Poetics. Aristotle. Thomas Twining (Translator). London, UK. 1789.
Sponsored by Perseus Project, Tufts University.
Poetics (Thomas Twining, 1789) (OCR draft) (English) (Thomas Twining's English translation of Aristotle's Poetics, published in 1789 and aligned to the Kassel reference passage sequence.)
Provisional text from uncorrected OCR; expect errors.
2.
mvp-aristotle-comment-200
ἔστιν οὖν τραγῳδία κτέ.
The definition, which is in logical form,
per genus et differentias, professes to be a summary of points already established; and in its principal elements it is that. (1) That Tragedy is a
μίμησις was said in
1, 1447 a 13
; and that it is a
μίμησις πράξεως is implied in
1, 1447 a 28
. (2)
σπουδαίας, which differentiates Tragedy from Comedy, recalls chap. 2 and
4, 1448 b 34
—
καὶ τελείας μέγεθος ἐχούσης being added in recognition apparently of the point indicated in
4, 1449 a 19
. (3) The means in Tragedy were noted in
1, 1447 b 24–28
; and (4) the dramatic manner of its imitation in
3, 1448 a 23–28
.
But for the concluding clause, on the effect of Tragedy on the emotions, we have not been prepared by anything in the earlier chapters. Aristotle no doubt regarded one part of it,
δι᾽ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου, as self-evident, but the rest is presumably an anticipation of a point worked out at length in the lost Second Book of the Poetics. In just the same way we find him using the term
προαιρετική in the definition of virtue in
Eth. N. 2. 6, 1106 b 36
, and reserving the formal explanation of
προαίρεσις for
3. 4, 1111 b 4
. This concluding clause is an integral part of the definition, since the end of the thing to be defined cannot be ignored in any logically complete statement of its nature (
De anima 1. 1, 403 a 25
;
Metaph. H 2, 1043 a 14
).
2.
mvp-aristotle-comment-201
1449b25
τελείας μέγεθος ἐχούσης
The point is considered in chap. 7, where 'completeness' is said to imply a whole of some magnitude (
7, 1450 b 24
).
We have not yet been told that the action in Tragedy must be a
τελεία πρᾶξις, but from the explanatory
μέγεθος ἐχούσης Aristotle would seem to regard the point as the natural consequence of the
μέγεθος mentioned already in
4, 1449 a 19
as one of the characteristics of Tragedy proper. In that case the term distinguishes Tragedy proper with its complete and self-contained stories from the rudimentary Drama of an earlier period.
2.
mvp-aristotle-comment-202
ἡδυσμένῳ
:
Plato Rep. 607 A
εἰ δὲ τὴν ἡδυσμένην μοῦσαν παραδέξῃ ἐν μέλεσιν ἢ ἔπεσιν, ἡδονή σοι καὶ λύπη ἐν τῇ πόλει βασιλεύσετον. The word is taken from cookery (comp.
De sensu 4, 442 a 10
). The nature of the metaphor may be seen, in the case of the substantive
ἥδυσμα, from Aristotle's criticism of the style of Alcidamas in
Rhet. 3. 3, 1406 a 19
οὐ γὰρ ἡδύσματι χρῆται ἀλλ᾿ ὡς ἐδέσματι τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις ('the sauce with him is the dish').
Said of language
ἡδυσμένος implies the accession of something (here metre and music) to make it agreeable, just as
κοσμηθῆναι in
4, 1449 a 29
meant the accession of something to make the work beautiful. An echo of this passage (comp.
6, 1450 b 11
) may perhaps be recognized in
Plutarch Erot. 769 C
λόγῳ ποίησις ἡδύσματα (τὰ) μέλη καὶ μέτρα καὶ ῥυθμοὺς ἐφαρμόσασα , and also in
Strabo 818 Cas.
φλυαροῦσιν ὥσπερ μέλος ἢ ῥυθμὸν [ἢ] ἥδυσμά τι τῷ λόγῳ τὴν τερατείαν προσφέροντες. The metaphor reappears in Shakespeare,
Hamlet 2. 2
I remember one said there were no sallets in the lines to make the matter savoury.
2.
mvp-aristotle-comment-203
ἑκάστῳ τῶν εἰδῶν
scil.
τῶν ἡδυσμάτων, understood from
ἡδυσμένῳ. Similarly in
Isocrates 190 D
περὶ τούτων δηλῶσαι μὴ μόνον τοῖς τεταγμένοις ὀνόμασιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ξένοις τὰ δὲ καινοῖς τὰ δὲ μεταφοραῖς, καὶ μηδὲν παραλιπεῖν ἀλλὰ πᾶσι τοῖς εἶδεσι διαποικίλαι τὴν ποίησιν one may supply
τῶν ὀνομάτων with
εἶδεσι. For another instance of this allusive use of
εἶδος see
25, 1461 b 22
. In what follows (b 29)
ἑκάστῳ τῶν εἰδῶν is replaced by
τοῖς εἶδεσι ; the reading of the MS.,
ἑκάστου, seems to have arisen through
χωρίς having been mistaken for a preposition.
The juxtaposition of
χωρίς and
ἑκάστῳ is just like that in
Pol. 7. 1, 1323 b 41
καὶ χωρὶς ἑκάστῳ καὶ κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεσιν (comp.
χωρὶς ἕκαστον in
De caelo 2. 12, 292 a 13
, b 27) . The implied antithesis in the present passage is between 'each separately' (
χωρίς), and 'all together, and at once' (
ἅμα: comp.
De gen. et corr. 1. 5, 322 a 13
, and
Metaph. E 4, 1027 b 23
). Tragedy (unlike the Dithyramb etc.) has the
ἥδυσμα of metre in the dialogue, and that of melody only in the choral parts (see on
1, 1447 b 28
).
ἑκάστῳ, therefore, is loosely put for
ἑκατέρῳ (comp.
Pol. 3. 12, 1282 b 38
, and
HSt. s. v.
).
2.
mvp-aristotle-comment-204
1449b26
δρώντων
scil.
τῶν μιμουμένων , the subject being omitted as it is in
13, 1450 a 10
, 21, b 31, and
26, 1461 b 29
. Other Aristotelian instances of this ellipse with a gen. absolute may be seen in
Bon. Ind. 149 b 29
. Tyrwhitt, with less probability, as it seems to me, supplies
μίμησις with
δρώντων, comparing
3, 1448 a 29
μιμοῦνται δρῶντας.
2.
mvp-aristotle-comment-205
οὐ δι᾿ ἀπαγγελίας
scil.
μιμουμένων.
2.
mvp-aristotle-comment-206
1449b27
δι᾽ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου
means practically
δι᾿ ἐλεεινῶν καὶ φοβερῶν, 'by piteous and alarming scenes'; comp.
Goulston's paraphrase
,
'per misericordiam metumque factis expressum'. The more abstract form of expression is adopted in order to prepare the way for
τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων. For the use of the preposition in this connexion comp.
διὰ μέτρων περαίνεσθαι
in b 30
. —
De part. an. 3. 4, 666 a 15
περαίνονται [scil. αἱ κινήσεις] διὰ τοῦ ἕλκειν καὶ ἀνιέναι. —
Plato Gorg. 450 D
διὰ λόγου πᾶν περαίνουσι. —
Rep. 392 D
δι᾿ ἀμφοτέρων περαίνουσιν (v.
Bernays, Zwei Abhandl. p. 85
).
This excitement of pity and fear is, as far as the poet is concerned, the end of Tragedy, but it is in truth only a means to its ultimate end, its
κάθαρσις of such emotions.
2.
mvp-aristotle-comment-207
τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν
'its catharsis of such emotions' , just as
ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μίμησιν (
1, 1447 a 22
;
6, 1449 b 31
) means 'to make their imitation', and
ποιεῖν τὴν ἡδονήν (
4, 1448 b 18
), 'to produce its pleasure' (comp.
4, 1448 b 7
, and
Kühner, Gr. Gr. 2. 1 p. 593
).
The article, in fact, is not so otiose as is usually supposed. This interpretation of the article removes more than one of the preliminary difficulties in this much debated passage, the implication being that a cathartic effect is not peculiar to Tragedy; so that the text is seen at once to stand in close relation to the passage in
Pol. 8. 7
(v. Fr. V), in which the existence of several forms of catharsis is affirmed.
