Plato Republic 8.566

Πλάτωνος Πολιτεία . On the name, characters, and date of action of the dialogue, see Introd. §§ 1, 2, 3.

κατέβην κτλ. Dionys. Hal. de comp. verb. p. 208 (Reiske) ὁ δὲ Πλάτων, τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ διαλόγους κτενίζων καὶ βοστρυχίζων, καὶ πάντα τρόπον ἀναπλέκων, οὐ διέλιπεν ὀγδοήκοντα γεγονὼς ἔτη. πᾶσι γὰρ δή που τοῖς φιλολόγοις γνώριμα τὰ περὶ τῆς φιλοπονίας τἀνδρὸς ἱστορούμενα, τά τ’ ἄλλα, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν δέλτον ἣν τελευτήσαντος αὐτοῦ λέγουσιν εὑρεθῆναι ποικίλως μετακειμένην τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς πολιτείας ἔχουσαν τήνδε “κατέβην χθὲς εἰς Πειραιᾶ μετὰ Γλαύκωνος τοῦ Ἀρίστωνος.” See also Quint. VIII 6. 64, and Diog. Laert. III 37. The latter gives as his authorities Euphorion and Panaetius. As Cicero was tolerably familiar with the writings of Panaetius, it is possible that he too has the same story in view in de Sen. V 13, where he says of Plato

The anecdote may well be true, but does not of course justify any inference as to the date of composition of the Republic. See Introd. § 4.

τῇ θεῷ . What goddess? Bendis or Athena? The festival is the Bendideia (354 A) and it is perhaps safest to acquiesce in the usual view that Bendis is here meant. “Alii Minervam intelligunt, quae vulgo ἡ θεὸς appellabatur; neque mihi videtur Socrates in ista Panathenaeorum propinquitate de Minerva veneranda cogitare non potuisse: sed quod simpliciter τὴν ἑορτὴν dicit, numina diversa statuere non sinit” (Schneider). We hear of a temple of Bendis in the Piraeus in 403 B.C. ( τὴν ὁδὸν ἡ φέρει πρός τε τὸ ἱερὸν τῆς Μουνυχίας Ἀρτεμίδος καὶ τὸ Βενδίδειον Xen. Hell. II 4. 11 ). See also Introd. § 3 and App. I.

νῦν πρῶτον . Perhaps 410 B.C. Introd. § 3.

οἱ Θρᾷκες . Probably resident aliens (as opposed to the ἐπιχώριοι or natives), living for commercial purposes in the Piraeus, which at all times contained a large admixture of foreign population. It was part of Athenian policy to encourage commercial settlers by allowing them to exercise their own cults (Foucart des assoc. relig. chez les Grecs p. 131). Foucart holds that the worship of the Thracian goddess Bendis was brought to the Piraeus by Thracian merchants (p. 84). Others have supposed that οἱ Θρᾷκες refers to envoys from Thrace, or Thracian mercenaries, the survivors of those who came to Athens in 414 B.C. (Thuc. VII 27); but the other view is more probable.

τὸ ἄστυ or

ἄστυ 327 C is regular for Athens itself as opposed to the Piraeus. Hartman would omit the article (cf. Lys. 13. 88

): but it occurs infra 328 C, Phaedr. 230 C , Arist. Pol. Ath. 38. 1 and elsewhere.

αὐτός : ‘ ipse’ ‘ erus’ ‘ the master’ as often: cf. e.g. Prot. 314 D οὐ σχολὴ αὐτῷ and the Pythagorean αὐτὸς ἔφα. With the deictic

οὗτος cf. Symp. 175 A Σωκράτης οὗτος—ἕστηκεν, ‘there goes Socrates—standing.’

ἓν λείπεται . See cr. n. ἐλλείπεται (which Hermann and others retain) is less pointed, in view of the two alternatives ἢ—κρείττους γένεσθε ἢ μένετ’ αὐτοῦ. For λείπεται said of the μεταξύ τι ( Symp. 202 A ) or third alternative, cf. Theaet. 188 A ἄλλο γ’ οὐδὲν λείπεται περὶ ἕκαστον πλὴν εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι.

ὡς ‐‐ διανοεῖσθε : ‘well, you may make up your mind that we shall refuse to listen.’ Cf. (with Stallbaum) Crat. 439 C διανοηθέντες—ὡς ἰόντων ἁπάντων ἀεὶ καὶ ῥεόντων.

μὴ is owing to the imperative: cf. Soph. O. C. 1154 and Jebb's note.

λαμπὰς κτλ . λαμπάς was the official name for a torch-race: see Mommsen Heortologie pp. 170 note, 282.

τῇ θεῷ : see on 327 A and App. I.

λαμπάδια : Harpocratio remarks ἣν νῦν ἡμεῖς λαμπάδα καλοῦμεν, οὕτως ὠνόμαζον. But λαμπάς was used for ‘torch’ even in classical Greek. Plato chooses λαμπάδιον because he has just used λαμπάς in a different sense.

διαδωσουσιν κτλ. shews that—except for the novel substitution of mounted competitors for runners—the torch-race in question was of the kind alluded to in Hdt. VIII 98 and elsewhere as held in honour of Hephaestus. The competition was not between one individual and another, but between different lines of competitors, the torch being passed on from man to man. Victory fell to the chain whose torch, still burning, first reached the goal. The well-known figure in Laws 776 B καθάπερ λαμπάδα τὸν βίον παραδιδόντας ἄλλοις ἐξ ἄλλων refers to the same form of race. Plato nowhere mentions the simpler form described by Pausanias (1 30. 2), in which individuals contended against each other: see Baumeister Denkmäler d. kl. Altert. p. 522.

ἄξιον θεάσασθαι . Songs and dances were the leading features in a παννυχίς. See Soph. Ant. 1146 —1152 and Eur. Heracl. 781 —783 ἀνεμόεντι δὲ γᾶς ἐπ’ ὄχθῳ | (the Acropolis) ὀλολύγματα παννυχίοις ὑπὸ παρθένων ἰακχεῖ ποδῶν κρότοισιν (in honour of Athena at the Panathenaea).

ἐξαναστήσομεθα κτλ. The promise is nowhere fulfilled.

μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖτε . Schanz ( Novae Comm. Plat. p. 25) shews that this phrase, which is tolerably frequent in Plato, always occurs in combination with a positive command (here μένετε) except in II 369 B.

εἰς τοῦ Πολεμάρχου . Polemarchus was older than Lysias (infra 331 D), and we are to infer that at this time Cephalus lived with him. There is no reason why we should (with Blass Att. Ber. p. 338) reject Plato's statement that Polemarchus had a house in the Piraeus: the words of Lysias (12. 16), which Blass relies upon as shewing that Polemarchus lived not in the Piraeus, but in Athens, refer to 404 B.C. and do not prove it even for that year. Lysias probably lived at this time in a house of his own in the Piraeus, as in 404 B.C. ( Lys. 12. 8 ): it is to be noted that he is mentioned along with the visitors, in contrast with Cephalus ( ἦν δ’ ἔνδον κτλ. —τεθυκὼς γὰρ ἐτύγχανεν ἐν τῇ αὐλῇ infra C). Cf. Boeckh Kl. Schr. IV p. 475 note 1 and Shuckburgh Lys. Orat. ed. 2 p. xii.

