[210] Now that this latter differs from our Way of thought is plain at once; for Heracleitus ¹ makes dogmatic statements about many non-evident things, whereas we, as has been said, do not. It is true that Aenesidemus and his followers used to say that the Sceptic Way is a road leading up to the Heracleitean philosophy, since to hold that the same thing is the subject of opposite appearances is a preliminary to holding that it is the subject of opposite realities, and while the Sceptics say that the same thing is the subject of opposite appearances, the Heracleiteans go on from this to assert their reality. ² But in reply to them we declare that the view about the same thing having opposite appearances is not a dogma of the Sceptics but a fact which is experienced not by the Sceptics alone but also by the rest of philosophers and by all mankind;

[211] for certainly no one would venture to say that honey ³ does not taste sweet to people in sound health or that it does not taste bitter to those suffering from jaundice; so that the Heracleiteans start from the general preconception of mankind, just as we also do and probably all the other philosophies. Consequently, if they had derived their theory that the same thing is the subject of opposite realities from one of the Sceptic formulae, such as ‟All things are non-apprehensible,” or ‟I determine nothing,” or some similar expression, probably they would have reached the conclusion they assert; but since their starting-points are impressions experienced not by us only but by all the other philosophers and by ordinary people, why should anyone declare that our Way of thought is a road to the Heracleitean philosophy any more than any of the other philosophies or even than the ordinary view, since we all make use of the same common material? ⁴

[212] Rather it is the case that the Sceptic Way so far from being an aid to the knowledge of the Heracleitean philosophy is actually an obstacle thereto, seeing that the Sceptic decries all the dogmatic statements of Heracleitus as rash utterances, contradicting his ‟Ecpyrosis,” ⁵ and contradicting his view that the same thing is the subject of opposite realities, and in respect of every dogma of Heracleitus scoffing at his dogmatic precipitancy, and constantly repeating, as I said before, his own ‟I apprehend not” and ‟I determine nothing,” which are in conflict with the Heracleiteans. Now it is absurd to say that a conflicting Way is a road to the system with which it is in conflict; therefore it is absurd to say that the Sceptic Way is a road leading to the Heracleitean philosophy.