Aristotle recognizes there a catharsis of 'enthusiasm' effected by certain kinds of music, as well as a catharsis of pity and fear effected by Tragedy ; and there is reason to think that a catharsis of laughter also must have been similarly posited as the effect and ultimate justification of Comedy in the lost Second Book of the Poetics.
τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων, therefore, is a general expression for this whole group of disturbing emotions (enthusiasm, pity, fear, etc.), instead of being, as is so often thought, either limited to the two emotions (pity and fear) which appear in the context, or applying to the emotions in general.
The great difficulty, however, in this formula is as to the interpretation of
κάθαρσις. Is the term to be understood as a physiological metaphor, in the sense of 'purging', or 'clearing away' ; or as a metaphor from the religious rite of lustration, in the sense of 'purification'? The ancient evidence, in Aristotle and elsewhere, is to my mind very decidedly in favour of the first interpretation.
I. This, the pathological interpretation, as it may be called, is now generally associated with the names of Weil (1848) and Bernays (1857), who each independently arrived at a very similar conclusion. It is in reality much older; all its essential points in fact are to be found in Tyrwhitt's note on the present passage :
'Satis apparet, Aristotelem hic regulam de tragoedia tragica instituisse, qua scilicet probaret affectus misericordiae et metus, qui in tragoediis vehementissime excitantur, non ex eo nutriri et validiores effici, quod Plato criminabatur, sed contra levari et exhauriri; et proinde affectuum horum purgationem opus esse proprium et quasi finem Tragoediae; cum caeterae Poesis species vel ad doctrinam, vel ad delectationem magis aptae sint.'.
To understand Aristotle's position we have to go back to Plato's condemnation of the Drama in the Tenth Book of the Republic. One of Plato's points is, that the Drama appeals mainly to two of the inferior elements in the soul, our faculty for grief (
τὸ θρηνῶδες, τὸ ἐλεεινόν) and our faculty for laughter ; and that its effect is to gratify these at the expense of the reason, and ultimately to weaken or nullify the self-control prescribed by reason (
Rep. 605 c-606 c
). As a view like this, supported by so great a name, could hardly be ignored by Aristotle in an Art of Poetry based throughout on the assumption of the legitimacy of the Drama, and of the emotional effects it aims at, his catharsis theory may very well be supposed to have been intended as his answer to the Platonic indictment.
Though the formal exposition of the theory, as it was to be read in the complete Poetics, is no longer before us, it is still possible to recover some idea of it from the two statements in the Politics on the 'cathartic' effect of certain kinds of music. In
Pol. 8. 6, 1341 a 21
, as a reason for leaving the flute to professionals, instead of making it part of a liberal education for all, Aristotle explains that the flute, instead of having an 'ethical' effect, is simply orgiastic or exciting, and to be kept for the times when the hearing of music is a 'catharsis' rather than a form of instruction:
οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ αὐλὸς ἠθικὸν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀργιαστικόν, ὥστε πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους αὐτῷ καιροὺς χρηστέον ἐν οἷς ἡ θεωρία κάθαρσιν μᾶλλον δύναται ἢ μάθησιν. It will be seen that a sharp distinction is drawn here between the emotional effect of the flute, and the 'ethical' effect of certain other kinds of music ; and that
κάθαρσις is in Aristotle's view connected with the former rather than with the latter.
A much more important passage, however, is that in
Pol. 8. 7, 1341 b 32
, which will be found
in extenso among the Fragments of the Poetics (Fr. V). It begins by assuming a current division of 'airs' into
ἠθικά, πρακτικά, καὶ ἐνθουσιαστικὰ μέλη, and a similar classification of 'harmonies' or modes. The distinction here is between (1) the music that imitates character, and has thus a reflex influence on the character of the hearer (comp.
Pol. 8. 5, 1340 b
); (2) that which imitates action (comp.
Plato Rep. 399 A
), and moves us to it ; and (3) that which imitates, and so arouses in us, the orgy of emotion termed by the Greeks 'enthusiasm'.
The most 'ethical' harmonies may be practised by all, as a regular part of their lives; whereas the other two kinds are to be left to professionals. This tolerance of the 'enthusiastic harmonies' in a well-ordered state Aristotle justifies by showing that they stand in much the same position as Tragedy. There are certain emotions, he tells us, which arise in some degree in every man's soul, and in a disquieting degree (
ἰσχυρῶς) in certain of us, e.g. pity and fear. Enthusiasm is one of these disturbing emotions.
Experience, however, shows that the enthusiastic music (that of the hymns of Olympus, for instance) has a salutary effect on those subject to accesses (
κατοκώχιμοι) of enthusiasm, restoring them to a normal condition of calm and peace (
καθισταμένους: comp.
Bon. Ind. 356 a 35 and 375 a 8
), just as though they had undergone a cure or catharsis at the hands of a physician (
ὥσπερ ἰατρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως). The same sort of treatment (
πάσχειν) is required by other emotional natures also, e.g. by those liable to accesses of pity and fear, and by the rest of mankind likewise, in so far as they have a share in these feelings ; all want a certain catharsis, a pleasurable relief (
κουφίζεσθαι) from emotion.
And it is in just the same way (i.e. by the relief they bring) that the cathartic airs give a harmless delight to mankind. The sense of
κάθαρσις in the Politics is well explained by Sepulveda in his note on
8. 6, 1341 a 23
:
'Purgatio intelligitur expulsio cuiuspiam affectus'; and again in that on
8. 7, 1342 a 6
(
τῷ δὲ ἧττον διαφέρει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον):
'Itaque plus et minus, tamen omnes moventur affectibus, a quibus iucunde per musicam sanantur et quasi medicamento quodam adhibito purgantur' (comp.
J. of Phil. 27 p. 269
).
The term in fact is a metaphor from medicine, as Aristotle intimates by making it a synonym for
ἰατρεία (
ὥσπερ ἰατρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως), in a context too which presents a whole series of words which either have, or may have, a medical meaning (
πάθος, πάσχειν, ἰσχυρῶς, κίνησις, κατοκώχιμοι, καθισταμένους, κουφίζεσθαι, καθαρτικά). In Greek physiology and pathology
κάθαρσις is a very general term for a physical clearance or discharge, the removal by art or an effort of nature of some bodily product (some
περίττωμα, as Aristotle would call it), which, if allowed to remain, would cause discomfort or harm.
The
κάθαρσις of the soul as described in the Politics is a similar process in reference to certain emotions (
πάθη)—the tacit assumption being apparently that the emotions in question are analogous to those peccant humours in the body which, according to the ancient humoral theory of medicine, have to be expelled from the system by the appropriate
κάθαρσις.
With some adaptation of the statements and hints in
Pol. 8. 7
, as thus interpreted, it is not difficult to recover the outlines at any rate of the Aristotelian theory of the cathartic effect of Tragedy: Pity and fear are elements in human nature, and in some men (
τοὺς ἐλεήμονας καὶ τοὺς φοβητικούς) they are present in a disquieting degree (
ἰσχυρῶς). With these latter the tragic excitement is a necessity (
ἀναγκαῖον πάσχειν) ; but it is also in a certain sense good for all. It serves as a sort of medicine, producing a catharsis to lighten and relieve the soul (
κουφίζεσθαι) of the accumulated emotion within it ; and as the relief is wanted, there is always a harmless pleasure attending the process of relief.
This, then, may be taken as Aristotle's answer to the Platonic argument in the Republic ; it shows that the pleasure we derive from the moving scenes in Tragedy is not, as Plato had maintained, a demoralizing, but on the contrary a harmless pleasure, (
χαρὰ ἀβλαβής). The legitimacy of this pleasure is assumed throughout the Poetics (see especially
14, 1453 b 11
), but its precise nature is not explained, either in the existing book or elsewhere, by Aristotle.
