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Chapter XIII.—Does Proof Exist?

[144] That proof has no real existence may be inferred from their own statements, by refuting each of the assumptions implied in its conception.¹ Thus, for instance, the argument is compounded of judgements, but compound things cannot exist unless its component elements mutually co-exist, as is pre-evident from the case of a bed and similar objects; but the parts of an argument do not mutually co-exist. For when we are stating the first premiss, neither the second premiss nor the inference is as yet in existence; and when we are stating the second premiss, the first is no longer existent and the inference is not yet existent; and when we announce the inference, its premisses are no longer in being. Therefore the parts of the argument do not mutually co-exist; and hence the argument too will seem to be non-existent.

[145] But apart from this, the conclusive argument is non-apprehensible; for if it is judged by the coherence of the hypothetical premiss, and the coherence in that premiss is a matter of unsettled dispute and is probably non-apprehensible, as we suggested in our chapter (xi.) ‟On the Sign,” then the conclusive argument also will be non-apprehensible.

[146] Now the Dialecticians² assert that an argument is inconclusive owing to inconsistency or to deficiency or to its being propounded in a bad form or to redundancy. An example of inconsistency is when the premisses are not logically coherent with each other and with the inference, as in the argument ‟If it is day, it is light; but in fact wheat is being sold in the market; therefore Dion is walking.”

[147] And it is a case of redundancy when we find a premiss that is superfluous for the logic of the argument, as for instance ‟If it is day, it is light; but in fact it is day and Dion also is walking; therefore it is light.” And it is due to the bad form in which it is propounded when the form of the argument is not conclusive; for whereas the really syllogistic arguments are, they say, such as these: ‟If it is day, it is light; but in fact it is day; therefore it is light;” and ‟If it is day, it is light; but it is not light; therefore it is not day,”—the inconclusive argument runs thus: ‟If it is day, it is light; but in fact it is light; therefore it is day.”

[148] For since the major premiss announces that if its antecedent exists its consequent also exists, naturally when the antecedent is admitted the consequent also is inferred, and when the consequent is denied the antecedent also is denied; for if the antecedent had existed, the consequent also would have existed. But when the consequent is admitted, the antecedent is not necessarily admitted as well; for the major premiss did not promise that the antecedent should follow the consequent, but only the consequent the antecedent.

[149] Hence, the argument which deduces the consequent from the major premiss and the antecedent is said to be syllogistic,³ and also that which deduces the opposite of the antecedent from the major premiss and the opposite of the consequent; but the argument which, like that stated above, deduces the antecedent from the major premiss and the consequent is inconclusive, so that it makes a false deduction, even though its premisses are true, whenever it is uttered by lamplight at night. For though the major premiss ‟If it is day, it is light” is true, and also the minor premiss, ‟but in fact it is light,” the inference ‟therefore it is day” is false.

[150] And the argument is faulty by deficiency, when it suffers from the omission of some factor needed for the deducing of the conclusion: thus, for instance, while we have, as they think, a valid argument in ‟Wealth is either good or bad or indifferent; but it is neither bad nor indifferent; therefore it is good,”⁴ the following is faulty by way of deficiency: ‟Wealth is either good or bad; but it is not bad; therefore it is good.”

[151] If, then, I shall show that, according to them, it is impossible to distinguish any difference between the inconclusive and the conclusive arguments, I shall have shown that the conclusive argument is non-apprehensible, so that their endless disquisitions on ‟dialectic”⁵ are superfluous. And I show it in this wise.

[152] It was said that the argument which is inconclusive owing to inconsistency is recognized by the want of coherence which marks its premisses in their relation both to each other and to the inference.⁶ Since, then, the recognition of this coherence ought to be preceded by the judgement on the hypothetical syllogism,⁷ and that syllogism, as I have argued, does not admit of judgement, the argument that is inconclusive through inconsistency will likewise be incapable of being distinguished.

[153] For he who declares that any particular argument is inconclusive through inconsistency will, if he is merely uttering a statement, find himself opposed by a statement which contradicts his own; while if he tries to prove it by argument, he will be told that this argument of his must itself be conclusive before he can prove that the premisses of the argument said to be inconsistent are devoid of consistency. But we shall not know whether it is probative, since we have no agreed test of the syllogism whereby to judge whether the conclusion follows the logical connexion formed by the premisses. And thus, also, we shall be unable to distinguish the argument that is faulty through inconsistency from those that are conclusive.

[154] And we will make the same reply to the man who says that an argument is unsound owing to its being propounded in a faulty form; for he who maintains that a form is unsound will have no argument agreed to be conclusive whereby he will be able to draw the conclusion he states.

[155] And hereby we have also potentially refuted those who try to show that there are arguments which are inconclusive through deficiency. For if the complete and finished argument is indistinguishable from others, the deficient also will be non-evident. And, further, he who proposes to prove by argument that a certain argument is deficient, seeing that he has no agreed test of a hypothetical syllogism whereby he can judge the coherence of the argument he is talking about, will be unable to make a tested and true pronouncement that it is deficient.

[156] Moreover, the argument that is said to be faulty through redundancy is indistinguishable from those that are probative. For, so far as concerns redundancy, even the ‟non-demonstrable” arguments⁸ so much talked of by the Stoics will be found to be inconclusive, and if they are demolished the whole of dialectic is overturned; for they are the arguments which, they say, need no proof to establish them, and themselves serve as proofs of the conclusiveness of the other arguments. And that they are redundant will be clear when we have set forth these non-probative arguments and thus confirm our statement by reasoning.

[157] Now there are, in their imaginings, many non- demonstrable arguments, but the five which they chiefly propound, and to which all the rest can, it seems, be referred, are these. The first is that which deduces the consequent from the major premiss⁹ and the antecedent, as for example ‟If it is day, it is light; but in fact it is day; therefore it is light.” The second is that which deduces the opposite of the antecedent from the major premiss and the opposite of the consequent, as for example ‟If it is day, it is light; but it is not light; therefore it is not day.”

[158] The third deduces from the negation of a coupled premiss¹⁰ and the affirmation of one of its clauses the opposite of the other clause, as for example ‟It is not both night and day; but it is day; therefore it is not night.” The fourth deduces from a disjunctive premiss and one of its alternative clauses the opposite of the other, as for example ‟Either it is day or it is night; but it is day; therefore it is not night.” The fifth¹¹ deduces from a disjunctive premiss and the opposite of one of its clauses the other clause, as for example ‟Either it is day or it is night; but it is not night; therefore it is day.”

[159] These, then, are the much talked of non-demonstrable arguments, but they all seem to me to be inconclusive through redundancy. Thus for instance, to begin with the first, either it is agreed, or else it is non-evident, that in the major premiss ‟If it is day, it is light,” the clause ‟it is light” follows from its antecedent ‟it is day.” But if this is non-evident, we shall not grant the major premiss as agreed; if, however, it is pre-evident that if the clause ‟it is day” be true, the clause ‟it is light” will necessarily be true also, then, once we have asserted that ‟it is day,” the statement ‟it is light” is also inferred, so that an argument in the form ‟It is day, therefore it is light” is sufficient,¹² and the major premiss ‟If it is day, it is light” is redundant.

[160] And in the case of the second non-demonstrable argument we make a similar objection. For it is either possible or impossible for the antecedent to be true when the consequent is not true. But if this is possible, the major premiss will not be valid; while if it is impossible, at the moment of positing ‟Not the consequent” we posit also ‟Not the antecedent,” and the major premiss is redundant once again, the argument propounded being ‟It is not light, therefore it is not day.”

[161] The same reasoning applies also to the third non- demonstrable argument. For either it is pre-evident that it is impossible for the clauses in the coupled premiss mutually to co-exist, or else it is non-evident. And if it is non-evident we shall not grant the negative of the coupled premiss; but if it is pre-evident, at the moment of positing the one clause the other is annulled, and the negative of the coupled premiss is redundant when we propound the argument in the form ‟It is day, therefore it is not night.”

[162] And we deal in like manner with the fourth non- demonstrable argument and the fifth. For either it is pre-evident or it is non-evident that in the disjunctive premiss one clause is true, the other false, in complete contradiction, as the disjunctive proclaims. And if this is non-evident, we shall not grant the disjunctive; but if it is pre-evident, if one of its clauses be affirmed it is apparent that the other is not true, and if one is negated it is pre-evident that the other is true, so that it is sufficient to frame the argument thus—‟It is day, therefore it is not night,” or ‟It is not day, therefore it is night;” and the disjunctive premiss is redundant.

