1.
mvp-aristotle-comment-195
1.
mvp-aristotle-comment-196
1449b21
περὶ . . . τῆς ἐν ἑξαμέτροις μιμητικῆς
: in
chaps. 23–24
.
1.
mvp-aristotle-comment-197
περὶ κωμῳδίας
: in the lost Second Book of the Poetics.
1.
mvp-aristotle-comment-198
1449b23
ἀναλαβόντες
:
Top. 6. 14, 151 b 19
καλῶς εἰρημένον ὅρον ἀναλαβεῖν
. —
Meteor. 1. 3, 339 a 33
ἀναλαβόντες οὖν τὰς ἐξ ἀρχῆς θέσεις . . λέγωμεν
. —
1. 8, 345 b 31
ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγωμεν ἀναλαβόντες τὴν ὑποκειμένην ἀρχὴν ἡμῖν
. —
Rhet. 1. 13, 1373 b 27
ἀναλαβόντες τί ἐστι τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι λέγωμεν
.
1.
mvp-aristotle-comment-199
ὅρον τῆς οὐσίας
: the definition of its essence, or essential nature; comp.
Metaph. Z 13, 1039 a 19
δοκεῖ γε πᾶσι καὶ ἐλέχθη πάλαι ἢ μόνον εἶναι οὐσίας ὅρον ἢ μάλιστα
. —
De part. an. 1. 1, 642 a 26
ὁρίσασθαι τὴν οὐσίαν
. —
4. 5, 678 a 34
τῷ λόγῳ... τῷ ὁρίζοντι τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῶν
.
2.
mvp-aristotle-comment-200
ἔστιν οὖν τραγῳδία κτέ.
The definition, which is in logical form,
per genus et differentias, professes to be a summary of points already established; and in its principal elements it is that. (1) That Tragedy is a
μίμησις was said in
1, 1447 a 13
; and that it is a
μίμησις πράξεως is implied in
1, 1447 a 28
. (2)
σπουδαίας, which differentiates Tragedy from Comedy, recalls chap. 2 and
4, 1448 b 34
—
καὶ τελείας μέγεθος ἐχούσης being added in recognition apparently of the point indicated in
4, 1449 a 19
. (3) The means in Tragedy were noted in
1, 1447 b 24–28
; and (4) the dramatic manner of its imitation in
3, 1448 a 23–28
.
But for the concluding clause, on the effect of Tragedy on the emotions, we have not been prepared by anything in the earlier chapters. Aristotle no doubt regarded one part of it,
δι᾽ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου, as self-evident, but the rest is presumably an anticipation of a point worked out at length in the lost Second Book of the Poetics. In just the same way we find him using the term
προαιρετική in the definition of virtue in
Eth. N. 2. 6, 1106 b 36
, and reserving the formal explanation of
προαίρεσις for
3. 4, 1111 b 4
. This concluding clause is an integral part of the definition, since the end of the thing to be defined cannot be ignored in any logically complete statement of its nature (
De anima 1. 1, 403 a 25
;
Metaph. H 2, 1043 a 14
).
2.
mvp-aristotle-comment-201
1449b25
τελείας μέγεθος ἐχούσης
The point is considered in chap. 7, where 'completeness' is said to imply a whole of some magnitude (
7, 1450 b 24
).
We have not yet been told that the action in Tragedy must be a
τελεία πρᾶξις, but from the explanatory
μέγεθος ἐχούσης Aristotle would seem to regard the point as the natural consequence of the
μέγεθος mentioned already in
4, 1449 a 19
as one of the characteristics of Tragedy proper. In that case the term distinguishes Tragedy proper with its complete and self-contained stories from the rudimentary Drama of an earlier period.
2.
mvp-aristotle-comment-202
ἡδυσμένῳ
:
Plato Rep. 607 A
εἰ δὲ τὴν ἡδυσμένην μοῦσαν παραδέξῃ ἐν μέλεσιν ἢ ἔπεσιν, ἡδονή σοι καὶ λύπη ἐν τῇ πόλει βασιλεύσετον
. The word is taken from cookery (comp.
De sensu 4, 442 a 10
). The nature of the metaphor may be seen, in the case of the substantive
ἥδυσμα, from Aristotle's criticism of the style of Alcidamas in
Rhet. 3. 3, 1406 a 19
οὐ γὰρ ἡδύσματι χρῆται ἀλλ᾿ ὡς ἐδέσματι τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις
('the sauce with him is the dish').
Said of language
ἡδυσμένος implies the accession of something (here metre and music) to make it agreeable, just as
κοσμηθῆναι in
4, 1449 a 29
meant the accession of something to make the work beautiful. An echo of this passage (comp.
6, 1450 b 11
) may perhaps be recognized in
Plutarch Erot. 769 C
λόγῳ ποίησις ἡδύσματα (τὰ) μέλη καὶ μέτρα καὶ ῥυθμοὺς ἐφαρμόσασα
, and also in
Strabo 818 Cas.
φλυαροῦσιν ὥσπερ μέλος ἢ ῥυθμὸν [ἢ] ἥδυσμά τι τῷ λόγῳ τὴν τερατείαν προσφέροντες
. The metaphor reappears in Shakespeare,
Hamlet 2. 2
I remember one said there were no sallets in the lines to make the matter savoury
.
2.
mvp-aristotle-comment-203
ἑκάστῳ τῶν εἰδῶν
scil.
τῶν ἡδυσμάτων, understood from
ἡδυσμένῳ. Similarly in
Isocrates 190 D
περὶ τούτων δηλῶσαι μὴ μόνον τοῖς τεταγμένοις ὀνόμασιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ξένοις τὰ δὲ καινοῖς τὰ δὲ μεταφοραῖς, καὶ μηδὲν παραλιπεῖν ἀλλὰ πᾶσι τοῖς εἶδεσι διαποικίλαι τὴν ποίησιν
one may supply
τῶν ὀνομάτων with
εἶδεσι. For another instance of this allusive use of
εἶδος see
25, 1461 b 22
. In what follows (b 29)
ἑκάστῳ τῶν εἰδῶν is replaced by
τοῖς εἶδεσι ; the reading of the MS.,
ἑκάστου, seems to have arisen through
χωρίς having been mistaken for a preposition.
The juxtaposition of
χωρίς and
ἑκάστῳ is just like that in
Pol. 7. 1, 1323 b 41
καὶ χωρὶς ἑκάστῳ καὶ κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεσιν
(comp.
χωρὶς ἕκαστον
in
De caelo 2. 12, 292 a 13
, b 27) . The implied antithesis in the present passage is between 'each separately' (
χωρίς), and 'all together, and at once' (
ἅμα: comp.
De gen. et corr. 1. 5, 322 a 13
, and
Metaph. E 4, 1027 b 23
). Tragedy (unlike the Dithyramb etc.) has the
ἥδυσμα of metre in the dialogue, and that of melody only in the choral parts (see on
1, 1447 b 28
).
ἑκάστῳ, therefore, is loosely put for
ἑκατέρῳ (comp.
Pol. 3. 12, 1282 b 38
, and
HSt. s. v.
).
2.
mvp-aristotle-comment-204
1449b26
δρώντων
scil.
τῶν μιμουμένων , the subject being omitted as it is in
13, 1450 a 10
, 21, b 31, and
26, 1461 b 29
. Other Aristotelian instances of this ellipse with a gen. absolute may be seen in
Bon. Ind. 149 b 29
. Tyrwhitt, with less probability, as it seems to me, supplies
μίμησις with
δρώντων, comparing
3, 1448 a 29
μιμοῦνται δρῶντας
.
2.
mvp-aristotle-comment-205
οὐ δι᾿ ἀπαγγελίας
scil.
μιμουμένων.
2.
mvp-aristotle-comment-206
1449b27
δι᾽ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου
means practically
δι᾿ ἐλεεινῶν καὶ φοβερῶν, 'by piteous and alarming scenes'; comp.
Goulston's paraphrase
,
'per misericordiam metumque factis expressum'
. The more abstract form of expression is adopted in order to prepare the way for
τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων. For the use of the preposition in this connexion comp.
διὰ μέτρων περαίνεσθαι
in b 30
. —
De part. an. 3. 4, 666 a 15
περαίνονται [scil. αἱ κινήσεις] διὰ τοῦ ἕλκειν καὶ ἀνιέναι
. —
Plato Gorg. 450 D
διὰ λόγου πᾶν περαίνουσι
. —
Rep. 392 D
δι᾿ ἀμφοτέρων περαίνουσιν
(v.
Bernays, Zwei Abhandl. p. 85
).
This excitement of pity and fear is, as far as the poet is concerned, the end of Tragedy, but it is in truth only a means to its ultimate end, its
κάθαρσις of such emotions.
2.
mvp-aristotle-comment-207
τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν
'its catharsis of such emotions' , just as
ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μίμησιν (
1, 1447 a 22
;
6, 1449 b 31
) means 'to make their imitation', and
ποιεῖν τὴν ἡδονήν (
4, 1448 b 18
), 'to produce its pleasure' (comp.
4, 1448 b 7
, and
Kühner, Gr. Gr. 2. 1 p. 593
).
The article, in fact, is not so otiose as is usually supposed. This interpretation of the article removes more than one of the preliminary difficulties in this much debated passage, the implication being that a cathartic effect is not peculiar to Tragedy; so that the text is seen at once to stand in close relation to the passage in
Pol. 8. 7
(v. Fr. V), in which the existence of several forms of catharsis is affirmed.
Aristotle recognizes there a catharsis of 'enthusiasm' effected by certain kinds of music, as well as a catharsis of pity and fear effected by Tragedy ; and there is reason to think that a catharsis of laughter also must have been similarly posited as the effect and ultimate justification of Comedy in the lost Second Book of the Poetics.
τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων, therefore, is a general expression for this whole group of disturbing emotions (enthusiasm, pity, fear, etc.), instead of being, as is so often thought, either limited to the two emotions (pity and fear) which appear in the context, or applying to the emotions in general.
The great difficulty, however, in this formula is as to the interpretation of
κάθαρσις. Is the term to be understood as a physiological metaphor, in the sense of 'purging', or 'clearing away' ; or as a metaphor from the religious rite of lustration, in the sense of 'purification'? The ancient evidence, in Aristotle and elsewhere, is to my mind very decidedly in favour of the first interpretation.
I. This, the pathological interpretation, as it may be called, is now generally associated with the names of Weil (1848) and Bernays (1857), who each independently arrived at a very similar conclusion. It is in reality much older; all its essential points in fact are to be found in Tyrwhitt's note on the present passage :
'Satis apparet, Aristotelem hic regulam de tragoedia tragica instituisse, qua scilicet probaret affectus misericordiae et metus, qui in tragoediis vehementissime excitantur, non ex eo nutriri et validiores effici, quod Plato criminabatur, sed contra levari et exhauriri; et proinde affectuum horum purgationem opus esse proprium et quasi finem Tragoediae; cum caeterae Poesis species vel ad doctrinam, vel ad delectationem magis aptae sint.'
