136.
mvp-aristotle-comment-136
NOTE 136. P. 98.
17.3
IN COMPOSING, THE POET SHOULD ALSO, AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE, BE AN ACTOR.
Τοις σχήμασι συναπεργαζομενον ποιειν
. — The same expression occurs in the
Rhetoric III. 8
.
ἀναγκη τους συναπεργαζομενους σχήμασι, και φωναις, και ἐσθητι, και όλως τη ὑποκρισει, ἐλεεινοτερους ειναι
. But there, this is mentioned only as the means, by which the Orator may excite greater emotion in the hearer, immediately: here, as the means, by which the Poet may excite a stronger emotion, a greater reality of imagination and feeling, and a more perfect alienation of person, if I may venture so to call it, in himself, immediately; in order to produce afterwards a correspondent effect upon the spectator, by the force and truth of his imitation.
"I have often observed,"
says the admirable author of the
Inquiry concerning the Sublime and Beautiful,
1
"that on mimicking the looks and gestures of angry, or placid, or frighted, or daring men, I have involuntarily found my mind turned to that passion whose appearance I endeavoured to imitate; nay, I am convinced it is hard to avoid it, though one strove to separate the passion from its correspondent gestures."
I believe, however, it is hardly possible to put on the bodily appearance of any passion,
without previously turning the mind, in some degree, to that passion. But it is certain, that the effect, in this case, will react upon the cause, and convert a slight and nascent emotion into a more steady, strong, and real feeling of the passion.
A singular instance of the practice of this rule of
Aristotle —
σχημασι συναπεργαζομενον ποιειν
— in a sister art, is given in the following curious account, from
Felibien, of
Domenichino, a painter remarkable for expression.
"Il ne pouvoit comprendre qu’il y eut des peintres qui travaillassent à des ouvrages considérables avec si peu d’application, que pendant leur travail ils ne laisassent pas de s’entretenir avec leurs amis. Il les regardoit comme des ouvriers qui n’avoient que la pratique, et nulle intelligence de l’art; etant persuadé qu’un Peintre, pour bien réüssir, doit entrer dans une parfaite connoissance des affections de l’esprit et des passions de l’ame; qu’il doit les sentir en lui même, et s’il faut ainsi dire, faire les memes actions et souffrir les mêmes mouvemens qu’il veut représenter: ce qui ne se peut au milieu des distractions. Aussi on l’entendoit quelquefois parler en travaillant, avec une voix languissante et pleine de douleur, ou tenir des discours agréables et joyeux, selon les divers sentimens qu’il avoit intention d’exprimer. Mais pour cela, il s’enfermoit dans un lieu fort retiré, pour n’être pas apperçu dans ces differens états, ni par ses eléves, ni par ceux de sa famille; parcequ’il lui étoit arrivé quelquefois, que des gens qui l’avoient vû dans ces transports, l’avoient soupçonné de folie. Lorsque dans sa jeunesse il travailloit au Tableau, du Martyre de S. André qui est à S. Gregoire, Annibal Carrache étant allé pour le voir, il le surprit comme il étoit dans une action de colére et menaçante. Après l’avoir observé quelque temps, il connut qu’il representoit un soldat qui menace le S. Apôtre. Alors ne pouvant plus se tenir caché, il s’approcha du Dominiquin, et en l’embrassant, lui avoüa qu’il avoit dans ce moment-là beaucoup appris de lui."
2
I will just observe, farther, that this precept, or rather counsel, of
Aristotle, would appear the less strange to the Poets of his time, because, as he himself tells us, the earlier Tragic Poets were also actors:
ὑπεκρινοντο γαρ αυτοι Τραγῳδιας οι ποιηται το πρωτον
. —
Rhet. III. 1
. But, indeed, I am so far from seeing any thing strange or improbable in this advice, that, on the contrary, if it be liable to any objection at all, it is, perhaps, rather to that of being unnecessary: for I scarce believe, that any Poet of genius, antient or modern, ever yet composed a Tragedy without practising involuntarily, in some degree or other, what the critic here recommends. No dramatic Poetry, I think, can be less chargeable with the
μανικον
, than that of the French. Yet
M. Marmontel sees no difficulty in this precept. In his account of this part of
Aristotle’s work, he says,
"Il recommande que l’on soit présent à l’action que l’on veut peindre, que l’on se penetre soi-meme des sentimens que l’on doit exprimer, et qu’on imite, en composant, l’action des personnages qu’on met sur la scene: méthode qui contribue réellement à donner au style plus de chaleur et de vérité."
[
Poet. Franc. I. p. 15.]
