[1] 1354a 1 Rhetoric is a counterpart ¹ of Dialectic; for both have to do with matters that are in a manner within the cognizance of all men and not confined ² to any special science. Hence all men in a manner have a share of both; for all, up to a certain point, endeavor to criticize or uphold an argument, to defend themselves or to accuse.

[2] Now, the majority of people do this either at random or with a familiarity arising from habit. But since both these ways are possible, it is clear that matters can be reduced to a system, for it is possible to examine the reason why some attain their end by familiarity and others by chance; and such an examination all would at once admit to be the function of an art. ³

[3] Now, previous compilers of Arts ⁴ of Rhetoric have provided us with only a small portion of this art, for proofs are the only things in it that come within the province of art; everything else is merely an accessory. And yet they say nothing about enthymemes which are the body of proof, but chiefly devote their attention to matters outside the subject;

[4] for the arousing of prejudice, compassion, anger, and similar emotions has no connection with the matter in hand, but is directed only to the dicast. ⁵ The result would be that, if all trials were now carried on as they are in some States, 20 especially those that are well administered, there would be nothing left for the rhetorician to say.

[5] For all men either think that all the laws ought so to prescribe, ⁶ or in fact carry out the principle and forbid speaking outside the subject, as in the court of Areopagus, and in this they are right. For it is wrong to warp the dicast's feelings, to arouse him to anger, jealousy or compassion, which would be like making the rule crooked which one intended to use.

[6] Further, it is evident that the only business of the litigant is to prove that the fact in question is or is not so, that it has happened or not; whether it is important or unimportant, just or unjust, in all cases in which the legislator has not laid down a ruling, is a matter for the dicast himself to decide; it is not the business of the litigants to instruct him.

[7] First of all, therefore, it is proper that laws, properly enacted, should themselves define the issue of all cases as far as possible, and leave as little as possible to the discretion of the judges; in the first place, because it is easier to find one or a few men of good sense, 1354b 1 capable of framing laws and pronouncing judgements, than a large number; secondly, legislation is the result of long consideration, whereas judgements are delivered on the spur of the moment, so that it is difficult for the judges properly to decide questions of justice or expediency. But what is most important of all is that the judgement of the legislator does not apply to a particular case, but is universal and applies to the future, whereas the member of the public assembly and the dicast have to decide present and definite issues, and in their case love, hate, or personal interest is often involved, so that they are no longer capable of discerning the truth adequately, their judgement being obscured by their own pleasure or pain.

[8] All other cases, as we have just said, should be left to the authority of the judge as seldom as possible, except where it is a question of a thing having happened or not, of its going to happen or not, of being or not being so; this must be left to the discretion of the judges, for it is impossible for the legislator to foresee such questions.

[9] If this is so, it is obvious that all those who definitely lay down, for instance, what should be the contents of the exordium or the narrative, or of the other parts of the discourse, are bringing under the rules of art what is outside the subject; for the only thing to which their attention is devoted 20 is how to put the judge into a certain frame of mind. They give no account of the artificial proofs, ⁷ which make a man a master of rhetorical argument.

[10] Hence, although the method of deliberative and forensic Rhetoric is the same, and although the pursuit of the former is nobler and more worthy of a statesman than that of the latter, which is limited to transactions between private citizens, they say nothing about the former, but without exception endeavor to bring forensic speaking under the rules of art. The reason of this is that in public speaking it is less worth while to talk of what is outside the subject, and that deliberative oratory lends itself to trickery less than forensic, because it is of more general interest. ⁸ For in the assembly the judges decide upon their own affairs, so that the only thing necessary is to prove the truth of the statement of one who recommends a measure, but in the law courts this is not sufficient; there it is useful to win over the hearers, for the decision concerns other interests than those of the judges, who, having only themselves to consider and listening merely for their own pleasure, surrender to the pleaders but do not give a real decision. ⁹ 1355a 1 That is why, as I have said before, in many places the law prohibits speaking outside the subject in the law courts, whereas in the assembly the judges themselves take adequate precautions against this.

[11] It is obvious, therefore, that a system arranged according to the rules of art is only concerned with proofs; that proof is a sort of demonstration, ¹⁰ since we are most strongly convinced when we suppose anything to have been demonstrated; that rhetorical demonstration is an enthymeme, which, generally speaking, is the strongest of rhetorical proofs and lastly, that the enthymeme is a kind of syllogism. Now, as it is the function of Dialectic as a whole, or of one of its parts, ¹¹ to consider every kind of syllogism in a similar manner, it is clear that he who is most capable of examining the matter and forms of a syllogism will be in the highest degree a master of rhetorical argument, if to this he adds a knowledge of the subjects with which enthymemes deal and the differences between them and logical syllogisms. For, in fact, the true and that which resembles it come under the purview of the same faculty, and at the same time men have a sufficient natural capacity for the truth and indeed in most cases attain to it; wherefore one who divines well in regard to the truth will also be able to divine well in regard to probabilities. ¹²

It is clear, then, that all other rhetoricians bring under the rules of art what is outside the subject, 20 and ¹³ have rather inclined to the forensic branch of oratory.

[12] Nevertheless, Rhetoric is useful, because the true and the just are naturally superior to their opposites, so that, if decisions are improperly made, they must owe their defeat to their own advocates; which is reprehensible. Further, in dealing with certain persons, even if we possessed the most accurate scientific knowledge, we should not find it easy to persuade them by the employment of such knowledge. For scientific discourse is concerned with instruction, ¹⁴ but in the case of such persons instruction is impossible; our proofs and arguments must rest on generally accepted principles, as we said in the Topics, ¹⁵ when speaking of converse with the multitude. Further, the orator should be able to prove opposites, as in logical arguments; not that we should do both (for one ought not to persuade people to do what is wrong), but that the real state of the case may not escape us, and that we ourselves may be able to counteract false arguments, if another makes an unfair use of them. Rhetoric and Dialectic alone of all the arts prove opposites; for both are equally concerned with them. However, it is not the same with the subject matter, but, generally speaking, that which is true and better is naturally always easier to prove and more likely to persuade. Besides, it would be absurd if it were considered disgraceful not to be able to defend oneself with the help of the body, 1355b 1 but not disgraceful as far as speech is concerned, whose use is more characteristic of man than that of the body.

[13] If it is argued that one who makes an unfair use of such faculty of speech may do a great deal of harm, this objection applies equally to all good things except virtue, and above all to those things which are most useful, such as strength, health, wealth, generalship; for as these, rightly used, may be of the greatest benefit, so, wrongly used, they may do an equal amount of harm.

[14] It is thus evident that Rhetoric does not deal with any one definite class of subjects, but, like Dialectic, [is of general application]; also, that it is useful; and further, that its function is not so much to persuade, as to find out in each case the existing means of persuasion. ¹⁶ The same holds good in respect to all the other arts. For instance, it is not the function of medicine to restore a patient to health, but only to promote this end as far as possible; for even those whose recovery is impossible may be properly treated. It is further evident that it belongs to Rhetoric to discover the real and apparent means of persuasion, just as it belongs to Dialectic to discover the real and apparent syllogism. For what makes the sophist is not the faculty but the moral purpose. But there is a difference: in Rhetoric, one who acts in accordance with sound argument, and one who acts in accordance with moral purpose, 20 are both called rhetoricians; but in Dialectic it is the moral purpose that makes the sophist, the dialectician being one whose arguments rest, not on moral purpose but on the faculty. ¹⁷

Let us now endeavor to treat of the method itself, to see how and by what means we shall be able to attain our objects. And so let us as it were start again, and having defined Rhetoric anew, pass on to the remainder of the subject.

RHETORIC1 is the counterpart of logic*2; since both are conversant with subjects of such a nature as it is the business of all to have a certain knowledge of, and which belong to no distinct science. ¹ Wherefore all ² men in some way participate of both 3; since all, to a ^{3 4 5} certain extent, attempt, as well to sift, as to maintain an argument; as well to defend themselves, as to impeach ⁶ 4. Now, of the multitude 5, some do this at random ; others, by reason of practice, from habit; but as it is possible either way, it is plain that the case will admit of our reducing these things to a system. For we are at liberty to speculate on the causes of the success, as well of those who from practice, as of those who on the spur of the moment, [attempt either to convince . or to persuade]. And every one will be antecedently prepared to acknowledge that an undertaking of this description is the business of art6.

⁷ Hitherto, however, such as have compiled systems of oratory have executed a very trifling part of it ; for the means of making credible alone come pro* ^{8 9 10 11} perly within the sphere of the art, but other points are merely adscititious. On the subject of enthymems, ¹² however, which in point of fact is the very body of proof, these men say not a word; while on points foreign to the subject they busy themselves most mightily. Now the feeling of ill-will8, pity, and anger, ¹³ and the like emotions of the mind, appertain not to the case, but refer to the judge; so that if, in regard to all judicial processes, matters were regulated as they now are in some states, (and more particularly in such as are well constituted, these spokesmen would not have a word to say. And every one [approves the regulation], ¹⁴ whether they think that the law should hold this language, or whether they avail themselves of the rule, and positively forbid to speak irrelevantly to the case ; just as they do in the Areopagus, observing this usage properly enough. For it is not right that an orator should bias the judge by winning him onto anger,or pity, or jealousy; since it is equally absurd as though one were to make a ruler crooked which he is about to use9. It is further evident that the ¹⁵ pleader's business is nothing more than to prove the matter of fact, either that it is, or is not the case ; that it has, or has not happened. But as to the question whether it be important or trifling, just or ^{16 17 18 19} unjust, whatever questions of this nature the legislator has not determined ; on these the judge must somehow or other make up his mind of himself and not take instructions on them from the parties at issue. ²⁰ It would then be most admirably adapted to the purposes of justice, if laws properly enacted were, as far as circumstances admitted, of themselves to mark out all cases, and to abandon as few as possible to the discretion of the judge. And this because, ²¹ in the first place, it is easier to get one or a few of good sense, and of ability to legislate and adjudge, ²² than to get many10: and next to this, legislative enactments proceed from men carrying their views a long time back; [or, from men who have reflected on the subject for a long time ;] while judicial decisions are made off hand ; so that it is difficult for persons deciding under these circumstances ²³ to assign what is just and expedient: and, what is most of all to the point, is this, that the award of the legislator is not particular nor about present circumstances, but about what is future and general; whereas the member of a popular assembly and the judge decide on points actually present and definite ; and under their circumstances, feelings of partiality, and dislike, and personal expediency, will, in many instances, antecedently have been interwoven with the case ; and to such a degree, that one is no longer able, adequately, to contemplate the truth, and that personal pleasure or pain throws a shade over the ²⁴ judgement. In regard, then, to other particulars, as I ²⁵ observed, it is right to leave the judge a discretion in as few as possible11: but questions of fact, whether it has or has not taken place, will or will not happen, does or does not exist; all such it is necessary12 to abandon to the discretion of the judges ; since it is not possible that the legislator ever should foresee them.

If these things be so, it is plain that they embrace ²⁶ in their systems matters foreign to the subject, who give us explanations of the other points, as for instance-what the proem, and the narration, and the other divisions, ought severally to embrace: for in these treatises they busy themselves about nothing else, except how to render the judge of a certain disposition ; while on the subject of those means of persuasion, recognised by art, they discover nothing ; and yet this is the source whence an orator may become a good reasoner. And it is for this reason ²⁷ that, notwithstanding the same system is conversant about deliberative and judicial cases, and although the business of the senate is more honourable, and embraces higher social interests, than that whose subject is merely the transactions of individuals; yet about the former they say not one word, while all undertake to frame systems of judicial pleading. And13 they are not without a reason for this, since ^{28 29 30} in deliberative speeches it is less worth while to state matters foreign to the subject, and a deliberative speech admits less of malicious sophistry than judicial pleading, but is more widely interesting; for here the judge [i. e. the senator] decides on questions which nearly interest himself, so that no more is necessary than to prove that the question stands just as he, the adviser, asserts. In judicial questions, however, this is not sufficient, but it is worth while to engage the hearer; for the decision is about a case which does not affect himself: so that the judges, looking to their own gratification, and listening with a view to amusement, surrender themselves up to the pleaders ; and, strictly speaking, do not fulfil the character of judges14. On which very account the law, in many places, as I before remarked, forbids ^{31 32} the saying any thing irrelevant; but there [in deliberative assemblies] the judges are, of themselves, careful enough of this.

But as it is plain that an artificial system is conversant ³³ about the means of making credible, and as this is a sort of proof, (because we are then most persuaded when we conceive that the point has been proved,) but the proof of rhetoric is enthymem, (and this, to speak generally, has the most sovereign effect of all the means of persuasion ;) and the enthymem is a sort of syllogism ; since too it is the province of logic to consider equally every sort of syllogism, whether of that art as a whole, or of some particular branch of it; then, these points being admitted, it is evident that the man best able to consider the question, out of what sources and how the syllogism arises, will moreover be in the highest degree capable of employing enthymems ; provided he make himself acquainted, besides his logic, with the kind of subjects about which enthymems are conversant, and what differences they exhibit as compared with the syllogism of logic. Because it belongs to the same faculty of the mind to recognise both truth and the semblance, of truth ; and more than this, mankind have a15 tolerable natural tendency toward that which is true; and, in general, bit the truth; wherefore an aptness in conjecturing probabilities belongs to birD who hasa similar aptness in regard to truth. It is plain, then, that other rhetoricians embrace in their systems, points foreign to the subject, and what reasons they have for inclining to the subject of judicial pleading in preference to the other branches of rhetoric.

But rhetoric is useful, because truth and justice ³⁴ are in their naturestronger than their opposites ; so that if decisions be made, not in conformity to the rule Propriety, it must have been that they have beengot the Better of,through fault of the advocates themselves : and this is deserving reprehension. ^{35 36} thermore, in the case of some people, not even if we had the most accurate scientific knowledge, would it be easy to persuade them were we to address them through the medium of that knowledge; for a scientific discourse, it is the privilege of education [to appreciate], and it is impossible that this [should extend to the multitude16] ; bat we must construct our means of persuasion, and our addresses, through the medium of ordinary language; as in fact I stated in my Topics, "on the manner of communicating with ³⁷ the multitude!, Again, too, we ought to be able to [persuade on opposite sides of a question; as also we ought in the case of arguing by syllogism: not that we should practise both, for it is not right to persuade to what is bad; but in order that the bearing of the case may not escape us, and that when another makes an unfair use of these reasonings, we may be able to solve them. 17 Now, of all the other arts, there is not one which embraces contraries in its conclusions ; but logic and rhetoric alone do this; for they are both in an equal degree18 conversant about contraries; not, however, that these contrary subjects present equal facilities: but the true and better side of the question is always naturally of a more easy inference, and has, generally speaking, a greater tendency ³⁸ to persuade. To illustrate further the utility of rhetoric, it were absurd, if, while it is disgraceful ^{39 40 41} for a man not to be able to assist himself by his person, it were not disgraceful to be unable to do this by his speech, which is more a peculiarity of man than the exercise of the body 19. If, however, [any one ⁴² should object20] that a person, unfairly availing himself of such powers of speaking, may be, In a very high degree, injurious ; this is an objection which will lie in some degree against every good indiscriminately, except virtue; and with especial force against those which are most advantageous, as strength, health, wealth, and generalship. Because, employing these fairly, a person may be beneficial in points of the highest importance; and, by employing them unfairly, may be equally injurious.

That rhetoric, then, is conversant not with any one ⁴³ class of subjects, but like logic [is of universal applicability], and that it is useful, is evident; as also that its business is not absolute persuasion 21, but to consider on every subject what means of persuasion are inherent in it ; just as is also the case in every ^{44 45 46} other art: for neither is it the duty of medicine to render its patient healthy, but to bring him on as far as the case admits; for it is nevertheless very possible to treat properly even such as may be incapable of again partaking of health : and besides this [it is evident] that it belongs to the self-same art to observe both the real and seeming means of persuasion; just as it is incumbent on logic to consider syllogisms ⁴⁷ and apparent syllogisms. And this is the case, because the character of sophist does not consist in the faculty22 [for the logician possesses this as well as he], but in his fixed design [of abusing it23]. Here [in ^{48 49 50} rhetoric], however, the one who is considered in ⁵¹ ference simply to his knowledge of the art, as well as he who is considered in reference to his moral principles, is indiscriminately designated an orator.ButItS logic, a sophist is called so in reference to his moral principles; a logician, however, without reference to his principles, simply as regards the faculty he is master of.

