προσήκοντά γε κτλ.
729 is twice 364 1/2, and Philolaus counted 364 1/2 days, and presumably therefore 364 1/2 nights in the year (Censor.
de die nat. 19). This explains
ἡμέραι καὶ νύκτες. It is not so obvious in what way the number 729 is related to months. On this subject J. and C. remark “12 months in a year: 30 + 1/3 days in a month: 12 x (30 + 1/3)= 364: 2 x 364 1/2=729.” I can see no point in such a calculation. Susemihl on the other hand reminds us that Philolaus believed in a so-called great year of 729 months, and as Plato is following Philolaus in
ἡμέραι καὶ νύκτες, we may reasonably suppose that he does so in the rest of the passage, so that
καὶ μῆνες will be a reference to Philolaus' great year. See Sus.
Gen. Entw. II p. 244 note 3, and on the subject of Philolaus' year of 729 months Zeller^{5} I p. 428 note 3. I have as yet found no evidence for supposing that Philolaus went a step farther and postulated a yet greater year of 729 ordinary years, but the words
καὶ ἐνιαυτοί in Plato make it probable that he did so. On this supposition the full explanation of
προσήκοντα—ἐνιαυτοί will be
πλέον
. See cr. n.
πλέον and not
πλεῖον is the classical form, though both
πλέονι and
πλείονι were admissible (Meisterhans^{3} p. 152). The diphthong
ει (in A^{2}
Π etc.) may therefore be held to favour the reading
πλείονι, which I formerly adopted; but the dative is undeniably awkward, and it is better to acquiesce in
πλέον: cf.
τοσοῦτον ἡδονῇ νικᾷ above.
ἦν δέ που λεγόμενον
. The reference is to II 361 A ff. For
αὐτῷ C. Schmidt conjectured
αὖ οὕτω, which I too hastily adopted in my edition of the text. Glauco and Adimantus are careful in Book II to disclaim the views which they expound; and after
ἦν δέ που λεγόμενον it is easy to refer
αὐτῷ to the hypothetical person (not necessarily Thrasymachus in particular: see II 358 C and 367 A) for whom they speak: cf.
ὁ ἐκεῖνα λέγων presently and
ὁ περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου λέγων (II 360 D), as well as
φήσει λογιζόμενος (ib. 366 A). See also on 590 A.
εἰκόνα πλάσαντες κτλ.
Cf.
Tim. 69 D
—70 E and the picture of the soul in
Phaedr. 246 A
, 253 D ff. We are told by Clement (
Strom. II 20, 1058 C Migne) that Basilides compared man to a wooden horse, peopled by a host of different spirits. The underlying idea of Plato's similitude is that man is a compound of the mortal and the immortal, standing midway between corruptibility and incorruptibility:
θνητῆς καὶ ἀθανάτου φύσεως μεθόριον (Philo
de mund. opif. 46). In the noble lines of George Herbert:
Χιμαίρας κτλ.
The Scholiast thus explains:
ἡ Χίμαιρα τὸ εἶδός ἐστι ‘πρόσθε λέων, ὄπιθεν δὲ δράκων, μέσση δὲ Χίμαιρα’—Σκύλλα δὲ—πρόσωπον ἔχουσα καὶ στέρνα γυναικός, ἐκ λαγόνων δὲ κυνῶν κεφαλὰς ἓξ καὶ πόδας δώδεκα—εἶχε δὲ οὗτος (
Κέρβερος)
τρεῖς μὲν κυνῶν κεφαλάς, οὐρὰν δὲ δράκοντος, κατὰ νώτου δὲ παντοίων ὄφεων εἷχε κεφαλάς .
καὶ ἄλλαι τινὲς κτλ.
: e.g. Hippocentaurs, Gorgons, Pegasus (
Phaedr. 229 D
). The relatival is succeeded by an independent sentence, as often (II 357 B note).
θηρίου ‐‐ πολυκεφάλου
. Cf.
Phaedr. 230 A
θηρίον—Τυφῶνος πολυπλοκώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτεθυμμένον,
Tim. 70 E
(the
ἐπιθυμητικόν as a
θρέμμα ἄγριον) and Arist.
Pol.
Γ 16. 1287^{a} 30
ἥ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον (viz.
θηρίον). For the epithet
ποικίλου see VIII 557 C, 561 E and
πολυειδίαν in 580 D.
ἡμέρων δέ
. Madvig would write
ἡμέρων τε: but
ἡμέρων—ἀγρίων is loosely treated as a new point in the description, although it only elaborates and explains
πολυκεφάλου, and
δέ does not balance the preceding
μέν. So also J. and C.
μέγιστον ‐‐ τὸ πρῶτον
. The
ἐπιθυμητικόν is the largest part of soul: see IV 442 A and II 379 C note
σύναπτε τοίνυν κτλ.
Krohn finds fault with Plato for failing to preserve the essential unity of the individual throughout this comparison (
Pl. St. p. 229). But, according to Plato, the true unity of the individual is realised only through the subjection of the two lower ‘parts’ of soul to the highest (586 E note); and this subjection is described in 589 A, B.