἶναί φασι (Stoic. fr. I 73 Arn.) σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων συγγεγυμνασμένων , τὰς δὲ καταλήψεις γίγνεσθαι περὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. πῶς οὖν ἐν τῷ ¹⁴⁸ ἡγεμονικῷ, πνεύματι κατ’ αὐτοὺς ὑπάρχοντι,
ἐναπόθεσις γίνεται καταλήψεων καὶ ἀθροισμὸς τοσούτων ὧς γενέσθαι τέχνην , οὐχ οἷόν τε ἐννοῆσαι, τῆς ἐπιγινομένης τυπώσεως ἀεὶ τὴν πρὸ αὐτῆς ἀπαλειφούσης, ἐπεὶ χυτόν τέ ἐστι τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ ἐξ ὅλου κινεῖσθαι λέγεται
καθ’ ἑκάστην τύπωσιν.

[189] τὸ γὰρ τὴν Πλάτωνος ἀνειδωλοποίησιν λέγειν ἐπιδεκτικὴν εἶναι δύνασθαι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, φημὶ δὲ τὴν κρᾶσιν τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ μεριστῆς οὐσίας καὶ τῆς θατέρου φύσεως καὶ ταὐτοῦ, ἢ τούς
ἀριθμούς, τέλεον ληρῶδές ἐστιν. ὅθεν οὐδὲ περὶ ψυχὴν εἶναι δύναται τὸ ἀγαθόν.

[190] εἰ δὲ μήτε τὸ αἱρεῖσθαι αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν ἐστι, μήτε ἐκτὸς ὑπόκειται τὸ δι’ αὑτὸ αἱρετόν, μήτε περὶ σῶμά ἐστι μήτε περὶ ψυχήν, ὧς ἐπελογισάμην, οὐδ’ ὅλως ἔστι τι φύσει ἀγαθόν

Διὰ δὲ τὰ προειρημένα οὐδὲ κακόν τι ἔστι φύσει. τὰ γὰρ ἑτέροις δοκοῦντα εἶναι κακά, ταῦτα ἕτεροι διώκου- σιν ὡς ἀγαθά, οἷον ἀσέλγειαν ἀδικίαν φιλαργυρίαν ἀκρα- σίαν, τὰ ἐοικότα. ὅθεν εἰ τὰ μὲν φύσει πάντας ὁμοίως πέφυκε κινεῖν, τὰ δὲ λεγόμενα εἶναι κακὰ οὐ πάντας ὁμοίως
κινεῖ, οὐδέν ἐστι φύσει κακόν.

[191] Ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδ’ ἀδιάφορόν ἐστί τι φύσει διὰ τὴν περὶ ¹⁴⁹ 166 τῶν ἀδιαφόρων διαφωνίαν. οἷον γοῦν οἱ μὲν Στωικοὶ (Stoic. fr. III 122 Arn.) τῶν ἀδιαφόρων φασὶ τὰ μὲν προηγμένα μένα εἷναι, τὰ δὲ ἀποπροηγμένα, τὰ δὲ οὔτε προηγμένα οὔτε ἀποπροηγμένα, ’π’ προηγμένα μὲν τὰ ¹⁵⁰ ἱκανὴν ἀξίαν ἔχοντα ὡς Ὑγίειαν πλοῦτον, ἀποπροηγμένα
δὲ τὰ μὴ ἱκανὴν ἔχοντα ἀξίαν ὡς πενίαν νόσον, μήτε δὲ προηγμένα μήτε ἀποπροηγμένα ὡς τὸ ἐκτεῖναι ἢ συγκάμψαι τὸν δάκτυλον.

[192] τινὲς δὲ οὐδὲν τῶν ἀδιαφόρων φύσει προηγμένον ἢ ἀποπροηγμένον εἶναι λέγουσιν· ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων ¹⁵¹ παρὰ τὰς διαφόρους περιστάσεις ὁτὲ μὲν
προηγμένον φαίνεσθαι, ὁτὲ δὲ ἀποπροηγμένον. εἰ γοῦν, φασίν, οἱ μὲν πλούσιοι ἐπιβουλεύοιντο ὑπὸ τυράννου οἱ δὲ πένητες εἰρηνεύοιντο, πᾶς ἄν ἕλοιτο εἶναι πένης μᾶλλον ἢ πλούσιος, ὡς ἀποπροηγμένον γίνεσθαι τὸν πλοῦτον.

[193] ὥστε ἐπεὶ ἕκαστον
τῶν λεγομένων ἀδιαφόρων οἱ μὲν ἀγαθὸν εἶναί φασιν, οἱ δὲ κακόν, ἅπαντες δ’ ἂν ὁμοίως ἀδιάφορον αὐτὸ ἐνόμιζον εἶναι, εἴγε ἀδιάφορον ἦν φύσει, οὐδέν ἐστι φύσει ἀδιάφορον.

Οὕτως καὶ εἴ τις φύσει αἱρετὴν εἶναι λέγοι τὴν ἀνδρείαν
διὰ τὸ τοὺς λέοντας φυσικῶς τολμᾶν καὶ ἀνδρίζεσθαι δοκεῖν καὶ ταύρους, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ ἀνθρώπους τινὰς καὶ ἀλεκτρυόνας , λέγομεν, ὅτι ὅσον ἐπὶ τούτῳ καὶ ἡ δειλία τῶν φύσει αἱρετῶν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ ἔλαφοι καὶ λαγῴ καὶ ἄλλα
πλείονα ζῷα φυσικῶς ἐπ’ αὐτὴν ὁρμᾷ. καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων δειλοὶ θεωροῦνται· σπανίως μὲν γάρ τις ὑπὲρ πατρίδος ἑαυτὸν ἐπέδωκεν εἰς θάνατον βλακευσάμενος ἢ ἄλλως θερμόν τι τυφωθεὶς ἔδοξέ τις διαπράττεσθαι, ὁ δὲ πλεῖστος ὅμιλος τῶν ἀνθρώπων πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐκ-
¹⁵²¹⁵³¹⁵⁴ 167 κλίνει.

[194] ὅθεν καὶ οἱ Ἐπικούρειοι (Epicurea p. 274, 25 Us.) δεικνύναι νομίζουσι φύσει αἱρετὴν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν· τὰ γὰρ ζῷά φασιν ἅμα τῷ γενέσθαι, ἀδιάστροφα ὄντα, ὁρμᾶν μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν ἡδονήν, ἐκκλίνειν ¹⁵⁵ δὲ ἀλγηδόνας.

[195] καὶ πρὸς τούτους δὲ ἔστι λέγειν,
τι τὸ ποιητικὸν κακοῦ οὐκ ἂν εἴη φύσει ἀγαθόν· ἡ δέ ἡδονὴ κακῶν ἐστι ποιητική· πάσῃ γὰρ ἡδονῇ παραπέπηγεν ἀλγηδών, ἥ ἐστι κατ’ αὐτοὺς (Epicurea p. 276, 23 Us.) φύσει κακόν. οἷον γοῦν ἥδεται ὁ μέθυσος ἐμφορούμενος οἴνου καὶ ὁ γαστρίμαργος τροφῆς, καὶ ὁ λάγνος ἀφροδισίοις
ἀμέτρως χρώμενος· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα καὶ πενίας καὶ νόσων ἐστὶ ποιητικά, ἅπερ ἀλγεινά ἐστι καὶ κακά, ὡς φασίν. οὐκ ἄρα φύσει ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἡ ἡδονή.

[196] παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἀγαθοῦ οὔκ ἐστι φύσει κακόν, ἡδονὰς δὲ ἀποτελοῦσιν ἀλγηδόνες· καὶ γὰρ ἐπιστήμας ἀναλαμβάνομεν
μὲν πονοῦντες, καὶ πλούτου καὶ ἐρωμένης οὕτως ἐγκρατὴς γίνεταί τις, καὶ ὑγίειαν περιποιοῦσιν αἱ ἀλγηδόνες. οὐκ ἄρα ὁ πόνος φύσει κακόν. καὶ γὰρ εἰ φύσει ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἦν ἡ ἡδονὴ, φαῦλον δὲ ὁ πόνος, πάντες ἂν ὁμοίως διέκειντο περὶ αὐτῶν, ὧς ἐλέγομεν· ὁρῶμεν δὲ πολλοὺς τῶν
φιλοσόφων τὸν μὲν πόνον καὶ τὴν καρτερίαν αἱρουμένους, τῆς ἡδονῆς δὲ καταφρονοῦντας.

[197] ὁμοίως δ’ ἂν περιτρίποιντο
καὶ οἱ τὸν ἐνάρετον βίον φύσει ἀγαθὸν εἶναι λέγοντες, ἐκ τοῦ τινὰς τῶν σοφῶν τὸν μεθ’ ἡδονῆς αἱρεῖσθαι βίον, ὡς ἐκ τῆς παρ’ αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις διαφωνίας τὸ φύσει τι τοῖον ἢ τοῖον εἶναι διατρέπεσθαι.

[198] Οὐκ ἄτοπον δ’ ἂν ’ίσως εἴη πρὸς τούτοις καὶ εἰδικώτερον ἐπιστῆσαι διὰ βραχέων ταῖς ὑπολήψεσι ταῖς περὶ αἰσχρῶν καὶ οὐκ αἰσχρῶν, ἀθέσμων τε καὶ οὐ τοιούτων καὶ νόμων καὶ ἐθῶν καὶ τῆς εἰς θεοὺς εὐσεβείας καὶ τῆς περὶ τοὺς κατ’ οἰχομένους ὁσιότητος καὶ τῶν ἐοικότων· καὶ γὰρ
οὕτω περὶ τῶν πρακτέων ἢ μὴ πολλὴν εὑρήσομεν ἀνωμα- ¹⁵⁶¹⁵⁷ 168 λίαν.

[199] οἷον γοῦν παρ’ ἡμῖν μὲν αἰσχρόν, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ παράνομον νενόμισται τὸ τῆς ἀρρενομιξίας, παρὰ Γερμανοῖς δέ, ὡς φασίν , οὐκ αἰσχρόν, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἔν τι τῶν συνήθων. λέγεται δὲ καὶ παρὰ Θηβαίοις τὸ παλαιὸν οὐκ αἰσχρὸν τοῦτο εἶναι δόξαι, καὶ τὸν Μηριόνην τὸν Κρῆτα οὕτω κεκλῆσθαί
φασι δι’ ἔμφασιν τοῦ Κρητῶν ἔθους, καὶ τὴν Ἀχιλλέως πρὸς Πάτροκλον διάπυρον φιλίαν εἰς τοῦτο ἀνάγουσί τινες.

[200] καὶ τί θαυμαστόν, ὅπου γε καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς κυνικῆς φιλο σοφίας καὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν Κιτιέα Ζήνωνα καὶ Κλεάνθην καὶ Χρύσιππον (fr. Stoic. I, 256 Arn.) ἀδιάφορον
τοῦτο εἶναί φασιν; καὶ τὸ δημοσίᾳ γυναικὶ μίγνυσθαι, καίτοι παρ’ ἡμῖν αἰσχρὸν εἶναι δοκοῦν, παρά τισι τῶν Ἰνδῶν οὐκ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι νομίζεται· μίγνυνται γοῦν ἀδιαφόρως δημοσίᾳ, καθάπερ καὶ περὶ τοῦ φιλοσόφου Κράτητος ἀκηκόαμεν.

[201] ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ τὰς γυναῖκας ἑταιρεῖν παρ’ ἡμῖν
μὲν αἰσχρόν ἐστι καὶ ἐπονείδιστον, παρὰ δὲ πολλοῖς τῶν Αἰγυπτίων εὐκλεές· φασὶ γοῦν, ὅτι αἱ πλείστοις συνιοῦσαι καὶ κόσμον ἔχουσι περισφύριον, σύνθημα τοῦ παρ’ αὐταῖς σεμνολογήματος. παρ’ ἐνίοις δὲ αὐτῶν αἱ κόραι πρὸ τῶν γάμων τὴν προῖκα ἐξ ἑταιρήσεως συνάγουσαι γαμοῦνται.
καὶ τοὺς Στωικοὺς (Stoic. fr. III, 755 Arn.) δὲ ὁρῶμεν οὐκ ἄτοπον εἶναι λέγοντας τὸ ἑταίρᾳ συνοικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἐξ ἑταίρας ἐργασίας διαζῆν.

[202] ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐστίχθαι παρ’ ἡμῖν μὲν αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἄτιμον εἶναι δοκεῖ, πολλοὶ δὲ
Αἰγυπτίων καὶ Σαρμάτων στίζουσι τὰ γεννώμενα.

[203] τό τε ἐλλόβια ἔχειν τούς ἄρρενας παρ’ ἡμῖν μὲν αἰσχρόν ἐστι, παρ’ ἐνίοις δὲ τῶν βαρβάρων , ὥσπερ καὶ Σύροις, εὐγενείας ἐστὶ σύνθημα. τινὲς δὲ ἐπιτείνοντες τὸ σύνθημα τῆς
εὐγενείας, καὶ τὰς ῥῖνας τῶν παίδων τιτρώσκοντες κρίκους ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ἀργυρέους ἢ χρυσοῦς ἀπαρτῶσιν , ὃ παρ’ ἡμῖν οὐκ ἂν ποιήσειέ τις,

[204] ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἀνθοβαφῆ καὶ ποδήρη τις ἄρρην ἐνταῦθα <ἂν> ἀμφιέσαιτο ἐσθῆτα, καίτοι Πέρσαις εὐπρεπεστάτου τοῦ παρ’ ἡμῖν αἰσχροῦ τούτου
¹⁵⁸ 169 δοκοῦντος εἶναι. καὶ παρὰ Διονυσίῳ δὲ τῷ τῆς Σικελίας τυράννῳ τοιαύτης ἐσθῆτος Πλάτωνι καὶ Ἀριστίππῳ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις προσενεχθείσης ὁ μὲν Πλάτων’ ἀπεπέμψατο, εἰπὼν (Eurip. Bacch. 836)

οὖσ’ ἄν δυναίμην θῆλυν ενδῦναι στολήν

ἄρρην πεφυκὼς,

ὁ δὲ Ἀρίστιππος προσήκατο, φήσας (Bacch. 317)

καὶ γὰρ ἐν βακχεύμασιν

οὖσ' ἥ γε σώφρωνov οὐ διαφθαρήσεται.

οὕτω καὶ τῶν σοφῶν ᾧ μὲν οὐκ αἰσχρόν, ᾧ δὲ αἰσχρὸν ἐδόκει τοῦτο εἶναι.

[205] ἄθεσμον τέ ἐστι παρ’ ἡμῖν μητέρα ἢ ἀδελφὴν ἰδίαν γαμεῖν· Πέρσαι δέ, καὶ μάλιστα αὐτῶν οἱ σοφίαν ἀσκεῖν δοκοῦντες, οἱ Μάγοι, γαμοῦσι τὰς μητέρας, καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι τὰς ἀδελφὰς ἄγονται πρὸς γάμον, καὶ ὧς
ὁ ποιητής φησιν Σ 356),

Ζεὺς Ἥρην προσέειπε κασιγνήτην ἄλοχόν τε. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Κιτιεὺς Ζήνων (Stoic. fr. I, 256 Arn.) φησὶ μὴ ἄτοπον εἶναι τὸ μόριον τῆς μητρὸς τῷ ἑαυτοῦ μορίῳ τρῖψαι, καθάπερ οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι μέρος
τοῦ σώματος αὐτῆς τῇ χειρὶ τρῖψαι φαῦλον
ἂν εἶποι τις εἶναι. καὶ ὁ Χρύσιππος δὲ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ (fr. Stoic. III, 745 Arn.) δογματίζει τόν τε πατέρα ἐκ τῆς θυγατρὸς παιδοποιεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν μητέρα ἐκ τοῦ παιδὸς καὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἐκ τῆς ἀδελφῆς. ¹⁵⁹ Πλάτων’ (Resp. IV 423 E sqq.) δὲ καὶ καθολικώτερον
κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς γυναῖκας δείν’ ἀπεφήνατο.

[206] τό τε αἰσχρουργεῖν ἐπάρατον ὂν παρ’ ἡμὶν ὁ Ζήνων (Stoic. fr. I, 255 Arn.) οὐκ ἀποδοκιμάζει· καὶ ἄλλους δὲ ὧς ἀγαθῷ τινι τούτῳ χρῆσθαι τῷ κακῷ πυνθανόμεθα.

[207] ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἀνθρωπείων γεύεσθαι σαρκῶν παρ’ ἡμῖν μὲν ¹⁶⁰ ἄθεσμον, παρ’ ὅλοις δὲ βαρβάροις ἔθνεσιν ἀδιάφορόν
ἐστιν. καὶ τί δεῖ τοὺς βαρβάρους λέγειν, ὅπου καὶ ὁ Τυδεὺς τὸν ἐγκέφαλον τοῦ πολεμίου λέγεται φαγεῖν φαγεῖν, καὶ ¹⁶¹ 170 οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς (Stoic. fr. I, 254 III, 748 Arn.) οὐκ ἄτοπον εἶναί φασι τὸ σάρκας τινὰ ἐσθίειν ἄλλων τε ἀν’ θρώπων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ;

[208] τό τε ἀνθρωπείῳ μιαίνειν αἵματι βωμὸν θεοῦ παρ’ ἡμῖν μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἄθεσμον, Λάκωνες δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ βωμοῦ τῆς Ὀρθωσίας Ἀρτέμιδος μαστίζονται
πικρῶς ὑπὲρ τοῦ πολλὴν αἵματος ἐπὶ τοῦ βωμοῦ τῆς θεοῦ γενέσθαι ῥύσιν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ Κρόνῳ θύουσιν ἄνθρωπόν τινες, καθάπερ καὶ Σκύθαι τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι τοὺς ξένους· ἡμεῖς δὲ χραίνεσθαι τὰ ἱερὰ δοκοῦμεν ἀνθρώπου φόνῳ.

[209] τούς γε μὴν μοιχοὺς κολάζει παρ’ ἡμῖν νόμος, παρὰ δέ
τισιν ἀδιάφορόν ἐστι ταῖς τῶν ἑτέρων γυναιξὶ μίγνυσθαι· καὶ φιλοσόφων δέ τινές φασιν ἀδιάφορον εἶναι τὸ ἀλλοτρίᾳ γυναικὶ μίγνυσθαι.

[210] τοὺς πατέρας τε ὑπὸ τῶν παίδων ἐπιμελείας ἀξιοῦσθαι κελεύει παρ’ ἡμῖν νόμος· οἱ Σκύθαι δὲ ὑπὲρ τὰ ἑξήκοντα ἔτη γενομένους
αὐτοὺς ἀποσφάττουσιν. καὶ τί θαυμαστόν , εἴγε ὁ μὲν Κρόνος τῇ ἅρπῃ τὰ αἰδοία ἐξέτεμε τοῦ πατρός, ὁ δὲ Ζεὺς τὸν Κρόνον κατεταρτάρωσεν , ἡ δὲ Ἀθηνᾶ μετὰ Ἥρας καὶ Ποσειδῶνος τὸν πατέρα δεσμεύειν ἐπεχείρησεν; ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ παῖδας ὁ Κρόνος ἀναιρεῖν ἔκρινεν,

[211] καὶ
ὁ Σόλων Ἀθηναίοις τὸν περὶ τῶν ἀκρίτων νόμον ἔθετο, καθ’ ὃν φονεύειν ἑκάστῳ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ παῖδα ἐπέτρεψεν· παρ’ ἡμῖν δὲ τὸ τοὺς παῖδας φονεύειν ἀπαγορεύουσιν οἱ
νόμοι. οἴ τε ωμαίων νομοθέται τούς παῖδας ὑποχειρίους καὶ δούλους τῶν πατέρων κελεύουσιν εἶναι, καὶ τῆς οὐσίας τῶν παίδων μὴ κυριεύειν τούς παῖδας ἀλλὰ τοὺς πατέρας, ἕως ἂν ἐλευθερίας οἱ παῖδες τύχωσι κατὰ τούς ἀργυρωνήτους·
παρ’ ἑτέροις δὲ ὡς τυραννικὸν τοῦτο ἐκβέβληται.

[212] νόμος τέ ἐστι τοὺς ἀνδροφόνους κολάζεσθαι· οἱ μονομάχαι δὲ φονεύοντες πολλάκις καὶ τιμῆς τυγχάνουσιν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ τύπτειν ἐλευθέρους οἱ νόμοι κωλύουσιν· οἱ ἀθληταὶ δὲ τύπτοντες ἐλευθέρους ἄνδρας, πολλάκις <δὲ> καὶ
ἀναιροῦντες , τιμῶν καὶ στεφάνων ἀξιοῦνται.

[213] νόμος τε ¹⁶² 171 παρ’ ἡμὶν κελεύει μιᾷ συνοικεῖν ἕκαστον, Θρᾳκῶν δὲ καὶ Γαιτούλων Λιβύων δὲ ἔθνος τοῦτο) πολλαῖς ἕκαστος συνοικεῖ.

[214] τό τε λῃστεύειν παρ’ ἡμῖν μὲν παράνομον καὶ
ἄδικόν ἐστι, παρὰ δὲ πολλοῖς τῶν βαρβάρων οὐκ ἄτοπον. φασὶ δέ, ὅτι καὶ εὐκλεὲς τοῦτο οἱ Κίλικες ἐνόμιζον εἶναι, ὧς καὶ τοὺς ἐν λῃστείᾳ τελευτήσαντας τιμῆς ἀξίους εἷναι δοκεῖν. καὶ ὁ Νέστωρ δὲ παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ, μετὰ τὸ φιλοφρονήσασθαι τοὺς περὶ τὸν Τηλέμαχον, φησὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς

(γ 72) ἦ μαψιδίως ἀλάλησθε

οἶά τε ληιστῆρες;

καίτοι εἰ ἄτοπον ἦν τὸ λῃστεύειν, οὐκ ἂν οὕτως αὐτοὺς φιλοφρονησάμενος διὰ τὸ ὑποπτεύειν, μὴ ἄρα τοιοῦτοί τινες εἶεν.

[215] ἀλλὰ καὶ <τὸ> κλέπτειν παρ’ ἡμῖν μὲν ἄδικον
καὶ παράνομόν ἐστιν· οἱ δὲ καὶ κλεπτίστατον εἶναι θεὸν λέγοντες τὸν Ἑρμῆν οὐκ ἄδικον τοῦτο νομίζεσθαι ποιοῦσιν πῶς γὰρ ἂν θεὸς εἴη κακός;). φασὶ δέ τινες, ὅτι καὶ οἱ Λάκωνες τοὺς κλέψαντας ἐκόλαζον οὐ διὰ τὸ κεκλοφέναι, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πεφωρᾶσθαι.

[216] ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ δειλὸς καὶ ὁ ῥίψασπις
ἀνὴρ κολάζεται παρὰ πολλοῖς νόμῳ· διὸ καὶ ἡ τὴν ἀσπίδα τῷ παιδὶ ἐπὶ πόλεμον ἐξιόντι διδοῦσα Λάκαινα ‘σὺ
ἔφη, ‘τέκνον, ἢ ταύταν ἢ ἐπὶ ταύταν'. Ἀρχίλοχος δέ, ὥσπερ σεμνυνόμενος ἡμῖν ἐπὶ τῷ τὴν ἀσπίδα ῥίψας φυ- γεῖν, ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασι περὶ ἑαυτοῦ φησὶν (fr. 58 B.)

ἀσπίδι μὲν Σαΐων τις ἀγάλλεται, ἣν παρὰ θάμνῳ

ἔντος ἀμώμητον κάλλιπον οὐκ ἐθέλων,

αὐτὸς δ’ ἐξέφυγον θανάτου τέλος.

[217] αἱ δὲ Ἀμαζόνες καὶ ἐχώλευον τὰ ἄρρενα τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτῶν γεννωμένων ὑπὲρ τοῦ μηδὲν ἀνδρεῖον αὐτὰ ποιῆσαι δύνασθαι, περὶ πόλεμον δὲ ἔσχον αὐταί, τοῦ ἐναντίου ¹⁶³ 172 παρ’ ἡμῖν καλῶς ἔχειν νενομισμένου. καὶ ἡ μήτηρ δὲ τῶν
θεῶν προσίεται τοὺς θηλυδρίας, οὐκ ἂν οὕτω κρίνασα ἡ θεός, εἴγε φύσει φαῦλον ἦν τὸ μὴ ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι.