However, commencing from this point, let us attempt ⁵² to treat of the system both from what sources and in what manner we shall be able to attain the proposed objects; having then once more, as at the outset, defined what this art is, let us treat of what remains.

LET us define rhetoric to be, " A faculty of considering ⁵³ all the possible means of persuasion on every subject ;” for this is the business of no one of the other arts, each of which is fit enough to inform or persuade respecting its own subject; medicine, for instance, on what conduces to health or sickness ; and geometry, on the subject of relations incidental to magnitudes ; and arithmetic, on the subject of numbers ; and in the same way the remaining arts and sciences. But rhetoric, as I may say, seems able to consider the means of persuasion on any given subject whatsoever. And hence I declare it to have for its province, as an art, no particular limited class of subjects. Now ⁵⁴ of the means of effecting persuasion, some originate in the art, others independently of it. By inartificial ⁵⁵ I mean whatever are not furnished forth by our own means, but which are in existence already, as witnesses, torture, deeds, and all of this kind ; by artificial, such as may be got up by means of the system, and by our own talents. So that as regards these, we have to employ the one class, to discover the other.

⁵⁶ Of means of persuading by speaking there are three species1: some consist in the character of the speaker ; others in the disposing the hearer a certain way; others in the thing itself which is said, by reason of its proving, or appearing to prove the point. ⁵⁷ [Persuasion is effected by means of the moral character, when the speech shall have been spoken in such a way as to render the speaker worthy confidence : for we place confidence in the good to a wider extent, and with less hesitation, on all subjects generally ; but on points where no real accuracy exists, but there is room for doubt, we even entirely confide in them. This feeling, however, should arise by means of the speech, and not by reason of its having been preconceived that the speaker is a certain kind of man. For it is no true, as some treatise-mongers lay down in their systems, of the probity of the speaker, that it contributes nothing to persuasion ; but moral character nearly, I may say, carries with it the most sovereign ⁵⁸ emcacy in making credible2. [Persuasion is effected through the medium of the hearers, when they shall have been brought to a state of excitement under the influence of the speech; for we do not, when influenced by pain or joy, or partiality or dislike, award our decisions in the same way ; about which means of persuasion alone, I declare that the ^{59 60} system-mongers of the present day busy themselves. On the subject of these, however, some light will be afforded, when I speak on the subject of the passions.

Men give credit from the force of what is said, ⁶¹ when out of the means of persuasion which attach to each subject, we evince the truth, or that which appears so. Now as persuasion is effected by these ⁶² means, it is plain that it will be the privilege of him who is able to draw inferences syllogistically, and to take a full view of the subject of morals, and of the virtues, and thirdly of the passions, both what each of the passions is, of what nature it is, and from what causes it is engendered, and how : so that the fact is, that rhetoric is, as it were, a kind of off-shoot of logic, and of that department of moral philosophy which it is fair to call the science of social life 3. Whence rhetoric is invested with the costume of that science, as well as its professors, partly from inexperience, partly arrogance, and in part from other human causes ; because, as I stated at the outset, it is a sort of subordinate division of logic, and portraiture of it; neither of them being a science of any one definite ^{63 64} subject, as to what may be its nature; but both being certain faculties for furnishing ourselves with arguments. Now on the subject of the powers of the two, and their mutual relation, nearly enough has been said.

⁶⁵ With regard to means of persuading by proving, or appearing to prove your point, just as in logic one is induction, another syllogism, another apparent syllogism, so also is the case here in rhetoric; for its example is an induction, its enthymem a syllogism ; and enthymem I call rhetorical syllogism; rhetorical induction. Nowallorators effect their demonstrative proofs by allegation either of enthymems or examples, and, besides these, in no other way whatever. So that if it be incumbent on you to prove with regard to any thing or person in form of syllogism or induction, it cannot but be (as is evident from Analytics) that each of these will be essentially the same as each of the former (enthymem and induction. ⁶⁶ And what the difference is between example and enthymem is plain from the Topics, where, on the subject of syllogism and induction, it has been stated before, that the proving that such or such is the fact in many and similar cases, is called in the other art, ⁶⁷ induction; in this, example. But when, certain points having been granted, there results, by virtue of these, something else over and above these, by virtue of their existence, either as generals or particulars ; this process is, in that art, called syllogism : ⁶⁸ in this, enthymem5. Rhetoric, it is plain, enjoys each advantage ; for [with respect to it] the case, in this treatise, is the same as in the Methodica has been stated of logic ; the speeches of orators abounding, some in examples, others in enthymems ; and orators themselves being in the same way, some fond of example, others of enthymem. Reasonings, however, ^{69 70} conducted through the medium of example, are not less calculated to persuade ; but those of which enthymem is the characteristic are rather applauded7. ut I will hereafter explain what is the cause of this, and how we are to use each species of proof: let us, at present, distinguish more clearly respecting these proofs themselves. Now forasmuch as that which ⁷¹ carries persuasion with it, does so in reference to some one ; and either is, immediately on being enunciated, actually of a nature to persuade, and enforce belief; or [has its effect] from its appearing to prove through the medium of such [as compose the former class] ; and as no art considers particular cases; medicine for example, what is wholesome for the individuals, Socrates or Callias, but what is so for any person of such a constitution ; for this question comes within the province of art, but particulars are infinite, and cannot be known: so neither will rhetoric consider probability in reference to particular individuals; what, for instance, is probable to Socrates or Callias, but that which is so to persons such as they are; just in the same way as logic, for that art does not draw conclusions indiscriminately from any subjects; for some things there are which appear probable even to a madman; [yet you never would dream of arguing about them;] but it supplies itself from subjects ^{72 73} which require reasoning, as does rhetoric from subjects which are usual matters of deliberation. Its business then is respecting points about which we deliberate, and have no art specially conversant, and before auditors of such abilities as are not able to take a connected view of reasonings, conducted through ⁷⁴ many stages, nor to deduce an argument from remote principles. Now we deliberate on subjects which appear to admit of having themselves in either of two ways: for on questions which cannot, under any circumstances, past, present, or future, be otherwise; on these, I say, no one deliberates, at least not while he apprehends them to be such 8; for by such a deli- ⁷⁵ beration nothing is gained. And you may draw your conclusions and inferences, sometimes from premises which you have arrived at by former syllogisms; and sometimes from propositions, not syllogistically deduced, but requiring such a process by reason of their not being probable at first sight; but of these processes, it is impossible that the former should not be hard to follow up, by reason of its prolixity (for your hearer is supposed to be a man of merely ordinary understanding), and the latter defective in persuasive efficacy, by reason of its not being deduced out of principles either acknowledged, or probable ; sothat it is necessary that both the enthymem and example should be conversant about points which generally speaking, admit of being otherwise, the example an- swering to induction, xmpand the enthymem to syllo- ^{76 77} Igism,) and be deduced out of few, and frequently out of fewer intermediate propositions than the syllogism, in its original form, consisted of. For if any of these be known, it is not necessary to mention it; for the hearer of himself makes this addition. For example, in order to convey the information that Dorieus was conqueror in a contest where a chaplet is the prize; it suffices to say, that he conquered in the Olympic games : but as to the circumstance that, having conquered at Olympia, he got a chaplet, there is no necessity for adding it, because every one knows it.

But as the necessary premises out of which the ⁷⁸ syllogisms of rhetoric are formed are very few, (for the majority of questions about which decisions and consideration are exercised admit of being otherwise; because men deliberate and consider on the subjects of human conduct, and all conduct is of this contingent nature, nor is a single branch, I may say, of these subjects necessary,) and it cannot but be that you should deduce contingent conclusions from premises whose nature is such; and necessary ones, from necessary; ( this is evident to us from the Analytics:) I say, since this is the case, it is plAiD that the premises out of which enthymems are deduced, will be some of them necessary, but the greatest part contingent : enthymems are - educed from probabilities10 ( εἰκότα) and signs ( σημει̃). And thus it follows of necessity; that, of these, each ⁷⁹ respectively is identified with each of the former. ⁸⁰ For probability is what usually happens, not abso- ^{81 82 83} lately so, however, as some define it, but, at any rate, that which, in contingent matter, has itself so towards that with respect to which it is probable, as an universal to a particular 11. But of the signs, one ^{84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91} has the same ratio as a particular to an universal; the other, as an universal to a particular : and of these, the one which is necessarily conclusive, I call τεκμήριον; but the other, which is not necessary, has no name assigned to it in reference to its difference ⁹² [as a species.] Now by necessary propositions, I mean those out of which a syllogism is adduced ; and hence this kind of signs is called τεκμήριον, for when they think it impossible to do away what has been stated, people then esteem that they adduce a τεκμή­ ριον ; the point having been evinced and concluded; for, according to the old language, τέκμαρ is the ⁹³ same as " a boundary. Again, there is one sign whose ratio is as that of a particular to an universal: thus, were one to assert, for instance, that wise are just;,-because Socrates wise and just this then is a sign, but it may be done away, even supposing the premiss stated to be true ; for it violates the rules of syllogism, as to the other, when, for instance, a person alleges as a sign that a man is sick, his being in a fever ; or says a woman has had a child, because she has milkl ; this is a necessary sign ; which very one of the signs alone amounts to a τεκμήριον ; since it alone, if the premiss be true, cannot be done away. The other sign is in the ratio of an universal to a particular ; as if, for instance, ^{94 95} dne were to say it was a sign that a man has a fever, because he breathes thickly. But this, even granting the premiss be true, may be done away : for it is very possible that one who has not a fever should breathe thickly. Now what is probability, what sign, and what τεκμήριον, and in what they differ, has been explained : but in the Analytics [these several gradations of proof] as well as the reasons why some are not correctly inferred, and others are, have been distinctly stated with-greater clearness . As to ex- ⁹⁶ ample, it has been stated that it is an induction, and induction on what kind of subjects ; and its ratio is neither that of a part to a whole, nor of a whole to a part, nor of a whole to a whole : but example is in the ratio of a part to a part 14, of a similar case to a similar, when, both coming under the same genus, the one case happens to be better known than the other. For instance, you assert that Dionysius, in asking a guard, has views of setting up a tyranny, because Pisistratus before him, when designing this, began to ask for a body guard, and when he got it, established himself as tyrant; so too did Theogenes, at Megara. And all other persons who have acted in this way, and with whom your audience are acquainted, become examples against Dionysius, with respect to whom they do not yet know whether he be asking a guard with this intention : and all these ^{97 98} cases come under the same general premiss15, that he who is laying schemes to set up a tyranny, asks a guard. Now then the points have been stated out of which the proofs which have an air of demonstration are adduced.

⁹⁹ The difference of enthymems is considerable, and has remarkably escapednearly every writer : it is, too, a difference the very same as exists between syllogisms in logic : for some enthymems there are of applicability equal to that of rhetoric itself, in the same way that in some syllogisms are; others, according to the extent of other arts and faculties, existing, some already, and others not yet comprised by rules. And hence those who employ them both escape the observation of their hearers, and if they handle them more than is right, pass out of their pro- ^{100 101} per characters as mere orators. This however will become clearer, if stated more in detail. I call those forms of reasoning16 properly logical or rhetorical, in reference to which, I use the expression places ; such are those which apply with equal advantage to questions of justice, and natural philosophy, and of the philosophy of social life, and to numerous other subjects which differ in species. The place for instance, of greater and less; for there will not be a whit more advantage in deducing a syllogism or an enthymem from this place, on a question of justice or of natural philosophy, than on any other subject whatsoever; ¹⁰² and yet there are questions specifically distinct. But I call peculiar, all those reasonings which arise out of propositions, conversant with each species and genus of subjects; for instance, there are propositions on subjects of natural philosophy17 out of which neither ^{103 104 105} enthymem nor syllogism could be constructed respecting morals; and on this subject, again, there are others out of which will arise no reasoning respecting natural philosophy; this is also the case equally on every subject. Now the first-mentioned reasonings (the τόποι) will render a man informed on no class of subjects, for they are about no distinct subject-matter: as to the other ( ἴδια), the orator, in proportion as he makes the better 18 selection of propositions peculiar, will imperceptibly produce a science different from mere rhetoric or logic19 ; for, if he light on first principles, thenceforth, it will no longer be rhetoric or logic which he is employing, but that science whose principles he embraces.

The greatest number of enthymems are constructed ¹⁰⁶ out of these peculiar propositions, which are particular and limited; and from the universal ones, the less. Just then as I did in the Topics, so here must I make a distinction of the peculiar20 propositions and places of enthymems, whence we are to deduce them. Now I mean by εἶδη, those propositions which are peculiar to the several kindsof rhetoric; by τόποι, those which are common alike to all. Let us then ¹⁰⁷ treat of the special propositions before the others. Let us, however, first ascertain the kinds of rhetoric itself; in order that having distinguished them as to ^{108 109 110} their number, we may separately ascertain the elements of persuasion and propositions peculiar to each 21.

^{111 112} 1 i THE species of rhetoric are three in number, for of so many descriptions are the hearers of orations; because an oration is constituted of three things, of the speaker, and of the subject about which he speaks, and of the person to whom; and to him it is that the end of the speech has its reference ;I mean to the hearer.TheTiearer must of necessity be either an unconcerned hearer, or a judge; and a judge either of things past or to come; one then acts as judge respecting what is yet to happen, as the member of a popular assembly; the other respecting what has already taken place, as the president of a court of justice; the other respecting the abilities of the ¹¹³ orator, as the unconcerned hearer1. Thus, then, there will necessarily result three kinds of orations, the deliberative, judicial, and demonstrative2. The business of deliberation is partly exhortation, partly. dissuasion ; for invariably those who in their individual capacities simply advise, and those who publicly harangue, effect one of these objects. The business of judicial rhetoric is partly accusation, partly defence; for the litigants must of course do one or the other of these things. Of demonstrative the business ¹¹⁴ is partly praise, partly blame. Moreover the ^{115 116 117} time proper to each of these respectively is, to the deliberative orator, the future; for in exhorting or dissuading, he advises respecting thingsfuture3. The time proper to a judicial pleader is the past;for it is ever on the subject of actions already that tEe one party accuses, and the other defends. To the demonstrative orator the present time is the most appropriate, for it is in reference to qualities actually possessed that all either praise or blame.Orators, however, do very frequently avail themselves of other times; as well by awakening a recollection of what has already happened, as by anticipating what is likely to happen. The end of each of these ¹¹⁸ branches is different, and, as belonging to three subjects, is itself triple.*

The object of the deliberative orator is the expe-* dient and inexpedient; for he who recommends, advises you to adopt the better measure; but he who dissuades, diverts you from the worse; the other considerations either of justice and injustice, of honour or disgrace, he adjoins by the way, in addition to these two. The object of the judicial pleader is justice and injustice; but he also embraces by the way those oTher considerations. The object of those praise and blame is honour and disgrace ; and these also refer other considerations to tHese two.

But we may take as a sign that what I have stated ¹¹⁹ is the particular object of each, the fact that there are times when they will not feel inclined even to raise a question about the other: the litigant, for example, will not always deny that the fact has taken place, or that it has hurt the other party; but he ¹²⁰ never, under any circumstances, would admit that he has been guilty of injustice toward him ; for then would there be no need of a judicial decision. In the same way the deliberative orator very often abandons the other considerations ; but as to the point that he is advising what is disadvantageous, or dissuading from what is useful, this will he never admit; but it frequently happens that (on a question of invasion) they do not trouble themselves to make out that the subjugating a neighbouring people is not inconsistent with justice. Just so those who praise and blame do not consider whether the person's conduct has been advantageous or disadvantageous ; nay, they, in many instances, set it down on the score of praise, that, overlooking his own interests, he wrought some deed of honour : thus they praise Achilles, because he came to aid the cause of his comrade Patroclus, with full knowledge that himself was fated to die ; it being in his power, [by withholding that aid,] to live. To him, however, a death such as this was the more honourable prize : but to live would have been advantageous.

