Aristotle Poetics 6.4

ed. Henry James Pye

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and by the forms being distinct in their respective parts, that some parts attain their end by verse only and others have the assistance of music. 1 2

Poetics. Aristotle. ed. Henry James Pye. London. 1792.

Current edition Experimental

The Poetic of Aristotle (Henry James Pye, revised 1792) (OCR draft) (English) (Henry James Pye's revised 1792 English translation, corrected against the 1788 first edition, aligned to the Kassel reference edition, and supplied with a selective apparatus of substantive 1788 readings.)

Provisional text from uncorrected OCR; expect errors.

Editions (4)
Περὶ ποιητικῆς (OCR draft) (Aristotle, Poetics. Immanuel Bekker, editor, Aristotelis Opera, volume 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1837.) — 6 focus
Περὶ ποιητικῆς (OCR draft) Perseus (Aristotle, De arte poetica liber. Rudolf Kassel, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965. Reference edition for passage alignment.) — 6 focus
Poetics, Greek text (Ingram Bywater, 1909) (OCR draft) Experimental (Ingram Bywater's Greek text of Aristotle's Poetics, published in 1909.) — 6 focus
Poetics, Greek text (Franz Ritter, 1839) (OCR draft) Experimental (Franz Ritter's 1839 Greek edition, corrected against OCR of the represented copy and aligned to the conventional Perseus chapter-and-subchapter sequence.) — 6 focus
Translations (13)
Poetics (W. H. Fyfe) (OCR draft) Perseus (William Hamilton Fyfe's English translation of Aristotle's Poetics, Loeb Classical Library, 1939 printing.) — 6 focus
Arabic Poetics (Badawī edition, 1953) (OCR draft) (The ancient Arabic translation of Aristotle's Poetics in ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Badawī's 1953 edition.) — 6 focus
Poetics (S. H. Butcher, 1911) (OCR draft) Experimental (S. H. Butcher's English translation from Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, fourth edition, 1911.) — 6 focus
Aristotle on the Art of Poetry (Ingram Bywater, 1909) (OCR draft) Experimental (Ingram Bywater's English translation of Aristotle's Poetics, published in 1909.) — 6 focus
Poetics (Thomas Twining, 1789) (OCR draft) Experimental (Thomas Twining's English translation of Aristotle's Poetics, published in 1789 and aligned to the Kassel reference passage sequence.) — 6.4 focus
And I add, by different means in different parts, because in some parts metre alone is employed, in others, melody.
The Poetic of Aristotle (Theodore Alois Buckley) (OCR draft) Experimental (Theodore Alois Buckley's English translation, first published in 1850 and represented from the Henry G. Bohn 1857 printing; corrected against a second OCR and aligned to the Kassel reference passage sequence.) — 6.4 focus
And it uses separately the several species [of imitation], because some parts of the tragedy are alone perfected through metres, and others again through melody. 1
Poetica Latine conversa (Franciscus Ritter, 1839) (OCR draft) Experimental (Franz Ritter's Latin translation, corrected against OCR of the represented copy and aligned to the conventional Perseus chapter-and-subchapter sequence.) — 6 focus
La poëtique d'Aristote (André Dacier, 1692) (OCR draft) Experimental (André Dacier's French translation of Aristotle's Poetics, published in 1692.) — 6.4 focus
& j'ajoûte, mais differemment dans toutes ſes parties, parce que le vers regne dans les unes, & le nombre & l'harmonie dans les autres.
Poetica d'Aristotile (Bernardo Segni, 1549) (OCR draft) Experimental (Bernardo Segni's 1549 Florentine Italian translation, aligned to the Kassel reference passage sequence.) — 6 focus
De poetica (Antonio Riccobono, 1587) (OCR draft) Experimental (Antonio Riccobono's Latin translation, first published in 1587; text represented from Immanuel Bekker's 1831 edition.) — 6 focus
De arte poetica liber (William of Moerbeke, ca. 1277) (OCR draft) Experimental (William of Moerbeke's medieval Latin translation, represented by the 1953 Aristoteles Latinus edition.) — 6 focus
Arabic Poetics (Abū Bishr Mattā; Tkatsch edition) (OCR draft) Experimental (The Arabic translation attributed to Abū Bishr Mattā, edited by Jaroslaus Tkatsch in 1928 and aligned to the Kassel reference passage sequence.) — 6 focus
Arabic Poetics (Abū Bishr Mattā; Tkatsch edition, unaligned) (OCR draft) Experimental (Tkatsch's edition of the medieval Arabic translation in its original, unaligned segmentation.) — 6 focus

Notes on the current edition

Poetics

1. That is the regular epopee to which hexameter verse was an essential ornament.
2. The conjunction άλλα, which is omitted in all the Mss. should certainly not be inserted, as no oppofition between ἀπαγελίας and ἐλές και φόβs can possibly be intended. See Winstanley's note. For a farther investigation of this celebrated definition of tragedy, with the various opinions of different commentators and translator's own conjectures (he prefumes to offer nothing more,) the reader is referred to note 1, ch. vi. of the Commentary.

Commentary

Commentary on the Poetics (Ingram Bywater, 1909) (OCR draft) (Ingram Bywater's English commentary on Aristotle's Poetics.) focus

1. mvp-aristotle-comment-195

1. mvp-aristotle-comment-196

1449b21 περὶ . . . τῆς ἐν ἑξαμέτροις μιμητικῆς : in chaps. 23–24 .

1. mvp-aristotle-comment-197

περὶ κωμῳδίας : in the lost Second Book of the Poetics.

1. mvp-aristotle-comment-198

1449b23 ἀναλαβόντες : Top. 6. 14, 151 b 19
καλῶς εἰρημένον ὅρον ἀναλαβεῖν
. — Meteor. 1. 3, 339 a 33
ἀναλαβόντες οὖν τὰς ἐξ ἀρχῆς θέσεις . . λέγωμεν
. — 1. 8, 345 b 31
ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγωμεν ἀναλαβόντες τὴν ὑποκειμένην ἀρχὴν ἡμῖν
. — Rhet. 1. 13, 1373 b 27
ἀναλαβόντες τί ἐστι τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι λέγωμεν
.

1. mvp-aristotle-comment-199

ὅρον τῆς οὐσίας : the definition of its essence, or essential nature; comp. Metaph. Z 13, 1039 a 19
δοκεῖ γε πᾶσι καὶ ἐλέχθη πάλαι ἢ μόνον εἶναι οὐσίας ὅρον ἢ μάλιστα
. — De part. an. 1. 1, 642 a 26
ὁρίσασθαι τὴν οὐσίαν
. — 4. 5, 678 a 34
τῷ λόγῳ... τῷ ὁρίζοντι τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῶν
.
1449b24

2. mvp-aristotle-comment-200

ἔστιν οὖν τραγῳδία κτέ. The definition, which is in logical form, per genus et differentias, professes to be a summary of points already established; and in its principal elements it is that. (1) That Tragedy is a μίμησις was said in 1, 1447 a 13 ; and that it is a μίμησις πράξεως is implied in 1, 1447 a 28 . (2) σπουδαίας, which differentiates Tragedy from Comedy, recalls chap. 2 and 4, 1448 b 34 — καὶ τελείας μέγεθος ἐχούσης being added in recognition apparently of the point indicated in 4, 1449 a 19 . (3) The means in Tragedy were noted in 1, 1447 b 24–28 ; and (4) the dramatic manner of its imitation in 3, 1448 a 23–28 . But for the concluding clause, on the effect of Tragedy on the emotions, we have not been prepared by anything in the earlier chapters. Aristotle no doubt regarded one part of it, δι᾽ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου, as self-evident, but the rest is presumably an anticipation of a point worked out at length in the lost Second Book of the Poetics. In just the same way we find him using the term προαιρετική in the definition of virtue in Eth. N. 2. 6, 1106 b 36 , and reserving the formal explanation of προαίρεσις for 3. 4, 1111 b 4 . This concluding clause is an integral part of the definition, since the end of the thing to be defined cannot be ignored in any logically complete statement of its nature ( De anima 1. 1, 403 a 25 ; Metaph. H 2, 1043 a 14 ).

2. mvp-aristotle-comment-201

1449b25 τελείας μέγεθος ἐχούσης The point is considered in chap. 7, where 'completeness' is said to imply a whole of some magnitude ( 7, 1450 b 24 ). We have not yet been told that the action in Tragedy must be a τελεία πρᾶξις, but from the explanatory μέγεθος ἐχούσης Aristotle would seem to regard the point as the natural consequence of the μέγεθος mentioned already in 4, 1449 a 19 as one of the characteristics of Tragedy proper. In that case the term distinguishes Tragedy proper with its complete and self-contained stories from the rudimentary Drama of an earlier period.

2. mvp-aristotle-comment-202

ἡδυσμένῳ : Plato Rep. 607 A
εἰ δὲ τὴν ἡδυσμένην μοῦσαν παραδέξῃ ἐν μέλεσιν ἢ ἔπεσιν, ἡδονή σοι καὶ λύπη ἐν τῇ πόλει βασιλεύσετον
. The word is taken from cookery (comp. De sensu 4, 442 a 10 ). The nature of the metaphor may be seen, in the case of the substantive ἥδυσμα, from Aristotle's criticism of the style of Alcidamas in Rhet. 3. 3, 1406 a 19
οὐ γὰρ ἡδύσματι χρῆται ἀλλ᾿ ὡς ἐδέσματι τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις
 ('the sauce with him is the dish'). Said of language ἡδυσμένος implies the accession of something (here metre and music) to make it agreeable, just as κοσμηθῆναι in 4, 1449 a 29 meant the accession of something to make the work beautiful. An echo of this passage (comp. 6, 1450 b 11 ) may perhaps be recognized in Plutarch Erot. 769 C
λόγῳ ποίησις ἡδύσματα (τὰ) μέλη καὶ μέτρα καὶ ῥυθμοὺς ἐφαρμόσασα
 , and also in Strabo 818 Cas.
φλυαροῦσιν ὥσπερ μέλος ἢ ῥυθμὸν [ἢ] ἥδυσμά τι τῷ λόγῳ τὴν τερατείαν προσφέροντες
. The metaphor reappears in Shakespeare, Hamlet 2. 2
I remember one said there were no sallets in the lines to make the matter savoury
.

2. mvp-aristotle-comment-203

ἑκάστῳ τῶν εἰδῶν scil. τῶν ἡδυσμάτων, understood from ἡδυσμένῳ. Similarly in Isocrates 190 D
περὶ τούτων δηλῶσαι μὴ μόνον τοῖς τεταγμένοις ὀνόμασιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ξένοις τὰ δὲ καινοῖς τὰ δὲ μεταφοραῖς, καὶ μηδὲν παραλιπεῖν ἀλλὰ πᾶσι τοῖς εἶδεσι διαποικίλαι τὴν ποίησιν
 one may supply τῶν ὀνομάτων with εἶδεσι. For another instance of this allusive use of εἶδος see 25, 1461 b 22 . In what follows (b 29) ἑκάστῳ τῶν εἰδῶν is replaced by τοῖς εἶδεσι ; the reading of the MS., ἑκάστου, seems to have arisen through χωρίς having been mistaken for a preposition. The juxtaposition of χωρίς and ἑκάστῳ is just like that in Pol. 7. 1, 1323 b 41
καὶ χωρὶς ἑκάστῳ καὶ κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεσιν
 (comp.
χωρὶς ἕκαστον
in De caelo 2. 12, 292 a 13 , b 27) . The implied antithesis in the present passage is between 'each separately' ( χωρίς), and 'all together, and at once' ( ἅμα: comp. De gen. et corr. 1. 5, 322 a 13 , and Metaph. E 4, 1027 b 23 ). Tragedy (unlike the Dithyramb etc.) has the ἥδυσμα of metre in the dialogue, and that of melody only in the choral parts (see on 1, 1447 b 28 ). ἑκάστῳ, therefore, is loosely put for ἑκατέρῳ (comp. Pol. 3. 12, 1282 b 38 , and HSt. s. v. ).

2. mvp-aristotle-comment-204

1449b26 δρώντων scil. τῶν μιμουμένων , the subject being omitted as it is in 13, 1450 a 10 , 21, b 31, and 26, 1461 b 29 . Other Aristotelian instances of this ellipse with a gen. absolute may be seen in Bon. Ind. 149 b 29 . Tyrwhitt, with less probability, as it seems to me, supplies μίμησις with δρώντων, comparing 3, 1448 a 29
μιμοῦνται δρῶντας
.

2. mvp-aristotle-comment-205

οὐ δι᾿ ἀπαγγελίας scil. μιμουμένων.

2. mvp-aristotle-comment-206

1449b27 δι᾽ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου means practically δι᾿ ἐλεεινῶν καὶ φοβερῶν, 'by piteous and alarming scenes'; comp. Goulston's paraphrase ,
'per misericordiam metumque factis expressum'
. The more abstract form of expression is adopted in order to prepare the way for τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων. For the use of the preposition in this connexion comp.
διὰ μέτρων περαίνεσθαι
in b 30 . — De part. an. 3. 4, 666 a 15
περαίνονται [scil. αἱ κινήσεις] διὰ τοῦ ἕλκειν καὶ ἀνιέναι
. — Plato Gorg. 450 D
διὰ λόγου πᾶν περαίνουσι
. — Rep. 392 D
δι᾿ ἀμφοτέρων περαίνουσιν
 (v. Bernays, Zwei Abhandl. p. 85 ). This excitement of pity and fear is, as far as the poet is concerned, the end of Tragedy, but it is in truth only a means to its ultimate end, its κάθαρσις of such emotions.

