2.
mvp-aristotle-comment-439
μὴ ἁπλῆν ἀλλὰ πεπλεγμένην:
see the explanation of these terms in
10, 1452 a 12-18
. The finest kind of tragedy involves a complex plot, because the element of surprise (
comp.
9, 1452 a 4
and
14, 1454 a 4
) in the complex plot accentuates the tragic impression (
comp.
6, 1450 a 33
and
9, 1452 a 4
). It may be observed, as an instance of
Aristotle's inconsistency in matters of language, that in
13, 1453 a 13
the
ἁπλοῦς μύθος is the opposite of the
διπλοῦς, not (as here) of the
πεπλεγμένος μύθος.
2.
mvp-aristotle-comment-440
φοβερῶν καὶ ἐλεεινῶν εἶναι μιμητικήν:
as was assumed in the definition of Tragedy (
6, 1449 b 27
), and again in
9, 1452 a 2
and
11, 1452 a 38.
φοβερὰ καὶ ἐλεεινά
(
scil.
πράγματα) is a comprehensive designation for the incidents distinctive of Tragedy, just as
γελοῖα describes those of Comedy.
A tragic scene may be either
φοβερόν
,
alarming, suggestive of coming evil or danger to the hero, or
ἐλεεινόν
,
piteous, a representation of his anguish and suffering. Fear (the opposite of hope) relates to the future; pity to evil or suffering actually present and before us. In
Aristotle's time the definition of fear was
expectation of coming evil,
προσδοκία κακοῦ
(
Eth. N. 3. 9, 1115 a 9
), or
προσδοκία μέλλοντος κακοῦ
(
Plato
Laches 198 B
); or, as he puts it in
Rhet. 2. 5, 1382 a 21
,
λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ
. In pity on the other hand the evil or suffering, instead of being possible and prospective, is actual and before our eyes as it were:
Rhet. 2. 8, 1385 b 13
ἔστω δὴ ἔλεος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινομένῳ κακῷ φθαρτικῷ ἢ λυπηρῷ
(
comp.
Tumlirz,
Die tragischen Affecte Mitleid und Furcht nach Aristoteles p. 15
). The distinction between the
φοβερά and
ἐλεεινά in a play may be seen in the
Oedipus Tyrannus, in which we are gradually prepared for the piteous incidents of the catastrophe by a series of premonitions of coming evil in the earlier scenes.
The sympathetic interest we are thus made to take in the fortunes of the tragic hero depends, according to
Aristotle, on one condition, his being more or less like ourselves (
ὅμοιος),
i. e. neither exceptionally good nor exceptionally wicked. This ethical similarity is what renders fear for another possible with us, as we are told in the context,
13, 1453 a 5
φόβος περὶ τὸν ὅμοιον
; and in the
Rhetoric the same is said of pity:
Rhet. 2. 8, 1386 b 24
τοὺς ὁμοίους ἐλεοῦσι ... κατὰ ἤθη
. It would be easy, if it were worth while, to amplify the present statement by further illustrations from the corresponding chapters of the
Rhetoric (
2. 5
and
2. 8
). The general point of view, however, in the two discussions is not the same. The pity and fear of the
Rhetoric are the pity and fear of the judges whom the rhetor is addressing; it is part of his art to work, it may be, on their fears, and deter them from an adverse decision by showing how injurious its consequences may be to them and theirs. But the apprehension the tragic poet arouses in us is not of this personal description; it is a disinterested fear for another, the danger that arouses it being that of the hero, not that of the audience in the theatre.
The point being so obvious, it is strange to see a diametrically opposite view taken by a critic of such distinction as
Lessing.
Aristotle's fear (he tells us) is not the fear which the impending evil of another arouses in us for that other; it is the fear that arises for ourselves from our likeness to the sufferer; it is the fear that the misfortunes, which we see hanging over him, may befall ourselves; it is the fear that we may ourselves become the pitied object
(
Hamb. Dram. St. 75
). The rhetoric of
Lessing's statement may perhaps conceal the underlying confusion of thought: he has confused our fear that something will happen with our recognition of the possibility that something may happen to us. This latter is the general condition of all sensibility to pity and fear; but it is not a
πάθος, and cannot, therefore, be identical with either of these emotions (
comp.
Tumlirz
l. c. p. 7
;
Zeller,
Phil. d. Gr. 2. 2 p. 783
).