¹²¹ From what has been said, it is plain that the orator must first be in possession of propositions on the subject of each of these divisions, separately; for the τεκμήρια, the probabilities and signs, are degrees of proof available to rhetoric generally. It is necessary because syllogism, in general, is made up of propositions, and the enthymem is a syllogism made up of the propositions which have been mentioned.

¹²² And as it cannot be that what is impossible should ever heretofore have been done or should ever be done hereafter, but what is possible, only: as again it cannot be that what has not happened, or that what is never about to happen, ever should, the one have been already done, the other be about to be done: it becomes necessary for the deliberative, judicial, and demonstrative orator to have propositions on the subject of possibility and impossibility; and on the questions, whether a fact has or has not happened, ¹²³ will or will not take place. And further, since all, as well in praising as in blaming, as well in exhorting as in dissuading, as well in accusing as in defending, attempt to evince not only the points I have mentioned, but likewise to prove respecting this good or bad, this honourable or dishonourable, this just or unjust, that it is, moreover, either great or small, whether speaking of the things independently, or comparing them respectively one with another: as this is the case, it is plain that it will be necessary to have propositions respecting the degrees of great and small, of greater and less, as well general, as peculiar to each division: what good, for instance, is greater or less, what deviation from justice, or what conformity to it ; and so in the same way also respecting the other subjects. The points then have been stated, respecting which it will be absolutely necessary to get at propositions. We must, after this, make a distinction between each of these respectively ; the questions, for instance, about which deliberation is conversant; those, too, about which demonstrative rhetoric is concerned; and, thirdly, those about which judicial.

FIRST, then, we must ascertain what kind of good ¹²⁴ or evil.it is respecting which the deliberative orator gives his advice; for we have seen that it is not about every kind, but about such as may or may not befall US1. Such however as either has or will have an ¹²⁵ existence of necessity; such, again, as it is impossible should exist or be produced; respecting every such description [of good or evil] there never is any de- ^{126 127} liberation: neither, in fact, is there about every one even of contingent subjects ; for of goods which may or may not accrue2, some exist naturally, others are produced by chance, on the subject of which it is not worth while to deliberate; but evidently [he is confined to subjects] about which men resolve; of which character are all such as are of a nature to be referred ¹²⁸ to ourselves, and the first principle of whose creation is in our own power; for in deliberation we carry on our views thus far, viz. till we shall ascertain whether the achievement of the object be possible to us or not3.

¹²⁹ Now, to enumerate in accurate detail, and to divide into separate species, every subject about which men are wont to interest themselves; to enter moreover into minute distinctions conformable to the standard of truth to the very utmost that the subject admits it; these inquiries it is not necessary, on the present occasion, to institute, by reason that they belong not to the art of rhetoric, but to some art whose province is, in a more peculiar manner, intellect, and truth4; and because many speculations more than are proper to this art have already been assigned to ¹³⁰ it. For that remark is true, which I have before made; that rhetoric is made up of the science of ^{131 132 133 134} logic5, and of that branch of the science of social life ^{135 136 137} which recognises the subject of morals; and it partly resembles logic, partly the declamations of the sophists : and in exact proportion as one shall attempt to get up logic or rhetoric, not as they are general faculties, but as distinct sciences, he will unwittingly do away their nature by his encroaching, in the act of so tricking them out, upon sciences of certain definite subject-matter, and not of words alone. Let us, however, even on the present occasion, discuss such points as it is worth while to enlarge upon, and which still reserve the more full consideration for the science of social life: for nearly all the questions on which men deliberate and on which the deliberative orator harangues, those at least of the highest concernment, are in number five6; and these are questions of finance, of war and peace, and again respecting the safeguard of territory, and respecting imports and exports ,respecting legislature.

So that it will be fitting that the orator, who is about to give his advice on the subject of the finance of the state, be acquainted with its revenues, both ^{138 139} what and how great they may be; in order that, if any branch is overlooked, it may be added to the rest; and, if any be in default, it may be augmented. Moreover he should be acquainted with the whole expenditure of the state, that if any expense be superfluous it may be curtailed; if any too high, it may be reduced. For men become more wealthy, not only by adding to their capital stock, but by detracting from their expenses as well. These, however, are points which we must not only learn from our own experience as individuals ; but, with a view to deliberation on these subjects, one ought to be qualified by a research into the discoveries made by other people.

¹⁴⁰ Respecting questions of war and peace, the orator must needs be acquainted with the force of the state, how great it actually is already, and how great it admits of becoming; of what description also it is already, and what additions admit of being made to it. Moreover he should know both what wars the state has been engaged in, and how it has conducted them. This must he needs know, not in relation to his own state only, but as regards frontier states also; particularly in the case of those with whom there is a likelihood of being at war, in order that toward the more powerful, pacific measures may be held, and that in regard to the weaker, it may rest with his own state to make war or not. He should also be acquainted with the description of force which belongs to each state, whether it resemble or differ? from his own; for it is possible, even in this respect, to secure an advantage to yourself, or to have one taken by the enemy. In order to all which things, the orator must necessarily have considered with attention the wars, not of his own state only, but those also of others, what has been their issue; for it is natural that from similar causes similar results should accrue. ¹⁴¹

¹⁴² Moreover as regards the safeguard of the tern- ¹⁴³ tory, it should not escape his attention how that is preserved; but he must be acquainted as well with the numbers, as the nature of the garrisons, and with the positions of the strong holds: this it is impossible that one not acquainted with the country should know. But known it must be, in order that if any garrison be weak, it may be reinforced; if any be unnecessary, it may be done away, and the force may rather maintain positions strictly adapted to defence.

Again, on the subject of provision, the orator ¹⁴⁴ should know how great a consumption is sufficient to subsist the state, and of what kind that is which arises at home, and what is imported; and those nations whose exports there is need of, and those to whose markets he wants to import his home productions, in order that commercial treaties and agree- ments may be entered into with them. [All this should the orator be acquainted with, because it is absolutely necessary strictly to preserve your citizens from any ground of quarrel in two of their relations, viz. in respect to those physically their superiors8, and those who may be serviceable in afore- mentioned points.

Thus much then it is absolutely necessary that the deliberative orator should be able to consider, in order to the security of the state; neither is an at- ¹⁴⁵ tention to legislation the least essential; for in its legislative enactments stands the safety of the state. And thus it becomes requisite, both that he should know how many forms of government there are, and what system of things is expedient for each; and what things, as well peculiar to the government, as opposite to it, have a natural tendency to destroy it9. I talk of a government being destroyed by ^{146 147} things peculiar to itself; because, with the exception of the most excellent form of government, every other, by being relaxed or strained too much, destroys itself. Thus a democracy, not only when relaxed, but even when overstrained, grows weaker, and thus will at last be brought an oligarchy. Just as hookedness or flatness of the nose, not only approach the mean in proportion as they relax from the excess, but also, when they become excessively hooked or flat, dispose the nostrils in such a way as no longer so resemble the nasal organ.

¹⁴⁸ It is serviceable moreover with a view to legislation, to apprehend not only what constitution is expedient, by deriving your view from circumstances past, but to become acquainted also with the constitution of other states, and to what kind of constitutions ¹⁴⁹ what sort of measures are adapted. Thus it is plain, that accounts of travellers are of use with a view to legislation ; for hence we are able to ascertain what the laws of other nations are ; and with a view to debates on matters of state, the researches of those who write on human conduct are useful: all these points however form part, not of rhetoric, but of the science of social life.

So many then are the questions of highest concern touching which the deliberative orator must be in possession of propositions. We will, however, again discuss the elements out of which it is proper to exhort and dissuade, as well on these as on other questions. ¹⁵⁰

NEARLY every one individually, and all men in ge- ¹⁵² 2. neral, have some object, at which directing every aim, they both choose and avoid; and this, to speak summarily, is happiness and its constituents. Let us then, for the sake of getting at a received standard, ascertain what happiness, generally speaking, is ; and what are its constituents; for on the subject of it, and what conduces to it, and of its opposites, exhortation or dissuasion is always conversant; and this, because we needs do the things which procure it or any of its constituents, or which render it greater from having been less, and refrain from doing the things which destroy or impede it, or produce its opposites.

Let happiness then be defined to be good fortune ¹⁵³ in conjunction with virtue2,—or, independency of life, -or, the life which is most pleasant,accompanied by security,—or, abundance of property and slaves, with power to preserve and augment it; for mankind allow either one or more of these things to amount nearly to happiness. If then happiness be such as I ¹⁵⁴ have described, i s constituents must necessarily be— 1st, noble birth 3, many and excellent friends, wealth, a good and numerous offspring, a good old age ; and moreover personal excellencies ; as health, comeliness, strength, stature, ability in the games; character; ^{155 156 157} —2nd, honour, good fortune;—3rd, virtue, and its constItuent . prudence, courage, justice, temperance. Thus furnished, one would be most independent, were both external and internal goods his own ; for besides ¹⁵⁸ these there are no others. But the internal goods are mental and personal; the external, noble birth, friends, wealth, and distinction. We deem, moreover, that power and good fortune ought to be present, for thus would life be most independent. Wherefore, let us ascertain what each of these advantages is.- ¹⁵⁹ Noble birth then is, in the case of a nation or state, their being aborigines 4, or at least ancient possessors, and fo their first leaders to have been illustrious, and indeed for many to have been born from among them illustrious on the score of things which men emulate. ¹⁶⁰ Considered in reference to individuals, noble birth is derivable from male or female ancestry, and legitimacy on both sides ; and, just as in the case of a state, to have had the first of their line well known on the score of virtue, wealth, or any other valued quality; and for many of their kindred to have been illustrious, as well men as women, as well young as old :— ¹⁶¹ we cannot be at a loss for the constituents of a goodand numerous progeny., As referred to the commonwealth ; a good offspring will be, youth who are numerous and accomplished. Accomplished in respect to personal excellence, as stature, comeliness, strength, ability in : and as to that of the mind, temperance and courage; these all, in their two ¹⁶² visions, are excellencies of the young. In reference to individuals, a good and numerous offspring consists in your own children being numerous, and they, as well male as female, such as I have described. The excellence of females in regard to person, is beauty and stature ; in regard to the mind, temperance and fondness for employment, without meanness: -and we ought, as well individually as collectively, ¹⁶³ in respect both to men and women, to see that each of these qualities exists. Since all states among whom the regulations regarding women are bad (as is the case among the Lacedaemonians), enjoy scarcely the half of happiness.

The constituents of wealth are, plenty of money, ¹⁶⁴ the being master of lands and seats, with the possession moreove of personal property of live stock and slaves, such as are remarkable for number, stature, and comeliness; and all these should be secure, and respectable, and useful. The useful are of that de- ¹⁶⁵ scription rather which are profitable; the respectable, which conduce to enjoyment. But by profitable I mean those out of which the rent arises; by those conducing to enjoyment, all out of which arises nothing (that's worth mentioning at least) beyond their mere use. The definition of security is the having possession there, and in such a manner, that the enjoyment of the property is one's own. The essentials of a property then exist, when the right of alienating is in one's hands: I understand by alienation either gift or sale. But, in a word, the being rich stands more in enjoyment than in possession; for the active employment and the use of such means is wealth.

Goodness of character is the apprehension of mankind, ¹⁶⁶ that you are a worthy person, or in possession of something of such a kind that all men aim at it, or at least the generality, or the good, or the welljudging. Honour is an evidence of your having a ¹⁶⁷ character for beneficence; and those are honoured with justice, and in an eminent degree 5, whose beneficence has already been exercised: not but that he, too, is honoured who simply has the power to benefit. Beneficence relates either to the safety, and the causes, whatever they are, of the existence of its object, or to his wealth, or to any other goods whose acquisition is not easy, whether it be so generally, or at that place or time. For many meet with honour ¹⁶⁸ in consequence of things apparently trifling; but then it is the manner or the time [of conferring the benefit] which is the reason. The constituent parts ofhonour are sacrifices,—monumental inscriptions, in metre or prose,—rewards,—consecrated pieces of ground6,— precedence,—public burial,—statues,—pensions from the state; those received among barbarians areprostration,—giving place7. The presents also usual among each people are, with them, respectively marks of honour; for a present is at once the gift of property, and a mark of honour. Wherefore it is that the avaricious are equally desirous of these, as the ambitious ; because they convey to both that which they desire, since at once it is a property, the object which the avaricious desire, and includes honour, the object of the ambitious.

¹⁶⁹ The excellencies of the body are health ; and that in such a degree as for us to be exempt from sickness, while we have the free exercise of the body. For many are in a state of health, indeed, whom, like Herodicus8, no one would feel inclined to congratulate on the score of health, by reason of their depriving themselves of most, if not all, the enjoy- ments proper to man.

¹⁷⁰ Comeliness is different according to the several ages. Now the comeliness of a youth, is the having a body useful in enduring toils, whether those of the course, or of personal exertion, himself being pleasant withal to look upon with a view to delight. On which account those who practise the pentathlum are most comely, inasmuch as they are formed for violent ^{171 172 173} exertion, and swiftness as well. But the comeliness of one who has attained life's prime, is a person adapted to the fatigues of war, with an'aspect to be looked upon with pleasure tempered by awe. That of the old consists in the body being capable of the fatigues which it needs must undergo, and exempt withal from pain, by reason that it has none of the afflictions by which an old age is disfigured. Strength ¹⁷⁴ is the capability of moving another at will: you move another, of course, either by dragging, or shoving, or lifting, or crushing him ; so that the man who is endowed with strength, is requisitely so for some, if not for all these purposes. Excellence of stature, ¹⁷⁵ is the exceeding the generality in height, substance, and breadth, in such a ratio as not, by reason of that excess, to render one s motions ¹⁷⁶ more tardy. Gymnastic excellence of person is made up of stature, strength, and speed; for the swift is also endued with strength : for he who is able to throw out his legs in a particular way, and move them rapidly, and in a forward direction, is fit for running ; but he who can crush and grapple with an adversary, is fit for wrestling ; while he who can send him forward by a blow, is the man for boxing : but if any be endued with the two latter qualifications, he is fit for a pancratiast; while he who has all three may contend in the pentathlum.

A good old age is an old age slow in approach, un- ¹⁷⁷ attended by pain ; for neither is it a good old age if one grows rapidly old ; nor if he does so slowly, indeed, but painfully: this blessing, however, is of the number both of the excellencies of the body and of fortune. For one who is neither unmolested by sickness, nor endued with strength, will not be exempt from sufferings ; and his days will be but few, and those not void of pain: nor without good fortune will he hold out at all. Indeed, independently both of strength and health there is means of long life ; for many, without the excellencies of the body, are long-lived. But accuracy of statement on these subjects makes nothing to our present purpose.

^{178 179} In what number and excellence of friends consists is not doubtful, it having been distinctly stated, respecting a friend, that he is a friend who exerts himself to do for another whatever he esteems good for him, solely for the other's sake. He to whom many are so affected, has numerous friends; he to whom worthy men, has excellent friends.

¹⁸⁰ Good fortune is the accession, and actual possession, either of all, of most, or the greatest of those goods of which chance is the cause. Now chance is the cause of some things about which there are arts conversant9; of many things, too, unrecognised by art; for instance, of whatever things nature is a cause; for it is possible that they should happen contrarily to nature : for art is a cause of health ; nature, of comeliness and stature. In a word, those goods proceed from chance, about which envy is felt 10. Chance is also a cause of those goods which baffle all calculation ; when, for instance, one is handsome, the rest of whose brothers are ugly ; or when every one else overlooked a treasure, and he found it; or if a weapon hit one's neighbour and not one's self; or if he alone, who used always to frequent a place, did not come there, while they who came then only were destroyed; for all such things appear to be pieces of good luck.

¹⁸¹ As to moral excellence, since that topic is most intimately connected with praise11, we must lay down distinctions respecting it when we treat of the subject of praise. It is then plain at what objects we ought to aim in exhorting, as likely to take place,or ^{182 183 184 185} already in existence; and what in dissuading for they are the contraries of these.

SINCE the expedient is the object proposed to the de- ^{186 187} liberative orator, and as all form their conclusions, not about the end itself, but about the means conducive to that end ; as moreover these are all things which are expedient in reference to human conduct (now every thing expedient is a good), we shall have to ascertain certain elementary propositions, on the subjects of the good and the expedient in general.