2. mvp-aristotle-comment-207

τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν 'its catharsis of such emotions' , just as ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μίμησιν ( 1, 1447 a 22 ; 6, 1449 b 31 ) means 'to make their imitation', and ποιεῖν τὴν ἡδονήν ( 4, 1448 b 18 ), 'to produce its pleasure' (comp. 4, 1448 b 7 , and Kühner, Gr. Gr. 2. 1 p. 593 ). The article, in fact, is not so otiose as is usually supposed. This interpretation of the article removes more than one of the preliminary difficulties in this much debated passage, the implication being that a cathartic effect is not peculiar to Tragedy; so that the text is seen at once to stand in close relation to the passage in Pol. 8. 7 (v. Fr. V), in which the existence of several forms of catharsis is affirmed. Aristotle recognizes there a catharsis of 'enthusiasm' effected by certain kinds of music, as well as a catharsis of pity and fear effected by Tragedy ; and there is reason to think that a catharsis of laughter also must have been similarly posited as the effect and ultimate justification of Comedy in the lost Second Book of the Poetics. τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων, therefore, is a general expression for this whole group of disturbing emotions (enthusiasm, pity, fear, etc.), instead of being, as is so often thought, either limited to the two emotions (pity and fear) which appear in the context, or applying to the emotions in general. The great difficulty, however, in this formula is as to the interpretation of κάθαρσις. Is the term to be understood as a physiological metaphor, in the sense of 'purging', or 'clearing away' ; or as a metaphor from the religious rite of lustration, in the sense of 'purification'? The ancient evidence, in Aristotle and elsewhere, is to my mind very decidedly in favour of the first interpretation. I. This, the pathological interpretation, as it may be called, is now generally associated with the names of Weil (1848) and Bernays (1857), who each independently arrived at a very similar conclusion. It is in reality much older; all its essential points in fact are to be found in Tyrwhitt's note on the present passage :
'Satis apparet, Aristotelem hic regulam de tragoedia tragica instituisse, qua scilicet probaret affectus misericordiae et metus, qui in tragoediis vehementissime excitantur, non ex eo nutriri et validiores effici, quod Plato criminabatur, sed contra levari et exhauriri; et proinde affectuum horum purgationem opus esse proprium et quasi finem Tragoediae; cum caeterae Poesis species vel ad doctrinam, vel ad delectationem magis aptae sint.'
. To understand Aristotle's position we have to go back to Plato's condemnation of the Drama in the Tenth Book of the Republic. One of Plato's points is, that the Drama appeals mainly to two of the inferior elements in the soul, our faculty for grief ( τὸ θρηνῶδες, τὸ ἐλεεινόν) and our faculty for laughter ; and that its effect is to gratify these at the expense of the reason, and ultimately to weaken or nullify the self-control prescribed by reason ( Rep. 605 c-606 c ). As a view like this, supported by so great a name, could hardly be ignored by Aristotle in an Art of Poetry based throughout on the assumption of the legitimacy of the Drama, and of the emotional effects it aims at, his catharsis theory may very well be supposed to have been intended as his answer to the Platonic indictment. Though the formal exposition of the theory, as it was to be read in the complete Poetics, is no longer before us, it is still possible to recover some idea of it from the two statements in the Politics on the 'cathartic' effect of certain kinds of music. In Pol. 8. 6, 1341 a 21 , as a reason for leaving the flute to professionals, instead of making it part of a liberal education for all, Aristotle explains that the flute, instead of having an 'ethical' effect, is simply orgiastic or exciting, and to be kept for the times when the hearing of music is a 'catharsis' rather than a form of instruction:
οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ αὐλὸς ἠθικὸν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀργιαστικόν, ὥστε πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους αὐτῷ καιροὺς χρηστέον ἐν οἷς ἡ θεωρία κάθαρσιν μᾶλλον δύναται ἢ μάθησιν
. It will be seen that a sharp distinction is drawn here between the emotional effect of the flute, and the 'ethical' effect of certain other kinds of music ; and that κάθαρσις is in Aristotle's view connected with the former rather than with the latter. A much more important passage, however, is that in Pol. 8. 7, 1341 b 32 , which will be found in extenso among the Fragments of the Poetics (Fr. V). It begins by assuming a current division of 'airs' into ἠθικά, πρακτικά, καὶ ἐνθουσιαστικὰ μέλη, and a similar classification of 'harmonies' or modes. The distinction here is between (1) the music that imitates character, and has thus a reflex influence on the character of the hearer (comp. Pol. 8. 5, 1340 b ); (2) that which imitates action (comp. Plato Rep. 399 A ), and moves us to it ; and (3) that which imitates, and so arouses in us, the orgy of emotion termed by the Greeks 'enthusiasm'. The most 'ethical' harmonies may be practised by all, as a regular part of their lives; whereas the other two kinds are to be left to professionals. This tolerance of the 'enthusiastic harmonies' in a well-ordered state Aristotle justifies by showing that they stand in much the same position as Tragedy. There are certain emotions, he tells us, which arise in some degree in every man's soul, and in a disquieting degree ( ἰσχυρῶς) in certain of us, e.g. pity and fear. Enthusiasm is one of these disturbing emotions. Experience, however, shows that the enthusiastic music (that of the hymns of Olympus, for instance) has a salutary effect on those subject to accesses ( κατοκώχιμοι) of enthusiasm, restoring them to a normal condition of calm and peace ( καθισταμένους: comp. Bon. Ind. 356 a 35 and 375 a 8 ), just as though they had undergone a cure or catharsis at the hands of a physician ( ὥσπερ ἰατρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως). The same sort of treatment ( πάσχειν) is required by other emotional natures also, e.g. by those liable to accesses of pity and fear, and by the rest of mankind likewise, in so far as they have a share in these feelings ; all want a certain catharsis, a pleasurable relief ( κουφίζεσθαι) from emotion. And it is in just the same way (i.e. by the relief they bring) that the cathartic airs give a harmless delight to mankind. The sense of κάθαρσις in the Politics is well explained by Sepulveda in his note on 8. 6, 1341 a 23 :
'Purgatio intelligitur expulsio cuiuspiam affectus'
; and again in that on 8. 7, 1342 a 6 ( τῷ δὲ ἧττον διαφέρει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον):
'Itaque plus et minus, tamen omnes moventur affectibus, a quibus iucunde per musicam sanantur et quasi medicamento quodam adhibito purgantur'
(comp. J. of Phil. 27 p. 269 ). The term in fact is a metaphor from medicine, as Aristotle intimates by making it a synonym for ἰατρεία ( ὥσπερ ἰατρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως), in a context too which presents a whole series of words which either have, or may have, a medical meaning ( πάθος, πάσχειν, ἰσχυρῶς, κίνησις, κατοκώχιμοι, καθισταμένους, κουφίζεσθαι, καθαρτικά). In Greek physiology and pathology κάθαρσις is a very general term for a physical clearance or discharge, the removal by art or an effort of nature of some bodily product (some περίττωμα, as Aristotle would call it), which, if allowed to remain, would cause discomfort or harm. The κάθαρσις of the soul as described in the Politics is a similar process in reference to certain emotions ( πάθη)—the tacit assumption being apparently that the emotions in question are analogous to those peccant humours in the body which, according to the ancient humoral theory of medicine, have to be expelled from the system by the appropriate κάθαρσις. With some adaptation of the statements and hints in Pol. 8. 7 , as thus interpreted, it is not difficult to recover the outlines at any rate of the Aristotelian theory of the cathartic effect of Tragedy: Pity and fear are elements in human nature, and in some men ( τοὺς ἐλεήμονας καὶ τοὺς φοβητικούς) they are present in a disquieting degree ( ἰσχυρῶς). With these latter the tragic excitement is a necessity ( ἀναγκαῖον πάσχειν) ; but it is also in a certain sense good for all. It serves as a sort of medicine, producing a catharsis to lighten and relieve the soul ( κουφίζεσθαι) of the accumulated emotion within it ; and as the relief is wanted, there is always a harmless pleasure attending the process of relief. This, then, may be taken as Aristotle's answer to the Platonic argument in the Republic ; it shows that the pleasure we derive from the moving scenes in Tragedy is not, as Plato had maintained, a demoralizing, but on the contrary a harmless pleasure, ( χαρὰ ἀβλαβής). The legitimacy of this pleasure is assumed throughout the Poetics (see especially 14, 1453 b 11 ), but its precise nature is not explained, either in the existing book or elsewhere, by Aristotle. It falls naturally enough, however, into its place in the classification of pleasures in the Nicomachean Ethics, which recognizes the existence of a class of things as pleasurable not directly and in themselves, but through their effect, as being of the nature of cures or remedies ( ἰατρεῖαι) to remove the disquietude arising from an unsatisfied want, and restore us to a normal condition of body or mind ( Eth. N. 7. 13, 1152 b 34 ; 7. 15, 1154 b 17 ). The tragic excitement, which in the language of the Politics, acts as an ἰατρεία or κάθαρσις, is clearly a pleasure of this kind, one of those described by Aristotle as ἰατρεύοντα ἡδέα. A further point in his idea of κάθαρσις may perhaps be noticed, as suggested at any rate by his use of the term to express the effect of Tragedy on the mind. A catharsis in the medical sense of the word is an ἰατρεία, and only for occasional use ; and its analogue, the παθημάτων κάθαρσις, may very well be presumed to resemble it in this respect. In assuming Tragedy, therefore, to have a cathartic rather than a permanent moral effect, Aristotle would seem to have been mindful of the position of the Drama in Greek life, and to have seen that the dramatic performances in the theatre were not sufficiently frequent or continuous to generate a moral habit, or make a lasting impression for good or evil on character—a point overlooked not only by Plato but also by Lessing and most of the modern interpreters of the Aristotelian theory of Tragedy (comp. E. Müller, Theorie der Kunst bei den Alten 2 p. 378 ). In the phrase παθημάτων κάθαρσις the genitive after κάθαρσις, denoting the object purged away or removed, is a construction not uncommon in Aristotle's physiological writings (v. Bon. Ind. 354 b 22 ); and it is found also in other authors, e.g. Hippocrates 1 p. 104 K.
πτυέλων καθάρσεις
. — p. 654
καθάρσεις τοῦ θερμοῦ ἐκ τοῦ σώματος
. — 3 p. 502
τῶν ἀπὸ πλευμόνων καθάρσεις
. — Thucydides 2. 49
ἀποκαθάρσεις χολῆς
. — Demosthenes 64. 12
κάθαρσις αἵματος
. — Polybius 5. 100. 6
ἀνακάθαρσις πτώματος
. The same construction is found with κάθαρσις (etc.) in its metaphorical application to the analogous process in the mind: Plato Phaed. 69 B
κάθαρσίς τις τῶν τοιούτων πάντων
, 'a purging away of all such things' (Jowett), where the object purged away or removed is shown by the context to be certain affections of the soul ( ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων). — Plutarch De cap. ex inimicis utilit. 91 F
τῶν παθῶν τούτων ποιούμενος εἰς τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἀποκαθάρσεις
. — Iamblichus De myst. 1. 12
κάθαρσις παθῶν
. — Hierocles in Aur. carm. p. 124 (Needham)
ἡ τῶν λυμαινομένων παθῶν ἐκκάθαρσις
. — p. 134
κάθαρσις τῆς οἰήσεως
. — p. 194
ἀποκάθαρσις νείκους
. Aristotle's τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν may perhaps be an unconscious reminiscence of the phrase in Plato. The idea of κάθαρσις, in the sense of a working-off of emotion brought about by something that excites emotion, was not unknown in late Greek literature ; it is recognized in reference to music by Plutarch and Aristides Quintilianus, and in reference to the Drama by Iamblichus and Proclus. The theories reproduced by these writers are clearly of Peripatetic origin, and on exactly the same lines as the Aristotelian justification of the emotional forms of music and of the Drama in the brief statement in the Politics. (1) In his very curious chapter on the ἀκροθώρακες, on whom wine is said to have a sedative effect, Plutarch illustrates the paradox ( Qu. conv. 3. 8, 657 A ) by a parallel instance, that of the sad airs at funerals, which, while exciting the grief of the mourners, at the same time work off their sorrow:—
ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ θρηνῳδία καὶ ὁ ἐπικήδειος αὐλὸς ἐν ἀρχῇ πάθος κινεῖ καὶ δάκρυον ἐκβάλλει [ἐκκαλεῖ Emperius], προάγων δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς οἶκτον οὕτω κατὰ μικρὸν ἐξαιρεῖ [ἐξερᾶ Bernays] καὶ ἀναλίσκει τὸ λυπητικόν· ὁμοίως ἴδοις ἂν καὶ τὸν οἶνον, ὅταν σφόδρα ταράξῃ καὶ παροξύνῃ τὸ ἀκμαῖον καὶ θυμοειδές, αὖθις καταδύοντα [? καταλύοντα], καὶ καθιστάντα τὴν διάνοιαν ὡς πορρωτέρω μέθης προϊοῦσαν ἡσυχάζειν
. (2) The language in Aristides Quintilianus De Musica 3. 25 (p. 13 Jahn) , on the cathartic effect of the music and dancing in the Bacchic and other mysteries, has a more distinctly Aristotelian imprint on it:—
διὸ καὶ τὰς Βακχικὰς τελετὰς καὶ ὅσαι ταύταις παραπλήσιοι λόγου τινὸς ἔχεσθαί φασιν, ὅπως ἂν ἡ τῶν ἀμαθεστέρων πτοίησις διὰ βίον ἢ τύχην ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταύταις μελῳδιῶν τε καὶ ὀρχήσεων ἅμα παιδιαῖς ἐκκαθαίρηται
. (3) There are two passages in Iamblichus, which may serve to illustrate the Aristotelian idea of κάθαρσις. In De myst. 3. 9 (ed. Parthey) , writing as a Neoplatonic occultist against the naturalistic explanation of enthusiasm, he insists that it is an error to regard the effect of the enthusiastic music as being of the nature of a mere ἀποκάθαρσις, a working-off or evacuation ( ἀπέρασις) of some morbid product within the soul :—
ἀπέρασιν δὲ καὶ ἀποκάθαρσιν ἰατρείαν τε οὐδαμῶς αὐτὸ κλητέον, οὐδὲ γὰρ κατὰ νόσημά τι ἢ πλεονασμὸν ἢ περίττωμα πρώτως ἐν ἡμῖν ἐμφύεται, θεία δε αὐτοῦ συνίσταται ἡ πᾶσα ἄνωθεν ἀρχὴ καὶ καταβολή
. There is reason to think that the theory thus set aside was that of Theophrastus, and, through him, of Aristotle. And it will be seen how completely the language of the above passage harmonizes with the pathological interpretation of the formula, ὥσπερ ἰατρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως in the Politics. The second passage is in De myst. 1. 11 :—
αἱ δυνάμεις τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων παθημάτων τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν πάντῃ μὲν εἰργόμεναι καθίστανται σφοδρότεραι, εἰς ἐνέργειαν δὲ βραχεῖαν [so Bernay's; βραχεῖς vulg.] καὶ ἄχρι τοῦ συμμέτρου προαγόμενοι χαίρουσι μετρίως καὶ ἀποπληροῦνται, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἀποκαθαιρόμεναι πειθοῖ καὶ οὐ πρὸς βίαν ἀναπαύονται. διὰ δὴ τοῦτο ἔν τε κωμῳδίᾳ καὶ τραγῳδίᾳ ἀλλότρια πάθη θεωροῦντες ἵσταμεν τὰ οἰκεῖα πάθη καὶ μετριώτερα ἀπεργαζόμεθα καὶ ἀποκαθαίρομεν
. The theory Iamblichus is accepting for the moment is that the passions cannot be suppressed for any length of time with impunity ; that they require an occasional outlet (comp. ἀποκαθαιρόμεναι) to keep them quiet ; and that the secret of our interest in the Drama is that it serves to work off emotion ( τὰ οἰκεῖα πάθη ἀποκαθαίρομεν). It is clear that Iamblichus must have had a pathological explanation of the effect of the Drama before him. But he has taken the edge off the Aristotelian theory by giving it an ethical turn; it will be seen that he makes the catharsis of passions mean the same thing as the moderation of them ( μετριώτερα ἀπεργαζόμεθα καὶ ἀποκαθαίρομεν), thus anticipating by many centuries the interpretation of παθημάτων κάθαρσις now usually associated with the names of Heinsius and Lessing. (4) The cathartic effect of the Drama is one of the many controversial points discussed by Proclus in his commentary on Plato's Republic. The passages bearing on it will be found quoted under Fr. V. According to Proclus the Aristotelian answer to Plato was that the Drama serves a useful purpose as an outlet for emotions which would disturb the peace of the soul, if their just claims were not recognized and from time to time duly satisfied by means of some such gratification as is supplied in the theatre. This view of the effect of the Drama Proclus attributes to Aristotle ; his reference, however, to other apologists for the Drama may make one hesitate to believe him to have found it for himself in the now lost Second Book of the Poetics. The statement in its existing form seems rather to have been taken from some follower of Aristotle, possibly from Theophrastus, its phraseology representing the sense rather than the words of the Aristotelian original. Disengaged from its Neoplatonic surroundings in Iamblichus and Proclus, the catharsis theory before them may be thus reconstructed in outline: The Drama has a therapeutic (comp. Proclus τὸ πεπονηκὸς αὐτῶν θεραπεύσαντας) rather than a directly moral effect ; and the excitement it supplies is required by us at times (comp. Proclus δεόμενα δέ τινος ἐν καιρῷ κινήσεως) to carry off (comp. παθῶν ἀπεράσεις in both Iamblichus and Proclus) or purge away (comp. Iamblichus πάθη ἀποκαθαίρομεν) certain emotions, and relieve the soul of the disquietude they would cause (comp. Proclus ἀνενοχλήτους ἡμᾶς ἀπ᾿ αὐτῶν ... ποιεῖν), if defrauded of the satisfaction naturally due to them (comp. Proclus πρὸς ἀφοσίωσιν τῶν παθῶν). The whole theory in fact is simply a fuller and more complete version of that we still have in brief in the Politics, with ἀποκάθαρσις or ἀπέρασις in place of the primitive Aristotelian term, κάθαρσις. II. Notwithstanding the arguments of Weil and Bernays, the old interpretation of παθημάτων κάθαρσις, which makes it mean the 'purification' of certain passions, is far from being extinct even in our own day. Κάθαρσις is supposed to be a metaphor from the religious rite of purification, whereby the hand or soul was cleansed from some pollution or stain of sin. Understood in this sense, therefore, the term would naturally imply that certain passions require 'purification' from something, i.e. from something more or less of the nature of an impurity. What this element of impurity is, and in what sense the emotions in question are supposed to become 'pure', are points on which there is no slight divergence of opinion among the upholders of this interpretation of κάθαρσις. The principal explanations which have been propounded may be roughly distinguished and classified as follows: (1) Tragedy is said to purify pity and fear, because the frequent excitement of these emotions in the theatre has a tendency to weaken their force, and thus moderate and reduce them to just measure (Heinsius, Milton, Lessing, etc.). (2) The lessons and examples in Tragedy have a purifying and moderating effect on pity, fear, and other evil passions (Victorius, etc.). (3) The tragic pity and fear are regarded as pure, because they are aroused not by real suffering, but only by the imaginary woes of the theatre; so that there is no admixture of pain in them (Batteux, etc.). (4) They are regarded as pure, because, as aroused by Tragedy, they are disinterested emotions, with no self-regarding element in them (Brandis, Susemihl). (5) They are pure, because the sublimity of Tragedy exalts pity and fear into high and noble forms of feeling (Hermann). The first of these, the only view that calls for serious consideration, has an especial interest for us owing to the fact that in the eighteenth century it found a very distinguished exponent in Lessing. It must be admitted, however, that Lessing himself did little more than expand the old idea of 'moderating' the passions, and translate it back into the language of the Nicomachean Ethics. 'The tragic purification of the passions,' he says, 'consists merely in the conversion of pity and fear into virtuous habits of mind'.
'Da nämlich, es kurz zu sagen, diese Reinigung in nichts anderm beruht, als in der Verwandlung der Leidenschaften in tugendhafte Fertigkeiten, bei jeder Tugend aber, nach unserm Philosophen, sich dies diesseits und jenseits ein Extrem findet, zwischen welchem sie inne steht: so muss die Tragödie, wenn sie unser Mitleid in Tugend verwandeln soll, uns von beiden Extremen des Mitleids zu reinigen vermögend sein; welches auch von der Furcht zu verstehen'
( Hamb. Dram. St. 78 ). As Heinsius had said something very like this long before him, Lessing's originality here is not so marked as his power of statement. The whole theory, as stated even by Lessing, is open to many and very grave objections. (1) It confuses two distinct things, the purification of a feeling and the purification of the soul from a feeling. (2) It confuses the ideas of 'pure' and 'moderate', though there is no direct logical or other relation between them; excess or defect in certain matters may be a fault, but they cannot be termed 'impurities'. (3) It rests on a false hypothesis as to the position of Tragedy in the social life of ancient Greece; the performance of Tragedy was too occasional to have a marked and abiding effect on the moral character of the hearers. (4) Even if the tragic excitement of emotion be supposed to have been sufficiently frequent to produce a habit, it does not follow that the resulting habit would be one of moderation in the matter of feeling; we have no right to suppose that the habitual indulgence of strong emotion (e.g. pity and fear) will weaken its force or reduce it to just measure. Habits according to Aristotle arise from corresponding activities, Eth. N. 2. 1 p. 1103 b 21
ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται
. We should expect, therefore, that the strong emotion aroused by Tragedy would, if habitualized by repetition, end in a habit of strong emotion, not in a habit of subdued or moderate emotion, not in that mean state of feeling which Aristotle identifies with virtue. The primary error, however, in this and similar interpretations of παθημάτων κάθαρσις is that it reads a directly moral meaning into the term, as though the theatre were a school, and the tragic poet a teacher, of morality. That, however, is not Aristotle's theory; the great function of the tragic poet, he thinks, is to excite certain emotions, and procure us the pleasure that must accompany such excitement ( Poet. 14, 1453 b 11 ). This pleasurable excitement of emotion, in fact, is with him the end and aim of Tragedy, so far as the poet himself is concerned. The statesman, however, viewing human nature and society as a whole, is able to look beyond all this, and see the ultimate justification of the existence of Tragedy. In the Politics, accordingly, Aristotle recognizes the usefulness of Tragedy, explaining that it supplies a natural want, as a sort of catharsis of emotion, which as emotional creatures men require from time to time to keep their souls in health and quietude. This is a reasonable apology for Tragedy, and a sufficient answer to Plato's criticism. One may perhaps also say of it, that it is more consonant with fact and experience than the moral or disciplinary purpose which many still profess to regard as the true raison d'étre of the theatre.
1449b29

3. mvp-aristotle-comment-208

ἁρμονίαν καὶ μέλος The και is explanatory, μέλος being added as a synonym to explain ἁρμονία (v. on 1, 1447 a 22 ).
1449b30

4. mvp-aristotle-comment-209

διὰ μέτρων is opposed to διὰ μέλους: comp. Probl. 19. 31, 920 b 12
διὰ τὸ πολλαπλάσια εἶναι τότε τὰ μέλη ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις τῶν μέτρων
. — Plato Symp. 187 D
μέλεσί τε καὶ μέτροις
. — Lysis 205 A
οὗ τι τῶν μέτρων δέομαι ἀκοῦσαι οὐδὲ μέλος
. — Isocrates 191 B
ταῖς ᾠδαῖς καὶ τοῖς μέτροις
.
1449b31

5. mvp-aristotle-comment-210

πράττοντες ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν scil. οἱ μιμούμενοι. Aristotle is thinking not of the poet but of the performers, who tell the story by acting it on the stage (v. on 3, 1448 a 23 ). πράττοντες recalls the idea of the δρώντων in the preceding definition of Tragedy.

5. mvp-aristotle-comment-211

1449b33 ὁ τῆς ὄψεως κόσμος ὄψις is usually rendered by 'spectaculum,' 'apparatus,' 'scenery,' or mise en scène; according to Twining it comprehends 'scenery, dresses—the whole visible apparatus of the theatre'. This explanation is too wide; the reference is merely to the visible appearance of the actors when got up in character by the σκευοποιός or costumier (see on 6, 1450 b 20 ). Aristotle accordingly more than once uses the word in a concrete sense in the plural, because each of the characters would require a special and distinctive make-up. The formula ὁ τῆς ὄψεως κόσμος implies that the visible make-up of the actors is of the nature of a decorative adjunct (v. on 4, 1449 a 29 ), a mere accessory to the poet's work (v. 6, 1450 b 16 ), on which he, as an artist, has no right to rely for his effects (v. 14, 1453 b 7 ). The term ὄψις like many other technical words in the Poetics was probably already familiar in this sense in the language of the theatre (comp. Festschrift Theodor Gomperz dargebracht p. 166 ).

5. mvp-aristotle-comment-212

μελοποιία (properly the making of μέλη) replaces the original term μέλος as a synonym for it; comp. 6, 1450 b 16 , and Pol. 8. 7, 1341 b 23
τὴν μουσικὴν ὁρῶμεν διὰ μελοποιίας καὶ ῥυθμῶν οὖσαν
.
1449b34

6. mvp-aristotle-comment-213

λέγω δὲ λέξιν μὲν ταύτην is to be compared with
λέγω γὰρ μῦθον τοῦτον
in 6, 1450 a 4 (v. ad loc.). A definition is given because λέξις is a term with several meanings (v. on 21, 1459 a 12 ). The present definition describes the λέξις in a play in reference to the poet, as the 'composition of the verses'; that which comes later on, in 6, 1450 b 13 , views it rather from the side of the dramatic personages, as the 'expression of their thought in words'.

6. mvp-aristotle-comment-214

1449b35 μέτρων has the concrete sense of 'verses', like τοῖς μέτροις in 1, 1447 b 29 (comp. on b 30 ).

6. mvp-aristotle-comment-215

1449b36 πᾶσαν πᾶσιν, the emendation of Madius, may perhaps seem to be supported by the fragment of Democritus ( fr. 165 Diels ),
ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ὃ πάντες ἴσμεν
. But no change is really wanted; instead of defining μελοποιία Aristotle thinks it enough to say that its whole nature is too obvious to require explanation.

7. mvp-aristotle-comment-216

ἐπεὶ δὲ πράξεώς ἐστι κτέ. Comp. μίμησις πράξεως in the preceding definition. Having spoken of the externals of a tragedy, its ὄψις, λέξις and μελοποιία, Aristotle passes on to elements of another kind, those which constitute its internal content. The subject in a tragedy is an action with the personages concerned therein as agents. The μῦθος, the fable or plot of the play, represents the action as such; the ἦθος and διάνοια manifested in the language of the dramatis personae represent the personality of the agents. Oedipus, for instance, is in a poem only a name for a certain group of qualities, moral and intellectual, which his actions and the language put into his mouth reveal to us (comp. 9, 1451 b 7 ).

7. mvp-aristotle-comment-217

ποιούς τινας εἶναι κατά τε τὸ ἦθος καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν Intellectual as well as moral states are included under ποιότητες ( Cat. 8, 8 b 29 ). A little further on, however, in 1450 a 5 , Aristotle uses the term ποιούς τινας as though it naturally referred rather to the ἦθος or moral character. For the antithesis between ἦθος and διάνοια comp. Pol. 8. 1, 1337 a 38
οὐδὲ φανερὸν πότερον πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν πρέπει μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος
, and the distinction assumed throughout the Nicomachean Ethics and elsewhere between the ἠθικαί and the διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταί.

7. mvp-aristotle-comment-218

1450a1 πέφυκεν begins the apodosis. There are thus in the natural order of things, says Aristotle, two distinguishable factors in the action of the individual agent, his ἦθος and his διάνοια; these are the inner causes of men's actions, and of the success or failure of their lives. πέφυκεν is, like the Platonic φύσιν ἔχει ( Rep. 473 C , 489 B ), impersonal. Vahlen illustrates this usage from Pol. 2. 2, 1261 b 7
οὔτε πέφυκε μίαν οὕτως εἶναι τὴν πόλιν
. — 4. 12, 1296 b 26
ἐνταῦθα πέφυκεν εἶναι δημοκρατίαν
, and Demosthenes 14, 30
τὰς κρήνας καὶ τὰ φρέατα ἐπιλείπειν πέφυκεν
.

7. mvp-aristotle-comment-219

1450a2 κατὰ ταύτας =
κατὰ τὰς πράξεις
; comp. a 19
κατὰ δὲ τὰς πράξεις εὐδαίμονες ἢ τοὐναντίον
.
1450a3

8. mvp-aristotle-comment-220

τῆς μὲν πράξεως ὁ μῦθος ἡ μίμησις To complete the statement Aristotle might very well have added a clause like
τῶν δὲ πραττόντων τὰ ἤθη καὶ αἱ διάνοιαι
; and it has been suggested ( J. of Phil. 5 p. 119 ) that these words or something equivalent must have dropped out. In a context like the present, however, this second point may have been left to be mentally supplied by the reader (comp. Vahlen ad loc.), as the emphatic mention of the first point ( τῆς μὲν πράξεως κτέ.) is enough to suggest it (comp. De interpr. 14, 23 b 30 , and Waitz ad loc.). For this use of μέν solitarium comp. 26, 1462 b 5 , and Waitz on An. pr. 2. 11, 61 b 19 .

8. mvp-aristotle-comment-221

1450a4 τοῦτον (= τοῦτο) is preparative and explained by τὴν σύνθεσιν τῶν πραγμάτων. The assimilation of gender has been a stumbling-block to Madius and others, though found again in 22, 1458 a 26
αἰνίγματός τε γὰρ ἰδέα αὕτη ἐστί, τὸ λέγοντα ὑπάρχοντα ἀδύνατα συνάψαι
 (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr. 2. 1 p. 74 ).

8. mvp-aristotle-comment-222

1450a6 διάνοιαν scil. εἶναι λέγω. Instead of attempting a definition, Aristotle evades the difficulty by saying that διάνοια is manifested in the argumentative and reflective utterances of the dramatis personae (comp. infra b 11 ). The statement here is merely provisional, as one may see by comparing the fuller exposition in 19, 1456 a 34 — b 8 —where we are told among other things that the διάνοια of a personage may be shown in his actions as well as in his words. Διάνοια in the sense it bears in the Poetics is, like ἦθος, an element in the personality of the dramatis personae. It is their intellectual capacity, as evinced in their language (or it may be, in their actions), and it is to be seen whenever they argue or make an appeal to the feelings of their hearers, in other words, when they reason or plead with one of the other dramatis personae in the same sort of way as a rhetor might do. Hence it is that the general theory of the διάνοια in a play is said ( 19, 1456 a 34 ) to belong to Rhetoric rather than Poetry; and a speech with a great display of διάνοια in it is a rhetorical speech (v. on b 6 ). The term answering to Aristotle's διάνοια in Isocrates is ἐνθυμήματα, 'arguments': Isocr. 191 B
μετὰ μέτρων καὶ ῥυθμῶν ἅπαντα ποιοῦσιν . . . τοσαύτην ἔχει χάριν, ὥστ᾿ ἂν καὶ τῇ λέξει καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν . . . ἔχῃ κακῶς, ὅμως αὐταῖς ταῖς εὐρυθμίαις καὶ ταῖς συμμετρίαις ψυχαγωγοῦσι τοὺς ἀκούοντας
. — 319 D
καὶ γὰρ τῇ λέξει ποιητικωτέρᾳ καὶ ποικιλωτέρᾳ τὰς πράξεις δηλοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν ὀγκωδεστέροις καὶ καινοτέροις χρῆσθαι ζητοῦσιν
.

