Poetics. Aristote. Paris. 1692.
La poëtique d'Aristote (André Dacier, 1692) (OCR draft) (fra) (André Dacier's French translation of Aristotle's Poetics, published in 1692.)
Provisional text from uncorrected OCR; expect errors.
1. mvp-aristotle-comment-157
1.
mvp-aristotle-comment-158
1449a32
ἡ δὲ κωμῳδία κτέ.
The progress of Tragedy having been sketched, the next point to be considered is the progress of Comedy (
a 37
—
b 8
). The statement is introduced by a definition (
a 32-37
) based on hints already given in preceding chapters as to the nature of Comedy. In
2, 1448 a 16
Comedy was said to deal with personages worse than the average man (
χείρους, =
φαυλότεροι in the present passage) ; and in
4, 1448 b 36
its subject was assumed to be
τὸ γελοῖον.
These two points Aristotle reconciles and combines in a rough provisional definition before proceeding to the question more immediately before him, that of the
μεταβάσεις of Comedy. It is not necessary, therefore, to suppose this defining clause to be out of place. If we try the experiment of transferring it to another place, it will be found that little or nothing is gained by this disturbance of the traditional order.
1.
mvp-aristotle-comment-159
1449a33
ὥσπερ εἴπομεν
: in
2, 1448 a 17
and
4, 1448 b 37
.
1.
mvp-aristotle-comment-160
πᾶσαν κακίαν
:
Plato Rep. 490 D
ὁρᾶν αὐτῶν τοὺς μὲν ἀχρήστους, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς κακοὺς πᾶσαν κακίαν. —
Demosthenes 18, 279
τὸ δὲ δὴ καὶ τοὺς πρὸς ἔμ᾿ αὐτὸν ἀγῶνας ἐάσαντα νῦν ἐπὶ τόνδ᾿ ἤκειν καὶ πᾶσαν ἔχει κακίαν.
1.
mvp-aristotle-comment-161
1449a34
ἀλλὰ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ ἐστι τὸ γελοῖον μόριον
a compressed statement, practically equivalent to
οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ καθ᾿ ἕν τι εἶδος κακίας· τοῦ γὰρ αἰσχροῦ ἐστι τὸ γελοῖον μόριον.
The personages in Comedy are worse than most men, but only in one particular respect, as presenting a certain harmless deformity or ugliness of character, which makes them ridiculous only—not objects for blame or aversion. It is, in Aristotle's view, the harmlessness of the evil in them that makes them fit objects of laughter.
τὸ γὰρ γελοῖον κτέ.
Two kinds of possible objects of laughter are implied in the text. (1) An act is
γελοῖον when it is of the nature of a harmless mistake or blunder (
ἁμάρτημα ἀνώδυνον) ; and (2) a person is
γελοῖος when he presents some moral or physical deformity of the same harmless kind (
αἶσχος ἀνώδυνον).
The negative element here is a very essential part of the definition. Plato also, who thinks that the spectacle of human ignorance is the true object of laughter in Comedy, explains that, to be laughable, the ignorance must be harmless (
ἀβλαβὴς τοῖς ἄλλοις).
As
γελοῖα are the basis of all Comedy, Aristotle must be assumed to have devoted a section of his theory of Comedy (in the lost Second Book) to the causes and conditions of laughter, in the same way as we find him analysing
τὸ φοβερὸν καὶ ἐλεεινόν in chaps. 13-14 of the existing Poetics. It is not impossible that several traces of his theory survive in Cicero's discussion of the 'Ridiculous' in
De Oratore 2, 58-59
, which seems to be on distinctly Aristotelian lines.
1.
mvp-aristotle-comment-117
5.1
La Comedie eſt, comme je l'ay deja dit, une imitation des plus méchans hommes. Quand je dis méchans, ce n'eſt pas dans toutes ſortes de vices, mais ſeulement dans le ridicule.]
1
38.
mvp-aristotle-comment-38
NOTE 38.