.
To understand Aristotle's position we have to go back to Plato's condemnation of the Drama in the Tenth Book of the Republic. One of Plato's points is, that the Drama appeals mainly to two of the inferior elements in the soul, our faculty for grief (
τὸ θρηνῶδες, τὸ ἐλεεινόν) and our faculty for laughter ; and that its effect is to gratify these at the expense of the reason, and ultimately to weaken or nullify the self-control prescribed by reason (
Rep. 605 c-606 c
). As a view like this, supported by so great a name, could hardly be ignored by Aristotle in an Art of Poetry based throughout on the assumption of the legitimacy of the Drama, and of the emotional effects it aims at, his catharsis theory may very well be supposed to have been intended as his answer to the Platonic indictment.
Though the formal exposition of the theory, as it was to be read in the complete Poetics, is no longer before us, it is still possible to recover some idea of it from the two statements in the Politics on the 'cathartic' effect of certain kinds of music. In
Pol. 8. 6, 1341 a 21
, as a reason for leaving the flute to professionals, instead of making it part of a liberal education for all, Aristotle explains that the flute, instead of having an 'ethical' effect, is simply orgiastic or exciting, and to be kept for the times when the hearing of music is a 'catharsis' rather than a form of instruction:
οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ αὐλὸς ἠθικὸν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀργιαστικόν, ὥστε πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους αὐτῷ καιροὺς χρηστέον ἐν οἷς ἡ θεωρία κάθαρσιν μᾶλλον δύναται ἢ μάθησιν
. It will be seen that a sharp distinction is drawn here between the emotional effect of the flute, and the 'ethical' effect of certain other kinds of music ; and that
κάθαρσις is in Aristotle's view connected with the former rather than with the latter.
A much more important passage, however, is that in
Pol. 8. 7, 1341 b 32
, which will be found
in extenso among the Fragments of the Poetics (Fr. V). It begins by assuming a current division of 'airs' into
ἠθικά, πρακτικά, καὶ ἐνθουσιαστικὰ μέλη, and a similar classification of 'harmonies' or modes. The distinction here is between (1) the music that imitates character, and has thus a reflex influence on the character of the hearer (comp.
Pol. 8. 5, 1340 b
); (2) that which imitates action (comp.
Plato Rep. 399 A
), and moves us to it ; and (3) that which imitates, and so arouses in us, the orgy of emotion termed by the Greeks 'enthusiasm'.
The most 'ethical' harmonies may be practised by all, as a regular part of their lives; whereas the other two kinds are to be left to professionals. This tolerance of the 'enthusiastic harmonies' in a well-ordered state Aristotle justifies by showing that they stand in much the same position as Tragedy. There are certain emotions, he tells us, which arise in some degree in every man's soul, and in a disquieting degree (
ἰσχυρῶς) in certain of us, e.g. pity and fear. Enthusiasm is one of these disturbing emotions.
Experience, however, shows that the enthusiastic music (that of the hymns of Olympus, for instance) has a salutary effect on those subject to accesses (
κατοκώχιμοι) of enthusiasm, restoring them to a normal condition of calm and peace (
καθισταμένους: comp.
Bon. Ind. 356 a 35 and 375 a 8
), just as though they had undergone a cure or catharsis at the hands of a physician (
ὥσπερ ἰατρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως). The same sort of treatment (
πάσχειν) is required by other emotional natures also, e.g. by those liable to accesses of pity and fear, and by the rest of mankind likewise, in so far as they have a share in these feelings ; all want a certain catharsis, a pleasurable relief (
κουφίζεσθαι) from emotion.
And it is in just the same way (i.e. by the relief they bring) that the cathartic airs give a harmless delight to mankind. The sense of
κάθαρσις in the Politics is well explained by Sepulveda in his note on
8. 6, 1341 a 23
:
'Purgatio intelligitur expulsio cuiuspiam affectus'
; and again in that on
8. 7, 1342 a 6
(
τῷ δὲ ἧττον διαφέρει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον):
'Itaque plus et minus, tamen omnes moventur affectibus, a quibus iucunde per musicam sanantur et quasi medicamento quodam adhibito purgantur'
(comp.
J. of Phil. 27 p. 269
).
The term in fact is a metaphor from medicine, as Aristotle intimates by making it a synonym for
ἰατρεία (
ὥσπερ ἰατρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως), in a context too which presents a whole series of words which either have, or may have, a medical meaning (
πάθος, πάσχειν, ἰσχυρῶς, κίνησις, κατοκώχιμοι, καθισταμένους, κουφίζεσθαι, καθαρτικά). In Greek physiology and pathology
κάθαρσις is a very general term for a physical clearance or discharge, the removal by art or an effort of nature of some bodily product (some
περίττωμα, as Aristotle would call it), which, if allowed to remain, would cause discomfort or harm.
The
κάθαρσις of the soul as described in the Politics is a similar process in reference to certain emotions (
πάθη)—the tacit assumption being apparently that the emotions in question are analogous to those peccant humours in the body which, according to the ancient humoral theory of medicine, have to be expelled from the system by the appropriate
κάθαρσις.
With some adaptation of the statements and hints in
Pol. 8. 7
, as thus interpreted, it is not difficult to recover the outlines at any rate of the Aristotelian theory of the cathartic effect of Tragedy: Pity and fear are elements in human nature, and in some men (
τοὺς ἐλεήμονας καὶ τοὺς φοβητικούς) they are present in a disquieting degree (
ἰσχυρῶς). With these latter the tragic excitement is a necessity (
ἀναγκαῖον πάσχειν) ; but it is also in a certain sense good for all. It serves as a sort of medicine, producing a catharsis to lighten and relieve the soul (
κουφίζεσθαι) of the accumulated emotion within it ; and as the relief is wanted, there is always a harmless pleasure attending the process of relief.
This, then, may be taken as Aristotle's answer to the Platonic argument in the Republic ; it shows that the pleasure we derive from the moving scenes in Tragedy is not, as Plato had maintained, a demoralizing, but on the contrary a harmless pleasure, (
χαρὰ ἀβλαβής). The legitimacy of this pleasure is assumed throughout the Poetics (see especially
14, 1453 b 11
), but its precise nature is not explained, either in the existing book or elsewhere, by Aristotle.
It falls naturally enough, however, into its place in the classification of pleasures in the Nicomachean Ethics, which recognizes the existence of a class of things as pleasurable not directly and in themselves, but through their effect, as being of the nature of cures or remedies (
ἰατρεῖαι) to remove the disquietude arising from an unsatisfied want, and restore us to a normal condition of body or mind (
Eth. N. 7. 13, 1152 b 34
;
7. 15, 1154 b 17
). The tragic excitement, which in the language of the Politics, acts as an
ἰατρεία or
κάθαρσις, is clearly a pleasure of this kind, one of those described by Aristotle as
ἰατρεύοντα ἡδέα.
A further point in his idea of
κάθαρσις may perhaps be noticed, as suggested at any rate by his use of the term to express the effect of Tragedy on the mind. A catharsis in the medical sense of the word is an
ἰατρεία, and only for occasional use ; and its analogue, the
παθημάτων κάθαρσις, may very well be presumed to resemble it in this respect.
In assuming Tragedy, therefore, to have a cathartic rather than a permanent moral effect, Aristotle would seem to have been mindful of the position of the Drama in Greek life, and to have seen that the dramatic performances in the theatre were not sufficiently frequent or continuous to generate a moral habit, or make a lasting impression for good or evil on character—a point overlooked not only by Plato but also by Lessing and most of the modern interpreters of the Aristotelian theory of Tragedy (comp.
E. Müller, Theorie der Kunst bei den Alten 2 p. 378
).
In the phrase
παθημάτων κάθαρσις the genitive after
κάθαρσις, denoting the object purged away or removed, is a construction not uncommon in Aristotle's physiological writings (v.
Bon. Ind. 354 b 22
); and it is found also in other authors, e.g.
Hippocrates 1 p. 104 K.
πτυέλων καθάρσεις
. —
p. 654
καθάρσεις τοῦ θερμοῦ ἐκ τοῦ σώματος
. —
3 p. 502
τῶν ἀπὸ πλευμόνων καθάρσεις
. —
Thucydides 2. 49
ἀποκαθάρσεις χολῆς
. —
Demosthenes 64. 12
κάθαρσις αἵματος
. —
Polybius 5. 100. 6
ἀνακάθαρσις πτώματος
.
The same construction is found with
κάθαρσις (etc.) in its metaphorical application to the analogous process in the mind:
Plato Phaed. 69 B
κάθαρσίς τις τῶν τοιούτων πάντων
, 'a purging away of all such things' (Jowett), where the object purged away or removed is shown by the context to be certain affections of the soul (
ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων). —
Plutarch De cap. ex inimicis utilit. 91 F
τῶν παθῶν τούτων ποιούμενος εἰς τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἀποκαθάρσεις
. —
Iamblichus De myst. 1. 12
κάθαρσις παθῶν
. —
Hierocles in Aur. carm. p. 124 (Needham)
ἡ τῶν λυμαινομένων παθῶν ἐκκάθαρσις
. —
p. 134
κάθαρσις τῆς οἰήσεως
. —
p. 194
ἀποκάθαρσις νείκους
. Aristotle's
τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν may perhaps be an unconscious reminiscence of the phrase in Plato.
The idea of
κάθαρσις, in the sense of a working-off of emotion brought about by something that excites emotion, was not unknown in late Greek literature ; it is recognized in reference to music by Plutarch and Aristides Quintilianus, and in reference to the Drama by Iamblichus and Proclus. The theories reproduced by these writers are clearly of Peripatetic origin, and on exactly the same lines as the Aristotelian justification of the emotional forms of music and of the Drama in the brief statement in the Politics.
(1) In his very curious chapter on the
ἀκροθώρακες, on whom wine is said to have a sedative effect, Plutarch illustrates the paradox (
Qu. conv. 3. 8, 657 A
) by a parallel instance, that of the sad airs at funerals, which, while exciting the grief of the mourners, at the same time work off their sorrow:—
ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ θρηνῳδία καὶ ὁ ἐπικήδειος αὐλὸς ἐν ἀρχῇ πάθος κινεῖ καὶ δάκρυον ἐκβάλλει [ἐκκαλεῖ Emperius], προάγων δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς οἶκτον οὕτω κατὰ μικρὸν ἐξαιρεῖ [ἐξερᾶ Bernays] καὶ ἀναλίσκει τὸ λυπητικόν· ὁμοίως ἴδοις ἂν καὶ τὸν οἶνον, ὅταν σφόδρα ταράξῃ καὶ παροξύνῃ τὸ ἀκμαῖον καὶ θυμοειδές, αὖθις καταδύοντα [? καταλύοντα], καὶ καθιστάντα τὴν διάνοιαν ὡς πορρωτέρω μέθης προϊοῦσαν ἡσυχάζειν
.