[163] One may also make similar observations on the so- called ‟categorical” syllogisms, which are chiefly used by the Peripatetics.¹³ Thus, for example, in the argument—‟The just is fair, but the fair is good, therefore the just is good,”¹⁴ either it is agreed and pre-evident that ‟the fair is good,” or it is disputed and is non-evident. But if it is non-evident, it will not be granted in the process of deduction, and consequently the syllogism will not be conclusive; while if it is pre-evident that whatsoever is fair is also without exception good, at the moment of stating that this particular thing is fair the fact that it is good is likewise implied, so that it is enough to put the argument in the form ‟The just is fair, therefore the just is good,” and the other premiss, in which it was stated that ‟the fair is good,” is redundant.

[164] So too in an argument such as this—‟Socrates is a man; every man is an animal; therefore Socrates is an animal,”—if it is not at once pre-evident that whatsoever is man is always also animal, the universal premiss is not agreed, and neither will we admit it in the process of deduction.

[165] But if the fact that he is a man is logically followed by the fact that he is also an animal, and in consequence the premiss ‟Every man is an animal” is by agreement true, at the moment of stating that ‟Socrates is a man” we admit therewith that he is also an animal, so that an argument in the form ‟Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is an animal” is sufficient, and the premiss ‟Every man is an animal” is redundant.

[166] And (not to dwell on the matter now) in the case of the other primary¹⁵ categorical arguments also it is possible to employ similar methods of reasoning.

Since, however, these arguments which the Dialecticians¹⁶ lay down as the foundations of their syllogisms are redundant, by reason of this redundancy the whole of Dialectic is thus far overthrown, seeing that we cannot distinguish the redundant, and consequently inconclusive, arguments from what are called the conclusive syllogisms.

[167] But if some persons disapprove of arguments being of a ‟one-premiss form,” they deserve no more credence than does Antipater¹⁷ who does not reject such arguments.

For these reasons, then, the argument named by the Dialecticians ‟conclusive” is not judged acceptable. But further, the ‟true”¹⁸ argument is indiscoverable both for the foregoing reasons¹⁹ and because it ought in all cases to end in truth. For the conlusion which is said to be true is either apparent or non-evident.

[168] And it is certainly not apparent; for it would not need to be disclosed by means of the premisses if it were perceptible of itself and no less apparent than its premisses. But if it is non-evident, then, since there is an unsettled dispute concerning things non-evident, as we mentioned above,²⁰ and they are in consequence non-apprehensible, the conclusion also of the argument said to be true will be non- apprehensible. And if this is non-apprehensible, we shall not know whether the deduction is true or false. Thus we shall be in ignorance as to whether the argument is true or false, and the ‟true” argument will be indiscoverable.

[169] But, to pass over these objections also, the argument which deduces what is non-evident by means of pre-evident premisses is indiscoverable. For if the inference follows from the combination of its premisses, and what follows and forms the consequent is relative and relative to the antecedent, and relatives are apprehended, as we have shown,²¹ simultaneously,— then, if the conclusion is non-evident, the premisses also will be non-evident, while if the premisses are pre-evident the conclusion also will be pre-evident, as being apprehended along with the pre-evident premisses, so that no longer is there a deduction of what is non-evident from pre-evident premisses.

[170] And for these reasons, neither is the inference revealed by the premisses, as it is either non-evident and not apprehended, or pre-evident and not in need of anything to reveal it. So that if proof is defined²² as ‟an argument which by deduction, that is conclusively, reveals a non-evident inference by means of certain premisses agreed to be true,” while we have shown that there exists no argument either conclusive or true or which deduces a non-evident conclusion by means of evident premisses or serves to reveal its conclusion,—then it is apparent that proof is without real existence.

[171] That proof is unreal, or even inconceivable, we shall discover also from the following line of attack.²³ He who asserts the existence of proof posits either a general or a particular proof; but, as we shall suggest, it is not possible to posit either the general or the particular proof; and besides these no other can be conceived; no one, therefore, can posit proof as really existing.

[172] Now the general proof is unreal for the following reasons. It either has or has not certain premisses and a certain inference. And if it has them not, it is not even proof; while if it has premisses and an inference, then, since everything which proves or is proved in this way belongs to the class of ‟particulars,”²⁴ proof will be particular; therefore no general proof exists. Nor yet any particular proof.

[173] For they will describe as proof either the system made up of the premisses and the inference²⁵ or only the system of the premisses; but neither of these is proof, as I shall show; therefore particular proof does not exist.

[174] Now the system composed of the premisses and the inference is not proof because, firstly, it contains a non-evident part—that is to say, the inference—and so will be non-evident, which is absurd; for if the proof is non-evident, instead of serving to prove other things it will itself be in need of something to prove it.

[175] Moreover, since they assert that proof is a relative thing and relative to the inference, and relatives, as they themselves affirm, are conceived in relation to other things, the thing proved must be other than the proof ; if, then, the thing proved is the conclusion, the proof will not be conceived along with the conclusion. For the conclusion either contributes something to its own proof or does not do so; but if it contributes, it will serve to reveal itself, while if it does not contribute but is redundant it will not be even a part of the proof, since we shall declare the proof to be faulty by reason of redundance.

[176] Nor yet will the system composed of the premisses by itself be proof; for who would maintain that a statement in the form ‟If it is day, it is light; but in fact it is day,” either is an argument or completely expresses a piece of reasoning? So then, neither does the system of the premisses alone constitute proof. Therefore the particular proof has no real existence either. But if neither the particular nor the general proof has real existence, and besides these one can conceive no other proof, then proof is without real existence.

[177] And it is possible to show the unreality of proof from these further considerations. If proof exists, either as apparent it serves to reveal what is apparent, or as non-evident what is non-evident, or as non- evident what is apparent, or as apparent what is non-evident; but it cannot be conceived as serving to reveal any of these; therefore it is inconceivable.

[178] For if it as apparent serves to reveal the apparent, the thing revealed will be at once both apparent and non-evident—apparent because it was assumed to be such, and non-evident because it needs a revealer and is not clearly perceived by us of itself. And if as non-evident it reveals the non-evident, it will itself need something to reveal it and will not serve to reveal other things, which is foreign to the conception of proof.

[179] And for these reasons neither can there be a non-evident proof of the pre-evident; nor yet a pre-evident proof of the non-evident; for since they are relatives, and relatives are apprehended together, that which is said to be proved, being apprehended together with its pre-evident proof, will be pre-evident, so that the argument is reversed and the proof probative of the non-evident is not found to be pre-evident. If, therefore, proof is neither apparent of the apparent, nor non-evident of the non-evident, nor non-evident of the pre-evident, nor pre-evident of the non-evident, and besides these, as they say, there is no other alternative, then we must declare that proof is nothing.

[180] Furthermore, there is this also to be said. Proof is a matter of controversy; for some declare that it does not even exist, as do those who assert that nothing at all exists,²⁶ but others, including the majority of the Dogmatists, that it does exist; and we affirm that it is ‟no more”²⁷ existent than non- existent.

[181] And besides, proof always contains a dogma, and they are in dispute about every dogma, so that there must necessarily be dispute about every proof. For if (for the sake of argument) when the proof for the existence of void is accepted the existence of void is likewise accepted,²⁸ it is plain that those who dispute the existence of void dispute its proof also; and the same argument applies to all the other dogmas with which the proofs are concerned. Therefore every proof is questioned and is in dispute.

[182] Since, then, proof is non-evident, owing to the controversy which exists concerning it (for things controverted, in so far as controverted, are non- evident), its existence is not self-evident but needs to be established for us by proof. The proof, then, by which proof is established will not be evident and agreed (for we are now inquiring whether proof in general exists), and being thus in dispute and non- evident it will need another proof, and this again a third, and so on ad infinitum. But it is impossible to prove an infinite series; therefore it is impossible to show that proof exists.

[183] But neither can it be revealed by means of a sign. For since it is a matter of inquiry whether sign exists,²⁹ and since the sign needs proof to ensure its reality, we find ourselves involved in circular reasoning— the proof requiring a sign, and the sign in turn a proof; which is absurd. And for these reasons neither is it possible to decide the controversy regarding proof, seeing that the decision requires a criterion, but—because it is a matter of inquiry, as we have shown,³⁰ whether a criterion exists, and consequently the criterion needs a proof showing the existence of a criterion—we are again involved in the perplexity of circular reasoning.

[184] If, then, neither by proof nor by sign nor by criterion it is possible to show that proof exists, and it is not evident of itself either, as we have shown,³¹ then it will be non-apprehensible whether proof exists. Consequently, proof will also be unreal; for it is conceived together with the act of proving, and were it not apprehended it would be unable to prove.³² Wherefore proof will not exist.

