Aristotle Poetics 13.3

Thomas Twining (Translator)

View: By Part
Neither should the contrary change, from adversity to prosperity, be exhibited in a vitious character: this, of all plans, is the most opposite to the genius of Tragedy, having no one property that it ought to have; for it is neither gratifying in a moral view, nor affecting, nor terrible.

Poetics. Aristotle. Thomas Twining (Translator). London, UK. 1789.

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Poetics (Thomas Twining, 1789) (OCR draft) (English) (Thomas Twining's English translation of Aristotle's Poetics, published in 1789 and aligned to the Kassel reference passage sequence.)

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Editions (4)
Περὶ ποιητικῆς (OCR draft) (Aristotle, Poetics. Immanuel Bekker, editor, Aristotelis Opera, volume 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1837.) — 13 focus
Περὶ ποιητικῆς (OCR draft) Perseus (Aristotle, De arte poetica liber. Rudolf Kassel, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965. Reference edition for passage alignment.) — 13 focus
Poetics, Greek text (Ingram Bywater, 1909) (OCR draft) Experimental (Ingram Bywater's Greek text of Aristotle's Poetics, published in 1909.) — 13 focus
Poetics, Greek text (Franz Ritter, 1839) (OCR draft) Experimental (Franz Ritter's 1839 Greek edition, corrected against OCR of the represented copy and aligned to the conventional Perseus chapter-and-subchapter sequence.) — 13 focus
Translations (13)
Poetics (W. H. Fyfe) (OCR draft) Perseus (William Hamilton Fyfe's English translation of Aristotle's Poetics, Loeb Classical Library, 1939 printing.) — 13 focus
Arabic Poetics (Badawī edition, 1953) (OCR draft) (The ancient Arabic translation of Aristotle's Poetics in ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Badawī's 1953 edition.) — 13 focus
Poetics (S. H. Butcher, 1911) (OCR draft) Experimental (S. H. Butcher's English translation from Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, fourth edition, 1911.) — 13 focus
Aristotle on the Art of Poetry (Ingram Bywater, 1909) (OCR draft) Experimental (Ingram Bywater's English translation of Aristotle's Poetics, published in 1909.) — 13 focus
The Poetic of Aristotle (Henry James Pye, revised 1792) (OCR draft) Experimental (Henry James Pye's revised 1792 English translation, corrected against the 1788 first edition, aligned to the Kassel reference edition, and supplied with a selective apparatus of substantive 1788 readings.) — 13.3 focus
Neither should a very bad man be represented as falling from happiness to misery;
The Poetic of Aristotle (Theodore Alois Buckley) (OCR draft) Experimental (Theodore Alois Buckley's English translation, first published in 1850 and represented from the Henry G. Bohn 1857 printing; corrected against a second OCR and aligned to the Kassel reference passage sequence.) — 13.3 focus
for it neither appeals to moral sense, nor is piteous, nor fearful.
Poetica Latine conversa (Franciscus Ritter, 1839) (OCR draft) Experimental (Franz Ritter's Latin translation, corrected against OCR of the represented copy and aligned to the conventional Perseus chapter-and-subchapter sequence.) — 13 focus
La poëtique d'Aristote (André Dacier, 1692) (OCR draft) Experimental (André Dacier's French translation of Aristotle's Poetics, published in 1692.) — 13.3 focus
Il eſt évident encore qu'il ne faut pas prendre un méchant homme pour le faire paſſer d'un état malheureux à un état heureux & tranquille, Il n'y a rien qui ſoit moins tragique, & on ne voit là aucun des effets de la Tragedie, car outre que cela n'excite, ny la terreur ny la compaſſion, il ne fait aucun plaiſir.
Poetica d'Aristotile (Bernardo Segni, 1549) (OCR draft) Experimental (Bernardo Segni's 1549 Florentine Italian translation, aligned to the Kassel reference passage sequence.) — 13 focus
De poetica (Antonio Riccobono, 1587) (OCR draft) Experimental (Antonio Riccobono's Latin translation, first published in 1587; text represented from Immanuel Bekker's 1831 edition.) — 13 focus
De arte poetica liber (William of Moerbeke, ca. 1277) (OCR draft) Experimental (William of Moerbeke's medieval Latin translation, represented by the 1953 Aristoteles Latinus edition.) — 13 focus
Arabic Poetics (Abū Bishr Mattā; Tkatsch edition) (OCR draft) Experimental (The Arabic translation attributed to Abū Bishr Mattā, edited by Jaroslaus Tkatsch in 1928 and aligned to the Kassel reference passage sequence.) — 13 focus
Arabic Poetics (Abū Bishr Mattā; Tkatsch edition, unaligned) (OCR draft) Experimental (Tkatsch's edition of the medieval Arabic translation in its original, unaligned segmentation.) — 13 focus