It falls naturally enough, however, into its place in the classification of pleasures in the Nicomachean Ethics, which recognizes the existence of a class of things as pleasurable not directly and in themselves, but through their effect, as being of the nature of cures or remedies (
ἰατρεῖαι) to remove the disquietude arising from an unsatisfied want, and restore us to a normal condition of body or mind (
Eth. N. 7. 13, 1152 b 34
;
7. 15, 1154 b 17
). The tragic excitement, which in the language of the Politics, acts as an
ἰατρεία or
κάθαρσις, is clearly a pleasure of this kind, one of those described by Aristotle as
ἰατρεύοντα ἡδέα.
A further point in his idea of
κάθαρσις may perhaps be noticed, as suggested at any rate by his use of the term to express the effect of Tragedy on the mind. A catharsis in the medical sense of the word is an
ἰατρεία, and only for occasional use ; and its analogue, the
παθημάτων κάθαρσις, may very well be presumed to resemble it in this respect.
In assuming Tragedy, therefore, to have a cathartic rather than a permanent moral effect, Aristotle would seem to have been mindful of the position of the Drama in Greek life, and to have seen that the dramatic performances in the theatre were not sufficiently frequent or continuous to generate a moral habit, or make a lasting impression for good or evil on character—a point overlooked not only by Plato but also by Lessing and most of the modern interpreters of the Aristotelian theory of Tragedy (comp.
E. Müller, Theorie der Kunst bei den Alten 2 p. 378
).
In the phrase
παθημάτων κάθαρσις the genitive after
κάθαρσις, denoting the object purged away or removed, is a construction not uncommon in Aristotle's physiological writings (v.
Bon. Ind. 354 b 22
); and it is found also in other authors, e.g.
Hippocrates 1 p. 104 K.
πτυέλων καθάρσεις. —
p. 654
καθάρσεις τοῦ θερμοῦ ἐκ τοῦ σώματος. —
3 p. 502
τῶν ἀπὸ πλευμόνων καθάρσεις. —
Thucydides 2. 49
ἀποκαθάρσεις χολῆς. —
Demosthenes 64. 12
κάθαρσις αἵματος. —
Polybius 5. 100. 6
ἀνακάθαρσις πτώματος.
The same construction is found with
κάθαρσις (etc.) in its metaphorical application to the analogous process in the mind:
Plato Phaed. 69 B
κάθαρσίς τις τῶν τοιούτων πάντων, 'a purging away of all such things' (Jowett), where the object purged away or removed is shown by the context to be certain affections of the soul (
ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων). —
Plutarch De cap. ex inimicis utilit. 91 F
τῶν παθῶν τούτων ποιούμενος εἰς τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἀποκαθάρσεις. —
Iamblichus De myst. 1. 12
κάθαρσις παθῶν. —
Hierocles in Aur. carm. p. 124 (Needham)
ἡ τῶν λυμαινομένων παθῶν ἐκκάθαρσις. —
p. 134
κάθαρσις τῆς οἰήσεως. —
p. 194
ἀποκάθαρσις νείκους. Aristotle's
τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν may perhaps be an unconscious reminiscence of the phrase in Plato.
The idea of
κάθαρσις, in the sense of a working-off of emotion brought about by something that excites emotion, was not unknown in late Greek literature ; it is recognized in reference to music by Plutarch and Aristides Quintilianus, and in reference to the Drama by Iamblichus and Proclus. The theories reproduced by these writers are clearly of Peripatetic origin, and on exactly the same lines as the Aristotelian justification of the emotional forms of music and of the Drama in the brief statement in the Politics.
(1) In his very curious chapter on the
ἀκροθώρακες, on whom wine is said to have a sedative effect, Plutarch illustrates the paradox (
Qu. conv. 3. 8, 657 A
) by a parallel instance, that of the sad airs at funerals, which, while exciting the grief of the mourners, at the same time work off their sorrow:—
ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ θρηνῳδία καὶ ὁ ἐπικήδειος αὐλὸς ἐν ἀρχῇ πάθος κινεῖ καὶ δάκρυον ἐκβάλλει [ἐκκαλεῖ Emperius], προάγων δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς οἶκτον οὕτω κατὰ μικρὸν ἐξαιρεῖ [ἐξερᾶ Bernays] καὶ ἀναλίσκει τὸ λυπητικόν· ὁμοίως ἴδοις ἂν καὶ τὸν οἶνον, ὅταν σφόδρα ταράξῃ καὶ παροξύνῃ τὸ ἀκμαῖον καὶ θυμοειδές, αὖθις καταδύοντα [? καταλύοντα], καὶ καθιστάντα τὴν διάνοιαν ὡς πορρωτέρω μέθης προϊοῦσαν ἡσυχάζειν.
(2) The language in
Aristides Quintilianus De Musica 3. 25 (p. 13 Jahn)
, on the cathartic effect of the music and dancing in the Bacchic and other mysteries, has a more distinctly Aristotelian imprint on it:—
διὸ καὶ τὰς Βακχικὰς τελετὰς καὶ ὅσαι ταύταις παραπλήσιοι λόγου τινὸς ἔχεσθαί φασιν, ὅπως ἂν ἡ τῶν ἀμαθεστέρων πτοίησις διὰ βίον ἢ τύχην ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταύταις μελῳδιῶν τε καὶ ὀρχήσεων ἅμα παιδιαῖς ἐκκαθαίρηται.
(3) There are two passages in Iamblichus, which may serve to illustrate the Aristotelian idea of
κάθαρσις. In
De myst. 3. 9 (ed. Parthey)
, writing as a Neoplatonic occultist against the naturalistic explanation of enthusiasm, he insists that it is an error to regard the effect of the enthusiastic music as being of the nature of a mere
ἀποκάθαρσις, a working-off or evacuation (
ἀπέρασις) of some morbid product within the soul :—
ἀπέρασιν δὲ καὶ ἀποκάθαρσιν ἰατρείαν τε οὐδαμῶς αὐτὸ κλητέον, οὐδὲ γὰρ κατὰ νόσημά τι ἢ πλεονασμὸν ἢ περίττωμα πρώτως ἐν ἡμῖν ἐμφύεται, θεία δε αὐτοῦ συνίσταται ἡ πᾶσα ἄνωθεν ἀρχὴ καὶ καταβολή.
There is reason to think that the theory thus set aside was that of Theophrastus, and, through him, of Aristotle. And it will be seen how completely the language of the above passage harmonizes with the pathological interpretation of the formula,
ὥσπερ ἰατρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως in the Politics. The second passage is in
De myst. 1. 11
:—
αἱ δυνάμεις τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων παθημάτων τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν πάντῃ μὲν εἰργόμεναι καθίστανται σφοδρότεραι, εἰς ἐνέργειαν δὲ βραχεῖαν [so Bernay's; βραχεῖς vulg.] καὶ ἄχρι τοῦ συμμέτρου προαγόμενοι χαίρουσι μετρίως καὶ ἀποπληροῦνται, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἀποκαθαιρόμεναι πειθοῖ καὶ οὐ πρὸς βίαν ἀναπαύονται. διὰ δὴ τοῦτο ἔν τε κωμῳδίᾳ καὶ τραγῳδίᾳ ἀλλότρια πάθη θεωροῦντες ἵσταμεν τὰ οἰκεῖα πάθη καὶ μετριώτερα ἀπεργαζόμεθα καὶ ἀποκαθαίρομεν.
The theory Iamblichus is accepting for the moment is that the passions cannot be suppressed for any length of time with impunity ; that they require an occasional outlet (comp.
ἀποκαθαιρόμεναι) to keep them quiet ; and that the secret of our interest in the Drama is that it serves to work off emotion (
τὰ οἰκεῖα πάθη ἀποκαθαίρομεν). It is clear that Iamblichus must have had a pathological explanation of the effect of the Drama before him. But he has taken the edge off the Aristotelian theory by giving it an ethical turn; it will be seen that he makes the catharsis of passions mean the same thing as the moderation of them (
μετριώτερα ἀπεργαζόμεθα καὶ ἀποκαθαίρομεν), thus anticipating by many centuries the interpretation of
παθημάτων κάθαρσις now usually associated with the names of Heinsius and Lessing.