[185] Thus much it will be enough to say by way of outline and in criticism of proof. The Dogmatists, however, maintaining the opposite view assert that the arguments propounded against proof are either probative or not probative; and if they are not probative, they are incapable of showing that proof does not exist; while if they are probative, they themselves involve the reality of proof by self- refutation.³³

[186] Hence also they propound an argument in this form:³⁴ ‟If proof exists, proof exists; if proof exists not, proof exists; but proof either exists or exists not; therefore proof exists.” With the same intention they propound also this argument: ‟That which follows logically from contradictories is not only true but necessary; 'proof exists' and 'proof exists not' are contradictories, and the existence of proof follows from each of them; therefore proof exists.”

[187] Now to this we may reply, for instance, that, because we do not believe that any argument is probative, we do not assert either that the arguments against proof are absolutely probative but that they appear to us plausible; but those that are plausible are not necessarily probative. Yet if they actually are probative (which we do not positively affirm) they certainly are also true. And true arguments are those which deduce what is true by means of true premisses; wherefore their inference is true. Now the inference was this—‟therefore proof does not exist;” therefore the statement ‟proof does not exist” is true by reversing the argument.

[188] And just as purgative medicines expel themselves together with the substances already present in the body, so these arguments are capable of cancelling themselves along with the other arguments which are said to be probative.³⁵ Nor is this preposterous, since in fact the saying ‟nothing is true” not only refutes every other saying but also nullifies itself as well.

And as regards this argument—‟If proof exists, proof exists; if proof does not exist, proof exists; but it either exists or exists not; therefore it exists” —there are a number of ways by which it can be shown to be inconclusive, but for the moment the following method may suffice.

[189] If the hypothetical premiss ‟If proof exists, proof exists” is valid, the contradictory of its consequent, namely ‟proof does not exist,” must conflict with ‟proof exists,” for this is the antecedent of the hypothetical premiss. But, according to them, it is impossible for a hypothetical premiss to be valid when composed of conflicting clauses. For the hypothetical premiss promises that when its antecedent is true its consequent is also true, whereas conflicting clauses contrariwise promise that if either one of them is true the other cannot possibly be true. If therefore the premiss ‟If proof exists, proof exists” is valid, the premiss ‟If proof exists not, proof exists” cannot be valid.

[190] And again. conversely, if we grant by way of assumption that the premiss ‟If proof exists not, proof exists” is valid, then the clause ‟If proof exists” can co-exist with ‟proof exists not.” But if it can co-exist with it, it is not in conflict with it. Therefore, in the premiss ‟If proof exists, proof exists,” the contrary of its consequent is not in conflict with its antecedent, so that, conversely, this premiss will not be valid, as the former was posited, by agreement, as valid.

[191] And as the clause ‟proof exists not” is not in conflict with ‟proof exists,” the disjunctive ‟Either proof exists or proof exists not” will not be valid; for the valid disjunctive promises that one of its clauses is valid, but the other or others false and contradictory. Or else, if the disjunctive be valid, the hypothetical premiss ‟If proof exists not, proof exists” is, in turn, found to be fallacious, as composed of conflicting clauses. So then the premisses in the foregoing argument are discordant and mutually destructive; wherefore the argument is not valid.

[192] And further, they are unable even to show that anything follows logically from the contradictories, since, as we have argued,³⁶ they possess no criterion of logical consequence or deduction.

But this discussion is, in fact, superfluous. For if, on the one hand, the arguments in defence of proof are (let it be granted) plausible, while, on the other hand, the criticisms directed against proof are also plausible, then we must necessarily suspend judgement concerning proof also, and declare that proof is ‟no more” existent than non-existent.

Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes. Sextus Empiricus. Robert Gregg Bury (Translator). London. 1933.

Funding provided by Tisch Library, Tufts University.

Current edition First1KGreek

Outlines of Pyrrhonism (English) (Sextus Empiricus, Vol. 1. Bury, Robert Gregg, translator. London: William Heinemann Ltd.; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1933.)

Editions (1)

Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes First1KGreek (Sextus Empiricus. Sexti Empiricii Opera, Volume 1. Mutschmann, Hermann, editor. Leipzig: Teubner, 1912.) — 2.13 focus

ιγ′ εἰ ἔστιν

[144] ὅτι δὲ ἀνύπαρκτός ἐστιν ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ἀπ’ αὐτῶν
ὧν λέγουσιν ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δυνατόν, ἕκαστον τῶν περιεχομένων ἐν τῇ ἐννοίᾳ διατρέποντα. οἷον γοῦν ὁ λόγος σύγκειται ἐξ ἀξιωμάτων, τὰ δὲ σύνθετα πράγματα οὐ δύναται ὑπάρχειν, ἐὰν μὴ τὰ ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκεν ἀλλήλοις συνυπάρχῃ, ὡς πρόδηλον ἀπὸ κλίνης καὶ τῶν παραπλησίων,
τὰ δὲ μέρη τοῦ λόγου ἀλλήλοις οὐ συνυπάρχει. ὅτε γὰρ λέγομεν τὸ πρῶτον λῆμμα, οὐδέπω ὑπάρχει οὔτε τὸ ἕτερον λῆμμα οὔτε ἡ ἐπιφορά· ὅτε δὲ τὸ δεύτερόν φαμεν, τὸ μὲν πρότερον λῆμμα οὐκέτι ὑπάρχει, ἡ δὲ ἐπιφορὰ
οὐδέπω ἔστιν· ὅτε δὲ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν προφερόμεθα, τὰ λήμματα αὐτῆς οὐκέτι ὑφέστηκεν. οὐ συνυπάρχει ἄρα ἀλλή- λοις τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου· ὅθεν οὐδὲ ὁ λόγος ὑπάρχειν δόξει.

[145] χωρὶς δὲ τούτων ὁ συνακτικὸς λόγος ἀκατάληπτός ἐστιν·
εἰ γὰρ οὗτος κρίνεται ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ συνημμένου ἀκολουθίας, ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὸ συνημμένον ἀκολουθία ἀνεπικρίτως διαπεφώνηται καὶ ἔστιν ἴσως ἀκατάληπτος, ὡς ἐν τῷ περἲ σημείου λόγῳ §§ 110 — 114) ὑπεμνήσαμεν, καὶ ὁ συνακτικὸς λόγος ἀκατάληπτος ἔσται.

[146] οἴ γε μὴν διαλεκτικοί
φασιν ἀσύνακτον λόγον γίγνεσθαι ἤτοι παρὰ διάρτησιν ἢ παρὰ ἔλλειψιν ἢ παρὰ τὸ κατὰ μοχθηρὸν ἠρωτῆσθαι σχῆμα ἢ κατὰ παρολκήν. οἷον κατὰ διάρτησιν μὲν, ὅταν μὴ ἔχῃ τὰ λήμματα ἀκολουθίαν πρὸς ἄλληλά τε καὶ τὴν ἐπιφοράν, ὡς ὁ τοιοῦτος ‘εἰ ἡμέρα ¹²³⁴ 90
ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν πυροὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ πωλοῦνται·

[147] Δίων ἄρα περιπατεὶ'. παρὰ δὲ παρολκήν, ὅταν εὑρίσκηται λῆμμα παρέλκον πρὸς τὴν τοῦ λόγου συναγωγήν, οἷον ‘εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Δίων περιπατεῖ· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν'. παρὰ
δὲ τὸ ἐν μοχθηρῷ ἠρωτῆσθαι σχήματι, ὅταν μὴ ᾖ σχῆμα τοῦ λόγου συνακτικόν, οἶον ὄντων συλλογιστικῶν, ὡς φασί, τούτων ‘εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν', ‘εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, <φῶς ἔστιν>· δὲ φῶς ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα ἡμέρα ἔστιν', ὁ λόγος ἀσύνακτός
ἐστιν οὗτος ‘εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν φῶς ἔστιν· ἡμέρα ἄρα ἔστιν'.

[148] ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐπαγγέλλεται τὸ συνημμένον ἐντὸς τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡγουμένου εἶναι καὶ τὸ λῆγον, εἰκότως τοῦ ἡγουμένου προσλαμβανομένου ἐπάγεται καὶ τὸ λῆγον, καὶ τοῦ λήγοντος ἀνῃρημένου ἀναιρεῖται καὶ
τὸ ἡγούμενον· εἰ γὰρ ἦν τὸ ἡγούμενον, ἦν ἂν καὶ τὸ λῆγον. τοῦ δὲ λήγοντος προσλαμβανομένου οὐ πάντως τίθεται καὶ τὸ ἡγούμενον· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑπισχνεῖτο τὸ συνημμένον τῷ λήγοντι ἀκολουθεῖν τὸ ἡγούμενον, ἀλλὰ τῷ
ἡγουμένῳ τὸ λῆγον μόνον.