8. mvp-aristotle-comment-223

λέγοντες : comp. b 6
ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων
, and b 7
πολιτικῶς ἐποίουν λέγοντας
. Aristotle is thinking more immediately of the ῥήσεις in a tragedy, and of the intellectual, i. e. the rhetorical or argumentative, capacity they may reveal in the personages.

8. mvp-aristotle-comment-224

1450a7 ἀποδεικνύασίν τι :
ἀποδεικνύουσί τι ὡς ἔστιν ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν
. — 19, 1456 a 37
τό τε ἀποδεικνύναι καὶ τὸ λύειν
. — Rhet. 1. 1, 1355 a 5
ἡ δὲ πίστις ἀπόδειξίς τις· τότε γὰρ πιστεύομεν μάλιστα ὅταν ἀποδεδεῖχθαι ὑπολάβωμεν
.

8. mvp-aristotle-comment-225

ἢ καὶ ἀποφαίνονται γνώμην The equivalent in b 12 is the more general expression,
καθόλου τι ἀποφαίνονται
, but it is hardly worth while to bring the two passages into unison by restoring here (with Bernays, Zwei Abhandl. p. 155 ) ἢ καθόλου ἀποφαίνονται, on the assumption that γνώμην may have come in as a gloss. A γνώμη as defined in the Rhetoric is a maxim, or general proposition relating to the conduct of life: Rhet. 2. 21, 1394 a 21
ἔστι δὲ γνώμη ἀπόφανσις, οὐ μέντοι περὶ τῶν καθ᾿ ἕκαστον, οἷον ποιός τις Ιφικράτης, ἀλλὰ καθόλου· καὶ οὐ περὶ πάντων καθόλου, οἷον ὅτι τὸ εὐθὺ τῷ καμπύλῳ ἐναντίον, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσων αἱ πράξεις εἰσί, καὶ αἱρετὰ ἢ φευκτά ἐστι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν
. The corresponding Latin term was sententia: Quintilian 8. 5. 3
Antiquissimae sunt quae proprie . . . sententiae vocantur, quas Graeci γνώμας appellant: utrumque autem nomen ex eo acceperunt, quod similes sunt consiliis aut decretis
.
1450a8

9. mvp-aristotle-comment-226

μέρη εἶναι ἕξ An answer to the question announced in 1, 1447 a 10
ἐκ πόσων καὶ ποίων ἐστὶ μορίων
.

9. mvp-aristotle-comment-227

καθ᾿ ὃ ποιά τις ἐστὶν ἡ τραγῳδία The word μέρος being ambiguous ( Metaph. Δ 25, 1023 b 12 ; Ζ 10, 1034 b 32 ), this clause had to be added to mark the distinction between the 'parts' at present under consideration and those to be enumerated hereafter in chap. 12. The parts here described are the formative constituents of a tragedy; whereas those defined in chap. 12 are the sections into which it is divided. It is through these various formative constituents that we are able to speak of a tragedy as ποία τις—as good or bad, as ἠθική or πεπλεγμένη or παθητική, or whatever else it may be said to be, when we come to judge of its quality.
1450a12

11. mvp-aristotle-comment-228

οὐκ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν =
οὐκ ὀλίγοι τῶν ποιητῶν
. The ὡς εἰπεῖν which follows should perhaps be transposed and inserted after πᾶν in the next line. Of the many emendations that have been propounded the simplest certainly is that of Bursian, οὐκ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν 〈ἀλλὰ πάντες〉, on which that formerly suggested by myself, ὀλίγου αὐτῶν 〈ἅπαντες〉 ( J. of Phil. 14 p. 44 ), was based. οὐκ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν, however, has on it a certain stamp of genuineness. The sense seems to be this: The six parts are in the nature of things possible elements in every tragedy, so to say; and due use has been made of them by not a few of the poets. The statement may be compared with those in a 25 , 36, and 18, 1456 a 3 , where the existence is recognized of plays weak or deficient in some of the parts. For the sense of ἔχει in this passage (='admits of', 'has in it the possibility of') comp. 2, 1448 a 7 ; and for the distinction between it and κέχρηνται, Eth. N. 7. 4, 1146 b 32
ὁ ἔχων μὲν οὐ χρώμενος δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ
. — 1147 a 1
ἔχοντα μὲν ἀμφοτέρας [scil. τὰς προτάσεις] οὐδὲν κωλύει πράττειν παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, χρώμενον μέντοι τῇ καθόλου ἀλλὰ μὴ τῇ κατὰ μέρος
 (comp. Bon. Ind. 854 b 37 ).

11. mvp-aristotle-comment-229

1450a13 εἴδεσι : see on 4, 1449 a 7 .

11. mvp-aristotle-comment-230

ὄψεις : see on 6, 1449 b 33 .

11. mvp-aristotle-comment-231

πᾶν , i. e. every play; comp. 12, 1452 a 18
ἁπάντων
. — 18, 1456 a 31
ἐξ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλο
.
1450a15

12. mvp-aristotle-comment-232

μέγιστον κτέ. Aristotle proceeds at this point to arrange the six elements in the order of their relative importances; and he begins by asserting, with an abundance of reasons which seems to imply that it was a subject of controversy at the time, the supreme importance of the μῦθος. As it is the first duty of a tragedy to represent an action, the μῦθος or story of action in it must be the first and most essential element in its construction. The characters, i.e. the personal agents, are mainly required in order to work out the story, and as means to that end; so that this element is to be deemed of secondary and subordinate significance as compared with the μῦθος. The paramount importance of plot in Drama has been re-asserted with equal emphasis in our own time by an eminent living dramatist: 'The idea, the plot, always comes first. The plot, in a sense, is nine-tenths of a play' ( H. A. Jones, Strand Magazine 34 p. 379 ).

12. mvp-aristotle-comment-233

ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων σύστασις = ὁ μῦθος. As the action in a tragedy is a whole of some magnitude (comp. 4, 1449 a 19 ; 6, 1449 b 25 ), it must have a plurality of incidents ( πράγματα) embodied in it. What Aristotle means by a combination of incidents may be seen from his synopses of the Iphigenia and Odyssey in 17, 1455 b 2 sqq. .

12. mvp-aristotle-comment-234

1450a17 βίου : Plato Laws 817 B
ἡμεῖς ἐσμὲν τραγῳδίας αὐτοὶ ποιηταὶ κατὰ δύναμιν ὅτι καλλίστης ἅμα καὶ ἀρίστης· πᾶσα οὖν [? γοῦν] ἡμῖν ἡ πολιτεία ξυνέστηκε μίμησις τοῦ καλλίστου καὶ ἀρίστου βίου, ὃ δή φαμεν ἡμεῖς γε ὄντως εἶναι τραγῳδίαν τὴν ἀληθεστάτην
. — Lycurgus in Leocr. 102
οἱ ποιηταὶ μιμούμενοι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον
. Alcidamas described the Odyssey as a
καλὸν ἀνθρωπίνου βίου κάτοπτρον
( Aristot. Rhet. 3. 3, 1406 b 12 ). Of Menander also it was said:
Μένανδρε καὶ βίε, πότερος ἄρ᾿ ὑμῶν πότερον ἀπεμιμήσατο;
( Nauck, Aristophanis Byz. Fragm. p. 249 ).

12. mvp-aristotle-comment-235

καὶ εὐδαιμονίας : Plato Rep. 603 C
πράττοντας, φαμέν, ἀνθρώπους μιμεῖται ἡ μιμητικὴ βιαίους ἢ ἑκουσίας πράξεις καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν ἢ εὖ οἰομένους ἢ κακῶς πεπραγέναι
.

12. mvp-aristotle-comment-236

1450a18 ἐν πράξει According to the definition in Eth. N. 1. 6, 1098 a 16 happiness is a certain kind of activity, a
ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ᾿ ἀρετήν
. Comp. Phys. 2. 6, 197 b 4
ἡ δὲ εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξίς τις· εὐπραξία γάρ
. — Pol. 7. 3, 1325 a 32
ἡ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξίς ἐστιν
 (also Eth. N. 1. 8, 1098 b 21 ; Rhet. 1. 5, 1360 b 14 ).

12. mvp-aristotle-comment-237

τὸ τέλος : Eth. N. 1. 8, 1098 b 18
πράξεις τινὲς λέγονται καὶ ἐνέργειαι τὸ τέλος
.

12. mvp-aristotle-comment-238

οὐ ποιότης : Eth. N. 10. 2, 1173 a 14
οὐδὲ γὰρ αἱ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαι ποιότητές εἰσιν, οὐδ᾿ ἡ εὐδαιμονία
.
1450a21

13. mvp-aristotle-comment-239

πράττουσι scil. οἱ μιμούμενοι. The reference is to the actors (see on 3, 1448 a 23 ) rather than the poets.

13. mvp-aristotle-comment-240

συμπεριλαμβάνουσιν scil. ἐν τῇ μιμήσει, 'they include in the representation'; συμπεριλαμβάνειν in this sense is not infrequent in later Greek (v. HSt. s. v. ). It is hardly necessary, therefore, to reject it for the reading of one of the apographs, συμπαραλαμβάνουσιν, though it is no doubt quite true that manuscripts are apt to confuse the two prepositions.

13. mvp-aristotle-comment-241

1450a22 διὰ τὰς πράξεις διά in this connexion must mean 'with a view to', 'for the sake of', as in Thuc. 2. 89. 4
διὰ τὴν σφετέραν δόξαν
.

13. mvp-aristotle-comment-242

καὶ ὁ μῦθος The καί is explanatory, 'that is to say'.

13. mvp-aristotle-comment-243

1450a23 τὸ δὲ τέλος μέγιστον ἁπάντων modelled on the proverb in Plato Rep. 377 A
ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἔργου μέγιστον
, which reappears in Aristotle Soph. el. 33, 183 b 22
μέγιστον γὰρ ἴσως ἀρχὴ παντός, ὥσπερ λέγεται
. — Probl. 10. 13, 892 a 29
ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἔργου μέγιστον· ἥμισυ γάρ
.
1450a25

15. mvp-aristotle-comment-244

τῶν νέων As it is clear from 14, 1453 b 28 that Euripides is not classed among the old poets ( οἱ παλαιοί), οἱ νέοι, 'the moderns,' must mean the poets from Euripides downwards. It is to be observed also that, when Aristotle a little further on in this chapter distinguishes between οἱ ἀρχαῖοι and οἱ νῦν, the point noted as characteristic of 'the moderns' ( ῥητορικῶς ποιοῦσι λέγοντας) is manifestly true of Euripides, and was recognized as true of him by the ancients themselves (see on ῥητορικῶς, b 8 ).

15. mvp-aristotle-comment-245

ἀήθεις : 24, 1460 a 11
οὐδέν᾿ ἀήθη ἀλλ᾿ ἔχοντα ἤθη
. ἀήθης is, like other compounds of α privativum ( De anima 2. 10, 427 a 26 ; Metaph. Δ 22, 1022 b 32 ), an ambiguous word, as it may mean either 'destitute of character', or merely 'deficient in character'. Aristotle must be using it in this latter sense, since a play with personages wholly destitute of character is hardly conceivable. The language in the illustration which follows from painting,
οὐδὲν ἔχει ἦθος
, is an instance of a common form of exaggeration, just like that in the saying of Pope,
Most women have no characters at all
.

15. mvp-aristotle-comment-246

1450a26 τοιοῦτοι i. e. ἀήθεις.

15. mvp-aristotle-comment-247

οἷον καὶ τῶν γραφέων Ζεῦξις πρὸς Πολύγνωτον πέπονθεν : De gen. an. 5. 3, 783 a 6
ἔστι δ᾿ ἔνια τῶν ζῴων . . . μαλακὴν μὲν ἔχει τὴν τρίχα ἧττον δὲ λεπτήν, οἷον τὸ τῶν δασυπόδων πρὸς τὸ τῶν προβάτων πέπονθεν
. — Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 22
οἷον ἡ Θεοδώρου φωνὴ πέπονθε πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ὑποκριτῶν
.

15. mvp-aristotle-comment-248

γραφέων For other illustrations from painting see on 2, 1448 a 5 .

15. mvp-aristotle-comment-249

1450a27 Πολύγνωτον The same view of him, as one who knew how to indicate character in painting, is implied in Pol. 8. 5, 1340 a 37
τὰ Πολυγνώτου κἂν εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν γραφέων ἢ τῶν ἀγαλματοποιῶν ἐστιν ἠθικός
.

15. mvp-aristotle-comment-250

1450a28 Ζεύξιδος This taken in connexion with what is said of him later on, in 25, 1461 b 12 , would seem to show that, in Aristotle's view, Zeuxis sacrificed expression to beauty.
1450a29

16. mvp-aristotle-comment-251

ῥήσεις i. e. the speeches put into the mouths of the personages in a play or poem (comp. 15, 1454 a 31 ; 18, 1450 b 31 ). The word had been already used in this technical sense by both Plato and Aristophanes.

16. mvp-aristotle-comment-252

ἠθικάς In the Rhetoric the ἠθικὸς λόγος is one designed to create a favourable idea of the speaker's ἦθος, in contradistinction to the παθητικὸς λόγος, which addresses the feelings, and the ἀποδεικτικὸς λόγος, which addresses the reason of his audience. In matters of imitative art, however, the usual meaning of ἠθικός is μιμητικὸς ἤθους, 'expressive of character' (comp. Bon. Ind. 315 b 21 )—which is the sense the word has in the present and other passages in the Poetics. Thus in 18, 1456 a 1 a certain kind of tragedy is termed the ἠθική τραγῳδία, 'the tragedy of character', because its main interest is as a portraiture of character; in 23, 1459 b 16 the Odyssey is described as ἠθική, because it is more of a portraiture of character than the Iliad; in 24, 1460 b 3 certain passages in a poem are termed ἠθικά μέρη, as serving to bring out the ἦθος of the personages in the story.

16. mvp-aristotle-comment-253

λέξει καὶ διανοίᾳ εὖ πεποιημένας , 'made perfect in the matter of language and thought'. The same use of the dative is found in a 36
τῇ λέξει καὶ τοῖς ἤθεσιν ἀκριβοῦν
. — 24, 1460 b 2
τῇ δὲ λέξει δεῖ διαπονεῖν
; and in Alcidamas De soph. 12
οἱ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀκριβῶς ἐξειργασμένοι [scil. λόγοι].

16. mvp-aristotle-comment-254

1450a30 οὔπω ποιήσει ὃ ἦν τῆς τραγῳδίας ἔργον : Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 2
ὁ λόγος, ἐὰν μὴ δηλοῖ, οὐ ποιήσει τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον
. The Arabic version seems to suggest οὔπω (see on 9, 1451 b 13 ) rather than οὐ. For the fut. with οὔπω comp. Eth. N. 5. 10, 1135 a 22
ὥστε ἔσται τι ἄδικον μὲν ἀδίκημα δὲ οὔπω, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ ἑκούσιον προσῇ
. — 6. 13, 1144 a 35
ὥστε τὴν μὲν ἤδη τὴν δ᾿ οὔπω εἰληφὼς ἔσται
. The imperfect in ἦν τῆς τραγῳδίας ἔργον implies that the point has been already settled in the preceding discussion (comp. Bon. Ind. 754 a 40 ), the reference being presumably to 6, 1449 b 36 , where Tragedy is said to be a μίμησις πράξεως.

16. mvp-aristotle-comment-255

1450a31 ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον scil. ποιήσει, as in Eth. N. 6. 8, 1141 b 18
εἰ γὰρ εἰδείη ὅτι τὰ κοῦφα εὔπεπτα κρέα καὶ ὑγιεινά, ποῖα δὲ κοῦφα ἀγνοοῖ, οὐ ποιήσει ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ᾿ ὁ εἰδὼς ὅτι τὰ ὀρνίθεια [κοῦφα καὶ] ὑγιεινὰ ποιήσει μᾶλλον
. For the form of antithesis comp. De caelo 2. 3, 286 a 5
πόρρω δ᾿ οὐχ οὕτω τῷ τόπῳ, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ ... ὀλίγην ἔχειν αἴσθησιν
 , and the instances collected by Vahlen (ad loc.) and Schwab (Schanz's Beiträge 4. 1, p. 66).

16. mvp-aristotle-comment-256

τούτοις refers back to the ῥήσεις ἠθικαὶ καὶ λέξει καὶ διανοίᾳ εὖ πεποιημέναι of 29. Aristotle's point is, that the dramatic effectiveness of a tragedy depends before all else on its plot, and that no literary or rhetorical brilliancy will make up for a weak plot.
1450a33

17. mvp-aristotle-comment-257

ψυχαγωγεῖ comp. b 17
ψυχαγωγικόν
. Said of a work of art the word means no more than to 'move' or 'rivet the attention', and is thus the equivalent of our word 'attract' or (as people now sometimes say) 'fascinate'. This sense of ψυχαγωγεῖν is as old as Xenophon: Mem. 3. 10. 6
ὃ δὲ μάλιστα ψυχαγωγεῖ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, τὸ ζωτικὸν φαίνεσθαι, πῶς τοῦτο ἐνεργάζῃ τοῖς ἀνδριασιν;
. It is found more than once in Isocrates: 24 D
δέδεικται τοῖς ἐπιθυμοῦσι τοὺς ἀκροωμένους ψυχαγωγεῖν ὅτι τοῦ μὲν νουθετεῖν καὶ συμβουλεύειν ἀφεκτέον, τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα λεκτέον οἷς ὁρῶσι τοὺς ὄχλους μάλιστα χαίροντας
. — 191 A
τοσαύτην ἔχει χάριν, ὥστ᾿ ἂν καὶ τῇ λέξει καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν ἔχῃ κακῶς, ὅμως αὐταῖς ταῖς εὐρυθμίαις καὶ ταῖς συμμετρίαις ψυχαγωγοῦσι τοὺς ἀκούοντας
. Later writers also often use the word in the sense of to 'attract' or 'please'; comp. the Antiatticista in Bekker's Anecdota 116
ψυχαγωγεῖν: τὸ τέρπειν
, and Vahlen, Symb. Phil. Bonn. p. 168.

17. mvp-aristotle-comment-258

1450a34 αἵ τε περιπέτειαι καὶ ἀναγνωρίσεις These are considered later on in chap. 11 . It will be observed that Aristotle uses the two terms without explanation, as though they were already part of the established language of the theatre. The appositional clause comes in as an afterthought, at some distance from the words it illustrates (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr. 2. 1 p. 282 ).
1450a37

7. mvp-aristotle-comment-273

ἦθος A statement is said to have ἦθος in it when it reveals the moral purpose of the speaker, the kind of thing that he purposes to do or not to do. ἦθος is an element in oratory also, as the credibility of the orator often depends on the impression one forms of his character. The language in the text may be compared with that in Rhet. 2. 21, 1395 b 13
ἦθος δ᾿ ἔχουσιν οἱ λόγοι ἐν ὅσοις δήλη ἡ προαίρεσις· αἱ δὲ γνῶμαι πᾶσαι τοῦτο ποιοῦσι διὰ τὸ ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸν τὴν γνώμην λέγοντα καθόλου περὶ τῶν προαιρετῶν, ὥστ᾿ ἂν χρησταὶ ὦσιν αἱ γνῶμαι, καὶ χρηστοήθη φαίνεσθαι ποιοῦσι τὸν λέγοντα
. — 3. 16, 1417 a 16
ἠθικὴν δὲ χρὴ τὴν διήγησιν εἶναι. ἔσται δὲ τοῦτο ἂν εἰδῶμεν τί ἦθος ποιεῖ. ἓν μὲν δὴ τὸ προαίρεσιν δηλοῦν, ποιὸν δὲ τὸ ἦθος τῷ ποιὰν ταύτην· ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ποιὰ τῷ τέλει. διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔχουσιν οἱ μαθηματικοὶ λόγοι ἤθη, ὅτι οὐδὲ προαίρεσιν· τὸ γὰρ οὗ ἕνεκα οὐκ ἔχουσιν. ἀλλ᾿ οἱ Σωκρατικοί· περὶ τοιούτων γὰρ λέγουσιν.
.