(4) The cathartic effect of the Drama is one of the many controversial points discussed by Proclus in his commentary on Plato's Republic. The passages bearing on it will be found quoted under Fr. V. According to Proclus the Aristotelian answer to Plato was that the Drama serves a useful purpose as an outlet for emotions which would disturb the peace of the soul, if their just claims were not recognized and from time to time duly satisfied by means of some such gratification as is supplied in the theatre. This view of the effect of the Drama Proclus attributes to Aristotle ; his reference, however, to other apologists for the Drama may make one hesitate to believe him to have found it for himself in the now lost Second Book of the Poetics. The statement in its existing form seems rather to have been taken from some follower of Aristotle, possibly from Theophrastus, its phraseology representing the sense rather than the words of the Aristotelian original.
Disengaged from its Neoplatonic surroundings in Iamblichus and Proclus, the catharsis theory before them may be thus reconstructed in outline: The Drama has a therapeutic (comp. Proclus
τὸ πεπονηκὸς αὐτῶν θεραπεύσαντας) rather than a directly moral effect ; and the excitement it supplies is required by us at times (comp. Proclus
δεόμενα δέ τινος ἐν καιρῷ κινήσεως) to carry off (comp.
παθῶν ἀπεράσεις in both Iamblichus and Proclus) or purge away (comp. Iamblichus
πάθη ἀποκαθαίρομεν) certain emotions, and relieve the soul of the disquietude they would cause (comp. Proclus
ἀνενοχλήτους ἡμᾶς ἀπ᾿ αὐτῶν ... ποιεῖν), if defrauded of the satisfaction naturally due to them (comp. Proclus
πρὸς ἀφοσίωσιν τῶν παθῶν). The whole theory in fact is simply a fuller and more complete version of that we still have in brief in the Politics, with
ἀποκάθαρσις or
ἀπέρασις in place of the primitive Aristotelian term,
κάθαρσις.
II. Notwithstanding the arguments of Weil and Bernays, the old interpretation of
παθημάτων κάθαρσις, which makes it mean the 'purification' of certain passions, is far from being extinct even in our own day.
Κάθαρσις is supposed to be a metaphor from the religious rite of purification, whereby the hand or soul was cleansed from some pollution or stain of sin. Understood in this sense, therefore, the term would naturally imply that certain passions require 'purification' from something, i.e. from something more or less of the nature of an impurity. What this element of impurity is, and in what sense the emotions in question are supposed to become 'pure', are points on which there is no slight divergence of opinion among the upholders of this interpretation of
κάθαρσις.
The principal explanations which have been propounded may be roughly distinguished and classified as follows: (1) Tragedy is said to purify pity and fear, because the frequent excitement of these emotions in the theatre has a tendency to weaken their force, and thus moderate and reduce them to just measure (Heinsius, Milton, Lessing, etc.). (2) The lessons and examples in Tragedy have a purifying and moderating effect on pity, fear, and other evil passions (Victorius, etc.). (3) The tragic pity and fear are regarded as pure, because they are aroused not by real suffering, but only by the imaginary woes of the theatre; so that there is no admixture of pain in them (Batteux, etc.). (4) They are regarded as pure, because, as aroused by Tragedy, they are disinterested emotions, with no self-regarding element in them (Brandis, Susemihl). (5) They are pure, because the sublimity of Tragedy exalts pity and fear into high and noble forms of feeling (Hermann).
The first of these, the only view that calls for serious consideration, has an especial interest for us owing to the fact that in the eighteenth century it found a very distinguished exponent in Lessing. It must be admitted, however, that Lessing himself did little more than expand the old idea of 'moderating' the passions, and translate it back into the language of the Nicomachean Ethics. 'The tragic purification of the passions,' he says, 'consists merely in the conversion of pity and fear into virtuous habits of mind'.
'Da nämlich, es kurz zu sagen, diese Reinigung in nichts anderm beruht, als in der Verwandlung der Leidenschaften in tugendhafte Fertigkeiten, bei jeder Tugend aber, nach unserm Philosophen, sich dies diesseits und jenseits ein Extrem findet, zwischen welchem sie inne steht: so muss die Tragödie, wenn sie unser Mitleid in Tugend verwandeln soll, uns von beiden Extremen des Mitleids zu reinigen vermögend sein; welches auch von der Furcht zu verstehen' (
Hamb. Dram. St. 78
). As Heinsius had said something very like this long before him, Lessing's originality here is not so marked as his power of statement.
The whole theory, as stated even by Lessing, is open to many and very grave objections. (1) It confuses two distinct things, the purification of a feeling and the purification of the soul from a feeling. (2) It confuses the ideas of 'pure' and 'moderate', though there is no direct logical or other relation between them; excess or defect in certain matters may be a fault, but they cannot be termed 'impurities'. (3) It rests on a false hypothesis as to the position of Tragedy in the social life of ancient Greece; the performance of Tragedy was too occasional to have a marked and abiding effect on the moral character of the hearers. (4) Even if the tragic excitement of emotion be supposed to have been sufficiently frequent to produce a habit, it does not follow that the resulting habit would be one of moderation in the matter of feeling; we have no right to suppose that the habitual indulgence of strong emotion (e.g. pity and fear) will weaken its force or reduce it to just measure. Habits according to Aristotle arise from corresponding activities,
Eth. N. 2. 1 p. 1103 b 21
ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται. We should expect, therefore, that the strong emotion aroused by Tragedy would, if habitualized by repetition, end in a habit of strong emotion, not in a habit of subdued or moderate emotion, not in that mean state of feeling which Aristotle identifies with virtue.
The primary error, however, in this and similar interpretations of
παθημάτων κάθαρσις is that it reads a directly moral meaning into the term, as though the theatre were a school, and the tragic poet a teacher, of morality. That, however, is not Aristotle's theory; the great function of the tragic poet, he thinks, is to excite certain emotions, and procure us the pleasure that must accompany such excitement (
Poet. 14, 1453 b 11
). This pleasurable excitement of emotion, in fact, is with him the end and aim of Tragedy, so far as the poet himself is concerned. The statesman, however, viewing human nature and society as a whole, is able to look beyond all this, and see the ultimate justification of the existence of Tragedy. In the
Politics, accordingly, Aristotle recognizes the usefulness of Tragedy, explaining that it supplies a natural want, as a sort of catharsis of emotion, which as emotional creatures men require from time to time to keep their souls in health and quietude. This is a reasonable apology for Tragedy, and a sufficient answer to Plato's criticism. One may perhaps also say of it, that it is more consonant with fact and experience than the moral or disciplinary purpose which many still profess to regard as the true raison d'étre of the theatre.
1449b29
1.
mvp-aristotle-comment-141
2.
mvp-aristotle-comment-142
3.
mvp-aristotle-comment-143
4.
mvp-aristotle-comment-144
5.
mvp-aristotle-comment-145
6.2
5.
Et qui ſans le ſecours de la narration, par le moyen de la compaſſion & de la terreur, acheve de purger en nous ces fortes de paſſions, & toutes les autres ſemblables.]
5
6.
mvp-aristotle-comment-146
7.
mvp-aristotle-comment-147
8.
mvp-aristotle-comment-148
44.
mvp-aristotle-comment-44
NOTE 44. P. 75.
6.2
IN THE WAY, NOT OF NARRATION, BUT OF ACTION.
It is surprising, that so strange a phrase as
ειδων --- δρωντων—
formis---agentibus—should have passed as genuine with any Greek scholar. It is still more so, that the obvious opposition of
δρωντων to
ἀπαγγελια, and the no less obvious absurdity of opposing narration to pity and terror, (
δι' ἀπαγγελιας, ΑΛΛΑ δ᾽ ἐλεου και φοβου) should have escaped the notice of any commentator.—I should write the passage thus; still considering it as imperfect:—
χωρις ἐκαστου των ειδων ἐν τοις μοριοις * * * [forte ΔΙΑ] δρωντων και ου δι' ἀπαγγελιας
1
* * * * ἀλλα δι' ἐλεου και φοβου, κ. τ. αλ.
Thus the word
δρωντων will retain its proper sense, and the active imitation of the drama, which Aristotle every where makes its characteristic distinction, as opposed to the Epic, will be, as we might expect to find it, in a formal and exact definition of Tragedy, distinctly marked.