(2) The language in
Aristides Quintilianus De Musica 3. 25 (p. 13 Jahn)
, on the cathartic effect of the music and dancing in the Bacchic and other mysteries, has a more distinctly Aristotelian imprint on it:—
διὸ καὶ τὰς Βακχικὰς τελετὰς καὶ ὅσαι ταύταις παραπλήσιοι λόγου τινὸς ἔχεσθαί φασιν, ὅπως ἂν ἡ τῶν ἀμαθεστέρων πτοίησις διὰ βίον ἢ τύχην ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταύταις μελῳδιῶν τε καὶ ὀρχήσεων ἅμα παιδιαῖς ἐκκαθαίρηται
.
(3) There are two passages in Iamblichus, which may serve to illustrate the Aristotelian idea of
κάθαρσις. In
De myst. 3. 9 (ed. Parthey)
, writing as a Neoplatonic occultist against the naturalistic explanation of enthusiasm, he insists that it is an error to regard the effect of the enthusiastic music as being of the nature of a mere
ἀποκάθαρσις, a working-off or evacuation (
ἀπέρασις) of some morbid product within the soul :—
ἀπέρασιν δὲ καὶ ἀποκάθαρσιν ἰατρείαν τε οὐδαμῶς αὐτὸ κλητέον, οὐδὲ γὰρ κατὰ νόσημά τι ἢ πλεονασμὸν ἢ περίττωμα πρώτως ἐν ἡμῖν ἐμφύεται, θεία δε αὐτοῦ συνίσταται ἡ πᾶσα ἄνωθεν ἀρχὴ καὶ καταβολή
.
There is reason to think that the theory thus set aside was that of Theophrastus, and, through him, of Aristotle. And it will be seen how completely the language of the above passage harmonizes with the pathological interpretation of the formula,
ὥσπερ ἰατρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως in the Politics. The second passage is in
De myst. 1. 11
:—
αἱ δυνάμεις τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων παθημάτων τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν πάντῃ μὲν εἰργόμεναι καθίστανται σφοδρότεραι, εἰς ἐνέργειαν δὲ βραχεῖαν [so Bernay's; βραχεῖς vulg.] καὶ ἄχρι τοῦ συμμέτρου προαγόμενοι χαίρουσι μετρίως καὶ ἀποπληροῦνται, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἀποκαθαιρόμεναι πειθοῖ καὶ οὐ πρὸς βίαν ἀναπαύονται. διὰ δὴ τοῦτο ἔν τε κωμῳδίᾳ καὶ τραγῳδίᾳ ἀλλότρια πάθη θεωροῦντες ἵσταμεν τὰ οἰκεῖα πάθη καὶ μετριώτερα ἀπεργαζόμεθα καὶ ἀποκαθαίρομεν
.
The theory Iamblichus is accepting for the moment is that the passions cannot be suppressed for any length of time with impunity ; that they require an occasional outlet (comp.
ἀποκαθαιρόμεναι) to keep them quiet ; and that the secret of our interest in the Drama is that it serves to work off emotion (
τὰ οἰκεῖα πάθη ἀποκαθαίρομεν). It is clear that Iamblichus must have had a pathological explanation of the effect of the Drama before him. But he has taken the edge off the Aristotelian theory by giving it an ethical turn; it will be seen that he makes the catharsis of passions mean the same thing as the moderation of them (
μετριώτερα ἀπεργαζόμεθα καὶ ἀποκαθαίρομεν), thus anticipating by many centuries the interpretation of
παθημάτων κάθαρσις now usually associated with the names of Heinsius and Lessing.
(4) The cathartic effect of the Drama is one of the many controversial points discussed by Proclus in his commentary on Plato's Republic. The passages bearing on it will be found quoted under Fr. V. According to Proclus the Aristotelian answer to Plato was that the Drama serves a useful purpose as an outlet for emotions which would disturb the peace of the soul, if their just claims were not recognized and from time to time duly satisfied by means of some such gratification as is supplied in the theatre. This view of the effect of the Drama Proclus attributes to Aristotle ; his reference, however, to other apologists for the Drama may make one hesitate to believe him to have found it for himself in the now lost Second Book of the Poetics. The statement in its existing form seems rather to have been taken from some follower of Aristotle, possibly from Theophrastus, its phraseology representing the sense rather than the words of the Aristotelian original.
Disengaged from its Neoplatonic surroundings in Iamblichus and Proclus, the catharsis theory before them may be thus reconstructed in outline: The Drama has a therapeutic (comp. Proclus
τὸ πεπονηκὸς αὐτῶν θεραπεύσαντας) rather than a directly moral effect ; and the excitement it supplies is required by us at times (comp. Proclus
δεόμενα δέ τινος ἐν καιρῷ κινήσεως) to carry off (comp.
παθῶν ἀπεράσεις in both Iamblichus and Proclus) or purge away (comp. Iamblichus
πάθη ἀποκαθαίρομεν) certain emotions, and relieve the soul of the disquietude they would cause (comp. Proclus
ἀνενοχλήτους ἡμᾶς ἀπ᾿ αὐτῶν ... ποιεῖν), if defrauded of the satisfaction naturally due to them (comp. Proclus
πρὸς ἀφοσίωσιν τῶν παθῶν). The whole theory in fact is simply a fuller and more complete version of that we still have in brief in the Politics, with
ἀποκάθαρσις or
ἀπέρασις in place of the primitive Aristotelian term,
κάθαρσις.
II. Notwithstanding the arguments of Weil and Bernays, the old interpretation of
παθημάτων κάθαρσις, which makes it mean the 'purification' of certain passions, is far from being extinct even in our own day.
Κάθαρσις is supposed to be a metaphor from the religious rite of purification, whereby the hand or soul was cleansed from some pollution or stain of sin. Understood in this sense, therefore, the term would naturally imply that certain passions require 'purification' from something, i.e. from something more or less of the nature of an impurity. What this element of impurity is, and in what sense the emotions in question are supposed to become 'pure', are points on which there is no slight divergence of opinion among the upholders of this interpretation of
κάθαρσις.
The principal explanations which have been propounded may be roughly distinguished and classified as follows: (1) Tragedy is said to purify pity and fear, because the frequent excitement of these emotions in the theatre has a tendency to weaken their force, and thus moderate and reduce them to just measure (Heinsius, Milton, Lessing, etc.). (2) The lessons and examples in Tragedy have a purifying and moderating effect on pity, fear, and other evil passions (Victorius, etc.). (3) The tragic pity and fear are regarded as pure, because they are aroused not by real suffering, but only by the imaginary woes of the theatre; so that there is no admixture of pain in them (Batteux, etc.). (4) They are regarded as pure, because, as aroused by Tragedy, they are disinterested emotions, with no self-regarding element in them (Brandis, Susemihl). (5) They are pure, because the sublimity of Tragedy exalts pity and fear into high and noble forms of feeling (Hermann).
The first of these, the only view that calls for serious consideration, has an especial interest for us owing to the fact that in the eighteenth century it found a very distinguished exponent in Lessing. It must be admitted, however, that Lessing himself did little more than expand the old idea of 'moderating' the passions, and translate it back into the language of the Nicomachean Ethics. 'The tragic purification of the passions,' he says, 'consists merely in the conversion of pity and fear into virtuous habits of mind'.
'Da nämlich, es kurz zu sagen, diese Reinigung in nichts anderm beruht, als in der Verwandlung der Leidenschaften in tugendhafte Fertigkeiten, bei jeder Tugend aber, nach unserm Philosophen, sich dies diesseits und jenseits ein Extrem findet, zwischen welchem sie inne steht: so muss die Tragödie, wenn sie unser Mitleid in Tugend verwandeln soll, uns von beiden Extremen des Mitleids zu reinigen vermögend sein; welches auch von der Furcht zu verstehen'
(
Hamb. Dram. St. 78
). As Heinsius had said something very like this long before him, Lessing's originality here is not so marked as his power of statement.
The whole theory, as stated even by Lessing, is open to many and very grave objections. (1) It confuses two distinct things, the purification of a feeling and the purification of the soul from a feeling. (2) It confuses the ideas of 'pure' and 'moderate', though there is no direct logical or other relation between them; excess or defect in certain matters may be a fault, but they cannot be termed 'impurities'. (3) It rests on a false hypothesis as to the position of Tragedy in the social life of ancient Greece; the performance of Tragedy was too occasional to have a marked and abiding effect on the moral character of the hearers. (4) Even if the tragic excitement of emotion be supposed to have been sufficiently frequent to produce a habit, it does not follow that the resulting habit would be one of moderation in the matter of feeling; we have no right to suppose that the habitual indulgence of strong emotion (e.g. pity and fear) will weaken its force or reduce it to just measure. Habits according to Aristotle arise from corresponding activities,
Eth. N. 2. 1 p. 1103 b 21
ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται
. We should expect, therefore, that the strong emotion aroused by Tragedy would, if habitualized by repetition, end in a habit of strong emotion, not in a habit of subdued or moderate emotion, not in that mean state of feeling which Aristotle identifies with virtue.
The primary error, however, in this and similar interpretations of
παθημάτων κάθαρσις is that it reads a directly moral meaning into the term, as though the theatre were a school, and the tragic poet a teacher, of morality. That, however, is not Aristotle's theory; the great function of the tragic poet, he thinks, is to excite certain emotions, and procure us the pleasure that must accompany such excitement (
Poet. 14, 1453 b 11
). This pleasurable excitement of emotion, in fact, is with him the end and aim of Tragedy, so far as the poet himself is concerned. The statesman, however, viewing human nature and society as a whole, is able to look beyond all this, and see the ultimate justification of the existence of Tragedy. In the
Politics, accordingly, Aristotle recognizes the usefulness of Tragedy, explaining that it supplies a natural want, as a sort of catharsis of emotion, which as emotional creatures men require from time to time to keep their souls in health and quietude. This is a reasonable apology for Tragedy, and a sufficient answer to Plato's criticism. One may perhaps also say of it, that it is more consonant with fact and experience than the moral or disciplinary purpose which many still profess to regard as the true raison d'étre of the theatre.
3.
mvp-aristotle-comment-208
ἁρμονίαν καὶ μέλος
The
και is explanatory,
μέλος being added as a synonym to explain
ἁρμονία (v. on
1, 1447 a 22
).
4.
mvp-aristotle-comment-209
διὰ μέτρων
is opposed to
διὰ μέλους: comp.