διὰ χρόνου ‐‐ αὐτόν . καί ‘indeed’ goes with the whole clause: cf. Soph. Ant. 1253 ἀλλ’ εἰσόμεσθα μή τι καὶ κατάσχετον | κρυφῇ καλύπτει καρδίᾳ θυμουμένη with Jebb's note. Tucker translates ‘for it was some time since I had so much as seen him’—throwing, I think, too much emphasis on καί.

προσκεφαλαίου τε καὶ δίφρου : virtually a hendiadys, as Hartman remarks, comparing Homer Il. IX 200 εἷσεν δ’ ἐν κλισμοῖσι τάπησί τε πορφυρέοισιν. It is somewhat fanciful to suppose (with Hartman) that Plato throughout this picture was thinking of the aged Nestor seated among his sons ( Od. III 32 ff.). τινος adds a touch of vagueness: ‘a sort of combination of cushion and chair’ (Tucker).

τεθυκὼς γάρ explains ἐστεφανωμένος: “coronati sacrificabant, ut satis constat” Stallbaum. The God to whom Cephalus had been sacrificing was doubtless Ζεὺς ἑρκεῖος, whose altar stood in the αὐλή.

οὐδὲ ‐‐ Πειραιᾶ . A negative must be supplied, “ut amice expostulabundus cum Socrate senex hoc dicere videatur: tu neque alia facis, quae debebas, neque nostram domum frequentas. Simili ellipsi nostrates: Du kommst auch nicht oft zu uns” (Schneider). οὐδέ is ‘also not’: for exx. see Riddell Digest of Platonic Idioms § 141 and Jebb on Soph. O. C. 590 f. οὐδέ in οὐδὲ πάνυ ῥᾴδιον IX 587 C is another instance, in which, as here, the idiom has a kind of colloquial effect. Stallbaum takes οὐδέ with θαμίζεις “ne ventitas quidem ad nos, h. e. raro sane domum nostram frequentas”; but his equation hardly holds good, and is not justified by Xen. Symp. 4. 23. where οὐδέ coheres closely with the emphatic σοῦ. Others have suspected corruption, proposing οὔ τι (Ast, cf. Od. V 88 πάρος γε μὲν οὔ τι θαμίζεις), οὐ δέ (Nitzsch), or οὐ δή (Hartman). οὔ τι is very unlikely; for θαμίζω is not exclusively a poetic word (cf. Laws 843 B), and we need not suppose that Plato is thinking of Homer. I agree with Hartman that οὐ δέ is improbable: δέ is not sufficiently explained by saying that it is “adversative to the idea contained in ἠσπάζετο” (J. and C., with Schneider Additamenta p. 2). None of the cases quoted by Sauppe Ep. Crit. ad G. Hermannum p. 77 ( Ar. Knights 1302 , Hdt. IX 108, Theogn. 659, 887, 1070 and Callinus I 2) seem to me to justify the change of οὐδέ to οὐ δέ. Hartman's correction is better: but I believe the text is sound.

μὴ οὖν κτλ. To this sentence Lach. 181 B C furnishes a near parallel. νεανίαις refers to Socrates' companions who had come from Athens, as opposed to Cephalus, Polemarchus and the others; the emphasis, as often, being on the καί clause: ‘associate with these young men, but come and visit us also.’ So also Boeckh Kl. Schr. IV p. 475. There is no sufficient reason for reading νεανίσκοις (with II and other MSS): see Introd. § 3.

καὶ μὴν κτλ. : ‘Indeed, Cephalus,’ etc. γε need not be added (with II and other MSS) after χαίρω: cf. Phaed. 84 D καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τἀληθῆ σοι ἐρῶ, Euthyd. 275 E 304 C al., with Jebb on Soph. O. T. 749 , 1005.

τραχεῖα καὶ χαλεπή κτλ. The language (as Ast observes) is perhaps suggested by Hesiod OD. 290 ff. μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρθιος οἶμος ἐς αὐτὴν | καὶ τρηχὺς τὸ πρῶτον· ἐπὴν δ’ εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηται, | ῥηιδίη δὴ ἔπειτα πέλει, χαλεπή περ ἐοῦσα. Cf. II 364 D note

ἐπὶ γήραος οὐδῷ . The phrase occurs first in the Iliad (XXII 60, XXIV 487) to denote the natural limit of the life of man. Cephalus is μάλα πρεσβύτης 328 B. The same meaning suits also in Od. XV 246 ( οὐδ’ ἵκετο γήραος οὐδόν) 348 and XXIII 212, Hymn. Aphr. 106, Hes. OD. 331, Hdt. III 14 and elsewhere. Leaf can hardly (I think) be right in explaining οὐδῷ as= ὁδῷ in Il. XXII 60. γήραος is a descriptive genitive (like τέλος γήραος ἀργαλέου Mimn. Fr. 2. 6, τοῦ λογου in δόλιχον—not δολιχὸν—τοῦ λόγου Prot. 329 A ), old age being itself the threshold by which we leave the House of Life. We enter as it were by one door and pass out by another. The idea underlying the phrase may be compared with Democritus' ὁ κόσμος σκηνή, ὁ βίος πάροδος· ἠλθες, εἶδες, ἀπῆλθες (Mullach Fr. Phil. Gr. I p. 356).

χαλεπὸν κτλ . χαλεπόν is neuter on account of τοῦτο in ὅ τί σοι φαίνεται τοῦτο, and τοῦ βίου is a simple partitive genitive: cf. Xen. Mem. I 6. 4 ἐπισκεψώμεθα τί χαλεπὸν ᾔσθησαι τοὐμοῦ βίου. I cannot agree with Tucker in rendering ‘disagreeable in respect of the sort of life.’ Ast takes χαλεπόν as masc. (comparing cases like III 416 B τὴν μεγίστην τῆς εὐλαβείας), but αὐτό shews that he is wrong. Translate simply ‘whether it is a painful period of life.’ It is needless to insert (with Hartman) τι after χαλεπόν: still worse is Liebhold's addition of τέλος.

ἐξαγγέλλεις : like the ἐξάγγελος in tragedy, Cephalus is the bearer of news from behind the scenes.

παροιμίαν . ἥλιξ ἥλικα τέρπει ( Phaedr. 240 C ).

ξυνιόντες : i.q. ὅταν ξυνίωσιν ‘whenever they come together.’ Such a use of the participle is admissible when the main verb is in the present of habitual action. ξυνόντες is a needless conjecture.

οὐδὲ ζῶντες . Soph. Ant. 1165 —1167 τὰς γὰρ ἡδονὰς | ὅταν προδῶσιν ἄνδρες, οὐ τίθημ’ ἐγὼ | ζῆν τοῦτον, ἀλλ’ ἔμψυχον ἡγοῦμαι νεκρόν. Cf. also Mimn. Fr. I. 1 ff.: Sim. Fr. 71 τίς γὰρ ἁδονᾶς ἄτερ<*> θνατῶν βίος ποθεινός: Eur. Fr. 1065 . Similar sentiments are very common throughout Greek literature, especially in poetry.

ἔτι ‐‐ συγγίγνεσθαι . These words are rejected by Hirschig, Cobet, and Hartman, but their genuineness is supported by the singular αὐτό in αὐτὸ ἀπέφυγον and by Plut. περὶ φιλοπλουτίας 5. 525 A ὁ Σοφοκλῆς ἐρωτηθεὶς εἰ δύναται γυναικὶ πλησιάζειν, Εὐφήμει, ἄνθρωπε, εἶπεν κτλ. In such matters Greek realism called a spade a spade. In spite of the anecdote here told, few writers have painted sadder pictures of old age than Sophocles: see for example O. C. 1235— 1238 and Fr. 684. More in keeping with the present passage is Fr. 688 οὐκ ἔστι γῆρας τῶν σοφῶν, ἐν οἷς ὁ νοῦς | θείᾳ ξύνεστιν ἡμέρᾳ τεθραμμένος.