Commentary

Commentary on the Poetics (Ingram Bywater, 1909) (OCR draft) (Ingram Bywater's English commentary on Aristotle's Poetics.) focus

3. mvp-aristotle-comment-444

φιλάνθρωπον. The situation having no πάθος, actual or prospective, does not arouse any kind of tragic emotion; it does not appeal to our
philanthropy
, or our pity, or our fears. It is assumed here that
τὸ φιλάνθρωπον
has some sort of tragic value, but not the same as
τὸ ἐλεεινόν
or
τὸ φοβερόν
.
τὸ φιλάνθρωπον
is that which appeals to the φιλάνθρωποι. The φιλάνθρωπος, or tender-hearted man, is able to feel a certain commiseration even for the wicked in misfortune; this feeling, however, is not pity proper, since it lacks the moral basis of all pity, the belief that the misfortune is not deserved. This interpretation of
τὸ φιλάνθρωπον
accords with the use of the term in the context ( 1453 a 3 ; comp. 18, 1456 a 21 ), as well as with the ordinary Greek conception of
φιλανθρωπία
,
fellow-feeling
,
kindliness
,
tender-heartedness
( comp. L. Schmidt, Ethik der Gr. 2 p. 277 ). A certain affinity between φιλανθρωπία and pity is recognized in Rhet. 2. 13, 1390 a 19 , where the tender-heartedness of the young is said to make them easily moved to pity:
ἐλεητικοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ γέροντές εἰσιν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ δια ταὐτὸ τοῖς νέοις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ φιλανθρωπίαν, οἱ δὲ δι' ἀσθένειαν
( comp. Tumlirz l. c. p. 13 ). A very different sense has been attached to the word by Twining and others, who suppose that the situation described as φιλάνθρωπον is one that satisfies our sense of poetical justice, a true lover of mankind being bound to rejoice at the punishment of evil-doers. Any one who remembers what φιλανθρωπία meant to a Greek, will at once see the improbability of this somewhat artificial rendering of
τὸ φιλάνθρωπον
in Aristotle.
1453a2
1453a

Remarques sur la poëtique d'Aristote (André Dacier, 1692) (OCR draft) (André Dacier's French commentary on Aristotle's Poetics.) focus

2. mvp-aristotle-comment-293

13.3 Il est évident encore qu'il ne faut pas prendre un méchant homme pour le faire paſſer d'un état malheureux dans un état heureux, car il n'y a rien qui ſoit moins Tragique.] 1

3. mvp-aristotle-comment-294

13.3 Et on ne voit là aucun des effets de la Tragedie.] 2

4. mvp-aristotle-comment-295

13.3 Car outre qu'il n'excite ny la terreur ny la compaſſion, il ne fait aucun plaifir.] 3

Commentary on the Poetics (Thomas Twining, 1789) (OCR draft) (Thomas Twining's notes on Aristotle's Poetics, aligned to the Kassel reference edition.) focus

94. mvp-aristotle-comment-94

NOTE 94. P. 87.

13.3 FOR IT IS NEITHER GRATIFYING IN A MORAL VIEW, &C.
Οὐτε γαρ ΦΙΛΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΝ
—Without entering into a long discussion of all that has been urged by the commentators in favour of the different senses they have assigned to the word
φιλανθρωπον
here, I shall only say, that, upon the most attentive comparison of this passage with another, in cap. xviii. where the term again occurs, it appears to me, that the full meaning of it is, gratifying to philanthropy; pleasing by its conformity to our natural sense of justice, by its moral tendency . Indeed this seems to follow from the word
μιαρον
, to which
φιλανθρωπον
is opposed. The representation of a good man (
ἐπιεικης
) made miserable is
μιαρον
—disgusting, shocking . Why? Plainly, on account of its evident injustice, and immoral tendency. The representation of a very bad man (
σφοδρα πονηρος
) punished by calamity, is
φιλανθρωπον
; —that is, pleasing to the spectator, on the same principle, from its opposite tendency.
A singular, but somewhat similar, use is made of the same word in Plutarch's dialogue περι Μεσικης ; where, speaking of the wicked innovations of the more modern musicians, Timotheus, Philoxenus, &c. he says of them
φιλοκαινοι γεγονασι, τον ΦΙΛΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΝ και θεματικον ΝΥΝ ΟΝΟΜΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΝ διωξαντες
. M. Burette's note upon this is perfectly unsatisfactory. I believe we should read—
ΤΟ φιλανθρωπον και ΘΕΑΤΡΙΚΟΝ κ. τ. αλ.
—i. e. "being lovers of novelty, they affect what is now termed the pleasing and theatrical style". The Theatre, we know, was considered by the purists of that time, as the great source of corruption in Music. The reader may see how Plutarch rails, on this subject, p. 2081, and 2089 ; where he laments—
παντας τες μεσικης άπτομενες προς την ΘΕΑΤΡΙΚΗΝ προσκεχωρηκεναι μεσαν
. It appears, from his expression,
ΝΥΝ ὀνομαζομενον
, that this was a new and fashionable use of the word
φιλανθρωπον
; which, from the sense of pleasing to natural benevolence, (as in the passage of Aristotle,) seems to have been extended to signify, what was pleasing, and grateful, to the popular taste, in general ; in opposition to those more chaste and severe productions of the artist, which aimed only at the gratification of the critical, and the learned. And, indeed, no sort of philanthropy is more common, in all times, and in every art, than that of accommodation to the public taste. 1