Let good, then, be defined to be, 1. Whatever is an object of choice independently, for its own sake; 2. and for the sake of which we choose something else. 3. What every thing aims at1, or every thing which has perception, or which has intelligence; or every thing would aim at, were it possessed of intelligence. 4. Whatever intelligence would award to each. 5. Whatever the intelligence conversant with every instance awards to each, that to each individual is his good. 6. That which being present, one is well disposed and independent. 7. Independency. 8. Whatever produces or preserves such advantages2; 9. and that on which they are consequent. 10. Whatever, too, has a tendency to prevent or destroy their opposites. Now, things are consequent in two ways; ¹⁸⁸ for either they may be consequent simultaneously or subsequently.—Knowledge, for instance, is a consequent on learning subsequently; life is so on health simultaneously. Again, things are productive in ^{189 190 191 192} three ways 3; first, in the way that the being healthy is productive of health, or as food is so of health, or as exercise is, because usually it does produce health.

¹⁹³ These things being laid down, it must be of course that acquisitions of good, and the exemptions from evil, are good; for on the one is consequent the non-possession of evil simultaneously; on the other, the possession of good subsequently.

¹⁹⁴ And the acquisition of a greater instead of a less good; of a less evil instead of a greater; for this becomes an acquisition of the one and an exemption from the other, in the ratio of the excess of the ¹⁹⁵ greater above the less. The virtues also must of course be a good, for in reference to them are their possessors well-disposed4; they are also productive of goods, and bear on moral conduct: respecting each, however, severally what, and of what kind it is, ¹⁹⁶ must be distinctly treated. It must be also that pleasure is a good, for all living things naturally desire it. Thus, too, things pleasant and honourable must needs be good; for the first are productive of pleasure ; while, of things honourable, some are pleasant, and the rest are by themselves objects of ¹⁹⁷ choice on their own account, So that to speak of them severally, it must be that the following things are good.—Happiness; for it is both an object of choice by itself, and independent, and for the sake of it ¹⁹⁸ we choose many things. Justice, courage, temperance, ^{199 200} magnanimity, magnificence, and other habits of that ²⁰¹ sort; for they are excellencies of —and health and comeliness, and things of that sort, for they are excellencies of the body, and productive of many things ; health, for instance, both of pleasure and of life ; and it seems, on this account, to be the very best possession, because it is the cause of two things, which the generality of men value most, viz. of pleasure and life:—Wealth because it is an excellence of ²⁰² possession, and productive of many things A friend ²⁰³ and friendship; Tor a friend is an object of choice independently, and productive of many advantages. character; for they are pleas ant, and pro- ²⁰⁴ ductive of much; and there is usually consequent on them the actual possession of the qualities, on account of which the subject is honoured. Ability, in ²⁰⁵ speaking and acting; for all such powers are produce tive of good. Again, high genius, memory, readiness ²⁰⁶ in learning, quickness of thought, and all such qualities ; for these faculties are productive of good; and in the same way all the arts and sciences. And ²⁰⁷ life ; for were no other good consequent on it, of itself it is an object of choice. And that which is just ²⁰⁸ for it is a kind of general advantage. Such, then, are the things which are good, as it were confessedly.

But in the case of questionable goods, your reason- ^{209 210} ings will be deduced from these formulae,—that of which the contrary is an evil, is itself a good ; as is that of which the contrary is expedient to an enemy : for example, if your being cowards be above all things expedient to your enemies, it is plain, that to the citizens your courage will be above all things beneficial. And, in a word, whatever be the things ²¹¹ which the enemy desires and in which they rejoice, the contrary of those things appear beneficial; and hence was it well said ;— ^{212 213} And yet this case does not always hold, though it does generally ; for there is no reason why the self- same things should not, at times, be expedient to two hostile parties ; from which comes the saying that evils bring men together6, when the same thing happens ²¹⁴ to be injurious to both. That too is a good, which is not in excess ; but whatever exceeds what ²¹⁵ it ought, is an evil. And that on account of which much toil or expense has been bestowed, for already will it have appeared to be a good ; and we already conceive of every such thing as of an end, and as an end of many efforts ; but the end is a good ; and on this principle rests the force of that appeal, “ It were in accordance forsooth with Priam's heartiest prayer;” II. β, I. 176. and of this, " Base indeed is it to remain so long;” II. β, 1. 298. and that of the proverb of " Breaking the pitcher at the very door." Vide Erasmi Adagia II. i. 75. ²¹⁶ That too of which many are desirous, and which appears to be disputed for ; because that of which all are desirous, was laid down to be a good; the generality, however, have the appearance of being all. ²¹⁷ And that which is recommended; because no one recommends that which is not good8. And that which your enemies and the bad recommend; for all, as it were, already acknowledge it when even they do who are ill affected; for solely on account of its being plainly such will these acknowledge it9: and in ex- ^{218 219 220 221} actly the same way they are held to be but paltry characters land with these even their friends find fault, and all good men] with whom their enemy finds no fault: on which very principle the Corinthians conceived themselves to have been scandalized by Simonides introducing in his verses, " Troy finds no fault with the Corinthians 10.” And that is a good which any who are practically wise, ²²² whether among men or women, have preferred ; instanced in Minerva's choice of Ulysses ; Theseus' of Helen ; and the Goddesses' of Paris11; and Homer's of Achilles. In a word, all objects of determined ²²³ choice are good. And men determinately choose to do both the things which have been mentioned, and those which are evil to foes and good to friends ; and those which are possible-these are varied in two ways ; such as may be done, and such as may easily ²²⁴ be done12 . Easy things are such as are done either without pain, or in a short time ; for difficulty is defined in reference either to the pain, or length of time. And men choose what is done as they wish ; and they wish what either is in no respect an evil, or in a less degree than it is good. This will occur in the case of unjust action, where the punishment either escapes notice or is trifling : and such actions as are ²²⁵ peculiar ; as no one has done ; or which are extraordinary, for thus is their value greater : and those things which have an adaptation to ourselves; of which kind are things belonging to us in respect of family, and power. Things too which men consider are wanting to the completion of something else ; for ^{226 227 228} be they ever so trifling 13, they in no less degree determine ²²⁹ on putting them in execution : and things easily brought about; for they are possible, inasmuch as they are easy: but things easily brought about, are such as every one, or many, or our equals, or our inferiors, have succeeded in. Whatever gratines one's friends, or will be disliked by one's foes. Every thing, too, which they whom we admire deliberately set about. Things toward which men are well fitted by nature, and about which they have experience ; for they suppose they shall more easily succeed in them. Things too which no bad man does ; for they are the rather commendable. What people happen to be desirous of; for not only does it appear pleasant, but it is viewed in the more favourable ²³⁰ light 14. And men more particularly choose on deliberation the things in reference to which they severally are of a certain disposition ; the ambitious, for instance, if the object be victory ; the avaricious, if it be money ; and other characters in the same way.

On questions then of good and of expediency, we must deduce our means of persuading from hence.

²³¹ BUT as the advocates of opposite measures, while they in many instances allow both to be expedient, dispute nevertheless on the question which is the more so; we shall have next to speak of greater good, ²³² and what is in a higher degree expedient. Let excess, then, be defined to be, as much and yet more; the thing exceeded, however, to be that comprised ^{233 234} within the excess. Again, greater and more aFe terms relative always to some particular less thing: but great or small, much or little, have reference to the size of things generally. And that which is great exceeds; but that which is deficient is small; and of the terms much and little in the like manner.

Now as we call that good, which, independently, ²³⁵ for its own sake, and not on account of any thing else, is an object of choice ; that, too, which every thing desires ; and which, if invested with intelligence and practical wisdom, every thing would choose ; as also what is preservative or productive of, or on which such things are consequent; and as that, with a view to which we act, is the end ; and as an end is that for whose sake every thing else is done: but that is good to a man's self which has these affections in reference to himself: this being the case, it must be that plurality is a greater good than one or a few, provided that one or those few be enumerated in conjunction with it3; for it then exceeds them, and the within comprised one or few is exceeded. And if the ²³⁶ greatest individual of one species exceed the greatest individual of another, then also will the first species itself exceed the second. And, vice versa, wherever one species exceeds another, the greatest ^{237 238 239 240} individual of the exceeding, exceeds the greatest individuals of the exceeded species: for example, if the greatest man be greater than the greatest woman, then will also men, in general, be greater than women; and if men generally be greater than women, then will also the greatest man be greater than the greatest woman; for the excesses of species, and of the greatest individuals under them, have a common ²⁴¹ ratio. When one thing is a consequence of another, but that other thing is not a consequence of it; (now, things are consequent, recollect, either simultaneously or subsequently, or virtually;) then is that of which the other is a consequence the greater good; because the enjoyment of the consequent is inherent in the enjoyment of the other. Things are consequent simultaneously, as life on health ; but it is not consequent on life: and subsequently, as knowledge on learning; virtually, as larceny on sacrilege; for the man who has committed sacrilege would be ready also ²⁴² to steal. Things which exceed the same thing in a greater degree [than itself], are greater6; for of necessity ²⁴³ they exceed even the greater. T hings productive of a greater good are greater, for this would be by virtue of their being productive of something greater. That, too, the productive cause of which is greater, is likewise greater; for if that which is healthy, be preferable to, and a greater good than, that which is pleasant; then also will health be superior ²⁴⁴ to pleasure. As also that which, independently of any thing, is preferable, is superior to that which is not preferable independently: thus strength is above things conducing to health; for the latter are not sought on their own account, while the former is, ²⁴⁵ the which was assumed as a criterion of good. And should one object be an end, the other not an end ; ^{246 247} for the one is for the sake of something else, the other, for its own sake; thus is exercise inferior to a good habit of body 7. That too is a greater good which in ²⁴⁸ a less degree stands in need of any one or more things as accessions, for it is in a higher degree independent: now that is said less to need accessions, which needs such as either are fewer or more easily obtained. And whenever one thing does not exist, nor can possibly ²⁴⁹ be brought into existence independently of another, but that other can without it; then that which needs not the accession, is more independent, and thus shows itself to be a greater good. Again, if one be ²⁵⁰ a principle and the other not; and for the same reason, if one be a cause, the other not; since without a cause or principle, existence or production is impossible8. And of goods both proceeding from principles, that is the greater good which arises from the higher principle; as also that is the greater good which originates in the higher of two causes. And, vice versa, that of two principles which is the principle of the greater good, is greater ; and that of two causes which is the cause of the greater, is itself greater. It is evident then from what has been said, that it is ²⁵¹ possible for a thing to appear the greater both ways ; for supposing this to be a principle, and the other not, it will appear the greater 9; as also will it, supposing it not to be a principle 10 while the other is; ^{252 253 254 255} because the end, and not the principle, was above stated to be the greater. Just like the saying of Leodamus in impeaching Callistratus, " that the man who devised the deed was worse than he who executed it; for had he not devised it, the other could not have executed it:" and conversely, against Chabrias, he argued that " the agent was worse than the deviser; for had there not been an agent, it would not have been realized in action, because people devised plots on this very account, that others may ²⁵⁶ execute them." The more rare good is greater than the abundant11 ; thus gold is better than steel, notwithstanding that it is less useful; for the acquisition, by reason of its being more difficult, is greater. And in another view, the abundant is better than the rare, for the enjoy ment of ---It exceeds that of the other; for the idea of often exceeds that of seldom; whence ²⁵⁷ it is said, "Water12 is the best of things : and, in a word, the more difficult is superior to the easier acquisition, for it is more rare. In another point of view, the easier is above the more difficult; for it has ²⁵⁸ itself as we wish. That also is the greater good, the contrary of which is the greater evil; as is also that of which the deprivation is the greater loss. Virtue, too, is greater than what is not positive virtue, and vice than what is not positive vice; for the former ²⁵⁹ severally are ends, the latter are not ends. Causes, the productions of which are more becoming or more disgraceful, are themselves of greater importance. ^{260 261 262} Also of whatever things the excellencies and deficiencies are of greater importance, of them are also the productions of greater importance: since results stand to each other in the same ratio, as their several causes and principles; and, vice versa, causes and principles, in the ratio of their several results. Things, ²⁶³ tile excess or which is preferable or more becoming, as accuracy of sight is preferable to that of smelling, for sight is preferable to smelling; and the being greatly attached to friends is more becoming than to be greatly attached to money13, so that attachment to friends is more becoming than fondness for money. And conversely, too, the excesses of better feelings are themselves better: and of the more becoming, themselves, more becoming: as, too, are those things of ²⁶⁴ which the desires are better or more becoming; tor the greater desire is of the greater object: and, for the same reason, the desires which fasten on the more excellent and becoming objects, are themselves more excellent and becoming. Again, where the sciences ²⁶⁵ are more grave or becoming, there the subject-matter also is more grave and becoming; for, as is the science, so is its truth; for each science takes cognisance of its peculiar truths: and analogous to this precedence of subjects is that also of the sciences, which recognise graver and more becoming subjects, above the rest; for the same reasons. And that which men of practical ²⁶⁶ wisdom, or every person, or the generality, or the majority, or the best of men have, or would have pronounced to be a greater good; that of course must be such, either absolutely, or so far at least as they decided conformably to their prudence. This, too, is a test available in common to the other questions about good; for their substance, quantity, and quality, have themselves so as science and prudence may direct; on this subject however we have treated. For that has been defined to be good which every ²⁶⁷ being, if fraught with prudence14, would choose; wherefore it is evident, that what prudence pronounces ²⁶⁸ good in a high degree is a greater good. Also that which belongs to the better men, either absolutely, or in respect of their being better; as courage is better than strength. Also what the better man would make the object of his choice, either absolutely or in respect of its being better; as, the suffering rather than the doing an injury, for this would he choose ²⁶⁹ who is more just. And that which conduces more to pleasure rather that what conduces less; because every being pursues pleasure, and is desirous of enjoying it for its own sake; now it is in reference to this, that the good and the end have been defined: that is said to conduce more to pleasure, which is conducive to it with less alloy of pain, and for a ²⁷⁰ greater length of time. That which is more becoming rather than what is less so; for the becoming either is that which tends to please, or is desirable on ²⁷¹ its own account. Whatever things people prefer being the causes of to themselves or to their friends, those are greater goods; but whatever they would ²⁷² least wish, are greater evils. Things whose duration is long, rather than those whose duration is short; and those which are more secure, rather than those which are less so: for there is an advantage in their enjoyment; of the former, in respect to time; of the latter, from their being at will: for the enjoyment of what is secure is more in their power whenever ²⁷³ they wish. And as are the terms arising from conjugates and similar inflections, so are the qualities they denote; for example, if courageously be an idea more noble and desirable than temperately, courage will also be something more noble than temperance, and the idea of a man's being courageous than of his ²⁷⁴ being temperate. What every one chooses is better than what some do not, as also is the choice of a majority better than that of a minority; for as that was supposed a good which all desire, so that is propor- ²⁷⁵ tionately greater which is more desired. That, too, which litigants or foes, judges, or arbitrators selected by judges, prefer, is better ; for in one case the decision is equivalent to that of all mankind; and in the other, men of authority and information actually do pronounce. And sometimes good is greater in which ²⁷⁶ all participate; tor not to participate in it is a disgrace : while at others, that is which none, or which few share with you; for it is more rare. Things ²⁷⁷ more commended, because more becoming; and in the same way things are better to which belongs the greater honour, because honour is as a kind of estimate of worth. Those things again are more heinous on which are imposed the greater punishments. Again, what is greater than things confessedly or apparently ²⁷⁸ great, is itself superior in greatness. And the same objects, when separated into their several constituents, have an air of superior greatness, for the excess of a plurality of objects is conspicuous. Whence the poet says that Meleager's wife persuaded him to rise up to the war by entering into detail:­ " She paints the horrors of a conquer'd town, The heroes slain, the palaces o'erthrown, The matrons ravish'd, the whole race enslaved15." Iliad ix. 705. Again, the condensing and accumulating of circumstances in the way Epicharmus used to do, is productive of effect, and that on the same principle as their separation; viz. because the condensing of them evinces great excess, and for the further reason, that it appears a principle and a cause of great results. But as that is greater which is more rare and difficult, ²⁷⁹ circumstances both of opportunity, and age, and place, and time, and strength, produce great effect. 15 Another striking instance of the effect produced by a detail of circumstances may be found in the Septem contra Thebas of Aeschylus, 302, ed. Bl.­ and in Burke's speech on the Nabob of Arcot's Debts, Works, vol. ii. p. 480: see also Sheridan's celebrated speech against Warren Hastings. For an exploit beyond one's strength, and age, and equals, if achieved, or if under such circumstances, at such a place or time, will gain importance whether it be good, or honourable, or just, or the opposite. Whence originated the inscription of the Olympic victor, "Formerly, indeed, with a rough basket16 on my shoulders, I used to carry fish from Argos to Tegea." [Simonides.] And on this proceeds that encomium of Iphicrates [who was the son of a shoemaker on himself, when he said, " From what beginnings ²⁸⁰ have these things been realized !" That, too, which is innate is superior to what is adscititious, from its greater difficulty; wherefore the poet says, ²⁸¹ " Of myself am I taught17. And the greatest part of what is great; as Pericles said in his funeral oration 18, " That the youth were swept from the city, just as the spring, were it to be withdrawn from the ²⁸² year. That, too, is more precious which is available in the greater need; as in old age, or sickness, for instance. And of two means, that more immediately conducing to the end. That whose qualities have direct reference to one's self, than those which are general. What is possible, rather than what is impossible ; for the one attaches to one's self, the other not. And things which are comprised in the end19 of life; for things conducing to the end partake in a ²⁸³ greater degree of the nature of ends. Things having reference to truth rather than to opinion.-as a definition of matter of opinion we may take what one, likely to escape observation, would not choose to do: and on this principle the receiving good would appear more desirable than the doing it; since one would ^{284 285 286 287} choose the first even should it be unobserved; with respect however to the doing good, that it seems no one about to be unnoticed would choose20. Those ²⁸⁸ things, too, are better, of which men prefer the real possession to the appearance; for they have a nearer reference to truth: on which principle some argue . that justice is a trifling good, because it is better for it to appear, than merely to exist21 : in respect to health, however, this is not the case. That which ²⁸⁹ is conducive to the greater number of uses; as what conduces to life, to happy life, to pleasure, and to noble conduct; wherefore health and wealth appear the highest goods, for these include everything. That which is accompanied by less pain, and on ²⁹⁰ which pleasure is attendant; for the good is more than merely single, since it is realised both in the positive pleasure, and in the absence of pain. And of two goods, that which, added to the same good, renders the sum greater. That, too, whose presence ²⁹¹ does not escape us, rather than that which does22; for such approach reality; whence the being really rich will seem a greater good than the appearance of being so. That, too, which is held dear, is a greater ²⁹² good :-whether, as in some cases, it be single; or, as in others, accompanied by more: on which account the punishment is not equal, in the case of putting out the eye of a person who has but one23, and of ^{293 294 295 296} one who has two eyes ; for there is, in the one case, a deprivation of the dearest object. The sources then from which, in exhortation and dissuasion, we must deduce our means of persuading, have nearly been enumerated.