ἀπέφυγον ‐‐ ἀποφυγών . The repetition adds a certain impressiveness to the sentence. Herwerden is in error when he ejects ἀποφυγών, which seems to have been read also by Plutarch (referred to in last note).

κατατείνουσαι is intransitive. If the meaning were (as Ast holds) transitive —man being conceived as the puppet of the desires cf. Laws 644 E—we should expect ἐπι‐ or συν‐ rather than κατατείνουσαι: see Phaed. 94 C and 98 D.

παντάπασιν κτλ. The impressive iteration is in keeping with the age and earnestness of the speaker: cf. 331 A, B.

ἐστι . Stallbaum and others eject this word, but it is not easy to see why a scribe should have inserted it, particularly in such an idiomatic position. The asyndeton before δεσποτων is regular in explanatory clauses. I read ἐστι (with A) in preference to ἔστι: the meaning ‘is possible’ does not suit, and would require ἀπαλλαγῆναι rather than ἀπηλλάχθαι. Translate ‘it is the deliverance once and for all from tyrants full many and furious.’ The grammatical subject, as in English, remains vague; it is involved in ἐπειδὰν —χαλάσωσιν. For the use of ἐστι cf. Euthyphr. 2 D φαίνεταί μοι—ἄρχεσθαι ὀρθῶς· ὀρθῶς γάρ ἐστι τῶν νέων πρότερον ἐπιμεληθῆναι. The sentence-accent falls on πολλῶν and μαινομένων and not on ἐστι. The view of old age presented here recalls the μελέτη θανάτου of the Phaedo.

εὔκολοι . Like Sophocles himself: ὁ δ’ εὔκολος μὲν ἐνθάδ’ , εὔκολος δ’ ἐκεῖ ( Ar. Frogs 82 ).

ἐκίνουν . κινεῖν ‘rouse’ is technical in the Socratic dialect for the stimulating of the intellect by interrogation: cf. (with Stallbaum) Lys. 223 A , Xen. Mem. IV 2. 2. See also Ar. Clouds 745 .

οὐ μέντοι γε . The collocation μέντοι γε, which rarely occurs in good Greek, is condemned by Porson (on Eur. Med. 675 ) and others. In Plato it is found only here and in Crat. 424 C , [ Sisyph.] 388 A. Here some inferior MSS omit γε. It would be easy (with Hoefer de particulis Plat. p. 38, Cobet, and Blaydes) to write οὐ μέντοι ὅσον γε, but “notanda talia potius quam mutanda.” The idiom, though exceptional, is (in my judgment) sufficiently supported (see the instances cited by Blaydes on Ar. Thesm. 709 ). It should also perhaps be remembered that the speaker, Cephalus, was not a native Athenian. Cf. 331 B E notes

τὸ τοῦ Θεμιστοκλέους . The story as told by Herodotus VIII 125 is probably more true, if less pointed: ὡς δὲ ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος ἀπίκετο (sc. Θεμιστοκλῆς) ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας, ἐνθαῦτα Τιμόδημος Ἀφι<*>ναῖος—φθόνῳ καταμαργέων ἐνείκεε τὸν Θεμιστοκλέα—ὡς διὰ τὰς Ἀθήνας ἔχοι τὰ γέρεα τὰ παρὰ Λακεδαιμονίων, ἀλλ) οὐ δἰ ἑωυτόν. ὁ δὲ—εἶπε· οὕτω ἔχει τοι· οὔτ) ἂν ἐγὼ ἐὼν Βελβινίτης (Belbina was a small island about 2 miles south of Sunium) ἐτιμήθην οὕτω πρὸς Σπαρτιητέων, οὔτ’ ἂν σὺ ὤνθρωπε ἐὼν Ἀθηναῖος. The changes are not due to Plato: for τῷ in τῷ Σεριφίῳ—for which Heindorf on Charm. 155 D wrongly suggests τῳ, like Cicero's Seriphio cuidam ( Cato Mai. 8)—shews that Plato's form of the story was also familiar. The Platonic version, in which Belbina has become Seriphus, and Themistocles' detractor a Seriphian, afterwards held the field.

καὶ τοῖς δή . καί is ‘also’ and δή illative.

εὔκολος ‐‐ ἑαυτῷ . The dative is used as with εὐμενής: cf. Ar. Frogs 359 μηδ’ εὔκολός ἐστι πολίταις (v.l. πολίτης). To suit the application precisely to the story we should require (1) neither would the ἐπιεικής easily endure old age with poverty, (2) nor the μὴ ἐπιεικής easily endure old age with riches. For (2) Plato substitutes ‘nor would the bad man ever attain to peace with himself by becoming rich’; thereby conveying the further idea that the bad man is not εὔκολος ἑαυτῷ under any circumstances or at any time. Richards' suggestion ἐν αὐτῷ (i.e. γήρᾳ) for ἑαυτῷ is neat, but loses sight of this additional point. The allusion to old age in the second clause, so far as it is necessary to allude to it, is contained in ποτε.

ποἶ ἐπεκτησάμην κτλ. : ‘do you want to know what I acquired, Socrates?’ ποῖα is simply ‘what’ as in Men. 87 E σκεψώμεθα δὴ καθ’ ἕκαστον ἀναλαμβάνοντες, π οῖά ἐστιν ἃ ἡμᾶς ὠφελεῖ. ὑγίειά φαμεν καὶ ἰσχὺς καὶ κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος δή· ταῦτα λέγομεν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὠφέλιμα, and in the usual τὰ ποῖα ταῦτα; There is no derision implied, as in ποῖος Κτήσιππος ( Euthyd. 291 A ) and the like: had Cephalus desired to pour scorn on the suggestion, he would have said πόθεν ἐπεκτησάμην; (cf. Crat. 398 E ): and it would be absurd to deride a charge to which you at once plead guilty ( γέγονα χρηματιστής κτλ.). If Socrates' question had been not πότερον—τὰ πλείω παρέλαβες ἢ ἐπεκτήσω, but ποῖα ἐπεκτήσω, Cephalus would have said ὁποῖα ἐπεκτησάμην: but this idiom is inadmissible, except where the same interrogative occurs in its direct form in the original question. In view of the answer ( μέσος τις κτλ.) which Cephalus gives, πόσα for ποῖα would be too precise. Of the various emendations which have been suggested, the only plausible one (in point of sense) is Richards' πότερον for ποἶ or ποῖ: this would assimilate the original and the repeated question, but is less well adapted to Cephalus' reply. Cephalus in point of fact uses an old man's privilege and accommodates his interrogator's question to his own reply. See also V 465 E note

Λυσανίας δέ . Groen van Prinsterer's suggestion ( Platon. Prosopogr. p. 111) Λυσίας for Λυσανίας is at first sight plausible, since it is in harmony with the well-known Greek custom of calling grandsons after their grandfathers: but the fashion was by no means invariable: see Blümner, Gr. Privatalterth. p. 284. [Plut.] vit. Lys. 835 C also calls Cephalus son of Lysanias.