Commentary on the Poetics (Henry James Pye, 1792) (OCR draft) (Henry James Pye's 1792 English commentary, aligned to the Kassel reference edition.) focus

13.3. mvp-aristotle-comment-40 13.3

NEITHER SHOULD A VERY BAD MAN BE REPRESENTED AS FAL- LING FROM HAPPINESS TO MISERY; FOR THOUGH SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT MIGHT BE AGREEABLE TO OUR FEELINGS, IT WOULD EXCITE NEITHER PITY NOR TERROR. FOR ONE OF THESE PASSIONS IS EXCITED BY THE MISFORTUNES OF AN INNOCENT PERSON; THE OTHER BY THE MISFORTUNES OF A PERSON IN THE SAME SITUATION WITH OURSELVES; --SUCH AN EVENT, THEREFORE, WOULD BE NEITHER DISTRESSFUL NOR ALARMING.

IT is very obvious that Ariftotle [B], though he blames this mode of arranging the fable, at least prefers it to that which he has last mentioned, as not incurring the double defect of being disagreeable to our feelings, and at the same time not calculated to excite either pity or terror, and therefore totally repugnant to the nature and end of tragedy. What were the sentiments of the critic with regard to the comparative demerits of this, and the first mode, we can only conjecture, as he is himself filent on the subject; but from the general doctrine he advances, (at least in this chapter,) we must suppose his sentence would be most in favor of the first, as having tragic effect, though difagreeable to our feelings. The Fatal Curiosity of Lillo, which [c] Mr. Harris (I suppose by [B] See note VI. chap. XVIII. [c] See Philological Enquiries, p. 154. Mr. Harris seems to have mistaken the circumtance from which this play takes its name; he supposes the opening the casket to be the FATAL CURIOSITY, but I should rather conceive it to be the defire of the young man to fee the effect of his unexpected return on his parents. Ii way
way of a dramatic paradox) has chofen to compare with the Edipus, falls exactly under the censure of this passage. The misery arifes from no sudden start of paffion, or involuntary error, but from the cruel and deliberate murder of an innocent youth for the fake of his property. Would Mr. Harris (to anticipate a definition in the subsequent part of this chapter) allow this hoary ruffian, and his wife, who murder their fleeping guest with the same purpose and from the fame motive as the midnight housebreaker, to be persons of high reputation and profperity, whose misfortunes arise from some error of human frailty, and whose general characters and conduct in life are rather better and of higher dignity than the illustrious names produced from the annals of Greece; for so the critic says they ought to be if the circumstances allow it. This opinion of Mr. Harris seems to have in great measure arifen from the explanation he gives to the term [D] GOOD, (χρηςός) as applied by Ariftotle to manners. It is to be remarked, that there is another arrangement which Aristotle has omitted; that of a virtuous character raised from distress to profperity, which would at least on his own principles come under the fame class with that which is the object of the present note, being agreeable to our feelings but not productive, according to his hypothesis, of tragic effect, though in reality it is capable of producing it in the highest degree. Since while the principal character, in whose favor the spectators must be most strongly interested appears involved in deep distress, and his destruction appears inevitable, the passions of pity and terror will be violently excited; and, if the tragedy possesses the most perfect form, [D] Philological Enquiries, p. 170. For a different explanation of this term, see note 1, unit-
POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. [E] uniting the discovery, and peripetía with the catastrophe, this will continue through the greatest part of the piece. Aristotle himself says in this passage, that pity is excited by the sufferings of innocence, and there is no reason why the character should not also possess that equality of fituation which he requires as calculated to raise terror. Perhaps on confidering this subject very attentively, weighing all the reasoning of Aristotle on the subject, recollecting how capable fuch an arrangement is of producing pity and terror, and with what thin shades such a character may be diftinguished from that which he afterwards points out as proper for tragedy, we may be the less surprised at his not being perfectly fatisfied with his own hypothesis as to the tragic catastrophe. For to some such wavering of opinion I think, we must impute part of what he says on this fubject in the next chapter [F]. When Aristotle speaks of similitude of character as essential to excite terror, it is obvious he does not mean as to rank in life, but as to difposition, virtue, and domeftic connections; for high rank in life was necessary, both from the practice of the Greek theatre, and the doctrine of Ariftotle, to the principal persons of tragedy. A private citizen of Athens, or of London, might be exactly in the same situation with Edipus, though a monarch, as to every circumstance on which the diftress of the tragedy turns. But though the tale of domestic forrow in private life was not admitted, either into the drama or epopee in the time of Ariftotle, he nevertheless could fee, that the effects of pity and terror must increase in proportion to the resemblance of character in every [E] See chap. xΙ. [F] See note IV, chap. xiv. where there is an attempt to account for this seeming inconsistency on other principles. Ii 2 respect.