²⁹⁷ THE means of greatest and most paramount importance with a view to being able to persuade and give advice in a becoming style, is the having made one's self master of all the forms of government; and the having clearly distinguished their several practices, and legal principles, and interests: for all men are persuaded by what is advantageous; but that which ²⁹⁸ is preservative of the constitution, is absolute expediency1. ²⁹⁹ And further, the dictum of the ³⁰⁰ tative power of the state, is itself authoritative. But the authorities are distinguished according to the forms of government under which they exist; for ^{301 302 303} as many forms of government as there are, so many are the authorities.

Now there are four forms of government; democracy, ³⁰⁴ oligarchy, aristocracy, and monarchy. So that the authoritative and judicial functions will be merely one constituent of these, or the whole. Democracy ³⁰⁵ is a term of government2, in which men apportion out the magistracies to themselves by lot. But an ³⁰⁶ oligarchy, in which those only who, from the valuation of property, are entitled. Aristocracy, in which ³⁰⁷ those bear magistracy who can conform to the constitutional plan of education. By such education I mean that established by the law: for those who adhere to the principles of the law, are the men who, in an aristocracy, hold magistracies; and it must be that these should appear the best, whence this form of government took its name. Monarchy is that form ³⁰⁸ in which, conformably to its name, one man is supreme ; and, of monarchies, those which are held by conformity to some limitations are kingdoms, but the unlimited are tyrannies3.

Neither should the ends of the respective forms of ³⁰⁹ government escape us; for men choose whatever conduces to the end. The end then of a democracy, is liberty; of an oligarchy, it is wealth ; of an aristocracy, the institutions relating to education and the principles of the law; the end of a tyranny, is the protection of the tyrant's person 4. It is evident then, if ³¹⁰ Ibid. ³¹¹ men fix their choice by reference to the end, that we must accurately distinguish the respective practices, laws, and interests of each form.

³¹² But as means of persuasion originate not in argumentative oratory alone, but in such also as bears an empress of character; for it is from the speaker's appearing a man of certain character that we trust him; that is to say, if he appears an honest man, or well affected 5, or both : as this is the case, it will be necessary for us to be masters of the character of each form of government; for the character which is peculiar to each, must needs be most available to persuasion in addressing each. These points, however, will be ascertained by means of the same information; for the character will manifestly be conformable to the choice; now the settled choice has reference to the end.

³¹³ Thus then have the objects which we ought to aim at in exhorting and dissuading, as probable or actually in existence; the sources, too, out of which we must draw our means of proof on the subject of the expedient, and on the subject moreover of the character and legal principles belonging to the forms of government; and the means by which, and the manner how, we shall have facilities on such questions : all these points have been discussed, so far as was within the scope of the present occasion. For accuracy of detail on these points has been observed in the Politics. ^{314 315}

LET us next speak of virtue and vice, and of the ³¹⁷ honourable and disgraceful; because these are the objects of the orator who praises or blames 1; and because it will happen that, in speaking of these subjects, we shall at the same time throw light on the means by which we may ourselves be conceived to be of a certain turn of character, which was stated to be the second means of effecting belief; since we shall be able, by the application of the same points, to render ourselves or others deserving belief on the score of moral excellence. But as there frequently ³¹⁸ are instances, as well in sober earnest as without it, of praising not men or gods only, but even inanimate objects, and any animal whatever, as it may happen; we must here, in the same way as before, ascertain propositions on these subjects also. Let us then, so far as may serve for a specimen, discuss these subjects.

That then is honourable, which, while it is an ³¹⁹ object of choice on its own account, is commendable also; or which, being good, is pleasant, simply because it is good. But if the honourable be this, virtue must necessarily be honourable; for, being good, it is commendable. And virtue, as it should ³²⁰ seem, is a faculty tending to provide us with goods and preserve them to us; a faculty moreover capable of benefiting in many and important cases; of benefiting, in a word, every object in every respect2. ^{321 322 323} The constituent parts of virtue are justice, courage, temperance, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, ³²⁴ placability, prudence, wisdom ; and it must needs be, that those virtues are the highest which are the most beneficial to others, if at least virtue be (as it was defined) a faculty capable of benefiting on this account, men honour in the greatest degree the just and brave ; for justice and courage are useful to them, the one in war, and the other in peace3. Next is liberality ; for the liberal are profuse, and do not wrangle with people about money, the object which the rest of the world hanker after more than any ³²⁵ thing. Now justice is the virtue by which each has his own, as the law prescribes: injustice, however, is that habit by which some take the property of ³²⁶ others in contravention to law. Courage, that by which men are ready to achieve honourable exploits in the midst of danger, conformably to the direction of and in subservience to law4: cowardice, however, ³²⁷ is its contrary. But temperance is a virtue by which men carry themselves so, in respect to the pleasures of the body, as the law directs ; intemperance, ³²⁸ however, is its contrary. But liberality tends to benefit in pecuniary matters ; stinginess is its ³²⁹ contrary. Magnanimity is that virtue which is apt to confer important benefits; narrowness of soul ^{330 331 332 333 334} is its opposite. Magnificence is the virtue which ³³⁵ produces grandeur in expenditures :-again, narrowness of soul and meanness are opposed. Prudence ³³⁶ however is an intellectual virtue, by conforming to which men have the faculty of actually determining on the subjects of the good and evil6, which has been mentioned as entering into happiness.

Enough has been said on the subject of virtue and ³³⁷ vice in general, and of their constituent parts, to suit the present occasion : respecting the other points, ³³⁸ there is no difficulty in discerning what they are ; for it is plainly necessary both that the productives of virtue should be honourable (because they have reference to virtue), and also the fruits of virtue ; of which kind are both the indications and actions of virtue; but as the indications and all actions or sufferings ³³⁹ of a good man are honourable, it will necessarily follow that all exploits of courage whatever, and all indications of courage, that all conduct, in a word, which has been marked with courage is honourable; and so of things just and conforming to justice, so far at least as actions are concerned: (but as relates to sufferings this is not the case ; for in this single instance of all the virtues, does it occur that what is conformable to justice is not invariably honourable, but in the case of suffering punishment, that which is justly suffered is in a ^{340 341 342} higher degree disgraceful than what is unjustly8;) and so likewise in respect to the other virtues. ³⁴³ Whatever actions, have-national distinctions as their reward are honourable, or whatever have such distinctions ³⁴⁴ rather than money. Whatever things, among those which are objects of choice, one does, not for his own sake. And whatever things which abstractedly viewed are good, one has achieved for his country's sake, overlooking his own interest. Things good in their own nature ; things which are good, but not to one's self; every thing of that kind being ³⁴⁵ chosen on its own account. Whatever things admit of being realized to one when dead, rather than in his life-time ; for that which appertains to one in his life, rather carries the idea of its being for one's self. ³⁴⁶ Whatever actions are for the sake of others; for they ³⁴⁷ are not so much for one's own sake. And as many instances of successful management as occur where others are concerned, and where one's self is not; and this particularly respecting benefactors, for it then is just. Benefits, too, are honourable ; for they attach not to one's self. And the contraries of all cases in which men feel a delicacy; for men are sensible of delicacy both in mentioning, or doing, or intending any thing disgraceful; just as Sappho has expressed in verse on the occasion of Alcaeus' saying, " I would say something, but delicacy restrains me." "If thou entertainedst a desire of speaking things either good or honourable, and were not thy tongue teeming with the utterance of some evil; shame had not suffused thine eyes, but thou wouldest have ³⁴⁸ spoken what was fit." Objects for which men are keenly anxious without being affected by fear9, are honourable; for men are thus affected respecting ^{349 350} goods which tend to reputation. Those virtues and ³⁵¹ their fruits are honourable in a higher degree, which belong to subjects naturally more excellent10 ; as, for example, those of a man are higher than those of a woman. And those which are of a nature to be enjoyed ³⁵² by others, rather than by ourselves; the principle on which the just and justice are honourable.

Thus, the taking vengeance on a foe rather than ³⁵³ the being reconciled; both because to compensate is just, and what is just is honourable11; and further, because it belongs to the courageous man never to be worsted. Both victory and national distinction are ³⁵⁴ of the number ot things honourable; tor they are desirable, though unattended by lucre, and evince more than ordinary virtue; and the memorials of one's name; and what partakes of these respective characters more decidedly, is also more decidedly honourable. Again, things which do not follow one in his life; and whatever honour is attendant on; that which presents features of vastness; that, too, is honourable in a higher degree which belongs to one's self alone, for it is longer remembered. And ³⁵⁵ possessions unattended by profit, for they are more becoming a gentleman12; and whatever is peculiarly esteemed among each people, is honourable. Every ³⁵⁶ badge of what is held commendable in each nation: I at Lacedaemon13, for instance, it is honourable to wear ^{357 358 359 360 361} long hair14, because it is the badge of a free man, since it is not easy for a man with long hair to do ³⁶² any servile work. And the not exercising any vulgar craft; for it belongs to a gentleman not to live in ³⁶³ dependence on another15. And we must take for granted that qualities, akin to real ones, are actually identified with them, and this with a view as well to praise as to blame; for instance, taking the cautious man to be a cold-hearted, designing fellow; or a simpleton to be a good kind of man ; and the man who ³⁶⁴ is dead to feeling, to be of a mild disposition: and in a word, we must make a selection, invariably on the most favourable side, out of the qualities concomitant on the character of each; making out the passionate and furious to be men void of all duplicity ; and the self-wired to be magnificent and dignified: and such as are in excess, to be in the virtuous mean; the rash, for instance, to be brave; the profuse, liberal16 ; for it will both seem to be the case ἐσχάτης οὔϭης ταύτης ιμίας. Parr, Spit. Serm. p. 146. ^{365 366 367} to the nine-tenths of the world, and will afford room for deducing a piece of false reasoning out of the motives of the agent; for if one rush into danger where there is no necessity, much more should it seem that he will, where it is honourable 17; and if a man be lavish on all who fall in his way, surely he will also be so on his friends; for to benefit all is an excess of virtue. We ought to consider also before ³⁶⁸ whom our panegyric is pronounced ; for, as Socrates used to remark, " It is no difficult thing to panegyrise Athenians in the presence of Athenians." We must also assert that what is valued by each auditory, is to be essentially valuable ; what, for instance, either Scythians or Lacedaemonians or philosophers value : and, in short, to refer to the class of things really honourable, whatever is held in esteem; since by virtue of their being so esteemed, they appear to approximate closely that class. Again, whatever is ³⁶⁹ natural under such circumstances, tor instance, it one's actions be worthy of his ancestors or his own former achievements ; since the additional acquisition of glory tends to happiness, and is honourable. Likewise every action contrary to what is natural to one, so it be on one side of what is better and honourable; as when one in good fortune has been moderate, or magnanimous in adversity; or has become better and easier to be won over in proportion as he became greater. Of this nature was the appeal of Iphicrates, " From what beginnings to what have I attained !" And that of the Olympic conqueror, " Formerly bearing on my shoulders a rough basket," etc. And that of the epitaph by Simonides, " Though daughter, wife, and sister of tyrants18," etc. Vellem in amicitia sic erraremus, et isti Errori virtus nomen posuisset honestum, etc. Opinor Haec res et jungit, junctos et servat amicos. SAT. i. 3, 41. ^{370 371}

^{372 373} But as commendation arises out of moral conduct, and it is a peculiar characteristic of the good man to act on principle 19, we must endeavour to put the object of our commendation in the light of one who has acted on principle. Now his appearing to have acted so in many instances will be serviceable with a view to this ; wherefore coincidences and fortuitous occurrences must be assumed as done on principle: and should many and like circumstances be alleged, it will ³⁷⁴ appear to be a sign of virtue and principle. Now commendation is language exhibiting greatness in the case of virtue; we should therefore give this further proof of the actions of him we commend, that they are of this character. Encomium 20, however, is of actions; (and circumstances concur to the enforcing persuasion, as excellence of birth and education; for it is probable that a person so brought up, will be of such a character;) and hence we pass encomia on those who have acted. And a man's actions. are signs of his habit; since we commend even the man who has not acted, if we believe him to be of such a ³⁷⁵ character. But felicitation ( μακαριϭμὸς), and congratulation ( εὐδαιμονιϭμὸς), are synonymous the one to the other; but are not so to the other two: but felicitation comprehends them, just as happiness comprehends virtue.

³⁷⁶ Demonstrative and deliberative oratory have one point in common; for whatever you would suggest to a man in giving advice, that, by a change of the diction, becomes an encomium21. When, therefore, we ^{377 378 379 380} know what a man ought to do, and what kind of person ³⁸¹ he should be, it is necessary, if we would state this in the form of advice, to transpose and change the sentiment in its diction: for instance, suppose we are aware that we are not to think highly of goods obtained by chance, but of those obtained by our own means. Thus expressed the sentiment has the force of a suggestion ; but thus, of commendation, " thinking highly, not of goods which were his by chance, but those obtained by his own means." So that, when you wish to commend, see what you would suggest in advising; and when to advise, see what you would commend. But the diction will of necessity ³⁸² be reversed, when there has been submitted to change an idea which in one form is prohibitive, in another is not prohibitive.