[218] οὕτω καὶ τὰ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν καλοῦ πολλὴν ἀνωμαλίαν ἔχει. Καὶ τὰ περὶ εὐσεβείας δὲ καὶ θεῶν <θεραπείας> πεπλήρωται
πολλῆς διαφωνίας. θεοὺς γὰρ οἱ μὲν πολλοί φασιν εἶναι, τινὲς δὲ οὐκ εἶναι, ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ Δ ιαγόραν τὸν Μήλιον καὶ Θεόδωρον καὶ Κριτίαν τὸν Ἀθηναῖον. καὶ τῶν εἶναι θεοὺς ἀποφηναμένων οἱ μὲν τοὺς πατρίους νομίζουσι θεούς, οἱ δὲ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς δογματικαῖς αἱρέσεσιν ἀναπλασσομένους, ¹⁶⁴ ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης (cf.fr. 26 Rose) μὲν ἀσώματον
εἶπεν εἶναι τὸν θεὸν καὶ πέρας τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, Στωικοὶ (Stoic. fr. I 159 et II 103 Arn.) δὲ πνεῦμα διῆκον καὶ διὰ τῶν εἰδεχθῶν, Ἐπίκουρος (p. 355, 7 Us.) δὲ ἀνθρωπόμορφον, Ξενοθάνης (cf. A33 Diels) δὲ σφαῖραν ἀπαθῆ.

[219] καὶ οἱ μὲν προνοεῖν τῶν καθ’ ἡμᾶς, 24a οἱ δὲ μὴ προνοεῖν· τὸ γὰρ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον ὁ
Ἐπίκουρός (p. 71,3 Us.) φησί μήτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχειν μήτε ἑτέροις παρέχειν. ὅθεν καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον οἱ μὲν ἕνα φασὶν εἶναι θεόν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὺς καὶ διαφόρους ταῖς μορφαῖς, ὡς καὶ εἰς τὰς τῶν Αἰγυπτίων ὑπολήψεις ἐμπίπτειν, κυνοπροσώπους καὶ ἱερακομόρφους καὶ βόας καὶ
κροκοδείλους καὶ τί γὰρ οὐχὶ νομιζόντων τοὺς θεούς.

[220] ὅθεν καὶ τὰ περὶ θυσιῶν καὶ τῆς περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς θρησκείας ὅλως πολλὴν ἀνωμαλίαν ἔχει· ἃ γὰρ ἔν τισιν ἱεροῖς <νομίζεται> ὅσια, ταῦτα ἐν ἑτέροις ἀνόσια. καίτοι εἰ φύσει τὸ ὅσιον
καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον ἦν, οὐκ ἂν τοῦτο ἐνομίσθη. οἷον γοῦν Σαράπιδι χοῖρον οὐκ ἂν θύσειέ τις, Ἡρακλεῖ δὲ καὶ Ἀσκληπιῷ θύουσιν. πρόβατον Ἴσιδι θύειν ἄθεσμον, τῇ μητρὶ μέντοι λεγομένῃ τῶν θεῶν καὶ θεοῖς ἄλλοις καλλιερεῖται.

[221] ται. <. . . > τῷ Κρόνῳ θύουσιν ἄνθρωπον , ὃ τοῖς πλείστοις
¹⁶⁵ 173 ἀσεβὲς εἶναι νομίζεται. αἴλουρον ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ τῷ Ὥρῳ θύουσι, καὶ Θέτιδι σίλφην· ὃ παρ’ ἡμῖν οὐκ ἂν ποιήσειέ τις. ἵππον τῷ Ποσειδῶνι καλλιεροῦσιν· Ἀπόλλωνι δέ, ἐξαιρέτως τῷ Διδυμαίῳ, τὸ ζῷον ἀπεχθές. αἶγας Ἀρτέμιδι
θύειν εὐσεβές, ἀλλ’ οὐκ Ἀσκληπιῷ.

[222] καὶ ἄλλα δὲ τούτοις ὅμοια παμπληθῆ λέγειν ἔχων ἐῶ, τῆς συντομίας στοχαζόμενος. εἰ μέντοι τι ἦν ὅσιον φύσει θῦμα καὶ ἀνόσιον, παρὰ πᾶσιν ἂν ὁμοίως ἐνομίζετο.

Παραπλήσια δὲ τούτοις ἔστιν εὑρεῖν καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ
κατὰ τὴν δίαιταν τῶν ἀνθρώπων θρησκείᾳ περὶ τοὺς θεούς.

[223] Ἰουδαῖος μὲν γὰρ ἢ ἱερεὺς Αἰγύπτιος θᾶττον ἂν ἀποθάνοι ἤ χοίρειον φάγοι, Λίβυς δὲ προβατείου γεύσασθαι κρέως τῶν ἀθεσμοτάτων εἶναι δοκεῖ, Σύρων δέ τινες περιστερᾶς, ἄλλοι δὲ ἱερείων. ἰχθῦς τε ἐν τισὶ μὲν ἱεροῖς
θέμις ἐσθίειν 5 ἐν ἄλλοις δὲ ἀσεβές. Αἰγυπτίων τε τῶν σοφῶν εἶναι νενομισμένων οἱ μὲν κεφαλὴν ζῴου φαγεῖν ἀνίερον εἶναι νομίζουσιν, οἱ δὲ ὠμοπλάτην, οἱ δὲ πόδα, οἱ δὲ κρόμμυον τι.

[224] κρόμμυον δὲ οὐκ ἄν τις προσενέγκαιτο τῶν καθιερουμένων τῷ κατὰ Πηλούσιον Κασίῳ Διί, ὥσπερ
οὐδὲ ἱερεὺς τῆς κατὰ Λιβύην Ἀφροδίτης σκόρδου γεύσαιτο ἄν. ἀπέχονται δὲ ἐν <οἷς> μὲν ἱεροῖς μίνθης, ἐν οἶς
ἡδυόσμου, ἐν οἶς δὲ σελίνου. ἔνιοι δὲ θᾶττον ἂν τἀς κεφαλὰς φαγεῖν φασι τῶν πατέρων ἢ κυάμους. ἀλλὰ παρ’ ἑτέροις ταῦτα ἀδιάφορα.

[225] κυνείων τε γεύσασθαι δοκοῦμεν ἡμεῖς ἀνίερον εἶναι, Θρᾳκῶν δὲ ἔνιοι κυνοφαγεῖν
ἱστοροῦνται. ἴσως δὲ καὶ παρ’ Ἕλλησι τοῦτο ἦν σύνηθες· διόπερ καὶ Διοκλῆς ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τοὺς Ἀσκληπιάδας ὁρμώμενος τισὶ τῶν πασχόντων σκυλάκεια δίδοσθαι κελεύει κρέα. τινὲς δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπων σάρκας, ὧς ἔφην, ἀδιαφόρως ἐσθίουσιν, ὅπερ ἀνίερον παρ’ ἡμῖν εἶναι νενόμι- ¹⁶⁶ 174 ’σται.

[226] καίτοι εἴγε ἦν φύσει τὰ τῆς θρησκείας καὶ τῶν
ἀθέσμων, παρὰ πᾶσιν ἂν ὁμοίως ἐνομίζετο.

Παραπλήσια δὲ ἔστι λέγειν καὶ περὶ τῆς εἰς τοὺς κατοιχομένους ὁσιότητος. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὁλοκλήρως περιστεί- λαντες τοὺς ἀποθανόντας γῇ καλύπτουσιν, ἀσεβὲς εἶναι νομίζοντες ἡλίῳ δεικνύειν αὐτούς· Αἰγύπτιοι δὲ τὰ ἔντερα
ἐξελόντες ταριχεύουσιν αὐτοὺς καὶ σὺν ἑαυτοῖς ὑπὲρ γῆς ἔχουσιν.

[227] Αἰθιόπων δὲ οἱ ἰχθυοφάγοι εἰς τἀς λίμνας ἐμβάλλουσιν αὐτούς, ὑπὸ τῶν ἰχθύων βρωθησομένους· Υρκανοὶ δὲ κυσὶν αὐτοὺς ἐκτίθενται βοράν, Ἰνδῶν δὲ ἔνιοι γυψίν. Τρωγλοδύτας δέ φασιν ἐπί τινα γεώλοφον
ἄγειν τὸν ἀποθανόντα, εἶτα δεσμεύσαντας αὐτοῦ τὴν κε- φαλὴν πρὸς τοὺς πόδας λίθοις βάλλειν μετὰ γέλωτος, εἷθ’ ὅταν χώσωσιν αὐτὸν τοῖς βαλλομένοις ἀπαλλάσσεσθαι.

[228] τινὲς δὲ βάρβαροι τοὺς μὲν ὑπὲρ ἑξήκοντα ἔτη γεγονότας θύσαντες ἐσθίουσιν, τοὺς δὲ ἐν νεότητι ἀποθανόντας γῇ
κρύπτουσιν. ἔνιοι δὲ καίουσι τοὺς τετελευτηκότας· ὣν οἱ μὲν ἀναλαβόντες αὐτῶν τὰ ὀστέα κηδεύουσιν, οἱ δὲ ἀφροντίστως κατ’ καταλείπουσιν ἐρριμμένα. Πέρσας δέ φασιν ἀνασκολοπίζειν τοὺς ἀποθανόντας καὶ νίτρῳ ταριχεύειν, εἶθ’ οὕτω τελαμῶσι συνειλεῖν. ἄλλοι δὲ ὅσον πένθος ἐπὶ
τοῖς τελευτήσασιν ὑπομένουσιν ὁρῶμεν.

[229] καὶ τὸν θάνατον δὲ αὐτὸν οἱ μὲν δεινὸν καὶ φευκτόν εἶναι νομίζουσιν, οἱ δὲ οὐ τοιοῦτον. ὁ γοῦν Εὐριπίδης φησὶν (fr. 638Nauck).

τίς δ’ οἶδεν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μέν ἐστι κατθανεῖν,

τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν κάτω νομίζεται;

καὶ ὁ Ἐπίκουρος (p. 61, 6. 71, 6 Us.) δέ φησιν ‘ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ γὰρ διαλυθὲν ἀναισθητεῖ, τὸ δὲ ἀναισθητοῦν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς.’ φασὶ ¹⁶⁷ δὲ καὶ ὧς εἴπερ συνεστήκαμεν ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος,
ὁ δὲ θάνατος διάλυσίς ἐστι ψυχῆς καὶ σώμα- τος, ὅτε μὲν ἡμεῖς ἐσμέν, οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ θάνατος οὐ γάρ διαλυόμεθα), ὅτε δὲ ὁ θάνατος ἔστιν, οὐκ ἐσμὲν ἡμεῖς· τῷ γὰρ μηκέτι τὴν σύστασιν εἶναι τῆς ¹⁶⁸ 175
ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος οὐδὲ ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν.

[230] ὁ δὲ Ἡράκλειτός (cf. B 88 Diels) φησιν, ὅτι καὶ τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ ἀποθανεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ζῆν ἡμᾶς ἐστι καὶ ἐν τῷ τεθνάναι· ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἡμεῖς ζῶμεν, τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν τεθνάναι καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν τεθάφθαι, ὅτε δὲ ἡμεῖς ¹⁶⁹ ἀποθνῂσκοθεν, τὰς ψυχὰς ἀναβιοῦν καὶ ζῆν. ἔνιοι
δὲ καὶ βέλτιον εἶναι τὸ ἀποθανεῖν τοῦ ζῆν ἡμᾶς ὑπολαμβάνουσιν. ὁ γοῦν Εὐριπίδης φησὶν (fr. 449 Nauck)

ἐχρῆν γὰρ ἡμᾶς σύλλογον ποιουμένους

τὸν φύντα θρηνεῖν, εἰς ὅσ’ ἔρχεται κακά,

τὸν δ’ αὖ θανόντα καὶ κακῶν πεπαυμένον

χαίροντας εὐφημοῦντας ἐκπέμπειν δόμων.

ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς αὐτῆς ὑπολήψεως καὶ ταῦτα εἴρηται·

[231] (Theogn. 425)

ἀρχὴν μὲν μὴ φῦναι ἐπιχθονίοισιν ἄριστον,

μηδ’ ἐσιδεῖν αὐγὰς ὀξέος ἠελίου,

φύντα δ’ ὅπως ὤκιστα πύλας Ἀί·δαο περῆσαι
καὶ κεῖσθαι πολλὴν γαῖαν ἐφεσσάμενον. καὶ τὰ περὶ Κλέοβιν δὲ καὶ Βίτωνα ἴσμεν, ἅ φησιν ὁ Ἡρόδοτος ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς Ἀργείας ἱερείας λόγῳ (I 31).

[232] ἱστοροῦνται δὲ καὶ Θρᾳκῶν ἔνιοι περικαθεσθέντες τὸν γεννηθέντα θρηνεῖν. οὐδὲ ὁ θάνατος οὖν τῶν φύσει δεινῶν
εἶναι νομίζοιτο ἄν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ ζῆν τῶν φύσει καλῶν.
οὐδὲ τῶν προειρημένων τι ἐστὶ φύσει τοῖον ἢ τοῖον, νομιστὰ δὲ πάντα καὶ πρός τι.

[233] Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον τῆς ἐπιχειρήσεως μεταφέρειν ἔστι καὶ ἐφ’ ἕκαστον τῶν ἄλλων, ἃ μὴ ἐξεθέμεθα νῦν διὰ
τὴν συντομίαν τοῦ λόγου. εἰ δὲ καὶ περί τινων μὴ ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν αὐτόθεν ἀνωμαλίαν, λεκτέον, ὅτι ἔν τισιν ἔθνεσιν ἀγνοουμένοις ἡμῖν ἐνδέχεται καὶ περὶ τούτων εἶναι διαφωνίαν.

[234] ὧς οὖν εἰ μὴ ἐγιγνώσκομεν, εἰ τύχοι, τὸ περὶ τοῦ τἀς ἀδελφὰς γαμεῖν τῶν Αἰγυπτίων ἔθος, οὐκ ἂν
ὀρθῶς διεβεβαιούμεθα ὁμολογούμενον παρὰ πᾶσιν εἶναι τὸ μὴ δεῖν ἀδελφάς γαμεῖν, οὕτως οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐκείνων, ἐν οἶς οὐχ ὑποπίπτουσιν ἡμῖν ἀνωμαλίαι, διαγὰρ ¹⁷⁰ 176 βεβαιοῦσθαι προσήκει μὴ εἷναι διαφωνίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἐνδεχομένου, καθάπερ ἔφην, τοῦ παρά τισιν ἔθνεσι τῶν ἡμῖν μὴ γινωσκομένων τὴν περὶ αὐτῶν εἶναι διαφωνίαν.

[235] Ὁ τοίνυν σκεπτικὸς τὴν τοσαύτην ἀνωμαλίαν τῶν πραγμάτων ὁρῶν ἐπέχει μὲν περὶ τοῦ φύσει τι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ ὅλως πρακτέον εἶναι, κἀν τούτῳ τῆς δογματικῆς ἀφιστάμενος προπετείας , ἕπεται δὲ ἀδοξάστως τῇ βιωτικῇ τηρήσει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν μὲν τοῖς δοξαστοῖς ἀπαθὴς
θὴς μένει, ἐν δὲ τοῖς κατηναγκασμένοις μετριοπαθεῖ·

[236] ὧς μὲν γὰρ ἄνθρωπος αἰσθητικὸς πάσχει, μὴ προσδοξάζων δέ, ὅτι τοῦτο ὃ πάσχει κακόν ἐστι φύσει, μετριοπαθεῖ. τὸ γὰρ προσδοξάζειν τι τοιοῦτο χεῖρόν ἐστι καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πάσχειν, ὡς ἐνίοτε τοὺς μὲν τεμνομένους
ἢ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτο πάσχοντας φέρειν, τοὺς δὲ παρεστῶτας διὰ τὴν περὶ τοῦ γινομένου δόξαν ὡς φαύλου λειποψυχεῖν.

[237] ὁ μέντοι γε ὑποθέμενος τὸ φύσει τι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ ὅλως πρακτέον ἢ μὴ πρακτέον εἶναι ταράσσεται ποικίλως. καὶ γὰρ παρόντων αὐτῷ τούτων ἃ νομίζει φύσει κακὰ
εἶναι ποινηλατεῖσθαι δοκεῖ, καὶ τῶν φαινομένων ἀγαθῶν αὐτῷ γινόμενος ἐγκρατὴς ὑπό τε τοῦ τύφου καὶ τοῦ περὶ τὴν ἀποβολὴν αὐτῶν φόβου, καὶ] εὐλαβούμενος μὴ πάλιν ἐν τοῖς φύσει κακοῖς νομιζομένοις παρ’ αὐτῷ γένηται,
ταραχαῖς οὐχὶ ταῖς τυχούσαις περιπίπτει·

[238] τοὺς γὰρ ἀνα- πόβλητα εἶναι τὰ ἀγαθὰ λέγοντας ἐφέξομεν ἐκ τῆς ἀπορίας τῆς κατὰ τὴν διαφωνίαν. ὅθεν ἐπιλογιζόμεθα, ὅτι εἰ τὸ κακοῦ ποιητικὸν κακόν ἐστι καὶ φευκτόν, ἡ δὲ πεποίθησις
τοῦ τάδε μὲν εἶναι φύσει ἀγαθά, τάδε δὲ κακὰ ταραχὰς ποιεῖ, κακόν ἐστι καὶ φευκτὸν τὸ ὑποτίθεσθαι καὶ πεποιθέναι φαῦλόν τι ἢ ἀγαθὸν ὧς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν εἶναι.

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ἀρκεῖ λελέχθαι περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀδιαφόρων· ¹⁷¹¹⁷²¹⁷³

κε′ εἰ ἐστι τέχνη περὶ βίον.
177

[239] Δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, ὅτι οὐδὲ τέχνη τις ἂν εἴη περὶ τὸν βίον. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τοιαύτη τέχνη, περὶ τὴν θεωρίαν τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν κακῶν καὶ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων ἔχει· διὸ τούτων ἀνυπάρκτων ὄντων ἀνύπαρκτός ἐστι καὶ ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη. καὶ ἄλλως, ἐπεὶ μὴ ὁμοφώνως μίαν
ἀπολείπουσι πάντες οἱ δογματικοὶ τέχνην περὶ βίον, ἀλλ’ ἄλλοι ἄλλην ὑποτίθενται, ὑποπίπτουσι τῇ διαφωνίᾳ καὶ τῷ ἀπὸ τῆς διαφωνίας λόγῳ, ὃν ἠρώτησα ἐν τοῖς περὶ τἀγαθοῦ λελεγμένοις ἡμῖν § 169 sqq.).

[240] εἰ μέντοι καὶ μίαν εἶναι πάντες λέγοιεν καθ’ ὑπόθεσιν τὴν περὶ τὸν
βίον τέχνην, οἷον τὴν ἀοίδιμον φρόνησιν, ἥτις ὀνειροπολεἱται μὲν παρὰ Στωικοῖς, μᾶλλον δὲ πληκτικωτέρα τῶν ἄλλων εἶναι δοκεῖ, καὶ οὕτως οὐδὲν ἧττον ἀτοπίαι παρακολουθήσουσιν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ φρόνησίς ἐστιν ἀρετή, τὴν δὲ ἀρετὴν μόνος εἶχεν ὁ σοφός, οἱ Στωικοὶ μὴ ὄντες σοφοὶ οὐχ

[241]
ἕξουσι τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην. ὅλως τε, ἐπεὶ μὴ δύναται κατ’ αὐτοὺς ὑποστῆναι τέχνη, οὐδὲ περὶ τὸν βίον ἔσται τέχνη τις ὅσον ἐφ’ οἶς λέγουσιν. οἷον γοῦν τέχνην εἶναί φασι (Stoic. fr. I 73 Arn.) σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων, κατάληψιν ἱν δὲ καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ συγκατάθεσιν.
ἀνεύρετος δέ ἐστιν ἡ καταληπ·τικὴ φαντασία· οὔτε γὰρ πᾶσα φαντασία καταληπτική ἐστιν, οὔτε ποία τίς ἐστιν ἀπὸ τῶν φαντασιῶν ἡ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία ἐπιγνωσθῆναι δύναται, ἐπεὶ μήτε πάσῃ φαντασίᾳ δυνάμεθα κρίνειν
ἁπλῶς, τίς μέν ἐστι καταληπτική, τίς δὲ οὐ τοιαύτη, χρῂζοντές τε καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας εἰς τὴν ἐπίγνωσιν τοῦ ποία τίς ἐστιν ἡ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκβαλλόμεθα, εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν τῆς λαμβανομένης ὡς καταληπτικῆς
φαντασίας καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν ἄλλην αἰτούμενοι.

[242] ταῦτά ¹⁷⁴¹⁷⁵¹⁷⁶ 178 τοι καὶ οἱ Στωικοὶ (Stoic. fr. II 97 Arn.) ἐν τῇ τῆς καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας ἐννοίας ἀποδόσει οὐχ ὑγιῶς φέρονται· καταληπτικὴν μὲν μὶν γὰρ φαντασίαν λέγοντες τὴν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος γινομένην, ὑπάρχον δὲ εἷναι λέγοντες ὃ οἶόν τε κινεῖν κατ’ καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν εἰς τὸν
διάλληλον ἐμπίπτουσι τῆς ἀπορίας τρόπον. εἰ τοίνυν, ἴνα μὲν περὶ τὸν βίον ᾖ τις τέχνη, δεῖ πρότερον εἶναι τέχνην, ἴνα δὲ ὑποστῇ τέχνη, κατάληψιν προυφεστάναι, ἴνα δὲ ὑποστῇ κατάληψις, καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ συγκατάθεσιν κατειλῆφθαι, ἀνεύρετος δέ ἐστιν ἡ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία,
ἀνεύρετός ἐστιν ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη.

[243] Ἔτι κἀκεῖνο λέγεται. πᾶσα τέχνη ἐκ τῶν ἰδίως ὐπ’ αὐτῆς ἀποδιδομένων ἔργων καταλαμβάνεσθαι δοκεῖ, οὐδὲν δέ ἐστιν ἴδιον ἔργον τῆς περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνης· ὃ γὰρ ἂν ἔργον εἶναι ταύτης λέγῃ τις, τοῦτο κοινὸν εὑρίσκεται καὶ
τῶν ἰδιωτῶν, οἷον τὸ τιμᾶν γονεῖς, τὸ παραθήκας ἀποδιδόναι, τὰ ἄλλα πάντα. οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τις περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη. οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ἀπὸ φρονίμης δ’ διαθέσεως φαίνεσθαι γινόμενόν τι ὑπὸ τοῦ φρονίμου ἢ ποιούμενον ὡς φασί τινες) ἐπιγνωσόμεθα, ὅτι τῆς φρονήσεως
ἔργον ἐστίν.

[244] αὐτὴ γὰρ ἡ θρονίμη διάθεσις ἀκατάληπτός ἐστι, μήτε ἐξ αὑτῆς ἁπλῶς καὶ αὐτόθεν φαινομένη μήτε ἐκ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῆς· κοινὰ γάρ ἐστι ταῦτα καὶ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν. τό τε λέγειν, ὅτι τῷ διομαλισμῷ τῶν πράξεων καταλαμβάνομεν τὸν ἔχοντα τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην,
ὑπερφθεγγομένων ἐστὶ τὴν ἀνθρώπων φύσιν καὶ εὐχομένων μᾶλλον ἢ τἀληθῆ λεγόντων· (σ 136 sq.)

τοῖος γὰρ νόος ἐστὶν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων ἵρ’

οἷον ἐπ’ ἦμαρ ἄγῃσι πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε.

¹⁷⁷¹⁷⁸ 179

[245] Λείπεται λέγειν, ὅτι ἐξ ἐκείνων <τῶν> ἔργων καταλαμβάνεται ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη, ἅπερ ἀναγράφουσιν ἐν ταῖς
βίβλοις· ὧν πολλῶν καὶ παραπλησίων ἀλλήλοις ὄντων ὀλίγα ἐκθήσομαι παραδείγματος χάριν. οἷον γοῦν ὁ αἱρεσιάρχης αὐτῶν Ζήνων (Frgm. Stoic. I 250 Arn.) ἐν ταῖς διατριβαῖς φησι περὶ παίδων ἀγωγῆς ἄλλα τε ὅμοια καὶ τάδε ‘διαμηρίζειν μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἧσσον παιδικὰ ἢ μὴ
παιδικά, μηδὲ θήλεα ἢ ἄρρενα· οὐ γὰρ διαφέρει ἐν παιδικοῖς ἢ μὴ παιδικοῖς, οὐδὲ θηλείαις ἢ ἄρρεσιν, ἀλλὰ ταὐτὰ πρέπει τε καὶ πρέποντά ἐστιν'.