[149] διὰ τοῦτο οὖν ὁ μὲν ἐκ συνημμένου καὶ τοῦ ἡγουμένου τὸ λῆγον συνάγων συλλογιστικὸς εἶναι λέγεται, καὶ ὁ ἐκ συνημμένου καὶ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου τοῦ λήγοντος τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῷ ἡγουμένῳ
συνάγων· ὁ δὲ ἐκ συνημμένου καὶ τοῦ λήγοντος τὸ ἡγούμενον συνάγων ἀσύνακτος, ὡς ὁ προειρημένος, παρὸ καὶ ἀληθῶν ὄντων τῶν λημμάτων αὐτοῦ ψεῦδος συνάγει, ὅταν λυχνιαίου φωτὸς ὄντος νυκτὸς λέγηται. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ‘εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστι' συνημμένον ἀληθές ἐστιν, καὶ
ἡ ‘ἀλλὰ μὴν φῶς ἔστι πρόσληψις, ἡ δὲ ‘ἡμέρα ἄρα <ἔστιν>᾿ ἐπιφορὰ ψευδής.

[150] κατὰ παράλειψιν δέ ἐστι μοχθηρὸς λό- ⁵ 91 γος, ἐν ᾧ παραλείπεταί τι τῶν πρὸς τὴν συναγωγὴν τοῦ συμπεράσματος χρησιμευόντων· οἷον ὑγιοῦς ὄντος, ὧς οἴονται, τοῦ λόγου τούτου ῾ἤτοι ἀγαθός ἐστιν ὁ πλοῦτος ἢ κακὸς ἢ ἀδιάφορος· οὔτε δὲ κακός ἐστιν οὔτε ἀδιάφορος·
ἀγαθὸς ἄρα ἐστίν᾿, φαῦλός ἐστι παρὰ ἔλλειψιν οὕτος ὁ λόγος ῾ἤτοι ἀγαθός ἐστιν ὁ πλοῦτος ἢ κακός· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κακός· ἀγαθὸς ἄρα ἐστίν᾿.

[151] ἐὰν οὖν δείξω ὅτι οὐδεμία διαφορὰ τῶν ἀσυνάκτων διακρίνεσθαι δύναται κατ’ αὐτοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν συνακτικῶν, ἔδειξα ὅτι ἀκατάληπτός ἐστιν ὁ συνακτικὸς
λόγος, ὡς περιττὰς εἶναι τὰς κατὰ διαλεκτικὴν <παρ᾿> αὐτοῖς φερομένας ἀπειρολογίας. δείκνυμι δὲ οὕτως.

[152] Ὁ κατὰ διάρτησιν ἀσύνακτος λόγος ἐλέγετο ἐγνωρίσθαι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἔχειν ἀκολουθίαν τὰ λήμματα αὐτοῦ πρὸς ἄλληλά <τε> καὶ τὴν ἐπιφοράν. ἐπεὶ οὖν τῆς γνώσεως τῆς
ἀκολουθίας ταύτης δεῖ προηγεῖσθαι τὴν κρίσιν τοῦ συνημμένου, ἀνεπίκριτον δέ ἐστι τὸ συνημμένον, ὡς ἐπελογισάμην, <ἀδιάκριτος> ἔσται καὶ ὁ κατὰ διάρτησιν ἀσύνακτος λόγος.

[153] καὶ γὰρ ὁ λέγων κατὰ διάρτησιν ἀσύνακτον εἶναί τινα λόγον, φάσιν μὲν προφερόμενος μόνην ἀντιτιθεμένην
αὑτῷ φάσιν ἕξει τὴν ἀντικειμένην τῇ προειρημένῃ· ἀποδεικνύς δὲ διὰ λόγου ἀκούσεται, ὅτι δεῖ τὸν λόγον τοῦτον πρότερον συνακτικὸν εἶναι, εἶθ᾿ οὕτως ἀποδεικνύειν,
ὅτι ἀσυνάρτητα τὰ λήμματα τοῦ διηρτῆσθαι λεγομένου λόγου. οὐ γνωσόμεθα δὲ εἰ ἔστιν ἀποδεικτικός, μὴ ἔχοντες συνημμένου σύμφωνον κρίσιν, ἡ κρινοῦμεν εἰ ἀκολουθεῖ τῇ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων τοῦ λόγου συμπλοκῇ τὸ
συμπέρασμα. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο οὖν οὐχ ἕξομεν διακρίνειν τῶν συνακτικῶν τὸν κατὰ διάρτησιν μοχθηρὸν εἶναι λεγόμενον.

[154] τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ ἐροῦμεν πρὸς τὸν λέγοντα μοχθηρὸν ⁶⁷⁸ εἷναι λόγον τινὰ παρὰ τὸ ἐν φαύλῳ σχήματι ἠρωτῆσθαι· ὁ γὰρ κατασκευάζων ὅτι μοχθηρόν τι σχῆμά ἐστιν, οὐχ ἕξει ὁμολογούμενον συνακτικὸν λόγον δι’ οὗ δυνήσεται συνάγειν ὃ φησιν.

[155] δυνάμει δὲ ἀντειρήκαμεν διὰ τούτων καὶ πρὸς τοὺς πειρωμένους πα ἔλλειψιν ἀσυνάκτους λόγους εἶναι δεικνύναι. εἰ γὰρ ὁ ἐντελὴς <καὶ> ἀπηρτισμένος ἐστι, καὶ ὁ ἐλλιπὴς ἄδηλος ἔσται. καὶ ἔτι ὁ διὰ λόγου δεικνύναι τινὰ ἐλλιπῆ βουλόμενος λόγον, μὴ ἔχων συνημμένου κρίσιν ὡμολογημένην, δι’ ἧς κρίνειν δυνήσεται τὴν ἀκολουθίαν τοῦ ὐπ’ αὐτοῦ λεγομένου λόγου, οὐ δυνήσεται κεκριμένως καὶ ὀρθῶς λέγειν ὅτι ἐλλιπής ἐστιν.

[156] ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ κατὰ παρολκὴν λεγόμενος εἶναι μοχθηρὸς ἀδιάκριτός ἐστιν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν. ὅσον γὰρ ἐπὶ τῇ παρολκῇ καὶ οἱ θρυλούμενοι παρὰ τοῖς Στωικοῖς ἀναπόδεικτοι ἀσύνακτοι εὑρεθήσονται, ὧν ἀναιρουμένων ἡ πᾶσα διαλεκτικὴ ἀνατρέπεται· οὗτοι γάρ εἰσιν οὕς φασιν ἀποδείξεως μὲν μὴ δεῖσθαι πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν σύστασιν, ἀποδεικτικοὺς δὲ ὑπάρχειν <διὰ> τοῦ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους λόγους. ὅτι δὲ παρέλκουσιν, ἔσται σαφὲς ἐκθεμένων ἡμῶν τοὺς ἀναποδείκτους καὶ οὕτως ὅ φαμεν ἐπιλογιζομένων.

[157] Πολλοὺς μὲν <οὖν> ἀναποδείκτους ὀνειροπολοῦσιν (Stoic. fr. II 232 A), πέντε δὲ τούτους μάλιστα ἐκτίθενται, εἰς οὓς οἱ λοιποὶ πάντες ἀναφέρεσθαι δοκοῦσιν, πρῶτον <τὸν> ἐκ συνημμένου καὶ τοῦ τὸ λῆγον συνάγοντα, οἶον εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν'. δεύτε- ⁹¹⁰¹¹¹² ρον τὸν ἐκ συνημμένου καὶ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου τὸ λήγοντος τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ ἡγουμένου συνάγοντα, οἷον ‘εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ φῶς·

[158] οὐκ ἄρα ἡμέρα ἔστιν'. τρίτον τὸν ἐξ ἀποφατικοῦ συμπλοκῆς καὶ ἑνὸς τῶν ἐκ τῆς σὺ συμπλοκῆς τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ λοιποῦ συνάγοντα, οἷον ‘οὐχὶ ἡμέρα ἔστι καὶ νὺξ ἔστιν· ἡμέρα δὲ ἔστιν· οὐκἄρα νύξ ἔστιν'. τέταρτον τὸν ἐκ διεζευγμένου καὶ ἑνὸς τῶν ἐπεζευγμένων τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ λοιποῦ συνάγοντα,
οἷον ‘ἤτοι ἡμέρα ἔστιν ἢ νύξ ἔστιν· ἡμέρα δὲ ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα νὺξ ἔστιν'. πέμπτον τὸν ἐκ διεζευγμένου καὶ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου ἑνὸς τῶν ἐπεζευγμένων τὸ λοιπὸν συνάγοντα, οἶον ‘ἤτοι ἡμέρα ἔστιν ἢ νὺξ ἔστιν οὐχὶ δὲ νὺξ ἔστιν ἡμέρα ἄρα ἔστιν.