τούτοισιν . Bekker and others read τουτοισί, but there is no reason for deserting the MSS. The archaic dative in ‐οισι is tolerably often used by Plato. In the Republic alone it recurs in 345 E, 388 D, 389 B, 468 D (Homer), 560 E, 564 C, 607 B ( ‐αισι) (poetic): see also Schneider on III 389 B, and for the usage of inscriptions Meisterhans^{3} p. 126. In this particular passage the archaic ending suits the age of the speaker; but it should be remembered that Plato's style (at least in his more mature dialogues) is not a mere reproduction of the vernacular Attic, but also in no small measure a literary language or ‘Kunstsprache,’ in which Ionisms and poetic and archaic forms are occasionally employed: see especially Hirzel Der Dialog I pp. 246—250 notes Hirzel (ib. p. 34 note 1) gives reasons for holding that a sort of κοινὴ διάλεκτος, resembling the dialect of Herodotus, was actually spoken in certain cultivated circles at Athens in the Periclean age, e.g. by Anaxagoras and his group, by the Ionian sophists and their followers etc., and some of Plato's Ionisms may be inherited from this source. Cf. VII 533 B note

οὗ τοι ἕνεκα ‐‐ ὅτι . The reading τούτου for οὗ, though supported by Stobaeus ( Flor. 94. 22), is a correction made by some one unacquainted with the idiom, which is common enough in conversational style: cf. infra 491 B ὃ μὲν πάντων θαυμαστότατον ἀκοῦσαι, ὅτι κτλ. and Ar. Frogs 108 . Hartman's τοῦ τοι (interrogative) is ingenious, but unnecessary.

διπλῇ ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι . The meaning is simply ‘twice as much as the others’: cf. e.g. Laws 868 A διπλῇ τὸ βλάβος ἐκτεισάτω and 928 B ζημιούτω— διπλῇ. The ἤ is like ἤ after διπλάσιος, πολλαπλάσιος etc. If διπλῇ meant simply ‘on two grounds,’ it could not be followed by ἤ, and we should have to regard ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι as an interpolation. Cephalus expresses himself somewhat loosely, as if loving a thing on two grounds, or in two ways, were equivalent to loving it twice as much. ταύτῃ below is defined by the ὥσπερ clause, and is preferred to ὥσπερ, partly in order to correspond to διπλῇ but stiil more to suit κατὰ τὴν χρείαν. The present passage is through Aristotle ( Eth. Nic. IV 2. 1120^{b} 14, cf. ib. IX 7. 1168^{a} 1—3) the source of the proverb about ‘parents and poets.’

ξυγγενέσθαι : ‘to meet’ in social intercourse, as in Ap. 41 A . ξυγγίγνεσθαι (suggested by Richards) would express habitual intercourse, which is not what Plato means to say. With the sentiment cf. Symp. 173 C ὅταν μέν τινας περὶ φιλοσοφίας λόγους ἢ αὐτὸς ποιῶμαι ἢ ἄλλων ἀκούω—ὑπερφυῶς ὡς χαίρω· ὅταν δὲ ἀλλους τινάς, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοὺς ὑμετέρους τοὺς τῶν πλουσίων καὶ χρηματιστικῶν, αὐτός τε ἄχθομαι ὑμᾶς τε τοὺς ἑταίρους ἐλεῶ, ὅτι οἴεσθε τὶ ποιεῖν οὐδὲν ποιοῦντες.

ἐπειδὰν ‐‐ τελευτήσειν : ‘when a man faces the thought that he must die,’ not (with Jowett) ‘when a man thinks himself to be near death,’ which would be ἐπειδάν τις ἐγγὺς εἶναι οἴηται τοῦ τελευτῆσαι, as Herwerden proposes to read (cf. Laws 922 C ὅταν ἤδη μέλλειν ἡγώμεθα τελευτᾶν). “Senum, non iuvenum τὸ οἴεσθαι τελευτήσειν est” (Hartman): the weakness of old age convinces us at last that we too must die. Cf. Simon. 85. 7—10 θνητῶν δ’ ὄφρα τις ἄνθος ἔχῃ πολυήρατον ἥβης | κοῦφον ἔχων θυμόν, πόλλ’ ἀτέλεστα νοεῖ· | οὔτε γὰρ ἐλπίδ’ ἔχει γηρασέμεν οὔτε θανεῖσθαι, | οὐδ’ ὑγιὴς ὅταν ᾖ, φροντίδ’ ἔχει καμάτου .

ἀδικήσαντα ‐‐ διδόναι δίκην . Plato is fond of this verbal play: cf Euthyph. 8 B and 8 E τῷ γε ἀδικοῦντι δοτέον δίκην. He who does not render justice in deeds must render justice in punishment: for the tale of justice must be made up. Note that we have here in ἀδικία and δίκη the first casual allusion to the subject of the Republic.

αὐτὸς κτλ . αὐτός= ipse s. ultro as opposed to οἱ λεγόμενοι μῦθοι. The verb is to be supplied by a kind of zeugma from μᾶλλόν τι καθορᾷ αὐτά (i.e. τὰ ἐκεῖ; or rather the predicate is accommodated to the second alternative. Cf. 344 B infra and VIII 553 C. To regard the bodily weakness of old age as in itself the cause of clearer vision of the world beyond may be in harmony with the doctrine of the Phaedo, but Cephalus is not represented as a Platonist. Tucker needlessly doubts the text.

καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὕπνων κτλ . καί is ‘both,’ not ‘and,’ and balances καὶ ζῇ: ‘many a time, like children, awakes out of sleep in terror and lives in the expectation of ill.’ For ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες compare Phaed. 77 D , E, and for the general sentiment Arist. Eth. Nic. I 13. 1102^{b} 8—11 ἀργία γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ὕπνος τῆς φυχῆς ᾗ λέγεται σπουδαία καὶ φαύλη, πλὴν ε<*> πῃ κατὰ μικρὸν διικνοῦνταί τινες τῶν κινήσεων, καὶ ταύτῃ βελτίω γίνεται τὰ φαντάσματα τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἢ τῶν τυχόντων.

ἡδεῖα ‐‐ γηροτρόφος . ἡδεῖα is suggested by Pindar's γλυκεῖα, and καὶ ἀγαθή, as presently appears, is not part of the quotation, but goes with ἐλπίς and is added by Plato in contrast to μετὰ κακῆς ἐλπίδος.

γηροτρόφος κτλ. : ‘to nurse him in old age, as Pindar also says.’ γηροτρόφος is best taken by itself and not with ἀγαθή .

ἀτάλλοισα κτλ . ἀτάλλω is used of rearing children, and helps out the idea of γηροτρόφος: δὶς παῖδες οἱ γέροντες. It is not clear how the fragment is to be arranged, nor to what class of Pindar's poems it belongs. See Bergk Poet. Lyr. Gr.^{4} I p. 452.

εὖ οὖν ‐‐ σφόδρα . The emphasis is quite in keeping with Cephalus' age and character; and Hartman is certainly wrong in condemning the clause: cf. 329 C, 331 B.

ὀφείλοντα ‐‐ θεῷ θυσίας τινάς . Phaed. 118 A εἶπεν, ὃ δὴ τελευταῖον ἐφθέγξατο, ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὀφείλομεν ἀλεκτρυόνα· ἀλλὰ ἀπόδοτε καὶ μὴ ἀμελήσητε. Wealth is in Cephalus' view the indispensable χορηγία ἀρετῆς.