[246] περὶ δὲ τῆς εἰς τοὺς γονεῖς ὁσιότητος ὁ αὐτὸς ἀνήρ φησιν εἰς τὰ περὶ τὴν Ἰοκάστην καὶ τὸν Οἰδίποδα, ὅτι οὐκ ἦν ¹⁷⁹ δεινὸν τρίβειν τὴν μητέρα (Ι 256 Arn.). ‘καὶ εἰ μὲν
ἀσθενοῦσαν ἕτερόν τι μέρος τοῦ σώματος τρίψας ταῖς χερσὶν ὠφέλει, οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν· εἰ δὲ ἕτερα μέρη τρίψας εὔφραινεν, ὀδυνωμένην παύσας, καὶ παῖδας ἐκ τῆς μητρὸς γενναίους ἐποίησεν, αἰσχρόν;’ τούτοις δὲ ὁμογνωμονεῖ καὶ ὁ Χρύσιππος· ἐν γοῦν τῇ
πολιτείᾳ φησὶ ΙΙΙ 745 Arn.) ‘δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ ταῦτα οὕτω
διεξάγειν, καθάπερ καὶ νῦν οὐ κακῶς παρὰ πολλοῖς εἴθισται, ὥστε καὶ τὴν μητέρα ἐκ τοῦ υἱοῦ τεκνο- ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τὸν πατέρα ἐκ τῆς θυγατρὸς καὶ τὸν ὁμομήτριον ἐκ τῆς ὁμομητρίας'.

[247] καὶ <συνεχῶς καὶ τὸ;> ἀνθρωποφαγεῖν ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς
a ἡμῖν ἐπεισάγει· φησὶ γοῦν (I254Arn.) ‘καὶ ἐὰν τῶν ζώντων
ἀποκοπῇ τι μέρος πρὸς τροφὴν χρήσιμον , μήτε κατορύττειν αὐτὸ μήτε ἄλλως ῥίπτειν, ἀναλίσκειν δὲ αὐτό, ὅπως ἐκ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἕτερον μέρος γένηται'.

[248] ἐν δὲ τοῖς περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος περὶ τῆς τῶν ¹⁸⁰¹⁸¹ 180 γονέων ταφῆς ῥητῶς φησιν (III 752 Arn.) ‘ ἀπογενομένων δὲ τῶν γονέων ταφαῖς χρηστέον ταῖς ἁπλουστάταις,
ὧς ἂν τοῦ σώματος, καθάπερ ὀνύχων ἢ
ὀδόντων ἢ τριχῶν, οὐδὲν ὄντος πρὸς ἡμᾶς, καὶ οὐδὲ ἐπιστροφῆς ἢ πολυωρίας προσδεομένων ἡμῶν
τοιαύτης τινός. διὸ καὶ χρησίμων μὲν ὄντων τῶν κρεῶν τροφῇ χρήσονται αὐτοῖς, καθάπερ καὶ τῶν ἰδίων μερῶν, οἷον ποδὸς ἀποκοπέντος, ἐπέβαλλε χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς παραπλησίοις· ἀχρείων
δὲ ὄντων ἢ κατορύξαντες ἐάσουσιν, ἢ κατακαύσαντες τὴν τέφραν ἀφήσουσιν, ἢ μακρότερον ῥίψαντες οὐδεμίαν αὐτῶν ἐπιστροφὴν ποιήσονται καθάπερ ὄνυχος ἢ τριχῶν.’

[249] τοιαῦτα μὲν πλεῖστα ὅσα λέγουσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι· ἅπερ οὐκ ἂν τολμήσειαν διαπράττεσθαι, εἴγε μὴ παρὰ Κύκλωψιν ἢ Λαιστρυγόσι πολιτεύοιντο.
εἰ δὲ τούτων μὲν ἀνενέργητοι παντάπασίν εἶσιν, ἃ δὲ πράττουσι, κοινὰ καὶ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ἐστιν, οὐδὲν ἴδιον ἔργον ἐστὶ τῶν ἔχειν ὑποπτευομένων τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην. εἰ οὖν αἱ μὲν τέχναι πάντως ὀφείλουσιν ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων ἔργων καταλαμβάνεσθαι, οὐδὲν δὲ ἴδιον ἔργον ὁρᾶται τῆς περὶ τὸν
βίον λεγομένης τέχνης, οὐ καταλαμβάνεται αὕτη. διόπερ οὐδὲ διαβεβαιοῦσθαι περὶ αὐτῆς δύναταί τις, ὅτι ἐστὶν ὑπαρκτή.

κς′ εἰ γίνεται ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη.

[250] Καὶ μὴν εἰ γίνεται ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη, ἤτοι φύσει ἐγγίνεται αὐτοῖς ἢ διὰ μαθήσεως καὶ
διδασκαλίας. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν φύσει, ἤτοι καθό εἰσιν ἄνθρωποι ἐγγίνοιτο ἂν αὐτοῖς ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη, ἢ καθὸ οὔκ εἰσιν ἄνθρωποι. καθὸ μὲν οὖν οὔκ εἰσιν ἄνθρωποι, οὐδαμῶς· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὔκ εἰσιν ἄνθρωποι. εἰ δὲ καθό εἰσιν ἄνθρωποί, πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὑπῆρξεν ἂν ἡ φρόνησις,
¹⁸² 180 ὧς πάντας εἶναι γρονίμους τε καὶ ἐναρέτους καὶ σοφούς.

[251] φαύλους δὲ τοὺς πλείστους λέγουσιν. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ καθό εἰσιν ἄνθρωποι ὑπάρξειεν ἂν αὐτοῖς ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη. οὐδὲ φύσει ἄρα. καὶ ἄλλως, ἐπειδὴ (Stoic. fr. 173
Arn.) τὴν τέχνην σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων εἷναι ¹⁸³ βούλονται συγγεγυμνασμένων, διὰ πείρας τέ τινος καὶ μαθήσεως ἐμφαίνουσι μᾶλλον ἀναλαμβάνεσθαι τάς τε ἄλλας τέχνας καὶ ταύτην περὶ ἧς ὁ λόγος.

κζ′ εἰ διδακτή ἐστιν ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη.

[252] Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ διδασκαλίᾳ καὶ μαθήσει ἀναλαμβάνεται.
ἴνα γὰρ ὑπόστασιν ἔχῃ ταῦτα, δεῖ τρία προωμολογῆσθαι, τὸ διδασκόμενον πρᾶγμα, τὸν διδάσκοντα καὶ τὸν μανθάνοντα, τὸν τρόπον τῆς μαθήσεως. οὐδὲν δὲ τούτων ὑφέστηκεν· οὐδὲ ἡ διδασκαλία ἄρα.

κη′ εἰ ἔστι τι διδασκόμενον.

[253] Οἶον γοῦν τὸ διδασκόμενον ἤτοι ἀληθές ἐστιν ἢ ψεῦδις· καὶ εἰ μὲν ψεῦδος, οὐκ ἂν διδάσκοιτο· ἀνύπαρκτον γάρ φασιν εἶναι τὸ ψεῦδος, ἀνυπάρκτων δὲ οὐκ ἂν εἴη διδασκαλία. ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ εἰ ἀληθὲς εἶναι λέγοιτο· ὅτι γὰρ ἀνύπαρκτόν ἐστι τὸ ἀληθές, ὑπεμνήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς περὶ
κριτηρίου (II 80 sqq.). εἰ οὖν μήτε τὸ ψεῦδος μήτε τὸ ἀληθὲς διδάσκεται, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα διδακτὸν οὐδέν ἐστιν οὐ γὰρ δὴ τούτων ἀδιδάκτων ὄντων τοὺς ἀπόρους μόνους διδάσκειν ἐρεῖ τις), οὐδὲν διδάσκεται.

[254] τό τε διδασκόμενον πρᾶγμα ἤτοι φαινόμενόν ἐστιν ἢ ἄδηλον. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν φαινόμενόν ¹⁸⁴ ἐστιν, οὐκ ἔσται διδασκαλίας δεόμενον· τὰ γὰρ φαινόμενα
πᾶσιν ὁμοίως φαίνεται. εἰ δὲ ἄδηλον, ἐπεὶ τὰ ἄδηλα διὰ τὴν ἀνεπίκριτον περὶ αὐτῶν διαφωνίαν ἀκατά- ληπτά ἐστιν, ὡς πολλά.κις ὑπεμνήσαμεν, οὐκ ἔσται ¹⁸⁵¹⁸⁶¹⁸⁷ 181 διδακτόν· ὃ γὰρ μὴ καταλαμβάνει τις, πῶς ἂν τοῦτο διδάσκειν ἢ μανθάνειν δύναιτο; εἰ δὲ μήτε τὸ φαινόμενον μήτε τὸ ἄδηλον διδάσκεται, οὐδὲν διδάσκεται.

[255] ἔτι τὸ διδασκόμενον
ἤτοι σῶμά ἐστιν ἢ ἀσώματον, ἑκάτερον δὲ αὐτῶν ἤτοι φαινόμενον ἤ ἀδηλούμενον <ἂν> οὐ διδάσκεσθαι κατὰ τὸν μικρῷ πρόσθεν ἡμῖν εἰρημένον λόγον.

[256] οὐκ ἄρα διδάσκεταί τι. πρὸς τούτοις ἤτοι τὸ ὂν διδάσκεται ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν. τὸ μὲν οὖν μὴ ὂν οὐ διδάσκεται· εἰ γὰρ διδάσκεται
τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἐπεὶ τῶν ἀληθῶν δοκοῦσιν εἷναι αἱ διδασκαλίαι, ἀληθὲς ἔσται τὸ μὴ ὄν. ἀληθὲς δὲ ὂν καὶ ὑπάρξει· ἀληθὲς γὰρ εἶναί φασιν ὃ ὑπάρχει καὶ ἀντίκειταί τινι. ἄτοπον δέ ἐστι λέγειν ὑπάρχειν τὸ μὴ ὄν· οὐκ ἄρα διδάσκεται τὸ μὴ ὄν.

[257] ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ
τὸ ὄν. εἰ γὰρ διδάσκεται τὸ ὄν, ἤτοι καθὸ ὄν ἐστι διδάσκεται ἢ κατ’ ἄλλο τι. ἀλλ’ εἰ μέν, καθό <ἐστι> ἔστι διδακτόν, τῶν ὄντων ἔσται, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ διδακτόν· τἀς γὰρ διδασκαλίας ἐκ τινῶν ὁμολογουμένων
καὶ ἀδιδάκτων γίνεσθαι προσήκει. οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ὂν καθὸ ὄν ἐστι διδακτόν ἐστιν. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ κατ’ ἄλλο τι.

[258] τὸ γὰρ ὂν οὐκ ἔχει ἄλλο τι συμβεβηκὸς αὐτῷ ὃ μὴ ὄν ἐστιν, ὥστε εἰ τὸ ὂν καθὸ ὄν ἐστιν οὐ διδάσκεται, οὐδὲ κατ’ ἄλλο
τι διδαχθήσεται· ἐκεῖνο γὰρ ὅ τι ποτέ ἐστι συμβεβηκὸς αὐτῷ, ὄν ἐστιν. καὶ ἄλλως, εἴτε φαινόμενον εἴη τὸ ὂν ὃ λέξουσι διδάσκεσθαι, εἴτε ἄδηλον, ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἀπορίαις ὑποπῖπτον ἀδίδακτον ἔσται. εἰ δὲ μήτε τὸ ὂν διδάσκεται μήτε τὸ μὴ ὄν, οὐδέν ἐστι τὸ διδασκόμενον.

κθ′ εἰ ἔστιν ὁ δ’ διδάσκων καὶ ὁ μανθάνων.

[259] Συμπεριτρέπεται μὲν οὖν τούτῳ ὅ τε διδάσκων καὶ ὁ μανθάνων 5 οὐδὲν δὲ ἧττον καὶ κατὰ ἰδίαν ἀποροῦνται. ¹⁸⁸¹⁸⁹¹⁹⁰¹⁹¹ 182 ἤτ’ οἱ γὰρ ὁ τεχνίτης τὸν τεχνίτην διδάσκει ἢ ὁ ἄτεχνος τὸν ἄτεχνον ἢ ὁ ἄτεχνος τὸν τεχνίτην ἢ ὁ τεχνίτης τὸν
ἄτεχνον. ὁ μὲν οὖν τεχνίτης τὸν τεχνίτην οὐ διδάσκει· οὐθέτερος γὰρ αὐτῶν, καθό ἐστι τεχνίτης, δεῖται μαθήσεως. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ὁ ἄτεχνος τὸν ἄτεχνον, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τυφλὸν ὁδηγεῖν δύναται τυφλός. οὐδὲ ὁ ἄτεχνος τὸν τεχνίτην·

[260] γελοῖον γάρ. λείπεται λέγειν ὅτι ὁ τεχνίτης τὸν ἄτεχνον·
ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστίν. ὅλως γὰρ ὑποστῆναι τεχνίτην ἀδύνατον εἶναι λέγεται, ἐπεὶ μήτε αὐτοφυῶς τις καὶ ἅμα τῷ γενέσθαι τεχνίτης ὑφιστάμενος βλέπεται μήτε ἐξ ἀτέχνου γίνεταί τις τεχνίτης. ἤτοι γὰρ ‘ὲν θεώρημα καὶ μία κατάληψις δύναται ποιῆσαι τὸν ἄτεχνον τεχνίτην
ἢ οὐδαμῶς.

[261] ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν κατάληψις μία τὸν ἄτεχνον τεχνίτην ἀπεργάζεται, πρῶτον μὲν ἐνέσται λέγειν, ὅτι οὔκ ἐστι σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων ἡ τέχνη · ὁ γὰρ μηδὲν ὅλως εἰδώς, εἰ θεώρημα διδαχθείη τέχνης, τεχνίτης ἂν οὕτω λέγοιτο εἶναι. εἶτα καὶ ἐὰν λέγῃ τις, ὧς ὁ τινὰ θεωρήματα
τέχνης ἀνειληφὼς καὶ προσδεόμενος ἑνὸς ἔτι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὢν ἄτεχνος, ἂν τὸ ‘ὲν ἐκεῖνο προσλάβῃ, τεχνίτης ἐξ ἀτέχνου ἀποτελεῖται ἐκ καταλήψεως μιᾶς, ἀποκληρωτικὸν λέξει.

[262] ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν κατὰ μέρος οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο δείξαί
τινα ἄτεχνον μὲν ἔτι, τεχνίτην δὲ ἐσόμενον, ἐὰν ἔν τι θεώρημα προσλάβῃ· οὐ γὰρ δήπου τὴν ἐξαρίθμησιν τῶν θεωρημάτων ἑκάστης τέχνης ἐπίσταταί τις, ὥστε ἀπαρι- θμησάμενος τὰ ἐγνωσμένα θεωρήματα , πόσα λείπεται
πρὸς τὸν πλήρη τῶν θεωρημάτων τῆς τέχνης ἀριθμὸν εἰπεῖν ἔχειν. οὐκοῦν ἑνὸς θεωρήματος γνῶσις οὐ ποιεῖ τὸν ἄτεχνον τεχνίτην.

[263] εἰ δὲ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἀληθές, ἐπεὶ μὴ πάντα ἀθρόως τὰ θεωρήματα τῶν τεχνῶν ἀναλαμβάνει τις, ἀλλ’ εἴπερ ἄρα, κατὰ ‘ὲν ἕκαστον, ἴνα τις καὶ τοῦτο
καθ’ ὑπόθεσιν διδῷ, ὁ κατὰ ‘ὲν θεώρημα τῆς τέχνης ἀναλαμβάνειν λεγόμενος οὐκ ἂν τεχνίτης γένοιτο· ὑπεμιὥσπερ ¹⁹² 183 μνῂσκομεν γάρ, ὅτι οὐ δύναται θεωρήματος ἑνὸς γνῶσις τὸν ἄτεχνον ποιῆσαι τεχνίτην. οὐδὲ ἐξ ἀτέχνου τοίνυν γίνεταί τις τεχνίτης. ὥστε καὶ διὰ ταῦτα φαίνεται ἀνυπόστατος εἶναι ὁ τεχνίτης. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ διδάσκων.

[264] ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ὁ μανθάνειν λεγόμενος, ἄτεχνος ὤν, δύναται τὰ τῆς τέχνης θεωρήματα, ἧς ἐστιν ἄτεχνος, μανθάνειν τε καὶ καταλαμβάνειν. ὡς γὰρ ὁ ἐκ γενετῆς πηρός, εἰς ὅσον ἐστὶ πηρός, οὐκ ἂν λάβοι χρωμάτων ἀντίληψιν, οὐδὲ ὁ ἐκ γενετῆς κωφὸς ὁμοίως φωνῆς, οὕτως οὐδὲ ὁ ἄτεχνος
καταλάβοι ἂν τὰ τῆς τέχνης θ’ θεωρήματα ἧς ἐστιν ἄτεχνος. καὶ γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ὁ αὐτὸς εἴη τεχνίτης τε καὶ ἄτεχνος τῶν αὐτῶν, ἄτεχνος μὲν ἐπεὶ οὕτως ὑπόκειται, τεχνίτης δὲ ἐπεὶ κατάληψιν ἔχει τῶν τῆς τέχνης θεωρημάτων.

[265] ὥστε οὐδὲ ὁ τεχνίτης τὸν ἄτεχνον διδάσκει. εἰ δὲ μήτε ὁ
τεχνίτης τὸν τεχνίτην διδάσκει μήτε ὁ ἄτεχνος τὸν ἄτεχνον μήτε ὁ ἄτεχνος τὸν τεχνίτην μήτε ὁ τεχνίτης τὸν ἄτεχνον, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστιν, οὔτε ὁ διδάσκων ἔστιν οὔτε ὁ διδασκόμενος.

λ′ εἰ ἔστι τις μαθήσεως τρόπος.

[265] Μὴ ὄντος δὲ μήτε τοῦ μανθάνοντος μήτε τοῦ διδάσκοντος
καὶ ὁ τρόπος τῆς διδασκαλίας παρέλκει.

[266] Οὐδὲν δὲ ἧττον καὶ <οὗτος> διὰ τούτων ἀπορεῖται. ὁ γάρ τρόπος διδασκαλίας ἤτοι ἐναργείᾳ γίνεται ἢ λόγῳ· οὔτε δὲ ἐναργείᾳ γίνεται οὔτε λόγῳ, καθάπερ παραστήσομεν· οὐδὲ ὁ
τρόπος ἄρα τῆς μαθήσεως ἐστιν εὔπορος. ἐναργείᾳ μὲν οὖν οὐ γίνεται διδασκαλία, ἐπεὶ τῶν δεικνυμένων ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνάργεια. τὸ δὲ δεικνύμενον πᾶσίν ἐστι φαινόμενον· τὸ δὲ φαινόμενον ᾑ ἡ φαίνεται, πᾶσίν ἐστι ληπτόν· τὸ δὲ
¹⁹³¹⁹⁴ 184 κοινῶς πᾶσι ληπτὸν ἀδίδακτον· οὐκ ἄρα τι ἐναργείᾳ διδακτόν ἐστιν. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ λόγῳ διδάσκεταί τι.

[267] οὗτος γὰρ ἤτοι σημαίνει τι ἢ οὐδὲν σημαίνει. ἀλλὰ μηδὲν μὲν σημαίνων οὐδὲ ἔσται τινὸς διδασκαλικός. εἰ δὲ σημαίνει
τι, ἤτοι φύσει σημαίνει τι ἢ θέσει. καὶ φύσει μὲν οὐ σημαίνει διὰ τὸ μὴ πάντας πάντων ἀκούοντας συνιέναι, οἶον Ἕλληνας βαρβάρων καὶ βαρβάρους Ἑλλήνων.

[268] θέσει δὲ εἰ σημαίνει, δῆλον ὡς οἱ μὲν προκατειληφότες καθ’ ὧν αἱ λέξεις εἰσὶ τεταγμέναι ἀντιλήψονται τούτων, οὐκ ἐξ
αὐτῶν διδασκόμενοι ἅπερ ἠγνόουν, ἀλλὰ ἀναμιμνῃσκόμενοι καὶ ἀνανεούμενοι ταῦτα ἅπερ ᾔδεσαν, οἱ δὲ χρῄζοντες τῆς τῶν ἀνανεούμενοι μαθήσεως καὶ μὴ εἰδότες, καθ’ ὧν εἰσιν αἱ λέξεις τεταγμέναι, οὐδενὸς ἀντίληψιν ἕξουσιν.

[269] διόπερ οὐδὲ ὁ τρόπος τῆς μαθήσεως ὑποστῆναι δύναιτο ἂν. καὶ
γὰρ ὁ διδάσκων κατάληψιν τῶν θεωρημάτων τῆς διδασκαμένης τέχνης ἐμποιεῖν ὀφείλει τῷ μανθάνοντι, ἵνα οὕτως ἐκεῖνος τὸ σύστημα τούτων καταλαβὼν τεχνίτης γένηται. οὐδὲν δέ ἐστι κατάληψις, ὧς ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ὑπεμνήσαμεν § 264)· οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ὁ τρόπος τῆς
ὑφεστάναι δύναται. εἰ δὲ μήτε τὸ διδασκόμενον ἔστι μήτε ὁ διδάσκων καὶ ὁ μανθάνων μήτε ὁ τρόπος τῆς μαθήσεως, οὔτε μάθησις ἔστιν οὔτε διδασκαλία.

[270] Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν κοινότερον ἐπικεχείρηται περὶ μαθήσεως καὶ διδασκαλίας· ἔνεστι δὲ ἀπορεῖν οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς λεγομένης
περὶ βίον εἶναι τέχνης. οἶον γοῦν τὸ μὲν διδασκόμενον πρᾶγμα, τουτέστι τὴν φρόνησιν, ἀνυπόστατον ἐδείξαμεν ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν § 240)· ἀνυπόστατος δέ
καὶ ὁ διδάσκων καὶ ὁ μανθάνων. ἤτοι γὰρ ὁ φρόνιμος τὸν φρόνιμον διδάξει τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην ἢ ὁ ἄφρων τὸν ἄφρονα ἢ ὁ ἄφρων τὸν φρόνιμον ἤ ὁ φρόνιμος τὸν ἄφρονα· οὐδεὶς δὲ τούτων οὐδένα διδάσκει· οὐκ ἄρα διδάσκεται
ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον εἶναι λεγομένη τέχνη.

[271] καὶ περὶ μὲν ¹⁹⁵¹⁹⁶ 185 τῶν ἄλλων ἴσως περιττὸν καὶ λέγειν· εἰ δὲ ὁ φρόνιμος τὸν ἄφρονα διδάσκει τὴν φρόνησιν, ἡ δὲ θρόν ἥσις ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐθετέρων, ὁ ἄφρων μὴ ἔχων τὴν φρόνησιν ἄγνοιαν ἔχει τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐθετέρων , ἄγνοιαν δὲ τούτων ἔχων πάντως διδάσκοντος
αὐτὸν τοῦ φρονίμου τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ καὶ οὐθέτερα ἀκούσεται μόνον τῶν λεγομένων, οὐ γνώσεται δὲ ταῦτα. εἰ γὰρ ἀντιλαμβάνοιτο αὐτῶν ἐν ἀφροσύνῃ καθεστώς, ἔσται καὶ ἡ ἀφροσύνη τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐθετέρων θεωρητική.

[272] οὐχὶ δέ γε τούτων κατὰ αὐτοὺς
ἡ ἀφροσύνη θεωρητικὴ καθέστηκεν , ἐπεὶ ὁ ἄφρων ἔσται φρόνιμος. ὁ ἄρα ἄφρων οὐκ ἀντιλαμβάνεται τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ φρονίμου λεγομένων ἤ πραττομένων κατὰ τὸν τῆς φρονήσεως λόγον. μὴ ἀντιλαμβανόμενος δὲ οὐκ ἂν διδάσκοιτο ὐπ’ αὐτοῦ, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπεὶ μήτε ἐναργείᾳ μήτε διὰ λόγου
δύναται διδάσκεσθαι, καθὰ προειρήκαμεν. πλὴν ἀλλ’ εἰ μήτε διὰ μαθήσεως καὶ διδασκαλίας ἐγγίνεταί τινι ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον λεγομένη τέχνη μήτε φύσει, ἀνεύρετός ἐστιν ἡ παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις θρυλουμένη τέχνη περὶ τὸν βίον.

[273] Εἰ μέντοι καὶ δοίη τις ἐκ πολλοῦ τοῦ περιόντος ἐγγένεσαί
τινι τὴν ὀνειροπολουμένην τέχνην περὶ τὸν βίον, βλαβερὰ καὶ ταραχῆς αἰτία φανήσεται μᾶλλον τοῖς ἔχουσιν αὐτὴν ἢ ὠφέλιμος.

λα′ εἰ ὠφελεῖ ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη τὸν ἔχοντα ἀυτὴν.

[273] Αὐτίκα γοῦν, ἴνα παραδείγματος ἕνεκεν ὀλίγα ἀπὸ πολλῶν εἴπωμεν, ὠφελεῖν ἂν δοκοίη τὸν σοφὸν ἡ περὶ ¹⁹⁷ τὸν βίον τέχνη ἐγκράτειαν αὐτῷ παρεχομένη ἐν ταῖς
πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ὁρμαῖς καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ κακοῦ ¹⁹⁸¹⁹⁹ 185 ἀφορμαῖς.