[159] Oὗτοι μὲν οὖν εἰσιν οἱ θρυλούμενοι ἀναπόδεικτοι, πάντες δέ μοι δοκοῦσιν ἀσύνακτοι εἶναι κατὰ παρολκήν. αὐτίκα γοῦν, ἴνα ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀρξώμεθα, ἤτοι ὁμο- λογεῖται ὅτι ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ ‘φῶς ἔστιν' τῷ ‘ἡμέρα ἔστιν' ἡγουμένῳ αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ ‘εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν' συνημμένῳ, ἢ ἄδηλόν ἐστιν. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν ἄδηλόν ἐστιν, οὐ δώσομεν τὸ συνημμένον ὡς ὁμολογούμενον· εἰ δὲ πρόδηλόν ἐστιν ὅτι ὄντος τοῦ ‘ἡμέρα ἔστιν' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔσται καὶ τὸ ‘φῶς ἔστιν,' εἰπόντων ἡμῶν ὅτι ἡμέρα ἔστιν, συνάγεται καὶ τὸ φῶς ἔστιν, ὧς ἀρκεῖν τὸν τοιοῦτον λόγον ‘ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν', καὶ παρέλκειν τὸ ‘εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν' συνημμένον.

[160] ὁμοίως δὲ φερόμεθα καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δευτέρου ἀναποδείκτου. ἤτοι γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τοῦ λήγοντος μὴ ὄντος εἶναι τὸ ἡγούμενον, ἢ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν ἐνδέχεται, οὐκ ἔσται ὑγιὲς τὸ συνημμένον· εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ἅμα τῷ τεθῆναι τὸ ‘οὐχὶ τὸ λῆγον' τίθεται καὶ τὸ ‘οὐχὶ τὸ ἡγούμενον', καὶ παρέλκει πάλιν τὸ συνημμένον, τῆς συνερωτήσεως τοιαύτης γινομένης ‘οὐχὶ ¹³¹⁴ 93 φῶς ἔστιν, οὐκ ἄρα ὅτι] ἡμέρα ἔστιν'.

[161] ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ
ἐπὶ τοῦ τρίτου ἀναποδείκτου. ἤτοι γὰρ πρόδηλόν ἐστιν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὰ ἐν τῇ συμπλοκῇ συνυπάρξαι ἀλλήλοις, ἢ ἄδηλον. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἄδηλον, οὐ δώσομεν τὸ ἀποφατικὸν τῆς συμπλοκῆς· εἰ δὲ πρόδηλον, ἅμα τῷ τεθῆναι
τὸ ἕτερον ἀναιρεῖται τὸ λοιπόν, καὶ παρέλκει τὸ ἀποφατικὸν τῆς συμπλοκῆς, οὕτως ἡμῶν ἐρωτώντων ‘ἡμέρα ἔστιν, οὐκ ἄρα νὺξ ἔστιν'.

[162] τὰ δὲ παραπλήσια λέγομεν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ τετάρτου καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πέμπτου ἀναποδείκτου. ἤτοι γὰρ πρόδηλόν ἐστιν, ὅτι ἐν τῷ διεζευγμένῳ τὸ μὲν ἀληθές ἐστι
τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος μετὰ μάχης τελείας, ὅπερ ἐπαγγέλλεται τὸ διεζευγμένον, ἢ ἄδηλον. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἄδηλον, οὐ δώσομεν τὸ διεζευγμένον· εἰ δὲ πρόδηλον, τεθέντος ἑνὸς ἀπ’ αὐτῶν φανερόν ἐστιν ὅτι τὸ λοιπὸν οὐκ ἔστιν, καὶ ἀναιρεθέντος ἑνὸς πρόδηλον ὅτι τὸ λοιπὸν ἔστιν, ὡς ἀρκεῖν συνερωτᾶν
οὕτως ‘ἡμέρα ἔστιν, οὐκ ἄρα νὺξ ἔστιν', ‘οὐχὶ ἡμέρα ἔστιν, νὺξ ἄρα ἔστιν, καὶ παρέλκειν τὸ διεζευγμένον.

[163] Παραπλήσια δὲ λέγειν ἔνεστι καὶ περὶ τῶν κατηγορικῶν καλουμένων συλλογισμῶν, οἷς μάλιστα χρῶνται οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ Περιπάτου. οἶον γοῦν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ‘τὸ δίκαιον
καλόν, τό καλὸν <δὲ> ἀγαθόν, τὸ δίκαιον ἄρα ἀγαθόν' ὁμολογεῖται καὶ πρόδηλόν ἐστιν ὅτι τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, ἢ ἀμφισβητεῖται καὶ ἔστιν ἄδηλον. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν ἄδηλόν ἐστιν, οὐ δοθήσεται κατὰ τὴν τοῦ λόγου συνερώτησιν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐ συνάξει ὁ συλλογισμός· εἰ δὲ πρόδηλόν ἐστιν
ὅτι πᾶν ὅπερ ἂν ᾖ καλόν, τοῦτο πάντως καὶ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, ἅμα τῷ λεχθῆναι ὅτι τόδε τι καλόν ἐστι συνεισάγεται καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι, ὧς ἀρκεῖν τὴν τοιαύτην συνερώτησιν ‘τὸ δίκαιον καλόν, τὸ δίκαιον ἄρα ἀγαθόν᾿, καὶ παρέλκειν τὸ ἕτερον λῆμμα ἐν ᾧ τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθὸν
εἶναι ἐλέγετο.

[164] ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγῳ ‘Σωκράτης ἄνθρωπος, πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῷον, Σωκράτης ἄρα ζῷον,’ εἰ μὲν οὔκ ἐστι πρόδηλον αὐτόθεν, ὅτι πᾶν ὅ τι ¹⁵ 94 περ ἂν ᾐ ἄνθρωπος, τοῦτο καὶ ζῷόν ἐστιν, οὐχ ὁμολογεῖται ἡ καθόλου πρότασις, οὐδὲ δώσομεν αὐτὴν ἐν τῇ

[165] συνερωτήσει. εἰ δὲ ἕπεται τῷ ἄνθρωπον εἷναι τὸ καὶ ζῷον αὐτὸν ὑπάρχειν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀληθής ἐστιν ὁμολογουμένως ἡ ‘πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῷον' πρότασις, ἅμα τῷ λεχθῆναι ὅτι Σωκράτης ἄνθρωπος συνεισάγεται καὶ τὸ ζῷον
αὐτὸν εἷναι, ὧς ἀρκεῖν τὴν τοιαύτην συνερώτησιν ‘Σωκράτης ἄνθρωπος, Σωκράτης ἄρα ζῷον,’ καὶ παρέλκειν τὴν ‘πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῷον' πρότασιν.

[166] παραπλησίαις δὲ μεθόδοις καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων πρώτων κατηγορικῶν λόγων χρῆσθαι δυνατόν ἐστιν, ἵνα μὴ νῦν ἐνδιατρίβωμεν.
Πλὴν ἐπεὶ παρέλκουσιν οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι ἐν οἷς τὴν ὑποβάθραν τῶν συλλογισμῶν οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ τίθενται, ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ παρολκῇ διατρέπεται πᾶσα ἡ διαλεκτική, μὴ δυναμένων ἡμῶν διακρῖναι τοὺς παρέλκοντας καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀσυνάκτους λόγους ἀπὸ τῶν συνακτικῶν καλουμένων συλλογισμῶν.

[167] εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἀρέσκει τισὶ λόγους μονολημμάτους εἷναι, οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀξιοπιστότεροι Ἀντιπάτρου (fr. Stoic.III 1 67 A.), ὃς οὐδὲ τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους ἀποδοκιμάζει.