Probl. 19. 31, 920 b 12
διὰ τὸ πολλαπλάσια εἶναι τότε τὰ μέλη ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις τῶν μέτρων
. —
Plato Symp. 187 D
μέλεσί τε καὶ μέτροις
. —
Lysis 205 A
οὗ τι τῶν μέτρων δέομαι ἀκοῦσαι οὐδὲ μέλος
. —
Isocrates 191 B
ταῖς ᾠδαῖς καὶ τοῖς μέτροις
.
5.
mvp-aristotle-comment-210
πράττοντες ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν
scil.
οἱ μιμούμενοι. Aristotle is thinking not of the poet but of the performers, who tell the story by acting it on the stage (v. on
3, 1448 a 23
).
πράττοντες recalls the idea of the
δρώντων in the preceding definition of Tragedy.
5.
mvp-aristotle-comment-211
1449b33
ὁ τῆς ὄψεως κόσμος
ὄψις is usually rendered by 'spectaculum,' 'apparatus,' 'scenery,' or mise en scène; according to Twining it comprehends 'scenery, dresses—the whole visible apparatus of the theatre'. This explanation is too wide; the reference is merely to the visible appearance of the actors when got up in character by the
σκευοποιός or costumier (see on
6, 1450 b 20
).
Aristotle accordingly more than once uses the word in a concrete sense in the plural, because each of the characters would require a special and distinctive make-up. The formula
ὁ τῆς ὄψεως κόσμος implies that the visible make-up of the actors is of the nature of a decorative adjunct (v. on
4, 1449 a 29
), a mere accessory to the poet's work (v.
6, 1450 b 16
), on which he, as an artist, has no right to rely for his effects (v.
14, 1453 b 7
). The term
ὄψις like many other technical words in the Poetics was probably already familiar in this sense in the language of the theatre (comp.
Festschrift Theodor Gomperz dargebracht p. 166
).
5.
mvp-aristotle-comment-212
μελοποιία
(properly the making of
μέλη) replaces the original term
μέλος as a synonym for it; comp.
6, 1450 b 16
, and
Pol. 8. 7, 1341 b 23
τὴν μουσικὴν ὁρῶμεν διὰ μελοποιίας καὶ ῥυθμῶν οὖσαν
.
6.
mvp-aristotle-comment-213
λέγω δὲ λέξιν μὲν ταύτην
is to be compared with
λέγω γὰρ μῦθον τοῦτον
in
6, 1450 a 4
(v. ad loc.).
A definition is given because
λέξις is a term with several meanings (v. on
21, 1459 a 12
). The present definition describes the
λέξις in a play in reference to the poet, as the 'composition of the verses'; that which comes later on, in
6, 1450 b 13
, views it rather from the side of the dramatic personages, as the 'expression of their thought in words'.
6.
mvp-aristotle-comment-214
1449b35
μέτρων
has the concrete sense of 'verses', like
τοῖς μέτροις in
1, 1447 b 29
(comp. on
b 30
).
6.
mvp-aristotle-comment-215
1449b36
πᾶσαν
πᾶσιν, the emendation of Madius, may perhaps seem to be supported by the fragment of Democritus (
fr. 165 Diels
),
ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ὃ πάντες ἴσμεν
. But no change is really wanted; instead of defining
μελοποιία Aristotle thinks it enough to say that its whole nature is too obvious to require explanation.
7.
mvp-aristotle-comment-216
ἐπεὶ δὲ πράξεώς ἐστι κτέ.
Comp.
μίμησις πράξεως in the preceding definition. Having spoken of the externals of a tragedy, its
ὄψις,
λέξις and
μελοποιία, Aristotle passes on to elements of another kind, those which constitute its internal content.
The subject in a tragedy is an action with the personages concerned therein as agents. The
μῦθος, the fable or plot of the play, represents the action as such; the
ἦθος and
διάνοια manifested in the language of the dramatis personae represent the personality of the agents. Oedipus, for instance, is in a poem only a name for a certain group of qualities, moral and intellectual, which his actions and the language put into his mouth reveal to us (comp.
9, 1451 b 7
).
7.
mvp-aristotle-comment-217
ποιούς τινας εἶναι κατά τε τὸ ἦθος καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν
Intellectual as well as moral states are included under
ποιότητες (
Cat. 8, 8 b 29
). A little further on, however, in
1450 a 5
, Aristotle uses the term
ποιούς τινας as though it naturally referred rather to the
ἦθος or moral character. For the antithesis between
ἦθος and
διάνοια comp.
Pol. 8. 1, 1337 a 38
οὐδὲ φανερὸν πότερον πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν πρέπει μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος
, and the distinction assumed throughout the Nicomachean Ethics and elsewhere between the
ἠθικαί and the
διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταί.
7.
mvp-aristotle-comment-218
1450a1
πέφυκεν
begins the apodosis. There are thus in the natural order of things, says Aristotle, two distinguishable factors in the action of the individual agent, his
ἦθος and his
διάνοια; these are the inner causes of men's actions, and of the success or failure of their lives.
πέφυκεν is, like the Platonic
φύσιν ἔχει (
Rep. 473 C
,
489 B
), impersonal. Vahlen illustrates this usage from
Pol. 2. 2, 1261 b 7
οὔτε πέφυκε μίαν οὕτως εἶναι τὴν πόλιν
. —
4. 12, 1296 b 26
ἐνταῦθα πέφυκεν εἶναι δημοκρατίαν
, and
Demosthenes 14, 30
τὰς κρήνας καὶ τὰ φρέατα ἐπιλείπειν πέφυκεν
.
7.
mvp-aristotle-comment-219
1450a2
κατὰ ταύτας
=
κατὰ τὰς πράξεις
; comp.
a 19
κατὰ δὲ τὰς πράξεις εὐδαίμονες ἢ τοὐναντίον
.
8.
mvp-aristotle-comment-220
τῆς μὲν πράξεως ὁ μῦθος ἡ μίμησις
To complete the statement Aristotle might very well have added a clause like
τῶν δὲ πραττόντων τὰ ἤθη καὶ αἱ διάνοιαι
; and it has been suggested (
J. of Phil. 5 p. 119
) that these words or something equivalent must have dropped out.
In a context like the present, however, this second point may have been left to be mentally supplied by the reader (comp. Vahlen ad loc.), as the emphatic mention of the first point (
τῆς μὲν πράξεως κτέ.) is enough to suggest it (comp.
De interpr. 14, 23 b 30
, and Waitz ad loc.). For this use of
μέν solitarium comp.
26, 1462 b 5
, and Waitz on
An. pr. 2. 11, 61 b 19
.
8.
mvp-aristotle-comment-221
1450a4
τοῦτον
(=
τοῦτο) is preparative and explained by
τὴν σύνθεσιν τῶν πραγμάτων. The assimilation of gender has been a stumbling-block to Madius and others, though found again in
22, 1458 a 26
αἰνίγματός τε γὰρ ἰδέα αὕτη ἐστί, τὸ λέγοντα ὑπάρχοντα ἀδύνατα συνάψαι
(comp.
Kühner, Gr. Gr. 2. 1 p. 74
).
8.
mvp-aristotle-comment-222
1450a6
διάνοιαν
scil.
εἶναι λέγω. Instead of attempting a definition, Aristotle evades the difficulty by saying that
διάνοια is manifested in the argumentative and reflective utterances of the dramatis personae (comp. infra
b 11
).
The statement here is merely provisional, as one may see by comparing the fuller exposition in
19, 1456 a 34 — b 8
—where we are told among other things that the
διάνοια of a personage may be shown in his actions as well as in his words.
Διάνοια in the sense it bears in the Poetics is, like
ἦθος, an element in the personality of the dramatis personae. It is their intellectual capacity, as evinced in their language (or it may be, in their actions), and it is to be seen whenever they argue or make an appeal to the feelings of their hearers, in other words, when they reason or plead with one of the other dramatis personae in the same sort of way as a rhetor might do.
Hence it is that the general theory of the
διάνοια in a play is said (
19, 1456 a 34
) to belong to Rhetoric rather than Poetry; and a speech with a great display of
διάνοια in it is a rhetorical speech (v. on
b 6
).
The term answering to Aristotle's
διάνοια in Isocrates is
ἐνθυμήματα, 'arguments':
Isocr. 191 B
μετὰ μέτρων καὶ ῥυθμῶν ἅπαντα ποιοῦσιν . . . τοσαύτην ἔχει χάριν, ὥστ᾿ ἂν καὶ τῇ λέξει καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν . . . ἔχῃ κακῶς, ὅμως αὐταῖς ταῖς εὐρυθμίαις καὶ ταῖς συμμετρίαις ψυχαγωγοῦσι τοὺς ἀκούοντας
. —
319 D
καὶ γὰρ τῇ λέξει ποιητικωτέρᾳ καὶ ποικιλωτέρᾳ τὰς πράξεις δηλοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν ὀγκωδεστέροις καὶ καινοτέροις χρῆσθαι ζητοῦσιν
.
8.
mvp-aristotle-comment-223
λέγοντες
: comp.
b 6
ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων
, and
b 7
πολιτικῶς ἐποίουν λέγοντας
. Aristotle is thinking more immediately of the
ῥήσεις in a tragedy, and of the intellectual, i. e. the rhetorical or argumentative, capacity they may reveal in the personages.
8.
mvp-aristotle-comment-224
1450a7
ἀποδεικνύασίν τι
:
ἀποδεικνύουσί τι ὡς ἔστιν ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν
. —
19, 1456 a 37
τό τε ἀποδεικνύναι καὶ τὸ λύειν
. —
Rhet. 1. 1, 1355 a 5
ἡ δὲ πίστις ἀπόδειξίς τις· τότε γὰρ πιστεύομεν μάλιστα ὅταν ἀποδεδεῖχθαι ὑπολάβωμεν
.
8.
mvp-aristotle-comment-225
ἢ καὶ ἀποφαίνονται γνώμην
The equivalent in
b 12
is the more general expression,
καθόλου τι ἀποφαίνονται
, but it is hardly worth while to bring the two passages into unison by restoring here (with
Bernays, Zwei Abhandl. p. 155
)
ἢ καθόλου ἀποφαίνονται, on the assumption that
γνώμην may have come in as a gloss.
A
γνώμη as defined in the Rhetoric is a maxim, or general proposition relating to the conduct of life:
Rhet. 2. 21, 1394 a 21
ἔστι δὲ γνώμη ἀπόφανσις, οὐ μέντοι περὶ τῶν καθ᾿ ἕκαστον, οἷον ποιός τις Ιφικράτης, ἀλλὰ καθόλου· καὶ οὐ περὶ πάντων καθόλου, οἷον ὅτι τὸ εὐθὺ τῷ καμπύλῳ ἐναντίον, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσων αἱ πράξεις εἰσί, καὶ αἱρετὰ ἢ φευκτά ἐστι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν
.
