Soc.
Now what can law be? Let us consider it in this way. Suppose someone had asked us about what was stated just now:
314a
Since you say it is by sight that things seen are seen, what is this sight whereby they are seen? Our answer to him would have been: That sensation which shows objects by means of the eyes. And if he had asked us again: Well then, since it is by hearing that things heard are heard, what is hearing? Our answer to him would have been: That sensation which shows us sounds by means of the ears. In the same way then, suppose he should also ask us: Since it is by law that loyally accepted things are so accepted, what is this law whereby they are so accepted?
314b
Is it some sensation or showing, as when things learnt are learnt by knowledge showing them, or some discovery, as when things discovered are discovered—for instance, the causes of health and sickness by medicine, or the designs of the gods, as the prophets say, by prophecy; for art is surely our discovery of things, is it not?
Com.
Certainly.
Soc.
Then what thing especially of this sort shall we surmise law to be?
Com.
Our resolutions and decrees, I imagine: for how else can one describe law?
314c
So that apparently the whole thing, law, as you put it in your question, is a city’s resolution.
Soc.
State opinion, it seems, is what you call law.
Com.
I do.
Soc.
And perhaps you are right: but I fancy we shall get a better knowledge in this way. You call some men wise?
Com.
I do.
Soc.
And the wise are wise by wisdom?
Com.
Yes.
Soc.
And again, the just are just by justice?
Com.
Certainly.
Soc.
And so the law-abiding are law-abiding by law?
Com.
Yes.
Soc.
And the lawless are lawless by lawlessness?
Com.
Yes.
Soc.
And the law-abiding are just?
Com.
Yes.
Soc.
And the lawless are unjust?
Com.
Unjust.
Soc.
And justice and law are most noble?
Com.
That is so.
Soc.
And injustice and lawlessness most base?
Com.
Yes.
Soc.
And the former preserve cities and everything else, while the latter destroy and overturn them?
Com.
Yes.
Soc.
Hence we must regard law as something noble, and seek after it as a good.
Com.
Undeniably.
Soc.
And we said that law is a city’s resolution?
Com.
So we did.
Soc.
Well now, are not some resolutions good, and others evil?
Com.
Yes, to be sure.
Soc.
And, you know, law was not evil.
Com.
No, indeed.
Soc.
So it is not right to reply, in that simple fashion, that law is a city’s resolution.
Com.
I agree that it is not.
Soc.
An evil resolution, you see, cannot properly be a law.
Com.
No, to be sure.
Soc.
But still, I am quite clear myself that law is some sort of opinion; and since it is not evil opinion, is it not manifest by this time that it is good opinion, granting that law is opinion?
Com.
Yes.
Soc.
But what is good opinion? Is it not true opinion?
Minos. Plato. Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb (Translator). Cambridge, MA. 1927.
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