Διὰ ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀνεπίκριτός ἐστιν ὁ παρὰ τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς συνακτικὸς καλούμενος λόγος. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ ἀληθὴς
λόγος ἀνεύρετός ἐστι διά τε τὰ προειρημένα καὶ ἐπεὶ πάντως ὀφείλει εἰς ἀληθὲς λήγειν. τὸ γὰρ συμπέρασμα τὸ ἀληθὲς εἶναι λεγόμενον ἤτοι φαινόμενόν ἐστιν ἢ ἄδηλον.

[168] 168 καὶ φαινόμενον μὲν οὐδαμῶς· οὐ γὰρ ἂν διὰ τῶν λημμάτων ἐκκαλύπτεσθαι δι’ ἑαυτοῦ προσπῖπτον
καὶ οὐχ ἧττον τῶν λημμάτων αὐτοῦ φαινόμενον. εἰ δὲ ἄδηλον, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων ἀνεπικρίτως διαπεφώνηται, καθάπερ ἔμπροσθεν ὑπεμνήσαμεν, διόπερ καὶ ἀκατάληπτά ἐστιν, ἀκατάληπτον ἔσται καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα τοῦ ¹⁶¹⁷ 95
ἀληθοῦς εἷναι λεγομένου λόγου. εἰ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἀκατάληπτόν ἐστιν, οὐ γνωσόμεθα, πότερον ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ συναγόμενον ἢ ψεῦδος. ἀγνοήσομεν οὖν, πότερον ἀληθής ἐστιν ὁ λόγος ἢ ψευδής, καὶ ἀνεύρετος ἔσται ὁ ἀληθὴς
λόγος.

[169] ἴνα δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παρῶμεν, ὁ διὰ προδήλων ἄδηλον συνάγων ἀνεύρετός ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ ἕπεται τῇ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων αὐτοῦ συμπλοκῇ ἡ ἐπιφορά, τὸ δ’ ἑπόμενον καὶ τὸ λῆγον πρός τι ἐστὶ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἡγούμενον, τὰ δὲ
πρός τι συγκαταλαμβάνεται ἀλλήλοις, ὡς παρεστήσαμεν, μὲν ἄδηλόν ἐστι τὸ συμπέρασμα, ἄδηλα ἔσται καὶ τὰ λήμματα, εἰ δὲ πρόδηλά ἐστι τὰ λήμματα, πρόδηλον ἔσται ἴ’ καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἅτε συγκαταλαμβανόμενον αὐτοῖς προδήλοις οὖσιν, ὡς μηκέτι ἐκ προδήλων ἄδηλον συνάγεσθαι.

[170]
διὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲ ἐκκαλύπτεται ὑπὸ τῶν λημμάτων ἡ ἐπιφορά, ἤτοι ἄδηλος οὖσα καὶ μὴ καταλαμβανομένη, ἢ πρόδηλος καὶ μὴ δεομένη τοῦ ἐκκαλύψοντος. εἰ τοίνυν ἡ ἀπόδειξις λόγος εἶναι λέγεται κατὰ συναγωγήν, τουτέστι συνακτικός, διά τινων ὁμολογουμένως ἀληθῶν ἐπιφορὰν
ἐκκαλύπτων ἄδηλον, ὑπεμνήσαμεν δὲ ἡμεῖς, ὅτι οὔτε λόγος τις ἔστιν οὔτε συνακτικὸς οὔτε ἀληθὴς οὔτε διά τινων προδήλων ἄδηλον συνάγων οὔτε ἐκκαλυπτικὸς τοῦ συμπεράσματος, φανερόν ἐστιν ὅτι ἀνυπόστατός ἐστιν ἡ ἀπόδειξις.

[171] Καὶ κατ’ ἐκείνην δὲ τὴν ἐπιβολὴν ἀνύπαρκτον ἢ καὶ ἀνεπινόητον εὑρήσομεν τὴν ἀπόδειξιν. ὁ γὰρ λέγων εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν ἤτοι γενικὴν τίθησιν ἀπόδειξιν ἢ εἰδικήν τινα· ἀλλ’ οὔτε τὴν γενικὴν οὔτε εἰδικὴν ἀπόδειξιν τιθέναι δυνατόν, ὧς ὑπομνήσομεν· παρὰ δὲ ταύτας ἄλλο τι νοεῖν
ἐνδέχεται· οὐκ ἄρα δύναταί τις ὧς ὑπάρχουσαν τιθέναι τὴν ἀπόδειξιν.

[172] ἡ μὲν οὖν γενικὴ ἀπόδειξις ἀνυπόστατός ἐστι διὰ τάδε. ἤτοι ἔχει λήμματά τινα καί τινα ¹⁸¹⁹ 96 ἐπιφορὰν ἢ οὐκ ἔχει. καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἔχει, οὐδὲ ἀπόδειξίς ἐστιν· εἰ δὲ λήμματά τινα ἔχει καὶ ἐπιφοράν τινα, ἐπεὶ πᾶν τὸ ἀποδεικνύμενον οὕτω καὶ ἀποδεικνύον ἐπὶ μέρους
ἐστίν, εἰδικὴ ἔσται ἀπόδειξις· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τις γενικὴ ἀπόδειξις. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ εἰδική.

[173] ἤτοι γὰρ τὸ ἐκ τῶν λημμάτων καὶ τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς σύστημα ἀπόδειξιν ἐροῦσιν, ἢ τὸ σύστημα τῶν λημμάτων μόνον· οὐθέτερον δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν
ἀπόδειξις, ὧς παραστήσω· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν εἰδικὴ ἀπόδειξις.

[174] τὸ μὲν οὖν σύστημα τὸ ἐκ τῶν λημμάτων καὶ τῆς ἐπι- φορὰς οὔκ ἐστιν ἀπόδειξις, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι μέρος τι ἔχουσα ἄδηλον, τουτέστι τὴν ἐπιφοράν, ἄδηλος ἔσται, ὅπερ ἄτοπον·
εἰ γὰρ ἄδηλός ἐστιν ἡ ἀπόδειξις, αὐτὴ δεήσεται τοῦ ἀποδείξοντος αὐτὴν μᾶλλον ἢ ἑτέρων ἔσται ἀποδεικτική.

[175] εἶτα καὶ ἐπεὶ πρός τι φασὶν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόδειξιν καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐπιφοράν, τὰ δὲ πρός τι πρὸς ἑτέροις νοεῖται, ὡς αὐτοί φασιν, ἕτερον εἶναι δεῖ τὸ ἀποδεικνύμενον τῆς ἀποδείξεως·
εἰ οὖν τὸ συμπέρασμά ἐστι τὸ ἀποδεικνύμενον, οὐ νοηθήσεται ἡ ἀπόδειξις σὺν τῷ συμπεράσματι. καὶ γὰρ ἤτοι συμβάλλεταί τι πρὸς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἑαυτοῦ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἢ οὐδαμῶς· ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν συμβάλλεται, ἑαυτοῦ ἔσται ἐκκαλυπτικόν, εἰ δὲ οὐ συμβάλλεται ἀλλὰ παρέλκει,
οὐδὲ μέρος τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἔσται ἐπεὶ κἀκείνην κατὰ παρολκὴν ἐροῦμεν εἶναι μοχθηράν.

[176] ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τὸ σύστημα τῶν λημμάτων μόνον ἀπόδειξις ἂν εἴη· τὶς γὰρ ἂν εἴποι τὸ οὕτω λεγόμενον ‘εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν' φῶς ἔστιν] ἢ λόγον εἶναι ἢ διάνοιαν ὅλως ἀπαρτίζειν;
οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ τὸ σύστημα τῶν λημμάτων μόνον ἀπόδειξίς ἐστιν. οὐδὲ ἡ εἰδικὴ ἄρα ἀπόδειξις ὑπόστασιν ἔχει. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἡ εἰδικὴ ἀπόδειξις ὑφέστηκε μήτε ἡ γενική, παρὰ δὲ ταύτας οὐκ ἔστιν ἐννοεῖν ἀπόδειξιν, ἀνυπόστατός ἐστιν ἡ ἀπόδειξις.

²⁰²¹

[177] Ἔτι ἐκ τούτων τὸ ἀνυπόστατον τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἔνεστιν ὑπομιμνῄσκειν. εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἤτοι φαινομένη φαινομένου ἐστὶν ἐκκαλυπτικὴ ἢ ἄδηλος ἀδήλου ἢ ἄδηλος φαινομένου ἢ φαινομένη ἀδήλου· οὐδενὸς δὲ τούτων δύναται ἐπινοεῖσθαι· ἀνεπινόητος ἄρα ἐστίν.