[274] ὁ οὖν λεγόμενος κατ’ αὐτοὺς ἐγκρατὴς σοφὸς
ἤτοι κατὰ τοῦτο λέγεται ἐγκρατής, καθόσον ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ γίνεται ὁρμῇ τῇ πρὸς τὸ κακὸν καὶ ἀφορμῇ τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἢ καθόσον εἶχε μὲν φαύλας ὁρμὰς καὶ ἀφορμάς, περιεκράτει δὲ αὐτῶν τῷ γόγῳ.

[275] ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν τὸ μὴ
γίνεσθαι ἐν φαύλαις κρίσεσιν οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐγκρατής· οὐ γάρ κρατήσει οὗ οὐκ ἔχει. καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴποι τις τὸν εὐνοῦχον ἐγκρατῆ πρὸς ἀφροδίσια καὶ τὸν κακοστομαχοῦντα πρὸς ἐδεσμάτων ἀπόλαυσιν οὐδ’ ὅλως γὰρ ἐπιζήτησις αὐτοῖς γίνεται τῶν τοιούτων, ἴνα καὶ ἐγκρατῶς κατεξαναστῶσι
τῆς ἐπιζητήσεως), τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ οὐδὲ τὸν σοφὸν ἐγκρατῆ ῥητέον διὰ τὸ μὴ φύεσθαι ἐν αὐτῷ πάθος οὗ ἔσται ἐγκρατής.

[276] εἰ δὲ κατὰ τοῦτο ἀξιώσουσιν αὐτὸν ὑπάρχειν ἐγκρατῆ καθόσον γίνεται μὲν ἐν φαύλαις κρίσεσιν, περιγίνεται δὲ αὐτῶν τῷ λόγῳ, πρῶτον μὲν δώσουσιν, ὅτι
οὐδὲν ὠφέλησεν αὐτὸν ἡ φρόνησις, ἀκμὴν ἐν ταραχαῖς ὄντα καὶ βοηθείας δεόμενον, εἶτα καὶ κακοδαιμονέστερος τῶν φαύλων λεγομένων εὑρίσκεται. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὁρμᾷ ἐπί τι, πάντως ταράσσεται, εἰ δὲ περικρατεῖ τῷ λόγῳ, συνέχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸ κακόν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μᾶλλον ταράσσεται τοῦ
φαύλου ἐκείνου μηκέτι τοῦτο πάσχοντος·

[277] εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὁρμᾷ, ταράσσεται, εἰ δὲ τυγχάνει τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, παύεται τῆς ταραχῆς. οὐ τοίνυν ἐγκρατὴς γίνεται ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ φρο- νήσει ὁ σοφός· ἢ εἴπερ γίνεται, πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ κακοδαιμονέστατος, διόπερ οὐκ ὠφέλειαν, ἀλλὰ ταραχὴν αὐτῷ
μεγίστην ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον παρέσχε τέχνη. ὅτι δὲ ὁ νομίζων ἔχειν τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην καὶ δι’ αὐτῆς ἐπεγνωκέννι, τίνα τέ ἐστιν ἀγαθὰ ὧς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν καὶ τίνα φαῦλα, ταράσσεται σφόδρα καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐτῷ παρόντων καὶ τῶν κακῶν, ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ὑπεμνήσαμεν.

[278]
λεκτέον οὖν, ὅτι εἰ μήτε ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀδιαφόρων ὑπόστασις ὁμολογεῖται, ἥ τε περὶ τὸν βίον ²⁰⁰ τέχνη τάχα μὲν καὶ ἀνυπόστατός ἐστιν , εἰ δὲ καὶ ὑφεστάναι δοθείη καθ’ ὑπόθεσιν, οὐδεμίαν ὠφέλειαν τοῖς ἔχουσιν σιναὐτὴν παρέχει, τοὐναντίον δὲ ταραχὰς αὐτοῖς ἐμποιεῖ
μεγίστας, μάτην ὠφρυπωσθαι δοκοῖεν ἂν οἱ δογματικοὶ κἀν τῷ λεγομένῳ ἠθικῷ μέρει τῆς καλουμένης φιλοσοφίας.

[279] Τοσαῦτα καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ τόπου συμμέτρως ὧς ἐν ὑποτυπώσει διεξελθόντες , ἐνταῦθα περιγράφομεν καὶ
τὸ τρίτον σύνταγμα καὶ τὸ πᾶν τῶν Πυρρωνείων ὑποτυπώσεων σπούδασμα, ἐκεῖνο ἐπειπόντες·

λβ′ διὰ τί ὁ σκεπτικὸς ἐνίοτε ἀμυδροὺς ταῖς πιθανότησιν ἐρωτᾶν ἐπιτηδεύει λόγους.

[280] Ὁ σκεπτικὸς διὰ τὸ φιλάνθρωπος εἷναι τὴν τῶν δογματικῶν οἴησίν τε καὶ προπέτειαν κατὰ δύναμιν ἰᾶσθαι λόγῳ βούλεται. καθάπερ οὖν οἱ τῶν σωματικῶν παθῶν ἰατροὶ διάφορα
κατὰ μέγεθος ἔχουσι βοηθήματα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν σφοδρῶς πεπονθόσι τὰ σφοδρὰ τούτων προσάγουσι, τοῖς δὲ κούφως τὰ κουφότερα, καὶ ὁ σκεπτικὸς οὕτως διαφόρους ἐρωτᾷ καὶ] κατὰ ἰσχύν λόγους,

[281] καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐμβριθέσι καὶ εὐτόνως ἀνασκευάζειν δυναμένοις τὸ τῆς οἰήσεως τῶν δογματικῶν πάθος
ἐπὶ τῶν σφοδρᾷ τῇ προπετείᾳ κεκακωμένων χρῆται, τοῖς δὲ κουφοτέροις ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπιπόλαιον καὶ εὐίατον ἐχόντων τὸ τῆς οἰήσεως πάθος καὶ ὑπὸ κουφοτέρων πιθανοτήτων ανασκευάζεσθαι δυναμένων. διόπερ ὁτὲ μὲν ἐμβριθεῖς ταῖς πιθανότησιν, ὁτὲ δὲ καὶ ἀμαυροτέρους φαινομένους
οὐκ ὀκνεῖ λόγους συνερωτᾶν ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως ὁρμώμενος, ἐπίτηδες, ὧς ἀρκοῦντας αὐτῷ πολλάκις πρὸς τὸ ἀνύειν τὸ προκείμενον.

²⁰¹

²⁰²

Ὦ Πυρρῶν μέγα θαῦμα πεφασμένον ὡς πλέον
1

τῶν ἄλλων ἕτερον χρῆμά τι θαμβαλέον.

εἰ μὲν ὑπερφιάλως κατ’ ἐναντίον ἐλθέμεν ἔτλης,

συμπάντων γε σοφῶν φεῦ ὅσον ἦσθα τάλας·

εἰ δὲ κὲν ἰδμοσύνης τῆς ἀνδρομέης κατεγνωκώς,
5

τὰ πρώτιστα φέρεις ὣν σοφίης κατέγνως.

Translations (1)

Outlines of Pyrrhonism First1KGreek (Sextus Empiricus, Vol. 1. Bury, Robert Gregg, translator. London: William Heinemann Ltd.; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1933.) — 3.0 focus

[1] Concerning the logical division of what is called ‟Philosophy”¹ the foregoing account may suffice by way of outline.

Chapter I.—Of The Physical Division

[1] Pursuing the same method of exposition in our investigation of the Physical division of Philosophy, we shall not refute each of their statements in order, but we shall endeavour to overthrow those of a more general character² wherein the rest also are included.

Let us begin with their doctrine of Principles.³

Chapter II.—Of Efficient Principles

[1] Since it is agreed by most that of Principles some are material and some efficient, we shall make our argument start with the efficient; for these, as they assert, are superior to the material.

Chapter III.—Concerning God

[2] Since, then, the majority have declared that God is a most efficient Cause, let us begin by inquiring about God,⁴ first premising that although, following the ordinary view,⁵ we affirm undogmatically that Gods exist and reverence Gods and ascribe to them foreknowledge, yet as against the rashness of the Dogmatists we argue as follows.

When we conceive objects we ought to form conceptions of their substances⁶ as well, as, for instance, whether they are corporeal or incorporeal. And also of their forms; for no one could conceive ‟Horse” unless he had first learnt the horse’s form. And of course the object conceived must be conceived as existing somewhere.

[3] Since, then, some of the Dogmatists assert that God is corporeal, others that he is incorporeal, and some that he has human form, others not, and some that he exists in space, others not; and of those who assert that he is in space some put him inside the world, others outside;⁷ how shall we be able to reach a conception of God when we have no agreement about his substance or his form or his place of abode? Let them first agree and consent together that God is of such and such a nature, and then, when they have sketched out for us that nature, let them require that we should form a conception of God. But so long as they disagree interminably, we cannot say what agreed notion we are to derive from them.

[4] But, say they,⁸ when you have conceived of a Being imperishable and blessed, regard this as God. But this is foolish; for just as one who does not know Dion is unable also to conceive the properties which belong to him as Dion, so also when we do not know the substance of God we shall also be unable to learn and conceive his properties.

[5] And apart from this, let them tell us what a ‟blessed” thing is—whether it is that which energizes according to virtue and foreknows what is subject to itself, or that which is void of energy and neither performs any work itself nor provides work for another.⁹ For indeed about this also they disagree interminably and thus render ‟the blessed” something we cannot conceive, and therefore God also.

[6] Further, in order to form a conception of God one must necessarily—so far as depends on the Dogmatists —suspend judgement as to his existence or non-existence. For the existence of God is not pre-evident.¹⁰ For if God impressed us automatically, the Dogmatists would have agreed together regarding his essence, his character, and his place; whereas their interminable disagreement has made him seem to us non-evident and needing demonstration.

[7] Now he that demonstrates the existence of God does so by means of what is either pre-evident or non-evident. Certainly not, then, by means of the pre-evident; for if what demonstrates God’s existence were pre-evident, then—since the thing proved is conceived together with that which proves it, and therefore is apprehended along with it as well, as we have established¹¹—God’s existence also will be pre-evident, it being apprehended along with the pre-evident fact which proves it. But, as we have shown, it is not pre-evident; therefore it is not proved, either, by a pre-evident fact. Nor yet by what is non-evident.

[8] For if the non-evident fact which is capable of proving God’s existence, needing proof as it does, shall be said to be proved by means of a pre-evident fact, it will no longer be non-evident but pre-evident. Therefore the non-evident fact which proves his existence is not proved by what is pre-evident. Nor yet by what is non-evident; for he who asserts this will be driven into circular reasoning when we keep demanding proof every time for the non-evident fact which he produces as proof of the one last propounded. Consequently, the existence of God cannot be proved from any other fact.

[9] But if God’s existence is neither automatically pre-evident nor proved from another fact, it will be inapprehensible.

There is this also to be said. He who affirms that God exists either declares that he has, or that he has not, forethought for the things in the universe, and in the former case that such forethought is for all things or for some things. But if he had forethought for all, there would have been nothing bad and no badness in the world; yet all things, they say, are full of badness; hence it shall not be said that God forethinks all things.

[10] If, again, he forethinks some, why does he forethink these things and not those? For either he has both the will and the power to forethink all things, or else he has the will but not the power, or the power but not the will, or neither the will nor the power. But if he had had both the will and the power he would have had forethought for all things; but for the reasons stated above he does not forethink all; therefore he has not both the will and the power to forethink all. And if he has the will but not the power, he is less strong than the cause which renders him unable to forethink what he does not forethink:

[11] but it is contrary to our notion of God that he should be weaker than anything. And if, again, he has the power but not the will to have forethought for all, he will be held to be malignant; while if he has neither the will nor the powers he is both malignant and weak —an impious thing to say about God. Therefore God has no forethought for the things in the universe.

But if he exercises no forethought for anything, and there exists no work nor product of his, no one will be able to name the source of the apprehension of God’s existence, inasmuch as he neither appears of himself nor is apprehended by means of any of his products. So for these reasons we cannot apprehend whether God exists.

[12] And from this we further conclude that those who positively affirm God’s existence are probably compelled to be guilty of impiety; for if they say that he forethinks all things they will be declaring that God is the cause of what is evil, while if they say that he forethinks some things or nothing they will be forced to say that God is either malignant or weak, and obviously this is to use impious language.

Chapter IV.—Concerning Cause

[13] To prevent the Dogmatists attempting also to slander us,¹² because of their inability to refute us in a practical way, we shall discuss the question of the efficient Cause more at large when we have first tried to give attention to the conception of Cause. Now so far as the statements of the Dogmatists are concerned, it would be impossible for anyone even to conceive Cause, since, in addition to offering discrepant and contradictory conceptions of Cause, they have rendered its substance also indiscoverable by their disagreement about it.

[14] For some affirm Cause to be corporeal, others incorporeal.¹³ In the broad sense, a Cause would seem to be, according to them, ‟That by whose energizing the effect comes about;”¹⁴ as, for example, the sun or the sun’s heat is the cause of the wax being melted or of the melting of the wax. For even on this point they are at variance, some declaring that Cause is causal of nouns, such as ‟the melting,” others of predicates, such as ‟being melted.” Hence, as I said, in the broad sense Cause will be ‟that by whose energizing the effect comes about.”

[15] The majority of them hold that of these Causes some are immediate,¹⁵ some associate, some co- operant; and that causes are ‟immediate” when their presence involves the presence, and their removal the removal, and their decrease the decrease, of the effect (it is thus, they say, that the fixing on of the halter causes the strangling); and that an ‟associate” cause is one which contributes a force equal to that of its fellow-cause towards the production of the effect (it is thus, they say, that each of the oxen which draw the plough is a cause of the drawing of the plough); and that a ‟co-operant” cause is one which contributes a slight force towards the easy production of the effect, as in the case when two men are lifting a heavy load with difficulty the assistance of a third helps to lighten it.

[16] Some of them, however, have asserted further that things present are causes of things future, being ‟antecedents;” as when intense exposure to the sun causes fever. But this view is rejected by some, on the ground that, since the Cause is relative to something existent and to a real effect, it cannot precede it as its cause.¹⁶

As regards this controversy, our position is as follows:

Chapter V.—Does Anything Cause Anything

[17] That Cause exists is plausible; for how could there come about increase, decrease, generation, corruption, motion in general, each of the physical and mental effects, the ordering of the whole universe, and everything else, except by reason of some cause?¹⁷ For even if none of these things has real existence,¹⁸ we shall affirm that it is due to some cause that they appear to us other than they really are.

[18] Moreover, if cause were non-existent everything would have been produced by everything and at random. Horses, for instance, might be born, perchance, of flies, and elephants of ants; and there would have been severe rains and snow in Egyptian Thebes, while the southern districts would have had no rain, unless there had been a cause which makes the southern parts stormy, the eastern dry.

[19] Also, he who asserts that there is no Cause is refuted; for if he says that he makes this assertion absolutely and without any cause, he will not win credence; but if he says that he makes it owing to some cause, he is positing Cause while wishing to abolish it, since he offers us a cause to prove the non-existence of Cause.

For these reasons, then, the existence of Cause is plausible.

[20] But that it is also plausible to say that nothing is the Cause of anything will be evident when we have set forth, to suit the occasion, a few of the many arguments which go to prove this case. Thus it is, for example, impossible to conceive the Cause before apprehending its effect as its effect; for we only recognize that it is causative of the effect when we apprehend the latter as an effect.

[21] But we cannot either apprehend the effect of the Cause as its effect unless we apprehend the Cause of the effect as its Cause; for we think we know that it is its effect only when we have apprehended the Cause of it as its Cause.

[22] If, then, in order to conceive the Cause, we must first know the effect, while in order to know the effect we must, as I said, have previous knowledge of the Cause, the fallacy of this circular mode of reasoning proves both to be inconceivable, the Cause being incapable of being conceived as Cause, and the effect as effect. For since each of them needs the evidence of the other, we shall not be able to say which conception is to have the precedence. Hence we shall be unable to declare that anything is the Cause of anything.

[23] And even were one to grant that Cause can be conceived, it might be held to be inapprehensible because of the divergency of opinion. For he who says that there is some Cause of something either asserts that he makes this statement absolutely and without basing it on any rational cause, or else he will declare that he has arrived at his conviction owing to certain causes.¹⁹ If, then, he says that he states it ‟absolutely,” he will be no more worthy of credence than the man who asserts ‟absolutely” that nothing is a cause of anything; whereas if he shall mention causes on account of which he holds that something causes something, he will be attempting to support the matter in question by means of that matter itself; for when we are examining the question whether anything is the Cause of anything, he asserts that Cause exists since there exists a cause for the existence of Cause.

[24] Besides, since we are inquiring about the reality of Cause, it will certainly be necessary for him to produce a cause for the cause of the existence of Cause, and of that cause yet another, and so on ad infinitum. But it is impossible to produce causes infinite in number. It is impossible, therefore, to affirm positively that anything is Cause of anything.

[25] Moreover, the Cause, when it produces the effect, either is and subsists already as causal or is non-causal. Certainly it is not non-causal; while if it is causal, it must first have subsisted and become causal, and thereafter produces the effect which is said to be brought about by it as already existing Cause. But since the Cause is relative and relative to the effect, it is clear that it cannot be prior in existence to the latter; therefore not even as being causal can the Cause bring about that whereof it is Cause.

[26] And if it does not bring about anything either as being or as not being causal, then it does not bring anything about; and hence it will not be a Cause; for apart from its effecting something the Cause cannot be conceived as Cause.

Hence some people argue thus: The Cause must either subsist along with its effect or before it or must come into being after it. Now to say that the Cause is brought into existence after the appearance of its effect would seem ridiculous. But neither can it subsist before the effect; for it is said to be conceived in relation thereto, and they affirm that relatives,

[27] in so far as they are relative, co-exist with each other and are conceived together. Nor, again, can it subsist along with its effect; for if it is productive of the effect, and what comes into existence must so come by the agency of what exists already, the Cause must have become causal first, and this done, then produces its effect. If, then, the Cause neither subsists before its effect, nor subsists along with it, nor does the effect precede the Cause, it would seem that it has no substantial existence at all.

[28] And it is clear probably that by these arguments the conception of Cause is overthrown again. For if Cause as a relative notion cannot be conceived before its effect, and yet, if it is to be conceived as causative of its effect, it must be conceived before its effect, while it is impossible for anything to be conceived before that which the conception of it cannot precede,—then it is impossible for the Cause to be conceived.

[29] From all this we conclude finally that—if the arguments by which it was shown²⁰ that we ought to affirm the existence of Cause are plausible, and if the arguments which go to prove that it is improper to declare that any Cause exists are likewise plausible, and if it is inadmissible to prefer any of these arguments to the others, since, as we have shown above,²¹ we confessedly possess neither sign nor criterion nor proof,—we are compelled to suspend judgement concerning the real existence of Cause, declaring that a Cause is ‟no more” existent than non-existent, if we are to judge by the statements made by the Dogmatists.

Chapter VI.—Concerning Material Principles

[30] So far, then, as concerns the efficient Principle this account will suffice for the present. But we must also give a brief account of what are called the Material Principles.²² Now that these are inapprehensible may easily be gathered from the disagreement which exists about them amongst the Dogmatists. For Pherecydes of Syros²³ declared earth to be the Principle of all things; Thales of Miletus, water; Anaximander (his pupil), the Unlimited; Anaximenes and Diogenes of Apollonia, air; Hippasus of Metapontum, fire; Xenophanes of Colophon, earth and water; Oenopides of Chios, fire and air; Hippo of Rhegium, fire and water; Onomacritus, in his Orphica, fire and water and earth;

[31] the School of Empedocles as well as the Stoics, fire, air, water and earth—for why should one even mention that mysterious ‟indeterminate matter” which some of them talk about,²⁴ when not even they themselves are positive that they apprehend it? Aristotle the Peripatetic takes as his Principles fire, air, water, earth, and the ‟revolving body;”²⁵

[32] Democritus and Epicurus, atoms; Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, homoeomeries²⁶; Diodorus, surnamed Cronos, minimal and non-composite bodies; Heracleides Ponticus and Asclepiades the Bithynian,²⁷ homogeneous masses; the School of Pythagoras, the numbers; the Mathematicians, the limits of bodies; Strato the Physicist, the qualities.

[33] Since, then, there exists amongst them as much divergence as this, and even more, regarding the Material Principles, we shall give assent either to all the positions stated, and all others as well, or to some of them. But to assent to all is not possible; for we certainly shall not be able to assent both to Asclepiades, who says that the elements can be broken up and possess qualities, and to Democritus, who asserts that they are indivisible and void of quality, and to Anaxagoras, who leaves every sensible quality attached to the homoeomeries.

[34] Yet if we shall prefer any one standpoint, or view, to the rest, we shall be preferring it either absolutely and without proof or with proof.²⁸ Now without proof we shall not yield assent; and if it is to be with proof, the proof must be true. But a true proof can only be given when approved by a true criterion, and a criterion is shown to be true by means of an approved proof.

[35] If, then, in order to show the truth of the proof which prefers any one view, its criterion must be proved, and to prove the criterion in turn its proof must be pre-established, the argument is found to be the circular one which will not allow the reasoning to go forward, since the proof keeps always requiring a proved criterion, and the criterion an approved proof.

[36] And should any one propose to approve the criterion by a criterion and to prove the proof by a proof, he will be driven to a regress ad infinitum. Accordingly, if we are unable to assent either to all the views held about the elements or to any one of them, it is proper to suspend judgement about them.

[37] Now though it is, perhaps, possible to show by these arguments alone the inapprehensibility of the elements and of the Material Principles, yet in order that we may be able to refute the Dogmatists in a more comprehensive manner we shall dwell on this topic at appropriate length. And since the opinions about the elements are, as we have shown, numerous and well-nigh infinite, we will excuse ourselves— because of the character of our present treatise— from discussing each opinion in detail, but will make answer to them all implicitly. For since the elements, whatever view one takes of them, must be finally regarded either as corporeal or incorporeal,²⁹ we think it enough to show that corporeal things are inapprehensible and incorporeal things inapprehensible; for thus it will be clear that the elements also are inapprehensible.

Chapter VII.—Are Bodies Apprehensible

[38] Some say that Body is that which is capable of being active or passive.³⁰ But so far as this conception goes it is inapprehensible. For, as we have shown, Cause is inapprehensible; and if we cannot say whether any Cause exists, neither can we say whether anything passive exists; for what is passive is certainly made passive by a Cause. And when both the Cause and the passive object are inapprehensible, the result will be that Body also is inapprehensible.

[39] But some define Body as what has three dimensions combined with resistance or solidity.³¹ For they describe the point as that which has no parts, the line as length without breadth, the surface as length with breadth; and when this takes on both depth and resistance there is formed Body—the object of our present discussion—it being composed of length and breadth and depth and resistance.

[40] The answer, however, to these people is simple. For they will say either that Body is nothing more than these qualities, or that it is something else than the combination of the qualities already mentioned. Now apart from length and breadth and depth and solidity the Body would be nothing; but if these things are the Body, anyone who shall prove that they are unreal will likewise abolish the Body; for wholes are abolished along with the sum of their parts.

Now it is possible to disprove these dimensions in a variety of ways; but for the present it will be enough to say that if the Limits³² exist, they are either lines or surfaces or bodies.

[41] If, then, one should affirm the existence of a surface or a line, then it will be affirmed that each of the afore-mentioned objects either can subsist of itself or is cognized solely in connexion with so-called Bodies. But to imagine either a line or a surface as existing of itself is doubtless silly. While if it should be said that each of these objects is cognized solely in connexion with the Bodies and has no independent existence, it will thereby be granted, in the first place, that the Bodies are not generated from them (for if so, I suppose, these objects ought to have had independent existence first, and then have combined to form the Bodies);

[42] and further, they have no real existence even in the so-called Bodies.

This can be shown by several arguments, but for the present it will suffice to mention the difficulties which arise from the fact of touch.³³ For if juxtaposed Bodies touch one another they are in contact with their Limits—for example, with their surfaces. The surfaces, then, will not be completely unified one with another as a result of touching, since otherwise touch would be fusion and the separation of things touching a rending apart; and this is not what we find.

[43] And if the surface touches the surface of the juxtaposed Body with some of its parts, and with other parts is united with the Body of which it is a limit, it will not be without depth, since its parts are conceived as different in respect of depth, one part touching the juxtaposed Body, the other being that which effects its union with the Body whereof it is a limit. Hence, even in connexion with Body one cannot imagine length and breadth without depth, nor, consequently, surface.

So likewise when two surfaces are, let us imagine, juxtaposed along the limits where they come to an end, by way of what is called their ‟length,” that is to say by way of their ‟lines,” then these lines, by means of which the surfaces are said to touch each other, will not be unified (else they would be fused together); yet if each of them touches the line which lies next to it breadth-wise with some of its parts and by others is united with the surface of which it is a limit, it will not be without breadth, and, consequently, it will not be a line. But if there exists in Body neither line nor surface, neither length nor breadth nor depth will exist in Body.