Remarques sur la poëtique d'Aristote (André Dacier, 1692) (OCR draft) (André Dacier's French commentary on Aristotle's Poetics.) focus

1. mvp-aristotle-comment-141

6.2 1. La Tragedie eſt donc une imitation d'une action grave.] 1

2. mvp-aristotle-comment-142

6.2 2. Entiere.] 2

3. mvp-aristotle-comment-143

6.2 3. Et qui a une juſte grandeur.] 3

4. mvp-aristotle-comment-144

6.2 4. Dont le ſtyle eſt agreablement aſſaiſonné.] 4

5. mvp-aristotle-comment-145

6.2 5. Et qui ſans le ſecours de la narration, par le moyen de la compaſſion & de la terreur, acheve de purger en nous ces fortes de paſſions, & toutes les autres ſemblables.] 5

6. mvp-aristotle-comment-146

6.2 6. Et qui ſans le ſecours de la narration.] 6

7. mvp-aristotle-comment-147

6.2 7. Par le moyen de la terreur & de la compaſſion.] 7

8. mvp-aristotle-comment-148

6.2 8. Acheve de purger en nous ces fortes de paſſions & autres ſemblables.] 8

9. mvp-aristotle-comment-149

6.3 9. F'appelle, un ſtyle agreablement aſſaiſonné, un ſtyle qui a le nombre, le vers, & l'harmonie.] 9

10. mvp-aristotle-comment-150

6.4 10. Et j'ajoûte, mais differemment dans toutes ſes parties, because que le vers regne ſeul dans les unes, & le nombre & l'harmonie dans les autres.] 10

11. mvp-aristotle-comment-151

6.5 11. Cette imitation étant faite par des gens qui agiſſent, il s'enfuit de là neceſſairement, que la décoration de la Scene eſt en quelque ſorte une partie de la Tragedie.] 11

12. mvp-aristotle-comment-152

6.6 12. Comme la mélodie & le diſcours avec quoy on fait cette imitation. F'appelle diſcours, la compoſition même des vers, & mélodie la muſique, dont toute la force eſt connue.] 12

13. mvp-aristotle-comment-153

6.7 13. Comme c'eſt une imitation de quelque action.] 13

14. mvp-aristotle-comment-154

6.7 14. Et que ceux qui agiſſent ſont neceſſairement tels par les mœurs & par les ſentimens.] 14

15. mvp-aristotle-comment-155

6.7 15. N'y ayant point d'autre caractere qui puiſſe diſtinguer les actions.] 15

16. mvp-aristotle-comment-156

6.7 16. Et que ce ſont les deux cauſes du bonheur & du malheur des hommes.] 16

17. mvp-aristotle-comment-157

6.8 17. Car j'appelle icy Fable, la compoſition des choſes.] 17

18. mvp-aristotle-comment-158

6.8 18. Les mœurs ſont ce qui marque les qualitez de ceux qui agiſſent.] 18

19. mvp-aristotle-comment-159

6.8 19. Et les ſentimens ſont les diſcours, par leſquels ils font connoître quelque action, ou découvrent leur penſée.] 19

20. mvp-aristotle-comment-160

6.10 20. De ces ſix il y en a deux qui regardent le moyen.] 20

21. mvp-aristotle-comment-161

6.10 21. Une qui regarde la maniére.] 21

22. mvp-aristotle-comment-162

6.10 22. Et trois qui regardent le ſujet.] 22

23. mvp-aristotle-comment-163

6.11 23. Il n'y a preſque point de Poëte, pour ainſi dire, qui n'employe ces ſix parties dans ſes pieces tragiques.] 23

24. mvp-aristotle-comment-164

6.11 24. Il eſt vray auſſi qu'elles ſe trouvent toutes, dans toutes ſortes de ſujets.] 24

25. mvp-aristotle-comment-165

6.12 25. Mais la plus conſiderable, c'eſt la fable ou la compoſition des choſes.] 25

26. mvp-aristotle-comment-166

6.12 26. Car la Tragedie eſt une imitation, non pas des hommes, mais de leurs actions.] 26

27. mvp-aristotle-comment-167

6.12 27. De leur vie & de leur bonheur ou de leur malheur.] 27

28. mvp-aristotle-comment-168

6.12 28. Qui conſiſtent dans l'action.] 28

29. mvp-aristotle-comment-169

6.12 29. La fin même que les hommes ſe propoſent eſt toûjours une action, & non pas une qualité.] 29

30. mvp-aristotle-comment-170

6.12 30. On a telles ou telles qualitez par les mœurs.] 30

31. mvp-aristotle-comment-171

6.12 31. Et l'on eſt heureux ou malheureux par les actions.] 31

32. mvp-aristotle-comment-172

6.13 32. Mais ils ajoûtent les mœurs à cauſe des actions.] 32

33. mvp-aristotle-comment-173

6.13 33. De ſorte que les actions & la fable ſont la fin de la Tragedie.] 33

34. mvp-aristotle-comment-174

6.13 34. Or en toutes choſes, la fin eſt ce qu'il y a de plus impor-tant.] 34

35. mvp-aristotle-comment-175

6.14 35. Ajoutez à cette verité, qu'il ne sçauroit y avoir de Tra-gedie ſans action, & qu'il y en peut avoir ſans mœurs.] 35

36. mvp-aristotle-comment-176

6.15 36. En effet il n'y a point de mœurs dans les pieces de la plupart des Poëtes Modernes.] 36

37. mvp-aristotle-comment-177

6.15 37. On peut dire même en general, que l'on trouve preſque entre tous nos Poëtes, la même difference qui eſt entre les Peintres Zeuxis & Polygnote.] 37

38. mvp-aristotle-comment-178

6.15 38. Ce dernier exprimoit parfaitement les mœurs.] 38

39. mvp-aristotle-comment-179

6.15 39. Et on n'en trouve aucun indice dans les ouvrages de l'autre.] 39

40. mvp-aristotle-comment-180

6.16 40. D'ailleurs ſi quelqu'un s'aviſoit de faire une piece, où il y eût de ſuite pluſieurs discours, dans leſquels les mœurs ſeroient parfaitement exprimées, & où il y eût encore une belle diction & de beaux ſentimens.] 40

41. mvp-aristotle-comment-181

6.16 41. On peut aſſeurer qu'il n'auroit pas encore attrapé ce qui eſt le propre de la Tragedie.] 41

42. mvp-aristotle-comment-182

6.16 42. Et qui auroit un ſujet bien conſtitué & bien conduit.] 42

43. mvp-aristotle-comment-183

6.17 43. C'eſt que les moyens les plus efficaces, dont la Tragedie ſe ſert pour toucher & pour plaire, ce ſont les peripeties & les reconnoiſſances.] 43

Commentary on the Poetics (Thomas Twining, 1789) (OCR draft) (Thomas Twining's notes on Aristotle's Poetics, aligned to the Kassel reference edition.) focus

44. mvp-aristotle-comment-44

NOTE 44. P. 75.

6.2 IN THE WAY, NOT OF NARRATION, BUT OF ACTION.
It is surprising, that so strange a phrase as
ειδων --- δρωντων
—
formis---agentibus
—should have passed as genuine with any Greek scholar. It is still more so, that the obvious opposition of
δρωντων
to
ἀπαγγελια
, and the no less obvious absurdity of opposing narration to pity and terror, (
δι' ἀπαγγελιας, ΑΛΛΑ δ᾽ ἐλεου και φοβου
) should have escaped the notice of any commentator.—I should write the passage thus; still considering it as imperfect:—
χωρις ἐκαστου των ειδων ἐν τοις μοριοις * * * [forte ΔΙΑ] δρωντων και ου δι' ἀπαγγελιας
1
* * * * ἀλλα δι' ἐλεου και φοβου, κ. τ. αλ.
Thus the word
δρωντων
will retain its proper sense, and the active imitation of the drama, which Aristotle every where makes its characteristic distinction, as opposed to the Epic, will be, as we might expect to find it, in a formal and exact definition of Tragedy, distinctly marked.
I will just observe, farther, that this mode of expression—
δρωντων ΚΑΙ ΟΥ δι' ἀπ.
is familiar to Aristotle. Here however it may be justified by the necessity of marking clearly the distinction between Dramatic and Epic Poetry. In other instances, as,
ἑτερως και μη τον αυτον τροπον.
cap. i.
ὡς τον αυτον και μη μεταβαλλοντα.
cap. iii.
ειδως και μη ἀγνοων.
Eth. Nic. v. 8. it seems hardly to admit of the same excuse. In the Poets we are less surprised to find it frequent. Victorius has pointed out Homer, Il. Z. 333.
ἐπει με κατ᾿ ἀισαν ἐνεικεσας, ἐδ᾽ ὑπερ αισαν.
 —and Sophocles: Oed. Tyr. 58.
γνωτα, κ'ουκ ἀγνωτα μοι Προσηλθεθ' ίμειροντες.
If any man, in reading the ancients, can persuade himself to take such things for beauties, there is certainly no harm in it. The fact I take to be, that composition, even that of Poetry, was not yet so far improved and refined, as perfectly to exclude the inaccuracies and redundancies of popular and familiar speech.

45. mvp-aristotle-comment-45

NOTE 45. P. 75.

6.2 EFFECTING, THROUGH PITY AND TERROR, THE CORRECTION AND REFINEMENT OF SUCH PASSIONS.
Δι' ἐλεου και φοβου περαινουσα την των τοιουτων παθηματων καθαρσιν.
A history of the controversies which this obscure passage has excited among critics and commentators, and an exact statement and examination of the various explanations which have been given of it, would almost fill a volume. Among these, however, the opinions, that are worth regarding, or that can, with any show of probability, be deduced from Aristotle's expression, are, I think, reducible to two.
One is, that this purgation, or moderation, of the passions, is merely the effect of having them frequently excited, and of being familiarized with the occasions of them, in Tragic fiction; just as the passions of pity and terror are actually purged, or reduced to moderation, in a surgeon, a physician, or a soldier, by their being accustomed to those terrible or piteous objects that occasion them.
The other interpretation attributes the effect to the moral lesson and example of the drama: Tragedy purges the passions by the striking pictures it sets before us of the dreadful calamities occasioned by the unrestrained indulgence of them; by giving useful warnings, and preparing us to bear the ills of life with patience.
One, or the other, or both, of these meanings, have, I think, been attributed to Aristotle by the best commentators and critics. For the first, the reader may see Mr. Harris's Disc. on Music, Painting, &c. ch. v. note .— Heinf. De Trag. Const. cap. ii. p. 22, 23 . and Castelvetro, p. 117, 118 . For the second, Madius;— D'Alembert in his letter to Rousseau, Melanges, tom. ii. p. 414 .— Dryden, Obs. on the Æneid — Abbè Du Bos, Refl. sur la Poesie, tom. i. sect. 44, &c . For an explanation compounded of the two, Robortelli, Piccolomini, and Dacier, who, by the way, after declaring that all the explanations of former commentators
"servaient only to obscure the passage,"
and that the true sense was not to be found in any of them, proceeds to give us, as that true sense, and as his own discovery, exactly what had been said before him.
Let us first see what Aristotle says. He says, that Tragedy, by the means of pity and terror, effects the purgation (
καθαρσιν
) of such passions: i. e. of pity and terror and other passions of the same kind: for pity and terror seem clearly meant, by the expression, to be included in the effect. 2 And this, in my opinion, is sufficient to overturn the second of the explanations just mentioned; for, according to that, terror and pity are not both the means and the object of the purgation, as Aristotle, I think, asserts them to be, but they are the means only of purging other passions—those passions, whatever they may be, which are supposed to produce the calamitous events exhibited to our view. Indeed, according to this idea, the object is rather the vice that arises from passion, than the passion itself which is the cause of it. But, besides this objection, I do not see any reason to think, that the moral lesson of the drama, and the effects it might have in moderating our passions through the reflections it excites in us, were at all in Aristotle's thoughts 3 .
The first of the two explanations seems far more admissible. I believe it made a part of his idea, but I doubt whether it was the whole of it. What was precisely his meaning, and the whole of his meaning, will never, I fear, be the subject of a perfect, Stoical
καταληψις
to any man. There is, however, one passage in Aristotle's works, which throws some little light upon this; enough, at least, to keep us from false interpretations, if not to lead us to the true. It is in the seventh chapter of his eighth book De Republica . The Abbé Batteux is the only commentator I know of, who has paid a proper attention to this passage; but as I do not perfectly agree with him, either as to the translation he has given, or the use he makes of it, I shall produce so much of the original as appears to be of any importance to our present purpose, and subjoin a translation, with some necessary remarks.
The object of Aristotle, in the chapter referred to, is, to examine what kinds of Music (i. e. of melody and rhythm,) are proper to be used in the education of youth. He mentions and approves a division, made by some philosophical writers of that time, of the different kinds of melodies, into Moral, Active, and Enthusiastic:
τα μεν ΗΘΙΚΑ, τα δε ΠΡΑΚΤΙΚΑ, τα δ' ΕΝΘΟΥΣΙΑΣΤΙΚΑ.
By the first of these we are to understand a manly, grave, and simple melody. The sense of
πρακτικα
is less clear; but I suppose it means a more complicated and imitative sort of melody, adapted to express human actions; for, in the 49th of the Harmonic Problems [Sect. 19.] it is said of the Hypo-Phrygian mode, that it had
ἠθος πρακτικον
, and was, on that account, used only in the dialogue and action of the drama, never in the choral part. 4 And the same epithet,
πρακτικον
, is applied, in this treatise, to the Iambic measure. 5 As to enthusiastic, it wants no explanation. Aristotle then proceeds to observe, that "Music was to be used, not for one useful purpose only, but for several," which he enumerates; and one of them is—
ΚΑΘΑΡΣΕΩΣ ἐνεκα
: with respect to which he says—
τι δε λεγομεν την καθαρσιν, νυν μεν, άπλως παλιν δε, ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗΣ, ἐρουμεν σαφεστερον
: "What I mean by
Καθαρσις
, or purgation, I shall now explain only in a short and general way; but hereafter, in the books concerning Poetry, more explicitly and clearly."—And this, I suppose, he had done, in that part of this treatise which is lost.—He then proceeds thus:
Φανερον, ότι χρηστεον μεν πασαις ταις ἁρμονιαις, ου τον αυτον δε τροπον πασαις χρηστεον· άλλα προς μεν την παιδειαν, ταις ἠθικωταταις· προς δε ἀκροασιν [f. ΚΑΘΑΡΣΙΝ], ἐτερων χειρουργουντων, και ταις πρακτικαις, και ταις ἐνθουσιαστικαις. ὁ γαρ περι ἐνιας συμβαινει παθος ψυχας ἰσχυρως, τουτο ἐν πασαις ὑπαρχει, τῳ δε ήττον διαφερει και τῳ μαλλον. οἷον, ΕΛΕΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΦΟΒΟΣ. ἐτι δ᾽ ἐνθουσιασμος· και γαρ ὑπο ταυτης της κινησεως κατακωχιμοι τινες εισιν. ἐκ δε των ἱερων μελων ὁρωμεν τουτους, όταν χρησωνται τοις ἐξοργιαζουσι την ψυχην μελεσι, καθισταμενους, ώσπερ ΙΑΤΡΕΙΑΣ τυχοντας και ΚΑΘΑΡΣΕΩΣ. ταυτο δη τουτο ἀναγκαιον πασχειν και τας ἐλεημονας, και τους φοβητικους, και τους όλως παθητικους· τους δ᾽ ἄλλους, καθ᾽ όσον ἐπιβαλλει των τοιουτων ἐκαστῳ, και πασι γιγνεσθαι ΤΙΝΑ ΚΑΘΑΡΣΙΝ, και κουφιζεσθαι μεθ' ήδονης.
[ p. 458. Ed. Duval. ] 6
In this passage, for
ἀκροασιν
I have no doubt that we should read
καθαρσιν
. The similitude of the words is sufficient to account for the mistake of the transcriber; and the purport of the whole passage seems to require the correction. For Aristotle is here showing, in what manner the three different kinds of melody were to be applied to the different purposes, which he had just enumerated:
προς ΜΕΝ την ΠΑΙΔΕΙΑΝ, ταις ήθικ.
προς ΔΕ την ΚΑΘΑΡΣΙΝ,—ταις πρακτικαις,
&c. The opposition is clear. And so, afterwards, a third purpose is mentioned—
προς ΑΝΑΠΑΥΣΙΝ.
[p. 459.] The words immediately following,
ἐτερων χειρουργουντων
, probably contributed to this mistake. They allude to his doctrine, in the preceding chapter, that boys should not be allowed to practice or perform, themselves, any but the simplest kind of Music, and upon the sim- plest and easiest instruments, such as were not
δεομενα χειρουργικης ἐπιστημης.
[p. 457.] But this was not the character either of the active and enthusiastic melodies, of which he here speaks, or of the instrument used in the accompaniment of them 7 .
I shall now give what I think a fair and literal version of the passage.—
"It is manifest then, that all the different kinds of melodies are to be made use of; not all, however, for the same purpose. For education, the most moral kind should be used: for PURGATION, both the active, and the enthusiastic; performed, however, by others. For those passions, which in some minds are violent, exist, more or less, in all; such as PITY, for example, and TERROR: and, again, enthusiasm; for with this passion some men are subject to be possessed: but when the sacred melodies, intended to compose the mind after the celebration of the orgic rites, have been performed, we see those men become calm and sedate, as if they had undergone a kind of purgation, or cure. And the case must necessarily be the same with those who are particularly liable to be moved by PITY, or TERROR, or any other passion; and with other men, as far as they are under the influence of any such passion; all of them experiencing a sort of PURGATION, and PLEASURABLE RELIEF."
From this passage, though far enough, I am sensible, from being perfectly clear and explicit, two things, at least, may, I think, be confidently deduced. 1. That whatever be the meaning of the term
καθαρσις
, or purgation, here, must also be its meaning in the treatise on Poetry; since to that work Aristotle refers for a fuller explanation of it. The only difference is, that here, the term is applied to the effect of imitative Music; there, to that of imitative Poetry; of that species of it, however, which depended, we know, upon Music, for a very considerable part of its effect. 2. It is plain, that, according to Aristotle's idea, pity was to be purged by pity, terror by terror, &c.; contrary to the second of the two explanations above mentioned. For Aristotle is here expressly speaking of the use of enthusiastic Music applied
προς καθαρσιν
; and he says, that men, agitated by enthusiasm, were purged or relieved from that enthusiasm by the
ἱερα μελη
, which were plainly enthusiastic melodies; i. e. such as imitated, or expressed, that passion, and were intended to calm the mind, which had been violently agitated and inflamed; not, as M. Batteux understands, by the sudden opposition of Doric, grave, and moral strains, [p. 280, 1.] but by pleasurable indulgence of the same passion in imitative Music:
κουφιζεσθαι μεθ᾽ ἡδονης.
These melodies were, probably, such as those of Olympus, which had been mentioned just before [cap. 5.] and of which Aristotle says, that they,
Ὁμολογουμενως ΠΟΙΕΙ ΤΑΣ ΨΥΧΑΣ ΕΝΘΟΥΣΙΑΣΤΙΚΑΣ.
Indeed, from the manner, in which the Music of Olympus is spoken of by Plato, and Plutarch, there is great reason to suppose, that these "sacred melodies" were no other, than the very melodies of that musician 8 .
With respect to this
καθαρσις
itself, Aristotle by no means gives us in this passage, nor, indeed, professes to give us, a full and satisfactory explanation of it. Some light, however, he has flung upon it by the expressions,
ἰατρεια
, and
κουφιζεσθαι μεθ᾽ ἡδονης
, which he uses as synonymous to
καθαρσις
: "Purgation, cure, pleasurable relief." The Abbé Batteux understands Aristotle to mean no more by this, than that the passions of terror or pity, which, when excited by real objects, are simply painful, or, at least, have a predominant mixture of pain, are, by imitation, and the consciousness of fiction, purged or purified from this alloy of the disagreeable and painful, and converted, on the whole, into an emotion of delight. His meaning may be clearer in his own words. Aristotle, he says, had established it as a principle—
"Que les objets désagréables plaisent quand ils sont imités, même lorsqu'ils le font dans la plus grande verité. En appliquant ce principe à la Tragedie, il s'ensuit, que c'est l'imitation qui est la cause du plaisir qu'elle produit, et non la nature des objets imités, puisque ces objets sont par eux-mêmes désagréables. C'est donc l'imitation qui ôte à la terreur et à la pitié l'accessoire désagréable qu'elles ont dans la realité: c'est l'imitation qui opere la purgation Tragique, en mettant les malheurs imités à la place des malheurs réels, et en séparant par ce moyen ce que la pitié et la terreur ont d'agréable, comme emotions, d'avec ce qu'elles ont de désagréable, quand elles font jointes à l'idée de malheurs réels."
9 This account, which is exactly Fontenelle's solution of the pleasure arising from Tragic emotion 10 , is liable to a difficulty not easily, I think, surmounted. It confines Aristotle's meaning to the present pleasure of the emotion; it supposes all the purgation to consist merely in rendering the feeling of the passion pleasurable; not in any good effect which the habit of such emotion may produce, in correcting, refining, or moderating, such passions, when excited by real objects. Now, though it must be confessed, that Aristotle has not, in that short and professedly imperfect explanation given of the
καθαρσις
in the passage adduced, said any thing directly pointing to such effect, yet, I think, the whole turn and cast of his expression is such, as leads one naturally to conclude, that it was his meaning. The phrase,
κουφιζεσθαι μεθ' ήδονης
, does indeed appear to express the present effect only; but I can scarce conceive, that he would have used such a word as
καθαρσις
, and still less,
ΙΑΤΡΕΙΑ
, without a view to something beyond the pleasurable relief or vent of the moment; especially, in a chapter, where he is professedly enumerating and examining the uses of music 11 . Farther, the words,
ἐλεημονας, φοβητικους, παθητικους
, confirm this idea; being all words expressive of habitual excess, requiring correction and moderation 12 .
But, what still more strongly opposes the Abbé Batteux's idea, is, that Aristotle is here, as Heinsius and others have well observed, evidently combating the doctrine of Plato, whose great objection to Tragedy, was, that it feeds and inflames the passions 13 . It could be no answer to this, to allege, that the feeling of passion excited by Tragic imitation is pleasurable; for this is so far from being called in question by Plato, that it is the very foundation of his objection. The pleasure afforded by such Poetry is allowed by him in its utmost extent 14 . "Let its advocates," he says, "undertake to show us that it is not merely pleasurable, but USEFUL also, and we will lend a favourable ear to their apology; for we shall surely be gainers by the conviction." 15 Now Aristotle, if I understand him rightly, undertakes this apology, and points out the utility required. And no one, I think, can reasonably doubt, that such was his intention, who has attended to the following passage of Plato:—
ἀπολαυειν ἀναγκη ἀπο των ἀλλοτριων εις τα οικεια· ΘΡΕΨΑΝΤΑ γαρ ἐν ἐκεινοις ΙΣΧΥΡΟΝ ΤΟ ΕΛΕΕΙΝΟΝ, ου ραδιον ἐν τοις ΑΥΤΟΥ ΠΑΘΕΣΙ ΚΑΤΕΧΕΙΝ
16 . For, to this objection, there cannot well be a more direct and pointed answer, than Aristotle's assertion, as usually understood—that the habit of indulging the emotions of pity, or terror, in the fictitious representations of Tragedy, tends, on the contrary, to moderate and refine those passions, when they occur in real life.
But though the Abbé Batteux's idea of this purgation appears to me by no means to be the whole, it must, I think, be admitted as a part, and an essential part, of Aristotle's meaning. For the effect depends, not merely, as some commentators seem to suppose 17 , on the having our passions frequently and habitually excited, but, on the having them so excited by fictitious representation. Pity and terror frequently excited by such objects and such events in real life, as the imitations of the Tragic scene set before us, would rather tend to produce apathy than moderation. Nature would struggle against such violent and painful agitation, and the heart would become callous in its own defence. We must be insensible, that we might not be wretched. It is far otherwise with fictitious passion. There, the emotion, though often violent in spite of the consciousness of fiction, is always, more or less, delightful. We indulge it, as one of the first of pleasures; and the effect of that indulgence, frequently repeated, is perhaps, that, while it moderates real passion by the frequency of similar impressions, it, at the same time, cherishes such sympathetic emotions, in their proper and useful degree, by the delicious feelings which never fail to accompany the indulgence of them in imitative representation.
The passions of savages, or of men in the first rude stages of civilization, are ferocious and painful. They pity, or they fear, either violently, or not at all. With them, there is hardly any medium between ungovernable agitation, and absolute insensibility.—Suppose such a people to have access, like the Athenians, to theatrical representations, and to have their passions kept in frequent and pleasurable exercise by fictitious distress; the consequence, I think, would be, that, by degrees, they would come to have more feeling, and less perturbation. Instead of sympathetic emotions rarely excited, painfully felt, and soon extinguished, they would gradually acquire a calm, lasting, and useful habit of general tenderness and sensibility. In polished society, where the passions are accustomed to be indulged in fiction, either in the theatre, or by reading, and the pain is converted, on the whole, into one strong and delightful feeling, by the charms of imitation, Poetry, Music, aided by the indistinct consciousness of fiction—these passions, even when excited by real objects, seem to retain, (at least, in cases where we are not too closely touched,) some tincture of the same pleasurable emotion, which attended them, when raised by works of imagination; they are more moderately and agreeably felt, more easily governed, and more gentle and polished in their expressions.
Such appears to me, on the whole, to be the most probable explanation of Aristotle's meaning: I must, at least, confess it to be the only reasonable meaning, that I am able to discover. How far it is true, and founded on solid observation, is another question, which I willingly submit to the philosophical and thinking part of my readers.
I cannot omit to observe, that the short explanation given by MILTON, in the introduction to his Samson Agonistes , appears to coincide exactly, as far as it goes, with my idea of the passage.—"Tragedy, as it was anciently composed, hath been ever held the gravest, moraleft, and most profitable of all other Poems: therefore said by Aristotle to be of power, by raising pity, and fear or terror, to purge the mind of those and such like passions; that is, to temper and reduce them to just measure, with a kind of delight, stirred up by reading or seeing those passions well imitated." One thing should be added. Aristotle's assertion must be considered relatively to his own times, and nation. He speaks of the effects of Tragedy on the people of Athens, who, as reading was then no popular occupation, had scarce any opportunity of indulging fictitious emotion, but at the Theatre, and who, we know, were there accustomed to indulge it perpetually. With us, the case is widely different. The doctrine, therefore, of Aristotle, that "Tragedy purges the passions," translated, if I may so speak, into modern truth, would perhaps amount only to this—that the habitual exercise of the passions by works of imagination in general, of the serious and pathetic kind, (such as Tragedies, Novels, &c.) has a tendency to soften and refine those passions, when excited by real objects in common life.

