Poetics. Aristote. Paris. 1692.
La poëtique d'Aristote (André Dacier, 1692) (OCR draft) (fra) (André Dacier's French translation of Aristotle's Poetics, published in 1692.)
Provisional text from uncorrected OCR; expect errors.
6.
mvp-aristotle-comment-532
ὁμαλόν:
i.e. the character should always remain the same, with-out change or modification in the course of the play. The canon reappears in
Horace
A.P. 126
servetur ad imum [scil. persona] qualis ab incepto processerit, et sibi constet. The logical scheme of these four canons of character may be presented thus: the
ἦθος of the dramatic personage should be (1)
χρηστόν, not inconsistent with goodness of disposition; (2)
ἁρμόττον, not inconsistent with the
ἦθος of the class to which the personage belongs; (3)
ὅμοιον, not inconsistent with the received idea of the particular personage; (4)
ὁμαλόν, not inconsistent with itself.
6.
mvp-aristotle-comment-533
ἀνώμαλός τις.
Aristotle is perhaps thinking of Achilles, as a character subject to sudden changes of mood; comp.
fr. 168 (Teubn.)
Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶν ἀνώμαλον εἶναι τὸ Ἀχιλλέως ἦθος, and
Eustathius on
Il. 24, 569
(v.
Roemer, Bavarian Academy,
Sitzungsb. 1884 p. 297).
6.
mvp-aristotle-comment-534
ὁ τὴν μίμησιν παρέχων,
as the explanatory
καὶ τοιοῦτον ἦθος ὑποτι-θείς shows, means the original of the dramatic portrait, the person-age as known from history or legend.
29
111.
mvp-aristotle-comment-111
NOTE 111. P. 93.
15.6
THOUGH THE MODEL OF THE POET'S IMITATION BE SOME PERSON OF UNUNIFORM MANNERS, STILL THAT PERSON MUST BE REPRESENTED AS UNIFORMLY UNUNIFORM. —
Τεταρτον δε, το όμαλον κ'αν γαρ ἀνωμαλος τις ή, ὁ την μιμησιν παρέχων και τοιουτον ἠθος ὑποτιθεις, όμως όμαλως ἀνωμαλον δει ειναι.----
"which last words," says an eminent writer,
"having been not at all understood, have kept his interpreters from seeing the true sense and scope of the precept. For they have been explained of such characters as that of Tigellius in Horace; which, however proper for satyr, or for farcical Comedy, are of too fantastic and whimsical a nature to be admitted into Tragedy; of which Aristotle must there be chiefly understood to speak, and to which Horace, in this place, alone confines himself. 'Tis true, indeed, it may be said, that 'though a whimsical or fantastic character be improper for Tragedy, an irresolute one is not. Nothing is finer than a struggle between different passions; and it is perfectly natural, that in such a circumstance, each should prevail by turns."—"But then there is the widest difference between the two cases. Tigellius, with all his fantastic irresolution, is as uniform a character, as that of Mitio. If the expression may be allowed, its very inconsistency is of the essence of its uniformity. On the other hand, Electra, torn with sundry conflicting passions, is most apparently, and in the properest notion of the word, ununiform. One of the strongest touches in her character is that of a high, heroic spirit, sensible to her own, and her family's injuries, and determined, at any rate, to revenge them. Yet no sooner is this revenge perpetrated, than she softens, relents, and pities. Here is a manifest ununiformity, which can, in no proper sense of the expression, lay claim to the critic's
Comment. on the Ep. to the Pifos, &c. vol. i. p. 104, &c.
ὁμαλον, but may be so managed, by the Poet's skill, as to become consistent with the basis or foundation of her character, that is, to be
ὁμαλως ἀνωμαλον. And that this, in fact, was the meaning of the critic, is plain from the similar example to his own rule, given in the case of Iphigenia: which he specifies (how justly, will be considered hereafter) as an instance of the
ἀνωμαλε, irregular, or ununiform, character, ill-expressed, or made inconsistent. So that the genuine sense of the precept is, 'Let the manners be uniform; or, if ununiform, yet consistently so, or uniformly ununiform:' exactly copied, according to the reading here given, by Horace. Whereas in the other way, it stands thus: 'Let your characters be uniform, or unchanged; or, if you paint an ununiform character (such as Tigellius) let it be ununiform all the way; i. e. such an irregular character to the end of the play, as it was at the beginning; which is, in effect, to say, let it be uniform:' which apparently destroys the latter part of the precept, and makes it an unmeaning tautology with the former.'"
I have given this passage entire, that the reader may have it fully in his power to judge, for himself, whether I mistake or misrepresent the meaning of any part of it. I should be sorry to be thought capable of a perfect confidence in my own opinion, however carefully and deliberately formed, when it is opposed by that of such a writer. But, after having repeatedly considered this comment, as it certainly deserves to be considered, with all the attention in my power, I am obliged to confess, that it does not satisfy me, and that the common interpretation still appears to me to stand its ground. — My reasons are these:
1. I cannot think, that such change, irresolution, and temporary inconsistence as arises from "conflicting passions," comes under the meaning of Aristotle's
ΗΘΟΣ ἀνωμάλον.
