[16] We follow the same lines in replying to the question ‟Has the Sceptic a doctrinal rule?” For if one defines a ‟doctrinal rule” as ‟adherence to a number of dogmas which are dependent both on one another and on appearances,” and defines ‟dogma” as ‟assent to a non-evident proposition,” then we shall say that he has not a doctrinal rule.

[17] But if one defines ‟doctrinal rule” as ‟procedure which, in accordance with appearance, follows a certain line of reasoning, that reasoning indicating how it is possible to seem to live rightly (the word ‘rightly’ being taken, not as referring to virtue only, but in a wider sense ¹ ) and tending to enable one to suspend judgement,” then we say that he has a doctrinal rule. For we follow a line of reasoning which, in accordance with appearances, points us to a life conformable to the customs of our country and its laws and institutions, and to our own instinctive feelings.