We must avail ourselves also of amplification in ³⁸³ many cases: thus, if a man has done a thing alone, or first, or with few to share it, or even if it be a thing which he has done more than any other; these all are circumstances of honour. The topic also which is deducible from times and seasons ; these are circumstances contrary to what is natural. Also if a man has often succeeded in the same thing; for this is a feature of greatness, and originates not in chance, but will appear to arise through his own means. Also if orations commendatory and exhorting to emulation have been founded and got up on his account ; if also he be one on whom an encomium was first passed, as it was on Hippolochus ; and the having a statue set up in the forum first occurred to Harmodius and Aristogiton: and in the same way we use amplification with opposite views; and should you not abound in topics bearing on your subject himself, you should set him in comparison with others; which Isocrates used to do from his familiarity with judicial pleading. You should compare the ^{384 385 386} person of whom you speak, with men of character; for it is a feature of amplification, and honourable, if he be better than the good.

³⁸⁷ Amplification falls in easily with demonstrative oratory; for its essence is the being above mediocrity. On which account we should make a comparison with the generality of men, if we cannot with men of character; since the being above the ³⁸⁸ average seems to indicate virtue. In a word, of all the formulae common to each branch of rhetoric, amplification best suits demonstrative; for the orator takes the actions for granted, and it thus remains ³⁸⁹ only to invest them with greatness and beauty. Example22, however, suits deliberative; because we there decide, by arguing of the future from what has gone before. Enthymem, however, suits judicial; for by reason of its not being clear, the past most especially leaves room for assignment of reasons and demonstration.

³⁹⁰ Nearly all the sources out of which praise and blame are deduced, and on what sort of things we ought to have an eye in praising and blaming, the means too by which encomia and reproaches are produced, are these : for being possessed of these points, ³⁹¹ their contraries are plain ; for blame is deduced from the opposite sources.

IT will be for me next to speak of the number and ^{392 393 394} nature of the sources out of which the orator must construct his reasonings, touching accusation and defence. Now we must ascertain three points ; one, whatandhow many are the objects for the sake of which men act unjustly; the second, how themselves are disposed; the third, towards personsofwhat character and of what disposition they do so act.

Let us then, after defining the acting unjustly, speak in order of the rest. Let the acting unjustly be defined to be, the voluntary commission of hurt in contravention of law. Now law is either general or peculiar. The peculiar law I call that, by whose written enactments men direct their polity: the general, whatever unwritten rules appear to be recognised among all men. Men are voluntary agents in whatever they do wittingly, and without compulsion. Men, therefore, do not every thing on fixed principle, which they do wittingly: but whatever they do on fixed principle, that they do wittingly; because no one is ignorant of that which he chooses on principle. Now, the principles by whose motion men de- ^{395 396 397} liberately choose to hurt and do evil in contravention of law, are depravity and moral weakness2; for if any are depraved either in one or more respects, it is in reference to that point, on which they are so depraved, that they are guilty of injustice. The illiberal man, for instance, on the subject of money; the intemperate, touching the pleasure of the body ; and the effeminate, respecting objects of ease; and the coward, respecting danger ; (for it is by reason of fear that men abandon their comrades in danger;) the ambitious man, on the score of honour; the hasty man, by reason of anger ; the man eager to excel, on account of victory; the vindictive, for the sake of revenge; a silly man, owing toTis being mistaken on points of right and wrong ; a man of effrontery, from his contempt of character. And in other characters in the same way each [goes wrong] respecting ³⁹⁸ his own particular weakness. But my meaning on these matters will be evident from what has been already said on the subject of the virtues, and from what hereafter will be stated on the subject of the passions. It merely remains for me to state on what account, how effected, and toward whom, men do commit injustice.

³⁹⁹ First, then, let us distinctly enumerate the objects, which desiring, or which avoiding, we set about injustice3: because it evidently should be considered by the plaintiff how many, and what sort of those things, from a desire of which men wrong their neighbours, have an existence,on the side of his adversary; and by the defendant again, what, and ^{400 401} what number of these things do not so exist. Now ⁴⁰² all men do all things either of themselves, or not of themselves. The things which they do not of themselves, they do either by chance, or from necessity ; and the things done by necessity, they do either by compulsion, or by nature. So that all things whatsoever which men do not of themselves, they do either by chance, or from compulsion, or by nature. Again, the things which they do of themselves, and of which they are themselves the causes, some they do through custom, and others through natural desire ; and this partly through this desire influenced by reason, and in part through it devoid of reason. Now the act of ⁴⁰³ wishing is desire accompanied by reason, fixing on some good as its object; because no one wishes for any thing other than what he conceives to be a good. The desires devoid of reason, are anger and appetite. So that all things whatever which men do, they ne- ^{404 405} cessarily do from seven causes ; by chance, compulsion, nature, custom, will, anger, or appetite. But to carry on distinctions in reference to age, or habits, or whatever else enacts itself in conduct, were superfluous. For, granting that it happens to young men to be passionate, it is not by motion of their youth that they act thus, but by motion of anger and appetite: neither is it by motion either of wealth or poverty, simply, but (in the case of the poor) it is on account of their neediness that it happens that they cherish an appetite for wealth; and (in the case of the rich) on account of their having the means, that they risk an appetite for unnecessary pleasure ; and these persons will act neither by motion of their wealth nor of their poverty, but by motion of appetite. And in exactly the same way, the just and unjust, and all such as are said to act conformably to habits, will in reality act, under all circumstances, by motion of these principles ; for they on the impulse either of reason or of passion; but some from good manners and passions, others from the contrary. Still, however, it happens that on habits of this particular ⁴⁰⁶ character, principles of action the same in character are consequent; and on those of that kind, principles also of that kind. For on the temperate man perhaps forthwith, by motion of his temperance, are attendant good opinions and appetites respecting pleasures ; but on the intemperate, the contrary ⁴⁰⁷ on these same subjects. For which reason we must wave distinctions of such a kind; but we must consider, on what conditions4, what principles of conduct are wont to follow: for it is not ordained, (in the nature of things,) that, if a man be white or black, or tall or short, principles of this or that kind should be attendant on him; but if he be young or old, just or unjust, here some difference begins ; and so, in a word, in the case of all contingent circumstances whatever, which produce a difference in the tempers of men, for instance, a man's seeming to himself to be rich or poor, fortunate or unfortunate; in all these cases there will be some essential difference. Of this, however, we will speak hereafter; let ^{408 409} us now treat first of the remaining points. Things proceed from chance which are of such kind that their cause is not definite5, and are produced in the absence of any final motive, and that neither invariably, nor usually, nor in any prescribed order. My meaning on these subjects will be plain from the definition ^{410 411} of chance. All those thingsexist naturallywhose cause is internal and ordinate; for they turn out, either invariably or generally, in the same way; since there is no need of an accurate inquiry on results contrary to nature, whether they be produced conformably to a certain nature, or any other cause. It would appear, ^{412 413} too, that chance is the cause of such results. All ^{414 415} things originate in compulsion which are produced through the instrumentality of the agents themselves, contrary to their inclination and reason. In habit ^{416 417} originates every thing which men do because they have often done it before. From will proceed what- ^{418 419} ever of the forementioned goods appear to be useful, either as an end or as conducing to the end, when it is by reason of such their usefulness that they are realized in action: for even the intemperate do some things which are useful; but not on account of their usefulness, but on account of pleasure. Through the medium ^{420 421} of anger and excited feeling arise acts of vengeance. Now, between revenge and punishment there is a difference ; for punishment is for the sake of the sufferer, but revenge for that of the person inflicting it, in order that he may be satiated6. On what subjects this excitement of feeling exists, will therefore be plain in my treatise of the passions. But all such things as Ap- ^{422 423} pear pleasant are produced in action on the impulse of appetite. But that which is familiar and has become habitual, is of the number of things pleasant; for many things there are, even among such as are not pleasant naturally, which, when men have been habituated to, they do with pleasure. So that, to ⁴²⁴ speak in one word comprehending the whole, thing whatsoever which men do of their own proper motion, either is good, or apparently good; pleasant, or apparently pleasant. But as they act voluntarily in whatever they do of their own motion, and involuntarily in whatever they do not of their own motion; all things whatsoever in respect to which they act voluntarily, will be either good or apparently good; pleasant or apparently pleasant. For I also set down the getting quit either of evils or apparent evils, and the getting a less evil in exchange for a greater, in the class of goods; because they are in a certain way desirable things. And, among things pleasant, I likewise set down the getting quit of things bringing pain, or appearing to do so; or the getting things ^{425 426} less so, in exchange for such as are so in greater degree.

⁴²⁷ We have therefore to ascertain the number of things pleasant and of what kinds they are. Now on the subject of what is useful, something has been already said in my treating of deliberative rhetoric ; but on the subject of what is pleasant let us treat, beginning at this point. As to the definitions, you must deem them to be adequate [to my purpose] if they be found, on each subject, exempt from obscurity, though not accurately precise.

^{428 429} LET it be laid down by us, that pleasure is a certain motion of the soul, and a settlement of it, at once rapidsand perceptible, into its own proper nature; and that pain is the contrary. If then pleasure be a thing'of this nature, it is plain that whatever is productive of the disposition I have described, is pleasant ; while every thing of a nature to destroy it, or produce a disposition the opposite to it, is painful.

⁴³⁰ Generally speaking, therefore, it is necessary, both that the being in progress toward a state conformable to nature, should be pleasant; and that, in the highest degree, when those feelings, whose original is conformable to it, shall have recovered that their nature ; and habits, because that which is habitual becomes by that time natural, as it were; for, in a certain way, custom is like nature, because the idea of frequency is proximate to that of always; now nature belongs to the idea of always, custom to that of ⁴³¹ often. What is not compulsory, also, is pleasant; for ⁴³² compulsion is contrary to nature. Wherefore acts of necessity are painful; and it has been truly remark- A " Every act of necessity is in its nature painful." It must be also that a state of sedulous attention, anxiety, the having the mind on the stretch, are painful, for they all are acts of necessity, and constrained, unless they have become habitual; but it is custom which, under such circumstances, renders them pleasant. The contraries of these must also be pleasant; wherefore, relaxation of mind, leisure, listlessness, amusements, and intervals of rest, rank in the class of things pleasant; for none of these has any thing to do with necessity. Every thing of ⁴³³ which there is an innate appetite, is pleasant; for appetite is a desire of what is pleasant. Now, of appetites, some are irrational, others attended by reason. I call all those irrational, which men desire, not from ⁴³⁴ any conception which they form: of this kind are all which are said to exist naturally, as those of the body; thirst or hunger, for instance, in the case of sustenance; and the appetite of sustenance in every kind. And the appetites connected with objects of taste, and of lust, and, in fact, objects of touch generally ; the appetite of fragrant odours, too, as connected with smelling, and hearing, and sight. Appetites ⁴³⁵ attended by reason, are all those whatsoever which men exercise from a persuasion: for many things there are which they desire to behold, and possess, on hearsay and persuasion. Now, as the being ⁴³⁶ pleased stands in the perception of a certain affection, and as imagination is a kind of faint perception, there will attend on him who exercises either memory or hope, a kind of imagination of that which is the object of his memory or hope; but if so, it is plain that they who exercise memory or hope, certainly feel pleasure, since they have also a perception. So that every thing pleasant consists either in the ⁴³⁷ perception of present objects, or in the remembrance of those which have already been, or in the hope of such as are yet to be; for men exercise perception on present, memory on past, and hope on future objects. ⁴³⁸ Now the objects of memory are pleasant, not only such as at the moment while present were pleasant, but some even which were not pleasant, should their consequence subsequently be honourable and good ; and hence this saying, " But it is indeed pleasant for a man, when preserved, to remember his toils ;" and this, " For after his sufferings, a man who has suffered much, and much achieved, is gladdened at the recollection." But the reason of this is, that to be exempt from evil is ⁴³⁹ pleasant1. And all objects are pleasant in hope, which appear by their presence either to delight or benefit in a great degree ; or to benefit, without giving pain. In a word, whatever objects by their presence delight us, do so, generally speaking, as we hope for, or remember them. On which account, too, the feeling of anger is pleasant; just as Homer has remarked of anger in his poem, " That which with sweetness far greater than distilling honey as it drops for there is no one who feels anger where the object seems impracticable to his revenge ; nor with those far their superiors in power do men feel anger at all, or if they do, it is in a less degree. ⁴⁴⁰ There is also a kind of pleasure consequent on most appetites; for either in the recollection that they have enjoyed them, or in the hope that they shall enjoy them, men are affected and delighted by a certain pleasure: thus men possessed by fevers feel delight, amid their thirst, as well at the remembrance how they used to drink, as at the hope of drinking ⁴⁴¹ yet again. Lovers, too, feel delight in conversing, writing, and composing something, ever about the object beloved ; because, in all those energies, they have a perception, as it were, of the object they love. ⁴⁴² And this is in all cases a criterion of the commencement of love, when persons feel pleasure not only in the presence of the object, but are enamoured also of ⁴⁴³ it when absent, on memory; wherefore, even when ⁴⁴⁴ pain arises at absence, nay in the midst of mourning, and the very dirge of death, there yet arises within us a certain pleasure. For the pain is felt because the object is not present; but the pleasure consists in remembering and seeing, as it were, both the person, and what he used to do, and the kind of character of which he was. Whence has it been said, and with probability enough, "Thus spake he, and excited within them all a desire of lamentation." Also the ⁴⁴⁵ avenging one's self is pleasant2; for the getting of that is pleasant, the failing to get which is painful: now the angry do feel pain in an excessive degree if they be not avenged ; but in the hope of revenge they take pleasure. Again, to overcome is pleasant, not to the ⁴⁴⁶ ambitious only, but even to all; for there arises an imagination of superiority, for which all, either in a faint or more violent degree, have an appetite. But ⁴⁴⁷ since to overcome is pleasant, it must follow of course, that amusements where there is field for rivalry, as those of music and disputations, are pleasant ; for it frequently occurs, in the course of these, that we overcome; also chess, ball, dice, and draughts. Again, it is the same with respect to amusements where a lively interest is taken3; for, of these, some become pleasant as accustomed to them; others are pleasant at first; for instance, hunting and every kind of sporting ; for where there is rivalry, there is also victory; on which principle the disputations of the bar and of the schools are pleasant to those who have become accustomed to them, and have abilities. Also honour and good character are most ⁴⁴⁸ pleasant, by reason that an idea arises, that one is such as is the good man ; and this in a greater degree should those people pronounce one such, who ^{449 450} he think speaks truth: such are those immediately about one, rather than those who are more removed; familiar friends, and acquaintances, and one's fellow citizens, rather than those who are at a distance; the present, rather than a future generation ; a man of practical wisdom, rather than a mere ignoramus ; many, than a few; for it is more likely that these I have mentioned will adhere to the truth, than that the opposite characters will: since one has no anxiety about the honour or the opinions of such as one greatly despises, children and animals for instance, not at least for the sake of such opinion itself; but if one is anxious about it, then it is on account of ⁴⁵¹ something else. A friend, too, ranks among things pleasant; for the affection of love is pleasant; since there is no lover of wine, who does not delight in wine: also the having affection felt toward one is pleasant; for there is in this case also an idea of one's being an excellent person, which all who have any sensibility to it are desirous of; now' the having affection felt for you is the being beloved yourself, ⁴⁵² on your own account. Also the being held in admiration is pleasant, on the very account of being honcured ⁴⁵³ by it. Flattery and the flatterer are pleasant; since the flatterer is a seeming admirer and a seeming ^{454 455} friend4. To continue the same course of action is also pleasant; for what is habitual was laid down to be pleasant. To vary is also pleasant; for change is an approach to what is natural: for sameness produces an excess of a stated habit; whence it has been said, " In every thing change is pleasant5." For on this principle, whatever occurs at intervals of time is pleasant, whether persons or things; for ^{456 457} it is a variation of present objects; and at the same time that which occurs merely at intervals possesses the merit of rarity. Also learning and admiration, ⁴⁵⁸ generally speaking, are pleasant; for under admiration exists a desire [to learn], so that what is admired is desired: and in the act of learning there is a settlement into a state conformable to nature. To benefit ⁴⁵⁹ and to be benefited are also of the number of pleasant things ; for to be benefited, is to get what people desire ; but to benefit, is to possess and abound ; things, the both of which men desire. And because a tendency to beneficence is pleasant6, it is also pleasant to a man to set his neighbour on his legs again, and to put a finish to that which was deficient in some particular. But as the acquisition of knowledge ⁴⁶⁰ is pleasant, and the feeling admiration, and such things; that, too, must necessarily be pleasant which has been expressed in imitation, as in painting, ⁴⁶¹ sculpture, and poetry: also, every thing is pleasant which has been correctly imitated, although the original object, of which it is the imitation, may not in itself be pleasant; for one does not feel pleasure on that account; but there is an inference that " this means that and thus it happens that we learn something. Also sudden revolutions7, and the being ^{462 463} saved from danger narrowly; for all these are cases exciting admiration. Again, since that is pleasant which is conformable to nature, and things which are akin are respectively conformable to nature, every thing like and akin, speaking generally, is pleasant; ^{464 465} as man to man, horse to horse, and youth to youth. Whence also these proverbs originate: "Fellows in age, delight;!--" Whatever is similar;"—"Beasts recognise their species;"—" Birds of a feather flock ⁴⁶⁶ together;" and every other saying of this sort. But as every thing like and akin is delightful to it, and as every one stands to himself in this relation in a most special manner, all must be, more or less, lovers of themselves; for all these qualities do in a particular manner exist in reference to self. But as all are lovers of themselves, that necessarily which is their own must be pleasant to all; as, for instance, their sayings and productions. On which account men are in general fond of flatterers and lovers, and are ambitious and fond of children; for children are their own production8. It is also pleasant to put a finish to what is deficient9; for it became by that ⁴⁶⁷ time one a own production. And as rule is the most pleasant of all things, the appearing to be wise is also pleasant; for knowledge is a principle of power; ⁴⁶⁸ and wisdom is a knowledge of many subjects, and those commanding admiration. Moreover, as men in general are ambitious, the power of rebuking one's ⁴⁶⁹ neighbour must needs be pleasant. Also the pausing on that province in which he appears to be best, when compared with his own powers in other respects; just as Euripides remarks, "And this he plies, allotting the greatest part of each day to it, ^{470 471} in which, himself being compared with himself, he appears most excellent."