5.1
P. 73. THE RIDICULOUS-A SPECIES OF TURPITUDE OR DEFORMITY; SINCE IT MAY BE DEFINED, &C.
It has been asserted by some writers of eminence, that Aristotle here speaks, not of what is laughable or ludicrous, in general, but only of the ridiculous, in that particular sense of the word, in which it is distinguished from the merely risible, and implies laughter mixed with disapprobation or contempt. This, however, is certainly not what Aristotle has said; for the word
γελοιον, which he uses, is as general as possible, and answers exactly to our word laughable. And it is in this general sense, justified, I think, by common usage, that I have used the word ridiculous in my version. For though in a philosophical speculation the distinction above-mentioned may be necessary for clearness, and is undoubtedly well founded, yet, in common language, the word ridiculous is never used with this nice appropriation, but applied, like its Latin original, to whatever excites laughter.
But it is objected, that, if Aristotle means the laughable in general, his account of the matter is false; because "men laugh at that, in which there is neither fault nor turpitude of any kind."
1
I answer, that this is true in English, but not true in Greek. Our word, turpitude, is confined, I think, to a moral sense, and I suppose is here so used by Dr. Beattie; and it is certainly true, that we laugh at many things that have in them no turpitude of that kind-nothing morally wrong. But the Greek word,
ΑΙΣΧΡΟΝ, was a word of wide extent, and seems manifestly used here by Aristotle in its utmost latitude; comprehending every thing that is, in any degree, ugly or deformed, from atrocious villainy, the highest moral ugliness, to a ridiculous cast of features in an ugly face. It is the opposite to
ΚΑΛΟΝ, which was used in a correspondent latitude of application. - The objections, which have been made to this passage, have chiefly, I think, been owing to this, that the objectors have not been sufficiently aware of the extensive signification in which the Greeks used the words,
καλον, αισχρον, –ἀρετη, κακια σπεδαιον, φαυλον-άμαρτημα, &c. We trans- late the words of antient authors by words to which we annex different ideas, and then raise objections and difficulties from our own mistakes. The consequence of taking
αισχρον here in the restrained sense of moral turpitude, has been, that those writers, who have so taken it, have been obliged to deny, that
γελοιον means laughable, because the laughable in general could not truly be defined, "a species of moral turpitude."
It plainly was not Aristotle's design here to enter into an accurate inquiry about the nature of laughter, and the distinction of risible and ridiculous objects. This he had perhaps done, in that part of this mutilated treatise, which related to Comedy, and to which he himself refers in his Rhetoric.
2
His purpose, here, seems to have been, merely to support and explain his account of Comedy; i. e. that it was
μιμησις φαυλοτερων, "an imitation of bad characters;" that is, as he immediately limits the sense of the general term
φαυλον, of ridiculous, or laughable, characters. Such, he continues, are properly denominated
φαυλοι, κακοι, bad, &c. because the laughable (
γελοιον) is one species of the
αισχρον, taken in its most general sense. "But to what species, or class," it was obvious to ask, "does it belong?"-To that class, it is answered, of things
αισχρα, which are neither destructive nor painful: for these, exciting terror or pity, are the property of Tragedy. And he asserts, I think, plainly, that the laughable in general,
το γελοιον, i. e. every thing that excites laughter, is
ἁμαρτημα ΤΙ και αισχα ἀνωδυνον και φθαρτικον-is, in some respect or other, faulty, wrong, deformed, but neither painful nor pernicious. What follows, about a ridiculous face, is, I think, clearly, not an illustration merely, as Dr. Campbell understands it to be, but an instance.
3
This seems evident from Aristotle's using the very word
αισχρον; (
προσωπον αισχρον) which he would hardly have done, had he just before used the words
αισχρον and
αισχ, as Dr. Campbell and Dr. Beattie contend that he bas used them, in a moral sense only.
But it is objected "We can never suppose that Aristotle would have called distorted features 'a certain fault or slip.'" To call them a slip, would indeed found strangely; because that expression conveys the idea of something morally wrong. But when we say, that a very long nose, or a wide mouth, is a fault in a face, we use a very common expression; the word fault having, I think, the same latitude of application as the Greek word
ἀμαρτημα.
It must be observed, however, that all Aristotle says is, that these two characters, deformity of some sort, and the absence of pain, or hurt, are to be found in every object of laughter: he neither says, nor implies, the converse that every thing so qualified is laughable. With respect to one of these characters the absence of pain or harm-there can be no doubt. It is only saying that we cannot laugh at that which shocks us. As to the other general character, deformity, ugliness, something wrong, &c. (
ἁμαρτημα ΤΙ και αισχα) it seems to me, that these expressions, taken in that large sense, in which Aristotle plainly means to use them, amount to much the same as those used by modern philosophers to characterize the risible in general; such as, "incongruity, incongruous association, striking unsuitableness," "disproportion, inconsistence and dissonance of circumstances in the same object"
4
. With respect to works both of nature, and of art," says the ingenious and philosophical author of the Elements of Criticism, "none of them are risible but what are out of rule, some remarkable defect or excess; a very long visage, for example, or a very short one. Hence nothing just, proper, decent, beautiful, proportioned, or grand, is risible."