[178] εἰ μὲν γὰρ φαινομένη φαινομένου ἐκκαλυπτική ἐστιν, ἔσται τὸ ἐκκαλυπτόμενον ἄμα φαινόμενόν τε καὶ ἄδηλον, φαινόμενον μέν, ἐπεὶ τοιοῦτον εἶναι ὑπετέθη, ἄδηλον δέ, ἐπεὶ δεῖται τοῦ ἐκκαλύψοντος καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ὑποπίπτει ἡμῖν σαφῶς. εἰ δὲ ἄδηλος ἀδήλου, αὐτὴ δεήσεται τοῦ ἐκκαλύψοντος αὐτὴν καὶ οὐκ ἔσται ἐκκαλυπτικὴ ἑτέρων, ὅπερ ἀφέστηκε τῆς ἐννοίας τῆς ἀποδείξεως.

[179] διὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲ ἄδηλος προδήλου δύναται εἶναι ἀπόδειξις· ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ πρόδηλος ἀδήλου· ἐπεὶ γὰρ πρός τι ἐστίν, τὰ δὲ πρός τι ἀλλήλοις συγκαταλαμβάνεται, συγκαταλαμβανόμενον τῇ προδήλῳ ἀποδείξει τὸ ἀποδείκνυσθαι λεγόμενον πρόδηλον ἔσται, ὡς περιτρέπεσθαι τὸν λόγον καὶ μὴ εὑρίσκεσθαι πρόδηλον αὐτὴν ἀδήλου ἀποδεικτικήν. εἰ οὖν μήτε φαινομένη φαινομένου ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπόδειξις μήτε ἄδηλος ἀδήλου μήτε ἄδηλος προδήλου μήτε πρόδηλος ἀδήλου, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν εἶναι λέγουσιν, λεκτέον μηδὲν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόδειξιν.

[180] Πρὸς τούτοις κἀκεῖνο λεκτέον. διαπεφώνηται περὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως· οἱ μὲν γὰρ μηδὲ εἶναι λέγουσιν αὐτήν, ὧς οἱ μηδὲν ὅλως εἶναι φάσκοντες, οἱ δὲ εἶναι, ὧς οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν δογματικῶν· ἡμεῖς δὲ μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι αὐτὴν ἢ μὴ εἷναι φαμέν.

[181] καὶ ἄλλως ἡ ἀπόδειξις δόγμα πάντως περιέχει, περὶ παντὸς δὲ δόγματος διαπεφωνήκασιν, ὥστε περὶ πάσης ἀποδείξεως ἀνάγκη εἶναι διαφωνίαν. εἰ γὰρ τῆς ἀποδείξεως τοῦ εἶναι κενὸν λόγου ἕνεκεν ὁμολογουμένης καὶ τὸ εἶναι κενὸν συνομολογεῖται, δῆλον ὅτι οἱ ἀμφισβητοῦντες περὶ τοῦ εἶναι κενὸν καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως αὐτοῦ ²²²³²⁴ 98 ἀμφισβητοῦσιν· καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων δογμάτων, ὧν εἰσιν
αἱ ἀποδείξεις, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. πᾶσα τοίνυν ἀπόδειξις ἀμφισβητεῖται καὶ ἐν διαφωνίᾳ ἐστίν.

[182] ἐπεὶ οὖν ἄδηλός ἐστιν ἡ ἀπόδειξις διὰ τὴν διαφωνίαν τὴν περὶ αὐτῆς τὰ γὰρ διάφωνα, καθὸ διαπεφώνηται, ἄδηλά ἐστιν), οὐκ ἔστιν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς προῦπτος ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἀποδείξεως ὀφείλει ἡμῖν συνίστασθαι.
ἡ οὖν ἀπόδειξις δι’ ἧς κατασκευάζεται ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ὁμολογουμένη μὲν καὶ προῦπτος οὐκ ἔσται ζητοῦμεν γὰρ νῦν εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις ὅλως), διαφωνουμένη δὲ καὶ ἄδηλος οὖσα δεήσεται ἀποδείξεως ἄλλης, κἀκείνη ἄλλης, καὶ μέχρις
ἀπείρου. ἀδύνατον δὲ ἄπειρα ἀποδεῖξαι· ἀδύνατον ἄρα παραστῆσαι ὅτι ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις.

[183] ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ διὰ σημείου δύναται ἐκκαλύπτεσθαι ζητουμένου γὰρ τοῦ εἰ ἔστι σημεῖον, καὶ ἀποδείξεως τοῦ σημείου δεομένου πρὸς τὴν
ἑαυτοῦ ὕπαρξιν, ὁ δι’ ἀλλήλων εὑρίσκεται τρόπος, τῆς μὲν ἀποδείξεως σημείου δεομένης, τοῦ δὲ σημείου πάλιν ἀποδείξεως· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. διὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲ ἐπικρῖναι δυνατόν ἐστι <τὴν> περὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως διαφωνίαν, ἐπεὶ μὲν κριτηρίου ἡ ἐπίκρισις, ζητήσεως δὲ οὔσης περὶ τοῦ εἰ
ἔστι κριτήριον, ὧς παρεστήσαμεν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀποδείξεως τοῦ κριτηρίου δεομένου τῆς δεικνυούσης ὅτι ἔστι τι κριτήριον, ὁ διάλληλος τρόπος τῆς ἀπορίας εὑρίσκεται πάλιν.

[184] εἰ οὖν μήτε δι’ ἀποδείξεως μήτε διὰ σημείου μήτε διὰ κριτηρίου ἔστιν ὑπομνῆσαι ὅτι ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἀλλ’ οὐδ’
ἐξ ἑαυτῆς πρόδηλός ἐστιν, ὡς παρεστήσαμεν, ἀκατάληπτον ἔσται εἰ ἐστιν ἀπόδειξις. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἀνύπαρκτος ἔσται ἡ ἀπόδειξις· νενόηται μὲν γὰρ σὺν τῷ ἀποδεικνύναι, ἀποδεικνύναι δὲ οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο μὴ καταλαμβανομένη. διόπερ οὐδὲ ἀπόδειξις ἔσται.

[185] Ταῦτα μὲν ὧς ἐν ὑποτυπώσει καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἀρκέσει λελέχθαι. οἱ δὲ δογματικοὶ τοὐναντίον κατασκευά- ζοντές φασιν, ὅτι ἤτοι ἀποδεικτικοί εἰσιν οἱ κατὰ τῆς ἀπο- ²⁵²⁶ 99 δείξεως ἠρωτημένοι λόγοι ἢ οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοί· καὶ εἰ μὲν
οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοί, οὐ δύνανται δεικνύναι ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ἀπόδειξις· εἰ δὲ ἀποδεικτικοί εἰσιν, αὐτοὶ οὗτοι τὴν ὑπόστασιν τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἐκ περιτροπῆς εἰσάγουσιν.

[186] ὅθεν καὶ τοιοῦτον συνερωτῶσι λόγον· ‘εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· εἰ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· ἤτοι δὲ
ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· ἔστιν ἄρα ἀπόδειξις' ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς αὐτῆς δυνάμεως καὶ τοῦτον ἐρωτῶσι τὸν λό’ γον· ‘τὸ τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις ἑπόμενον οὐ μόνον ἀληθές ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον· ἀντίκειται δὲ ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις
“ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις — οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις'', ὧν ἑκατέρῳ ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν· ἔστιν ἄρα ἀπόδειξις’.

[187] ἔνεστι μὲν οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα ἀντιλέγειν, οἶον γοῦν, ἐπεὶ μὴ νομίζομέν τινα λόγον εἶναι ἀποδεικτικόν, καὶ τούς κατὰ τῆς
ἀποδείξεως λόγους οὐ πάντως φαμὲν ἀποδεικτικοὺς εἷναι ἀλλὰ φαίνεσθαι ἡμῖν πιθανούς· οἱ δὲ πιθανοὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἰσὶν ἀποδεικτικοί. εἰ δὲ ἄρα καὶ ἀποδεικτικοί εἰσιν ὅπερ οὐ διαβεβαιούμεθα) πάντως καὶ ἀληθεῖς. ἀλη- θεῖς δέ εἰσι λόγοι δι’ ἀληθῶν ἀληθὲς συνάγοντες· οὐκοῦν
ἀληθής ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἡ ἐπιφορά. ἦν δέ γε αὕτη ‘οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα ἀπόδειξες'· <ἀληθὲς> ἄρα ἔστι τὸ ‘οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ περιτροπῆς.