[44] And should anyone assert that the Limits are bodies, he can be answered very shortly. For if length is a body, it must needs be divided into its three dimensions, and each of these, in turn, being a body will be divided into three other dimensions, which will be bodies, and these likewise into others, and so on ad infinitum, so that the Body comes to be of infinite size, being divided into an infinity of parts: this result is absurd, and therefore the dimensions aforesaid are not bodies. But if they are neither bodies nor lines nor surfaces, they will be held to have no existence.

[45] Solidity³⁴ also is inapprehensible. For if it is apprehended, it must be apprehended by touch. If, then, we shall prove that touch is inapprehensible, it will be clear that it is impossible for solidity to be apprehended. That touch is inapprehensible we argue as follows. Things which touch one another either touch with their parts or as wholes touching wholes. Now they certainly will not touch as wholes; for then they will be unified instead of being in contact with one another. Nor yet through parts touching parts; for their parts, though in relation to the wholes they are parts, are wholes in relation to their parts.

[46] So these wholes, which are parts of other things, will not touch as wholes touching wholes, for the reasons aforesaid, nor yet through parts touching parts; for their parts, too, being wholes relatively to their own parts, will not be in contact either as wholes with wholes or as parts with parts. But if we apprehend the occurrence of touch neither by way of wholeness nor by way of parts, touch will be inapprehensible. And, consequently, solidity also; and, therefore, Body; for if this is nothing more than the three dimensions plus Solidity, and we have proved that each of these is inapprehensible, Body also will be inapprehensible.

Thus, then, if we are to judge by the conception³⁵ of Body, it is inapprehensible whether any body exists;

[47] and about this problem there is this also to be said. Of existing things some, they say, are sensible, others intelligible, and the latter are apprehended by the reason, the former by the senses, and the senses are ‟simply-passive,”³⁶ while the reason proceeds from the apprehension of sensibles to the apprehension of intelligibles. If then any body exists, it is either sensible or intelligible. Now it is not sensible; for it is supposed to be apprehended as a conglomeration of length and depth and breadth and solidity and colour and various other things, along with which it is experienced; whereas, according to their statements, the senses are ‟simply-passive.”

[48] And if Body is said to be intelligible, there must certainly be pre-existent in the nature of things some sensible object from which to derive the notion of bodies, they being intelligible. But nothing exists save Body and the Incorporeal, and of these the Incorporeal is essentially intelligible,³⁷ and Body, as we have shown, is not sensible. Since, then, no sensible object exists in the nature of things from which we can derive the notion of Body, Body will not be intelligible either. And if it is neither sensible nor intelligible, and besides these nothing else exists, we must declare that, so far as this argument goes, Body has no existence.

[49] Accordingly we, by thus opposing the arguments against Body to the apparent existence of Body, infer suspension of judgement concerning Body.

The inapprehensibility of Body involves also that of the Incorporeal. For privations are conceived as privations of states or faculties, as, for example, blindness of sight, deafness of hearing, and similarly with the rest. Hence, in order to apprehend a privation, we must first have apprehended the state of which the privation is said to be a privation; for if one had no conception of sight one would not be able to assert that this man does not possess sight, which is the meaning of being blind.

[50] If then Incorporeality is the privation of Body, and when states are not apprehended it is impossible for the privations of them to be apprehended, and it has been proved that Body is inapprehensible, Incorporeality also will be inapprehensible. Moreover, it is either sensible or intelligible. And if it is sensible, it is inapprehensible because of the variance amongst animals and men, the senses and the circumstances, and owing to the admixtures and all the other things we have previously described in our exposition of the Ten Tropes.³⁸ If, again, it is intelligible, since the apprehension of sensibles, which is supposed to form the starting-point from which we attain to the intelligibles,³⁹ is not immediately given, neither will the apprehension of the intelligibles be given immediately, nor, consequently, that of Incorporeality.

[51] Also, he who asserts that he apprehends the Incorporeal will maintain that he apprehends it either by sense or by means of reason. Certainly not by sense, since it is supposed that the senses perceive the sensibles by way of ‟impression” and ‟indentation,” —take sight, for instance, whether it occur by reason of the tension of a cone, or of the emissions and immissions of images, or by effusions of rays or colours;⁴⁰ and hearing too, whether it be the smitten air⁴¹ or the parts of the sound that are carried round the ears and smite the acoustic breath so as to effect the perception of sound. Smells also impinge on the nose and flavours on the tongue, and likewise objects of touch on the sense of touch.

[52] But incorporeals are incapable of submitting to impression of this kind, so that they could not be apprehended by sense.

Nor yet by means of reason. For if the reason is ‟verbally expressible”⁴² and incorporeal, as the Stoics assert, he who says that incorporeals are apprehended by means of reason is begging the question, For when our question is—‟Can an incorporeal object be apprehended?” he assumes an incorporeal object and then, by means of it alone, claims to effect the apprehension of incorporeals. Yet reason itself, if it is incorporeal, belongs to the class of things which are in question.

[53] How, then, is one to prove that this particular incorporeal (I mean reason) is previously apprehended? For if it is by means of another incorporeal, we shall ask for the proof of its apprehension also, and so on ad infinitum; whereas, if it is by means of a body, the apprehension of bodies is also in question; by what means, then, are we to prove that the body which is assumed in order to prove the apprehension of the incorporeal reason is itself apprehended? If by means of a body, we are plunged into infinite regress; while if we do so by means of an incorporeal, we are wrecked on circular reasoning. Reason, then, since it is incorporeal, remaining thus inapprehensible, no one will be able to say that by means of it the incorporeal is apprehended.

[54] But if reason is a body, inasmuch as about bodies also there is much controversy as to whether or not they are apprehended, owing to what is called their ‟continual flux,”⁴³ which gives rise to the view that they do not admit of the title ‟this” and are non- existent—just as Plato⁴⁴ speaks of bodies as ‟becoming but never being,”—I am perplexed as to how this controversy about Body is to be settled, as I see that it cannot be settled, because of the difficulties stated a moment ago, either by a body or by an incorporeal. Neither, then, is it possible to apprehend the incorporeals by reason.

[55] And if they are neither objects of sense nor apprehended by means of reason, they will not be apprehended at all.

If, then, it is impossible to be positive either about the existence of Body or about the Incorporeals, we must also suspend judgement concerning the Elements, and possibly about the things which lie behind the Elements⁴⁵ as well, seeing that of these some are bodies, others incorporeals, and both of these are matters of doubt. In fact, when both the active and the material Principles, for these reasons, call for suspense of judgement, the doctrine of Principles is open to doubt.

Chapter VIII.—Concerning Mixture

[56] But, to pass over these problems, how do they explain the production of the compounds from the primary elements,⁴⁶ when neither contact and touch nor mixture or blending⁴⁷ has any existence at all? For that touch is nothing I showed a moment ago, when I was discussing the subsistence of Body; and that the method of Mixture is equally impossible on their own showing, I shall briefly demonstrate. For there is much argument about Mixture, and the rival views held by the Dogmatists⁴⁸ on the problem propounded are well-nigh endless; and hence we might straightway infer, along with the indeterminable controversy, the inapprehensibility of the problem. And we shall for the moment, owing to the design of our treatise, excuse ourselves from answering all their views in detail, deeming that the following remarks will amply suffice for the present.

[57] They declare that mixed things are composed of substance and qualities. If so, one must declare either that their substances are blended⁴⁹ but not their qualities, or their qualities blended but not their substances any longer, or neither blended with the other, or both unified with each other. But if neither the qualities nor the substances are blended with one another, Mixture will be inconceivable; for how will a single sensation result from the things mixed if the things mixed are blended with one another in none of the ways stated above?

[58] And if it should be said that the qualities are simply juxtaposed and the substances blended, even so the statement would be absurd; for we do not perceive the qualities in the mixtures as separate objects but as a single sense- impression produced by the mixed things. And anyone who should assert that the qualities are blended, but the substances not, would be asserting the impossible; for the reality of the qualities resides in the substances, so that it would be ridiculous to assert that the qualities by themselves, in separation from the substances, are somehow blended with one another, while the substances are left apart void of quality.

[59] It only remains to say that both the qualities and the substances of the mixed things permeate one another⁵⁰ and by their blending produce Mixture. But this is a more absurd view than any of the foregoing; for such a mixture is impossible. Thus, for example, if a cup of hemlock juice were blended with ten cups of water, it will be said that the hemlock is mixed in with all the water; for certainly if one were to take even the least portion of the mixture he would find it full of the potency of the hemlock.

[60] Yet if the hemlock is blended in with every particle of the water and is distributed as a whole over the whole volume of the water and through the mutual interpenetration of both their substances and their qualities, so that Mixture may in this way result; and if the things so distributed over each other in every particle occupy an equal space, so that they are equal to each other,— then the cup of hemlock will be equal to the ten cups of water, so that the blend must consist of twenty cups or of only two, according to the assumption now made as to the mode of Mixture. And if, again, a cup of water were poured into the twenty cups, then—according to the theory assumed—the quantity is bound to be forty cups or, again, only two, since it is admissible to conceive either the one cup as all the twenty over which it is distributed, or the twenty cups as the one with which they are equalized.

[61] And by thus pouring in a cup at a time and pursuing the same argument it is possible to infer that the twenty cups seen in the blend must be twenty thousand and more, according to the theory of Mixture assumed, and at the same time only two—a conclusion which reaches the very height of incongruity. Wherefore this theory of Mixture also is absurd.

[62] But if Mixture cannot come about by the mutual blending either of the substances alone or of the qualities alone or of both or of neither, and it is impossible to conceive any other ways than these, then the process of Mixture and of blending in general is inconceivable. Hence, if the so-called Elements are unable to form the compounds either by way of contact through juxtaposition or by mixture or blending, then, so far as this argument goes, the physical theory of the Dogmatists is inconceivable.

Chapter IX.—Concerning Motion

[63] In addition to the foregoing we might have dwelt on the argument about the kinds of motion, since this also might be held to render the physical theory of the Dogmatists impossible. For the formation of the compounds must certainly be due to some motion both of the elements and of the efficient Principle. If, then, we shall show that no one kind of motion is generally agreed upon, it will be clear that, even if all the assumptions mentioned above be granted, the Dogmatists have elaborated their so-called ‟Physical Doctrine” in vain.

Chapter X.—Concerning Transient Motion

[64] Now those who are reputed to have given the most complete classification of Motion assert that six kinds of it exist—local transition, physical change, increase, decrease, becoming, perishing.⁵¹ We, then, shall deal with each of the aforesaid kinds of motion separately beginning with local transition. According, then, to the Dogmatists, this is the motion by which the moving object passes on from place to place, either wholly or partially—wholly as in the case of men walking, partially as when a globe is moving round a central axis, for while as a whole it remains in the same place, its parts change their places.

[65] The main views held about motion are, I imagine, three. It is assumed by ordinary people⁵² and by some philosophers that motion exists, but by Parmenides, Melissus and certain others⁵³ that it does not exist; while the Sceptics have declared that it is ‟no more” existent than non-existent; for so far as the evidence of phenomena goes it seems that motion exists, whereas to judge by the philosophic argument it would seem not to exist. So when we have exposed the contradiction which lies between those who believe in the existence of motion and those who maintain that motion is naught, if we shall find the counter-arguments of equal weight,⁵⁴ we shall be compelled to declare that, so far as these arguments go, motion is ‟no more” existent than non-existent.

[66] We shall begin with those who affirm its real existence.

These base their view mainly on ‟evidence.”⁵⁵ If, say they, motion does not exist, how does the sun move from east to west, and how does it produce the seasons of the year, which are brought about by its approximations to us and its recessions from us? Or how do ships put out from harbours and cast anchor in other harbours very far distant from the first?, And in what fashion does the denier of motion proceed from his house and return to it again? These facts are perfectly incontestable. Consequently, when one of the Cynics⁵⁶ had an argument against motion put to him, he made no reply but stood up and began to walk, thus demonstrating by his action and by ‟evidence” that motion is capable of real existence.

So these men attempt in this way to put to shame those who hold the contrary opinion;

[67] but those who deny the existence of motion allege such arguments as these: If a thing is moved, it is moved either by itself or by another thing. But if it is moved by another, it will be moved either causelessly or owing to some cause. Nothing, they assert, is moved causelessly; but if it is moved owing to some cause, the cause owing to which it moves will be what makes it move, and thus we are involved in an infinite regress, according to the criticism stated a little while ago.

[68] Moreover, if the movent thing is active, and what is active is moved, that movent thing will need another movent thing, and the second a third, and so on ad infinitum, so that the motion comes to have no beginning; which is absurd. Therefore the thing that moves is not always moved by another. Nor yet by itself. Since every movent causes motion either by pushing forward or by drawing after or by pushing up or by thrusting down, what is self-movent must move itself in one of the aforesaid ways.

[69] But if it moves itself propulsively, it will be behind itself; and if by pulling after, it will be in front of itself; and if by pushing up, it will be below itself; and if by thrusting down, it will be above itself. But it is impossible for anything to be above or before or beneath or behind its own self; therefore it is impossible for anything to be moved by itself. But if nothing is moved either by itself or by another, then nothing is moved at all.

[70] And if anyone should seek refuge in the notions of ‟impulse” and ‟purpose” we must remind him of the controversy about ‟what is in our power,”⁵⁷ and how it is still unsettled, since hitherto we have failed to find a criterion of truth.⁵⁸

[71] Further, there is this also to be said. If a thing moves, it moves either in the place where it is or in that where it is not. But it does not move in the place where it is, for if it is in it, it remains in it; nor yet does it move in the place where it is not; for where a thing is not, there it can neither effect nor suffer anything. Therefore nothing moves. This argument is, in fact, that of Diodorus Cronos,⁵⁹ but it has been the subject of many attacks, of which we shall describe, owing to the character of our treatise, only the more formidable, together with a judgement of their value, as it seems to us.

[72] Some, then, assert that a thing can move in the place where it is; at any rate the globes which revolve round their axes move while remaining in the same place.⁶⁰ Against these men we should transfer the argument which applies to each of the parts of the globe, and, reminding them that, to judge by this argument, it does not move even in respect of its parts, draw the conclusion that nothing moves in the place where it is.

[73] And we shall take the same course in replying to those who declare that the moving thing occupies two places, that wherein it is and that whereto it shifts. For we shall ask them when the moving object shifts from the place wherein it is to the other place—whether while it is in the first place or while it is in the second. But when it is in the first place it does not pass over into the second, for it is still in the first; and when it is not in this, it is not passing from it.

[74] And besides, the question is being begged; for where it is not, there it cannot be active.For surely no one will allow that any object to which he does not grant motion at all can shift to any place.

[75] Some, however, make this statement: Place is used in two senses, the broad sense, as for example ‟my house,” and the exact sense,⁶¹ as for instance ‟the air which enfolds the surface of my body.” So the moving object is said to move in place, ‟place” being used not in the exact sense but in the broad sense. To these we can reply by dividing up ‟place” in the broad sense, and saying that in one part of it the body said to be moved properly exists, this being its own ‟place” in the exact sense, and in the other part it does not exist, this being the remaining portions of ‟place” in the extended sense; next we shall argue that an object can move neither in the place where it is nor in that where it is not, and so conclude that nothing can move even in what is perversely termed ‟place” in the broad sense; for this is composed of the place wherein it is in the exact sense and the place wherein it is not, and it has been proved that a thing cannot move in either of these.

[76] We should also propound the following argument.⁶² If a thing moves it moves either by way of orderly, or gradual, progression or by occupying the divisible interval all at once; but in neither of these ways can a thing move, as we shall prove; so that it does not move at all.

Now that a thing can not move in orderly progression is plain on the face of it. For if bodies, and also the places and the times in which the bodies are said to move, are divided to infinity, motion will not occur, it being impossible to discover amongst the infinite any first thing wherefrom the object said to move will derive its initial movement.

[77] And if the aforesaid objects are reducible to atomic parts, and each of the moving things passes equally in an atomic period of time with its own first atom into the first atomic point of space, then all moving things are of equal velocity —the speediest horse, for instance, and the tortoise;⁶³ which is a result even more absurd than the former. Therefore motion does not take place by way of orderly progression.

Nor yet by way of immediate occupation of the divisible interval.

[78] For if one ought, as they declare, to take the apparent as evidence for the non-apparent, since, in order to complete the distance of a stade a man must first complete the first portion of the stade, and secondly the second portion, and so on with the rest, so likewise everything that moves ought to move by way of orderly progression; for surely if we should assert that the moving thing passes all at once through all the portions of the place wherein it is said to move, it will be in all the portions thereof at once, and if one portion of the place through which it has its motion should be cold, another hot, or, mayhap, one black, another white, so as to be able also to colour things in contact,—then the moving thing will be at once hot and cold and black and white, which is absurd.

[79] Next let them tell us how much space the moving thing passes through all at once. For if they shall assert that it is limitless, they will be granting that a thing moves through the whole of the earth all at once; while if they shirk this conclusion, let them define for us the extent of the space. But, on the one hand, the attempt to define precisely the space or interval beyond which the thing moving all at once will be unable to advance so much as a hair’s-breadth is probably not merely presumptuous and rash or even ridiculous, but plunges us again into the original difficulty;⁶⁴ for all things will be of equal velocity, if each of them alike has its transitional movements over definite intervals of space.

[80] And if, on the other go hand, they shall assert that the moving thing moves all at once through a space that is small but not precisely determined, it will be open to us to adopt the sorites argument⁶⁵ and keep constantly adding a hair’s-breadth of space to the breadth assumed. And if, then, they shall make a halt anywhere while we are pursuing this argument, they will be reverting to the monstrous theory of precise definition as before; while if they shall assent to the process of addition, we shall force them to grant that a thing can move all at once through the whole of the earth. Consequently, objects said to be in motion do not move by occupying a divisible interval all at once.

[81] But if a thing moves neither thus instantaneously nor by way of gradual progression, it does not move at all.

These, and yet more than these, are the arguments used by those who reject transient motion. But we, being unable to refute either these arguments or the apparent facts on which the view of the reality of motion is based, suspend our judgement—in view of the contradiction between appearances and arguments—regarding the question as to the existence or non-existence of motion.

Chapter XI.—Concerning Increase And Decrease

[82] Employing the same reasoning we suspend judgement also concerning both increase and decrease. For the outward evidence⁶⁶ seems to support their reality, which the arguments seem to refute. For just consider: That which increases must grow in size as a stable substance, so that it will be false for anyone to say that one thing increases when an addition is made to another. Since then substance⁶⁷ is never stable but always in flux, one part supplanting another, the thing said to have increased does not retain its former substance together with the added substance but has its substance all different.

[83] Just as if, for example, when there is a beam three cubits long a man should bring another of ten cubits and declare that the beam of three cubits had increased, he would be lying because the one is wholly different from the other; so too in the case of every object which is said to increase, as the former matter flows away and fresh matter enters in its place, if what is said to be added is added, one should not call such a condition increase but complete alteration.

[84] The same argument applies also to decrease.⁶⁸ For how could that which has no stable existence be said to have decreased? Besides, if decrease takes place by way of subtraction, and increase by addition, and neither subtraction nor addition is anything, then neither decrease nor increase is anything.

Chapter XII.—Concerning Subtraction And Addition

[85] That subtraction⁶⁹ is nothing they argue thus: If anything is subtracted from anything, either equal is subtracted from equal, or greater from less, or less from greater. But in none of these ways does subtraction take place, as we shall show; therefore subtraction is impossible.

That subtraction takes place in none of these ways is plain from what follows: What is subtracted from anything ought, before its subtraction, to be included in that from which it is subtracted.

[86] But the equal is not included in the equal—six, for instance, in six; for what includes must be greater than what is included, and that from which the subtraction is made than what is subtracted, in order that there may be some remainder after the subtraction; for it is this which is held to distinguish subtraction from complete removal. Nor is the greater included in the less—six, for instance, in five; for that is irrational.

[87] And for this reason, neither is the less included in the greater. For if five is included in six, as less in greater, four will be included in five, three in four, two in three, and one in two. Therefore six will contain five, four, three, two, and one, which when put together form the number fifteen, and this we conclude is included in six, if it be granted that the less is included in the greater. So likewise in the fifteen which is included in the six there is included the number thirty-five,⁷⁰ and so on, step by step, to infinity. But it is absurd to say that infinite numbers are included in the number six; and so it is also absurd to say that less is included in greater.

[88] If, then, what is subtracted from a thing must be included in that from which it is to be subtracted, and neither equal is included in equal, nor greater in less, nor less in greater, then nothing is subtracted from anything.

Again, if anything is subtracted from anything, it is either a whole subtracted from a whole, or a part from a part, or a whole from a part, or a part from a whole.

[89] But to say that a whole is subtracted from either a whole or a part is plainly nonsense. It remains, then, to say that a part is subtracted either from a whole or from a part; which is absurd. Thus for example—basing our argument on numbers for the sake of clearness—let us take ten and suppose that from it one is subtracted. This one, then, cannot be subtracted either from the whole ten or from the remaining part of the ten, as I shall show; therefore it is not subtracted at all.⁷¹

[90] For if the one is subtracted from the whole ten, since the ten is neither something other than the ten ones nor one of the ones, but the aggregate of the ones, the one ought to be subtracted from each of the ones in order to be subtracted from the whole ten. Now from a one, above all, nothing can be subtracted; for the ones are indivisible, and on this account the one will not be subtracted from the ten in this way.

[91] And even were we to grant that the one is subtracted from each of the ones, the one will contain ten parts, and as containing ten parts it will beaten. And further, since ten other parts remain, after the subtraction of the ten parts of the so-called one, the ten will be twenty. But it is absurd to say that the one is ten and the ten twenty, and to divide what, according to them, is indivisible.⁷² Wherefore it is absurd to say that the one is subtracted from the whole ten.

[92] Neither is the one subtracted from the remaining nine; for that from which anything is subtracted does not remain entire, but the nine does remain entire after the subtraction of that one. Besides, since the nine is nothing more than the nine ones, if it should be said that the one is subtracted from the whole nine, the sum subtracted will be nine, or if from a part of it, then in case it be eight the same absurd results will follow, while if the subtraction is made from the last one, they will be affirming the divisibility of the one, which is absurd.

[93] So then, neither from the nine is the one subtracted. But if it is neither subtracted from the whole ten nor from a part of it, no part can be subtracted from either a whole or a part. If, then, nothing is subtracted either as whole from whole or as part from whole, nor as whole from part or as part from part, then nothing is subtracted from anything.

[94] Moreover, addition is regarded by them⁷³ as one of the impossibles. For, they say, that which is added is added either to itself or to what pre-exists or to the compound of both; but none of these alternatives is sound; therefore nothing is added to anything. Suppose, for instance, a measure of four cups,⁷⁴ and add to this a cup. To what, I ask, is it added? for it cannot be added to itself, since what is added must be other than that whereto it is added, but nothing is other than itself.

[95] Neither is it added to the compound of the four cups and the one cup; for how could anything be added to what does not yet exist? Besides, if the added cup is blended with the four cups and the one cup, six cups will be the measure resulting from the four cups and the one cup and the added cup.

[96] And if the, cup is added to the four cups alone, since that which is extended over anything is equal to that over which it extends, the cup which extends over the measure of four cups will double the four cups so that the whole measure becomes eight cups—a result contrary to experience. If, then, what is said to be added is neither added to itself nor to what pre-exists nor to the compound of these, and besides these there are no other alternatives, then there is no addition of anything to anything.

Chapter XIII.—Concerning Transposition

[97] Together with the existence of addition and subtraction and local motion transposition also is abolished,⁷⁵ for this is subtraction from a thing and addition to a thing by way of transition.

Chapter XIV.—Concerning Whole And Part

[98] So too with both whole and part.⁷⁶ For the whole is held to come about by the combination and addition of the parts, and to cease from being a whole by the subtraction of one or more parts. Besides, if a whole exists, it is either other than its parts⁷⁷ or its parts themselves form the whole.

[99] Now it is apparent that the whole is nothing other than its parts; for certainly when the parts are removed there is nothing left, so as to enable us to account the whole as something else besides its parts. But if the parts themselves form the whole, the whole will be merely a name and an empty title,⁷⁸ and it will have no individual existence, just as separation⁷⁹ also is nothing apart from the things separated, or laying beams apart from the beams laid. Therefore no whole exists.

[100] Nor yet parts. For if parts exist, either they are parts of the whole, or of one another, or each one of itself. But they are not parts of the whole, since it is nothing else than its parts (and besides, the parts will on this assumption be parts of themselves, since each of the parts is said to be complementary to the whole); nor yet of one another, since the part is said to be included⁸⁰ in that whereof it is part, and it is absurd to assert that, say, the hand is included in the foot.

[101] Neither will each be a part of itself; for, because of the inclusion, it will be both greater and less than itself. If, then, the so-called parts are parts neither of the whole nor of themselves nor of one another, they are parts of nothing. But if they are parts of nothing, parts have no existence; for co- relatives are annulled together.⁸¹

Let thus much be said, then, of a general character, by way of digression, seeing that once already we have dealt with the subject of whole and part.