Lessing has an equally paradoxical view of the
Aristotelian
ἔλεος—one inspired, if I am not mistaken, by
Hobbes rather than by
Aristotle himself. He thinks that according to
Aristotle
the feeling of pity is impossible without fear for ourselves... fear is a necessary ingredient in pity
(
Hamb. Dram. St. 77
); one of his modern followers even goes so far as to assert that the
Aristotelian pity is only
a disguised fear
(
eine verkappte Furcht
,
Döring,
Kunstlehre des Aristoteles p. 310
). This
rapprochement of the two feelings is not warranted by the texts in the
Rhetoric
1
. A distinction between them is implied not only in the present, but also in other passages of the
Poetics;
comp.
ἔλεος καὶ φόβος
(
6, 1449 b 27; 14, 1453 b 12
),
ἔλεον ἕξει ἢ φόβον
(
11, 1452 a 38
),
οὔτε ἔλεον οὔτε φόβον
(
scil.
ἔχοι ἄν
,
13, 1453 a 3
),
φοβερὸν καὶ ἐλεεινόν
(
9, 1452 a 2; 13, 1452 b 2; 14, 1453 b 1
),
οὔτε ἐλεεινὸν οὔτε φοβερόν
(
13, 1453 a 1
, 6). It will be seen from the instances just quoted that in the formula
pity and fear
, pity comes first, whereas in the corresponding formula
φοβερά often precedes
ἐλεεινά. The explanation may perhaps be this, that
Aristotle (
like
Plato) assumes a tragedy to be a picture of human suffering (
πάθος); so that the excitement of pity is its primary and essential purpose, the element of fear coming in as a sort of secondary matter, to quicken our sympathy with the tragic hero, and prepare us for a catastrophe. In a play like the
Oedipus Tyrannus, for instance, which
Aristotle has so constantly in mind, the
φοβερά precede the
έλεεινά and lead up to them; but the great tragic interest is in the later scenes, in which
Oedipus becomes an object of pity.
2.
mvp-aristotle-comment-441
πρῶτον μὲν
is answered by
οὐδ᾽ αὐ
in
1453 a 1
(
comp.
Plato
Symp. 219 E
;
Laws 935 A
).
The connexion between the main points in the discussion in this and the next chapter is as follows. After laying down (1) the general rule that, if a tragedy is to arouse pity and fear in us, the tragic hero must be a man of a certain type of character (
13, 1452 b 34
),
Aristotle adds (2) that the tragic effect is enhanced by the play having an unhappy ending (
13, 1453 a 12
), and (3) weakened by a
double plot
, in which the unhappiness of certain of the personages is balanced by the happiness of others (
13, 1453 a 30
); and (4) that stories of horror in which kinsmen are involved have an especial tragic interest and value (
14, 1453 b 14
). This last leads him off (5) into a discussion on Discovery and its place in a play (
14, 1453 b 26
); the conclusion being (6) that, where kinsmen are concerned, the best form of tragedy is one in which a timely Discovery prevents the actual perpetration of the contemplated deed of horror (
14, 1454 a 4
).
2.
mvp-aristotle-comment-442
ἐπιεικεῖς,
the opposite of
μοχθηρούς in 36; in ordinary usage
ἐπιεικής is often synonymous with
σπουδαῖος ἢ
χρηστός (
comp.
15, 1454 b 13
), and opposed to
φαῦλος (
comp.
26, 1462 a 18
) and similar terms (
Bon. Ind. 271 b 36
). The sense we are to attach to the term in this passage is shown by the equivalent that replaces it in
13, 1453 a 8
ἀρετῇ διαφέρων καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ
.
Aristotle tells us that a man of great worth and virtue is not sufficiently like ourselves (
ὅμοιος
) for the purposes of Tragedy, because his sufferings will create an overpowering feeling of indignation or disgust instead of pity. It is difficult to reconcile his present view with what he tells us elsewhere of the tragic hero (see on
13, 1453 a 16
), or his present use of the term
ἐπιεικής with that in
15, 1454 b 13
. Besides this, according to the
Rhetoric it is quite possible for one who is
ἐπιεικής to be an object of pity:
Rhet. 2. 8, 1385 b 34
κἂν οἴωνταί τινας εἶναι τῶν ἐπιεικῶν
(
scil.
ἐλεοῦσιν). All this may perhaps show that strict consistency of language is not always to be expected even in
Aristotle.
2.
mvp-aristotle-comment-443
μιαρόν:
as an offence to our moral or religious feelings;
comp.
14, 1453 b 39
,
1454 a 3
.