respect. For he says in another place [G], 'We pity those who are our equals in age, in manners, in habits, in rank, and in family, fince in • all these circumstances of likeness, the fame things are most likely to ، ، happen to ourselves; and we may conclude in general, that those events which we fear should happen to ourselves, excite our pity when they happen to others.' As a farther illustration of this, and of what I have [H] before advanced, concerning the private life tragedy, especially in prose, I shall produce a quotation from the much admired work of the Abbé Barthelemi. • ZOPIRUS. And why do you not sometimes select these great mif- • fortunes, from the events of private life? They would affect me • much more strongly if I saw them continually happen on every fide ‹ of me. • THEODECTUS. I do not know, if they were drawn by a skilful hand, whether they would not excite our feelings too strongly. When • I take my examples from a rank much fuperior to your own, I leave you the liberty of applying them to yourself, and at the fame time the hope of escaping their consequences.' VOYAGE DU JEUNE ANA- CHARSIS, Chap. LXXI. Tom. IV. p. 32. French Ed. 4to. [C] Καὶ τοὺς ὅμοιους ἐλεῖυσι καθ᾽ ἡλικίαν, κατ᾽ ἤθη, κάθ᾿ ἕξεις, κατ᾿ ἀξιώματα, κατὰ γένει· ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις, μᾶλλον φαίνεθαι καὶ ἀυτῷ ἂν ὑπάρξαι· ὅλως γὰρ καὶ ἐνλᾶυθα δεῖ λαβεῖν, ὅτι ὅσα ἐφ᾽ ἀνθῶν φιβᾶνται, ταῦτα ἐπ᾿ ἄλλων γιγνόμενα ἐλεῦσιν. ARIST. RHET. L. II. CH. VII. [H] See note 1, chap. IV. The
POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. The observations as to the equality of character, extend to unnatural perfection as well as to unnatural deformity, though in a less degree. If a character is drawn compleatly vicious, it is impossible we can place ourselves so in the situation, as to bring it at all home to our own bosoms. We cannot interest ourselves in the fortune of a person, who we are conscious neither resembles ourselves nor any thing else in nature, or pity misfortunes which at once are the consequence and punishment of crimes we abhor. This excess of guilt is I believe seldom, if ever, afsigned to a principal character, but it is sometimes to be met with in fubordinate ones: Glenalvon is a confummate villain, without one quality to foften our indignation and disgust; [1] fince his brutal courage, folely employed in treachery and affaffination, only ferves to encrease our deteftation of him. The defect of the too perfect character is not so obvious. We can indeed at once fee that as to the first cafe, the want of interest on account of fimilarity of manners and situation, the consequence is nearly, if not exactly the fame. I believe Sir Charles Grandifon is much less a favorite with every reader than Tom Jones. But why we are less affected with pity by the sufferings of a perfect than an imperfect character, is not so clear. For if, as Aristotle says, pity is excited by misfortunes that are unmerited; this must apply most strongly to a character completely virtuous [K]. The cause however why we do not sympathife fo [1] See note 1, chap. xv. [K] In the passage quoted in note (G) from the Rhetoric, it appears that the paffions of pity and terror, as laid down there by Aristotle, are only modifications of the fame passion, diftinguished by the force with which they act on our own feelings, and which both depend on the resemblance of the condition and character of the fufferer to those of our own. much
A COMMENTARY ON THE CHAP. XIII. much with the sufferings of a perfect as an imperfect character, may perhaps arife from this circumftance. The resolution in misfortune, the intrepidity in danger, the contempt of pain and death, which are always shewn in a great and heroic character, take off much of our sense of his distress. We may revere, we may wish to emulate such a character, but we cannot feel strongly for a person who disdains to feel for himself. [L] When Iphigenia throws herself at her father's feet, and by the most tender supplications requests him to spare her life, we feel the strongest impreffions of pity; but when assuming a higher resolution, she resolves to devote herself for the glory of her country, we venerate the heroine indeed, but our tears for the trembling virgin are instantly dried. The observation of Horace, [M] To make ME grieve be first your anguish shewn, • And I shall feel your forrows like my own,' COLMAN. is as applicable to the poet's imitation of the character as the actor's performance of it. There is a just observation in the Tatler (No. 30) on this fingularity of feeling. Speaking of two rivals who were killed at the battle of Almanza, Steele makes this remark: 'The beloved lady is a woman of a sensible mind; but she has confefsed to me, that ⚫ after all her true and solid value for Conftant, she had much more concern for the loss of Careless. These noble and ferious spirits • have fomething equal to the adversities they meet with, and confequently lessen the objects of pity. Great accidents seem not cut out • so much for men of familiar characters, which makes them more eafily • pitied and soon after beloved.' [L] In the Iphigenia in Aulis of Euripides. See note VI. chap. xv. [м] ► Si vis me flere, dolendum eft • Primum ipfi tibi.' NOTE