Ηθος, is the prevailing disposition, the habitual
προαιρεσις, or settled character. "Electra," it is said, "torn with sundry conflicting passions, is most apparently, and in the properest sense of the word, ununiform." Not so, I think, in Aristotle's sense of the word
ἀνωμαλον, expressly applied by him here to
ήθη, or manners. The irregularities of conduct, or of sentiment and speech, arising from passion, seem to be a distinct thing from such as imply a change of the fixed, prevailing, or characteristic manners of the person. When such passionate ununiformity as that above described in Electra, is so managed by the Poet's skill, "as to become consistent with the basis or foundation of her character," that character is not, then, I think, as the ingenious critic considers it to be,
ὁμαλως ἀνωμαλον, i. e. (as it is expressed in the beginning of the following note, p. 127.) "an ununiform character justly sustained, or, uniformly ununiform:" it is not, if I understand Aristotle rightly,
ἀνωμαλον at all, in his sense; for he speaks only of anomalous manners; and anomalous manners, plainly, cannot be made "consistent with the basis or foundation of a character," in any other sense, than as that very anomaly itself constitutes the character. And this I take to be Aristotle's meaning: for he is speaking of that anomaly, in which different characters, not, in which "different passions, prevail by turns."
2. The very expression, —
κ'αν γαρ ΑΝΩΜΑΛΟΣ ΤΙΣ ή, ὁ την μιμησιν παρέχων και ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΝ ΗΘΟΣ ὑποτιθεις, seems plainly to indicate an ununiform character, such as he explains by the
ὁμαλως ἀνωμαλον that follows. —
ἀνωμαλά ΤΙΣ an anomalous PERSON: i. e. a person of inconsistent manners, or character. This expression seems hardly applicable, without violence, to such casual and merely apparent inconsistence, as arises from conflicting passions, and is reconcilable with "the basis or foundation of a character."
3. "The genuine sense of the precept," we are told, "is, Let the manners be uniform; or, if ununiform, yet consistently so, or uniformly ununiform." But, consistently, and uniformly, seem to present different ideas. Aristotle's word,
ὁμαλως, presents only the latter of these:—uniformly that is, more literally, equally*, evenly, &c. it does not, I think, answer at all to consistently, in the sense in which it is evidently applied, in this explanation, to what is not incongruous—not unaccountable, &c
1
. Had this, therefore, been Aristotle's meaning, he would, probably, have used, either
εικοτως, or
ευλογως, or some other such word appropriated to that meaning; not
ὁμαλως, which is never, as far as I know, used in the sense of consistently
2
.
4. But it is objected, that if we take
ὁμαλως ἀνωμαλον to mean "uniform all the way, i. e. such an irregular character to the end of the play, as it was at the beginning," this, "is, in effect to say, let it be uniform; which apparently destroys the latter part of the precept, and makes it an unmeaning tautology with the former." The first part of the precept, I think, is, Let the manners be uniform; or, as we say, of a piece. Now to this an objector might say,—"This cannot be an indispensable rule; uniformity cannot be essentially requisite to the manners: for, what, if the Poet should take for the subject of his imita- tion a person whose manners are not uniform?" —The answer, or "second part of the precept," is, "then, that want of uniformity must be such as constitutes the very character itself; for this falls within the rule; the 'very inconsistency' of the character (to use the ingenious critic's own words,) being, in this case, 'of the essence of its uniformity.'" I confess I do not here perceive any thing that can properly be called tautology; for though the philosopher says, indeed, in the second part of the precept no more than he meant to say in the first; yet he plainly apprehended it was more than he might be understood to say, and therefore he subjoined this necessary explanation
3
. What he says is, in short, only this—"Let the manners be uniform: an ununiform character is no exception to this rule."
The Tigellius of Horace offered himself naturally enough, upon this occasion, to the commentators, as an illustration. We need not, however, suppose Aristotle to have thought of so very fantastic and comic a species of incoherence. Mutability and caprice are sometimes found in higher characters, where they are less ludicrous in their appearance, and, sometimes, very serious in their effects. And though, perhaps, any character of the kind may have too much of a comic cast to accord with our ideas of Tragic dignity, we have no reason to conclude, that it would have found the same difficulty of admittance upon the Greek stage, where the Tragic muse did, not unfrequently, condescend to be seen, "
Δακρυσεν γελασασα."
I shall only add to this note the following passage from the commentary of Victorius, which appears to me to explain well, in few words, the meaning, and the spirit, of Aristotle's precept.
"Studens ostendere quantopere hoc præceptum cuftodiendura fit, affirmat, si quis fortè varius diſſimiliſque sibi inductus semel fit, eum, talem in omni facto totius fabulæ fervandum esse, ut æquabilitas à Poetâ custodiatur in naturâ illâ inæquabili ostendenda: quod non fieret, fi aliquis levis, nec in eodem proposito permanens, inductus, paulò pofteà firmus et obftinati animi ungeretur. Si morum igitur inæqualitas naturæque inconstantia constanter servanda est, quanto magis natura indoleſque stabilis par sibi ac jugis ad extremum servari debet."