The corresponding Latin term was sententia:
Quintilian 8. 5. 3
Antiquissimae sunt quae proprie . . . sententiae vocantur, quas Graeci γνώμας appellant: utrumque autem nomen ex eo acceperunt, quod similes sunt consiliis aut decretis
.
9.
mvp-aristotle-comment-226
μέρη εἶναι ἕξ
An answer to the question announced in
1, 1447 a 10
ἐκ πόσων καὶ ποίων ἐστὶ μορίων
.
9.
mvp-aristotle-comment-227
καθ᾿ ὃ ποιά τις ἐστὶν ἡ τραγῳδία
The word
μέρος being ambiguous (
Metaph. Δ 25, 1023 b 12
;
Ζ 10, 1034 b 32
), this clause had to be added to mark the distinction between the 'parts' at present under consideration and those to be enumerated hereafter in chap. 12.
The parts here described are the formative constituents of a tragedy; whereas those defined in chap. 12 are the sections into which it is divided. It is through these various formative constituents that we are able to speak of a tragedy as
ποία τις—as good or bad, as
ἠθική or
πεπλεγμένη or
παθητική, or whatever else it may be said to be, when we come to judge of its quality.
11.
mvp-aristotle-comment-228
οὐκ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν
=
οὐκ ὀλίγοι τῶν ποιητῶν
. The
ὡς εἰπεῖν which follows should perhaps be transposed and inserted after
πᾶν in the next line.
Of the many emendations that have been propounded the simplest certainly is that of Bursian,
οὐκ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν 〈ἀλλὰ πάντες〉, on which that formerly suggested by myself,
ὀλίγου αὐτῶν 〈ἅπαντες〉 (
J. of Phil. 14 p. 44
), was based.
οὐκ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν, however, has on it a certain stamp of genuineness.
The sense seems to be this: The six parts are in the nature of things possible elements in every tragedy, so to say; and due use has been made of them by not a few of the poets. The statement may be compared with those in
a 25
, 36, and
18, 1456 a 3
, where the existence is recognized of plays weak or deficient in some of the parts.
For the sense of
ἔχει in this passage (='admits of', 'has in it the possibility of') comp.
2, 1448 a 7
; and for the distinction between it and
κέχρηνται,
Eth. N. 7. 4, 1146 b 32
ὁ ἔχων μὲν οὐ χρώμενος δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ
. —
1147 a 1
ἔχοντα μὲν ἀμφοτέρας [scil. τὰς προτάσεις] οὐδὲν κωλύει πράττειν παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, χρώμενον μέντοι τῇ καθόλου ἀλλὰ μὴ τῇ κατὰ μέρος
(comp.
Bon. Ind. 854 b 37
).
11.
mvp-aristotle-comment-229
1450a13
εἴδεσι
: see on
4, 1449 a 7
.
11.
mvp-aristotle-comment-230
ὄψεις
: see on
6, 1449 b 33
.
11.
mvp-aristotle-comment-231
πᾶν
, i. e. every play; comp.
12, 1452 a 18
ἁπάντων
. —
18, 1456 a 31
ἐξ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλο
.
12.
mvp-aristotle-comment-232
μέγιστον κτέ.
Aristotle proceeds at this point to arrange the six elements in the order of their relative importances; and he begins by asserting, with an abundance of reasons which seems to imply that it was a subject of controversy at the time, the supreme importance of the
μῦθος.
As it is the first duty of a tragedy to represent an action, the
μῦθος or story of action in it must be the first and most essential element in its construction. The characters, i.e. the personal agents, are mainly required in order to work out the story, and as means to that end; so that this element is to be deemed of secondary and subordinate significance as compared with the
μῦθος.
The paramount importance of plot in Drama has been re-asserted with equal emphasis in our own time by an eminent living dramatist: 'The idea, the plot, always comes first. The plot, in a sense, is nine-tenths of a play' (
H. A. Jones, Strand Magazine 34 p. 379
).
12.
mvp-aristotle-comment-233
ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων σύστασις
=
ὁ μῦθος. As the action in a tragedy is a whole of some magnitude (comp.
4, 1449 a 19
;
6, 1449 b 25
), it must have a plurality of incidents (
πράγματα) embodied in it. What Aristotle means by a combination of incidents may be seen from his synopses of the Iphigenia and Odyssey in
17, 1455 b 2 sqq.
.
12.
mvp-aristotle-comment-234
1450a17
βίου
:
Plato Laws 817 B
ἡμεῖς ἐσμὲν τραγῳδίας αὐτοὶ ποιηταὶ κατὰ δύναμιν ὅτι καλλίστης ἅμα καὶ ἀρίστης· πᾶσα οὖν [? γοῦν] ἡμῖν ἡ πολιτεία ξυνέστηκε μίμησις τοῦ καλλίστου καὶ ἀρίστου βίου, ὃ δή φαμεν ἡμεῖς γε ὄντως εἶναι τραγῳδίαν τὴν ἀληθεστάτην
. —
Lycurgus in Leocr. 102
οἱ ποιηταὶ μιμούμενοι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον
. Alcidamas described the Odyssey as a
καλὸν ἀνθρωπίνου βίου κάτοπτρον
(
Aristot. Rhet. 3. 3, 1406 b 12
). Of Menander also it was said:
Μένανδρε καὶ βίε, πότερος ἄρ᾿ ὑμῶν πότερον ἀπεμιμήσατο;
(
Nauck, Aristophanis Byz. Fragm. p. 249
).
12.
mvp-aristotle-comment-235
καὶ εὐδαιμονίας
:
Plato Rep. 603 C
πράττοντας, φαμέν, ἀνθρώπους μιμεῖται ἡ μιμητικὴ βιαίους ἢ ἑκουσίας πράξεις καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν ἢ εὖ οἰομένους ἢ κακῶς πεπραγέναι
.
12.
mvp-aristotle-comment-236
1450a18
ἐν πράξει
According to the definition in
Eth. N. 1. 6, 1098 a 16
happiness is a certain kind of activity, a
ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ᾿ ἀρετήν
. Comp.
Phys. 2. 6, 197 b 4
ἡ δὲ εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξίς τις· εὐπραξία γάρ
. —
Pol. 7. 3, 1325 a 32
ἡ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξίς ἐστιν
(also
Eth. N. 1. 8, 1098 b 21
;
Rhet. 1. 5, 1360 b 14
).
12.
mvp-aristotle-comment-237
τὸ τέλος
:
Eth. N. 1. 8, 1098 b 18
πράξεις τινὲς λέγονται καὶ ἐνέργειαι τὸ τέλος
.
12.
mvp-aristotle-comment-238
οὐ ποιότης
:
Eth. N. 10. 2, 1173 a 14
οὐδὲ γὰρ αἱ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαι ποιότητές εἰσιν, οὐδ᾿ ἡ εὐδαιμονία
.
13.
mvp-aristotle-comment-239
πράττουσι
scil.
οἱ μιμούμενοι. The reference is to the actors (see on
3, 1448 a 23
) rather than the poets.
13.
mvp-aristotle-comment-240
συμπεριλαμβάνουσιν
scil.
ἐν τῇ μιμήσει, 'they include in the representation';
συμπεριλαμβάνειν in this sense is not infrequent in later Greek (v.
HSt. s. v.
).
It is hardly necessary, therefore, to reject it for the reading of one of the apographs,
συμπαραλαμβάνουσιν, though it is no doubt quite true that manuscripts are apt to confuse the two prepositions.
13.
mvp-aristotle-comment-241
1450a22
διὰ τὰς πράξεις
διά in this connexion must mean 'with a view to', 'for the sake of', as in
Thuc. 2. 89. 4
διὰ τὴν σφετέραν δόξαν
.
13.
mvp-aristotle-comment-242
καὶ ὁ μῦθος
The
καί is explanatory, 'that is to say'.
13.
mvp-aristotle-comment-243
1450a23
τὸ δὲ τέλος μέγιστον ἁπάντων
modelled on the proverb in
Plato Rep. 377 A
ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἔργου μέγιστον
, which reappears in Aristotle
Soph. el. 33, 183 b 22
μέγιστον γὰρ ἴσως ἀρχὴ παντός, ὥσπερ λέγεται
. —
Probl. 10. 13, 892 a 29
ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἔργου μέγιστον· ἥμισυ γάρ
.
15.
mvp-aristotle-comment-244
τῶν νέων
As it is clear from
14, 1453 b 28
that Euripides is not classed among the old poets (
οἱ παλαιοί),
οἱ νέοι, 'the moderns,' must mean the poets from Euripides downwards.
It is to be observed also that, when Aristotle a little further on in this chapter distinguishes between
οἱ ἀρχαῖοι and
οἱ νῦν, the point noted as characteristic of 'the moderns' (
ῥητορικῶς ποιοῦσι λέγοντας) is manifestly true of Euripides, and was recognized as true of him by the ancients themselves (see on
ῥητορικῶς,
b 8
).
15.
mvp-aristotle-comment-245
ἀήθεις
:
24, 1460 a 11
οὐδέν᾿ ἀήθη ἀλλ᾿ ἔχοντα ἤθη
.
ἀήθης is, like other compounds of
α privativum (
De anima 2. 10, 427 a 26
;
Metaph. Δ 22, 1022 b 32
), an ambiguous word, as it may mean either 'destitute of character', or merely 'deficient in character'.
Aristotle must be using it in this latter sense, since a play with personages wholly destitute of character is hardly conceivable. The language in the illustration which follows from painting,
οὐδὲν ἔχει ἦθος
, is an instance of a common form of exaggeration, just like that in the saying of Pope,
Most women have no characters at all
.
15.
mvp-aristotle-comment-246
1450a26
τοιοῦτοι
i. e.
ἀήθεις.
15.
mvp-aristotle-comment-247
οἷον καὶ τῶν γραφέων Ζεῦξις πρὸς Πολύγνωτον πέπονθεν
:
De gen. an. 5. 3, 783 a 6
ἔστι δ᾿ ἔνια τῶν ζῴων . . . μαλακὴν μὲν ἔχει τὴν τρίχα ἧττον δὲ λεπτήν, οἷον τὸ τῶν δασυπόδων πρὸς τὸ τῶν προβάτων πέπονθεν
. —
Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 22
οἷον ἡ Θεοδώρου φωνὴ πέπονθε πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ὑποκριτῶν
.
15.
mvp-aristotle-comment-248
γραφέων
For other illustrations from painting see on
2, 1448 a 5
.
15.
mvp-aristotle-comment-249
1450a27
Πολύγνωτον
The same view of him, as one who knew how to indicate character in painting, is implied in
Pol. 8. 5, 1340 a 37
τὰ Πολυγνώτου κἂν εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν γραφέων ἢ τῶν ἀγαλματοποιῶν ἐστιν ἠθικός
.