Mr. Mason says of the late ingenious and amiable
Mr. Whitehead, whose dramatic compositions, whatever other merit may justly be allowed them, certainly bear no marks of any unmanageable phrensy in the Poet, that "he is apt to believe, that he always acted, or at least declaimed, while he was composing for the stage." If, then, even the modern Tragic Poet is, almost necessarily, more or less, "an actor in composing," there can surely be little difficulty in conceiving an
Aeschylus, or a
Sophocles, in their free, solitary, and unwritten meditations, to have given still greater scope to their imaginations, and,
ΟΣΑ ΔΥΝΑΤΟΝ
, at least,
σχημασι συναπεργασασθαι
. We must, for once, divest ourselves of modern ideas, and think, not of a spruce Poet of "these degenerate days," shut up in his study, with his pen in his hand, and his writing-table before him — but of
Euripides, retired into that lonely, dark, and shaggy cavern, which is said to have been the favourite scene of his
Tragic meditations.
"Philochorus refert, in insulâ Salamine speluncam esse tetram et horridam, quam nos vidimus, in quâ Euripides Tragedias fcriptitarit."
—
Aul. Gell. xv. 20
.
137.
mvp-aristotle-comment-137
NOTE 137. P. 98.
17.3
FOR BY NATURAL SYMPATHY, &C.
Πιθανωτατοι γαρ ἀπο της αυτης φυσεως δι ἐν παθεσιν εισι
. — Nothing, I think, can be more forced and improbable, than the sense given to the words,
ἀπο της αυτης φυσεως
, by
Victorius, and, after him, by
Goulston and
Dacier:
"eorum qui pari naturâ ingenioque præditi, &c."
"De deux hommes qui seront d’un égal genie, celui qui se mettra dans la passion sera toujours plus persuasif."
If the text be right, the only sense I see is that given by
Heinsius:
"propter similitudinem ejusdem naturæ:"
i. e. "from natural sympathy." — But I am much disposed to suspect, that we should read,
ἀπ᾿ ΑΥΤΗΣ ΤΗΣ φυσεως
—
ab ipsa naturâ
; —
Ipsa naturâ comparatum est, ut, &c.
A similar, but contrary, transposition, of the same words, occurred at the end of the second chapter:
ἐν ἀυτῃ δε τη διαφορα
— plainly, as
Victorius observes, instead of
ΤΗ ΑΥΤΗ
. And, indeed, this sense is so obvious, that
Robortelli,
Castelvetro, and
Piccolomini, have all given it in their translations, though certainly not warranted by the text. However, as the other reading seems to express, though somewhat obscurely, the same idea, I have not departed from it any farther, than by adopting the explanatory version of
Heinsius, which takes the meaning, and leaves the obscurity.
138.
mvp-aristotle-comment-138
NOTE 138. P. 98.
17.3
WE SHARE THE AGITATION OF THOSE WHO APPEAR TO BE TRULY AGITATED-THE ANGER OF THOSE WHO APPEAR TO BE TRULY ANGRY.
Χειμαινει ὁ χειμαζομενος, και χαλεπαινει ὁ ὀργιζομενος ἀληθινωτατα
. I have given that sense of this passage, in which all the commentators I have seen are perfectly agreed. But I cannot dissemble a difficulty which has always occurred to me in this interpretation, though, to my surprise, I have not found it any where taken notice of. I mean, that it gives a transitive sense to the verbs,
χειμαινει
, and
χαλεπαινει
.
With respect, particularly, to the verb
χαλεπαινειν
, (for the other occurs but seldom,) the difficulty from the general, if not the constant, use of it, as a verb neuter, seems not easily to be overcome. This use of it, by
Aristotle himself, and by other prose writers, is so common and well known, that it would be mere trifling to produce instances. That it is never used by them transitively, it would be rash, perhaps, even in those, whose Greek reading is much more extensive than my own, to affirm. I can only say, that I have never seen a clear instance of it, either in prose, or verse. The lexicographers, indeed, send us to
Homer: but without giving any instance that appears to me to be at all decisive.
3
And, on the other hand, the word occurs clearly in its usual and intransitive sense in other passages: as,
Il. Ξ. 256. Π. 386. Σ. 103, &c.
But even admitting the verb to be now and then used by
Homer in a sense indisputably transitive, it seems very unlikely, that
Aristotle should transplant so rare, and poetical, a use of the word, into plain and philosophical prose; especially as other verbs were probably at hand, if he meant what
he is supposed to mean, which would not have been liable to this ambiguity.
This difficulty has sometimes led me to suspect, that the passage may possibly, after all, admit of a different sense; and that
Aristotle may have meant only to say this: — "The Poet should work himself, as far as may be, into the passion he is to represent, by even assuming the countenance, and the gestures, which are its natural expressions. For they, of course, have most probability and truth in their imitation, who actually feel, in some degree, the passion: and no one expresses agitation of mind (
χειμαινει
) so naturally, (
ἀληθινωτατα
,) as he who is really agitated, (
χειμαζομενος
,) or expresses anger (
χαλεπαινει
) so naturally, as he who is really angry (
ὀργιζομενος
.)" — Thus, the forms,
χειμαινει
,
χαλεπαινει
, will retain their neuter signification, referring to the Poet’s expression of the passion in his composition; as,
χειμαζομενου
, and
ὀργιζομενου
, refer to the internal feeling of the passion, which he has excited in his own mind.
