Sextus Empiricus Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes 2.11.130

Robert Gregg Bury (Translator)

View: By Chapter

Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes. Sextus Empiricus. Robert Gregg Bury (Translator). London. 1933.

Funding provided by Tisch Library, Tufts University.

Current edition First1KGreek

Outlines of Pyrrhonism (English) (Sextus Empiricus, Vol. 1. Bury, Robert Gregg, translator. London: William Heinemann Ltd.; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1933.)

Editions (1)
Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes First1KGreek (Sextus Empiricus. Sexti Empiricii Opera, Volume 1. Mutschmann, Hermann, editor. Leipzig: Teubner, 1912.) — 2.11.130 focus

Notes on the current edition

Outlines of Pyrrhonism

1. Cf. Adv. Log. ii. 279. The meaning of these sections, 130–133, is briefly this: The Dogmatists argue (§§ 130–131) (1) that the Sceptics’ objections to ‟sign” must signify either something or nothing; if nothing, they have no force against it, while if they signify something they are signs themselves and so prove sign’s existence; (2) the arguments (λόγοι) against ‟sign” prove either something or nothing; if nothing, they fail to prove the non-existence of ‟sign,” while if they prove something, they are ‟proofs,” i.e. a species of ‟sign,” and thus prove sign’s existence. Hence, whichever view we take—the Dogmatists’ that ‟sign exists,” or the Sceptics’ that ‟sign exists not”—we arrive at the same conclusion that ‟sign exists.” In § 132 we have the counter-argument of the Sceptics, ‟reversing” that of the Dogmatists.