15.
mvp-aristotle-comment-250
1450a28
Ζεύξιδος
This taken in connexion with what is said of him later on, in
25, 1461 b 12
, would seem to show that, in Aristotle's view, Zeuxis sacrificed expression to beauty.
16.
mvp-aristotle-comment-251
ῥήσεις
i. e. the speeches put into the mouths of the personages in a play or poem (comp.
15, 1454 a 31
;
18, 1450 b 31
).
The word had been already used in this technical sense by both Plato and Aristophanes.
16.
mvp-aristotle-comment-252
ἠθικάς
In the Rhetoric the
ἠθικὸς λόγος is one designed to create a favourable idea of the speaker's
ἦθος, in contradistinction to the
παθητικὸς λόγος, which addresses the feelings, and the
ἀποδεικτικὸς λόγος, which addresses the reason of his audience.
In matters of imitative art, however, the usual meaning of
ἠθικός is
μιμητικὸς ἤθους, 'expressive of character' (comp.
Bon. Ind. 315 b 21
)—which is the sense the word has in the present and other passages in the Poetics.
Thus in
18, 1456 a 1
a certain kind of tragedy is termed the
ἠθική τραγῳδία, 'the tragedy of character', because its main interest is as a portraiture of character; in
23, 1459 b 16
the Odyssey is described as
ἠθική, because it is more of a portraiture of character than the Iliad; in
24, 1460 b 3
certain passages in a poem are termed
ἠθικά μέρη, as serving to bring out the
ἦθος of the personages in the story.
16.
mvp-aristotle-comment-253
λέξει καὶ διανοίᾳ εὖ πεποιημένας
, 'made perfect in the matter of language and thought'. The same use of the dative is found in
a 36
τῇ λέξει καὶ τοῖς ἤθεσιν ἀκριβοῦν
. —
24, 1460 b 2
τῇ δὲ λέξει δεῖ διαπονεῖν
; and in
Alcidamas De soph. 12
οἱ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀκριβῶς ἐξειργασμένοι [scil. λόγοι].
16.
mvp-aristotle-comment-254
1450a30
οὔπω ποιήσει ὃ ἦν τῆς τραγῳδίας ἔργον
:
Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 2
ὁ λόγος, ἐὰν μὴ δηλοῖ, οὐ ποιήσει τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον
. The Arabic version seems to suggest
οὔπω (see on
9, 1451 b 13
) rather than
οὐ. For the fut. with
οὔπω comp.
Eth. N. 5. 10, 1135 a 22
ὥστε ἔσται τι ἄδικον μὲν ἀδίκημα δὲ οὔπω, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ ἑκούσιον προσῇ
. —
6. 13, 1144 a 35
ὥστε τὴν μὲν ἤδη τὴν δ᾿ οὔπω εἰληφὼς ἔσται
.
The imperfect in
ἦν τῆς τραγῳδίας ἔργον implies that the point has been already settled in the preceding discussion (comp.
Bon. Ind. 754 a 40
), the reference being presumably to
6, 1449 b 36
, where Tragedy is said to be a
μίμησις πράξεως.
16.
mvp-aristotle-comment-255
1450a31
ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον
scil.
ποιήσει, as in
Eth. N. 6. 8, 1141 b 18
εἰ γὰρ εἰδείη ὅτι τὰ κοῦφα εὔπεπτα κρέα καὶ ὑγιεινά, ποῖα δὲ κοῦφα ἀγνοοῖ, οὐ ποιήσει ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ᾿ ὁ εἰδὼς ὅτι τὰ ὀρνίθεια [κοῦφα καὶ] ὑγιεινὰ ποιήσει μᾶλλον
. For the form of antithesis comp.
De caelo 2. 3, 286 a 5
πόρρω δ᾿ οὐχ οὕτω τῷ τόπῳ, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ ... ὀλίγην ἔχειν αἴσθησιν
, and the instances collected by Vahlen (ad loc.) and Schwab (Schanz's Beiträge 4. 1, p. 66).
16.
mvp-aristotle-comment-256
τούτοις
refers back to the
ῥήσεις ἠθικαὶ καὶ λέξει καὶ διανοίᾳ εὖ πεποιημέναι of 29. Aristotle's point is, that the dramatic effectiveness of a tragedy depends before all else on its plot, and that no literary or rhetorical brilliancy will make up for a weak plot.
17.
mvp-aristotle-comment-257
ψυχαγωγεῖ
comp.
b 17
ψυχαγωγικόν
. Said of a work of art the word means no more than to 'move' or 'rivet the attention', and is thus the equivalent of our word 'attract' or (as people now sometimes say) 'fascinate'.
This sense of
ψυχαγωγεῖν is as old as Xenophon:
Mem. 3. 10. 6
ὃ δὲ μάλιστα ψυχαγωγεῖ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, τὸ ζωτικὸν φαίνεσθαι, πῶς τοῦτο ἐνεργάζῃ τοῖς ἀνδριασιν;
. It is found more than once in Isocrates:
24 D
δέδεικται τοῖς ἐπιθυμοῦσι τοὺς ἀκροωμένους ψυχαγωγεῖν ὅτι τοῦ μὲν νουθετεῖν καὶ συμβουλεύειν ἀφεκτέον, τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα λεκτέον οἷς ὁρῶσι τοὺς ὄχλους μάλιστα χαίροντας
. —
191 A
τοσαύτην ἔχει χάριν, ὥστ᾿ ἂν καὶ τῇ λέξει καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν ἔχῃ κακῶς, ὅμως αὐταῖς ταῖς εὐρυθμίαις καὶ ταῖς συμμετρίαις ψυχαγωγοῦσι τοὺς ἀκούοντας
. Later writers also often use the word in the sense of to 'attract' or 'please'; comp. the Antiatticista in Bekker's Anecdota 116
ψυχαγωγεῖν: τὸ τέρπειν
, and Vahlen, Symb. Phil. Bonn. p. 168.
17.
mvp-aristotle-comment-258
1450a34
αἵ τε περιπέτειαι καὶ ἀναγνωρίσεις
These are considered later on in
chap. 11
. It will be observed that Aristotle uses the two terms without explanation, as though they were already part of the established language of the theatre. The appositional clause comes in as an afterthought, at some distance from the words it illustrates (comp.
Kühner, Gr. Gr. 2. 1 p. 282
).
18.
mvp-aristotle-comment-259
συνίστασθαι
is apparently a middle in
24, 1460 a 34
also (v. ad loc.).
18.
mvp-aristotle-comment-260
οἷον καὶ
introduces not an instance but a parallel from a different class of things just like
ὥσπερ καὶ, from which it is often hardly distinguishable in sense (comp.
Top. 6. 9, 148 a 4
;
Eth. N. 9. 1, 1164 a 15
;
Rhet. 3. 11, 1412 a 11
;
3. 12, 1413 b 25
) . In
De mem. 1, 450 b 20
and in
Plato Phaedr. 255 C
οἷον
is so completely equivalent to
ὥσπερ as to have a
οὕτως as its antecedent. In
Poet. 25, 1460 b 33
οἷον ... ταύτῃ
is practically the same thing as
ὥσπερ ... οὕτως.
19.
mvp-aristotle-comment-261
ἀρχὴ
A little before this the
μῦθος was said to be the
τέλος τῆς τραγῳδίας (a 22). From one point of view it is the
ἀρχή, as being the necessary basis of every tragedy; from another it is the
τέλος, because it is this much more than the characters that Tragedy
μίμησις πράξεως
has to represent.
19.
mvp-aristotle-comment-262
ψυχὴ
:
Isocrates 142 B
ἔστι γὰρ ψυχὴ πόλεως οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἢ πολιτεία
. —
261 B
πᾶσα πολιτεία ψυχὴ πόλεώς ἐστιν
. —
[Demosthenes] 60. 23
ἡ τῶνδε τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀρετὴ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἦν ψυχὴ τἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν
—
Martianus Capella 3, 268
Est accentus, ut quidam putaverunt, anima vocis
.
20.
mvp-aristotle-comment-263
παραπλήσιον κτέ.
This clause Castelvetro and others would transpose and insert after
σύστασιν πραγμάτων in 33. It comes in, however, naturally enough where it stands, as an afterthought to illustrate the secondary position (
δεύτερον δὲ τὰ ἤθη) of the element of character in a play.
So also in the sister art of painting, says Aristotle, the colouring is of subordinate importance in comparison with the design which makes the work to mean something and be like something; a portrait is a portrait, and will give us the pleasure of one, even though executed in mere whites and greys; whereas a medley of much more beautiful colours without a design to give them meaning will not produce the same pleasure, because we cannot see that it represents anything. The nature of the pleasure found in a work of imitative art was explained in
4, 1448 b 13
.
20.
mvp-aristotle-comment-264
1450b1
εἰ γάρ τις ἐναλείψειε κτέ.
The sense is thus given by Goulston:
'si quis tabulam, pigmentis licet pulcherrimis, temere fusimque illeverit; non perinde spectantem oblectet, ac si, albo licet colore, imaginem delinearet certam: pari modo in tragoediis absque constitutione rerum minus valent mores quam morum expers fabula.'
.
The object left to be understood with
ἐναλείψειε is
τὸν πίνακα, the 'panel' or 'canvas', as we should say;
ἀλείφειν and
ἐπαλείφειν are used in just the same way, in the sense of covering a surface with colour.
ἐναλείφειν, it is to be observed, has apparently a different kind of object in
De gen. an. 2. 6, 743 b 23
οἱ γραφεῖς ὑπογράψαντες ταῖς γραμμαῖς οὕτως ἐναλείφουσι τοῖς χρώμασι τὸ ζῷον
('painters first sketch the outline of the figure before proceeding to work it out in colour').
χύδην means 'without system or order', i.e. without a design to give form and sense to the whole.
The direct opposite of this unmeaning medley of the most beautiful colours (
εἴ τις ἐναλείψειε τοῖς καλλίστοις φαρμάκοις χύδην) is a portrait in plain whites and greys (
λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνα); in what follows, therefore,
εἰκόνα serves as an antithesis to
χύδην (comp. Vahlen, Symb. Phil. Bonn. p. 166) and
λευκογραφήσας to
τοῖς καλλίστοις φαρμάκοις.
λευκογραφεῖν, as a derivative from
λευκογράφος (a word no longer to be found), is to 'paint monochromes in white', i.e. in shades of white and grey (it would seem) on a dark ground. Zeuxis, whom Aristotle has just mentioned in 27, was among other things a painter of monochromes in white—
pinxit et monochromata ex albo
(
Pliny N. H. 35. 64
; comp.
Brunn, Gr. Künstler 2 p. 55
).
A portrait, however, even though it be a mere monochrome in whites (comp.
λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνα), will have a meaning, and give the mind the intellectual pleasure which accompanies the recognition of the meaning (comp.
4, 1448 b 15
); whereas a medley of beautiful colours has no meaning, and the pleasure it gives the beholder is of a wholly different order (comp.