Χειμαζεσθαι
— to be violently agitated in mind: —
Χειμαινειν
— to express that agitation by words or actions:
ὀργιζεσθαι
— to be angry:
χαλεπαινειν
— to express that anger by words or actions.
It will, perhaps, be objected, that
χαλεπαινειν
, used as a verb neuter, appears to be synonymous with
ὀργιζεσθαι
. That it may be often so, I will not take upon me to deny: but numerous instances may certainly be produced, where it is not so — where it clearly denotes something beyond the mere internal passion. In this line of
Homer, for example;
Ζευς, ὅτε δη ῥ' ἀνδρεσσι ΚΟΤΕΣΣΑΜΕΝΟΣ ΧΑΛΕΠΗΝΗΙ.
Il. Π. 386.
—
"iratus sæviat;"
— where the anger of
Jupiter is expressed by
κοτεσσάμενος
but
χαλεπήνη
goes on to the external demonstration of it,
ὅτε λαβροτατον χεει ὑδωρ
. [
v. 385
]
4
So, too,
Od. Τ. v. 83
.
Μη πως τοι δεσποινα κοτεσσάμενη ΧΑΛΕΠΗΝΗ
— which, in vulgar language, would be fairly rendered, "lest your mistress should be angry, and scold."
Thus, again,
Il. Ο. 256
, of
Jupiter:
ὁ δ᾽ ἐπεγρομενος ΧΑΛΕΠΑΙΝΕ ΡΙΠΤΑΖΩΝ ΚΑΤΑ ΔΩΜΑ ΘΕΟΥΣ.
In the very passage adduced to exemplify the transitive use of this verb,
Il. Τ. 183
, it appears to have the same sense: for the words,
ὅτε τις προτερου χαλεπηνη
, allude to
Agamemnon’s own words,
Il. Β. 378
.
Και γαρ ἐγων Αχιλευς τε μαχεσσαμεθ᾽, εἵνεκα κουρης, Αντιβίοις ΕΠΕΕΣΣΙΝ· ἐγω δ᾽ ΗΡΧΟΝ ΧΑΛΕΠΑΙΝΩΝ.
Χαλεπαινειν
is here, I think, put as synonymous with
μαχεσθαι ἔπεεσσιν
.
Agamemnon confesses, that he himself gave the first verbal provocation — alluding, I think, to his speech, v. 131, where he first hints at the seizure of
Briseis. For though
Achilles speaks, indeed, somewhat roughly to the king in the preceding speech, yet his wrath cannot properly be said to commence before the subsequent speech,
Ω μοι, ἀναιδείην
, &c. [
v. 149
.]
I shall add only an instance or two more. In the
first book of Plato’s Repub.
Socrates says to
Thrasymachus,
ἐλεεισθαι οὖν ἡμας πολυ μαλλον εικός ἐστι παρ᾽ ὑμων των δεινων, ἢ ΧΑΛΕΠΑΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ
— i. e. "we deserve rather to be pitied by you wise men, than to be scolded at." In the passage quoted NOTE 22, p. 188,
Plato says of a dog,
ὃν μεν ἂν ἴδῃ ἀγνωτα, ΧΑΛΕΠΑΙΝΕΙ· — ὃν δ᾽ ἂν γνωριμον, ΑΣΠΑΖΕΤΑΙ
: "fawns on those he knows, and barks at strangers." In the
Memorabilia of
Xenophon,
II. 2
, we have —
Αισθομενος δε ποτε Λαμπροκλεα, τον πρεσβύτατον υἱον ἑαυτου, προς την μητερα ΧΑΛΕΠΑΙΝΟΝΤΑ
: i.e. "when he had heard him speaking angrily to his mother." It seems, then, that the passage will fairly admit of the meaning I have proposed, And whether that meaning would
not be more to
Aristotle’s purpose, than the other, I willingly submit to the reader’s consideration. For why recommend it to the Poet to help his imagination by action, when he composes? — plainly, for the sake of the effect of this method upon his poetry; that his expression of passion may have more of truth and nature; that his characters may
χειμαινειν
, or
χαλεπαινειν
,
ἀληθινωτατα
.
5
Now it seems more consonant to this purpose, that the words which follow as the reason of the advice, should refer to this immediate effect upon the Poet’s work, which is the object of the advice, than to the more remote and implied effect of the work upon the spectator. It seems, indeed, to have been this reference to the audience, in the usual way of understanding the passage, that led
Madius into the mistake of supposing this precept intended, not for the Poet, but for the Player.
Such are my objections to the sense hitherto given to this passage, and my reasons for thinking, that its meaning may have been mistaken. I abandon them, without reserve, to the judgment of the learned reader: in my own, it is impossible for me to confide, when I reflect, that the whole band of commentators, who have preceded me, have acquiesced, without doubt or scruple, in that interpretation which to me appears so unsatisfactory.