In a similar way, since amusement ranks among ⁴⁷² pleasant things, and as every relaxation and laughter is of the number, things ridiculous must therefore of course be pleasant, as well persons as expressions and productions. But on the subject of the ridiculous, a detailed discussion has been entered into in the Poetics 10. Let thus much have been said on the subject of things pleasant; from the contraries of these things, what is painful will be evident. These, then, are the objects for the sake of which men act unjustly.

LET us now state with what dispositions men commit ⁴⁷³ injustice, and towards whom they do so. As regards themselves then, it is when they think the thing is one possible to be done, and possible to themselves; and either that, in doing it, they shall escape detection, or, if they do not escape it, that they shall not suffer punishment, or that they shall indeed suffer a punishment, but that the damage thereby incurred will be less than the gain, either to themselves or those for whom they have a regard. Now the subject of things which appear possible, and those ⁴⁷⁴ which appear impossible, will be explained in the sequel; for these are points applicable in common to all kinds of rhetoric1. Now as to their own advantages, those men think they are in the highest degree likely to commit injustice with impunity, who are of ⁴⁷⁵ ability in speaking, and men of the world, and such as have experienced many a forensic contest. If, ^{476 477 478 479} too, they happen to have many friends. If they be rich2. And more particularly do they think they can get off, if they be themselves possessed of the forestated qualities; and if they be not themselves so qualified, yet if they have friends, or supporters, or associates of such talents, then also they think to get off; for these are the endowments, by aid of which men are able both to act, to escape detection, ⁴⁸⁰ and avoid punishment5. Again, if they be friends, either of the injured party, or of the judge; because friends are off their guard against injustice, and are moreover appeased before prosecuting their revenge. But the judges gratify their friends, and either altogether let them off, or amerce them in a trifle. ⁴⁸¹ People likely to escape detection, are those the very opposite in character to the charge; as, a man of personal imbecility, on a charge of assault; or one poor and deformed, on a charge of adultery. Again, circumstances exceedingly palpable, and in the eyes of all the world; for these are unobserved, by reason ⁴⁸² that no one would think of them at all. Acts, too, of such enormity and such a character that no one would presume; for in regard to these also men are off their guard: for it is against crimes which are ^{483 484 485 486 487 488} ordinary, as it is against bodily infirmity of an usual kind, that men set themselves on their guard; but as to cases in which no one yet has been afflicted, no one is cautious. Also those people are open to attack, ⁴⁸⁹ to whom no one is an enemy, or to whom many are; for in the one case the aggressors think to escape detection from their not being on their guard; and in the other, they escape from its not seeming likely that they would make an attempt on people ever on their guard, and from their having ever at hand the plea, that they never could have been so mad as to attempt it. Those again are likely to act unjustly, ⁴⁹⁰ who have at hand means of concealing or changing property, places to hide, or any easy means of disposing of it. All those persons, too, who, if they do not escape, having nevertheless means of setting aside the sentence, or of tedious delay, or of corrupting the judges; and who, if the fine be imposed, can yet set aside its payment, or put it off a length of time, or who, from their neediness, have nothing to lose. All, too, ⁴⁹¹ who have the gain clearly in view, or great, or close at hand; while the loss is trifling, indistinct, and at a distance. Also any one to whom the punishment is not adequate to the advantage; of which kind a tyranny seems to be. All, again, in whose case the commission ⁴⁹² of injustice is an act of gain, while the punishment is mere opprobrium. So, on the contrary, are they whose unjust acts lead to a kind of credit, (as if it should happen for one, in their commission to avenge a father or mother, as was the case of Zeno,) while the punishment leads merely to fine, banishment, or something of that kind; for both descriptions of persons act unjustly ; however, they are not the same in character, but the very opposite. Persons, too, ⁴⁹³ who have often escaped notice, or who have not been punished. People who have often met with ill success; for these, like persons engaged in warlike operations, are of a disposition to renew the contest. Every one also to whom the pleasant is immediate, ⁴⁹⁴ while the painful is subsequent; or if the object be gain, while the loss is subsequent; for all inconti- nent persons are thus affected: now incontinence is conversant about all objects whatsoever which men ⁴⁹⁵ desire6. And on the contrary, persons are wont to act unjustly in cases where the painful or loss is immediate, but the pleasant and expedient is subsequent, and slow in presenting itself; for continent persons, and such as have rather more practical ⁴⁹⁶ wisdom, pursue objects of this kind. Wherever, too, a person may appear to have acted by chance, by necessity, natural bent, or habit; and, in a word, to be guilty of error, not of injustice. Also in whatever cases it may happen that one would meet with ^{497 498 499 500} equity. Again, whatever persons are in want: now men are in want two ways ; for either they want necessaries, like the poor; or something in excess, just as the rich7. People, too, of exceedingly good character, or such as are utterly destitute of character ; the first, on the principle that they shall not appear the culprits ; the last, that they shall not be a whit worse off as to character. Thus affected in themselves, then, it is that men attack their neighbours.

But they act unjustly against persons, and on account of objects, of the following descriptions. Persons who possess things which themselves are in need of, be it for necessaries, for superfluity, or for sensual enjoyment: people who are at a distance, and those who are near; for the means of getting at the one are quick, and the vengeance of the others is slow ; as on those, for instance, who plunder Carthaginians8: and ^{501 502 503 504} men who are not cautious, nor apt to be on their ⁵⁰⁵ guard, but are of a disposition to repose confidence ; for it is easy enough to elude all such. Also towards ⁵⁰⁶ such as are of an indolent turn; for to prosecute is the part of a man who is strenuous. Against such also as ^{507 508} have a delicate sense of honour; for these are not apt to squabble about gain : and again, those who have been wronged by many already, yet without their prosecuting ; as though these were, in the words of the proverb, " a prey to very Mysians9." Both against ⁵⁰⁹ those who never yet have been wronged, and those who frequently have been, men are wont to act unjustly ; both being off their guard, the first under the idea that they never shall be wronged, the last as though they should not be wronged any more : also ⁵¹⁰ against those who have had imputations thrown on their characters, or who are open to it; for such people, from a fear of the judges, do not take on themselves to effect persuasion, neither, in fact, are they able ; of which class are all who are disliked and envied. Men act unjustly also towards those against ⁵¹¹ whom they have any pretext, on the part either of their ancestors, themselves, or friends, that they have wrought ill, or intended it, either against themselves, or their ancestors, or those for whom they have a regard ; for, as the proverb goes, " Malice wants only an excuse. Against friends10 and against enemies ⁵¹² are acts of injustice committed ; for against the first it is easy11, against the others pleasant: also against ^{513 514 515 516 517 518} those who are friendless, and those who are not of ability in speaking or acting; because these either do not at all attempt to prosecute, or are reconciled, or bring nothing to the point: also against those whom it will not pay to be waiting in watch for the sentence of court, or the payment of the fine; for instance, foreigners and mechanics; for people under these circumstances are reconciled for a trifle, and are easily hushed. ⁵¹⁹ People, too, who themselves have been guilty of injustice in many instances, or in cases of the very character under which they now are wronged; because it appears to approximate in some degree to non-commission of injustice, when a person shall have been wronged in a particular, in which he is himself wont to be guilty; it is, I mean, as if one were insolently to assault the person of a man who is himself ⁵²⁰ in the habit of being insolent. Those also get injured who have wrought ill, or who possessed, or do now possess, an inclination to do so, or who are about to do so ; for the act involves what is pleasant and honourable; and it appears to approximate to noncommission ⁵²¹ of injury: those, too, in injuring whom, a man gratifies his friends, those he admires or loves, on whom he is in dependence, or, in a word, all at whose control he lives, and at whose hands it happens ⁵²² he will meet with equitable consideration. Men also wrong those with whom they have ground of quarrel, and have been previously at variance, as Calippus did in the case about Dion; for acts of this nature seem to approximate to a non-commission of injustice: ⁵²³ and those who are on the eve of being injured by others, should we not do so ourselves; since this ⁵²⁴ admits no longer any deliberation; just as ⁵²⁵ demus is said to have sent presents of cups12 to Gelon after he had reduced some state, because he had gotten the start, himself being on the eve of attempting it. Injurers attack those, also, by injuring whom they ⁵²⁶ will be enabled to do many acts of justice, as though they could easily amend their error; just as Jason the Thessalian said, "that in some particulars one must needs act with injustice, in order to his being able to do many deeds of justice13:" again, they attack ⁵²⁷ people in those particulars, in regard to which, all or most persons usually act wrong ; because here they think to meet with fellow feeling: in regard also to particulars easy to conceal, of which nature are articles quickly consumed, victuals for instance ; or articles admitting a ready change, either in shape, colour, or composition ; or which it is easy to put out of sight in a variety of laces ; of which sort are ⁵²⁸ articles easily portable, and hidden in small places ; articles also the like to which, or some undistinguish- ⁵²⁹ able from them, have previously been in the possession of the individuals who thus violate justice. Men injure, moreover, in regard to such particulars, as the injured parties have a delicacy in mentioning ; thus in assaults on females intimately connected, or on themselves, or on their children: in all cases, too, in regard to which the prosecuting party would appear litigious; of this nature are trifling things, and those in which people sympathize and forgive. ^{530 531 532} The dispositions then under which, the objects for whose sake, and the person towards whom, men act unjustly, and why they do so, are nearly these which I have stated.

⁵³³ COMMENCING from this point, let me mark in detail all acts which conform to, or which violate justice. Now right and wrong have been defined in reference to two kinds of law, and in a twofold way also in regard to those persons to whom they refer1. ⁵³⁴ Law2, now, I understand, to be either peculiar or universal; peculiar, to be that which has been marked out by each people in reference to itself, and that this is partly unwritten, partly written. I call that law universal, which is conformable merely to dictates of nature ; for there does exist naturally an universal sense of right and wrong3, which, in a certain degree, all ^{535 536 537 538 539} intuitively divine, even should no intercourse with each other, nor any compact have existed4; which sentiment the Antigone of Sophocles enters uttering, that it was just, namely to bury Polynices, though denounced, since this by nature was a deed of justice: " For by no means is it for this or the next day merely that this maxim is in force, but for ever; nor is there any one who knows from whom it proceeded5. And as Empedocles says on the subject of not slaying that which has life: for this maxim is not right here, and wrong there, "but a principle of law to all, it is extended uninterruptedly throughout the spacious firmament and boundless light." And as Alcidamas remarks in the Messeniac oration.

As to the persons also in reference to whom right ⁵⁴⁰ and wrong have been defined, a twofold distinction has been made 6; for that which we ought to do and ⁵⁴¹ to leave undone, exists in reference either to the community, or to an individual member of it. And hence we may, as regards acts of justice, and the contrary, violate justice or adhere to it in two ways; for we may do so in reference either to an individual, or to the community: for the man who is guilty of ⁵⁴² adultery, or of an assault, injuries some individual; but he who will not bear arms injures the community. ^{543 544 545 546 547} Now as all acts of violating justice have been distinguished, and as some of them are against the community, and others against one or more individual members of it, let me, after reverting to what the suf- ⁵⁴⁸ fering injustice is, explain the rest. Now to be injured, is to suffer injustice at the hands of a willing agent; ⁵⁴⁹ for commission of injustice has been previously defined to be a voluntary act. As however it is necessary that the person injured should be hurt, and involuntarily hurt. Now what hurt is will be evident from what has gone before; for things good and evil have been distinctly spoken of above, and voluntary acts also ; namely. that they are all things done know- ⁵⁵⁰ ingly. So that all grounds for complaint must exist, necessarily in reference either to the community, or to individual interests; the agent being either unconscious, or unwilling, or willing and conscious; and [in the last] of these cases, acting either on deliberate ⁵⁵¹ choice, or on the impulse of passion. Now I shall treat on the subject of anger in my discussion of the passions ; but it has been above explained under what circumstances, and with what dispositions, men act on deliberate principle.

⁵⁵² But as people, while they acknowledge their having acted in such a way, very frequently will not acknowledge the designation in the indictment, or the view of the case on which the indictment turns : a man will avow, for example, his having taken a thing, but not his having stolen it; that he struck the first blow, but yet did not insult; that he cohabited, but did not commit adultery, with the woman in question; or that he stole, but was not guilty of sacrilege, for it was not consecrated property ; or that he did till beyond his boundary, but encroached not upon public land ; or conversed with the enemy, but was yet not guilty of treason: it will, for these reasons, be necessary to lay down definitions on these matters ; as to what essentially constitutes theft, insult, and adultery; in order that, if we wish to show that they really do or do not exist, we may be able ⁵⁵³ to set the right of the case in a true light. Now all these questions, as to a matter being unjust and criminal, or not unjust, do in fact constitute the ground of inquiry; for the criminality and injustice of the act stands essentially in the deliberate principle on which it is done ; and this sort of terms marks, over and above the matter of fact, the principle also of the agent; the terms, assault and felony, for instance ; for because a man has struck another, he will not under all circumstances have assaulted him, but if he has done so with a view to something, as with a view to treat him with disrespect, or to his own gratification : neither, supposing a man has taken privily, has he been guilty, in every case, of larceny; but if he took it to the injury of another, or in order to appropriate it to himself, then indeed he has been guilty of larceny. The case too is similar respecting other terms designating crimes to what has been remarked respecting these.