15.6.
mvp-aristotle-comment-55
15.6
EVEN IF AN INCONSISTENT PERSON IS THE OBJECT OF IMITA- IMITATED SHOULD BE MADE TION, THE CHARACTER SO CONSISTENTLY INCONSISTENT.
MR. TWINING begins one of his notes (101) with the observation that Aristotle affords so many passages to exercise the penetration and conjectures of the critics, that they might be perfectly fatisfied without inventing them when they do not find them. An observation that feems peculiarly applicable to this passage, which I own appears to me perfectly plain, and in the common and literal acceptation very naturally and even necessarily connected with what immediately precedes it. After Aristotle had mentioned consistency as one of the essential requifites of manners, it occurred to him that there might be, and perhaps he recollected there actually were, characters whose leading feature was inconfistency; and that he might be supposed to mean that the manners of such persons were improper for poetical imitation. He therefore explains himself by saying such characters were not improper, provided the inconfiftency was kept up throughout the whole conduct of the character, and the person was not made to act consistently with himself in some instances, and inconsistently in others. A very learned and elegant critic however has chosen to give a new meaning to this observation. One of his objections is, that such an inconsistent character is not proper for tragedy. He was induced to this idea by the character given to Tigellius by Horace, which so naturally suggests itself to the recollection of the reader. But it is by no means improbable, that
POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. that such characters may be found in the higher and more serious ranks of life, the consequences of whose inconsistency may be as productive of tragic distress as that of Tigellius is of comic ridicule [x]. Bishop Hurd is at great pains to prove, that by ὁμαλῶς ἀνόμαλον he means that a person in some things inconsistent, may yet be so managed by the poet'as to be made consistent with the basis of his character. And as an example of this, he brings Electra, and strange to tell, Iphigenia, the very character marked out by Aristotle to exemplify blameable inconsistency of manners. The Bishop says, that Iphigenia is more easily vindicated from this charge of inconfiftency, than even Electra, notwithstanding this charge of Aristotle against her. It may be so; but if it is so, if Aristotle knew what he meant, or had any meaning at all, he could not intend to praise in Electra what he censures in Iphigenia. If the character of Iphigenia is an inconsistency confiftent with the basis of the character, it is proof pofitive that such is not the meaning of Ariftotle's ὁμαλῶς ἀνόμαλον, which must be some quality that the manners of Iphigenia did not possess. To bring the very character quoted by Ariftotle as an instance of the breach of a dramatic rule, for an example of the exception to such rule on his own supposed principles, and that by changing the received and obvious meaning of the words defining such exception, can hardly be justified by the canons of fober criticifm. The idea of Mr. Markland, mentioned by Mr. Twining, that the inconfistency of Iphigenia 'was intended by the poet as a moral lesson, [x] See Mr. Twining, Note III, whose observations on this passage, and on the Bishop of Worcester's criticism, are as usual, accurate and convincing. Xx. 2 ' a strik-
34° a striking picture of the " levity and inconfistency of the human mind," reminds us of an observation of Brumoy, on part of the conduct of Jocasta in the Edipus of Sophocles. • We perceive (he says) that the trouble of Edipus has fo much encreased, and that his fcruples con- • cerning the death of Laius have taken such deep root in his heart, that ، ، ، Jocasta, to deliver him from them, becomes all at once pious inftead of impious, as the appeared at first. She goes to confult the gods : admirable character! she is a free-thinker in the first act and now a religious enthusiast, and this because both the effects are produced by the different circumstances she is in. Such is the human heart. In going to the temple she meets the Corinthian shepherd, who reassures her concerning the fate of Edipus, and she thinks no more of the gods.' By the way, after all to take the Bishop's own words, is not the fubstance of them a distinction without a difference? for what is such a character as Tigellius but an inconsistent person drawn consistent with the basis of his character, since that basis is inconsistency ?
4.
mvp-aristotle-comment-104
Ritter, cap. 15 § 4
τέταρτον δὲ τὸ ὁμαλόν: conf. Horatii in Arte poetica praeceptum v. 119. sibi convenientia finge, et praecipue v. 125.si quid inexpertum scenae committis et audes personam formare novam, servetur ad imum qualis ab incepto processerit et sibi constet.
ὁ τὴν μίμησιν παρέχων est persona in scenam inducta. ea si prae se fert inconstantiam (
τοιοῦτον ἦθος ὑποτιθείς, tragoediae scilicet sive poetae tragoediam scripturo), poeta tamen in depingenda inconstantia constantiam sequi debet, h. e. qui semel inconstans processit, talis usque ad imum servandus est. hoc est
ὁμαλῶς ἀνώμαλος εἶναι, acuta sane observatio et Aristotelis persona non indigna.