ἀλλά γε ἓν ἀνθ) ἑνός . ἀλλά γε is extremely rare in Attic prose: in the Platonic corpus it occurs—according to the best manuscript authority—here and in Rep. VIII 543 C, Phaed. 86 E , Hipp. Maior 287 B, Phaedr. 262 A ( ἀλλά γε δή), Phaed. 116 D (id.). In some of these passages ἀλλ’ ἄγε has been conjectured — wrongly, as I think (with Schneider), at all events in the passage from the Republic:—but ἀλλ’ ἄγε cannot be read in the Phaedrus and Hippias Maior. There is no a priori objection to the collocation, which is also implied in ἀλλὰ γάρ ( γ’ ἄρα); and in later Greek ἀλλά γε aroused no objection. The meaning is ‘but still,’ originally ‘yes, but’: as Schneider says, “ γε in his dictionibus concedit aliquatenus praecedentia, sed magis urget sequentia.” There is perhaps also a dramatic motive for putting ἀλλά γε into the mouth of Cephalus: see on οὐ μέντοι γε in 329 E. Against the reading of Stobaeus ( Flor. 94. 22) ἀλλὰ ἕν γε ἀνθ’ ἑνός, we may urge the further objection that the idiomatic phrase ἓν ἀνθ’ ἑνός (‘setting one thing against another,’ as Jowett correctly translates it) seems to depend for its peculiar force (like μόνος μόνῳ and the like) on the juxtaposition of its two parts: cf. Phil. 63 B ( ἓν ἀνθ’ ἑνός) and Laws 705 B ( ἀνθ’ ἑνὸς ἕν). The passage quoted by Stallbaum from Euripides Orest. 651 ἓν μὲν τόδ’ ἡμῖν ἀνθ’ ἑνὸς δοῦναί σε χρή is quite different and does not mean ‘hoc praecipue,’ but ‘one thing in return for one thing,’ as is clear from lines 646 f.

οὐκ ἐλάχιστον is not adverbial (as Hartman and others suppose), but belongs to τοῦτο: ‘setting one thing against another, I should regard this as not the least important object for which wealth is most useful to a man of sense.’ The emphasis is characteristic: cf. 329 C, 331 A.

τὴν ἀλήθειαν κτλ. This theory of justice or righteousness is deduced from the words of Cephalus: τὸ γὰρ μηδὲ ἄκοντά τινα ἐξαπατῆσαι ἢ ψεύσασθαι being generalised into ἀλήθειαν (truthfulness, cf. τἀληθῆ λέγειν below), and μηδ’ αὖ ὀφείλοντα ἢ θεῷ θυσίας τινὰς ἢ ἀνθρώπῳ χρήματα into ἀποδιδόναι ἄν τίς τι παρά του λάβῃ. Cf. (with Wohlrab) Mimn. Fr. 8 ἀληθείη δὲ παρέστω | σοὶ καὶ ἐμοί, πάντων χρῆμα δικαιότατον. It is simply Truth and Honesty, the two chief ingredients in the popular conception of morality.

ἁπλῶς οὕτως : ‘quite without qualification.’ For this idiomatic οὕτως cf. ῥᾳδιως οὕτω II 377 B note

οἷον τοιόνδε λέγω . Similar points of casuistry are raised in Socrates' conversation with Euthydemus ap. Xen. Mem. IV 2 12 ff.

οὐδ’ αὖ κτλ. I have removed the comma before οὐδέ, because the ὁ in ὁ ἀποδιδούς covers both participles, the person in both cases being the same.

ἔφη . There is not sufficient reason for changing the best supported reading ἔφη, ἐγω to ἔφην ἐγώ. Polemarchus is throughout the introduction represented as a vivacious person: e.g. in ὁρᾷς οὖν ἡμᾶς—ὅσοι ἐσμέν (327 C), and in the lively emphasis with which he breaks in just above: πάνυ μὲν οὖν—εἴπερ γέ τι χρὴ Σιμωνίδῃ πείθεσθαι. True to his name, he is first to mingle in the fray. It is this φιλολογία on the part of his son which draws a smile from Cephalus: over-much προθυμία always struck the Greeks as laughable: cf. e.g. Eur. Ion 1172 ff. The words in which Socrates addresses Polemarchus σὺ ὁ τοῦ λόγου κληρονόμος are also somewhat more appropriate if the title was self-chosen. Cephalus leaves the argument to be carried on by the assembled company (for ὑμῖν does not mean Polemarchus and Socrates alone): whereupon Polemarchus, seizing hold on the word παραδίδωμι in its sense of ‘transmit,’ ‘bequeath,’ playfully claims the right to inherit his λόγος as Cephalus' eldest son and heir. It may be added that ἔφη ἐγώ was much more likely to be changed to ἔφην ἐγώ than vice versa. With the Greek compare Phaed. 89 C ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐμέ, ἔφη, τὸν Ἰόλεων παρακάλει.

ἅμα ᾔει πρὸς τὰ ἱερά . Soph. Fr. 206 γήρᾳ πρεπόντως σῷζε την εὐφημίαν. The editors quote Cicero Epp. ad Att. IV 16. 3 “credo Platonem vix putasse satis consonum fore, si hominem id aetatis in tam longo sermone diutius retinuisset.” Cf. the words of Theodorus in Theaet. 162 B οἶμαι ὑμᾶς πείσειν ἐμὲ μὲν <*>ᾶν θεᾶσθαι καὶ μὴ ἕλκειν πρὸς τὸ γυμνάσιον, σκληρὸν ἤδη ὄντα, τῷ δὲ δὴ νεωτέρῳ τε<*>καὶ ὑγροτέρῳ ὄντι προσπαλαίειν. It is worthy of note that the entrance and exit of Cephalus are alike associated with the services of religion: see 328 C and Introd. § 2.

ὁ τοῦ λόγου κληρονόμος . See on παῖδες ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός II 368 A.

τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ‐‐ ἐστι . Probably some current saying attributed to Simonides: there is nothing like it in his fragments. The words do not profess to be a definition of justice: if they did, τό would appear before δίκαιον. It is not likely that Simonides himself explained this particular saying as Polemarchus does, although he would not have disapproved of the explanation. In Xen. Hier. II 2 he is represented as saying that tyrants are ἱκανώτατοι—κακῶσαι μὲν ἐχθρούς, ὀνῆσαι δὲ φίλους. The words of Socrates σὺ μέν, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, ἴσως γιγνώσκεις, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγνοῶ tend to fix the responsibility of the explanation on Polemarchus alone. Probably Simonides (if the saying is his) meant no more than that we should ‘render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's.’ Plato virtually confesses in 332 B that his interpretation is forced.

ἔμοιγε : said with confidence, as Σιμωνίδῃ γε with emphasis and some mockery: with you one might disagree, but not with Simonides.

σοφὸς ‐‐ θεῖος . Cf. Prot. 315 E . σοφός and θεῖος were fashionable words of praise: in the mouth of Socrates they are generally ironical. Plato's own connotation of the word θεῖος is given in Men. 99 C οὐκοῦν, ὦ Μένων, ἄξιον τούτους θείους καλεῖν τοὺς ἄνδρας, οἵτινες νοῦν μὴ ἔχοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα κατορθοῦσιν ὧν πράττουσι καὶ λέγουσιν; Ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοῖμεν θείους τε, οὓς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν χρησμῳδοὺς καὶ μάντεις καὶ τοὺς ποιητικοὺς ἅπαντας· καὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς οὐχ ἥκιστα τούτων φαῖμεν ἂν θείους τε εἶναι καὶ ἐνθουσιάζειν, ἐπίπνους ὄντας καὶ κατεχομένους ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅταν κατορθῶσι λέγοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πράγματα, μηδὲν εἰδότες ὦν λέγουσι.