But as there were two species of things right and ⁵⁵⁴ wrong ; for one was of written prescript, the other of unwritten law ; now those on the subject of which the laws speak a written language have been treated of; and of those arising from unwritten law there are ⁵⁵⁵ two kinds. And these are, the one class which is always in proportion to the excess of vice or virtue of the agent, on which are consequent either censures and praises, or deprivation of rank and marks of distinction and public grants ; thus, for instance, the being grateful to a benefactor, and the repaying with kindness one who has been kind to yourself, and the having an inclination to aid one's friends, and whatever other duties are of this kind: the other ⁵⁵⁶ class, are the supplement of the peculiar and written law of states ; for the equitable should seem to be somewhat just. And equity is that idea of justice, which contravenes the written law. And this con- ^{557 558} tradiction happens, partly indeed against the will, and partly with the will of the legislator: it then happens against his will, when the question may have escaped his notice ; but, with his will, whenever he has it not in his power accurately to make distinction, but it is necessary that he pronounce universally, though the case be not so absolutely without exceptions, but generally only. Thus also in respect to all cases about which, by reason of their infinitude, it is not easy to make distinctions; such, with regard to wounding with steel, are the distinctions as to the size and nature of the instrument, for an age would ⁵⁵⁹ fail one in the enumeration. Be it then that the case admits not such distinctions, yet if one must needs enact a law respecting it, he cannot do otherwise than speak in general terms 9; so that one who has so much as a ring on his finger, and lifts up his hand and strikes you, does by the letter of the written law stand guilty, and acts unjustly; but in real truth he does not act unjustly 10; and this is the equity of the ^{560 561 562} case. Now if equity be what it has been stated to ⁵⁶³ be, it will be evident what kind of things are equitable, and what not so ; also what kind of persons are not equitable. Since in whatever cases one is bound to have a fellow-feeling, these are all cases of equity. Again, equity is the not esteeming faults and crimes ⁵⁶⁴ of equal guilt, nor accidents, and faults. Now accidents are whatever things happen against all calculation, and proceed not from criminal principle ; and faults are whatever things do not happen against calculation, nor proceed from criminal principle ; but crimes are whatever things, not falling out contrary to calculation, proceed from criminal principle; for the things which are done through desire, proceed from criminal principle. Equity also is the having a ⁵⁶⁵ sympathy for human failings ; and the having an eye, not to the law, but to the lawgiver; and not to the language, but to the intention of the lawgiver 11. And ⁵⁶⁶ not to the conduct, but to the principles of the agent; not to his conduct in one particular, but to its whole tenor. Not what kind of person he has been in this instance, but what he has always shown himself, or generally at least. The having, too, a remembrance of the good one has received, rather than of the ill; of the good one has received, rather than what one has done; though injured, to endure it patiently; to prefer a decision by argument, rather than by recourse to action: a wish to proceed to arbitration, ⁵⁶⁷ rather than to judicial decision, for the arbitrator looks to what is equitable, the judge to what is law; and in order to this it was that arbitration was introduced, in order, namely, that equity might prevail. So far then for our distinctions on the subject of what is equitable. ⁵⁶⁸

⁵⁷⁰ THOSE acts of injustice are greater in degree, which proceed from the greater principle of injustice1; and on this account the most trifling are the greatest; as the charge which Callistratus laid against Melenopus, that he had defrauded the builders of the temple in his accounts, to the amount of three half farthings of consecrated property; but in the case of justice, things are more or less just in a contrary ratio2. Now these criteria arise from the actions virtually exceeding; for he who stole three half farthings of consecrated money would cheat one in any thing. The degree of an act of injustice is decided then, sometimes on this principle, at others on that of the ⁵⁷¹ harm done. Those also are very flagrant, for which no punishment is an equivalent, but of which every one falls short; as also that which there is no means of healing ; for such a case is difficult and impracticable : also where the injured party can get no redress in court; for the evil is without cure, because ⁵⁷² chastisement and a judicial sentence are a cure. If the party suffering, and who was wronged, hath grievously injured himself3; for then the man who did the wrong deserves punishment in a still greater degree; just as Sophocles said when pleading in behalf of Euctemon, who, on being insolently assaulted, slew himself; " that he would price the deed at no ^{573 574 575} less cost than the sufferer had prized himself at." Crimes, too, of which the present criminal has alone ⁵⁷⁶ been guilty, or he first, or very few besides. Also the being frequently guilty of the same enormity. Any thing too on account of which new prohibitory and penal statutes have been sought out, and introduced ; as at Argos they punish any one on whose account a law may have been enacted, and those on account of whom the prison was erected. That act ⁵⁷⁷ of injustice also is greater, which is of a more brutal character. That too which proceeds more immediately from malice aforethought. That too which, as they hear of, people are affected by dread, rather than compassion. And the rhetorical expedients for exaggeration are as follows;—“ he hath swept away or overleaped many principles of justice," as oaths, the plighting of his hand, pledges of fidelity, and marriage contracts ; for there is an excess by the ratio of many crimes. And its being on the very ⁵⁷⁸ spot where criminals receive punishment; which they do who bear false witness; for where would he not be ready to act wrong, if at least he does so even in the judgment hall4? Those deeds too on which shame is most especially felt. Also if the party has injured him at whose hands he has been benefited: for he is guilty in more than one way, both in that he does him wrong, and in that he did not good to him. Also the man who has violated the unwritten ⁵⁷⁹ principles of right; for it belongs to a man of superior excellence to be just unconstrainedly; now what is of written prescript is done of necessity, but not so what is unwritten. Taking it in another way, it is a feature of aggravation if it be in violation of written ⁵⁸⁰ law; for you may say, the man who is unjust in matters where is room for apprehending punishment, and on which loss attends, surely would be likely to be ⁵⁸¹ unjust in respect of matters on which no loss is consequent. Thus, then, the greater and less degrees of injustice have been treated of.

⁵⁸² It comes next to the subject just treated of, for me to run over the proofs which are called inartificial; ⁵⁸³ because these are peculiar to judicial oratory'. And they, are five in number, viz. laws, witnesses, deeds, torture, oaths.

⁵⁸⁴ First, then, let me speak of Laws, in what way an orator, in exhorting or dissuading, and in accusing or defending, is to turn them to his purpose. ⁵⁸⁵ Because it is plain, that it the written law be opposed to his case, he must avail himself of the universal law, and of topics of equity, as more absolutely just: and he must argue that, really "to act to the best of his judgment 2,” is to decline an implicit adherence to written prescript: he must insist, moreover, ^{586 587} that equity remains for ever, and varies not at any time, neither does the universal law, for this is in conformity to nature ; but that the written law does frequently vary; whence it was said in the Antigone ^{588 589} of Sophocles ; for she is defending herself because she acted in opposition to the law of Creon, but not in opposition to the universal law3, " for these are not of this or of the next day merely, but ever exist; their prescript would I, not for the sake of any one, —.” He must insist, also, that justice is some- ⁵⁹⁰ thing substantially true and expedient, but not so that mere seeming of justice, so that neither is the written law, for it does not the duty of law. And that the judge is, as it were, an assay-master, that he may distinguish between counterfeit and real ideas of justice. And that it is the part of a better ⁵⁹¹ man to employ and abide by the unwritten law than the written. He should also observe, if the law ⁵⁹² which stands in his way be at variance with any approved law, or be itself at variance with itself; thus sometimes one law directs that whatever men shall have covenanted should be valid; another forbids that they should covenant any thing contrary to the law. Observe, also, whether it be equivocal, so that you ⁵⁹³ may wrest it to your purpose, and discover to which construction either justice or expediency will best adjust itself: then let him avail himself of that law. And if the circumstances under which the law was ⁵⁹⁴ enacted be no longer remaining4, but the law itself is remaining, he should endeavour to make this clear, and battle against it on this ground. But should the ⁵⁹⁵ written law be in favour of his case, the orator then must state that " the best of one's judgment" is inserted, not for the sake of a judge's deciding contrary to the law, but in order that, if he be ignorant of what the law directs, he may not forswear himself. He should insist also, that no one chooses good in the abstract, but what is so to himself; and that there is no difference between a law not enacted and one not put in force. And he should observe that, in other arts, it advantages not for one to indulge himself in such over-wisdom; as, for example, in respect of a ^{596 597} physician; for there the errors of his physician do not so greatly hurt a mali, as the habituating himself to disobey him who has the direction of his health. And that the seeking to be wiser than the law, is the very thing which in well-approved laws is prohibited. And on the subject of laws let such be our distinctions.

⁵⁹⁸ But to the subject of Witnesses: witnesses are twofold, some ancient, others modern 5, and of these some are partners in the risk, others are uninvolved in it. I mean by ancient witnesses, both poets and all other illustrious persons whose decisions are open to the world; as, for example, the Athenians employed Homer as their witness in the matter of Salamis; and the people of Tenedos but recently employed Periander the Corinthian, against the people of Sigaeum; Cleophon, also, employed the Elegies of Solon against Critias, saying, that the family of old time was a dissolute one, for Solon would never otherwise have said, “Go, bid my Critias, with his yellow locks, to listen to his father." Such, then, are the witnesses on the subject of the ⁵⁹⁹ past. But, respecting the future, we have also soothsayers ; thus Themistocles insisted that they were to engage by sea, alleging the expression the wooden wall6. Moreover, proverbs also are testimonies, according to what has been stated above7; as, if one were going to advise another not top make an old man his friend, the proverb testifies to that point, " Never benefit an old man ;” also as to the taking off the children whose parents one has slain, "Foolish is he who having slain the father shall ^{600 601 602} leave the son behind8.” Modern witnesses are ⁶⁰³ all .those people of note who have passed an nion on any point; for these their opinions are useful to those who are debating on the same questions ; as Eubulus, for instance, in the trial against Chares, availed himself of that saying of Plato, in reference to Archibius, that the avowal of being wicked has gained ground in the city." Also those who participate the risk, should they appear to falsify. Witnesses, however, of this class, prove merely such ⁶⁰⁴ points as these ; whether the fact has or has not taken place ; whether it be in existence or not; but as to the further question of its character, they are not at all witnesses ; on the questions, for instance, whether a thing be just or unjust, expedient or prejudicial, But witnesses who are at a distance are ⁶⁰⁵ very credible, even touching questions of this nature. But ancient witnesses are of supreme credibility10, ⁶⁰⁶ because they are beyond the reach of corruption. But in reference to testimony the following may be adduced as confirmations of proof, by the orator, namely, who has no witnesses: it should be insisted that the judge ought to decide from probabilities, and that this is the spirit of his oath, “to the best of his judgment." Let him also say that it is impossible to lead probability astray on the score of money; and that probability never is detected bearing false testimony. But it must be urged by him ⁶⁰⁷ who has witnesses, against him who has them not, that neither is probability amenable to trial; and that there would be no need at all of offering testimony, if it were enough to consider matters on the ground of reasonings only. And testimony is partly ^{608 609 610 611 612} in reference to one's self, partly in reference to the adversary ; partly to fact, partly to moral character. Insomuch that it is plain that we can never be at a loss for testimony to suit our purpose ; for if there be not at hand any such testimony, bearing on the case itself, as is either admitted on our own part, or opposed to our adversary, we still may have enough, bearing on the subject of moral character, with a view either to our own excellence of character, or ⁶¹³ our adversary's depravity. Whatever else we allege on the subject of witnesses, as to their being friendly, inimical, or indifferent, of good character, or bad, or neither particularly, and whatever other distinctions of this kind there happen to be, must be alleged from the same places out of which we adduce enthymems.

⁶¹⁴ But on the subject of Deeds, pleading is useful so ⁶¹⁵ far as regards enhancing or depreciating their authority, or showing them to be valid, or void; in showing, if they exist on your own side, that they are deserving credit and valid ; if, however, they be on your ⁶¹⁶ adversary's side, in showing the contrary. Now in order to set them out as deserving credit or undeserving it, there is no difference from the process respecting witnesses. For of whatever characters those who have subscribed, or had the custody11 of the deeds, happen to be, of the same authority will the deeds themselves also be. When, however, the deeds are acknowledged to have been made, we must, in case they be on our side, aggrandize their authority; for a deed is law, private and particular12. And deeds ^{617 618} do not make valid the law, but the law makes valid those deeds which are conformable to law. And, in short, the law is itself a sort of deed ; so that whoever casts discredit on, or does away deeds, does away, in fact, with law. Moreover the greater part of the ⁶¹⁹ bargains of men, and their voluntary transactions, are carried on by means of deeds; so that if these become invalid, the intercourse of mankind with each other is subverted. And it is easy enough to discover what ⁶²⁰ other topics are adapted to the purpose. But should the deeds be opposed to you, and on the side of your adversary, these arguments will be to your purpose: -first, those with which one would contend against a law which made against him ; for it is absurd if we think we are not bound to obey the laws, unless well enacted, and if the legislators have been guilty of mistaking their point, but yet hold it necessary to abide by mere deeds. Next to argue that the judge is an ⁶²¹ arbiter of what is just, that he ought therefore to regard, not the matter of the deed, but something partaking more of justice. And that it is not possible to alter what is just, either by fraud or force ; for it has an existence in the nature of things13 : deeds, how- ⁶²² ever, are made both by persons who are imposed on, and those who are compelled to make them. Observe, moreover, whether it be in opposition to any written law, or any universal principle of right, and to the principles of justice and honour; whether again it be opposed to other later or earlier deeds; for either the later are valid, and the earlier invalid ; or the earlier are correct, and the later have been obtained by stratagem; urging whichever of these cases may happen to suit the purpose. Have an eye moreover to the matter of expediency, whether the deed stand in any respect in the way of the judges, and every other such consideration, for these may also be easily discovered. ⁶²³

^{624 625} Torture is a kind of evidence, and appears to carry with it absolute credibility, because a kind of constraint is applied. Now, it is not at all difficult respecting this to discern those considerations which the cause admits of, and to set them forth ; out of which, should the torture be on our side, it is possible to enhance its value, by insisting that of all evi- ⁶²⁶ dence this alone is true. Should it be, however, opposed to us, and on the side of our adversary, one may do away with the very truth, by declaiming against every sort of torture; for that men, when constrained, speak falsehood no less than truth, and will persist in not speaking the truth; and will easily falsify, as being likely the sooner to get off:14 and one ought to have it in his power to allege, over and above all these considerations, some actual instances, which the judges are acquainted with, besides topics such as I have described.

⁶²⁷ On the subject of oaths we may make a four-fold division; for a party either tenders an oath, and accepts it; or he does neither ; or he does the one, and not the other; that is, he either tenders, but does not accept it; or accepts, but does not tender it.15 Moreover, it may happen in a different way from this still, supposing the oath to have been previously taken by this or that party.

⁶²⁸ 1. Now, an advocate does not tender an oath on the ground that men easily forswear themselves; and because the other party will take it, and never repay; but that he is of opinion that the judges, if his ad- ^{629 630} versary does not take the oath, will give a verdict against him: that he esteems the risk which depends on the judges the preferable one, for in them he reposes confidence, but in his adversary, none.

2. But an advocate declines accepting it on the ⁶³¹ ground of its being an oath for a pecuniary object; and because, if he were a worthless fellow, he would forswear himself without more ado; since it were better surely to be a villain for some object, rather than for none; for if he but take the oath, he will gain his cause, if he decline taking it, he will not. Thus, then, his not taking it will be from virtuous motives, not from fear of forswearing himself; here, too, the saying of Xenophanes is in point, viz. that this sort of appeal, made by an impious man to a pious, is not fair, but is just such an one, as if a robust fellow were to challenge an infirm man, either to strike him, or to get beaten himself.

3. If, however, he accepts it, the advocate alleges ⁶³² that he feels confidence in himself, but none in his adversary. Let him also declare, inverting the saying of Xenophanes, that it is fair enough if the impious man tenders the oath, and the pious man takes it; also, that it is surely a strange thing that a man should be unwilling himself to take an oath, in a question about which he calls on the judges to give their verdict on oath.

4. If, however, he tenders the oath, let him insist ⁶³³ that a willingness to intrust the question to the gods is a matter of piety; and that his adversary need call on no other judges, since he throws the decision of the case into his own hands; and that an unwillingness to take an oath, in a question about which he calls upon other people to swear, is absurd.

Now, as it is thus plain how we are to speak in ⁶³⁴ reference to each [of the four simple cases], it will also be plain how we are to speak when taking them conjointly; supposing, for instance, either that yourself are willing to take the oath, but not to tender it; or, if you tender it, but are not willing to take it; or if you are inclined both to take it and to tender it; or to do neither; for these cases must be made up of those above mentioned, so that our reasonings must also be made up of those above stated.

⁶³⁵ But if a former oath, and that contradictory of your present, has been taken by yourself, you have to make out that it is not perjury; for injustice is essentially voluntary, and perjury is injustice; but that which is done under constraint, or deceit, is ⁶³⁶ involuntary, land therefore not unjust.] Here then we may introduce the saying about perjury, viz. "that it is a thing not of the tongue, but of the mind." If, however, an oath of this description shall have been taken by your adversary, declare, "that he who abides not by what he has sworn to, subverts every thing which is established; for this is the reason that judges administer the law only on oath:" exclaim, too, " that these men are calling on you, judges, to abide by those oaths, by virtue of taking which you give your verdict; and do they not themselves abide by them ? " And whatever else one may allege in way of amplification. So much, then, for the subject of proof not originated by art.