4, 1448 b 18
οὐχ ᾗ μίμημα ποιήσει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ ... τὴν χροιάν
). The antithesis, therefore, is simply between beautiful colours without an
εἰκών, and an
εἰκών without any beauty of colour.
Vahlen's view of the import of these words is somewhat different. He thinks that
λευκογραφήσας may denote the preliminary sketch (like
ὑπογράφειν in the above-quoted passage in the De gen. an.) in white, which is afterwards filled in with colour, when the picture comes to be finished; so that the clause may be taken to describe two stages in the process of painting, (1)
λευκογραφεῖν εἰκόνα, and (2)
ἐναλείφειν φαρμάκοις, and serves to illustrate the order of procedure in Tragedy, where the
μῦθος is said to come first, as the
ἀρχὴ τῆς τραγῳδίας, and the
ἤθη second:
'orationis formam sic accipio, εἴ τις ἐναλείψειε τοῖς καλλίστοις φαρμάκοις χύδην, οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως εὐφράνειεν καὶ λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνα εἰ ἐναλείψειε φαρμάκοις', ut χύδην, h. e. nulla ante delineatione facta, et λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνα inter se opponantur'
. This very subtle interpretation seems to me to read more into Aristotle's words than is required for the argument. Aristotle would perhaps have said:
οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως εὐφράνειε καὶ εἰ λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνα οὕτως ἐναλείψειε τοῖς φαρμάκοις.
21.
mvp-aristotle-comment-265
ἔστιν τε μίμησις πράξεως κτέ.
supports the statement (38-39) before the parenthesis by recalling the general fact on which it is based (v. 20-23).
22.
mvp-aristotle-comment-266
τρίτον δὲ ἡ διάνοια
As the intellectual quality of the dramatis personae comes out mainly in what they are made to say,
διάνοια is provisionally explained (see on 6) as a power of making the best of one's case or of saying the right thing.
22.
mvp-aristotle-comment-267
1450b5
τὰ ἐνόντα
scil.
ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν, as in
Isocr. 292 E
ὑπισχνοῦνται τοιούτους ῥήτορας τοὺς συνόντας ποιήσειν ὥστε μηδὲν τῶν ἐνόντων ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι παραλιπεῖν
(comp.
Bon. Ind. 250 a 56
). The whole expression
τὰ ἐνόντα καὶ τὰ ἁρμόττοντα covers the same ground as that in
Rhet. 2. 22, 1396 b 5
τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα καὶ τὰ ἐπικαιρότατα
.
22.
mvp-aristotle-comment-268
1450b6
ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων
has been taken to mean 'in soluta oratione' (Paccius), and 'in orationibus' (Valla) or 'in eloquentia', 'bei der Beredsamkeit' (Vahlen). The explanation, however, in the context,
ἐποίουν λέγοντας (57), is enough to show that the
λόγοι Aristotle has in mind are the
λόγοι in a play, i.e. the
ῥήσεις put into the mouths of the personages. This is apparently the sense the word bears in the next sentence also,
τῶν λόγων ἐν οἷς μηδ᾿ ὅλως ἔστιν τι προαιρεῖται ἢ φεύγει ὁ λέγων
(b 9).
22.
mvp-aristotle-comment-269
τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ ῥητορικῆς ἔργον
Aristotle seems to be thinking of what is said in a play by the chief personages (e. g. the tragic hero), and of the kind of intellectual capacity (
διάνοια) revealed in their statements. One has to remember that the chief personages in ancient Tragedy are not ordinary men, and that the tragic hero is expressly said by Aristotle (
13, 1453 a 10-21
) to be always in the best tragedies a man of great position and lineage. In a play, therefore, such personages might very well be made to speak
πολιτικῶς, 'like statesmen', and to show a statesmanlike power of saying what is appropriate to the situation before them (
τὰ ἁρμόττοντα). But it would also be possible to make them speak
ῥητορικῶς, 'like rhetors', with something of the rhetor's cleverness in seizing on the various possible points that may be urged on the occasion (
τὰ ἐνόντα, i.e.
τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα).
Though
ῥητορική stands in a certain relation to
πολιτική (
Rhet. 1. 2, 1356 a 27
), the distinction between them is a very real one with Aristotle;
πολιτική is with him the practical wisdom of the statesman (
Eth. N. 6. 8, 1141 b 23
), and
ῥητορική only a form of the art of argumentation—a
δύναμις τοῦ πορίσαι λόγους
(
Rhet. 1. 2, 1356 a 33
), or
δύναμις περὶ ἑκάστου τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν
(
Rhet. 1. 2, 1355 b 26
). There is no reference to
πολιτική in
chap. 19
. Aristotle may perhaps have felt that the practice of the later dramatists (
οἱ νῦν) was too firmly established to admit of change, and that the tragic personages accordingly must still be allowed to speak
ῥητορικῶς, as they did in the Tragedy of his time.
23.
mvp-aristotle-comment-270
ἀρχαῖοι
: the dramatists anterior to Euripides (see on
6, 1450 a 25
).
23.
mvp-aristotle-comment-271
πολιτικῶς . ... λέγοντας
which Valla rendered by 'civiliter dicentes', is often taken to mean 'to speak the language of civil life', like ordinary citizens, as distinct from the professional orator. But as the context shows that the ability to speak
πολιτικῶς implies something of
πολιτική in the speaker (comp.
Newman on Pol. 2. 11, 1273 b 12
),
πολιτικῶς would seem rather to mean 'like a
πολιτικός'—the statesman being assumed to say that which is befitting (
τὰ ἁρμόττοντα) without any ostentation of rhetorical cleverness (comp.
HSt. s. v. πολιτικός
).
Vahlen (Symb. phil. Bonn. p. 175) supposes the expression to coincide in sense with the
ἠθικῶς λέγειν of
Rhet. 3. 17, 1418 b 38
which means
ἀπὸ προαιρέσεως λέγειν, as opposed to
ἀπὸ διανοίας λέγειν (
Rhet. 3. 16, 1417 a 23
). The objection to this interpretation is twofold. (1) Aristotle is to all appearance not contrasting
διάνοια with
ἦθος, but distinguishing between the two forms it may assume in the dramatic
ῥήσεις. (2)
πολιτικῶς λέγειν can hardly be identical with
ἠθικῶς λέγειν; the personages in Comedy speak
ἠθικῶς, but it would be a paradox to say of them that they speak
πολιτικῶς, in the sense of there being something of
πολιτική in their utterances.
23.
mvp-aristotle-comment-272
1450b8
ῥητορικῶς
Euripides is termed by Aristophanes (
Pax 534
) a
ποιητὴς ῥηματίων δικανικῶν
. Quintilian also (10. 1, 68) thinks the study of his plays one of the best preparations for the bar:
'Illud quidem nemo non fateatur necesse est, iis qui se ad agendum comparant utiliorem longe fore Euripidem. namque is et sermone magis accedit oratorio generi et sententiis densus et in iis quae a sapientibus tradita sunt paene ipsis par, et dicendo ac respondendo cuilibet eorum qui fuerunt in foro diserti comparandus.'
.
7.
mvp-aristotle-comment-273
ἦθος
A statement is said to have
ἦθος in it when it reveals the moral purpose of the speaker, the kind of thing that he purposes to do or not to do.
ἦθος is an element in oratory also, as the credibility of the orator often depends on the impression one forms of his character.
The language in the text may be compared with that in
Rhet. 2. 21, 1395 b 13
ἦθος δ᾿ ἔχουσιν οἱ λόγοι ἐν ὅσοις δήλη ἡ προαίρεσις· αἱ δὲ γνῶμαι πᾶσαι τοῦτο ποιοῦσι διὰ τὸ ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸν τὴν γνώμην λέγοντα καθόλου περὶ τῶν προαιρετῶν, ὥστ᾿ ἂν χρησταὶ ὦσιν αἱ γνῶμαι, καὶ χρηστοήθη φαίνεσθαι ποιοῦσι τὸν λέγοντα
. —
3. 16, 1417 a 16
ἠθικὴν δὲ χρὴ τὴν διήγησιν εἶναι. ἔσται δὲ τοῦτο ἂν εἰδῶμεν τί ἦθος ποιεῖ. ἓν μὲν δὴ τὸ προαίρεσιν δηλοῦν, ποιὸν δὲ τὸ ἦθος τῷ ποιὰν ταύτην· ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ποιὰ τῷ τέλει. διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔχουσιν οἱ μαθηματικοὶ λόγοι ἤθη, ὅτι οὐδὲ προαίρεσιν· τὸ γὰρ οὗ ἕνεκα οὐκ ἔχουσιν. ἀλλ᾿ οἱ Σωκρατικοί· περὶ τοιούτων γὰρ λέγουσιν.
.
24.
mvp-aristotle-comment-274
1450b09
ὁποῖά τις.
This (the reading of
o) is very rightly retained by
Vahlen, who translates the clause by
quod aperiat voluntatem, qualia quis in quibus apertum non est aut appetat aut fugiat
; the explanation is added to show that
προαίρεσις is to be taken in a wide sense, which may include aversion as well as desire. For an explanatory clause of this form
comp.
16, 1455b10
συνελογίσαντο τὴν εἱμαρμένην ὅτι ἐν τούτῳ εἵμαρτο ἀποθανεῖν
, and
Plato
Rep. 535 A
μέμνησαι οὖν τὴν προτέραν ἐκλογὴν τῶν ἀρχόντων, οἷους ἐξελέξαμεν ;
ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔστι δῆλον is added because there are situations in which the moral purpose of the agent is too obvious to require to be revealed in an 'ethical' speech; see
19, 1456 b7
for a parallel statement on the subject of
διάνοια.
24.
mvp-aristotle-comment-275
1450b9_2
προαιρεῖται.
Though the usual opposite of
φεύγειν is the simple verb
αἱρεῖσθαι (
Bon. Ind. 18b3
), there is a certain propriety in
προαιρεῖται in a clause explanatory of
προαίρεσις. The word is found in a similar antithesis in
Eth. N. 10. 1, 1172b25
τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα προαιροῦνται, τὰ δὲ λυπηρὰ φεύγουσιν.
24.
mvp-aristotle-comment-276
1450b11
διόπερ κτέ.
In the
Rhetoric we are told that a mathematical argument does not admit of any colouring of character, because the facts with which it deals are indifferent to us—not objects of either desire or aversion:
Rhet. 3. 16, 1417b9
διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔχουσιν οἱ μαθηματικοὶ λόγοι ἤθη, ὅτι οὐδὲ προαίρεσιν· τὸ γὰρ οὗ ἕνεκα οὐκ ἔχουσιν.
In like manner a speech in a play may be on a subject wholly indifferent to the speaker, and in that case there is no room for any infusion of
ἦθος into his statement.
