Lucian of Samosata, Hermotimus, ed. Kenneth Kilburn, 55

Search the Perseus Catalog for:

← Previous Next →

ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ

Παπαί, ὦ Ἑρμότιμε, ὡς ἰσχυρὰ ταῦτα εἴρηκας ἀπὸ τῶν μερῶν ἀξιῶν τὰ ὅλα εἰδέναι. καίτοι ἐγὼ τὰ ἐναντία ἀκούσας μέμνημαι ὡς ὁ μὲν τὸ ὅλον εἰδὼς εἰδείη ἂν καὶ τὸ μέρος, ὁ δὲ μόνον τὸ μέρος οὐκέτι καὶ τὸ ὅλον. οὕτως καί μοι τόδε ἀπόκριναι· ὁ Φειδίας ἄν ποτε ἰδὼν ὄνυχα λέοντος ἔγνω ἄν ὅτι λέοντός ἐστιν, εἰ μὴ ἑωράκει ποτὲ λέοντα ὅλον; ἢ σὺ ἀνθρώπου χεῖρα ἰδὼν ἔσχες ἂν εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἀνθρώπου ἐστὶ μὴ πρότερον εἰδὼς μηδὲ ἑωρακὼς ἄνθρωπον; τί σιγᾷς; ἢ βούλει ἐγὼ ἀποκρίνωμαι ὑπὲρ σοῦ τά γε ἀναγκαῖα ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἶχες; ὥστε κινδυνεύει ὁ Φειδίας ἄπρακτος ἀπεληλυθέναι μάτην ἀναπλάσας τὸν λέοντα· οὐδὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸν Διόνυσον ὦπται ¹ λέγων. ἢ πῶς ταῦτα ἐκείνοις ὅμοια; τῷ μὲν γὰρ Φειδίᾳ καὶ σοὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο τοῦ γνωρίζειν τὰ μέρη αἴτιον ἦν ἢ τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ ὅλον—ἄνθρωπον λέγω καὶ λέοντα· ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ δέ, οἷον τῇ Στωϊκῶν, πῶς ἂν ἀπὸ τοῦ μέρους καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἴδοις; ἢ πῶς ἂν ἀποφαίνοιο ὡς καλά; οὐ γὰρ οἶσθα τὸ ὅλον οὗ μέρη ἐκεῖνά ἐστιν.

Hermotimus. Lucian of Samosata. ed. Kenneth Kilburn. Medford, MA. Perseus 5.0.

Sponsored by Perseus Project, Tufts University.

Funding provided by The National Endowment for the Humanities.

Current edition Perseus

Σκύθης ἢ πρόξενος (Greek) (Lucian, Vol. 6. Kilburn, Kenneth, editor. London: William Heinemann, Ltd.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959 (unrenewed copyright).)

Editions (1)

Ἑρμότιμος ἢ Περὶ Αἱρέσεων Perseus (Lucian. Luciani Samosatensis Opera, Vol. 1. Jacobitz, Karl, editor. Leipzig: Teubner, 1909.) — 55 focus

Λυκῖνος

παπαῖ, ὦ Ἑρμότιμε, ὡς ἰσχυρὰ ταῦτα εἴρηκας ἀπὸ τῶν μερῶν ἀξιῶν τὰ ὅλα εἰδέναι· καίτοι ἐγὼ τὰ ἐναντία ἀκούσας μέμνημαι ὡς ὁ μὲν τὸ ὅλον εἰδὼς εἰδείη ἂν καὶ τὸ μέρος, ὁ δὲ μόνον τὸ μέρος οὐκέτι καὶ τὸ ὅλον. οὕτως καί μοι τόδε ἀπόκριναι, ὁ Φειδίας ἄν ποτε ἰδὼν ὄνυχα λέοντος ἔγνω ἄν, ὅτι λέοντός ἐστιν, εἰ μὴ ἑωράκει ποτὲ λέοντα ὅλον; ἢ σὺ ἀνθρώπου χεῖρα ἰδὼν 796 ἔσχες ἂν εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἀνθρώπου ἐστὶ μὴ πρότερον εἰδὼς μηδὲ ἑωρακὼς ἄνθρωπον; τί σιγᾷς; ἢ βούλει ἐγὼ ἀποκρίνωμαι ὑπὲρ σοῦ τά γε ἀναγκαῖα, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἶχες; ὥστε κινδυνεύει ὁ Φειδίας ἄπρακτος ἀπεληλυθέναι μάτην ἀναπλάσας τὸν λέοντα· οὐδὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸν Διόνυσον ὦπται λέγων. ἢ πῶς ταῦτα ἐκείνοις ὅμοια; τῷ μὲν γὰρ Φειδίᾳ καὶ σοὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο τοῦ γνωρίζειν τὰ μέρη αἴτιον ἦν ἢ τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ ὅλον, ἄνθρωπον λέγω καὶ λέοντα, ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ δέ, οἷον τῇ Στωϊκῶν, πῶς ἂν ἀπὸ τοῦ μέρους καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἴδοις; ἢ πῶς ἂν ἀποφαίνοιο ὡς καλά; οὐ γὰρ οἶσθα τὸ ὅλον, οὗ μέρη ἐκεῖνά ἐστιν.

Translations (2)

The Scythian or Consul Perseus (Lucian, Vol. 6. Kilburn, Kenneth, translator. London: William Heinemann, Ltd.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959 (unrenewed copyright).) — 55 focus

LYCINUS

Goodness, Hermotimus, how sure you sound when you affirm that you can know the whole from the parts! And yet I remember hearing just the opposite, that if you know the whole you know the part as well, while if you know only the part, it does not follow now that you know the whole. Tell me this: would Phidias when he saw the lion’s claw ever have known that it belonged to a lion, if he had never seen a whole lion? If you saw a human hand, could you have said that it belonged to a man if you had not previously known or seen a man? Why do you not answer? Am I to give the only possible answer for you, that you could not have said it? It looks as though Phidias has retired unsuccessful and has modelled his lion in vain; clearly he is saying what has nothing to do with Dionysus! ¹ Or what comparison is there? Both Phidias and you yourself had no other means of recognising the parts than your knowledge of the whole—I mean the whole man and lion; and in a philosophy (the Stoic, for instance) how can you by knowing a part see the rest as well? How can you prove the rest beautiful? You see, you do not know the whole of which they are parts.

Hermotimus, or the Rival Philosophies Perseus (The Works of Lucian of Samosata, Vol. 2. Fowler, Henry Watson and Fowler, Francis George, translators. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905.) — 55 focus

[55]

Lycinus

Upon my word, how confident you are in your faculty of divining the whole from the parts! and yet I remember being told just the opposite—that knowledge of the whole includes that of the parts, but not vice versa. Well, but tell me; when Phidias saw the claw, would he ever have known it for a lion’s, if he had never seen a lion? Could you have said the hand was a man’s, if you had never known or seen aman? Why are you dumb? Let me make the only possible answer for you—that you could not; I am afraid Phidias has modelled his lion all for — nothing; for it proves to be neither here nor there. What resemblance is there? What enabled you and Phidias to recognize the parts was just your knowledge of the wholes— the lion and the man. But in philosophy—the Stoic, for instance—how will the part reveal the other parts to you, or how can you conclude that they are beautiful? You do not know the whole to which the parts belong.

Notes on the current edition

Σκύθης ἢ πρόξενος

1. ὦπται anon. conjecture: ὦ παῖ MSS.

Lucian of Samosata Hermotimus 55

ed. Kenneth Kilburn

Search the Perseus Catalog for:

Current edition Perseus

Lycinus

Notes on the current edition

Stable identifiers