I will just observe, farther, that this mode of expression—
δρωντων ΚΑΙ ΟΥ δι' ἀπ. is familiar to Aristotle. Here however it may be justified by the necessity of marking clearly the distinction between Dramatic and Epic Poetry. In other instances, as,
ἑτερως και μη τον αυτον τροπον.
cap. i.
ὡς τον αυτον και μη μεταβαλλοντα.
cap. iii.
ειδως και μη ἀγνοων.
Eth. Nic. v. 8.
it seems hardly to admit of the same excuse. In the Poets we are less surprised to find it frequent.
Victorius has pointed out
Homer, Il. Z. 333.
ἐπει με κατ᾿ ἀισαν ἐνεικεσας, ἐδ᾽ ὑπερ αισαν. —and
Sophocles:
Oed. Tyr. 58.
γνωτα, κ'ουκ ἀγνωτα μοι Προσηλθεθ' ίμειροντες.
If any man, in reading the ancients, can persuade himself to take such things for beauties, there is certainly no harm in it. The fact I take to be, that composition, even that of Poetry, was not yet so far improved and refined, as perfectly to exclude the inaccuracies and redundancies of popular and familiar speech.
45.
mvp-aristotle-comment-45
NOTE 45. P. 75.
6.2
EFFECTING, THROUGH PITY AND TERROR, THE CORRECTION AND REFINEMENT OF SUCH PASSIONS.
Δι' ἐλεου και φοβου περαινουσα την των τοιουτων παθηματων καθαρσιν.
A history of the controversies which this obscure passage has excited among critics and commentators, and an exact statement and examination of the various explanations which have been given of it, would almost fill a volume. Among these, however, the opinions, that are worth regarding, or that can, with any show of probability, be deduced from Aristotle's expression, are, I think, reducible to two.
One is, that this purgation, or moderation, of the passions, is merely the effect of having them frequently excited, and of being familiarized with the occasions of them, in Tragic fiction; just as the passions of pity and terror are actually purged, or reduced to moderation, in a surgeon, a physician, or a soldier, by their being accustomed to those terrible or piteous objects that occasion them.
The other interpretation attributes the effect to the moral lesson and example of the drama: Tragedy purges the passions by the striking pictures it sets before us of the dreadful calamities occasioned by the unrestrained indulgence of them; by giving useful warnings, and preparing us to bear the ills of life with patience.
One, or the other, or both, of these meanings, have, I think, been attributed to Aristotle by the best commentators and critics. For the first, the reader may see
Mr. Harris's Disc. on Music, Painting, &c. ch. v. note
.—
Heinf. De Trag. Const. cap. ii. p. 22, 23
. and
Castelvetro, p. 117, 118
. For the second,
Madius;—
D'Alembert in his letter to Rousseau, Melanges, tom. ii. p. 414
.—
Dryden, Obs. on the Æneid
—
Abbè Du Bos, Refl. sur la Poesie, tom. i. sect. 44, &c
. For an explanation compounded of the two,
Robortelli,
Piccolomini, and
Dacier, who, by the way, after declaring that all the explanations of former commentators
"servaient only to obscure the passage," and that the true sense was not to be found in any of them, proceeds to give us, as that true sense, and as his own discovery, exactly what had been said before him.
Let us first see what Aristotle says. He says, that Tragedy, by the means of pity and terror, effects the purgation (
καθαρσιν) of such passions: i. e. of pity and terror and other passions of the same kind: for pity and terror seem clearly meant, by the expression, to be included in the effect.
2
And this, in my opinion, is sufficient to overturn the second of the explanations just mentioned; for, according to that, terror and pity are not both the means and the object of the purgation, as Aristotle, I think, asserts them to be, but they are the means only of purging other passions—those passions, whatever they may be, which are supposed to produce the calamitous events exhibited to our view. Indeed, according to this idea, the object is rather the vice that arises from passion, than the passion itself which is the cause of it. But, besides this objection, I do not see any reason to think, that the moral lesson of the drama, and the effects it might have in moderating our passions through the reflections it excites in us, were at all in Aristotle's thoughts
3
.
The first of the two explanations seems far more admissible. I believe it made a part of his idea, but I doubt whether it was the whole of it. What was precisely his meaning, and the whole of his meaning, will never, I fear, be the subject of a perfect, Stoical
καταληψις to any man. There is, however, one passage in Aristotle's works, which throws some little light upon this; enough, at least, to keep us from false interpretations, if not to lead us to the true. It is in the
seventh chapter of his eighth book De Republica
. The Abbé Batteux is the only commentator I know of, who has paid a proper attention to this passage; but as I do not perfectly agree with him, either as to the translation he has given, or the use he makes of it, I shall produce so much of the original as appears to be of any importance to our present purpose, and subjoin a translation, with some necessary remarks.
The object of Aristotle, in the chapter referred to, is, to examine what kinds of Music (i. e. of melody and rhythm,) are proper to be used in the education of youth. He mentions and approves a division, made by some philosophical writers of that time, of the different kinds of melodies, into Moral, Active, and Enthusiastic:
τα μεν ΗΘΙΚΑ, τα δε ΠΡΑΚΤΙΚΑ, τα δ' ΕΝΘΟΥΣΙΑΣΤΙΚΑ. By the first of these we are to understand a manly, grave, and simple melody. The sense of
πρακτικα is less clear; but I suppose it means a more complicated and imitative sort of melody, adapted to express human actions; for, in the
49th of the Harmonic Problems [Sect. 19.]
it is said of the Hypo-Phrygian mode, that it had
ἠθος πρακτικον, and was, on that account, used only in the dialogue and action of the drama, never in the choral part.
4
And the same epithet,
πρακτικον, is applied, in this treatise, to the Iambic measure.
5
As to enthusiastic, it wants no explanation. Aristotle then proceeds to observe, that "Music was to be used, not for one useful purpose only, but for several," which he enumerates; and one of them is—
ΚΑΘΑΡΣΕΩΣ ἐνεκα: with respect to which he says—
τι δε λεγομεν την καθαρσιν, νυν μεν, άπλως παλιν δε, ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗΣ, ἐρουμεν σαφεστερον: "What I mean by
Καθαρσις, or purgation, I shall now explain only in a short and general way; but hereafter, in the books concerning Poetry, more explicitly and clearly."—And this, I suppose, he had done, in that part of this treatise which is lost.—He then proceeds thus:
Φανερον, ότι χρηστεον μεν πασαις ταις ἁρμονιαις, ου τον αυτον δε τροπον πασαις χρηστεον· άλλα προς μεν την παιδειαν, ταις ἠθικωταταις· προς δε ἀκροασιν [f. ΚΑΘΑΡΣΙΝ], ἐτερων χειρουργουντων, και ταις πρακτικαις, και ταις ἐνθουσιαστικαις. ὁ γαρ περι ἐνιας συμβαινει παθος ψυχας ἰσχυρως, τουτο ἐν πασαις ὑπαρχει, τῳ δε ήττον διαφερει και τῳ μαλλον. οἷον, ΕΛΕΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΦΟΒΟΣ. ἐτι δ᾽ ἐνθουσιασμος· και γαρ ὑπο ταυτης της κινησεως κατακωχιμοι τινες εισιν. ἐκ δε των ἱερων μελων ὁρωμεν τουτους, όταν χρησωνται τοις ἐξοργιαζουσι την ψυχην μελεσι, καθισταμενους, ώσπερ ΙΑΤΡΕΙΑΣ τυχοντας και ΚΑΘΑΡΣΕΩΣ. ταυτο δη τουτο ἀναγκαιον πασχειν και τας ἐλεημονας, και τους φοβητικους, και τους όλως παθητικους· τους δ᾽ ἄλλους, καθ᾽ όσον ἐπιβαλλει των τοιουτων ἐκαστῳ, και πασι γιγνεσθαι ΤΙΝΑ ΚΑΘΑΡΣΙΝ, και κουφιζεσθαι μεθ' ήδονης. [
p. 458. Ed. Duval.
]
6
In this passage, for
ἀκροασιν I have no doubt that we should read
καθαρσιν. The similitude of the words is sufficient to account for the mistake of the transcriber; and the purport of the whole passage seems to require the correction. For Aristotle is here showing, in what manner the three different kinds of melody were to be applied to the different purposes, which he had just enumerated:
προς ΜΕΝ την ΠΑΙΔΕΙΑΝ, ταις ήθικ.
