Sextus Empiricus Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes 1.14.60

1. See ii. 134 ff. where it is argued that logical demonstration or ‟proof” is ‟non-existent.” The argument here is that, even if we grant the existence of ‟proof” in the abstract we cannot prove anything in the particular case before us—the question as to the superiority of our impressions to those of animals. For all proof must be either ‟apparent” to us, or ‟non-apparent:” the latter kind we reject as incomprehensible; the former ‟apparent” proof is indecisive, its ‟apparency” being relative to us, who are a species of animal, and thus involved in the dispute. Further, as relative to us the ‟apparent proof” is not aboslute, and therefore not necessarily ‟true.”