[206] In a preliminary outline it will be sufficient to have explained the expressions now set forth, especially since it is possible to explain the rest by deductions from the foregoing. For, in regard to all the Sceptic expressions, we must grasp first the fact that we make no positive assertion respecting their absolute truth, since we say that they may possibly be confuted by themselves, seeing that they themselves are included in the things to which their doubt applies, just as aperient drugs do not merely eliminate the humours from the body, but also expel themselves along with the humours.

[207] And we also say that we employ them not by way of authoritatively explaining the things with reference to which we adopt them, but without precision and, if you like, loosely; for it does not become the Sceptic to wrangle over expressions, ¹ and besides it is to our advantage that even to these expressions no absolute significance should be ascribed, but one that is relative and relative to the Sceptics.

[208] Besides this we must also remember that we do not employ them universally about all things, but about those which are non-evident and are objects of dogmatic inquiry; and that we state what appears to us and do not make any positive declarations as to the real nature of external objects; for I think that, as a result of this, every sophism ² directed against a Sceptic expression can be refuted.

[209] And now that we have reviewed the idea or purpose of Scepticism and its divisions, and the criterion and the end, and the modes, too, of suspension, and have discussed the Sceptic expressions, and have thus made clear the character of Scepticism, our next task is, we suppose, to explain briefly the distinction which exists between it and the philosophic systems which lie next to it, in order that we may more clearly understand the ‟suspensive” Way of thought. Let us begin with the Heracleitean philosophy.