46. mvp-aristotle-comment-46

NOTE 46. P. 75.

6.4 IN SOME PARTS METRE ALONE IS EMPLOYED, IN OTHERS MELODY.
A passage of very tantalizing brevity. By
δια μετρων ΜΟΝΟΝ
, are we to understand, according to the obvious and literal meaning of the expression, that in some parts of Tragedy the verse was merely recited, spoken, as in modern Tragedy? —This contradicts what, by many writers, has been considered as a fact thoroughly established, that the Greek Tragedy was accompanied by musical instruments, and was therefore strictly musical, throughout: —for as to the dreams of the Abbé Du Bos, Rousseau, and others, about a noted declamation, a declamation accompanied by Music, yet not sung—this is too manifest an absurdity to stand in need of confutation. If, as Rousseau says, it is
"impossible to understand what the ancients have said about their theatrical declamation, without supposing this,"
would it not be better to say, at once, that we do not understand it, than to explain it into impossibilities?
As for the systematic Abbé Du Bos, he was set upon proving his point; and he proves it like a man resolved to prove it, by wresting all sorts of authors to his purpose, and translating them as he pleased. 18 All we know clearly, is, that the ancient drama was accompanied, (in part, at least,) by musical instruments. I conclude, confidently, that since the instruments could not speak, the actors must sing—that their declamation must certainly have been, strictly speaking, musical, however simple; the chanting of the simplest plain chant, being as truly Music, i. e. as essentially distinct from speech, as the most refined melody of a modern opera.
If, then, the Greek Tragedy had a musical accompaniment throughout, it must have been sung throughout. But here, Aristotle says, as plainly as words can say it, that in some parts of Tragedy, "metre only" was employed: —
δια ΜΕΤΡΩΝ ἐνια ΜΟΝΟΝ
: that is, as it is necessarily implied, without the two other
ήδυσματα
, or seasonings, of Tragic language, just mentioned, melody and rhythm. 19
Some commentators, I know, endeavour to evade the force of this expression, by saying, that Aristotle means, by
δια μετρων μονον
, only the noted declamation, which, being a sort of recitative, was not regarded as strictly musical, nor denominated
μελος
. And in support of this, it is alleged, that the word
λέξις
, Speech, is applied by him afterwards in a similar manner; 20 as
λεγεσθαι
is also by Plutarch, who talks of "some of the Iambics being spoken with an accompaniment, and others, sung: 21 as we sometimes say of a singer, that he speaks recitative well. But all this, I confess, does not satisfy me. It is one thing, to apply occasionally the word
λεξις
or
λεγεσθαι
, in this comparative way, to such kind of singing as most resembles speech, and another, to say roundly, that some parts of Tragedy made use of metre, or verse, only; and that too, immediately after having fixed the exclusive sense of
μονον
, by enumerating the three
ήδυσματα
of Tragic diction, which he asserts to be separately used in different parts, i. e.
ῥυθμου, άρμονια, μετρον
, — RHYTHM, MELODY, and METRE. 22 They who dispute this meaning, must at least, I think, allow that if it had been the meaning, Aristotle could not well have expressed it with more precision. How can
μετρων
here be taken in the loose and comparative sense contended for, when, in the very words immediately preceding, it is carefully limited to its strict and proper sense, by being expressly discriminated from melody, as well as from rhythm?
But after all, the fact, that the Greek Tragedy was sung throughout, though often asserted, has not yet been proved; nor do I think that it can be proved; at least, by any passage of ancient authors, that I have seen adduced to prove it. The Abbé Vatry, in a dissertation, Sur la recitation des Tragedies anciennes, undertook to prove, in form, that the Greek Tragedies were sung,
"bout à l'autre,"
like our operas. But how does he prove this?—by proving, what indeed is easily proved, 23 that a part of the Iambics, or the dialogue, was sung, and then by taking it for granted, that the ancients could not possibly have endured so barbarous a custom, as the mixture of speech and singing in the same piece.
"Il ne paroit pas qu'on puisse douter que ces cantiques ne se chantassent; mais de cela même je crois pouvoir conclurre, que tout le reste se chantoit, quoique differemment: car le bon sens, et ce que les anciens nous disent, nous conduit à penser que leur recitation etoit partout de même nature, et qu'elle ne se bigarroit point, tantôt d'une simple declamation, et tantôt d'un chant musical."
By the same presumptive mode of arguing, the Abbé might also have proved, à priori, that the Greeks could not possibly have been guilty of the modern barbarous bigarrure of serious and ludicrous, in their Tragic drama. But the first Greek Tragedy he had opened would probably have overturned his reasoning.
A thorough discussion of all the passages of ancient authors, that throw any light upon this question, relative to the dramatic representations of the Greeks, would draw me much too far beyond my bounds. I must content myself with pointing out (for I think it has not been observed,) the stubborn difficulty which this passage of Aristotle appears to me to throw in the way of the common opinion upon this subject; and with hazarding a merely hypothetical conjecture, that, if, as Aristotle seems plainly to say, some part of the Greek Tragedy was spoken, like our Tragic declamation, without any musical accompaniment, it was, most probably, that part of the dialogue, which, as I have before observed, in NOTE 33 , is, in every Tragedy, easily distinguished from the rest, by its being carried on in a sort of quick repartee of verse to verse. As, in this part of the dialogue, we almost constantly find the Tragic tone lowered to a more colloquial pitch, and even approaching frequently to the jocular and burlesque, it seems reasonable to think, that here, if anywhere, the musical accompaniment, and the elevation of lengthened and chanting tones, were withdrawn, and common conversation left to common speech.
But what, again, are we to understand by—
και παλιν ἐτερα δια μελους
?—Are we to repeat
μονον
, and understand Melody alone, without the two other
ήδυσματα
, Rhythm and Metre? This cannot be. For though we may strip the Tragic language of melody and of rhythm, or, in other words, of Music, we cannot strip it of metre. The ancients most certainly did not admit prose into their Tragedies; and as little can we conceive them to have set prose to Music. Dacier, and some other commentators, understand by
μελους
here, Music, including rhythm. This sense of the word is certainly warrantable; but it can hardly be the sense here: for, surely, an instance, in which all the three
ήδυσματα
were used, (as they must be, if metre be indispensable, and
μελος
imply rhythm and melody,) would be but a strange illustration of the
ΧΩΡΙΣ ἐκαστου των ειδων
κ. τ. αλ.
I do not see what remains, but, that we take
μελος
here in its most restrained sense, as distinct from rhythm, or time, and synonymous to
άρμονια
; that sense, in which Aristotle had used it before, in his first chapter. 24 25 And if we do this, we must necessarily, I think, understand, that some parts of the dialogue were sung without rhythm: I mean, without musical rhythm, or time, though certainly not without that poetical or profodic rhythm, by which in reciting verse, and, indeed, even in the most familiar conversation, the syllabic quantity must have been relatively, at least, observed, though not, I presume, with the inflexibility of musical measure, nor with such a rigorous equality of long to long, and short to short, as is essential to the execution of what is properly called Music, and as I suppose to have been observed in the choral odes. 26 Thus the dialogue of the Greek Tragedy will appear to have been not improperly compared to our recitative; differing from the chorus, as our recitative differs from the airs, both in the absence of strict time, and in the kind of melody, which was also, as mere melody, less musical than the choral melody, and more imitative of speech, as well as of action. 27
Whether the monologues, or long speeches—the
μακραι ῥησεις
, as Plato calls them—were performed in the same way, as the rest of the dialogue, or, as it has been imagined, were distinguished by being more measured and musical, is a point not easily cleared up. 28 The passages commonly appealed to for this purpose, from the grammarians Diomedes and Donatus, about the Cantica of the Roman Comedy, I look upon as a very frail foundation of any conclusion with respect to the Greek Tragedy. 29 The passage of Plutarch above quoted, note, furnishes the strongest support I know of for such a distinction. For, if by "spoken or recited to an instrumental accompaniment," (
τα μεν [sc. των ἰαμβειων] ΛΕΓΕΣΘΑΙ παρα την κρουσιν
) Plutarch meant, as I think he must mean, sung in recitative, not literally spoken, (for how could that admit of a musical accompaniment?) then,
ᾳδεσθαι
, which is opposed to it, must of course imply, not mere singing as opposed to speech, but a more musical and measured melody.

47. mvp-aristotle-comment-47

NOTE 47. P. 76.

6.6 THE MEANING OF MELOPOEIA IS OBVIOUS.
I have ventured to depart from the common interpretation, by understanding the word
δυναμις
, here, to mean, not the power, and effect, of the Melopæia itself, but the power, i. e. the meaning, of the term. Aristotle is here, as usual, explaining the terms he had made use of. It was directly to his purpose to say, as a reason for omitting a definition in this instance, that the meaning of the word was well known; but not at all to his purpose, to say—"I need not explain the word, because the power and effect of the thing signified by it, (that is, of Music,) is well known."
Dacier is amusing here. He wonders what could induce the Greeks to make Music a part of their drama; and at last,
"après bien des recherches,"
he discovers one principal cause to have been this—that they had very musical ears; but he does not dis- cover the cause of his own wonder, which, in all probability, was, that he had not.

48. mvp-aristotle-comment-48

NOTE 48. P. 76.

6.8 OR DELIVERING A GENERAL SENTIMENT.
In the Rhetoric, Aristotle defines
γνωμη
by
καθολου ἀποφανσις
. [ Lib. ii. cap. xxi. p. 572. ] Thus below, in this chapter, for,
ἀποφαινονται γνωμην
, his first expression, we have,
καθολου ἀποφαινονται
. — This has been loosely and inaccurately rendered in all the translations I have seen, except those of Castelvetro and Goulston.

49. mvp-aristotle-comment-49

NOTE 49. P. 76.

6.11 THESE PARTS----HAVE BEEN EMPLOYED BY MOST POETS.
Locus, as the critics say, conclamatus. Time is too precious to be wasted in the support, or refutation, of random conjectures upon a passage of such desperate corruption. How can
οὐκ ὀλιγοι
, "not a few," be tortured into, "all," or, "almost all?" Yet so Dacier, Batteux, Goulston, &c. On the other hand, if fairly translated, "not a few Poets have made use of these parts," how strangely it will follow—"for EVERY Tragedy has them all!"—And how is the
ὡς εἰπειν
, to be applied? to
οὐκ ὀλιγοι
, or, to
ειδεσι
? In the midst of these difficulties, all I could do was to make my version consistent with itself; faithful to the original, I could not make it, without making it nonsensical. Those commentators, who apply the
ὡς εἰπειν
to the word
ειδεσι
, seem favoured by ch. xii. where, speaking of the same essential parts of Tragedy, Aristotle says—
οἷς μεν ΩΣ ΕΙΔΕΣΙ δει χρησθαι
.

50. mvp-aristotle-comment-50

NOTE 50. P. 77.

6.12 THE SUPREME GOOD ITSELF----IS ACTION, NOT QUALITY.
See Ethic. Nicom. I. 5, 7, 8. ed. Wilk. & Mag. Moral. I. 4, p. 149, 150, ed. Duval.

51. mvp-aristotle-comment-51

NOTE 51. P. 77.

6.15 THE TRAGEDIES OF MOST MODERN POETS HAVE THIS DEFECT.
This receives illustration from what Aristotle presently after says, of "the rhetorical manner prevailing in the Poets of his time:"
οἱ δε νυν, ῥητορικως.
cap. vi: and from his observation, at the close of cap. xxiv. [Transl. Part III. Sect. 6.] that "the manners and sentiments are only obscured by too splendid a diction."
What he has here said of the recent Tragedies of his time, may perhaps be said, in general, of our modern Tragedies, compared with those of Shakspeare. The truth, I believe, is, that the Tragedy of a refined and polished age will always have less manners than that of ruder times, because it will have more dignity; more of that uniform and level elevation, which excludes strong traits of character, and the simple, unvarnished delineation of the manners. Indeed, what the Greeks denominated
ἦθος
, is the peculiar province of Comedy, and is seldom to be found in Tragedy, except in that stage of its progress, when it is not yet thoroughly and distinctly separated from Comedy; from the imitation of common life, and natural manners. 30 Such are the Tragedies of Shakspeare; and such, as I have before ventured to suggest, are those of Euripides in particular, which, in proportion as they have less dignity, have more
ἦθος
, than the Tragedies of Sophocles. But in neither of them, nor, probably, even in those very Poets here censured by Aristotle, was the "language of Poets," substituted for "the language of men," as it is almost constantly in the French Tragedy, and too often, in our own Tragedies of the French School. 31

52. mvp-aristotle-comment-52

NOTE 52. P. 77.

6.15 POLYGNOTUS EXCELS IN THE EXPRESSION OF THE MANNERS.
I see not the smallest reason for the substitution of
ἀγαθων
, for
ἀγαθα
, which is the reading, we are told, of all the MSS. What Aristotle had said before of Polygnotus, cap. ii. —
ότι κρειττους εικαζε
—seems not to afford the slightest ground for alteration here. [See Mr. Winstanley's ed. p. 281. ] Painters are compared in very different points of view, in these two passages: there, as imitating good or bad, serious or ridiculous, elevated or low, objects: here, only as expressing, or not expressing, manners. It was directly to Aristotle's purpose to say, that Polygnotus was a "good manner-painter;" (
ἀγαθος ήθογραφος
)—not at all to his purpose, (besides the awkwardness of the expression itself,) to say, that he was a "manner-painter of good men:" (
ἀγαθων ήθογραφος
). 32

53. mvp-aristotle-comment-53

NOTE 53. P. 77.

6.16 JUST AS IN PAINTING, &c.
I hope I shall not much shock even the most conscientious adherents to the established inaccuracy and authentic blunders of ancient manuscripts, by having ventured to adopt here the transposition first proposed, I believe, by Castelvetro. 33 I can only desire those readers, who may be alarmed at my temerity, to read the passage—
παραπλησιον γαρ ἐστι—κ. τ. αλλ.—γραφεας, εικονα
,—first, where it stands in all the editions, and then, where I have placed it, immediately after the words—
ἐχουσα δε μυθον και συστασιν πραγματων
. 34 —If this experiment alone be not sufficient to convince them of the propriety, or, rather, the necessity, of the transposition, I despair of the success of any arguments I am able to produce in the support of it. To me, I confess, it is among those things that are too evident for proof.

Commentary on the Poetics (Henry James Pye, 1792) (OCR draft) (Henry James Pye's 1792 English commentary, aligned to the Kassel reference edition.) focus

6.1. mvp-aristotle-comment-14 6.1

TRAGEDY IS AN IMITATION, IN ORNAMENTED LANGUAGE, OF AN ACTION IMPORTANT AND COMPLETE, AND POSSESSING A CERTAIN DEGREE OF MAGNITUDE, HAVING ITS FORMS DIS- TINCT IN THEIR RESPECTIVE PARTS, AND BY THE REPRE- SENTATION OF PERSONS ACTING, AND NOT BY NARRATION, EFFECTING THROUGH THE MEANS OF PITY AND TERROR, THE PURGATION OF SUCH PASSIONS.