Chapter XV.—Concerning Physical Change

[102] Some, too, maintain that what is called ‟physical change” is non-real, and the arguments they employ are such as these:⁸² If a thing changes, what changes is either corporeal or incorporeal; but each of these is matter of dispute; therefore the theory of change will also be disputable.

[103] If a thing changes, it changes through certain actions of a Cause⁸³ and by being acted upon. But it does not change by being acted upon, for the reality of Cause is refuted, and therewith is refuted also the object which is acted upon, as it has no agent to act upon it.

[104] Therefore nothing changes at all. If a thing changes, either what is changes or what is not.⁸⁴ Now what is not is unreal and can neither act nor be acted upon at all, so that it does not admit of change either. And if what is changes, it changes either in so far as it is in being or in so far as it is not in being.

[105] Now in so far as it is not in being it does not change, for it is not even existent; while if it changes in so far as it is existent, it will be other than existent, which means that it will be non-existent. But it is absurd to say that the existent becomes non-existent; therefore the existent does not change either. And if neither the existent nor the non-existent changes, and besides these there is nothing else, it only remains to say that nothing changes.

[106] Some also argue thus:⁸⁵ That which changes must change in a certain time; but nothing changes either in the past or in the future, nor yet in the present, as we shall prove; nothing therefore changes. Nothing changes in the past or in the future, for neither of these times is present, and it is impossible to do or suffer anything in time that is not existent and present. Nor yet in time present.

[107] For the present time is probably also unreal,⁸⁶ and—even if we set aside this point—it is indivisible; and it is impossible to suppose that in an indivisible moment of time iron, say, changes from hard to soft, or any one of all the other changes takes place; for they appear to require extension in time. If, then, nothing changes either in the past or in the future or in the present, we must declare that nothing changes at all.

[108] Further, if change exists at all it is either sensible or intelligible; but it is not sensible, since the senses are specialized,⁸⁷ whereas change is thought to possess ‟concurrent recollection”⁸⁸ both of that from which it changes and that into which it is said to change. And if it is intelligible, then, since (as we have frequently pointed out already⁸⁹) there exists among the ancients an unsettled controversy as to the reality of intelligibles, we shall also be unable to make any assertion about the reality of change.

Chapter XVI.—Concerning Becoming And Perishing

[109] Both becoming and perishing are included in the refutation of addition and subtraction and physical change; for apart from these nothing would become or perish. Thus, for instance, it is as a result of the perishing of the ten, as they say, that the nine becomes by the subtraction of one, and the ten from the perishing of the nine by the addition of one; and rust becomes from the perishing of bronze by means of change. Hence, if the aforesaid motions are abolished it is likely that becoming and perishing are also necessarily abolished.

[110] Yet none the less some argue also as follows:⁹⁰ If Socrates was born, Socrates became either when Socrates existed not or when Socrates already existed; but if he shall be said to have become when he already existed, he will have become twice; and if when he did not exist, Socrates was both existent and non- existent at the same time—existent through having become, non-existent by hypothesis.

[111] And if Socrates died, he died either when he lived or when he died. Now he did not die when he lived, since he would have been at once both alive and dead; nor yet when he died, since he would have been dead twice. Therefore Socrates did not die. And by applying this argument in turn to each of the things said to become or perish it is possible to abolish becoming and perishing.

[112] Some also argue thus:⁹¹ If a thing becomes, either the existent becomes or the non-existent. But the non-existent does not become; for to the non-existent nothing can occur; neither, therefore, can becoming occur. Nor does the existent become. For if the existent becomes, it becomes either in so far as it is existent or in so far as it is non-existent. Now in so far as it is non-existent it does not become. But if it becomes in so far as it is existent, then, since they assert that what becomes becomes other from other,⁹² what becomes will be other than the existent, and that is non-existent. Therefore what becomes will be non-existent, which is nonsense.

[113] If, then, neither the non-existent becomes nor the existent, nothing becomes at all.

For the same reasons, neither does anything perish.⁹³ For if anything perishes, it is either the existent that perishes or the non-existent. Now the non-existent does not perish, for what perishes must be a subject of action. Nor yet does the existent perish. For it must perish either while continuing in existence or while not so continuing. And if it be while continuing in existence, it will be at one and the same time both existent and non-existent;

[114] for since it does not perish in so far as it is non-existent but in so far as it is existent, it will be other than the existent and therefore non-existent in so far as it is said to have perished, whereas in so far as it is said to perish while continuing in existence it will be existent. But it is absurd to say that the same thing is both existent and non-existent; therefore the existent does not perish while continuing in existence. And if the existent does not perish while continuing in existence but passes first into non-existence and then in this way perishes, it is no longer the existent that perishes but the non-existent; and this we have shown to be impossible. If, then, neither the existent perishes nor the non-existent, and besides these there is nothing else, nothing perishes at all.

This account of the motions⁹⁴ will suffice by way of outline, and therefrom it follows that the Physical Science of the Dogmatists is unreal and inconceivable.

Chapter XVII.—Concerning Rest

[115] In like manner some have doubted about physical rest,⁹⁵ say ing that what is in motion is not at rest, but every body i is constantly in motion according to the views of the Dogmatists who assert that Being is in flux⁹⁶ and always undergoing effluxes and additions— just as Plato does not even speak of bodies as ‟being” but rather calls them ‟becoming,” and Heracleitus compares the mobility of our matter⁹⁷ to the swift current of a river. Therefore no body is at rest.

[116] What is said to be at rest is, in fact, held to be embraced by the things which surround it, and what is embraced is acted upon; but nothing acted upon exists, since no causal activity exists, as we have shown;⁹⁸ therefore nothing is at rest.

Some, too, propound this argument: What is at rest is acted upon; but what is acted upon is in motion; therefore what is said to be at rest is in motion; but if it is in motion, it is not at rest.

[117] And from this it is evident that neither does the incorporeal admit of being at rest. For if what is at rest is acted upon, and being acted upon is a property, if anything, of bodies and not of incorporeals, no incorporeal can either be acted upon or be at rest; therefore nothing is at rest.

[118] So much for the subject of rest. And since no one of the things we have mentioned is conceived apart from space or time, we must pass on to consider these; for if one should prove these to be unreal, then, because of them, each of the others also will be unreal. Let us begin with space.

Chapter XVIII.—Concerning Space

[119] Space, or place, then, is used in two senses,⁹⁹ the strict and the loose—loosely of place taken broadly (as ‟my city”), and strictly of exactly containing place whereby we are exactly enclosed. Our inquiry, then, is concerned with space of the strict kind. This some¹⁰⁰ have affirmed, others denied; and others have suspended judgement about it.

[120] And of these, those who maintain its existence have recourse to the evidence of experience.¹⁰¹ Who, they argue, could assert that space does not exist when he sees the parts of space, such as right and left, up and down, before and behind; and when he is now here, now there, and sees that where my teacher¹⁰² was talking there I am talking now; and when he observes that the place of things naturally light is different from that of things naturally heavy;

[121] and when, also, he hears the ancients declaring that ‟Verily first of all came Chaos into existence”¹⁰³ For space, they say, is called Chaos from its capacity for containing¹⁰⁴ what becomes within it. Then, too, if any body exists, space also exists; for without it body would not exist. And if ‟that-by- which” exists, and ‟that-from-which,”¹⁰⁵ there exists; also ‟that-in-which,” and this is space; but the first is in each of the two, therefore the second is in both.¹⁰⁶

[122] But those who deny space do not admit the existence of the parts of space; for space, they say, is nothing else than its parts, and he who tries to deduce the existence of space from the assumption that its parts exist is seeking to establish the matter in question by means of itself. Equally silly is the language of those who assert that a thing becomes or has become in some place, when space in general is not admitted¹⁰⁷ And they also presume the reality of body, which is not self-evident; and, in much the same way as space, both that-from-which and that-by-which are proved to be unreal.

[123] Hesiod, too, is no competent judge of philosophical problems. And while thus rebutting the arguments that tend to establish the existence of space, they also demonstrate its unreality more elaborately by making use of what are held to be the most weighty views of the Dogmatists about space, namely those of the Stoics and Peripatetics, in the following fashion.

[124] The Stoics declare that Void is that which is capable of being occupied by an existent but is not so occupied, or an interval empty of body, or an interval un- occupied by body; and that Place is an interval occupied by an existent and equated to that which occupies it (‟existent” being here the name they give to ‟body”); and that Room is an interval partly occupied by body and partly unoccupied—though some of them say that Room is the Place of the large body, so that the difference between Place and Room depends on size.

[125] Their opponents then argue thus: When the Stoics define Place as an ‟interval occupied by body,” in what sense do they call it an ‟interval?” Do they mean the length of the body or its width or its depth only, or all three dimensions? For if they mean one dimension, the place is not equated with the object of which it is the place, and besides, that which includes is part of what is included, which is pure nonsense.¹⁰⁸

[126] And if by ‟interval” is meant the three dimensions, then, since in the so-called place there subsists neither a void nor another body which has dimensions, but only the body said to exist in place, and it is composed of the dimensions (for it is length and breadth and depth and solidity,¹⁰⁹ this last being said to be a property of the foregoing dimensions), the body itself will be its own place and at once both container and contained, which is absurd.

[127] Therefore no dimension of a subsisting place exists. And, consequently, place is nothing.

This argument also is propounded.¹¹⁰ Since the dimensions are not found to be twofold in the case of each of the objects said to exist in place, but there is one length, one breadth and one depth, do these dimensions belong to the body only, or to the place only, or to both? If they belong only to the place, the body will have no length or breadth or depth of its own, so that the body will not even be body, which is absurd.

[128] If they belong to both, then, since the Void has no reality apart from the dimensions, if the dimensions of the Void subsist in the body and serve to compose the body itself, the components of the Void will also be components of the body—for about the reality of solidity it is impossible to say anything positive, as we have shown above.¹¹¹ And since in the case of the so-called body only those dimensions appear which belong to the Void and are identical with the Void, the body will be Void, which is absurd. And if the dimensions belong to the body only, there will be no dimension of place, and therefore no place either. If, then, no dimension of place is found in any of the ways described above, place does not exist.

[129] Further, it is argued that when the body occupies the Void and place comes about, the Void either remains or withdraws or perishes. But if it remains, the Plenum and the Void will be identical; and if it withdraws by a movement of transition, or perishes by change, the Void will be a body;¹¹² for these affections are peculiar to body. But it is absurd to say either that Void and Plenum are identical or that the Void is body. Therefore it is absurd to say that the Void can be occupied by body and become place.

[130] For these reasons also the Void is found to be unreal, since it is impossible for it to be occupied by body and to become place; for Void was defined¹¹³ as ‟that which is capable of being occupied by body.” And, in the refutation of these, Room also is involved; for it is annulled along with place if ‟room is the large place,” while if it is ‟that which is partly occupied by body and partly empty extension,” its refutation is included in that of these two.

These arguments, and others besides, are directed against the views about place held by the Stoics.

[131] The Peripatetics¹¹⁴ assert that place is ‟the limit of what encloses in so far as it encloses,” so that my place is the surface of the air that forms a mould round my body. But if this is place, the same thing will both be and not be. For when the body is about to become in a certain place, then, inasmuch as nothing can become in what is non-existent, the place must be pre-existent in order that the body may in this way become in it, and consequently the place will exist before the-body-in-the-place becomes therein. But inasmuch as it consists in the moulding of the surface of what encloses round the thing enclosed, place cannot be already subsisting before the body becomes within it, and therefore it will not be in existence then. But it is absurd to say that the same thing both is and is not; therefore place is not ‟the limit of what encloses in so far as it encloses.”

[132] Furthermore, if place is anything, it is either created or uncreate.Now it is not uncreate; for it is brought about, they say, by being moulded round the body within it. Nor yet is it created; for if it is created, it is either when the body is in place that the place, in which the body in place is already said to be, comes into existence, or when the body is not in it.

[133] But it does not come into existence either when the body is in it (for the place of the body within it exists already), or when it is not in it, since, as they assert, the container is moulded round the contained and in this way place becomes, and nothing can be moulded round that which is not within it. But if place does not become either when the body is in place or when it is not therein, and no other alternatives are conceivable, then place is not created at all. And if it is neither created nor uncreate, it has no existence.

[134] These objections may also be stated more generally.¹¹⁵ If place is anything, it is either corporeal or incorporeal; but each of these alternatives is, as we have shown, disputed; therefore place is in dispute. Place is conceived in relation to the body whereof it is the place; but the doctrine of the reality of body is disputed, therefore that of place is likewise disputable. The place of each thing is not eternal, but if we say that it becomes it is found to be unreal as becoming does not exist.

[135] It is possible to adduce many other arguments. But in order to avoid prolonging our exposition, we may conclude by saying that while the Sceptics are put to confusion by the arguments, they are also put to shame by the evidence¹¹⁶ of experience. Consequently we attach ourselves to neither side, so far as concerns the doctrines of the Dogmatists, but suspend judgement regarding place.

Chapter XIX.—Concerning Time

[136] Our attitude is the same with respect to the inquiry about time. For if we depend on appearances, time seems to be something, but if we depend on the arguments about it, it appears unreal. Some¹¹⁷ define time as ‟the interval of the motion of the Whole” (meaning by ‟Whole” the Universe), others¹¹⁸ as ‟the actual motion of the Universe;” Aristotle (or, as some say, Plato) as ‟the number of the prior and posterior in motion;”

[137] Strato (or, as some say, Aristotle) as ‟the measure of motion and rest;” Epicurus (according to Demetrius the Laconian¹¹⁹) as ‟a concurrence of concurrences, concomitant with days and nights and seasons and affections and non-affections and motions and rests.”

[138] And, in point of substance, some have affirmed that it is corporeal —for instance, Aenesidemus, arguing that it differs in nothing from Being and the prime body,—others,¹²⁰ that it is incorporeal. Either, then, all these theories are true, or all false, or some true and some false; but they cannot all be true (most of them being in conflict), nor will it be granted by the Dogmatists that all are false.

[139] And besides, should it be granted that the assertion of the corporeality of time is false, and that of its incorporeality likewise false, then, ipso facto, the unreality of time will be granted; for it cannot be anything but one or other of these. Nor yet can we apprehend which theories are true, which false, owing to the equal weight¹²¹ of the rival opinions as well as the perplexity regarding the criterion and proof.¹²²

[140] Hence for these reasons we shall be unable to affirm anything positively about time.

Further, since time does not seem to subsist without motion or even rest, if motion is abolished, and likewise rest, time is abolished. None the less the following objections against time are made by some. If time exists, it is either limited or unlimited.

[141] But if it is limited, it began at a certain time and will end at a certain time. Consequently, there was once a time when time was not (before it began), and there will once be a time when time will not be (after it has ended); which is absurd.¹²³ So then time is not limited.

[142] But if it is unlimited, since part of it is said to be past, part present, and part future, the future and past are either existent or non-existent. But if they are non-existent, and there remains only the present, which is momentary, time will be limited and the original difficulties¹²⁴ will follow. And if the past exists and the future exists, each of these will be present. But it is absurd to call past and future time present; neither, then, is time unlimited. But if it is neither unlimited nor limited, time does not exist at all.

[143] Further, if time exists it is either divisible or indivisible. Now it is not indivisible; for it is divided, as they themselves declare, into present, past, and future. Yet it is not divisible either. For each divisible thing is measured by some part of itself, the measure coinciding with each part of the measured, as when we measure a cubit by a finger. But time cannot be measured by any part of itself. If, for instance, the present measures the past, it will coincide with the past and will therefore be past, and similarly it will be future in the case of the future. And if the future should measure the rest, it will be present and past, and so likewise the past will be future and present; which is nonsense. Neither, then, is time divisible. But if it is neither indivisible nor divisible, it does not exist.

[144] Time, too, is said to be tripartite, partly past, partly present, and partly future. Of these the past and the future are non-existent; for if past and future time exist now, each of them will be present. Neither is the present existent; for if present time exists it is either indivisible or divisible. Now it is not indivisible; for what changes is said to change in the present time, but nothing changes in indivisible time¹²⁵—iron, for instance, into softness, and so on. Hence present time is not indivisible.

[145] Neither is it divisible; for it could not be divided into a plurality of presents, since time present is said to change into time past imperceptibly owing to the rapid flux of the things in the Universe. Nor yet into past and future; for so it will be unreal, having one part of itself no longer existent and the other part not yet existent.

[146] Hence, too, the present cannot be the end of the past and the beginning of the future, since then it will both be and not be existent; for it will exist as present, but will not exist because its parts are non-existent. Therefore it is not divisible either. But if the present is neither indivisible nor divisible, it does not exist. And when neither the present nor the past nor the future exists, time too is non-existent; for what is compounded of things unreal is unreal.

[147] This argument, too, is alleged against time: If time exists it is either generable and perishable or ingenerable and imperishable.¹²⁶ Now it is not ingenerable and imperishable, since part of it is said to be past and no longer in existence, and part to be future and not yet in existence. Neither is it generable and perishable.

[148] For things generated must be generated from something existent, and things which perish must perish into something existent, according to the postulates of the Dogmatists themselves.¹²⁷ If, then, time perishes into the past, it perishes into a non-existent; and if it is generated out of the future, it is generated out of a non-existent; for neither of these is in existence. But it is absurd to say that anything is generated from a non-existent or perishes into the non-existent. Therefore time is not generable and perishable. But if it is neither ingenerable and imperishable nor generable and perishable, it does not exist at all.

[149] Further, since everything which becomes seems to become in time, time, if it becomes, becomes in time. Either, then, it becomes itself in itself or as one time in another. But if it becomes in itself, it will be at once both existent and non-existent. For since that within which a thing becomes must exist before the thing which becomes within it, the time which becomes in itself does not yet exist in so far as it becomes, but does already exist in so far as it becomes in itself.¹²⁸ Consequently it does not become in itself.

[150] Nor yet in another. For if the present becomes in the future, the present will be future, and if in the past, it will be past. And the same may be said of all the other times; so that one time does not become in another. But if time neither becomes in itself nor as one time in another it is not generable. And it has been shown that it is not ingenerable either. Being, then, neither generable nor ingenerable, it is wholly non-existent; for each existing thing is bound to be either generable or ingenerable.

Chapter XX.—Concerning Number

[151] Since time, it seems, is not found apart from number, it will not be out of place to discuss number briefly.¹²⁹ In the customary way we speak undogmatically¹³⁰ of numbering a thing and hear number talked of as something which exists; but the extreme methods of the Dogmatists have provoked the attack upon number also.

[152] Thus, for example, the School of Pythagoras declare that numbers are also elements of the Universe. They assert, in fact, that phenomena are constructed from something, and that the elements must be simple; therefore the elements are non-evident. But of things non-evident, some are corporeal, like atoms and masses, others incorporeal, like figures¹³¹ and forms and numbers. Of these the corporeal are composite, being constructed from length and breadth and depth and solidity, or even weight. The elements, therefore, are not only non- evident but also incorporeal.

[153] Moreover, each of the incorporeals involves the perception of number, for it is either one or two or more. Thus it is inferred that the non-evident and incorporeal numbers which are involved in all perception are the elements of existing things. Yet not simply these numbers, but both the Monad also and the Indefinite Dyad which is generated by the expansion of the Monad, and by participation in which the particular dyads become dyads.¹³²

[154] For they say that it is from these that the rest of the numbers are generated—those, that is, which are involved in the perception of numerables—and the Universe is arranged. For the point presents the relation, or character, of the Monad,¹³³ and the line that of the Dyad (it being regarded as lying between two points), and the surface that of the Triad (for they describe it as a flowing of the line breadth-wise up to another point placed transversely), and the solid body that of the Tetrad; for Body is formed by an ascension of the surface up to a point placed above.

[155] It is in this way that they image forth both the bodies and the whole Universe, which also they declare to be arranged according to harmonic ratios¹³⁴—namely, that of the ‟By-Fours,” which is ‟epitrite,” as is the ratio of 8 to 6; and that of the “ By-Fives,” which is one and a half times, as is the ratio of 9 to 6; and that of the ‟By-Alls,” which is double, as is the ratio of 12 to 6.

[156] These are the fictions they imagine; and they also make out that number is something else apart from numerables, arguing that if ‟animal” according to its proper definition¹³⁵ is (say) one, the plant, since it is not an animal, will not be one; but the plant is one; therefore the animal is not one qua animal but in virtue of some other attribute perceived outside itself, whereof each animal partakes and because of which it becomes one. And if number is the numerables, since the numerables are men (say) and oxen and horses, number will be men and oxen and horses—and number will be white and black and bearded, if the objects counted should happen to be such.

[157] But these things are absurd; therefore number is not the numerables, but it has a reality of its own apart from them whereby it is involved in the perception of the numerables and is an element.

So when they had thus concluded that number is not the numerables, there arose in consequence the difficulty about number. For it is argued that if number exists, number is either the actual numerables or something else apart from them; but number is neither the actual numerables, as the Pythagoreans have proved, nor something else apart from them, as we shall show; number, therefore, is nothing.

[158] That number is nothing apart from the numerables we shall demonstrate by basing our argument on the Monad, for the sake of lucidity of exposition.¹³⁶ If the Monad, by partaking in which each of its participants becomes one, is in itself a real object, this Monad will be either one or as many as are its participants. But if it is one, does each of the things said to partake thereof partake of all of it or of a part of it? For if the one man (say) takes all the Monad, there will no longer exist a monad for the one horse to partake of, or the one dog or any one of all the other things which we declare to be one

[159] —just as, supposing there are a number of naked men, who possess only one garment amongst them, which one man had put on, all the rest will remain naked and without a garment. And if each thing partakes of a part of it, then, in the first place, the Monad will have a part. and parts, too, infinite in number into which it is divided; which is absurd. And further, just as the part of the Decad, such as the Dyad, is not a Decad, so neither will the part of the Monad be a Monad, and for this reason nothing will partake of the Monad. Hence the Monad whereof the particular objects are said to partake is not one.

[160] But if the monads, by participation in which each of the particular objects is called one, are equal in number to the numerables to which the term ‟one” is applied, the monads partaken of will be infinite in number. And these either partake of a superior¹³⁷ monad or of monads equal in number to themselves, or else they do not so partake but are monads apart from any participation.

[161] Yet if these can be monads without participation, each of the sensibles also will be able to be one without participation in a monad, and so at once the monad said to be perceived as real in itself is overthrown. Whereas, if those monads are monads by participation, either they all partake of one monad, or each partakes of a monad of its own. And if all partake of one, each will be said to partake either of a part or of the whole, and the original difficulties will still remain;

[162] but if each partakes of its own monad, we must posit a new monad for each of those monads, and others again for the former, and so on ad infinitum. If then, in order to apprehend that there are certain self-sub-sistent monads by participation in which each existing thing is one, it is necessary to apprehend an infinite infinity of intelligible monads, and to apprehend an infinite infinity of intelligible monads is a thing impossible, then it is impossible to show that there are certain intelligible monads and that each existing thing is one through becoming one by participation in its own monad.

[163] It is absurd, therefore, to say that the monads are as numerous as the things which partake of them. But if the so-called self-subsistent monad is neither one nor as many as its participants, a self-subsistent monad does not exist at all. So likewise none of the other numbers will be self-subsistent; for one may apply to all the numbers the argument which has now been employed in the typical case of the monad. But if number is neither self-subsistent, as we have shown, nor consists in the actual numerables, as the Pythagoreans have demonstrated, and beyond these there is no other alternative, then we must declare that number does not exist.

[164] In what way, too, is the Dyad said to be generated from the Monad by those who believe that number is something else apart from the numerables? For when we combine a monad with another monad either something external is added to the monads, or something is subtracted from them, or nothing is either added or subtracted. But if nothing is either added or subtracted, there will not be a Dyad. For neither did the monads, when existing apart from each other, contain the Dyad as involved in the perception of them, according to their own definition, nor has any addition now been made to them from without, just as, by hypothesis, nothing has been subtracted.

[165] Hence the combination of the monad with the monad will not be a dyad, as no addition or subtraction from without takes place. But if subtraction does take place, not only will there not be a dyad but the monads will even be diminished. And if the dyad is added to them from without, so that a dyad may be generated from the monads, the things which appear to be two will be four; for there exists already a monad and a second monad, and when an outside dyad is added to these the result will be the number four.

[166] And the same argument applies to all the other numbers which are said to be formed as a result of combination.

If, then, the numbers which are said to be compounded from the superior¹³⁸ numbers are formed neither by subtraction nor by addition nor without subtraction and addition, the formation of the number which is said to be independent and apart from the numerables is non-composite. But they themselves make it clear that the numbers formed by combination are not ungenerated by asserting that they are compounded and generated from the superior numbers —from the monad, for example, and the Indefinite Dyad.¹³⁹

[167] So then number does not subsist of itself. But if number neither is conceived as self-existent, nor subsists in the numerables, then, to judge from the subtleties introduced by the Dogmatists, number is nothing.

Let this, then, suffice as an account in outline of what is called the Physical section of philosophy.