5
This appears to me to be exactly the meaning, and to approach very near to the language, of Aristotle. For, of whatever may be thus characterized it surely may be said, that it has some species of fault, deformity, or distortion: in Aristotle's words,
ἁμαρτημα Τι και -αισχρον ΤΙ και ΔΙΕΣΤΡΑΜΜΕΝΟΝ.
Aristotle's account, then, of the
γελοíον, appears to be right, as far as it goes. It might, indeed, be objected to, as too general, had he given it as the result of an exact and particular analysis of the subject. But this, as I have already observed, was not his purpose in this place.
It is farther objected by Dr. Campbell, that to speak of laughter in general, "would have been foreign to Aristotle's purpose:" because, "laughter is not his theme, but Comedy; and laughter only so far as Comedy is concerned with it. Now the concern of Comedy reaches no farther than that kind of ridicule which relates to manners."
6
—Undoubtedly it was this kind of ridicule that Aristotle had principally in view. But I apprehend, that the Comedy here in question was concerned with the ridiculous or laughable in general. For Aristotle's notion of Comedy, as an excellent writer has observed, "was taken from the state and practice of the Athenian stage that is, from the old or middle Comedy, which answers to his description. The great revolution which the introduction of the new Comedy made in the drama, did not happen till afterwards."
7
Now the old and middle Comedy, as I have before observed, were no other than what we should call Farce. To raise a laugh was so eminently their object, that the ridiculous (
το γελοιον) is frequently used by Plato, as synonymous to Comedy, and substituted for it; as pity is also for Tragedy.
8
Nor was it even very "foreign to Aristotle's purpose" to instance in a ridiculous face; for that this also was an established source of fun in the Greek theatre, is well known from the curious account of the comic masks in Jul. Pollux; who says, particularly of those of the old Comedy, that they were ridiculous caricaturas of the persons represented:—
ἐπι το γελοιοτερον ἐσχηματισο.
9
The Athenians were certainly not more delicate than Cicero, who thought, we know, that bodily deformities were "satis bella materies ad jocandum."
10
He, also, agrees perfectly with Aristotle, or rather follows him, in his account of the ridiculous: "Locus autem et regio quasi ridiculi TURPITUDINE ET DEFORMITATE QUADAM continetur."
5.1.
mvp-aristotle-comment-11
5.1
RIDICULE IS PRODUCED BY ERRORS UNATTENDED BY DAN- GEROUS AND FATAL CONSEQUENCES; THUS DEFORMITY OF BODY IS RIDICULOUS, PROVIDED IT IS NOT OCCASIONED BY PAIN.
MISTAKES even in language, as blunders, and provincial and foreign dialects, are among the errors of this species, and are frequently used as a fource of the ridiculous in modern farce, and even comedy; ، So though I cannot agree with Lord Kaimes, as to the cause of this. ' quick-fighted' (he says) ' is pride in blemishes, and so willing to be ، ، gratified, that it takes up with the very flighteft improprieties; such as a blunder by a foreigner in speaking our language, especially if the blun- • der can bear a sense that reflects on the speaker.' ELEMENTS OF CRITICISM, Vol. 1. Ch. XII. As for deformity of body being an object of ridicule, it must be observed that Aristotle is here speaking of the old, or middle comedy, equivalent with our farce. Such as many of Foote's pieces were, who, like Ariftophanes, brought personal characters on the stage and marked them for public ridicule, not only by their habitual manners, but by bodily deformities, infirmities, and misfortunes; violating, without remorse, the latter part of the precept of the Stagirite. This liberty, or rather licentiousness of imitation, is justly reprobated by Churchill.