προς ΔΕ την ΚΑΘΑΡΣΙΝ,—ταις πρακτικαις, &c. The opposition is clear. And so, afterwards, a third purpose is mentioned—
προς ΑΝΑΠΑΥΣΙΝ. [p. 459.] The words immediately following,
ἐτερων χειρουργουντων, probably contributed to this mistake. They allude to his doctrine, in the preceding chapter, that boys should not be allowed to practice or perform, themselves, any but the simplest kind of Music, and upon the sim- plest and easiest instruments, such as were not
δεομενα χειρουργικης ἐπιστημης. [p. 457.] But this was not the character either of the active and enthusiastic melodies, of which he here speaks, or of the instrument used in the accompaniment of them
7
.
I shall now give what I think a fair and literal version of the passage.—
"It is manifest then, that all the different kinds of melodies are to be made use of; not all, however, for the same purpose. For education, the most moral kind should be used: for PURGATION, both the active, and the enthusiastic; performed, however, by others. For those passions, which in some minds are violent, exist, more or less, in all; such as PITY, for example, and TERROR: and, again, enthusiasm; for with this passion some men are subject to be possessed: but when the sacred melodies, intended to compose the mind after the celebration of the orgic rites, have been performed, we see those men become calm and sedate, as if they had undergone a kind of purgation, or cure. And the case must necessarily be the same with those who are particularly liable to be moved by PITY, or TERROR, or any other passion; and with other men, as far as they are under the influence of any such passion; all of them experiencing a sort of PURGATION, and PLEASURABLE RELIEF."
From this passage, though far enough, I am sensible, from being perfectly clear and explicit, two things, at least, may, I think, be confidently deduced. 1. That whatever be the meaning of the term
καθαρσις, or purgation, here, must also be its meaning in the treatise on Poetry; since to that work Aristotle refers for a fuller explanation of it. The only difference is, that here, the term is applied to the effect of imitative Music; there, to that of imitative Poetry; of that species of it, however, which depended, we know, upon Music, for a very considerable part of its effect. 2. It is plain, that, according to Aristotle's idea, pity was to be purged by pity, terror by terror, &c.; contrary to the second of the two explanations above mentioned. For Aristotle is here expressly speaking of the use of enthusiastic Music applied
προς καθαρσιν; and he says, that men, agitated by enthusiasm, were purged or relieved from that enthusiasm by the
ἱερα μελη, which were plainly enthusiastic melodies; i. e. such as imitated, or expressed, that passion, and were intended to calm the mind, which had been violently agitated and inflamed; not, as M. Batteux understands, by the sudden opposition of Doric, grave, and moral strains, [p. 280, 1.] but by pleasurable indulgence of the same passion in imitative Music:
κουφιζεσθαι μεθ᾽ ἡδονης. These melodies were, probably, such as those of
Olympus, which had been mentioned just before [cap. 5.] and of which Aristotle says, that they,
Ὁμολογουμενως ΠΟΙΕΙ ΤΑΣ ΨΥΧΑΣ ΕΝΘΟΥΣΙΑΣΤΙΚΑΣ. Indeed, from the manner, in which the Music of Olympus is spoken of by
Plato, and
Plutarch, there is great reason to suppose, that these "sacred melodies" were no other, than the very melodies of that musician
8
.
With respect to this
καθαρσις itself, Aristotle by no means gives us in this passage, nor, indeed, professes to give us, a full and satisfactory explanation of it. Some light, however, he has flung upon it by the expressions,
ἰατρεια, and
κουφιζεσθαι μεθ᾽ ἡδονης, which he uses as synonymous to
καθαρσις: "Purgation, cure, pleasurable relief." The Abbé Batteux understands Aristotle to mean no more by this, than that the passions of terror or pity, which, when excited by real objects, are simply painful, or, at least, have a predominant mixture of pain, are, by imitation, and the consciousness of fiction, purged or purified from this alloy of the disagreeable and painful, and converted, on the whole, into an emotion of delight. His meaning may be clearer in his own words. Aristotle, he says, had established it as a principle—
"Que les objets désagréables plaisent quand ils sont imités, même lorsqu'ils le font dans la plus grande verité. En appliquant ce principe à la Tragedie, il s'ensuit, que c'est l'imitation qui est la cause du plaisir qu'elle produit, et non la nature des objets imités, puisque ces objets sont par eux-mêmes désagréables. C'est donc l'imitation qui ôte à la terreur et à la pitié l'accessoire désagréable qu'elles ont dans la realité: c'est l'imitation qui opere la purgation Tragique, en mettant les malheurs imités à la place des malheurs réels, et en séparant par ce moyen ce que la pitié et la terreur ont d'agréable, comme emotions, d'avec ce qu'elles ont de désagréable, quand elles font jointes à l'idée de malheurs réels."
9
This account, which is exactly
Fontenelle's solution of the pleasure arising from Tragic emotion
10
, is liable to a difficulty not easily, I think, surmounted. It confines Aristotle's meaning to the present pleasure of the emotion; it supposes all the purgation to consist merely in rendering the feeling of the passion pleasurable; not in any good effect which the habit of such emotion may produce, in correcting, refining, or moderating, such passions, when excited by real objects. Now, though it must be confessed, that Aristotle has not, in that short and professedly imperfect explanation given of the
καθαρσις in the passage adduced, said any thing directly pointing to such effect, yet, I think, the whole turn and cast of his expression is such, as leads one naturally to conclude, that it was his meaning. The phrase,
κουφιζεσθαι μεθ' ήδονης, does indeed appear to express the present effect only; but I can scarce conceive, that he would have used such a word as
καθαρσις, and still less,
ΙΑΤΡΕΙΑ, without a view to something beyond the pleasurable relief or vent of the moment; especially, in a chapter, where he is professedly enumerating and examining the uses of music
11
. Farther, the words,
ἐλεημονας, φοβητικους, παθητικους, confirm this idea; being all words expressive of habitual excess, requiring correction and moderation
12
.
But, what still more strongly opposes the Abbé Batteux's idea, is, that Aristotle is here, as Heinsius and others have well observed, evidently combating the doctrine of
Plato, whose great objection to Tragedy, was, that it feeds and inflames the passions
13
. It could be no answer to this, to allege, that the feeling of passion excited by Tragic imitation is pleasurable; for this is so far from being called in question by Plato, that it is the very foundation of his objection. The pleasure afforded by such Poetry is allowed by him in its utmost extent
14
. "Let its advocates," he says, "undertake to show us that it is not merely pleasurable, but USEFUL also, and we will lend a favourable ear to their apology; for we shall surely be gainers by the conviction."
15
Now Aristotle, if I understand him rightly, undertakes this apology, and points out the utility required. And no one, I think, can reasonably doubt, that such was his intention, who has attended to the following passage of Plato:—
ἀπολαυειν ἀναγκη ἀπο των ἀλλοτριων εις τα οικεια· ΘΡΕΨΑΝΤΑ γαρ ἐν ἐκεινοις ΙΣΧΥΡΟΝ ΤΟ ΕΛΕΕΙΝΟΝ, ου ραδιον ἐν τοις ΑΥΤΟΥ ΠΑΘΕΣΙ ΚΑΤΕΧΕΙΝ
16
. For, to this objection, there cannot well be a more direct and pointed answer, than Aristotle's assertion, as usually understood—that the habit of indulging the emotions of pity, or terror, in the fictitious representations of Tragedy, tends, on the contrary, to moderate and refine those passions, when they occur in real life.
But though the Abbé Batteux's idea of this purgation appears to me by no means to be the whole, it must, I think, be admitted as a part, and an essential part, of Aristotle's meaning. For the effect depends, not merely, as some commentators seem to suppose
17
, on the having our passions frequently and habitually excited, but, on the having them so excited by fictitious representation. Pity and terror frequently excited by such objects and such events in real life, as the imitations of the Tragic scene set before us, would rather tend to produce apathy than moderation. Nature would struggle against such violent and painful agitation, and the heart would become callous in its own defence. We must be insensible, that we might not be wretched. It is far otherwise with fictitious passion. There, the emotion, though often violent in spite of the consciousness of fiction, is always, more or less, delightful. We indulge it, as one of the first of pleasures; and the effect of that indulgence, frequently repeated, is perhaps, that, while it moderates real passion by the frequency of similar impressions, it, at the same time, cherishes such sympathetic emotions, in their proper and useful degree, by the delicious feelings which never fail to accompany the indulgence of them in imitative representation.