[188] δύνανται δὲ οἱ λόγοι, καθάπερ καὶ τὰ καθαρτικὰ φάρμακα ταῖς ἐν τῷ σώματι ὑποκειμέναις ὕλαις ἑαυτὰ συνεξάγει, οὕτω καὶ αὐτοὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις λόγοις τοῖς
ἀποδεικτικοῖς εἶναι λεγομένοις καὶ ἑαυτούς συμπεριγράφειν. τοῦτο γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπεμφαῖνον, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ φωνὴ αὕτη ἡ ‘οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀληθές’ οὐ μόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑαυτὴν ἐκείνοις συμπεριτρέπει. ὅ τε λύγος οὗτος δύναται δείκνυσθαι ἀσύνακτος ‘εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις,
ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· εἰ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἐστιν ἀπόδειξις· ἤτοι δὲ ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν· ἔστιν ἄρα', καὶ διά πλειόνων μέν, ὧς δὲ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἀρκούντως διὰ τοῦδε τοῦ ἐπι- ²⁷²⁸²⁹³⁰ 100 χειρήματος.

[189] εἰ ὑγιές ἐστι τὸ συνημμένον τοῦτο ῾εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις᾿, δεῖ τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ λήγοντος, τουτέστι τὸ ῾οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις᾿, μάχεσθαι
τῷ ῾ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις᾿· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τοῦ συνημμένου τὸ ἡγούμενον. ἀδύνατον δέ ἐστι κατ᾿ αὐτοὺς συνγμμένον ὑγιὲς εἶναι ἐκ μαχομένων ἀξιωμάτων συνεστώς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ συνημμένον ἐπαγγέλλεται ὄντος τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡγουμένου εἶναι καὶ τὸ λῆγον, τὰ δὲ μαχόμενα τοὐναντίον,
ὄντος τοῦ ἑτέρου αὐτῶν ὁποιουδήποτε ἀδύνατον εἶναι τὸ λοιπὸν ὑπάρχειν. ὄντος ἄρα ὑγιοῦς τοῦδε τοῦ συνημμένου ῾εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις᾿ οὐ δύναται ὑγιὲς εἶναι τοῦτο <τὸ> συνημμένον ῾εἰ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις.᾿

[190] πάλιν δ᾿ αὖ συγχωρούντων ἡμῶν καθ᾿ ὑπόθεσιν ὑγιὲς εἶναι τόδε τὸ συνημμένον ῾εἰ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις', δύναται συνυπάρχειν τὸ ‘εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις᾿ τῷ ῾οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις᾿. εἰ δὲ δύναται αὐτῷ συνυπάρχειν,
οὐ μάχεται αὐτῷ. ἐν ἄρα τῷ ῾εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις᾿ συνημμένῳ οὐ μάχεται τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ λήγοντος τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡγουμένῳ, ὥστε οὐκ ἔσται ὑγιὲς πάλιν τοῦτο τὸ συνημμένον,

[191] ἐκείνου κατὰ συγχώρησιν ὡς ὑγιοῦς τιθεμένου, μὴ μαχομένου δὲ τοῦ
῾οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις᾿ τῷ ῾ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις᾿. οὐδὲ τὸ διεζευγμένον ὑγιὲς ἔσται τὸ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις᾿· τὸ γὰρ ὑγιὲς διεζευγμένον ἐπαγγέλλεται ἓν τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ὑγιὲς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἢ τὰ λοιπὰ ψεῦδος ἢ ψευδῆ μετὰ μάχης. ἢ εἴπερ ὑγιές ἐστι τὸ διεζευγμένον,
πάλιν φαῦλον εὑρίσκεται τὸ ‘εἰ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις᾿ συνημμένον, ἐκ μαχομένων συνεστώς. οὐκοῦν ἀσύμφωνά τέ ἐστι καὶ ἀλλήλων ἀναιρετικὰ τὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ προειρημένῳ λήμματα· διόπερ οὐκ ἔστιν ὑγιὴς ὁ λόγος.

[192] ἀλλ᾿ οὐδὲ ὅτι ἀκολουθεῖ τι τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις δύνανται
δεικνύναι, μὴ ἔχοντες κριτήριον ἀκολουθίας, ὧς ἐπελογισάεθα.

³¹ 101

Ταῦτα δὲ ἐκ περιουσίας λέγομεν. εἰ γὰρ πιθανοὶ μέν εἰσιν οἱ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀποδείξεως λόγοι (ἔστωσαν γάρ),
πιθαναὶ δὲ καὶ αἱ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν λεγόμεναι ἐπιχειρήσεις, ἐπέχειν ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως, μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν ἢ μὴ εἶναι λέγοντας.

Notes on the current edition

Outlines of Pyrrhonism

1. See the definition of ‟proof” in §§ 135–136. It is with ‟hypothetical syllogisms” that Sextus is here concerned. The ‟component elements” of the syllogism (or ‟argument”) are the ‟judgements” (or propositions) which go to form its ‟premisses.”

2. i.e. the Stoics, cf. §§ 166, 235.

3. i.e.(in Stoic terminology) definitely valid and conclusive; cf. § 163 infra. Note that the term συνημμένον (‟combination”) mostly means the ‟hypothetical, or major, premiss of a hypothetical syllogism,” but sometimes the whole syllogism.

4. Cf. iii. 177 ff.

5. Over 300 volumes, dealing with grammar and logic (‟dialectic”), are ascribed to Chrysippus.

6. With §§ 152–156 cf. Adv. Log. ii. 435 ff.

7. i.e. the syllogism as a whole, which is a ‟combination”

8. i.e. those which need no proof as being self-evident; cf. Aristotle’s ‟perfect syllogisms,” and i. 69; Adv. Log. ii. 223 ff.

9. Literally, the ‟combination,” which here (as in § 104) means the hypothetical major premiss, of which the ‟if,” clause is the ‟antecedent,” the other clause the ‟consequent.”

10. i.e. a premiss consisting of two clauses ‟coupled” by ‟and” (or ‟both . . . and”); a ‟conjunctive” premiss (as opposed to a ‟disjunctive,” coupled by ‟either . . . or”).

11. Cf. i. 69.

12. An example of the syllogismus decurtatus, which has but one premiss; cf. § 167.

13. Aristotle dealt only with this form of proof; later Peripatetics with the hypothetical and disjunctive forms as well.

14. Cf. Plato, Alcib. I. 116.

15. i.e. of the First Figure: the previous examples are cases of Barbara and Darii, so ‟the others” would belong to Celarent and Ferio. But Heintz’s suggestion, τρόπων τῶν (for πρώτων), ‟the other figures,” may well be right.

16. i.e. Stoics and Peripatetics, cf. § 146 supra.

17. A. of Tarsus was head of the Stoic School circa 150-30 b.c.; cf. Adv. Log. ii. 443 for Chrysippus on the ‟curtailed syllogism.”

18. Cf. § 143.

19. See §§ 85-94 supra, and § 138.

20. Cf. § 116.

21. Cf. §§ 117 ff., 125.

22. Cf. §§ 135, 143 ff.

23. Cf. Adv. Log. ii. 382 ff.

24. Cf. τὰ ἐπὶ μέρους, § 87 supra; ‟things of a partial character” as opposed to ‟wholes” or genera.

25. Cf. § 135 supra.

26. i.e. is real, as opposed to phenomenal; so Xenophanes, Xeniades, Gorgias, cf. § 18.

27. For this Sceptic formula cf. i. 188.

28. The Epicurean proof of Void ran thus: ‟If motion exists, Void exists; but motion does exist; therefore Void exists.” Cf. § 245, Adv. Log. ii. 329 ff.

29. Cf. §§ 104 ff., 121.

30. Cf. §§ 48 ff. supra.

31. Cf. §§ 144 supra.

32. i.e. if ‟proof” is non-apprehensible it must also be unreal or non-existent, because non-apprehensible ‟proof” is incapable of ‟proving” anything, and ‟proof” apart from ‟proving” is inconceivable—the ‟conception” of the one necessarily implying the other.

33. Lit. ‟reversal” of the argument; cf. § 128, Adv. Log. ii. 463.

34. Cf. § 131 for this hypothetical syllogism with double major premiss. Here, as there, the Dogmatists argue that the Sceptics’ proof that ‟proof exists not” refutes itself, the very proof they employ being itself an ‟existent” proof.

35. Cf. i. 206, Adv. Log. ii. 480.

36. See §§ 145 ff.

Sextus Empiricus Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes 2.13

Robert Gregg Bury (Translator)

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Chapter XIII.—Does Proof Exist?

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