Chapter XXI.—Concerning The Ethical Division Of Philosophy

[168] There remains the Ethical division, which is supposed to deal with the distinguishing of things good,¹⁴⁰ bad, and indifferent. In order, then, to treat of this branch also in a summary way, we shall inquire into the reality of things good, bad, and indifferent, explaining first the conception of each.

CHAPTER XXII.—Concerning Things Good, Bad And Indifferent

[169] The Stoics, then, assert that good is ‟utility or not other than utility,” meaning by ‟utility” virtue and right action, and by ‟not other than utility” the good man and the friend. For ‟virtue,” as consisting in a certain state of the ruling principle,¹⁴¹ and ‟right action,” being an activity in accordance with virtue, are exactly ‟utility;” while the good man and the friend are ‟not other than utility.”

[170] For utility is a part of the good man, being his ruling principle. But the wholes, they say, are not the same as the parts (for the man is not a hand), nor are they other than the parts (for without the parts they do not subsist). Wherefore they assert that the wholes are not other than the parts. Hence, since the good man stands in the relation of a whole to his ruling principle, which they have identified with utility, they declare that he is not other than utility.

[171] Hence also they assert that good has three meanings. In one of its meanings, good, they say, is that by which utility may be gained, this being the most principal good¹⁴² and virtue; in another meaning, good is that of which utility is an accidental result, like virtue and virtuous actions; and thirdly, it is that which is capable of being useful; and such is virtue and virtuous action and the good man and the friend, and gods and good daemons; so that the second signification of good is inclusive of the first signification, and the third of both the second and the first.

[172] But some define good as ‟what is to be chosen for its own sake;”¹⁴³ and others as ‟that which contributes to happiness or is supplementary thereto;” and happiness, as the Stoics declare, is ‟the smooth current of life.”

These, or such as these, are their statements with reference to the notion of the Good.

[173] But in describing as good what is useful or what is choiceworthy for its own sake or what is contributory to happiness, one is not exhibiting the essence of the good but stating one of its properties. And this is senseless. For the properties aforesaid belong either to the good only or to other things as well. But if they belong to other things as well, they are not, when thus extended, characteristic marks of the good; while if they belong only to the Good, it is not possible for us to derive from them a notion of the good.

[174] For just as the man who has no notion of ‟horse” has no knowledge of what ‟neighing” is and cannot arrive thereby at a notion of ‟horse,” unless he should first meet with a neighing horse, so too one who is seeking the essence of the good, because he has no knowledge of the good, cannot perceive the attribute which is peculiar to it alone in order that he may be enabled thereby to gain a notion of the good itself. For he must first learn the nature of the good itself, and then pass on to apprehend that it is useful, and that it is choiceworthy for its own sake, and that it is productive of happiness.

[175] But that the aforesaid attributes are not sufficient to indicate the concept and the real nature of the good is made plain by the practice of the Dogmatists. All, probably, agree that the good is useful and that it is choiceworthy (so that the good is said to be, as it were, ‟the delightful”¹⁴⁴) and that it is productive of happiness; but when asked what the thing is to which these properties belong, they plunge into a truceless war, some saying it is virtue, others pleasure, others painlessness,¹⁴⁵ and others something else. And yet, if the essence of the good had been proved from the foregoing definitions, they would not have been at feud as though its nature were unknown.

[176] Such, then, is the discord amongst those who are reputed the most eminent of the Dogmatists regarding the notion of the Good; and they have differed likewise regarding Evil, some defining Evil as ‟damage or not other than damage,”¹⁴⁶ others as ‟what is to be shunned for its own sake,” others as ‟what is productive of unhappiness.” But since they express by these phrases not the essence of evil but some of its possible attributes they are involved in the logical impasse mentioned above.

[177] The term ‟indifferent,” they say, is used in three senses—in one sense, of that which is an object of neither inclination nor disinclination, as for instance the fact that the stars or the hairs of the head are even in number; in another sense, of that which is an object of inclination or disinclination, but not towards this particular object any more than towards that, as in the case of two indistinguishable tetradrachms, when one has to choose one of them; for there arises an inclination to choose one of them, but not this one more than that one; and a third sense of the term ‟indifferent” is, they say, ‟that which contributes neither to happiness nor to unhappiness,” as health, or wealth; for what a man may use now well, now ill, that, they say, is indifferent, and they claim to discuss it specially in their Ethics.

[178] But what view we ought to take regarding this conception is plain from what we have already said about things good and evil.

Thus, then, it is plain that they have not guided us to a clear conception of the several things above- mentioned; yet, in thus failing with regard to matters that, perhaps, have no real existence, their experience is by no means strange. For there are some who argue on the following grounds that nothing is by nature¹⁴⁷ either good or evil or indifferent.

Chapter XXIII.—Is Anything By Nature Good, Bad, Or Indifferent?

[179] Fire which heats by nature appears to all as heating, and snow which chills by nature appears to all as chilling, and all things which move by nature move equally all those who are, as they say, in a natural condition. But none of the so-called ‟goods,” as we shall show, moves all men as being good; therefore no natural good exists. And that none of the so-called goods moves all men alike is, they assert, an evident fact.

[180] For, not to mention ordinary folk—of whom some regard right bodily condition as good, others chambering, others gluttony, others drunkenness, others gambling, others greed, and others still worse things,—some of the philosophers themselves (such as the Peripatetics) say that there are three kinds of goods;¹⁴⁸ of these some concern the soul, like the virtues, others the body, like health and similar things, while others are external, such as friends, wealth and the like.

[181] The Stoics themselves, too, assert that there is a trinity¹⁴⁹ of goods; of these some have to do with the soul, like the virtues, others are external, like the good man and the friend, while others are neither of the soul nor external, as for instance the good man in relation to himself; but they deny that the bodily states, which the Peripatetics declare to be goods, are goods. And some have accepted pleasure as a good, whereas some affirm that it is a downright evil, so that one professor of philosophy¹⁵⁰ actually exclaimed, ‟I would sooner be mad than merry.”

[182] If, then, things which move by nature move all men alike, while we are not all moved alike by the so-called goods, there is nothing good by nature. In fact it is impossible to believe either all the views now set forth, because of their conflicting character, or any one of them. For he who asserts that one must believe this view, but not that, becomes a party to the controversy, since he has opposed to him the arguments of those who take the rival view, and therefore he himself, along with the rest, will need an adjudicator instead of pronouncing judgement on others. And as there does not exist any agreed criterion or proof¹⁵¹ owing to the unsettled controversy about these matters, he will be reduced to suspending judgement, and consequently he will be unable to affirm positively what the good by nature is.

[183] Further, it is asserted by some that Good is either the Choice¹⁵² itself or that which we choose. Now Choice is not good according to its proper meaning; else we would not have been hurrying to obtain that which we choose, for fear of losing the power of continuing to choose it; for example, if the seeking to get drink were good, we would not have hurried to obtain drink; for when we have enjoyed it we are quit of seeking to get it. So, too, with hunger and love and the rest. Choice, then, is not choiceworthy in itself, even if it is not actually disagreeable; for in fact the hungry man hurries to partake of food in order to get quit of the discomfort due to his hunger; and so likewise the man in love and the thirsty man.

[184] But neither is the good the choiceworthy. For this is either external to us or in connexion with us. But if it is external to us either it produces in us a soothing motion and a welcome condition and a delightful feeling, or it does not affect us at all. And if it is not a delight to us it will not be good,¹⁵³ nor will it attract us to the choosing of it, nor will it be choiceworthy at all. And if there arises within us, from the external object, a congenial condition and an agreeable feeling, it is not for its own sake that the external object will be choiceworthy but for the sake of the internal condition which follows upon it;

[185] so that what is choiceworthy in itself cannot be external. Nor can it be personal to us. For it is said to belong either to the body alone or to the soul alone or to both. But if it belongs to the body alone, it will elude our perception; for our perceptions are said to be properties of the soul, and they assert that the body, viewed by itself, is irrational. And if it should be said to extend to the soul also, it would seem to be choiceworthy owing to its affecting the soul and to the agreeable feeling therein; for, according to them, what is judged to be choiceworthy is judged by the intellect and not by the irrational body.

[186] There remains the alternative that the good is in the soul only. But this, too, is impossible if we go by the statements of the Dogmatists. For the soul is, perhaps, actually non-existent;¹⁵⁴ and even if it exists, judging by what they say it is not apprehended, as I have argued in my chapter ‟On the Criterion.” How then could one venture to affirm that something takes place in a thing which he does not apprehend?

[187] But, to pass over these objections, in what manner does the good, according to them, come about in the soul? For certainly, if Epicurus makes the End consist in pleasure and asserts that the soul, like all else, is composed of atoms, it is impossible to explain how in a heap of atoms there can come about pleasure and assent or judgement that this object is choiceworthy and good, that object to be avoided and evil.

Chapter XXIV.—What Is The So-Called Art Of Living?¹⁵⁵

[188] Again, the Stoics declare that goods of the soul are certain arts, namely the virtues. And an art, they say, is ‟a system composed of co-exercised apprehensions,”¹⁵⁶ and the perceptions arise in the ruling principle. But how there takes place in the ruling principle, which according to them is breath,¹⁵⁷ a deposit of perceptions, and such an aggregation of them as to produce art, it is impossible to conceive, when each succeeding impression obliterates the previous one, seeing that breath is fluid and it is said to move as a whole at each impression.

[189] For it is perfect nonsense to say that Plato’s imaginary construction of the soul—I mean the mixture of the indivisible and the divisible essence and of the nature of the Other and of the Same,¹⁵⁸ or the Numbers—is capable of being receptive of the Good. Hence the good cannot belong to the soul either.

[190] But if the good is not choice itself, and what is choiceworthy in itself neither exists externally nor belongs to either body or soul—as I have argued, —then there does not exist at all any natural good.

For the foregoing reasons also there exists no natural evil. For things which seem to some to be evil are pursued as goods by others—for instance, incontinence, injustice, avarice, intemperance, and the like. Hence, if it is the nature of things naturally existent to move all men alike, whereas the things said to be evil do not move all alike, nothing is naturally evil.

[191] Similarly there is nothing naturally indifferent, because of the divergence of opinion about things indifferent. The Stoics, for example, assert that of the indifferents some are preferred, some rejected, and others neither preferred nor rejected,¹⁵⁹—the preferred being such as have sufficient value, like health and wealth; the rejected such as have not sufficient value, like poverty and sickness; while extending the finger or bending it in are cases of the neither preferred nor rejected.

[192] Some, however, maintain that none of the indifferents is by nature preferred or rejected; for, owing to the differences in the circumstances, each of the indifferents appears at one time preferred, at another rejected. For certainly, they argue, if the rich were being threatened with attack by a tyrant while the poor were being left in peace, everyone would prefer to be poor rather than rich, so that wealth would be a thing rejected.

[193] Consequently,since of each of the so-called indifferents some say that it is good, others bad, whereas all alike would have counted it indifferent had it been naturally indifferent, there is nothing that is naturally indifferent.

So also, should anyone declare that courage is naturally choiceworthy because lions seem to be naturally bold and courageous, bulls too, it may be, and some men and cocks, we reply that, as for that, cowardice also is one of the things naturally choiceworthy, since deer and hares and many other animals are naturally impelled thereto. The majority of men, too, show themselves to be cowardly; for it is rare for a man to give himself up to death for the sake of his country,¹⁶⁰ or to seem inspired to do any other daring deed, the great majority of mankind being averse to all such actions.

[194] Hence, also, the Epicureans suppose themselves to have proved that pleasure is naturally choiceworthy; for the animals, they say, as soon as they are born, when still unperverted, seek after pleasure and avoid pains.

[195] But to these we may reply that what is productive of evil cannot be naturally good; but pleasure is productive of evils; for to every pleasure there is linked a pain, and pain, according to them, is a natural evil. Thus, for example, the drunkard feels pleasure when filling himself with wine, and the glutton with food, and the lecher in immoderate sexual intercourse, yet these things are productive of both poverty and sickness, which, as they say, are painful and evil. Pleasure, therefore, is not a natural good.

[196] Similarly, too, what is productive of good is not naturally evil, and pains bring about pleasures; it is, in fact, by toil that we acquire knowledge, and it is thus also that a man becomes possessed both of wealth and of his lady-love, and pains preserve health. Toil, then, is not naturally evil. Indeed if pleasure were naturally good, and toil bad, all men, as we said, would have been similarly disposed towards them, whereas we see many of the philosophers choosing toil and hardship and despising pleasure.

[197] And so, too, those who assert that the virtuous life is naturally good might be refuted by the fact that some of the sages choose the life which includes pleasure,¹⁶¹ so that the claim that a thing is by nature of this sort or that is contradicted by the divergence of opinion amongst the Dogmatists themselves.

[198] And perhaps it may not be amiss, in addition to what has been said, to dwell more in detail, though briefly, on the notions concerning things shameful and not shameful, unholy and not so, laws and customs, piety towards the gods, reverence for the departed, and the like. For thus we shall discover a great variety of belief concerning what ought or ought not to be done.

[199] For example,¹⁶² amongst us sodomy is regarded as shameful or rather illegal, but by the Germani,¹⁶³ they say, it is not looked on as shameful but as a customary thing. It is said, too, that in Thebes long ago this practice was not held to be shameful, and they say that Meriones the Cretan was so called by way of indicating the Cretans’ custom,¹⁶⁴ and some refer to this the burning love of Achilles for Patroclus.¹⁶⁵

[200] And what wonder, when both the adherents of the Cynic philosophy and the followers of Zeno of Citium, Cleanthes and Chrysippus, declare that this practice is indifferent?¹⁶⁶ Having intercourse with a woman, too, in public, although deemed by us to be shameful, is not thought to be shameful by some of the Indians; at any rate they couple publicly with indifference, like the philosopher Crates, as the story goes.

[201] Moreover, prostitution is with us a shameful and disgraceful thing, but with many of the Egyptians it is highly esteemed; at least, they say that those women who have the greatest number of lovers wear an ornamental ankle-ring as a token of their proud position.¹⁶⁷ And with some of them the girls marry after collecting a dowry before marriage by means of prostitution. We see the Stoics also declaring that it is not amiss to keep company with a prostitute or to live on the profits of prostitution.

[202] Moreover, with us tattooing is held to be shameful and degrading, but many of the Egyptians and Sarmatians tattoo their offspring.

[203] Also, it is a shameful thing with us for men to wear earrings, but amongst some of the barbarians, like the Syrians, it is a token of nobility. And some, by way of marking their nobility still further, pierce the nostrils also of their children and suspend from them rings of silver or gold—a thing which nobody with us would do,

[204] just as no man here would dress himself in a flowered robe reaching to the feet, although this dress, which with us is thought shameful, is held to be highly respectable by the Persians. And when, at the Court of Dionysius the tyrant of Sicily, a dress of this description was offered to the philosophers Plato and Aristippus,¹⁶⁸ Plato sent it away with the words—

A man am I, and never could I don

A woman’s garb;
but Aristippus accepted it, saying—

For e’en midst revel-routs

She that is chaste will keep her purity.
Thus, even in the case of these sages, while the one of them deemed this practice shameful, the other did not.

[205] And with us it is sinful to marry one’s mother or one’s own sister ; but the Persians, and especially those of them who are reputed to practise wisdom— namely, the Magi,—marry their mothers; and the Egyptians¹⁶⁹ take their sisters in marriage, even as the poet says¹⁷⁰—

Thus spake Zeus unto Hera, his wedded wife and his

sister.
Moreover, Zeno of Citium says that it is not amiss for a man to rub his mother’s private part with his own private part, just as no one would say it was bad for him to rub any other part of her body with his hand. Chrysippus,¹⁷¹ too, in his book The State approves of a father getting children by his daughter, a mother by her son, and a brother by his sister. And Plato,¹⁷² in more general terms, has declared that wives ought to be held in common.

[206] Masturbation, too, which we count loathsome, is not disapproved by Zeno; and we are informed that others, too, practise this evil as though it were a good thing.

[207] Moreover, the eating of human flesh is sinful with us, but indifferent amongst whole tribes of barbarians.¹⁷³ Yet why should one speak of ‟barbarians” when even Tydeus¹⁷⁴ is said to have devoured the brains of his enemy, and the Stoic School declare that it is not wrong for a man to eat either other men’s flesh or his own?

[208] And with most of us it is sinful to defile an altar of a god with human blood, but the Laconians lash themselves fiercely over the altar of Artemis Orthosia¹⁷⁵ in order that a great stream of blood may flow over the altar of the goddess. Moreover, some sacrifice a human victim to Cronos, just as the Scythians¹⁷⁶ sacrifice strangers to Artemis; whereas we deem that holy places are defiled by the slaying of a man.

[209] Adulterers are, of course, punished by law with us, but amongst some peoples¹⁷⁷ intercourse with other men’s wives is a thing indifferent; and some philosophers,¹⁷⁸ too, declare that intercourse with the wife of another is indifferent.

[210] With us, also, the law enjoins that the fathers should receive due care from their children; but the Scythians cut their throats when they get to be over sixty years old. And what wonder, seeing that Cronos cut off his father’s genitals with a sickle, and Zeus plunged Cronos down to Tartarus, and Athena with the help of Hera and Poseidon attempted to bind her father with fetters?¹⁷⁹

[211] Moreover, Cronos decided to destroy his own children, and Solon gave the Athenians the law ‟concerning things immune,” by which he allowed each man to slay his own child; but with us the laws forbid the slaying of children. The Roman lawgivers also ordain that the children are subjects and slaves of their fathers, and that power over the children’s property belongs to the fathers and not the children, until the children have obtained their freedom like bought slaves; but this custom is rejected by others as being despotic.

[212] It is the law, too, that homicides should be punished; but gladiators when they kill often receive actual commendation. Moreover, the laws prevent the striking of free men; yet when athletes strike free men, and often even kill them, they are deemed worthy of rewards and crowns.

[213] With us, too, the law bids each man to have one wife, but amongst the Thracians and Gaetulians (a Libyan tribe)¹⁸⁰ each man has many wives.

[214] Piracy, too, is with us illegal and criminal, but with many of the barbarians it is not disapproved. Indeed they say that the Cilicians used to regard it as a noble pursuit, so that they held those who died in the course of piracy to be worthy of honour. So too Nestor—in the poet’s account¹⁸¹—after welcoming Telemachus and his comrades, addresses them thus—

Say, are you roaming

Aimlessly, like sea-rovers?
Yet, if piracy had been an improper thing, he would not have welcomed them in this friendly way, because of his suspicion that they might be people of that kind.

[215] Moreover, thieving is with us illegal and criminal; yet those who declare that Hermes is a most thievish god cause this practice to be accounted not criminal— for how could a god be bad? And some say that the Laconians also punished those who thieved, not because they had thieved, but because they had been found out.

[216] Moreover, the coward and the man who throws away his shield are in many places punished by law; and this is why the Laconian mother, when giving a shield to her son as he set out for the war, said, ‟Either with this, my child, or upon it.” Yet Archilochus,¹⁸² as though vaunting to us of his flight after flinging away his shield, speaks thus of himself in his poems—

Over my shield some Saïan warrior gloats,—

The shield I left, though loth, beside the bush—

A flawless piece of armour; I myself

Fled and escaped from death which endeth all.

[217] And the Amazons¹⁸³ used to maim the males amongst their offspring so as to make them incapable of any manly action, while they themselves attended to warfare; though with us the opposite practice is regarded as right. The Mother of the gods,¹⁸⁴ also, approves of effeminates, and the goddess would not have decided thus if unmanliness were naturally a bad thing.

[218] So it is that, in regard to justice and injustice and the excellence of manliness, there is a great variety of opinion.

Around all matters of religion and_ theology also, there rages violent controversy.¹⁸⁵ For while the majority declare that gods exist, some deny their existence, like Diagoras of Melos, and Theodorus, and Critias the Athenian.¹⁸⁶ And of those who maintain the existence of gods, some believe in the ancestral gods, others in such as are constructed in the Dogmatic systems—as Aristotle asserted that God is incorporeal and ‟the limit of heaven,”¹⁸⁷ the Stoics that he is a breath which permeates even through things foul, Epicurus that he is anthropomorphic,¹⁸⁸ Xenophanes that he is an impassive sphere.

[219] Some, too, hold that he cares for human affairs, others that he does not so care; for Epicurus declares that ‟what is blessed and incorruptible neither feels trouble itself nor causes it to others.” Hence ordinary people differ also, some saying that there is one god, others that there are many gods and of various shapes; in fact, they even come to share the notions of the Egyptians¹⁸⁹ who believe in gods that are dog-faced, or hawk-shaped, or cows or crocodiles or anything else.

[220] Hence, too, sacrificial usages, and the ritual of worship in general, exhibit great diversity. For things which are in some cults accounted holy are in others accounted unholy. But this would not have been so if the holy and the unholy existed by nature. Thus, for example, no one would sacrifice a pig to Sarapis, but they sacrifice it to Heracles and Asclepius. To sacrifice a sheep to Isis is forbidden, but it is offered up in honour of the so-called Mother of the gods and of other deities.

[221] To Cronos¹⁹⁰ a human victim is sacrificed at Carthage, although this is regarded by most as an impious act. In Alexandria they offer a cat to Horus and a beetle to Thetis—a thing which no one here would do. To Poseidon they sacrifice a horse; but to Apollo (especially the Didymaean¹⁹¹ Apollo) that animal is an abomination. It is an act of piety to offer goats to Artemis, but not to Asclepius.

[222] And I might add a host of similar instances, but I forbear since my aim is to be brief. Yet surely, if a sacrifice had been holy by nature or unholy, it would have been deemed so by all men alike.

Examples similar to these may also be found in the religious observances with regard to human diet.

[223] For a Jew or an Egyptian priest¹⁹² would sooner die than eat swine’s flesh; by a Libyan it is regarded as a most impious thing to taste the meat of a sheep, by some of the Syrians to eat a dove, and by others to eat sacrificial victims. And in certain cults it is lawful, but in others impious, to eat fish. And amongst the Egyptians some of those who are reputed to be sages believe it is sinful to eat an animal’s head,¹⁹³ others the shoulder, others the foot, others some other part.

[224] And no one would bring an onion¹⁹⁴ as an offering to Zeus Casius of Pelusium,¹⁹⁵ just as no priest of the Libyan Aphrodite would taste garlic. And in some cults they abstain from mint, in others from catmint, in others from parsley. And some declare that they would sooner eat their fathers’ heads than beans.¹⁹⁶

[225] Yet, amongst others, these things are indifferent. Eating dog’s flesh, too, is thought by us to be sinful, but some of the Thracians are reported to be dog-eaters. Possibly this practice was customary also amongst the Greeks; and on this account Diocles, too, starting from the practices of the Asclepiadae,¹⁹⁷ prescribes that hounds’ flesh should be given to certain patients. And some, as I have said,¹⁹⁸ even eat human flesh indifferently, a thing which with us is accounted sinful.

[226] Yet, if the rules of ritual and of unlawful foods had existed by nature, they would have been observed by all men alike.

A similar account may be given of reverence towards the departed.¹⁹⁹ Some wrap the dead up completely and then cover them with earth, thinking that it is impious to expose them to the sun; but the Egyptians take out their entrails and embalm them and keep them above ground with themselves.

[227] The fish-eating tribes of the Ethiopians cast them into the lakes, there to be devoured by the fish; the Hyrcanians²⁰⁰ expose them as a prey to dogs, and some of the Indians to vultures. And they say that some of the Troglodytes²⁰¹ take the corpse to a hill, and then after tying its head to its feet cast stones upon it amidst laughter, and when they have made a heap of stones over it they leave it there.

[228] And some of the barbarians²⁰² slay and eat those who are over sixty years old, but bury in the earth those who die young. Some burn the dead; and of these some recover and preserve their bones,²⁰³ while others show no care but leave them scattered about. And they say that the Persians²⁰⁴ impale their dead and embalm them with nitre, after which they wrap them round in bandages. How much grief others endure for the dead we see ourselves.

[229] Some, too, believe death itself to be dreadful and horrible, others do not. Thus Euripides says:²⁰⁵

Who knows if life be but the state of death,

And death be counted life in realms below?
And Epicurus declares:²⁰⁶ ‟Death is nothing to us; for what is dissolved is senseless, and what is senseless is nothing to us.” They also declare that, inasmuch as we are compounded of soul and body, and death is a dissolution of soul and body, when we exist death does not exist (for we are not being dissolved), and when death exists we do not exist, for through the cessation of the compound of soul and body we too cease to exist.

[230] And Heracleitus²⁰⁷ states that both life and death exist both in our state of life and in our state of death; for when we live our souls are dead and buried within us, and when we die our souls revive and live. And some even suppose that dying is better for us than living. Thus Euripides says;²⁰⁸

Rather should we assemble to bewail

The babe new-born, such ills has he to face;

Whereas the dead, who has surcease from woe,

With joy and gladness we should bear from home.