ἀνήρ . I formerly read ἁνήρ, but ἀνὴρ (in the predicate) is satisfactory enough: cf. Men. 99 D θεῖος ἀνήρ, φασίν, οὗτος.

παρακαταθεμένου κτλ. Xen. Cyr. I 6. 31 ff. καὶ ἔτι προβὰς (sc. ἐπὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων προγόνων γενόμενός ποτε ἀνὴρ διδάσκαλος τῶν παίδων ) ταῦτα ἐδίδασκεν ὡς καὶ τοὺς φίλους δίκαιον εἴη ἐξαπατᾶν, ἐπί γε ἀγαθῷ, καὶ κλέπτειν τὰ τῶν φίλων, ἐπί γε ἀγαθῷ: Mem. IV 2. 17 ff.

ὁτῳοῦν is to be taken with παρακαταθεμένου and not with ἀπαιτοῦντι.

καίτοι γε ὀφειλόμενον . There is the same dispute about καίτοι γε as about μέντοι γε and ἀλλά γε (see on 329 E, 331 B). καίτοι γε has the best MS authority in its favour here and in IV 440D: elsewhere in Plato it is not well-attested except in the νοθευόμενοι, where it occurs Min. 318 E , Axioch. 364 B , 368 E. καίτοι γε is also found occasionally in Aristophanes, Xenophon, Aristotle, and the orators: see Blaydes on Ar. Ach. 611 , and the Lex. Arist. Many distinguished critics would emend the idiom everywhere; but the instances are far too numerous for such a drastic policy. The difference between καίτοι ὀφειλόμενόν γε που (which Hoefer de part. Plat. p. 38 would read) and καίτοι γε ὀφειλόμενον would seem to be that in the former more stress is thrown on the word ὀφειλόμενον, in the latter on τοι. καίτοι γε is ‘and surely’ rather than ‘quamquam’ (as Kugler holds de part. τοι eiusque comp. ap. Pl. usu p. 20), cf. IV 440 D note The periphrasis ὀφειλόμενον—ἐστι is used of course to correspond to τὰ ὀφειλόμενα in E above: such periphrases (the principle of which is explained in Euthyph. 9 E ff.) are extremely common in Plato. See W. J. Alexander in A. J. Ph. IV pp. 299 ff.

ἀποδοτέον ‐‐ ἀπαιτοῖ : ‘well, but we were not on any account to make restoration at the time when the claimant is’—according to the Greek idiom ‘was’ —‘mad.’ Socrates, as in ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, is appealing to the admissions made by the πατὴρ τοῦ λόγου (in 331 C), as he is justified in doing when addressing his heir. ὁπότε is not—as τότε shews —the particle of ‘indefinite frequency,’ but stands for ὅτε of the direct: the whole clause τότε ὁπότε τις μὴ σωφρόνως ἀπαιτοῖ is thus in the oratio obliqua of self-quotation and exactly corresponds to εἰ μανεὶς ἀπαιτοῖ in 331 C. Madvig's ἀπαιτεῖ for ἀπαιτοῖ is therefore unnecessary. Goodwin MT. p. 213 explains the optative otherwise, but not (I think) rightly.

ἀγαθὸν μέν τι δρᾶν sc. αὐτούς, for τοῖς φίλοις depends on ὀφείλειν, to which τοὺς φίλους is the subject.

μανθάνω ‐‐ ὅτι . ὅτι is ‘because,’ not ‘that,’ as always (I believe) in Plato's use of this phrase: cf. Euthyph. 3 B , 9 B and infra III 402 E, VIII 568 E. For the sentiment cf. (with J. and C.) Xen. Mem. IV 2 17 ff.

ὀφείλεται δέ . See cr. n. In explanatory clauses of this kind δέ and not δέ γε is the correct usage: cf. infra 337 D, 344 A. I therefore follow Bekker in reading δέ.

προσήκει . ὀφειλόμενον has thus been equated with προσῆκον by means of the special cases τὸ τοῖς φίλοις ὀφειλόμενον and τὸ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ὀφειλόμενον. τὸ προσῆκον is a more general term and is the regular word in classical Greek for ‘proper conduct’ or ‘duty’ (as the Greeks conceived it), the Stoic καθῆκον being very rarely used in this sense by good authors.

ᾐνίξατο ‐‐ ποιητικῶς . Theaet. 194 C τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κέαρ, ὃ ἔφη Ὅμηρος αἰνιττόμενος τὴν τοῦ κηροῦ ὁμοιότητα. The present passage is no more serious than that in the Theaetetus: Plato knew that Simonides merely meant to say ‘it is just to render what you owe.’

ἀλλὰ τί ὄει ; is a rhetorical question, which needs and receives no answer, like τί μήν; and τί μὴν δοκεῖς; ( Theaet. 162 B ). It is equivalent to ‘of course.’ For the use of τί Stallbaum compares Gorg. 480 B τί γὰρ δὴ φῶμεν; to which there is also no reply. This explanation is preferable to that of Madvig, who gives ἀλλὰ τί οἴει to Socrates, and takes ἔφη as equivalent to συνέφη— a harsh usage in a narrated dialogue, and not likely to have been intended by Plato, because sure to be misunderstood. Liebhold's ἄλλο τι οἴει; <οὐκ> ἔφη has everything against it.

ὦ πρὸς Διὸς κτλ. ‘In the name of heaven, said I, if any one then had asked him’ etc. ‘what reply do you think he would have made to us?’ ὦ before πρὸς Διός is (as Schanz holds) an interjection, and does not require a vocative to follow it: cf. Euthyd. 287 A , 290 E. It is tempting (with Tucker) to take ὦ πρὸς Διός as part of the address to Simonides (cf. Euthyd. 294 B ὦ πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε—αὐτὼ τῷ ὄντι πάντα ἐπίστασθον). But on this view the presence of εἰ οὖν—ἤρετο forms a difficulty, and ὦ πρὸς Διός may very well go with τί ἂν οἴει— ἀποκρίνασθαι.

ὀφειλόμενον καὶ προσῆκον . It is characteristic of Plato to combine the thing explained and the explanation itself in this way: see my note on Prot. 314 A . Here ὀφειλόμενον is necessary to enable Simonides to recognise his own saying.

ἰατρικὴ ‐‐ μαγειρική . In Gorg. 463 A ff. Plato refuses the name of ‘art’ to ὀψοποιική: it is but an ἐμπειρία or τριβή, a sort of bastard adjunct to ἰατρική, as κομμωτική is to γυμναστική. Here, where less precision is required, both are regarded as τέχναι.

εἶεν according to Timaeus ( Lexicon s. v.) expresses συγκατάθεσις μὲν τῶν εἰρημένων, συναφὴ δὲ πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα. It rarely expresses συγκατάθεσις (‘assent’) and no more: see on IV 436 C. The word was pronounced εἶἑν with intervocalic aspiration (Uhlig in Fl. Jahrb. 1880 pp. 790 ff.) and may possibly be a compound of εἷα and ἕν (used as in ἓν μὲν τόδ’ ἤδη τῶν τριῶν παλαισμάτων Aesch. Eum. 589 ). εἶἑν is the usual orthography in Paris A, and has left some traces also in the Bodleian MS e.g. Gorg. 466 C .