• Mimics
• Mimics draw humour out of nature's fault, • With perfonal defects their mirth adorn, • And hang misfortunes out to public fcorn.' This humane qualification, as to the objects of personal ridicule, is strictly observed by Shakespear. A very ingenious critic observes, • He has given him (Falstaff) every infirmity of body that is not likely to • awaken our compaffion, and which is most proper to render both his • better qualities and his vices ridiculous.' ESSAY ON THE DRAMA- TIC CHARACTER OF FALSTAFF, Page 149 [A]. The rule of not sporting with serious misfortunes should be equally observed in comic narration. Indeed it is pointed out by nature; for he must have a heart little sensible of the feelings of humanity, who can find any thing ludicrous in the real distresses and fufferings of others, with whatever ridiculous circumstances they may be related. It is wonderful, that a people who boast so much of their refinement as the French, and whose delicacy cannot bear the exhibition of spectacles of suffering on the tragic scene for the purpose of exciting pity and terror, should approve the narration of such facts, when introduced to occafion mirth. And yet not only Scarron and Rabelais, the last of whom has defcribed very minutely, a monk kicked to death by a vicious horse, as a laughable accident; but even the works of Le Sage, abound with instances of this kind. Savage as we have often been called by our politer neighbours, our comic writers are seldom guilty of this impropriety. We have, however, one flagrant instance of it in the works of an author of [A] See alfo Beattie on Laughter and Ludicrous Composition, Ch. iii. p. 431. R2 undoubted
undoubted comic excellence. I mean Arbuthnot's Journal of the fix days preceding the death of the Bishop of Salisbury.
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mvp-aristotle-comment-32
Ritter, cap. 5 § 1
De fine comoediae proposito. initia comoediae in obscuro versantur. epopoeia tragoediam ita secuta est ut graves imitari pergeret, differt ab eadem eo quod narratio est, etiam metro et temporis spatio. partes aliae eaedem, aliae tragoediae peculiares. Tragoediae initiis et incrementis breviter expositis, accedit ad comoediam, non eo consilio ut ipsius naturam accurate definiat (id alii huius operis loco exsequendum reservavit), sed ut proposita comicae poesis a tragoedia diversitate atque explicata tragoediae et epopoeiae partim similitudine partim differentia dilucidetur, quomodo poesis in varias species diffusa sit, quasque immutationes earum quaeque subierit.
ἡ δὲ κωμῳδία-τὸ γελοῖον μόριον: tragoediam imitari quam vulgo reperiantur meliores, comoediam autem peiores, id dictum erat cap. 2, 4. iam accuratius definitur quatenus peiores comoedia imitetur. comoedia enim non pingit homines omni pravitatis genere corruptos, sed qui ea dedecoris specie qua continetur ridiculum turpes compareant, paulo licentius post
οὐ μέντοι κατὰ πᾶσαν κακίαν posuit quod contrarium
ἀλλὰ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ ἐστὶ τὸ γελοῖον μόριον. scilicet haec scripsit ita, ut ridiculum (
τὸ γελοῖον) a comicis poetis exprimi notum certumque esse legentibus acciperet praesumeretque. plenius ac planius dixisset
ἀλλὰ τῶν γε λοίων οἱ κοινωνοῦσι τοῦ αἰσχροῦ. ceterum haec scripsisse Aristotelem respicientem potissimum antiquam Graecorum comoediam, cui
τὸ αἰσχρὸν raro deerat, verbo monuisse sufficiat. conf. Ethic. Nicom. IV, 14 med.
τὸ γὰρ γελοῖόν ἐστιν ἁμάρτημά τι κα καὶ αἶσχος ἀνώδυνον καὶ οὐ φθαρτικόν : qui aliquid negotii agunt, ii risum excitant ubi ratione perperam inita a fine proposito aberrant (
ἁμαρτάνουσιν). quod initae rationi non respondet eventus, ridiculum est, si ex ea aberratione neque dolor neque pernicies sed nonnisi turpe quoddam nascitur. exemplum quod subsequitur, sumptum a comica persona, co non totam suam
τοῦ γελοίου definitionem voluit illustrare, sed id unum declarare quo intellectu posuerit
ἀνώδυνον καὶ οὐ φθαρτικόν. comoediae ingenio externus agentium habitus et figura convenire debet. Quod de natura
τοῦ γελοίου accuratius in Poetica se dixisse eiusque genera pertractasse profitetur in Rhetoricis I, 11. p. 1372 a 1. et III, 18. p. 1419 b5., id haud dubie fecit in operis parte nobis perdita, ubi separatim de comoedia exposuit. conf. Praefatio.