[231] These lines, too, spring from the same sentiment:²⁰⁹

Not to have been begotten at all were the best thing for

mortals,

Nor to have lookèd upon fiery rays of the sun:

Or, if begotten, to hasten amain to the portals of Hades,

And to lie unmoved robèd in masses of earth.
We know, too, the facts about Cleobis and Biton which Herodotus²¹⁰ relates in his story of the Argive priestess.

[232] It is reported, also, that some of the Thracians sit round the new-born babe and chant dirges.²¹¹ So, then, death should not be considered a thing naturally dreadful, just as life should not be considered a thing naturally good. Thus none of the things mentioned above is naturally of this character or of that, but all are matters of convention and relative.

[233] The same method of treatment may be applied also to each of the other customs, which we have not now described owing to the summary character of our exposition. And even if, in regard to some of them, we are unable to declare their discrepancy offhand, we ought to observe that disagreement concerning them may possibly exist amongst certain nations that are unknown to us.²¹²

[234] For just as, if we had been ignorant, say, of the custom amongst the Egyptians of marrying sisters,²¹³ we should have asserted wrongly that it was universally agreed that men ought not to marry sisters,—even so, in regard to those practices wherein we notice no discrepancy, it is not proper for us to affirm that there is no disagreement about them, since, as I said, disagreement about them may possibly exist amongst some of the nations which are unknown to us.

[235] Accordingly, the Sceptic, seeing so great a diversity of usages, suspends judgement as to the natural existence of anything good or bad or (in general) fit or unfit to be done, therein abstaining from the rashness of dogmatism;²¹⁴ and he follows undogmatically the ordinary rules of life, and because of this he remains impassive in respect of matters of opinion, while in conditions that are necessitated his emotions are moderate;

[236] for though, as a human being, he suffers emotion through his senses, yet because he does not also opine that what he suffers is evil by nature, the emotion he suffers is moderate. For the added opinion that a thing is of such a kind is worse than the actual suffering itself, just as sometimes the patients themselves bear a surgical operation, while the bystanders swoon away because of their opinion that it is a horrible experience.

[237] But, in fact, he who assumes that there exists by nature something good or bad or, generally, fit or unfit to be done, is disquieted in various ways. For when he experiences what he regards as natural evils he deems himself to be pursued by Furies, and when he becomes possessed of what seems to him good things he falls into no ordinary state of disquiet both through arrogance and through fear of losing them, and through trying to guard against finding himself again amongst what he regards as natural evils;

[238] for those who assert that goods are incapable of being lost²¹⁵ we shall put to silence by means of the doubts raised by their dissension. Hence we conclude that if what is productive of evil is evil and to be shunned, and the persuasion that these things are good, those evil, by nature produces disquiet, then the assumption and persuasion that anything is, in its real nature, either bad or good is evil and to be shunned.

For the present, then, this account of things good, evil, and indifferent is sufficient.

Chapter XXV.—Does There Exist An Art Of Living?

[239] It is plain from what has been said above that there can be no art of living.²¹⁶ For if such an art exists, it has to do with the consideration of things good, evil, and indifferent, so that these being non-existent the art of living also is non-existent. Further, since the Dogmatists do not all with one accord lay down one single art of living, but some propound one art, some another, they are guilty of discrepancy and open to the argument from discrepancy which I stated in our discussion of the Good.²¹⁷

[240] Yet, even if they were all to agree in assuming that the art of living is one —such as, for example, the celebrated ‟prudence” whereof the Stoics dream, and which seems to be more convincing than all the rest,—even so equally absurd results will follow. For since ‟prudence” is a virtue, and the Sage alone was in possession of virtue, the Stoics, not being sages,²¹⁸ will not be in possession of the art of living.

[241] And in general, since, according to them, no art²¹⁹ can have real existence, an art of living cannot exist, so far as their statements go.

Thus, for example, they declare that art is ‟a composite of apprehensions,” and apprehension is ‟assent to an apprehensive impression.”²²⁰ But the apprehensive impression is indiscoverable; for every impression is not apprehensive, nor is it possible to decide which one of the impressions is the apprehensive impression, since we cannot simply decide by means of every impression which one is apprehensive and which not, while if we require an apprehensive impression in order to determine which is the apprehensive impression we are wrecked on the ad infinitum fallacy, since we are asking for another apprehensive impression so as to determine the impression taken to be apprehensive.

[242] And herein, too, the procedure of the Stoics, in presenting the notion of the apprehensive impression, is logically unsound; for in stating, on the one hand, that an apprehensive impression is that which is derived from a real object,²²¹ and, on the other hand, that a real object is that which is capable of giving rise to an apprehensive impression, they fall into the fallacy of circular reasoning. If, then, in order that an art of living may exist, there must first exist art, and in order that art may subsist apprehension must pre-exist, and in order that apprehension may subsist assent to an apprehensive impression must be apprehended, but the apprehensive impression is indiscoverable, —then the art of living is indiscoverable.

[243] Another argument is this. Every art appears to be apprehended by means of its own special products, but there is no special product of the art of living; for anything you might mention as its product—such as honouring parents, paying back deposits, and all the rest—is found to be common to ordinary folk as well. Therefore no art of living exists. For we shall not ascertain (as some assert) from the apparent derivation of some speech or operation of the prudent man from a state of prudence that it is a product of prudence.

[244] For the state of prudence itself is inapprehensible, not being directly apparent either of itself or from its products, these being common to ordinary folk as well. And to say that we apprehend the possessor of the art of living by the unvarying quality of his actions²²² is the assertion of those who over-estimate human nature and are visionaries rather than truth- tellers:

As is the day which upon them is brought by the sire

immortal,

So are the minds of mortal men.²²³

[245] There remains the assertion that the art of living is apprehended by means of those effects which they describe in their books; and these being numerous and much alike, I will extract a few of them by way of examples. Thus, for instance, Zeno, the Master of their sect, in his treatises, amongst many other statements regarding the rearing of children, says this: ‟Have carnal knowledge no less and no more of a favourite than of a non-favourite child, nor of a female than of a male; favourite or non-favourite, males or females, no different conduct, but the same, befits and is befitting to all alike.”

[246] And as concerns piety towards parents, the same man states,²²⁴ in reference to the story of Jocasta and Oedipus, that there was nothing dreadful in his rubbing his mother: ‟If she had been ailing in one part of her body and he had done her good by rubbing it with his hands, it had not been shameful; was it, then, shameful for him to stop her grief and give her joy by rubbing other parts, and to beget noble children by his mother?” And with this opinion Chrysippus also agrees. At least he says in his State: ‟I approve of carrying out those practices—which, quite rightly, are customary even nowadays amongst many peoples —according to which a mother has children by her son,²²⁵ the father by his daughter, the brother by his full sister.”

[247] And he proceeds, in the same treatises, to introduce amongst us cannibalism,²²⁶ saying: ‟And if from a living body a part be cut off that is good for food, we should not bury it nor otherwise get rid of it, but consume it, so that from our parts a new part may arise.”

[248] And in his book On Duty he says expressly, regarding the burial of parents: ‟When our parents decease we should use the simplest forms of burial, as though the body—like the nails or teeth or hair—were nothing to us, and we need bestow no care or attention on a thing like it. Hence, also, men should make use of the flesh, when it is good, for food, just as also when one of their own parts, such as the foot, is cut off, it would be proper that it and the like parts should be so used; but when the flesh is not good, they should either bury it and leave it, or burn it up and let the ashes lie, or cast it far away and pay no more regard to it than to nails or hair.”

[249] Of such a kind are most of the philosophers’ theories; but they would not dare to put them into practice unless they lived under the laws of the Cyclopes or Laestrygones.²²⁷ But if they are totally incapable of acting thus, and their actual conduct is common to ordinary folk as well, there is no action peculiar to those who are suspected of possessing the art of living. So then, if the arts must certainly be apprehended by means of their peculiar effects, and no effect is observed that is peculiar to the so-called art of living, this art is not apprehended. Consequently, no one can positively affirm regarding it that it is really existent.

Chapter XXVI.—Does The Art Of Living Arise In Mankind?

[250] Moreover, if the art of living comes into existence in men, it so comes either by nature or through learning and teaching. But if it is by nature, then the art of living will arise in them either in so far as they are men, or in so far as they are not men. Certainly not in so far as they are not men; for it is not a fact that they are not men. But if it is in so far as they are men, then prudence²²⁸ would have belonged to all men, so that all would have been prudent and virtuous and wise. But they describe most men as bad.

[251] Neither, then, in so far as they are men will the art of living belong to them. Therefore it does not accrue by nature. And again, since they insist that art is ‟a system of co-exercised apprehensions,”²²⁹ they make it evident that the art under discussion, as well as all other arts, is acquired rather by some sort of effort and learning.

Chapter XXVII.—Is The Art Of Living Capable Of Being Taught?

[252] But neither is it acquired by teaching and learning. For in order that these should subsist, three things must first be agreed upon—the matter which is being taught, the teacher and the learner, and the method of learning. But none of these subsists; neither, then, does teaching.

Chapter XXVIII.—Does a Matter Of Instruction Exist?

[253] Thus, for instance, the matter of instruction is either true or false; if false it would not be taught; for they assert that falsehood is non-existent, and of non-existents there could be no teaching. Nor yet if it were said to be true; for we have shown in our chapter ‟On the Criterion”²³⁰ that truth is non-existent. If, then, neither the false nor the true is being taught, and besides these there is nothing capable of being taught (for no one, to be sure, will say that, though these are unteachable, he teaches only dubious lessons²³¹), then nothing is taught.

[254] And the matter taught is either apparent or non-evident. But if it is apparent, it will not require teaching; for things apparent appear to all alike. And if it is non-evident, then, since things non-evident are, as we have often shown, inapprehensible owing to the undecided controversy about them, it will be incapable of being taught; for how could anyone teach or learn what he does not apprehend? But if neither the apparent is taught nor the non-evident, nothing is taught.

[255] Again, what is taught is either corporeal or incorporeal, and each of these being either apparent or non-evident is incapable of being taught, according to the argument we have just now stated. Nothing, therefore, is taught.

[256] Further, either the existent is taught or the non- existent. Now the non-existent is not taught; for if the non-existent is taught the non-existent will be true, since teaching is held to be of things true. And if it is true, it will also subsist; for they declare that ‟a true thing is what subsists and is opposed to something.”²³² ‟But it is absurd to say that the non- existent subsists; therefore the non-existent is not taught.

[257] Yet neither is the existent. For if the existent is taught, it is taught either in so far as it is existent or in so far as it is something else. But if it is to be taught in so far as it is existent, it will be one of the existing things, and therefore a thing incapable of being taught; for teaching ought to proceed from certain acknowledged facts which require no teaching.²³³ Therefore the existent, in so far as it is existent, is not capable of being taught.

[258] Nor, in fact, in so far as it is something else. For the existent has not anything else which is non-existent attached to it, so that if the existent in so far as it is existent is not taught, neither will it be taught in so far as it is something else; for whatsoever thing is attached to it is existent. And further, whether the existent thing which, they will say, is taught be apparent or non-evident, as it is subject to the absurdities we have stated, it will be incapable of being taught. But if neither the existent nor the non-existent is taught, there is nothing that is taught.

Chapter XXIX.—Do The Teacher And The Learner Exist?

[259] Now with the refutation of this is involved that of both the teacher and the learner; though they are just as much open to doubt on their own account. For either the expert artist teaches the expert, or the non-expert the non-expert, or the non-expert the expert, or the expert the non-expert. Now the expert does not teach the expert; for neither of them, qua expert, needs teaching. Nor does the non-expert teach the non-expert, any more than the blind can lead the blind.²³⁴ Nor the non-expert the expert, for it would be ridiculous.

[260] The only thing left is to say that the expert teaches the non-expert; and this, too, is a thing impossible. For it is declared to be wholly impossible that an expert artist should exist, since neither do we see anyone existing spontaneously and from birth as an expert, nor does anyone turn into an expert from being a non-expert. For either one lesson and one apprehension can make an expert of the non-expert or they cannot do so at all.²³⁵

[261] But if one apprehension makes the non-expert an expert, it will be open to us to declare, firstly, that art is not a system of apprehensions;²³⁶ for the man who knows nothing at all would be termed an expert if only he were taught a single lesson of art. And, secondly, should anyone assert that, as soon as a man who has acquired some principles of art and still needs one more, and because of this is non-expert, acquires also that one principle, he at once becomes an expert instead of a non-expert by means of one apprehension, he will be making a random assertion.²³⁷

[262] For in the case of individual men we could not point to one who, being still a non-expert, will become an expert by acquiring one additional principle; for no one, to be sure, has such a command of the numeration of the principles of each art as to be able to say, by numbering off the known principles, how many are still needed to make up the full number of the principles of the art. So then the learning of one principle does not make the non-expert an expert.

[263] But if this is true, seeing that no one acquires all the principles of the arts at once, but each .one singly, if at all—this point also being granted by way of assumption—the man who is said to acquire the principles of the art one by one will not be termed an expert; for we recall the conclusion that the learning of one principle cannot make an expert of the non- expert. No one, then, becomes an expert from being a non-expert. Hence, on these grounds too, the expert artist appears to be non-existent. And therefore the teacher also.

[264] Neither can the so-called learner, if he is non- expert, learn and apprehend the principles of the art wherein he is non-expert. For just as the man who is blind from birth, in so far as he is blind, will not acquire perception of colours, nor, similarly, he who is deaf from birth, of sound,²³⁸ so too the non-expert will not apprehend the principles of the art wherein he is non-expert. For should he do so the same man would be both expert and non-expert in the same things—non-expert since he is such by hypothesis, and expert since he has apprehension of the principles of the art. Hence, neither does the expert teach the non-expert.

[265] But if neither the expert teaches the expert, nor the non-expert the non- expert, nor the non-expert the expert, nor the expert the non-expert, and these are all the alternatives possible, then neither the teacher exists nor the taught.

Chapter XXX.—Does There Exist Any Method Of Learning?

[265] And if neither the learner nor the teacher exists, the method of teaching also is abolished.

[266] And it is no less disputed on the following grounds. The method of teaching comes to exist either by ocular evidence or by speech;²³⁹ but it does not come to exist either by ocular evidence or by speech, as we shall show; therefore the method of learning also is not easy to discover.

Now teaching does not come by ocular evidence, since ocular evidence consists in things exhibited. But what is exhibited is apparent to all; and the apparent, qua apparent, is perceptible by all; and what is perceptible by all in common is incapable of being taught; therefore nothing is capable of being taught by ocular evidence.

[267] Nor, in fact, is anything taught by speech. For speech either signifies something or signifies nothing. But if it signifies nothing, neither will it be capable of teaching anything. And if it signifies something, it does so either by nature or by convention. But it is not significant by nature²⁴⁰ because all men do not understand all when they hear them, as is the case with Greeks hearing barbarians talk or barbarians hearing Greeks.

[268] And if it is significant by convention, evidently those who have grasped beforehand the objects to which the several words are assigned will perceive those objects, not through being taught by the words things of which they were ignorant, but by recollecting and recovering things which they knew; whereas those who require to learn what they do not know, and who are ignorant of the objects to which the words are assigned, will have no perception of anything.

[269] Consequently, the method of learning also will be incapable of subsisting. For, in fact, the teacher ought to impart to the learner an apprehension of the principles of the art he is teaching, so that the latter by apprehending them as a system may thus become an expert artist. But, as we have shown above,²⁴¹ apprehension is nothing; therefore also the method of teaching cannot subsist. But if neither the matter taught exists, nor the teacher and the learner, nor the method of learning, then neither learning exists nor teaching.

[270] Such, then, are the objections put forward regarding learning and teaching in general. And the same difficulties may also be alleged in the case of the so-called art of living. Thus, for instance, we have shown above²⁴² that the matter taught, namely prudence, is non-existent; and both the teacher and the learner are non-existent. For either the prudent man will teach the prudent the art of living, or the imprudent the imprudent, or the imprudent the prudent, or the prudent the imprudent; but none of these teaches any other; therefore the so-called art of living is not taught.

[271] Probably it is superfluous even to refer to the other cases; but if the prudent man teaches prudence to the imprudent, and prudence is ‟knowledge²⁴³ of things good and evil and neither,” the imprudent man, as he does not possess prudence, possesses ignorance of the things that are good and evil and neither; and since he possesses nothing but ignorance thereof, when the prudent man teaches him what things are good and evil and neither, he will merely hear what is said and will not get to know the things. For if he should grasp them while in a state of imprudence, then imprudence too will be capable of perceiving what things are good and evil and neither.

[272] But, according to them, imprudence is certainly not capable of perceiving these things, since, if it were, the imprudent man will be prudent. Therefore, according to the definition of prudence, the imprudent man does not grasp what is said or done by the prudent. And, as he fails to grasp, he will not be taught by him, especially since, as we have said above, he cannot be taught either by ocular evidence or by means of speech. But, in fine, if the so-called art of living is not imparted to anyone either by means of learning and teaching or by nature, then the art of living, so harped on by the philosophers, is indiscoverable.

[273] Yet even were one to grant, as an act of bounty, that this visionary art of living is imparted to someone, it will show itself to be hurtful to its possessors, and a cause of perturbation, rather than beneficial.

Chapter XXXI.—Does The Art Of Living Benefit Its Possessor?

[273] Thus, for instance—to take a few arguments out of many by way of example—the art of living might be thought to benefit the wise man by furnishing him with temperance²⁴⁴ in his impulses towards good and repulsions from evil.

[274] He, then, who is termed by them a temperate sage is called temperate either in virtue of his never feeling the impulse towards good or repulsion from evil,²⁴⁵ or in virtue of his possessing slight impulses in either direction and overcoming them by reason.

[275] But in respect of his freedom from bad resolutions he will not be self-controlled; for he will not control what he does not possess. And just as one would not call a eunuch temperate in sex- indulgence, or a man with a poor stomach temperate in respect of the pleasures of the table (for they feel no attraction at all towards such things, so that they might rise superior to the attraction through temperance), —in the same way we ought not to term the sage temperate, because he possesses no natural feeling over which he may exercise control.

[276] And if they shall claim that he is temperate in virtue of his forming bad resolutions but overcoming them by reason, then, firstly, they will be admitting that prudence was of no benefit to him just when he was in a state of perturbation and needed assistance, and, secondly, he is found to be even more unfortunate than those they term bad.²⁴⁶ For if he feels an impulse towards anything, he is certainly perturbed; while if he overcomes it by reason, he retains the evil, and because of this he is more perturbed than the bad man who no longer experiences this feeling; for the latter,

[277] though he is perturbed if he is feeling an impulse, yet ceases from his perturbation if he gains his desires.

So, then, the sage does not become temperate in virtue of his prudence; or if he does become so, he is of all men the most miserable, so that the art of living has brought him no benefit but the uttermost perturbation. And we have shown above²⁴⁷ that the man who believes that he possesses the art of living, and that by means of it he discerns what things are naturally good and what bad, is extremely perturbed both when good things are his and when evil things.

[278] We must, then, declare that, if there is no agreement as to the existence of things good and bad and indifferent, and the art of living is possibly non- existent, or—if its existence is provisionally admitted —brings no benefit to its possessors but, on the contrary, causes them extreme perturbations, then the Dogmatists would seem to be vainly puffed up in respect of the so-called Ethical division of what they term ‟philosophy.”

[279] Having now treated of the subject of Ethics also at sufficient length for an account in outline, we conclude at this point our third book, and with it the complete treatise on ‟Pyrrhonean Outlines,” adding only this final section:

Chapter XXXII.—Why The Sceptic Sometimes Purposely Propounds Arguments Which Are Lacking In Power Of Persuasion

[280] The Sceptic, being a lover of his kind, desires to cure by speech, as best he can, the self-conceit and rashness²⁴⁸ of the Dogmatists. So, just as the physicians who cure bodily ailments have remedies which differ in strength, and apply the severe ones to those whose ailments are severe and the milder to those mildly affected,—so too the Sceptic propounds arguments which differ in strength,

[281] and employs those which are weighty and capable by their stringency of disposing of the Dogmatists' ailment, self-conceit, in cases where the mischief is due to a severe attack of rashness, while he employs the milder arguments in the case of those whose ailment of conceit is superficial and easy to cure, and whom it is possible to restore to health by milder methods of persuasion. Hence the adherent of Sceptic principles does not scruple to propound at one time arguments that are weighty in their persuasiveness, and at another time such as appear less impressive,—and he does so on purpose, as the latter are frequently sufficient to enable him to effect his object.

Notes on the current edition

Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes

1. 1 concediemus Τ 24 epimonibus Τ

Stable identifiers

Citation URI: http://catalog.perseus.org/citations/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0544.tlg001.opp-lat1:3

Text URI: http://catalog.perseus.org/texts/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0544.tlg001.opp-lat1

Work URI: http://catalog.perseus.org/texts/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0544.tlg001

Catalog Record URI: http://catalog.perseus.org/catalog/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0544.tlg001.opp-lat1

Search the Perseus Catalog for:

Search the Perseus Catalog for:

Specimen Translationis latinae.

Current edition

ΠYPPΩΝΕΙΩΝ ΥΠΟΤΥΠΩΣΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΕΙΣ TPIA ΤΟ TPITON.

α′ περὶ τοῦ φυσικοῦ μέρους.

β′ περὶ ἀρχῶν δραστικῶν.

γ′ περὶ θεοῦ.

δ′ περὶ αἰτίου.

ε′ εἴ ἐστι τὶ τινὸς αἴτιον.

ς′ περὶ ὑλικῶν ἀρχῶν.

ζ′ εἰ καταληπτὰ τὰ σώματα.

η′ περὶ κράσεως.

θ′ περὶ κινήσεως.

ι′ περὶ τῆς μεταβατικῆς κινήσεως.

ια′ περὶ αὐξήσεως καὶ μειώσεως.

ιβ′ περὶ ἀφαιρέσεως καὶ προσθέσεως.

ιγ′ περὶ μεταθέσεως.

ιδ′ περὶ ὅλου καὶ μέρους.

ιε′ περὶ φυσικῆς μεταβολῆς.

ις′ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς.

ιζ′ περὶ μονῆς.

ιη′ περὶ τόπου.

ιθ′ περὶ χρόνου.

κ′ περὶ ἀριθμοῦ.

κα′ περὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ μέρους τῆς φιλοσοφίας.

κβ′ περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἅδ’ ιαφόρων.

κγ′ εἰ ἔστι τι φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀδιάφορον.

κδ′ τί ἐστιν ἡ λεγομένη τέχνη περὶ βίον.

κε′ εἰ ἐστι τέχνη περὶ βίον.

κς′ εἰ γίνεται ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη.

κζ′ εἰ διδακτή ἐστιν ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη.

κη′ εἰ ἔστι τι διδασκόμενον.

κθ′ εἰ ἔστιν ὁ δ’ διδάσκων καὶ ὁ μανθάνων.

λ′ εἰ ἔστι τις μαθήσεως τρόπος.

λα′ εἰ ὠφελεῖ ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη τὸν ἔχοντα ἀυτὴν.

λβ′ διὰ τί ὁ σκεπτικὸς ἐνίοτε ἀμυδροὺς ταῖς πιθανότησιν ἐρωτᾶν ἐπιτηδεύει λόγους.

Chapter I.—Of The Physical Division

Chapter II.—Of Efficient Principles

Chapter III.—Concerning God

Chapter IV.—Concerning Cause

Chapter V.—Does Anything Cause Anything

Chapter VI.—Concerning Material Principles

Chapter VII.—Are Bodies Apprehensible

Chapter VIII.—Concerning Mixture

Chapter IX.—Concerning Motion

Chapter X.—Concerning Transient Motion

Chapter XI.—Concerning Increase And Decrease

Chapter XII.—Concerning Subtraction And Addition

Chapter XIII.—Concerning Transposition

Chapter XIV.—Concerning Whole And Part

Chapter XV.—Concerning Physical Change

Chapter XVI.—Concerning Becoming And Perishing

Chapter XVII.—Concerning Rest

Chapter XVIII.—Concerning Space

Chapter XIX.—Concerning Time

Chapter XX.—Concerning Number

Chapter XXI.—Concerning The Ethical Division Of Philosophy

CHAPTER XXII.—Concerning Things Good, Bad And Indifferent

Chapter XXIII.—Is Anything By Nature Good, Bad, Or Indifferent?

Chapter XXIV.—What Is The So-Called Art Of Living? 155

Chapter XXV.—Does There Exist An Art Of Living?

Chapter XXVI.—Does The Art Of Living Arise In Mankind?

Chapter XXVII.—Is The Art Of Living Capable Of Being Taught?

Chapter XXVIII.—Does a Matter Of Instruction Exist?

Chapter XXIX.—Do The Teacher And The Learner Exist?

Chapter XXX.—Does There Exist Any Method Of Learning?

Chapter XXXI.—Does The Art Of Living Benefit Its Possessor?

Chapter XXXII.—Why The Sceptic Sometimes Purposely Propounds Arguments Which Are Lacking In Power Of Persuasion

Notes on the current edition

Stable identifiers

Chapter XXIV.—What Is The So-Called Art Of Living?¹⁵⁵