τέχνη δικαιοσύνη . The Socratic view that Justice is an art—a view that dominates the whole of the conversation w<*> Polemarchus—is thus introduced quite incidentally.

τὸ ‐‐ λέγει . Cf. Xen. Hiero II 2 (cited above on 331 E).

τί δέ; ὁ δίκαιος κτλ. This punctuation throws more emphasis on ὁ δίκαιος than τί δὲ ὁ δίκαιος; which appears in some editions. It is therefore to be preferred in introducing the application of the two illustrations. So also below in 333 A τί δὲ δή; τὴν δικαιοσύνην κτλ.

προσπολεμεῖν explains ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν as ξυμμαχεῖν explains φίλους ὠφελεῖν. Ast's προπολεμεῖν (a conjecture of Stephanus) would leave ἐχθ<*>οὺς βλάπτειν unrepresented. Stephanus' conjecture was natural enough with the wrong reading καὶ ξυμμαχεῖν, which Ast also followed. For

ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ Hartman demands ἔμοιγε δοκεῖν; but cf. 333 B, Crito 43 D, Phaed. 108 D , Menex. 236 B . These cases shew that δοκεῖ can be used without ὡς: and ἐμοὶ ( ἔμοιγε) δοκεῖν does not occur in the Republic (Grünenwald in Schanz's Beitr. <*>ur hist. Synt. d. gr. Spr. II 3 p. 12).

ξυμβολαια are contracts where money is involved. Polemarchus (as in εἰς ἀργυρίου in B below), in harmony with the natural meaning of Simonides' saying, thinks first of pecuniary dealings as the sphere in which δικαιοσύνη acts. Socrates substitutes for ξυμβόλαια the more general term κοινωνήματα, in order once more to introduce the analogy of the arts.

εἰς τίνα δὴ κοινωνίαν is idiomatic for εἰς τίνος δὴ κοινωνίαν. Compare VIII 556 C ἢ ἐν ὁδῶν πορείαις ἢ ἐν ἄλλαις τισὶ κοινωνίαις and τὴν τιμὴν ταύτην (where the English idiom would expect τὴν τιμὴν ταύτης) in II 371 E. In spite of εἰς κρουμάτων and εἰς ἀργυρίου, it is not necessary to read (with Richards) τίνος.

παρακαταθέσθαι καὶ σῶν εἶναι . The double expression is necessary to explain κοινῇ χρῆσθαι: the κοινωνία arises because one deposits the money and by the other it is kept safe.

ἄχρηστον ‐‐ χρήσιμος . ἄχρηστος fluctuates between ‘unused’ and ‘useless’: the latter sense is predominant here and gives an epigrammatic tone to the sentence (cf. ἐν μὲν χρήσει ἄχρηστος, ἐν δὲ ἀχρηστίᾳ χρήσιμος in D). It is noticeable that Plato does not take into account the possibility of money being deposited at interest: in this case the money could not be said to be useless.

καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ : not ‘to the individual and to the state,’ but ‘both in dealings with others, and in personal concerns.’ The words καὶ ἰδίᾳ are, strictly speaking, irrelevant, for it is with κοινωνήματα (in the widest sense) that we are concerned. They are to be regarded merely as a rhetorical amplification for the sake of emphasis: cf. infra 350 A, 351 A notes

οὐκ ἂν οὖν κτλ. See cr. n. Some may think that we should read οὐκοῦν (with the majority of MSS) and cancel εἴη after σπουδαῖον (so also Vind. D), understanding ἐστι. The accidental omission of ἄν is however not uncommon in Plato's MSS: see on IV 437 B.

οὗτος καὶ φυλάξασθαι . Because knowledge of anything implies knowledge also of its opposite, according to the usual Socratic view. See Phaed. 97 D οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπεῖν προσήκειν ἄνθρωπον—ἀλλ’ ἢ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον· ἀναγκαῖον δὲ εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον εἰδέναι, Charm. 166 E , Hipp. Min. 367 A ff. See also Stewart's Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics Vol. I p. 378.

φυλάξασθαι κτλ. See cr. n. With the emendation in the text, the argument is as follows: (1) he who can πατάξαι, can φυλάξασθαι: (2) he who can φυλάξασθαι ( νόσον), can λαθεῖν ἐμποιήσας ( νόσον): (3) he who can κλέψαι ( τὰ τῶν πολεμίων), is a good φύλαξ of an army. Thus the predicate of each step in the argument corresponds to the subject of the step next following: for λαθεῖν ἐμποιήσας ( νόσον) is to be taken as parallel to κλέψαι ( τὰ τῶν πολεμίων). The argument is unsound, and not intended to be serious: it is enough that it suffices to bewilder Polemarchus. For a further discussion on this passage see App. II.

στρατοπέδου γε κτλ. The στρατηγός must be both φυλακτικος τε καὶ κλέπτης according to Socrates in Xen. Mem. III 1. 6.

κλέπτειν and

κλέμμα were used (especially by Spartans) with reference to military operations involving surprise and stealth (Classen on Thuc. v 9. 5).

κλέπτης ‐‐ ἀναπέφανται . Cf. Hipp. Min. 365 C ff., where this view is worked out at length, ib. 369 B ἀναπέφανται ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν ψευδής τε καὶ ἀληθής and Xen. Mem. IV 2. 20 ff. ἀναπέφανται, as J. and C. remark, expresses an unexpected result—here a paradox. Like ὁ ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνων ἀμείνων, the conclusion is a logical inference from the Socratic identification of virtue and knowledge, made without regard to experience.

ἀγαπᾷ , ‘esteems,’ is said with reference to ἐσθλόν in Hom. Od. XIX 395 f. μητρὸς ἑῆς πατέρ’ ἐσθλόν, ὃς ἀνθρώπους ἐκέκαστο | κλεπτοσύνῃ θ’ ὅρκῳ τε. The suggested ἄγαται for ἀγαπᾷ τε would be too strong: see Symp. 180 B μᾶλλον— θαυμάζουσιν καὶ ἄγανται—ὅταν ὁ ἑρώμενος τὸν ἐραστὴν ἀγαπᾷ, where the meaning of ἀγαπᾷ is shewn by οὕτω περὶ πολλοῦ ἐποιεῖτο in 180 A.

τοῦτο ‐‐ ἔτι . So Euthyphro (15 B) harks back to his first definition of piety (6 E) after he has been refuted by Socrates. Cf. also VII 515 E note

δοκεῖ does double duty, first with τοῦτο and then with δικαιοσύνη: cf. VI 493 A, VII 517 B, 525 B, 530 B and (with Stallbaum) Ap. 25 B . Hartman needlessly doubts the text.

φίλους δὲ λέγεις κτλ. The same mode of argument recurs in 339 B ff. Cf. also Hipp. Maior 284 D.

φίλοι κτλ. Schneider rightly observes that κατὰ δὴ τὸν σὸν λόγον below tends to shew that ἀλλ’ ὅμως —βλάπτειν is interrogative. The argument is in the form of a dilemma: either a it is just to injure those who do us no injustice (and benefit those who do), or b it is just to injure friends and benefit foes. The first alternative is immoral ( πονηρός), and the second directly opposed to Simonides' view. Socrates suppresses the words which I have put in brackets, because they lessen rather than increase the immorality of the conclusion: the second alternative is expressed in full as the αὐτὸ τοὐναντίον ἢ τὸν Σιμωνίδην ἔφαμεν λέγειν .