25.
mvp-aristotle-comment-277
καθόλου τι ἀποφαίνονται
replaces the
ἀποφαίνονται γνώμην in 7 (
v. ad loc.).
26.
mvp-aristotle-comment-278
τέταρτον δὲ τῶν ἐν λόγῳ κτέ.
On the reading which I have ventured to introduce into the text see the
J. of Phil. 5 p. 1191.
It is clear that the four elements in a tragedy, the
μύθος
ἤθη
διάνοια and
λέξις, belong to it as a work of literature, and that the music and 'spectacle' are accessories, which attach to it only when it comes to be acted on the stage. Apart from these accessories, a tragedy is, like an epic (
comp.
23, 1459 b10
), a
μίμησις ἐν λόγῳ (see on
1, 1447 29
), and all the elements which constitute it are
ἐν λόγῳ.
τὰ ἐν λόγῳ, therefore, is a comprehensive designation for the four literary elements, as distinct from the non-literary elements (
τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν b 15), the music and 'spectacle', with which the enumeration concludes. If
τῶν μὲν λόγων be retained, the genitive
1
has to be taken as an objective gen. after
λέξις.
Valla renders the words by
orationum dictio
,
Paccius by
sermonum dictio
, and
Goulston by
ipsarum orationum elocutio
. The main difficulty, however, is in the particle, which has never been satisfactorily explained.
Vahlen formerly (
Symb. Phil. Bonn. p. 181
) connected the clause with that which follows in 615
τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν κτέ., supposing the sense to be 'viertens für die Dialoge (
τῶν λόγων) die sprachliche Form; für das übrige (
τῶν λοιπῶν) die Melopöie'. His later view (1885) is that the
μέν in
τῶν μὲν λόγων may be an instance of
μέν solitarium, and that
Aristotle may have meant at first to append something about the
τῶν δὲ μελῶν... Such a division of the fourth part, it seems to me, is wholly inconsistent with the general scheme of the six parts, which is throughout this chapter so clearly before
Aristotle's mind, as well as with the express mention of the
μελοποιία in its proper place in the next sentence.
26.
mvp-aristotle-comment-279
1450b13_2
ὥσπερ πρότερον εἴρηται.
If the reference is to
6, 1449 b 34
, where the
λέξις is defined as
ἡ τῶν μέτρων σύνθεσις,
Aristotle must have forgotten the exact terms of his previous formula. The point, however, is practically the same in both instances;
λέξις is to be understood in the sense of 'diction' or 'expression in language', and not in any of the other senses which the word might bear (see on
23, 1459 12
).
26.
mvp-aristotle-comment-280
1450b14
διὰ τῆς ὀνομασίας
διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων, i. e. by means of the words or language of the speaker. As the
ὄνομα, which includes the verb and the adverb as well as the noun, is the directly significant part of all language,
ὀνομασία means practically the same thing as vocabulary or language.
26.
mvp-aristotle-comment-281
1450b14_2
ἑρμηνείαν,
'communication', 'expression'; the Latin equivalent for it is
interpretatio. After
ἑρμηνείαν we may supply τῶν ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ, the spoken word being the outward sign or expression of a thought in the mind:
De interpr. 1, 16ª3
ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα.
On the meaning of
ἑρμηνεία in
Aristotle see
Waitz,
Organon 1 p. 323
, and
Steinthal,
Gesch. der Sprachwissenschaft 1 p. 235.
26.
mvp-aristotle-comment-282
1450b15
ἔχει τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν
ταὐτὸ δύναται, 'is practically the same thing' (see on
1, 1447ª8
).
27.
mvp-aristotle-comment-283
1450b16
πέντε
Similar instances of an intrusive numeral will be found in
Rhet. 1. 2, 1356 21
, and
1. 13, 1373 b3
(
v.
Roemer
ad loc.).
Vahlen accepts the correction πέμπτον, in the sense of
quinto loco: 'reliquarum autem partium (h. e. quae post illas quattuor iam reliquae sunt duae) quinto loco
μελοποιία gravissimum est condimentum,
ὄψις autem ad poeticam artem omnino non pertinet'.
27.
mvp-aristotle-comment-284
μέγιστον τῶν ἡδυσμάτων:
see on
6, 1449 b 25
(
ἡδυσμένῳ). For the pleasure given by music
comp.
Pol. 8. 5, 1339 b 20
τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν πάντες εἶναί φαμεν τῶν ἡδίστων.
—
1340 a 2
δεῖ μὴ μόνον τῆς κοινῆς ἡδονῆς μετέχειν ἀπ᾿ αὐτῆς, ἧς ἔχουσι πάντες αἴσθησιν· ἔχει γὰρ ἡ μουσικὴ τὴν ἡδονὴν φυσικήν, διὸ πάσαις ἡλικίαις καὶ πᾶσιν ἤθεσιν ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῆς ἐστι προσφιλής.
—
οἱ μὲν γὰρ νέοι διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν ἀνήδυντον οὐδὲν ὑπομένουσιν ἑκόντες, ἡ δὲ μουσικὴ φύσει τῶν ἡδυσμένων [ἡδυσμάτων] ἐστίν.
Bernays (
Zwei Abhandl. p. 157) supposed that a further statement on the subject of music, like that in the
Anonymus De Comedy (
Kaibel,
CGF. 1 p. 52
),
μέλος τῆς μουσικῆς ἐστιν ἴδιον, ὅθεν ἀπ᾿ ἐκείνης τὰς αὐτοτελεῖς ἀφορμὰς δεήσει λαμβάνειν
, may have dropped out after
ἡδυσμάτων.
28.
mvp-aristotle-comment-285
28.
mvp-aristotle-comment-286
1450b17_2
ἀτεχνότατον:
13, 1453 67
τὸ δὲ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως τοῦτο παρασκευάζειν ἀτεχνότερον καὶ χορηγίας δεόμενόν ἐστιν.
ἄτεχνος is frequently used in the sense of 'depending on means outside the art itself';
comp.
Rhet. 3. 16, 1416 b 18
σύγκειται γὰρ ἔχων ὁ λόγος τὸ μὲν ἄτεχνον, οὐθὲν γὰρ αἴτιος ὁ λέγων τῶν πράξεων, τὸ δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς τέχνης.
The opposite of it in this sense is
ἔντεχνος (
Bon. Ind. 11964
).
28.
mvp-aristotle-comment-287
1450b18
ἡ γὰρ τῆς τραγῳδίας δύναμις κτέ.
The tragic effect may be produced by a good tragedy even without any actual performance of it on a stage, i. e. as a mere work of literature (
comp.
14, 1453b4
, and
26, 1462ª11
). The reading of A
o here,
ὡς γὰρ, is defended by
Vahlen, who translates it by
quia enim (wenn nämlich), on the assumption that the apodosis is omitted in the same way as in
Eth. N. 8. 6, 1157 3
οἱ δ᾽ ἀγαθοὶ δι᾽ αὐτοὺς φίλοι· ᾗ γὰρ ἀγαθοί
[scil. φίλοι εἰσίν].—
8. 10, 1159 10
οἱ χρήσιμοι δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς ἐπὶ πλεῖον διαμένουσιν ἕως γὰρ ἂν πορίζωσιν ἡδονὰς ἢ ὠφελείας ἀλλήλοις
[scil. διαμένουσιν], and certain more or less similar passages. The present passage (with the reading
ὡς γὰρ) does not seem to me to be a genuine parallel. On behalf of the amended reading (
ἡ γὰρ) it has to be remembered that a confusion between ἡ and the compendium for ὡς is not so uncommon in MSS. of a certain date (
Bast,
Comm. Palaeogr. p. 780
).
28.
mvp-aristotle-comment-288
1450b18_2
ἄνευ ἀγῶνος.
ἀγών is generally rendered by
certamen or 'contest', but it is not clear that that is the sense
Aristotle attaches to it in the present and other places (
7, 1451b
;
13, 1453ª27
) of the
Poetics. It seems to mean rather little more than a 'public performance'. Similarly
ἀγωνίζεσθαι in
7, 1451ª8
and
24, 146089
means apparently 'to perform in public',
συναγωνίζεσθαι in
18, 1456ª26
'to take part in such a performance'; and
ἀγώνισμα in
9, 1451b37
a 'work to be performed in public'. The word
ἀγωνιστής, likewise, in
Pol. 8. 7, 1342=18
and
Probl. 19. 15, 918b 28
, means no more than a 'public' or 'professional performer' (
comp.
πρωταγωνιστής etc.). In
Rhet. 3. 12, 1413b4
ἀγωνιστικὴ λέξις
means the style allowable in public speaking, as distinct from the
γραφικὴ λέξις, the more formal style required for a purely literary work. The idea of contest or competition, there- fore, is not always a recognizable element in the meaning of this group of words (
comp.
Nitzsch,
De historia Homeri 2 p. 113
).
28.
mvp-aristotle-comment-289
1450b18_3
ἀγῶνος καὶ ὑποκριτῶν:
13, 1453ª27
ἐπὶ τῶν σκηνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγώνων.
—
Probl. 19. 15, 918 28
ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑποκριτὴς ἀγωνιστής.
—
Rhet. 3. 12, 141358
ἔστι δὲ λέξις γραφικὴ μὲν ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη, ἀγωνιστικὴ δὲ ἡ ὑποκριτικωτάτη κτέ.
The present clause shows that the
ὄψις is
ἥκιστα οἰκεῖον τῆς ποιητικῆς; the next, that it is
ἀτεχνότατον.
28.
mvp-aristotle-comment-290
1450b18_4
ὄψεων:
for the plural see on
6, 1449b 33
.
28.
mvp-aristotle-comment-291
1450b18_5
σκευοποιοῦ,
the theatrical costumier, who enabled the actors to appear in character by supplying the masks, dresses, and other paraphernalia of their make-up;
comp.
Aristophanes
Eq. 230
καὶ μὴ δέδιθ· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐξῃκασμένος. ὑπὸ τοῦ δέους γὰρ αὐτὸν οὐδεὶς ἤθελε τῶν σκευοποιῶν εἰκάσαι
(v. Schol. ad loc.). —
Aelian
V. H. 2. 13
οἱ σκευοποιοὶ ἔπλασαν αὐτὸν ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα ἐξεικάσαντες.
—
Pollux 4. 115
σκευὴ μὲν ἡ τῶν ὑποκριτῶν στολή . . . σκευοποιός δὲ ὁ προσωποποιός.
—
2. 47
ἡ δὲ νέα κωμῳδία καὶ προσωποποιὸν εἴρηκεν ὃν ἡ ἀρχαία σκευοποιὸν ἐκάλει
(ν. Meineke, FCG. 4 p. 680). For
σκευή in the sense of the make-up of actors see
Eurip. Suppl. 1054
,
Aristoph. Ran. 108
,
Plato Rep. 577 b.