The passions of savages, or of men in the first rude stages of civilization, are ferocious and painful. They pity, or they fear, either violently, or not at all. With them, there is hardly any medium between ungovernable agitation, and absolute insensibility.—Suppose such a people to have access, like the Athenians, to theatrical representations, and to have their passions kept in frequent and pleasurable exercise by fictitious distress; the consequence, I think, would be, that, by degrees, they would come to have more feeling, and less perturbation. Instead of sympathetic emotions rarely excited, painfully felt, and soon extinguished, they would gradually acquire a calm, lasting, and useful habit of general tenderness and sensibility. In polished society, where the passions are accustomed to be indulged in fiction, either in the theatre, or by reading, and the pain is converted, on the whole, into one strong and delightful feeling, by the charms of imitation, Poetry, Music, aided by the indistinct consciousness of fiction—these passions, even when excited by real objects, seem to retain, (at least, in cases where we are not too closely touched,) some tincture of the same pleasurable emotion, which attended them, when raised by works of imagination; they are more moderately and agreeably felt, more easily governed, and more gentle and polished in their expressions.
Such appears to me, on the whole, to be the most probable explanation of Aristotle's meaning: I must, at least, confess it to be the only reasonable meaning, that I am able to discover. How far it is true, and founded on solid observation, is another question, which I willingly submit to the philosophical and thinking part of my readers.
I cannot omit to observe, that the short explanation given by
MILTON, in the introduction to his
Samson Agonistes
, appears to coincide exactly, as far as it goes, with my idea of the passage.—"Tragedy, as it was anciently composed, hath been ever held the gravest, moraleft, and most profitable of all other Poems: therefore said by Aristotle to be of power, by raising pity, and fear or terror, to purge the mind of those and such like passions; that is, to temper and reduce them to just measure, with a kind of delight, stirred up by reading or seeing those passions well imitated." One thing should be added. Aristotle's assertion must be considered relatively to his own times, and nation. He speaks of the effects of Tragedy on the people of Athens, who, as reading was then no popular occupation, had scarce any opportunity of indulging fictitious emotion, but at the Theatre, and who, we know, were there accustomed to indulge it perpetually. With us, the case is widely different. The doctrine, therefore, of Aristotle, that "Tragedy purges the passions," translated, if I may so speak, into modern truth, would perhaps amount only to this—that the habitual exercise of the passions by works of imagination in general, of the serious and pathetic kind, (such as Tragedies, Novels, &c.) has a tendency to soften and refine those passions, when excited by real objects in common life.
2.
mvp-aristotle-comment-37
Ritter, cap. 6 § 2
πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας:
σπουδαίαν intelligit actionem cui magnus quidam finis propositus est, ad quem consequendum omnes eorum qui agunt vires ita intenduntur, ut ipsi aut concidant. aut post varios casus voti compotes fiant.
τελεία est actio cui nihil deest, cuius est principium et medium et finis. conf. c. 7, 3. eandem aliis in locis modo
τελείαν καὶ ὅλην (c. 7,2) modo simpliciter
ὅλην (c. 8, 4) vocavit.
μέγεθος ἔχουσης: ut tragoediae vim et finem spectatores percipiant, actio tragica ambitum quendam rerumque complexionem habeat oportet, accuratius non multo post (c. 7, 2) dixit
τι μέγεθος: non enim quaevis magnitudo intelligitur, sed quae vulgo vocatur.
χωρὶς ἑκάστου τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις: ita ut non quaeque formarum in partibus (tragoediae) assit. haec breviter significavit c. 1 extr., ubi dithyrambos nomosque et tragoediam comoediamque consentire dixit quod numero (saltatione) uterentur et cantu et metro, differre quod dithyrambi nomique illis coniunctis (
ἅμα πᾶσιν), comoediatragoediaque eisdem separatis (
κατά μέρος) imitationem peragerent. quae si contulerimus iis quae de eadem re paulo post dicuntur, - §. 3.
τὸ δὲ χωρὶς τοῖς εἶδεσι τὸ διὰ μέτρων ἔνια μόνον περαίνεσθαι καὶ πάλιν ἕτερα διὰ μέλους-, a vera huius loci interpretatione non aberrabimus.
εἴδη sive imitandi formae (Darstellungsweisen) tres sunt in tragoedia, dictio numero adstricta (
τὰ μέτρα), cantus (
μέλος), saltatio (
ὄρχησις). hae formae non omnes in singulis partibus tragoediae coniunctae reperiuntur, sed ubi metrica est oratio, ibi non etiam cantica 1) et saltatio: nam nonnulla (§. 3) solis metris absolvuntur et rursus alia per cantum. alii aliter explicant, quos neque reprehendere neque laudare attinet: sed unum moneo, non licere immutata codicum scriptura in eiusmodi locis verae certaeque interpretationi fundamenta subtrahere.
μόρια quae h. 1. memorantur, non sunt eae tragoediae partes quae mox enumerantur, sed indefinite partes tragoediae deinceps positas intellexit.
δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι' ἀπαγγελίας: tragoedia agentes ipsos producit, epopoeia quamvis
δραματικῶς composita aut ipsa narrat aut nonnisi quasi agentes introducit, ut proprium eius negotium sit
ἀπαγγελία. conf. c. 5, 4. caute hic noster scripsit
δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι᾽ ἀπαγγελίας, non
δρώντων καὶ οὐκ ἀπαγγελλόντων, propterea quod etiam in tragoediis
ῥήσεις ἀγγελικαὶ inveniuntur, sed ipsae eiusmodi narrationes agentes nuntios (
δρῶντας) requirunt. tragoedia igitur dum
ἀπαγγελίαν (epicam narrationem) excludit,
ἀπαγγέλ λοντας tamen admittit. post
ἀπαγγελίας particulam
ἀλλὰ ! Aldo auctore plerique editores, praecipue antiquiores, infarserunt, sed vocula inepta a nullo codice agnosci videtur: abest saltem ab AcBcNa (id ex Bekkeri silentio aliisque indiciis certe consequitur), a Mediceis omnibus et a G.Q. mire 1) Dixerit aliquis "nonne canticis choricis subiecta est metrica oratio?" est sane; sed Aristoteles
τὰ μέτρα appellat quae cantu destituta sunt,
μέλος et
μελοποιίαν lyricam tragoediae partem.illa torsit cum alios tum Lessingium. vid. Dramaturg. Hamb. c. 74.
δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τομ ούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν : quid tragoedia efficiat vel efficere debeat, nondum significatum est; hoc igitur novum in definitione accedit neque ex antegressis colligitur. de sententia his verbis subiecta copiose disputavit Lessingius in libro laudato t. II. c. 74-78. conf. Raumerus de Aristotelis Poetica in Commentationibus academiae regiae Berolinensis a. 1828 (Berolini 1831) p. 125 sqq. illud recte Lessingius probe tenendum praecepit c. 75., tam
έλεον quam
φόβον communis notionis vinculo contineri, quatenus quod in aliis hominibus miseratione nos afficit, idem ne nobis accidat timemus. miseratio enim metusque in nobis oriuntur, ubi calamitatem aliis ex propinquo incumbentem vel impendentem videmus, et miseratio quidem excitatur, si miseram condicionem eorum qui eam non commeruerunt spectamus, metus, si eandem calamitatem nobis accidere posse credimus, hoc est illud quod
τὰ φοβερὰ καὶ τὰ ἐλεεινὰ δι' ἄλληλα esse c. 9, 11. pronuntiatur. utramque animi perturbationem Aristoteles accurate definivit in Rhetoricis II, 5 init. et 8 init. illic de metu haec afferuntur:
ἔστω δὴ φόβος λύπη τις ἢ ταραχή ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ·
οὐ γὰρ πάντα τὰ κακὰ φοβοῦνται,
οἷον εἰ ἔσται ἄδικος ἢ βραδύς,
ἀλλ' ὅσα λύπας μεγάλας ἢ φθοράς δύναται,
καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἐὰν μὴ πόρρω ἀλλὰ σύνεγγυς φαίνηται ὥστε μέλλειν. altero loco miseratio sic definitur:
ἔστω δὴ ἔλεος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινομένῳ κακῷ φθαρτικῷ καὶ λυπηρῷ τοῦ ἀναξίου τυγχάνειν,
ὃ κἂν αὐτὸς προσδοκήσειεν ἂν παθεῖν ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ τινά,
καὶ τοῦτο,
ὅταν πλησίον φαίνηται. iam tragoediae eum finem propositum esse audimus, ut ea per miserationem et metum tales animi perturbationes purget. sed quae sunt illae tales perturbationes (
τοιαῦτα παθήματα)? num ipsa miseratio metusque? et nego et aio. nego, quia non
τοιούτων scriptum oportuit sed
τούτων, si miseratio et metus simpliciter denotarentur, nego quia non quamcumque miserationém neque quemcumque metum
πάθημα esse scio: sed idem aio per
τοιούτων παθημάτων affectiones miserationis et metus significari, quia scriptum lego
διὰ ἐλέου καὶ φύ βου περαίνουσα τὴν κάθαρσιν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων, sed eas intelligo affectiones quae sua vi hominis mentem turbant et animum commotum quam maxime reddunt, eas quarum purgationem in rebus utilissimis referri decet. itaque philosophus ne potuit quidem
τούτων scribere sed
τοιούτων debuit, cum nollet hoc pronuntiari, per tragoediam purgari quamcumque miserationem metumque, sed illam miserationem metumque, quorum vi animus et mens perturbarentur, h. e. miserationis metusque affectiones ita vehementes, ut in numero
παθημάτων reponendae sint 2). deinceps dicendum est quomodo tragoedia eas perturbationes purget. id ut efficere possit, necesse videtur esse, ut miserationem et metum excitet: nam per haec illa miserationis et metus
παθήματα purgari dicuntur. excitantur ergo in spectatoribus miseratio et timor, dum tragoedia insignem calamitatem magnosque labo- 'res aut uni dramatis personae aut pluribus etiam incumbentem vel impendentem ostendit oculisque sive spectantium sive legentium quasi explicatam subiicit. nam dum ipsi agunt illi quibus mala accidunt, haec ex propinquo et imminent et 2) Lessingius in Dramaturgia Hamburg. c. 77. dicit Aristotelem
τοιούτων eo consilio scripsisse, ut metum misericordiamque et omnes similes affectiones, v. c.
τὸ φιλάνθρωπον, purgari per tragoediam significaret. sed illud
φιλάνθρωπον (conf c. 13,2) neque
πάθημα est neque purgatione eget. verba viri peracuti haec respicio: "Er sagt aber
τοιούτων und nicht
τούτων; er sagt dieser und dergleichen, und nicht bloss dieser: um anzuzeigen, dass er unter dem Mitleid nicht bloss das eigentlich sogenannte Mitleid, sondern überhaupt alle philanthropische Empfindungen, so wie unter der Furcht nicht bloss die Unlust über ein uns bevorstehendes Uebel, sondern auch jede damit verwandte Unlust verstehe.”
πάθημα est perturbatio, Leidenschaft,
πάθος quamcumque animi affectionem denotat.incumbunt. etiam illud a poeta tragico, si quid deceat haud ignorat, prospicitur, ut calamitas non tam flagitio vel scelere adducatur quam errore quodam vel leviore peccato paretur. vid. c. 13. §. 2 et 3. etenim ad miserationem requiritur ut calamitatem quam quis perpetitur non omnino commeruerit is cuius miseremur. itaque actio tragica omnia continet quibus opus est ad miserationem in nobis excitandam. porro si homines in tragoediis qui producuntur propter peccata non admodum gravia et propter humanae infirmitatis errores acerbis adversae fortunae plagis affligi videmus, dumque recordamur et nos homines esse humanique generis vitiis et erroribus obnoxios, tum ne nobis idem quod oculis expositum est vel simile quoddam infortunium accidat, timere incipimus. itaque tragicam actionem spectantes et ob nostri et totius humani generis sortem metu quodam tangimur. adhuc diximus quomodo per tragoediam miseratio et metus excitetur: explicandum restat, qua ratione eiusmodi perturbationes purgentur. primum quaeritur quid sit
κάθαρσις παθημάτων, non esse eandem ac
καθαίρεσιν vel
ἀναίρεσιν per se patet: immo
κάθαρσις est ea affectuum animi conformatio, ut omne nimium et omne quod perturbat animum mentemque humanam inde removeatur. hanc esse veram nominis significationem et huius loci ratio et alius in Aristotelis Politicis (VIII, 7. p. 1342 a 11 et 14) ostendit. itaque non id agit tragoedia, ut miseratio et metus ex animis nostris tollantur, sed ut nimia perturbantis cuiusdam miserationis metusque vis et impetus frangatur 3). id quomodo a tragoedia perficiatur videamus. si talis est miseratio nostra metusque, ut propter calamitatem immerito alicui accidentem nonnisi gravem et acerbum dolorem sentiamus simulque humiliter et vehementer metuamus ne nobis 3) Bene Raumerus 1. 1. pag. 134.: "Die Reinigung ist keineswegs, wie einige gedeutet haben, eine Vernichtung der Leidenschaften, sondern ..eine Hinführung auf das Mittlere, mit Ausschliessung des zu viel und zu wenig.idem accidat, eiusmodi affectus animi nos deprimit et diffundit (
ποιεῖ κατακωχίμους. v. Aristoteles loco ex Politicis indicato); contrahit idem animi magnitudinem (
τὸ σεμνὸν συστέλλει) atque omnino intelligendi facultatem minuit et ratiocinandi considerandique negotium impedit; quid multa? ita integra et animi et mentis sanitas corrumpitur. iam si tragoedia hanc vim haberet, ut eiusmodi perturbationes excitaret et libere soluteque grassari sineret, ea sane legibus quam severissimis interdicenda et ex omnibus civitatibus bene constitutis expellenda esset. sed inde demum divina tragoediae vis se ostendit, quod miserationis et metus nimias affectiones purgat. purgat vero duobus modis. 1. qui insigni calamitate conflictatur in tragoedia, is contra necessitatem 4) summa virium contentione nititur et post varios casus aut concidit nobili leto aut superior discedit laeto eventu. ea consideratio, quantae sint hominum vires, spectatorem evehit eique virium humano generi concessarum scientiam largitur. ita et miseratio et metus iustis finibus continentur, ut omne nimium vel perturbatorium eis ademptum videatur. pro vehementibus animi motibus quieta cogitatio, pro perturbationibus sana rerum humanarum consideratio invalescit. 2. tragoedia miserationem metumque purgat, dum illum qui gravia perpetitur saltem ex aliqua parte ipsum suae calamitatis auctorem fuisse ostendit. vera enim tragoedia quamvis obscure monstrare non negligit, quomodo miseriis sese qui premitur subtrahere potuisset, si is ab initio iustoque etiam tempore omnes animi nervos intendisset totamque mentis considerationem adhibuisset. eiusmodi autem consideratione miseratio metusque rursus purgantur, et conscientia intellectusque praestantiae humanae excitatur. duobus hisce modis rudes illae et deprimentes sive contrahentes affectiones animi cohibentur et ad sanae mentis considerationem relatae castigantur, ut inde 4) Necessitatem dico eam rerum humanarum implicationem quae ipsis hominum erroribus vitiisque paratur.amoveatur quidquid nocere possit. quod ut fieri possit facilius, Graeca tragoedia chori sive recta suadentis et praecipientis sive prava et vitiosa severe diiudicantis interventu curavit. sed iam uberrimae disputationis, quae sane de xa-
θάρσει a choro Graecorum tragicorum effecta institui posset, occasionem praecido,. ne ab ipsa interpretatione verborum Aristoteliorum deficiam: ipsos Graecos quid sit chori officium docuit summus tragicorum poetarum in disputatione de choro a se edita, vid. Suid. s. v.
Σοφοκλῆς.