VARIOUS and contradictory have been the explanations given by different commentators of this celebrated definition of tragedy; and yet the grand object it proposes to have in view, the purgation of the paffions by the means of pity and terror, and how those means operate to attain that end, or whether, in fact, they have any fuch operation at all, has received little elucidation from their combined enquiries. To entertain any hope of success where so many persons of the highest literary reputation have failed, would be a great degree of presumption. I shall therefore only state, with all the diffidence due where so little is certainty, and fo much conjecture, what appears to me, from all that can be collected on the fubject, the real notion of Aristotle as to the means and the effect of purging the paffions; and enquire how far that notion is founded in nature and confirmed by experience; allowing for the lapfe of time, and the consequent alteration of manners and opinions. Any
POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. Any obscurity in an author, especially if it relates to his particular judgment on any general subject [A], will be most likely to receive light from comparifon with his other works, of which our critic has left us an ample store. Indeed, these have been so long, and so univerfally, the objects of scholaftic disquisition, that one should have imagined every correfpondent, and every discordant passage, would have long fince been collated and examined. But as M. Leffing (who strongly [в] recommends this method of illustration,) observes, their pursuits were very different from the investigation of elegant literature. Those writings of the Stagirite which, at the present time, are the principal subjects of enquiry, and especially the Poetic, had little to engage the attention of men devoted to the study of logic and metaphyfics: and, perhaps, there are few of those whose turn of mind induces them to make the treatise before us the particular object of their attention, who would have the patience and perfeverance, to go through the various and voluminous works of Aristotle, which treat of matters so foreign to their taste. There is one treatife, however, on a congenial fubject, (the Rhetoric) which throws light on the imperfect and mutilated state of the Poetic in a hundred instances. But the present subject of our enquiry receives most elucidation from a work where we should less expect to find it. The philofopher [c], in his treatise on government, speaking of the power of music to foften and alleviate the passions, says; • Whatever paffions have a strong effect [A] In regard to verbal obfcurity, this will often be fallacious. Ariftotle has frequently employed the same word in different senses, even in this short sketch. SEE NOTE III. ch. 1. [B] DRAMATURGIE, Vol II. p. 11. [C] POLITIC, 1. vii. chap. vii. T2 ، on
، on any minds, will have some effect on all, and they will only differ in degree. Such passions, for example, as pity and terror, to which we may add enthusiasm, an affection of the mind with which fome men are violently possessed. Now we fee this last, when those sacred • melodies which accompany the celebration of the mystic rights are ،
، performed, is foothed and quieted, as if it were by medicine or purgation; and the fame thing will happen to those who are liable to the impreffions of pity or terror, or whose passions in general are eafily excited, and others indeed as far as they may be under the influence of • fuch paffions. They will all feel a kind of purgation, or unburthening of the mind, accompanied by fome degree of pleasure.' Ariftotle is treating here only of the purgation of the passions, as effected by mufic, and [D] which he professes to explain in a flight and superficial manner, with a promise to be more explicit in his writings on poetry: if this promise has ever been fulfilled, it is generally supposed it must have been in some of those parts of his criticism on poetry which are loft. But [E] M. Leffing is of opinion, that it is compleatly fulfilled in the Poetic, as we now have it. If this is the cafe, I have [D] Τὶ δὲ λέγομεν τὴν κάθαρσιν, νῦν μὲν ΑΠΛΩΣ, πάλιν δ᾽ ἐν τοις περὶ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗΣ ἐροῦμεν ΣΑΦΕΣΤΕΡΟΝ. [E] 'Aristotle, at the conclufion of his Treatise on Government, where he speaks of the < purgation of the passions by mufic, promises to treat of this purgation with more perfpicuity in his Poetic. "But (Corneille says,) fince we fee nothing at all of this matter there, most of the " interpreters think that we have it not complete." Nothing at all? For my part I think that I find, even in what remains of the Poetic, every thing that he could confider, as ne- ⚫ ceffary to say on the fubject to any one who was not ignorant of the principles of his philo- ' fophy.' DRAMATURGIE, Vol. II. p. 28. only
POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. only to lament my own ill fortune in not finding it; or my stupidity in not comprehending it. The above quotation, from the Treatise on Government, however, if it does not itself receive much illustration from this, or any other part of the Poetic now extant, seems to throw fome light on the paffage under confideration, and affords some clue for the discovery of what Aristotle means by purging the passions. His example of the enthusiast having his mind relieved by sounds congenial, though in a milder degree, with his own more violent feelings, leads us to fuppofe, that he conceives the exceffive, habitual effects of pity and terror, and other paffions of the fame kind [F], may also be alleviated by exciting them in a more moderate degree, through the apparently fictitious means of dramatic imitation. Mr. Harris [G], perhaps, carries the efficacy of tragic imitation a little too far, when he supposes it capable of blunting the feelings, by frequent representation of scenes of terror and distress, in the way the realities act on military men, physicians, and furgeons. Yet, however, much allowance must be made for the difference of manners, and habits. The drama might have had an effect on the people of Athens, who made an attendance on the theatre almost the business of their lives, [F] Ariftotle confines this effect to pity and terror, and affections of the fame kind (among which he includes enthusiasm,) in express words, using τῶν τοιέτων, in both places. Such paffions as love and anger, are enflamed instead of foftened by the fame means. [G] Difcourse on Music, Poetry, and Painting, chap. v. note c. which
which we can have no idea of. We know (says M. Leffing [H]) to • what a degree the Greeks and Romans carried their passion for public ، spectacles, and the first more especially for tragedy; and, on the contrary, how indifferent and cold our people are in regard to the theatre. • Whence arifes this difference, if not from the Greeks finding them- ، selves affected with such strong and extraordinary [1] feelings, during • the representation, that they waited with transport the moment of their return? On the contrary, the impressions we receive at the • theatre are so trivial, and so weak, that we scarcely esteem them worth ⚫ the time and expence it costs to procure them. We almost all, and • almost always go, either from curiosity, or because it is the fashion, or • for want of fomething else to do, or for the fake of company, or to • fee and be seen; very few go with other views, and those but feldom.' [H] Though M. Lessing speaks of the Germans, it is full as applicable to the people of this country. Indeed, he himself adds, 'I say WE, OUR PEOPLE, OUR THEATRE, but I do not ' mean to be understood as speaking only of the Germans. For we freely acknowledge that as yet we have no theatre.. [1] This must have arisen from the sensibility of the people, rather than the superior effect of the drama. The fatire of M. Leffing is directed against the infipidity of the French tragedy; for he puts the Greek and English stage together, and classes Shakespear with Euripides and Sophocles: and yet it is impossible for any people to be less interested in the amufements of the theatre than we are. The truth feems to be, that the conftant attendance of the Athenian people on the theatre, arose from the splendor of the exhibition, and its being at the public charge; and that the fuperior effect of the representation on their minds, was the confequence, not the cause, of their strong attachment to tragic imitation. The Romans were, as M. Leffing allows, equally attached to spectacles, though of another kind; and yet they have never been particularly characterized for strong and extraordinary feelings; nor were their favourite exhibitions calculated to excite them.
It
POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. ! i It remains now to enquire how far our paffions are really blunted or softened, by being excited in a fainter degree, through the fictions of tragedy. Or whether, on the contrary, they are not, at least sometimes, rather heightened and enflamed by them. Indeed, this was a point at issue in the time of Aristotle, and had, before him, been decided contrary to his opinion, by Plato, who banished poets from his republic on this account. His expreffion on this head I shall give in the words of M. Twining's tranflation, together with his observation on it [k]. "The habit of indulging our paffions, in the concerns of others, will, " of neceffity, bring on the same habitual indulgence in those which " relate to ourselves: for he who has nourished and strengthened to "excess, the passion of pity for example, by habitual sympathy with "the misfortunes of others, will not find it easy to restrain the same "kind of feelings in his own." • To this objection there cannot be a more direct and pointed answer than Aristotle's affertion, as usually • understood, that the habit of indulging the emotions of pity or terror, in the fictitious representations of tragedy, tends, on the contrary, to moderate and refine those passions when they occur in real life.' TWINING'S NOTES ON ARISTOTLE, note 45, p. 240. That this doctrine of Aristotle is intended as an anfwer to the objection of Plato, is confirmed, if any confirmation were necessary, by its being first started in his own treatise on a republic. It may feem great arrogance even to attempt to decide, when such doctors as Plato and Ariftotle disagree. But as they are both defending [κ] ᾿Απολαύειν ἀνάγκη ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἐις τὰ ὀικῖια· Θρέψαντα γὰρ ἐν ἐκείνοις ἰσχυρὸν τὸ ἐλεεινὸν, ὀυ ρἅδιον ἐν τοις άντε πάθεσι κατέχειν. Plato de Rep. 1. x. Ed. Seran. 1602. p. 756. В. a favorite
a favorite hypothefis, they may possibly each be partly right, and partly wrong. Much must depend on the different feelings of individuals, as well as of nations, these depending on habits of mind and body, profeffion, or education, and those on the form of government, and degree of civilization, and refinement. The foldier will be affected differently from the mechanic, the polished from the rude, the indolent from the active. And the inhabitant of London, or Paris, will certainly have different sensations of pity and terror, from the inhabitant of the desarts of Arabia, or the woods of America. When the objects of pity or terror, whether real or imaginary, press so strongly on our fenfations as to exclude any fentiment of pleasure, they will, in my opinion, have rather a tendency to increase than diminish the natural force of those paffions, and this will often depend on the firmness of the mind, or the ductility of the imagination. But when the excitement of these passions is accompanied by any degree [L] of pleasure, however flight, the mind will acquire gradual strength to bear stronger representations by habitual exercise, till at length, as pofsibly was the cafe with the people of Athens, the sensations might attain such a state as to require encreasing force of terror and distress, to awaken the sensibility so as to cause that agitation, which is the fource [L] Hume, in one of his effays, observes, that the pleasure of being out of danger, and near it, (which he exemplifies by standing on the edge of a precipice, so as to be perfectly safe) is a species of terror so modified as to be perfectly pleasing. Now to a seaman, or a mountaineer, this would convey no idea at all of terror; and I know a person who would feel a greater dread from it, than if exposed to the most imminent danger in any other form whatever, and which, confequently, could not be attended with the flightest semblance. of pleasure. of
POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. of the delight we receive from tragic imitation. And in this situation the mind may be something deadened to the fame impreffions, though occafioned by circumstances in real life. As we can only judge of the opinion of Aristotle, and how far it is really founded on nature, by our own sensations, or our observation of the sensations of others, we are much at a loss where to look for these means of decifion. Dramatic representation, we have already observed, neither occupies the time or attention enough to have any great, or permanent energy, on our paffions; and the perusal of tragedies, or other compofitions of a congenial cast, is confidered in general as the amusement of an idle hour, ready to be thrown aside in a moment on the arrival of the newspaper, or the summons to the card table. The only persons of the present day, who at all devote their attention with ardor and perfeverance to the reading compositions of fictitious distress, (and I believe their number, especially among the higher ranks, decreases every day,) are those usually called romantic young women, who dedicate much of their time to the study of the numerous tales, with which the press continually furnishes our circulating libraries. It is not my business here to enquire how this kind of application may influence their opinions, and conduct in life; but it certainly seems likely to throw some light on the influence a ferious attention to scenes of imitated paffion, may have on the force of real paffion. And here we must confefs, the first appearance is against the doctrine of the critic; the general effect of novel-reading on the gentler sex is too obvious to be doubted; it excites and enflames the paffion which is the principal subject of the tale, and the fufceptibility of the female votary of the circulating library, is proverbial. But we must, in the first place, recollect, that the passion of U love
love is very different in itself from terror and pity, though it may be the cause of circumftances replete with both [(M); and it is the tendency to this paffion, and not to those of pity and terror, which is encreased by this kind of reading. Befides, it is not perhaps so much the paffion itself that is enflamed, as the wish to feel it is created by this study. A defire of resembling the fictitious heroine of a novel, has often induced a young mind to enquire for those sensations, which, without fuch a search, might have continued for some time dormant in the bosom. So far, therefore, is love from being blunted by imitative fiction, that such fiction is often an efficient cause of its being first excited. But, in the next place, is it so clear that the paffion, of pity at least, (the terrible is seldom admitted in a novel,) is not purged and blunted in these very fufceptible minds? The reasoning of Aristotle seems to be this: the mind that has been awakened and agitated by the calamities of Edipus, Orestes, or Merope; that fees high rank and exalted character so far from exempting their possessors from pain and distress, only add accumulated weight to their sufferings, will be apt, from conftant attention to fuch scenes, to feel less from the contemplation of fimilar incidents in real life, which are seldom attended with those complicated and unallayed distresses which attend the fiction of the poet, whose business it is to select every circumstance proper to excite the paffions of pity and terror in the highest degree, and omit every event that might at all tend to alleviate or divert them. That such are the characters Ariftotle points out as proper for tragedy, appears from the thirteenth chapter.. [M] The advantage modern tragedy draws from love, confidered in this light, will be examined in another place. See Note IV. chap. хил. And
POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. And Beni, in consequence of this, renders τῶν τοιέτων παθημάτων, ' the paffions of fuch perfons, i. e. σπουδαίων, as implied in σπουδαίας,' paraphrafing it thus. As it was the object of comedy to expose and cor- • rect the foibles of private perfons, so it was that of tragedy to inftance ⚫ those in persons of higher rank, and who were invested with authority.'
My opinion of the idea of Aristotle receives the strongest corroboration from the fragment of Timocles, an Athenian comic poet, quoted by Mr. Cumberland, in the Obferver, No. 106. Yet hear me fpeak. Man is, of living beings, By nature most unhappy. Life to him Then for your woes Brings many a bitter pang. • This confolation feek. He finds oblivion • Of his own griefs, whose fufceptible heart • Is gently drawn to feel another's suff'rings, • And finds instruction mingled with delight. ، ، Turn to the tragic muse, and meet relief In every scene. If " steep'd in poverty Up to the lips; there Telephus shall shew A monarch poorer, and confole your want. Say, Are you mad? Behold Alcmæon's frenzy. • Are your eyes dim? Lo the Phineidæ blind! Is your fon dead? The loss of Niobe • Shall lighten yours. Or, are you old and wretched ? • Learn from Oëneus. If unnumber'd ills • Worse than all these should press you, he who turns U2 His
• His thoughts on other's miseries, will know • With patience more refign'd, to bear his own [N].' On the fame principle with this mode of reasoning, (and I fee no cause to question the justness of it) may not the young woman, who is for ever weeping over the distresses of a Clarissa, or a Sydney Biddulph, and tracing the affecting scenes, and wonderful revolutions, to be found in the adventures of a Cecilia, or an Emmeline, have her feelings something deadened to the less interesting distresses of ordinary life; or, to use the words of Ariftotle, with some paraphrafe, may not the paffion of pity be purged of fome of its more violent effects in reality, from being frequently excited for amusement by fictitious tales [o] of woe. Much [N] I ought, perhaps, to apologize to the reader for substituting a version of my own, for the elegant tranflation of Mr. Cumberland. But my purpose required a closer copy of the original; especially in the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th lines, which correspond so exactly with the opinion of Ariftotle. Παραψυχὰς ἐν φρόντιδων ἀνεῦρατον Τάυτας, ὁ γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ἰδίων λήθην λαβών Πρὸς ἄλλοτριῳ τε ψυχαγωγηθείς πάθει ΜΕΘ' ΗΔΟΝΗΣ ἀπῆλθε, παιδευθεὶς ἅμα. [o] May I be allowed to quote a former attempt of my own, to support this opinion? • Awake to each fictitious feeling grown, And moved by ills to real life unknown; The mind, with scenes of fabled woe possess'd, • Will shut to homely grief the senseless breaft, • And turn from want and pain the offended ear, • To pour for feign'd distress the barren tear." PROGRESS OF REFINEMENT. Perhaps the effect of comic imitation may, in some measure, illustrate this subject. Does not the representation of ridiculous characters and incidents, heightened beyond what we ever find in reality, blunt in some degree the force of ridicule on characters in life, which are never so truly laughable as the fictitious ones: for as Longinus observes, laughter is a paffion, though a pleasing one. Κὰι γὰρ ὁ γελὼς πάθος ἐν ἡδονῆ. Long. sect. xxxviii. See also Note XIV. on chap. xxv. has
POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. has been faid of the tear of sensibility, and I own I should have little opinion of the head or heart of any person, and especially of a woman, that could laugh over Clariffa, or fit with dry eyes, while Mrs. Siddons was acting Isabella or Belvidera. But these tears are the means, and not the end; or, to pursue the medical metaphor of Aristotle, they are the operation of the medicine, and not its final effect; neither are these feelings always a test of real humanity. Rousseau observes somewhere, that the tears which we shed for fictitious forrow, are admirably ' adapted to make us proud of all the virtues we do not possess.' Some very humane and benevolent men are fond of being present at executions; and others will feel for distress on the stage, without having, in reality, any humanity at all. Plutarch, in his Life of Pelopidas, and in his treatise on the Fortune of Alexander, relates an anecdote of Alexander, king of Phærea, one of the most cruel tyrants of antiquity, who, on being moved to tears by the representation of a tragedy of Euripides, left the theatre with confufion, ashamed to discover, that he who was insensible to the fufferings of his people, should be so strongly affected by the distresses of [P] Hecuba and Andromache. [P] These are the characters Plutarch mentions in the Life of Pelopidas, where he names the Troades as the tragedy: but in the treatise on the Fortune of Alexander, he names Hecuba and Polyxena, which last character is not in the Troades, but in the tragedy of Hecuba. Mr. Upton, in his note on this line in Hamlet, ' What's Hecuba to him, or he to Hecuba,' observes, that it is plain Shakespear alludes to this anecdote, which, confidering how much Shakespear appears to be converfant with Plutarch, (all of whose works were translated in his time) seems highly probable. Though there is a confiderable difference in the application, as the emotion of a performer is mentioned by Shakespear, and Alexander was a spectator. If Hamlet himself had been moved by the recital, it would have been more germane to the allufion. Before
Before I conclude this part of my fubject, I will hazard a quotation from a very intelligent financier and statefman, (M. Pinto) on the effect of the universal prevalence of cards on modern manners, as I conceive it is by no means foreign to our present enquiry. It is part of a letter, printed at the end of his treatise on Circulation and Credit. • The magic of cards forms a common focus of almost all the passions in miniature. They all find there, if I may use the expreffion, their proper food. It is true that every thing there is microscopic, and more illufive than common illufions are; a confused idea of happiness ' and mifery is found there. The sphere of the paffions is reduced, concentred, and drawn into a narrower circle; all the paffions in a manner entangle themselves, evaporate and spend themselves at a diftance from their fource and their proper object; restlessness, leifure, idleness, avarice and ambition, devour in common an unsubstantial food, which enervates their force and their activity.' The ESSAY ON THE END OF TRAGEDY, ACCORDING TO ARIS- TOTLE, by profeffor Moore, of Glasgow, which is mentioned by Mr. Twining, is an ingenious, but unfuccefsful attempt to reconcile this passage with his own hypothefis, that the end of tragedy is the awakening the mind, to a sense of the evils attending errors of conduct in human life, and to cause, by the pity and terror they occafion, an exemption or removal of fuch calamities from themselves. I once had the book, but as it was at a time when I had no particular interest in its contents, it made but a flight impreffion on my mind, and having lost it, I have never been able to procure a fecond copy. His chief argument, I remember, rests on παθημάτα, being generally used not for passions, but actual misfortunes; and he cites various inftances from Ariftotle and other writers. But
POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. But though there can be no reasonable doubt, I think, of the meaning of Aristotle, yet it by no means follows, but that the hypothesis of Dr. Moore, though not that of Aristotle, may be still more congenial with modern tragedy, whose end I cannot conceive to be the purging of the paffions of pity and fear. But this will be much more fully treated of, when we come to speak of Aristotle's opinion of the proper tragic catastrophe.

6.2. mvp-aristotle-comment-15 6.3

SOME PARTS ATTAIN THEIR END BY VERSE ALONE, AND OTHERS HAVE THE ASSISTANCE OF MUSIC.

