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Chapter X.—Concerning Sign
[97] Of objects, then, some, according to the Dogmatists,
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are pre-evident, some non-evident; and of the non-evident, some are altogether non-evident, some occasionally non-evident, some naturally non-evident. Pre-evident are, as they assert, those which come to our knowledge of themselves,
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as for example the fact that it is day-time; altogether non-evident are those which are not of a nature to fall within our apprehension, as that the stars
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are even in number; occasionally non-evident are those which,
[98] though patent in their nature, are occasionally rendered non- evident to us owing to certain external circumstances,
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as the city of Athens is now to me; naturally non- evident are those which are not of such a nature
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as to fall within our clear perception, like the intelligible pores; for these never appear of themselves but may be thought to be apprehended, if at all, owing to other things, such as perspirations or something of the sort.
[99] Now the pre-evident objects, they say, do not require a sign, for they are apprehended of themselves. And neither do the altogether non-evident, since of course they are not even apprehended at all. But such objects as are occasionally or naturally non-evident are apprehended by means of signs— not of course by the same signs, but by ‟suggestive” signs in the case of the occasionally non-evident and by ‟indicative” signs in the case of the naturally non-evident.
[100] Of the signs, then, according to them, some are suggestive, some indicative.
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They term a sign ‟suggestive” when, being mentally associated with the thing signified, it by its clearness at the time of its perception, though the thing signified remains non-evident, suggests to us the thing associated with it, which is not clearly perceived at the moment— as for instance in the case of smoke and fire.
[101] An ‟indicative” sign, they say, is that which is not clearly associated with the thing signified, but signifies that whereof it is a sign by its own particular nature and constitution, just as, for instance, the bodily motions are signs of the soul. Hence, too, they define this sign as follows: ‟An indicative sign is an antecedent judgement, in a sound hypothetical syllogism,
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which serves to reveal the consequent.”
[102] Seeing, then, that there are, as we have said, two different kinds of sign, we do not argue against every sign but only against the indicative kind as it seems to be invented by the Dogmatists. For the suggestive sign is relied on by living experience, since when a man sees smoke fire is signified, and when he beholds a scar he says that there has been a wound. Hence, not only do we not fight against living experience, but we even lend it our support by assenting undogmatically to what it relies on, while opposing the private inventions of the Dogmatists.
[103] These prefatory remarks it was, perhaps, fitting to make for the sake of elucidating the object of our inquiry. It remains for us to proceed to our refutation, not in any anxiety to show that the indicative sign is wholly unreal, but reminding ourselves of the apparent equivalence of the arguments adduced for its reality and for its unreality.
Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes. Sextus Empiricus. Robert Gregg Bury (Translator). London. 1933.
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