Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes, ed. Hermann Mutschmann, 2.9.94

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[94] εἰ οὖν μήτε τὰ φαινόμενά ἐστιν ἀληθῆ μήτε τὰ ἄδηλα μόνα, μήτε τινὰ μὲν φαινόμενα, τινὰ δὲ ἄδηλα, οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀληθές. εἰ δὲ μηδέν ἐστιν ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ κριτήριον δοκεῖ πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς χρησιμεύειν, ἄχρηστον καὶ μάταιόν ἐστι τὸ κριτήριον,
κἂν δῶμεν αὐτῷ κατὰ συγχώρησιν ἔχειν τινὰ ὑπόστασιν. καὶ εἴγε ἐφεκτέον περὶ τοῦ εἰ ἔστι τι ἀληθές, ἀκόλουθόν ἐστι τοὺς λέγοντας ὡς διαλεκτική ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ψευδῶν καὶ ἀληθῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων προπετεύεσθαι.

Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes. Sextus Empiricus. ed. Hermann Mutschmann. Germany. 2014.

Current edition First1KGreek

Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes (Greek) (Sextus Empiricus. Sexti Empiricii Opera, Volume 1. Mutschmann, Hermann, editor. Leipzig: Teubner, 1912.)

Translations (1)

Outlines of Pyrrhonism First1KGreek (Sextus Empiricus, Vol. 1. Bury, Robert Gregg, translator. London: William Heinemann Ltd.; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1933.) — 2.9.94 focus

[94] If, then, neither the apparent nor the non-evident alone are true, nor yet some apparent and some non- evident things, nothing is true. But if nothing is true, and the criterion seems to require the true for the purpose of judging, the criterion is useless and vain, even if we grant, by way of concession, that it possesses some substantial reality. And if we have to suspend judgement as to whether anything true exists, it follows that those who declare that ‟dialectic is the science of things true and false and neither”¹ speak rashly.

Sextus Empiricus Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes 2.9.94

ed. Hermann Mutschmann

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