Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes, ed. Hermann Mutschmann, 2.13.170

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[170]
διὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲ ἐκκαλύπτεται ὑπὸ τῶν λημμάτων ἡ ἐπιφορά, ἤτοι ἄδηλος οὖσα καὶ μὴ καταλαμβανομένη, ἢ πρόδηλος καὶ μὴ δεομένη τοῦ ἐκκαλύψοντος. εἰ τοίνυν ἡ ἀπόδειξις λόγος εἶναι λέγεται κατὰ συναγωγήν, τουτέστι συνακτικός, διά τινων ὁμολογουμένως ἀληθῶν ἐπιφορὰν
ἐκκαλύπτων ἄδηλον, ὑπεμνήσαμεν δὲ ἡμεῖς, ὅτι οὔτε λόγος τις ἔστιν οὔτε συνακτικὸς οὔτε ἀληθὴς οὔτε διά τινων προδήλων ἄδηλον συνάγων οὔτε ἐκκαλυπτικὸς τοῦ συμπεράσματος, φανερόν ἐστιν ὅτι ἀνυπόστατός ἐστιν ἡ ἀπόδειξις.

Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes. Sextus Empiricus. ed. Hermann Mutschmann. Germany. 2014.

Current edition First1KGreek

Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes (Greek) (Sextus Empiricus. Sexti Empiricii Opera, Volume 1. Mutschmann, Hermann, editor. Leipzig: Teubner, 1912.)

Translations (1)

Outlines of Pyrrhonism First1KGreek (Sextus Empiricus, Vol. 1. Bury, Robert Gregg, translator. London: William Heinemann Ltd.; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1933.) — 2.13.170 focus

[170] And for these reasons, neither is the inference revealed by the premisses, as it is either non-evident and not apprehended, or pre-evident and not in need of anything to reveal it. So that if proof is defined¹ as ‟an argument which by deduction, that is conclusively, reveals a non-evident inference by means of certain premisses agreed to be true,” while we have shown that there exists no argument either conclusive or true or which deduces a non-evident conclusion by means of evident premisses or serves to reveal its conclusion,—then it is apparent that proof is without real existence.

Sextus Empiricus Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes 2.13.170

ed. Hermann Mutschmann

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