Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes, Robert Gregg Bury (Translator), 1.15.172

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[172] And if the sense-object shall have to be decided by a thought-object, then, since thought-objects also are controverted, this being an object of thought will need examination and confirmation. Whence then will it gain confirmation? If from an intelligible object, it will suffer a similar regress ad infinitum; and if from a sensible object, since an intelligible was adduced to establish the sensible and a sensible to establish the intelligible, the Mode of circular reasoning¹ is brought in.

Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes. Sextus Empiricus. Robert Gregg Bury (Translator). London. 1933.

Funding provided by Tisch Library, Tufts University.

Current edition First1KGreek

Outlines of Pyrrhonism (English) (Sextus Empiricus, Vol. 1. Bury, Robert Gregg, translator. London: William Heinemann Ltd.; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1933.)

Editions (1)

Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes First1KGreek (Sextus Empiricus. Sexti Empiricii Opera, Volume 1. Mutschmann, Hermann, editor. Leipzig: Teubner, 1912.) — 1.15.172 focus

[172] εἰ δὲ ὑπὸ νοητοῦ ἐπικρίνεσθαι δεήσει τὸ
αἰσθητόν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ νοητὰ διαπεφώνηται, δεήσεται καὶ τοῦτο νοητὸν ὂν κρίσεως τε καὶ πίστεως. πόθεν οὖν πι στωθήσεται; εἰ μὲν ὑπὸ νοητοῦ, εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπεσεῖται ὁμοίως· εἰ δ’ ὑπὸ αἰσθητοῦ, ἐπεὶ πρὸς μὲν τὴν πίστιν τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ παρελήφθη νοητόν, πρὸς δὲ τὴν τοῦ νοητοῦ
πίστιν αἰσθητόν, ὁ διάλληλος εἰσάγεται τρόπος.

Notes on the current edition

Outlines of Pyrrhonism

1. Lit. ‟the through-one-another mode” (of reasoning). This is the fallacy known as circulus in probando, by which each of two propositions is used in turn to prove the truth of the other.

Sextus Empiricus Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes 1.15.172

Robert Gregg Bury (Translator)

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