Commentarius in Aristotelis Poeticam (Franciscus Ritter, 1839) (OCR draft) (Ritter's Latin commentary, extracted from the 1839 volume, divided by Ritter's chapters and sections, and linked to the corresponding Perseus reference subsections.) focus

2. mvp-aristotle-comment-88

Ritter, cap. 13 § 2

ἐπειδὴ οὖν δεῖ-ἀλλὰ πεπλεγμένην: haec scribit respiciens quae c. 11. disputaverat. illud tamen, fabulam implexam esse pulcherrimam, non tam demonstravit quam obscure significavit, nisi illa disputatio in brevius ab epitomatore quodam contracta est. conf. Comment. ad. c. 18, 5 extr. τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἄνδρας: vir ἐπιεικής is est quem esse decet, h. e. nullis vitiis infectus, et pluribus virtutibus ornatus. οὐ γὰρ φοβερὸν οὐδὲ ἐλεεινὸν τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ μιαρόν ἐστιν: viri egregie innocentis insignis calamitas in tragoedia repraesentata neque metum neque miserationem nostram potest excitare, propterea quod illam accidere posse primum credere vix sustinemus, tum quod indignatio de eiusmodi casu in nobis orta metum miserationemque opprimere solet. illud enim indignum est ac foedum ( μιαρόν), ideoquc non misereri nos facit, sed indignari. huius pronuntiati veritatem praeclare perspexit et optime vindicavit Lessingius in Dramaturgia Hamburgensi c. 82. οὔτε γὰρ φιλάνθρωπον οὔτε ἐλεεινὸν οὔτε φοβερόν ἐστιν : ubi improbus ex infelice felix evaserit, neque timor neque miseratio, ne id quidem quod prope ad miserationem accedit, h. e. τὸ φιλάνθρωπον, excitari potest. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλάνθρωπον ἔχοι ἂν ἡ τοιαύτη σύστασις: si vir improbus pro felice factus erit infelix, ne id quidem tragicum videbitur. nam cum ea sit humanissimi cuiusque natura, ut vel scelestissimi hominis calamitate moveatur, miseratio tamen metusque illa re oriri nequeunt. nam ut miseratione afficiamur, requiritur ut innocens sit qui aerumnis conflictatur: ὁ μὲν ( ἔλεος) γὰρ περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιών ἐστι δυστυχοῦντα. conf. Rhetor. II, 8 et 9. nec vero metus emergit, ne nobis idem accidat, cum nemo spectantium vel legentium tam sese improbum esse credat, ut simili poena plecti çommereat. ἔλεος μὲν περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον, φόβος δὲ περὶ τὸν ὅμοιον: mirum sane videtur neminem adhuc vidisse haec orta esse ex nota in margine posita. nimirum additamentum ad sententiam enuntiandam non modo plane supervacaneum est, sed etiam his verbis sublatis ne vestigium quidem obscuritatis exsistit, cum unusquisque Graece mediocriter doctus ὁ μὲν referri intelligat ad έλεον modo positum, alterum autem ὁ δὲ ad φόβον. copiosius Aristoteles de miseratione metuque disputavit in Rhetoricis II, 5 et 8 et 9.