IT seems impoffible for any thing to be more clearly expressed than this; for Ariftotle, contrary to his general custom, has been particularly careful in defining the precise meaning of the two words he uses, μέτρον and μέλος ; and he also expressly says, they are employed separately. Yet notwithstanding this, many critics are decidedly of opinion, that the Greek tragedies were fung throughout, and the distinction between the dialogue and the choral odes, was exactly the fame with that between the recitative and the airs in the Italian opera; and, in support of this opinion, they draw many arguments from the accounts given by ancient writers on the manner of performing the Greek tragedy. Being not very well acquainted with the technical language of the music of my own country, I cannot be supposed to be a critic in that of Greece. Under this disadvantage, it is with diffidence I attempt to reconcile this positive declaration of Ariftotle, with those passages in other writers, which appear to contradict it, and which the reader will find in Metaftafio's ESTRATTO DELLA POETICA. The
The ancient theatres (2) were of such a vast extent, besides being open at the top, that it was impoffible for the human voice to fill them in its natural pitch; in consequence of which, it was absolutely necessary to employ artificial means to encrease its force, and the dramatic [R] mask was invented, which, in some measure, acted as a speaking trumpet: but as this must destroy all natural modulation of the voice, it was found necessary to supply this defect by an [s] artificial notation of found, and to render this more distinct and loud, it was very probably attended by fome flight inftrumental accompaniment, but folely for the purpose of encreasing and regulating the found of the voice, and not to produce any musical effect; and this was equally applicable to the [T] quick repartee of the dialogue, as to the longer monologue. It must be observed, that Ariftotle does not fimply say, that tragedy EM- PLOYS music and verse separately, but that it ATTAINS ITS END by [Q] See Note VII. chap. XIII. [R] The mask had fomething very fingular. The immenfe aperture of the mouth was ' so contrived as to augment the found of the voice; it was in effect a real speaking trumpet, (porte voix) necessary to fill the wide extent of the place, as well as the brazen vases which ▲ were placed in the intervals of the theatre.' BRUMOY. [s] For a curious obfervation of Dr. Francklin on this practice of the ancients, fee note I. [T] ' If, as Ariftotle seems plainly to say, fome part of the Greek tragedy was spoken like ⚫ our tragic declamation, without any musical accompaniment, it was, most probably, that part of the dialogue which is in every tragedy easily diftinguished from the rest, by its being ' carried on in a fort of quick repartee of verse to verse.' TWINING, note 46, page 245- Whether the monologues, or long speeches, the μακραὶ ῥήσεις, as Plato calls them, were ' performed in the fame way as the rest of the dialogue, or, as has been imagined, were ' diftinguished by being more measured, or musical, is a point not easily cleared up.' IBID. page 247. them
POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. them separately, in their respective parts; using the word περαίνεσθαι, which he has just before applied to the accomplishment of its final purpose, the refinement of the paffions. Therefore, in those parts, where verse only is used, though tragedy might be compelled, from fome incidental cause, to employ accompaniment, he does not confider it as effential to the performance and effect, as he does in those parts where the end of tragedy is attained by music [u]. What Metaftafio says on this subject, is well worth our attention. He is very fanguine in the notion, that the whole composition of the ancient tragedy was musical, following the opinion of his countryman Castelvetro, which he quotes. His reasoning on this subject is founded on the idea, that all recitation must adopt some kind of tune different from the common cadence of speech. A voice,' he says, to be • heard by a number of people to whom it is addressed, must be fo exceffively altered from its natural system, that it must necessarily be regulated differently, according to the different orders of its new proportions, (that is, I suppose, according to the extent it is necessary, from the fize of the place, or the number of the auditors, to give it,) * otherwise it will form a wild, dissonant, and ridiculous scream; this new regulation must be music, and this music is so necessary to whoever speaks in public, that if it is not supplied by art, nature herself suggests it. There is no orator that does not fing; no cryer, no public vender of any merchandize, that is not conftrained, for the purpose ' of making himself heard, either to adopt, or form, according to his own caprice, some kind of tune. Even those actors who pretend to [υ] Διὰ μέλος. X recite C
recite verfe without music, are obliged to invent one which they call • declamation: music, indeed, but very imperfect, since it is only regu- • lated by the uncertain judgement of the reciter's ear. This natural ، proof, which is as clear as it is true, joined to an infinite number of others which confirm it, discovers the error of those critics who have pofitively decided, that no part of the ancient drama was sung except the chorus.' ESTRATTO DELLA POETICA, page 52. Now after all, this only proves, or rather corroborates the truth of my conjecture, that, as when the voice is carried to an extent beyond its natural pitch, it will necessarily adopt some unnatural tone; so it is highly probable that recitation in the ancient theatres, whose size required an extraordinary extent of voice, and its consequence, an unnatural tone, might have that tone regulated by some instrumental accompaniment, which though so perfectly distinct from those parts, such as the choral odes, where mufic was employed, in the fullest sense of the word, as completely to justify the opposition in which they are placed to each other by Aristotle, might yet occafion those passages in the ancient writers, that are quoted. by Metaftafio in support of his hypothefis [x]. [x] The strongest argument of Metastasio is drawn from a passage of Ariftotle himself, Problem, Sect. xix. 49. where he describes the different kinds of music adapted to the actors, and the chorus. All the others are drawn from Roman writers, except one from Lucian de Saltatione, which is evidently intended to shew the absurdity of the musical accompaniment, in his time, which was, most probably, different from that of the Athenian stage in the time of Ariftotle; for while the blames this unnatural accompaniment, he expressly says, that the AN- CIENT POETS regulated the other decorations of the theatre as well as the mere words, a proof that the practice was changed; and Metastasio himself allows he is complaining of the effeminate music of the actors of his own time; therefore it not only invalidates the evidence of the Roman writers, but tends to overturn the general system of Metastafio, as to the merit of the musical drama.. The
POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. The real motive of Metastasio's attachment to this hypothesis, it is sufficiently obvious, arose from his partiality to the opera, in which he was a most excellent writer, and which he wishes to shew was a lineal, and legitimate offspring, of the Greek tragedy, as most probably it was. The Roman theatre having turned the neceffary means of modulating the voice, in so large and open a room, into a real musical accompaniment, which the Italian theatre retained as an ornament after it ceased to be abfolutely requifite. But the fize of the modern theatre (v) is by no means such as to require any unnatural elevation of the voice. And as to the necessity of every person speaking in a tone, who addresses a public assembly, it certainly is not founded on fact. A member of parliament, who was to address the house of commons, or even his constituents, in any thing like a tone, or tune, would not be heard a moment. Indeed the substitution of modulated, for empassioned accent, or, in other words, the laying any emphafis of any kind, but what the sense, or rather the expreffion of the sense requires, is a certain unerring proof that the speaker is delivering what he has before committed to memory. I have heard many good preachers; but I never heard one who did not, in the course of a fermon, lay the [z] emphasis often on places contrary to the sense. I have heard (Y) I mean the theatres of this country, used for the representation of the regular drama. The theatres of Italy, especially those at Naples, Turin, and Milan, may require modulated recitation to fill them with propriety. [z] By emphasis here, I mean the distinction of words in a fentence, and not of fyllables in a word, which, I think, both Dr. Beattie and Mr. Nares have erroneoufly confounded with accent. For a further attempt to illustrate this subject, the reader is referred to note II. chap. xx. as
as many bad speakers in parliament; but I never heard one who was speaking on the subject in debate without premeditation, that ever placed the emphafis contrary to the sense he meant to convey; and in common conversation the emphasis was never yet laid improperly. As to the tone used by the venders of merchandize, we allow a kind of fong to the cryers of oysters and mackrel; but an auctioneer, who attempted to adopt one, would certainly be laughed at. And fince the days of Garrick [A], all unnatural declamation has been entirely banished from our theatres. The probability and excellence of the musical drama is also defended by Metastasio on another principle, with which, as a general rule, I perfectly agree, viz. That an imitator, who does not undertake to pro- • duce the exact truth, but only to give as great a likeness as possible to the • material that he employs, has perfectly fulfilled his promise, and attain- ' ed his end, when he has given it every thing of which his materials are 'capable-and that it is from ignorance of this nature of imitation, that' arises the contemptuous judgement of those, who treat the musical • drama as improbable, and absurd, because the actors die with a fong in ' their mouth; as if from its first origin, language measured and modu- •lated, was not the appropriated and indispensible material of every kind • of poetical imitation.' ESTRATTO DELLA POETICA, page 87, 88. [A] However much the public may be obliged to Mr. Garrick for this and other improvements of dramatic representation, we must lament his alteration of Drury-lane Theatre, which, from being the best calculated of any I was ever in to convey found, since the deepening of the front boxes, and first gallery, is so faulty in that respect, as almost to want the afsistance of the ancient mask. This defect is now radically removed by the pulling down the old theatre and I hope it will not exist in the magnificent one which is erecting on its fite. Now
POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. Now though, as I have already faid, I perfectly allow the truth of this as a general principle; yet the last part of the quotation, taken in its strictest sense, is not true; neither does it follow, because in imitations made by the fine arts the material should appear, that every material is proper for every kind of imitation, or that some materials may not be fo inadequate, or so oppofite to the imitation of the object intended, as to be entirely incapable of producing any interest. For though difficulty overcome may, in some cafes, inhance the merit of imitation, as 'fculp- • ture in marble is more valuable than in wax, on account of the greater • difficulty of the execution (B);' yet no difficulty furmounted can ever compenfate for any radical inadequacy in the material to effect its proposed end. A statue of Glycon will excite the admiration of cultivated taste, even when well copied by the easiest process; but Atlas hewn into a statue, would only awake the wonder of the multitude. Even Metastafio could fee the force of this distinction when it favored an hypothefis of his own. For arguing against the ancient chorus, he blames the absurdity of a number of persons agreeing together in the same sentiments at once, and bursting forth in a general declaration of them. (Estratto, page 236.) Forgetting that this may also be solved, by saying these combined voices are only the means of imitation, and that there is no more real abfurdity in a [c] speech being accompanied by vocal than by instrumental performers. And again, in his note on this line of the epistle to the Pifos, Quæ canerent agerentque peruncti fæcibus ora.' [B] Estratto, page 344. [c] Many of the choral odes in the Greek tragedies are in the fingular number, as spoken by one person. As in the Edipus Tyrannus, v. 1105, beginning Είπερ ἐγὼ μάντις ἐιμί where
where he is defending against Sanadon the continued music of the Greek drama, he observes, that if the contrary were allowed, there would be found in the Greek tragedy, that disgustful medly [D] of speaking and ، ، finging, which is now hardly tolerated in the [E] comic opera, as being an extravagant deformity, invented by the mirth of scurrilous licentiousness, to excite the laugh of the vulgar.' In regard to the first instance, Metastafio, aware that what he urges against the fudden coincidence of sentiment and expreffion, in the perfons of the Greek chorus, might be urged with equal force against the chorus of the Italian opera, tries to qualify it by saying, it is natural for the stage to avail itself of the pleasure of a chorus, in a facrifice, or a triumph, where the people may be supposed to fing premeditated words, or, in a popular commotion, where they may naturally agree, on a fudden, in their thoughts and expression, as in calling for justice, vengeance, pity, war, or peace. Unluckily in this cafe the theory and the practice of Metastafio are at variance; for there is hardly a concluding chorus among his operas, that is not, to the full, as unlike the sudden coincidence of popular opinion, as the most moral ode of Sophocles. And as to the people's finging a premeditated chorus, what becomes then of the material of imitation? (F) From that instant, musical language ceases to be [D] See Mr. Twining's note 46, page 245, for a complete answer to the notion of this mixture being incompatible with the dignity of the Grecian tragic muse. [E] Metastasio does not mean the Italian comic opera which is accompanied throughout and is their regular comedy, but the French opera comique (which words he uses,) and which mode of compofition, copied from the French, has driven the scenes of Shakespear from our disgraced theatre, to found their fame on the inferior, though generous efforts of a fifter art. [F] There is a curious instance of this fort in LOVE IN A VILLAGE, when Justice Woodcock fings a fong, as a fong to his daughter's lover. There is an absurdity the reverse of this, though of
POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. be the language of the characters, the deception is expressly disavowed, and the performer may as well, as Bottom advises the lion, 'come forward and fay, "I am no such thing, I am a man as other men are." And ' there indeed let him name his name, and tell them plainly, he is Snug ' the joiner.' What was the effect of the musical accompaniment on the ancient theatre, whether continued throughout the whole piece, or only used in parts of it, we can now hardly judge, as we scarcely know what it was. On the modern stage it feems to weaken the force of the interest, as I think no artificial modulation can ever equal the empaffioned notes of nature uttered by a good actor. In general, the pleasure we derive from the mufic, is rather our object in the Italian opera than the intereft of the scene. It appears, I confefs, to me, that blending music with empaffioned language [G], tends strongly to weaken the energy of both, and the only way to give each their full effect is to follow the precept of Ariftotle, and keep them ' diftinct in their respective parts [H].' of exactly the fame tendency, in Tancred and Sigismunda, where the letter from Tancred, which Sigifmunda reads, is in profe. In both these cafes the material of imitation is avowed. It is exactly as if the dialogue only of the Iliad, or the Paradife Loft, were in verse, and the connective parts, like the marginal directions of the drama, were in prose. If all the other characters of Love in a Village occafionally express their sentiments in musical airs, Justice Woodcock should not be an exception. If Tancred speaks in verse, he should not write in profe. [G] It must be remembered I am not speaking of lyric poetry, but confine my observations entirely to dramatic effect. [H] Aristotle, in his first chapter, make the diftinguishing character between the regular drama and the nomi and dithyrambic poetry, to confist in this circumstance, of the one species ufing music and poetry together throughout the piece, and the other in separate places. Thofe
Those writers who have particularly confidered the powers of mufic, its merit as an imitative art, and its influence over the passions [1], have been of opinion, that its principal force does not confist so much in exciting our feelings by imitation, as in the power it possesses of caufing fuch a temper of mind, as is fit to receive the impreffions intended to be made by the poet. If this is the cafe, the chorus [K] being an essential part of the ancient tragedy, could not poffibly have been disposed better than it was by the custom of the Grecian theatre, where the leading character of the group, or the Coryphæus, was confidered as one of the characters of the drama, and took a part in the action; while the whole body together were employed as a kind of musical ornament between the intervals of the action, keeping up, and heightening the force of the impreffion arifing from the incidents, by moral and pathetic reflections on their consequences, delivered in beautiful verse, and accompanied by mufic calculated to awaken congenial sensations in the mind. M. Leffing observes, [L] (Dramaturgie, vol. i. page 44,) that ' as the ' orchestre in our theatres, in fome degree, holds the fame place with ' the chorus of the ancients, the lovers of the drama have long wished, ' that the music which precedes the performance, and that which is ، played between the acts, should agree with the nature of the piece.' And he tells us, an attempt of this fort was made by a M. Scheibe, on the tragedies of Polyeucte, and Mithridate, and executed on several dif- [1] Particularly Mr. Harris, Dr. Beattie, and Mr. Twining. [K] See note IV. chap. XII. [L] Mr. Twining makes the fame observation. The performers,' he says, 'in the orchestra • of a modern theatre, are little, I believe, aware that they occupy the place, and may confider ' themselves as the lineal defcendants of the ancient chorus.' NOTE ON THE TRANSLATION, Part ii. Sect. xxi. page 103. ferent
POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. ferent theatres in the year 1736. The fame attempt, he says, was also made by M. Agricola, at Berlin, on the tragedy of Semiramis, and with complete success. I fear this experiment would hardly succeed on our theatre. It is, sometimes, very difficult for the lover of the drama to prevail on his neighbours, to suppress their conversation in the most interesting scenes of a tragedy; and I believe no musical power, lefs than that of Orpheus, could charm an English audience from the pleasure of talking between the acts. We fee, every day, the same persons, who, in the country, would pay half a guinea, and travel twenty miles in the dark, to fit in raptures, real or affected, at a concert, performed by a band, in every respect inferior to those which fill our theatrical orchestres, appear perfectly inattentive to the music at the play-houses, and who would think a person out of his senses, who should request their attention to any piece of mufie that should be performed between the acts of a play. Only one attempt, that I know of, (I cannot say of this kind, fince its tendency was directly oppofite,) has been made here, to introduce any thing, during the intervals of the representation, at all allusive to the incidents of the piece. This was in the tragedy of Zara, where, in the intervals, a humourous dialogue was to be sung by Mr. Beard and Mrs. Clive, commenting on, and ridiculing the incidents and sentiments of the preceding act. Of the success of this curious attempt, or whether the dialogue was ever performed, I am ignorant; but it is generally printed with the tragedy. Y NOTE

6.3. mvp-aristotle-comment-16 6.17

THE FABLE THEN IS THE CHIEF PART, AND, AS IT WERE, THE SOUL OF TRAGEDY.

THIS observation of Aristotle is undoubtedly founded on nature, and is not only applicable to tragedy, but to every other kind of imitative composition, whether dramatic or narrative. Perhaps there is no circumstance in which the tragedies of the present day are so deficient, as in the want of interesting action. This is, in a great measure, owing to the strict adherence to the French rule, of not fuffering the supposed time of action to exceed the real time of reprefentation. Dramatic poetry is, by this regulation, almost confined to the boundary of painting, and can only represent a fsingle scene of any great event. And this is attended by another inconvenience; for the allotted space of five acts becomes as much too great for that single scene, as the confined period of three hours would be too small for the whole action; and hence the poet is obliged to spin out his tragedy by means of the dialogue, and falls under the same [M] inconvenience as would attend a proper and complete dramatic fable, without episodic parts, if swelled to the fize of the epopee. The great defect in that [N] truly fublime poem, the Paradife Loft, is a want of interest in the fable; every character, except two, being fuper- [M] Poetic, Chap. xxvI. [N] See Beattie on Poetry and Music, Part i. Chap. iv. natural;
POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. natural; and we can never be greatly interested in the distress, or profperity, of a person, into whose situation it is impossible for us to [o] put ourselves. Addison, who was determined to find every possible excellence in the Paradife Loft, though he could not help [P] seeing this defect in the fable, nevertheless makes the following remark. After observing that the Iliad and Æneid, from [Q] their national subjects, must have been respectively very interesting to the Greeks and Romans, he proceeds, • Milton's poem is admirable in this respect, since it is impossible for any of its readers, whatever nation, country, or people he may belong to, not to be related to the persons who are the principal actors in it.' Spectator, No. 273. Now, befides the mistake Addison appears to have made as to the effect of national fable, which seems to be rather the foothing the vanity of the reader, than the encrease of his interest in the action, one should hardly have supposed, that Addison could have been ignorant of the obvious truth, that every affection is exactly weakened in proportion to its becoming general. There is no distinction so great in civil life as that between a man and any other animal, and yet I never knew a perfon proud of this last distinction, though there is no elevation of rank so inconfiderable, as not to have awakened pride in some bofoms. [ο] Θόβος δὲ περὶ τὸν ὅμοιον. Poet. Ch. xiii. [P] Spectator, No. 357. [Q] It seems a national hero, in Addison's opinion, was a fine qua non, in the epopee; for he says, in his critique on Chevy Chace, Virgil's hero was the founder of Rome,' (was he?) › Homer's a prince of Greece, and for this reason Valerius Flaccus, and Statius, who were * both Romans, might be justly derided for having chosen the expedition of the golden fleece, ← and the wars of Thebes, for the subjects of their epic writings. SPECT. No. 70. Y 2 The
The fame thing happens to the other paffions. We are strongly affected by a tale of private distress, even if not extending to danger or death; but we read, [R] without any emotion, of In one great day, on Hockstet's fatal plain, • French and Bavarians, twenty thousand flain, Push'd through the Danube to the shores of Styx; Squadrons eighteen, battalions twenty-fix. PRIOR. An error of the opposite side, but arifing from the fame cause, appears in the last book of the English Garden. By making an affecting tale the principal object, the subject of the poem is thrown entirely into the back ground. The mind is so much more influenced by the imitation of human actions and manners, than by any the most beautiful description of inanimate nature, that when they coincide, if the former is not very much kept down, it will entirely destroy all our interest in the latter. The story of Eurydice, in the fourth Georgic, is like the sketch of a mythological incident, such as Niobe, for inftance, introduced into a landscape. But the pathetic tale of Nerina, and especially in the peculiar form in which Mr. Mason has introduced it, takes up our whole attention, and the embellishment of the English Garden becomes the mere scenery of the action. Who will regard the ornament of a temple who is looking at the flaughter of the innocents, or examine the perspective of an apartment, which contains a Beaufort expiring in the agonies of guilt and despair ? [R] This is admirably well illustrated by a story told in one of the numbers of the Adventurer. See also the Encyclopedie, Art. Illusion. NOTE

Commentarius in Aristotelis Poeticam (Franciscus Ritter, 1839) (OCR draft) (Ritter's Latin commentary, extracted from the 1839 volume, divided by Ritter's chapters and sections, and linked to the corresponding Perseus reference subsections.) focus

1. mvp-aristotle-comment-36

Ritter, cap. 6 § 1

De tragoediae forma et fine. partes eius esse sex et gravissimam quidem fabulam sive τὸν μύθον. Poeticae causas postquam universe declaravit et praecipuas eius formas demonstravit, genera poesis singillatim pertractare eorumque formam et vim explicare pergit. incipit a tragoedia, deinceps descendit ad epopoeiam, denique ad comoediam pervenit, sed in operis parte nobis deperdita. rectius ille haud dubie poesin epicam primo loco expediendam sibi sumpsisset: ea enim non solum simplicissima est ex omnibus generibus et antiquissima, sed etiam ita subiecta tragoediae, ut haec ipsa tamquam filia pulchrior ex decora matre in luminis auras prodierit, sed quia tragoedia magis culta et perfecta ei videbatur, ab hac disputationis initium capere maluit, ut de epopoeia brevius posset absolvere, via interim ad illam disputationem praemunita. vid. c. 5 extr. sed si opus integrum ad nos pervenisset, maius videremus, credo, incommodum huic poeticae artis explicationi inde accidisse, quod non utramque dramatici generis speciem, tragoediam dico comoediamque, deinceps tractavit, sed alteram a priore illata epopoeiae explicatione discrevit. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἐν ἑξαμέτροις μιμητικῆς - ἐροῦμεν : quam vulgo ἐποποιίαν vocant, eam h. 1. τὴν ἐν ἑξαμέτροις μιμητικὴν appellavit. infra (c. 23, 1) epopoeiam quam vulgo intelligunt, nomen ipsum evitaturus,nam designavit τὴν διηγηματικὴν καὶ ἐν μέτρῳ μιμητικήν. cum ἐποποιίας nomine in operis principio (c. 1, 6) nove usus esset, telam pertexens modo ad vulgarem dicendi usum revolvitur modo ab ipso nomine abstinere voluit. ἀπολαβόντες αὐτῆς - ὅρον τῆς οὐσίας: tragoediae forma et habitus in antecedentibus iam exposita, originesque et incrementa breviter enarrata erant. inde igitur sumi ( ἀπολαμβάνεσθαι) poterat definitio ( ὅρος), ita tamen ut finis tragoediae nunc demum indicetur. dictum enim ante erat (c. 2 et 3) tragoediam esse eam agentium imitationem ut agentes ipsi producerentur narratioque excluderetur, esse porro imitationem meliorum ( βελτιόνων) hominum graviumque ( σπουδαίων); dictum erat praeterea c. 5, 4. eandem certo temporis ambitu fere includi, nec saltationem cantumque et dictionem coniuncta in illa reperiri (c. 1, 10). ea iam in unum collecta ita augentur, ut simul quem finem tragoedia propositum habeat declaretur.

2. mvp-aristotle-comment-37

Ritter, cap. 6 § 2

πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας: σπουδαίαν intelligit actionem cui magnus quidam finis propositus est, ad quem consequendum omnes eorum qui agunt vires ita intenduntur, ut ipsi aut concidant. aut post varios casus voti compotes fiant. τελεία est actio cui nihil deest, cuius est principium et medium et finis. conf. c. 7, 3. eandem aliis in locis modo τελείαν καὶ ὅλην (c. 7,2) modo simpliciter ὅλην (c. 8, 4) vocavit. μέγεθος ἔχουσης: ut tragoediae vim et finem spectatores percipiant, actio tragica ambitum quendam rerumque complexionem habeat oportet, accuratius non multo post (c. 7, 2) dixit τι μέγεθος: non enim quaevis magnitudo intelligitur, sed quae vulgo vocatur. χωρὶς ἑκάστου τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις: ita ut non quaeque formarum in partibus (tragoediae) assit. haec breviter significavit c. 1 extr., ubi dithyrambos nomosque et tragoediam comoediamque consentire dixit quod numero (saltatione) uterentur et cantu et metro, differre quod dithyrambi nomique illis coniunctis ( ἅμα πᾶσιν), comoediatragoediaque eisdem separatis ( κατά μέρος) imitationem peragerent. quae si contulerimus iis quae de eadem re paulo post dicuntur, - §. 3. τὸ δὲ χωρὶς τοῖς εἶδεσι τὸ διὰ μέτρων ἔνια μόνον περαίνεσθαι καὶ πάλιν ἕτερα διὰ μέλους-, a vera huius loci interpretatione non aberrabimus. εἴδη sive imitandi formae (Darstellungsweisen) tres sunt in tragoedia, dictio numero adstricta ( τὰ μέτρα), cantus ( μέλος), saltatio ( ὄρχησις). hae formae non omnes in singulis partibus tragoediae coniunctae reperiuntur, sed ubi metrica est oratio, ibi non etiam cantica 1) et saltatio: nam nonnulla (§. 3) solis metris absolvuntur et rursus alia per cantum. alii aliter explicant, quos neque reprehendere neque laudare attinet: sed unum moneo, non licere immutata codicum scriptura in eiusmodi locis verae certaeque interpretationi fundamenta subtrahere. μόρια quae h. 1. memorantur, non sunt eae tragoediae partes quae mox enumerantur, sed indefinite partes tragoediae deinceps positas intellexit. δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι' ἀπαγγελίας: tragoedia agentes ipsos producit, epopoeia quamvis δραματικῶς composita aut ipsa narrat aut nonnisi quasi agentes introducit, ut proprium eius negotium sit ἀπαγγελία. conf. c. 5, 4. caute hic noster scripsit δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι᾽ ἀπαγγελίας, non δρώντων καὶ οὐκ ἀπαγγελλόντων, propterea quod etiam in tragoediis ῥήσεις ἀγγελικαὶ inveniuntur, sed ipsae eiusmodi narrationes agentes nuntios ( δρῶντας) requirunt. tragoedia igitur dum ἀπαγγελίαν (epicam narrationem) excludit, ἀπαγγέλ λοντας tamen admittit. post ἀπαγγελίας particulam ἀλλὰ ! Aldo auctore plerique editores, praecipue antiquiores, infarserunt, sed vocula inepta a nullo codice agnosci videtur: abest saltem ab AcBcNa (id ex Bekkeri silentio aliisque indiciis certe consequitur), a Mediceis omnibus et a G.Q. mire 1) Dixerit aliquis "nonne canticis choricis subiecta est metrica oratio?" est sane; sed Aristoteles τὰ μέτρα appellat quae cantu destituta sunt, μέλος et μελοποιίαν lyricam tragoediae partem.illa torsit cum alios tum Lessingium. vid. Dramaturg. Hamb. c. 74. δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τομ ούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν : quid tragoedia efficiat vel efficere debeat, nondum significatum est; hoc igitur novum in definitione accedit neque ex antegressis colligitur. de sententia his verbis subiecta copiose disputavit Lessingius in libro laudato t. II. c. 74-78. conf. Raumerus de Aristotelis Poetica in Commentationibus academiae regiae Berolinensis a. 1828 (Berolini 1831) p. 125 sqq. illud recte Lessingius probe tenendum praecepit c. 75., tam έλεον quam φόβον communis notionis vinculo contineri, quatenus quod in aliis hominibus miseratione nos afficit, idem ne nobis accidat timemus. miseratio enim metusque in nobis oriuntur, ubi calamitatem aliis ex propinquo incumbentem vel impendentem videmus, et miseratio quidem excitatur, si miseram condicionem eorum qui eam non commeruerunt spectamus, metus, si eandem calamitatem nobis accidere posse credimus, hoc est illud quod τὰ φοβερὰ καὶ τὰ ἐλεεινὰ δι' ἄλληλα esse c. 9, 11. pronuntiatur. utramque animi perturbationem Aristoteles accurate definivit in Rhetoricis II, 5 init. et 8 init. illic de metu haec afferuntur: ἔστω δὴ φόβος λύπη τις ἢ ταραχή ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ· οὐ γὰρ πάντα τὰ κακὰ φοβοῦνται, οἷον εἰ ἔσται ἄδικος ἢ βραδύς, ἀλλ' ὅσα λύπας μεγάλας ἢ φθοράς δύναται, καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἐὰν μὴ πόρρω ἀλλὰ σύνεγγυς φαίνηται ὥστε μέλλειν. altero loco miseratio sic definitur: ἔστω δὴ ἔλεος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινομένῳ κακῷ φθαρτικῷ καὶ λυπηρῷ τοῦ ἀναξίου τυγχάνειν, ὃ κἂν αὐτὸς προσδοκήσειεν ἂν παθεῖν ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ τινά, καὶ τοῦτο, ὅταν πλησίον φαίνηται. iam tragoediae eum finem propositum esse audimus, ut ea per miserationem et metum tales animi perturbationes purget. sed quae sunt illae tales perturbationes ( τοιαῦτα παθήματα)? num ipsa miseratio metusque? et nego et aio. nego, quia non τοιούτων scriptum oportuit sed τούτων, si miseratio et metus simpliciter denotarentur, nego quia non quamcumque miserationém neque quemcumque metum πάθημα esse scio: sed idem aio per τοιούτων παθημάτων affectiones miserationis et metus significari, quia scriptum lego διὰ ἐλέου καὶ φύ βου περαίνουσα τὴν κάθαρσιν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων, sed eas intelligo affectiones quae sua vi hominis mentem turbant et animum commotum quam maxime reddunt, eas quarum purgationem in rebus utilissimis referri decet. itaque philosophus ne potuit quidem τούτων scribere sed τοιούτων debuit, cum nollet hoc pronuntiari, per tragoediam purgari quamcumque miserationem metumque, sed illam miserationem metumque, quorum vi animus et mens perturbarentur, h. e. miserationis metusque affectiones ita vehementes, ut in numero παθημάτων reponendae sint 2). deinceps dicendum est quomodo tragoedia eas perturbationes purget. id ut efficere possit, necesse videtur esse, ut miserationem et metum excitet: nam per haec illa miserationis et metus παθήματα purgari dicuntur. excitantur ergo in spectatoribus miseratio et timor, dum tragoedia insignem calamitatem magnosque labo- 'res aut uni dramatis personae aut pluribus etiam incumbentem vel impendentem ostendit oculisque sive spectantium sive legentium quasi explicatam subiicit. nam dum ipsi agunt illi quibus mala accidunt, haec ex propinquo et imminent et 2) Lessingius in Dramaturgia Hamburg. c. 77. dicit Aristotelem τοιούτων eo consilio scripsisse, ut metum misericordiamque et omnes similes affectiones, v. c. τὸ φιλάνθρωπον, purgari per tragoediam significaret. sed illud φιλάνθρωπον (conf c. 13,2) neque πάθημα est neque purgatione eget. verba viri peracuti haec respicio: "Er sagt aber τοιούτων und nicht τούτων; er sagt dieser und dergleichen, und nicht bloss dieser: um anzuzeigen, dass er unter dem Mitleid nicht bloss das eigentlich sogenannte Mitleid, sondern überhaupt alle philanthropische Empfindungen, so wie unter der Furcht nicht bloss die Unlust über ein uns bevorstehendes Uebel, sondern auch jede damit verwandte Unlust verstehe.” πάθημα est perturbatio, Leidenschaft, πάθος quamcumque animi affectionem denotat.incumbunt. etiam illud a poeta tragico, si quid deceat haud ignorat, prospicitur, ut calamitas non tam flagitio vel scelere adducatur quam errore quodam vel leviore peccato paretur. vid. c. 13. §. 2 et 3. etenim ad miserationem requiritur ut calamitatem quam quis perpetitur non omnino commeruerit is cuius miseremur. itaque actio tragica omnia continet quibus opus est ad miserationem in nobis excitandam. porro si homines in tragoediis qui producuntur propter peccata non admodum gravia et propter humanae infirmitatis errores acerbis adversae fortunae plagis affligi videmus, dumque recordamur et nos homines esse humanique generis vitiis et erroribus obnoxios, tum ne nobis idem quod oculis expositum est vel simile quoddam infortunium accidat, timere incipimus. itaque tragicam actionem spectantes et ob nostri et totius humani generis sortem metu quodam tangimur. adhuc diximus quomodo per tragoediam miseratio et metus excitetur: explicandum restat, qua ratione eiusmodi perturbationes purgentur. primum quaeritur quid sit κάθαρσις παθημάτων, non esse eandem ac καθαίρεσιν vel ἀναίρεσιν per se patet: immo κάθαρσις est ea affectuum animi conformatio, ut omne nimium et omne quod perturbat animum mentemque humanam inde removeatur. hanc esse veram nominis significationem et huius loci ratio et alius in Aristotelis Politicis (VIII, 7. p. 1342 a 11 et 14) ostendit. itaque non id agit tragoedia, ut miseratio et metus ex animis nostris tollantur, sed ut nimia perturbantis cuiusdam miserationis metusque vis et impetus frangatur 3). id quomodo a tragoedia perficiatur videamus. si talis est miseratio nostra metusque, ut propter calamitatem immerito alicui accidentem nonnisi gravem et acerbum dolorem sentiamus simulque humiliter et vehementer metuamus ne nobis 3) Bene Raumerus 1. 1. pag. 134.: "Die Reinigung ist keineswegs, wie einige gedeutet haben, eine Vernichtung der Leidenschaften, sondern ..eine Hinführung auf das Mittlere, mit Ausschliessung des zu viel und zu wenig.idem accidat, eiusmodi affectus animi nos deprimit et diffundit ( ποιεῖ κατακωχίμους. v. Aristoteles loco ex Politicis indicato); contrahit idem animi magnitudinem ( τὸ σεμνὸν συστέλλει) atque omnino intelligendi facultatem minuit et ratiocinandi considerandique negotium impedit; quid multa? ita integra et animi et mentis sanitas corrumpitur. iam si tragoedia hanc vim haberet, ut eiusmodi perturbationes excitaret et libere soluteque grassari sineret, ea sane legibus quam severissimis interdicenda et ex omnibus civitatibus bene constitutis expellenda esset. sed inde demum divina tragoediae vis se ostendit, quod miserationis et metus nimias affectiones purgat. purgat vero duobus modis. 1. qui insigni calamitate conflictatur in tragoedia, is contra necessitatem 4) summa virium contentione nititur et post varios casus aut concidit nobili leto aut superior discedit laeto eventu. ea consideratio, quantae sint hominum vires, spectatorem evehit eique virium humano generi concessarum scientiam largitur. ita et miseratio et metus iustis finibus continentur, ut omne nimium vel perturbatorium eis ademptum videatur. pro vehementibus animi motibus quieta cogitatio, pro perturbationibus sana rerum humanarum consideratio invalescit. 2. tragoedia miserationem metumque purgat, dum illum qui gravia perpetitur saltem ex aliqua parte ipsum suae calamitatis auctorem fuisse ostendit. vera enim tragoedia quamvis obscure monstrare non negligit, quomodo miseriis sese qui premitur subtrahere potuisset, si is ab initio iustoque etiam tempore omnes animi nervos intendisset totamque mentis considerationem adhibuisset. eiusmodi autem consideratione miseratio metusque rursus purgantur, et conscientia intellectusque praestantiae humanae excitatur. duobus hisce modis rudes illae et deprimentes sive contrahentes affectiones animi cohibentur et ad sanae mentis considerationem relatae castigantur, ut inde 4) Necessitatem dico eam rerum humanarum implicationem quae ipsis hominum erroribus vitiisque paratur.amoveatur quidquid nocere possit. quod ut fieri possit facilius, Graeca tragoedia chori sive recta suadentis et praecipientis sive prava et vitiosa severe diiudicantis interventu curavit. sed iam uberrimae disputationis, quae sane de xa- θάρσει a choro Graecorum tragicorum effecta institui posset, occasionem praecido,. ne ab ipsa interpretatione verborum Aristoteliorum deficiam: ipsos Graecos quid sit chori officium docuit summus tragicorum poetarum in disputatione de choro a se edita, vid. Suid. s. v. Σοφοκλῆς.

3. mvp-aristotle-comment-38

Ritter, cap. 6 § 3

λέγω δὲ ἡδυσμένον μὲν λόγον τὸν ἔχον τα ῥυθμὸν καὶ ἁρμονίαν καὶ μέλος: λόγος ὁ ἔχων ῥυθμὸν est λόγος ἔμμετρος : numero enim condiri sive suavem reddi sermonem liquet ; numerumque metri patrem esse veteres dicere solebant. conf. ad c. 4, 6. quod c. 1, 10. ῥυθ μός pro saltatione ponitur, id nihil impedit quo minus hunc ῥυθμὸν pro numero sermonis accipiamus: numerus enim non magis sermoni quam saltationi competit. saltationem vero h. 1. intelligere non possumus, quoniam haec tragoediae quidem, sed non sermonis, est condimentum. ἁρμονίαν καὶ μέλος est ἁρμονικὸν μέλος, cantum harmoniae legibus aс- commodatum, quemadmodum λόγοι καὶ μιμήσεις sunt λόγοι μιμητικοὶ in fragmento operis περὶ Ποιητῶν, quod transcripsimus pag. 84. quod Victorius μέτρον pro μέλος ex coniectura sua scripsit, id loci ratione non satis perspecta fecit. διὰ μέτρων ἔνια μόνον περαίνεσθαι – διὰ μέλους: nonnulla metrica tantum oratione ( διὰ μέτρων) alia cantu absolvuntur sive peraguntur. saltationem non memoravit, quia saltatio non sine canticis, cantica autem multa sine saltatione peraguntur. de significatione μέτρων diximus ad c. 1,6.

4. mvp-aristotle-comment-39

Ritter, cap. 6 § 4

ὁ τῆς ὄψεως κόσμος: quia personae agentes ipsae producuntur, et quidem homines gravitate conspicui ac fere claris natalibus orti, non solum scena opus est, sed co etiam apparatu quo viri graves et illustres instructi solent itaque non solum ὄψις sed ὄψεως κόσμος requiritur. etiam illud notandum est, ipsi Aristoteli ὄψιν vel ὄψεως κόσμον esse.videri necessariam tragoediae partem ( ἐξ ἀνάγκης τι μόριον τραγωδίας). aliter iudicavit huius operis interpolator infra §. 19 et c. 26, 3. vide quae ad illos locos monentur et ad c. 14, 1. εἶτα μελοποιία καὶ λέξις: postquam agentes in conspectum spectatorum venerunt, eos aut loqui aut canere oportet: eo enim imitationem peragunt. λέγω δὲ λέξιν μὲν αὐτὴν τὴν τῶν μέτρων σύνθεσιν: λέξις vulgo quamcumque dictionem denotat, sed hoc loco Aristoteles orationem modis musicis cantuque carentem sed numeris tamen adstrictam λέξιν nove vocavit. discrepat quod infra (§. 18) scripsit auctor personatus λέγω δέ, ὥσπερ πρότερον εἴρηται, λέξιν εἶναι τὴν διὰ τῆς ὀνομασίας ἑρμηνείαν. – μελοποιίαν δὲ ὃ τὴν δύναμιν φανερὰν ἔχει πᾶσαν: vocis μελοποιίας in aperto esse omnem potestatem sive significationem dicit: λέξιν enim modo posuit discedens a vulgari loquendi usu, μελοποιίαν autem intelligit eam quam vulgo dicere solent. πᾶσιν, non πᾶσαν, legendum esse Madius putavit.

5. mvp-aristotle-comment-40

Ritter, cap. 6 § 5

καὶ κατὰ ταύτας καὶ τυγχάνουσι καὶ ἀποτυγχάνουσι πάντες: omnes qui agunt finem propositum pro moribus suis et sentiendi ratione feliciter consequuntur aut inceptis suis excidunt. sapiens enim et temperatus nonnisi ea sectatur quae assequi potest : immoderatus contra et stultus nimis alta et iniqua et incredibilia cupere solet, ut a fine fere aberret.

6. mvp-aristotle-comment-41

Ritter, cap. 6 § 6

ἔστι δὲ τῆς μὲν πράξεως ὁ μῦθος ἡ μίμησις : multi editores codicibus invitis articulum ante μί μησις expungunt, sed frustra: hoc enim Aristoteles dicere vult, actionis imitationem de qua modo (§. 5) locutus erat contineri fabula ( τῷ μύθῳ) tragoediae subiecta. ipsum μῦθον hisce definire non intendit, sed eius definitionem statim subiunxit. λέγω γὰρ μῦθον τοῦτον τὴν σύνθεσιν τῶν πραγμάτων: dicit μῦθον τοῦτον eum quem modo cogitabat, cum tragicae actionis imitationem contineri τῷ μύθῳ pronuntiabat, h. e. nove et aliter ac vulgo μύθου nomine h. 1.usus est. hoc si bene tenuerimus, errores nonnullos ab aliis viris doctis commissos cavere poterimus. vid. Comment. ad c. 5, 3 et c. 17, 3. ubi μύθον ponit pro parte tragoediae vel epopoeiae, ibi hic novus et technicus vocis significatus valet: alioqui etiam in hoc libro μύθοι sunt fabulae (h. e. fabulosae narrationes). · τὰ δὲ ἤθη, καθ' ἃ ποιούς τινας εἶναί φαμεν: recte scripsit ποιούς τινας εἶναί φαμεν, non ποιοί τινες εἰσί: nam etiam secundum διάνοιαν sunt ποιοί τινες, sed si ποιό τητος hominum mentionem facimus, mores fere respicimus.

7. mvp-aristotle-comment-42

Ritter, cap. 6 § 7

καθ' ἃ ποιά τις ἐστὶν ἡ τραγῳδία : partes illae formam tragoediae et qualitatem efficiunt. infra eaedem (c. 24, 1) nullo additamento μέρη vocantur. interpolator huius operis μέρη οἷς ὡς εἴδεσι χρῆται ἡ τραγωδία c. 12, 1. has partes designavit, idemque alteras tragoediae partes quantitatis habita ratione ( μέρη κατὰ τὸ ποσόν) constituit c. 12, 1., easque c. 18, 2. μέρη simpliciter appellavit. οἷς μὲν γὰρ μιμοῦνται, δύο μέρη ἐστίν: sunt λέξις et μελοποιία. vid. §. 4. ὡς δὲ μιμοῦνται, ἓν : est ὄψις. v. §. 4. ἃ δὲ μιμοῦνται, τρία: sunt μῦθος et ἤθη et διάνοια.

8. mvp-aristotle-comment-43

Ritter, cap. 6 § 8

τούτοις μὲν οὖν - ὡσαύτως: vide possisne vel minimum ingenii Aristotelii vestigium in his agnoscere: ego non potui. cuivis tragoediae inesse sex illas partes dicit auctor personatus: verus autem (§. 11) pronuntiat non solum fieri posse tragoediam moribus carentem sed etiam a novis poetis fere ` ἀήθεις τραγῳδίας fieri. porro ne sibimet ipsa quidem haec consentiunt. nam si οὐκ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν νίχ aliter atque de poetis tragicis accipi potest, primo non paucos eorum illis partibus (iste εἶδεσι, non μορίοις, posuit) usos esse et statim omnes isdem usos esse audimus. vel sic οὐκ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν mire et obscure dictum est. tertium interpolationis signum est quod eadem sex nomina frigide et inepte, h. e. sine ullo consilio, recurrunt. accedunt tria indicia secundaria quibus idem probatur. corum primum est mira illa tragicorum poetarum vel generatim poetarum designatio, οὐκ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν. alterum est πᾶν nude positum, quod quo referatur non habet: interpolator πᾶν δρᾶμα dicere videtur voluisse. tertium est additum ὡς εἰπεῖν, quod homo iste dormitans sine ratione et consilio chartae illevit. quartum adeo accedit. codices enim a Bekkero et Burgesio et aliis collati aut ὄψεις aut ὄψις exhibent, ubi ὄψις a librariis leviter a vero detortum est. quod Victorius in uno vetustissimo exemplari ὄψιν invenit, id correctori vitium ὄψις emendare temere festinanti tribuendum est, eo magis quod Madius ὄψιν in margine trium librorum ab alia manu scriptum repperit. itaque ὄψεις haud dubie vera scriptura est. sed Aristoteles ubi ὄψιν pro parte tragoediae ponit, ibi constanter et recte singularem admisit, non pluralem. vid. c. 6, 4 et 7. c. 24, 1. interpolator igitur nomen ὄψιν a se modo lectum ne repetere quidem recte potuit. conf. Comment. ad c. 6, 19.

9. mvp-aristotle-comment-44

Ritter, cap. 6 § 9

ἡ γὰρ τραγῳδία μίμησίς ἐστιν οὐκ ἀνθρώπων: tragoedia non ipsos homines, h. e. totam eorum qualitatem exprimit, sed singula quaedam eorum facinora imitatur. qualitatem ita tantum pingit, quatenus ea ex actis intelligitur. ἀλλὰ πράξεως [ καὶ βίου- οὐ ποιότης]: sic exhibemus hunc locum restitutum ex librorum scriptorum fide et purgatum additamentis, quae sive Aldus sive alii correctores Itali intulerunt. tragoediam esse imitationem vitae cuiusdam ( βίου) et felicitatis ( εὐδαιμονίας) pronuntiari utique nequit, ne de illis quidem tragoediis quae laeto eventu concluduntur. quid igitur fecerunt Itali ad hoc incommodum sublevandum vel tollendum? post εὐδαιμονίας continuo inseruerunt καὶ κακοδαιμονίας, ut iam tragoedia dicatur esse imitatio felicitatis et infelicitatis. restant alia. statim enim codices praebent καὶ ἡ κακοδαιμονία ἐν πράξει ἐστι. haec cum vel correctis illis καὶ εὐδαιμονίας καὶ κακοδαιμονίας male convenirent, iidem Itali scripserunt καὶ γὰρ ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν πράξει ἐστι. antiqua igitur scriptura ex scriptis libris restituta, videamus quid ea faciendum sit. interpolator aliquis antiquus apud Aristotelem paulo post cum legeret εἰσὶ.. κατὰ δὲ τὰς πράξεις εὐδαίμονες ἢ τουναντίον, inde sumpsit primum illud suum καὶ βίου καὶ εὐδαιμονίας, et hoc post πράξεως inseruit; tum propter illud τούναντίον adiecit explicationis gratia καὶ ἡ κακοδαιμονία ἐν πράξει ἐστί. porro cum legeret εἰσὶ δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὰ ἤθη ποιοί τινες, et paulo post ὥστε τὰ πράγματα καὶ ὁ μῦθος τέλος τῆς τραγωδίας, iste iam hic posuit καὶ τὸ τέλος πρᾶξίς τις ἐστίν, οὐ ποιότης. sed finem esse actionem, non qualitatem, monere h. 1. nihil attinebat. finis enim ( τὸ τέλος) per sese est quod homines omnibus factis suis consequi student (v. Ethica Nicom. 1, 5. Magna Mor. I, 4. Eudem. II, 1), tragoediae autem finis singulari quadam actione continetur. de fine igitur generatim dici quidquam h. 1. non aptum erat. quid, quod tragoediae finem esse τὸν μῦθον (h. e. πρᾶξιν sive πράγματα) non multo post ex praecedentibus demum colligitur? sic: ὥστε τὰ πράγματα καὶ ὁ μῦθος τέλος τῆς τραγῳδίας. itaque falsus scriptor verum praecurrens fini generatim vindicat 4) quae ille de tragoediae fine praedicat. insiticiis eiectis, Aristotelis ratiocinatio bene procedit, id quod manifestissimum est interpolationis indicium. propositio maior est ἡ γὰρ τραγῳδία μίμησίς ἐστιν οὐκ ἀνθρώπων (h. e. ποιότητος ἀνθρώπων) ἀλλὰ πράξεως. sequitur minor εἰσὶ δὲ (h. e. atqui sunt cet.) κατὰ μὲν τὰ ἤθη ποιοί τινες, κατὰ δὲ τὰς πράξεις εὐδαίμονες ἢ τουναντίον. inde hoc consectatarium est, οὔκουν (non igitur) ὅπως τὰ ἤθη (sive τὴν ποιότητα) μιμήσωνται πράττουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἤθη συμπεριλαμβάνουσι διὰ τὰς πράξεις. ex his tribus pronuntiatis consequitur iam altera et primaria conclusio ὥστε τὰ πράγματα καὶ ὁ μῦθος τέλος τῆς τραγῳδίας, cui cum successisset τὸ δὲ τέλος μέγιστον ἁπάντων, nunc ostensum est quod demon- 4) Quae interpolator de fine ( τῷ τέλει) profert, ea Aristotelis doctrinae alibi expositae non quidem repugnant, sed Aristoteles ipse placita sua neque loco non apto neque nisi aliis libris allegatis afferre solet.13) strandum ante proposuerat (§.9 init.), dico μέγιστον δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων σύστασις. ex illo enim additamento τὸ δὲ τέλος μέγιστον ἁπάντων apparet fabulam non solum potiorem esse moribus sed potiorem etiam ceteris tragoediae partibus.

11. mvp-aristotle-comment-45

Ritter, cap. 6 § 11

post absolutam illam ratiocinationem (§. 9-10) hinc iam sequuntur quattuor σημεῖα, quibus quae ante demonstrata sunt firmari auctor voluit. primum est, sine moribus fieri tragoediam posse, sine fabula non posse. a

12. mvp-aristotle-comment-46

Ritter, cap. 6 § 12

ἔτι ἐάν τις ἐφεξῆς – καὶ σύστασιν πραγμάτων: est alterum σημεῖον. particulam negantem ante ποιήσει ex Aldina recepi cum ceteris editoribus. codicibus omittitur, et quidem ab omnibus ut videtur; Buhlius certe ex Winstanleii silentio nimis festinanter collegit οὐ inesse libris Mediceis. etiamsi concedere ultro velis, eum quoque qui deinceqs ponet sermones moratos et locutiones sententiasque bene factas, quodammodo facere quod sit tragici poetae officium, tum saltem scribi oportuit ποιήσει μὲν ὅ ἐστι τῆς τραγῳδίας ἔργον. ut nunc est, particula negante carere non possumus.

13. mvp-aristotle-comment-47

Ritter, cap. 6 § 13

tertium signum ad fabulae praestantiam et dignitatem declarandam ex partibus eius ducitur: nam cum eae valde graves sint, totum non minus grave esse sequitur. ceterum partes illae, περιπέτεια et ἀναγνώρισις, non in omnibus fabulis reperiuntur sed in unis implexis. haec igitur minus accurate scripta sunt.