ὅσοι κτλ. : not ‘those of mankind who are in error’ (J. and C.) but ‘those who have mistaken their men’: cf. Phaedr. 257 D τοῦ ἑταίρου συχνὸν διαμαρτάνεις. So also Schneider, and Davies and Vaughan.

πονηροὶ γὰρ κτλ. Stallbaum (followed by D. and V.) wrongly takes αὐτοῖς as ‘in their eyes.’ The reasoning is difficult only from its brevity. If it is δίκαιον βλάπτειν ἀδίκους, and men sometimes suppose that a man is good when he is bad ( πονηροὶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσὶν ‘for they have bad friends’), then since friend has been defined as one whom we suppose to be good (334 C), it is sometimes δίκαιον βλάπτειν φίλους. Stallbaum's view is quite inconsistent with the definition of friends in 334 C as οὓς ἄν τις ἡγῆται χρηστούς.

τὸν φίλον καὶ ἐχθρόν . Hartman (with some inferior MSS) wishes to insert τόν before ἐχθρόν; but cf. infra III 400 D and many other examples cited by himself. To pronounce them all corrupt is to destroy the basis on which our knowledge of Platonic idiom rests.

τὸν δοκοῦντά τε ‐‐ καὶ τὸν ὄντα . The meaning required—‘he who both seems and is good’—would be more correctly expressed by τὸν δοκοῦντά τε—καὶ ὄντα (so Ast and others), but “aliquid tribuendum interpositis ἧ δ’ ὅς, quae negligentiam repetendi, si est negligentia, saltem excusant” (Schneider, who compares also infra 341 B ποτέρως λεγεις τὸν ἄρχοντά τε καὶ τὸν κρείττονα). In τὸν δὲ δοκοῦντα μέν, ὄντα δὲ μή Polemarchus expresses himself more accurately.

ὁ ἀγαθός ‐‐ ὁ πονηρός . Socrates unfairly neglects the δοκῶν, although according to Polemarchus' amended definition the ἀγαθός who seemed πονηρός would not be a friend, nor the πονηρός who seemed ἀγαθός an enemy. Polemarchus' theory indeed points to a division of men into three classes: friends, enemies, and those who are neither (viz. those who seem good and are bad, and those who seem bad and are good). The somewhat ideal view that the ἀγαθός is φίλος and the πονηρὸς ἐχθρός is genuinely Socratic (cf. Mem. II 6. 14 ff.): it is part of the wider view that all men desire the good ( Symp. 206 A , Gorg. 467 C ff.).

προσθεῖναι ‐‐ βλάπτειν . ἤ after τῷ δικαίῳ must mean ‘or in other words’: cf. infra 349 E πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ ἀξιοῦν πλέον ἔχειν and Phaed. 85 D ἐπὶ βεβαιοτέρου ὀχήματος, ἢ λόγου θείου τινός (so the Bodleian, but ἤ is cancelled by many editors). The late expression Φαίδων ἢ περὶ ψυχῆς involves essentially the same use of ἤ. .The clause ὡς—κακῶς is summed up in τούτῳ, and the whole sentence means: ‘do you wish us to make an addition to our account of justice, or in other words to say now—in addition to our original definition where we said it was just to do good to friends and harm to enemies—that it is just to do good to friends if they are good etc.’ This explanation is (I think) the least vulnerable one, if the text is to be retained. With προσθεῖναι used absolutely cf. 339 B. For other views see App. III.

ἔστιν ἄρα κτλ. Cf. Crito 49 A ff., Corg. 469 B , [ περὶ ἀρετῆς] 376 E. This chapter contains the only element of permanent ethical interest and value in the discussion with Polemarchus—the only element, moreover, which reappears in a later book of the Republic (11 379 B). The underlying principle—that κακῶς ποιεῖν = κακὸν ποιεῖν—is in accordance with the traditional Greek view of life. For illustrations we may cite Od. XVIII 136 f. τοῖος γὰρ νόος ἐστὶν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων | οἷον ἐπ’ ἦμαρ ἄγῃσι πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε, Arch. Fr. 70 (Bergk), and Simon. Fr. 5. 10—14 ἄνδρα δ’ οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι | ὃν ἀμάχανος συμφορὰ καθέλοι· | πράξας μὲν εὖ πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, | κακὸς δ’ εἰ κακῶς <τις>, | κἀπὶ πλεῖστον ἄριστοι, τούς κε θεοὶ φιλῶσιν. The same point of view is manifest in the transition of meaning in μοχθηρός and πονηρός from ‘laborious,’ ‘afflicted’ (e.g. Hesiod Fr. 95. 1 Göttling) to ‘depraved.’ Conversely, prosperity makes one morally better, as in Solon 13. 69 f. τῷ δὲ κακῶς ἔρδοντι θεὸς περὶ πάντα τίθησιν | συντυχίην ἀγαθήν, ἔκλυσιν ἀφροσύνης, and in the frequent identification of εὐπραγία or εὐδαιμονία with εὖ πράττειν e.g. Charm. 172 A , 173 D, Alc. I 116 B, Arist. Eth. Nic. I 8. 1098^{b} 20. It is by the analogy of the arts that Socrates in this chapter seeks to prove, first the identification κακῶς ποιεῖν = κακὸν ποιεῖν, and second that the good man cannot harm others: the Socratic conception of right conduct as an art is still predominant. It is important to observe that it was by means of this Socratic weapon that Plato achieved this noble anticipation of Christian ethical theory (St Matth. 5. 44 al.). Cf. also Gorg. 472 D ff.

ἀνθρώπους δὲ κτλ. Cf. 352 E— 353 E.

οὐκ ἦν σοφὸς ‐‐ εἰπών . Teichmüller ( Lit. Fehd. I p. 22 note) finds in this an allusion to Xenophon, who puts into the mouth of Socrates (addressing Critobulus in Mem. II 6. 35) the words ἔγνωκας ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν εἶναι, νικᾶν τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιοῦντα, τοὺς δὲ ἐχθροὺς κακῶς: but the reference is only to 331 E σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θεῖος ἀνήρ. The presents φησίν and νοεῖ are used in a general way, because such a theory and such an interpretation of it might be held by any one at any time: in οὐκ ἦν σοφὸς ὁ ταῦτα εἰπών the time is changed to the past to suggest οὐκ ἦν Σιμωνίδης ὁ ταῦτα εἰπών (Simonides being σοφός 331 E). But for ὁ ταῦτα εἰπών, ἦν would be ἐστι. It is a mistake to take ἦν as ‘is after all’: ἦν is hardly so used in Plato without ἄρα, nor is Phaedr. 230 A (cited by Goodwin MT. p. 13) an example of that idiom.

ἐάν τις αὐτὸ φῇ ‐‐ Σιμωνίδην : as Xenophon virtually does in Hier. II 2: see 331 E note

τῶν σοφῶν τε καὶ μακαρίων ἀνδρῶν . μακάριος is somewhat stronger than θεῖος, which it suggests, μάκαρες being a usual epithet of gods. The whole phrase is intended to carry us back to 331 E σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θεῖος ἀνήρ. Ast's view that μακαρίων means “qui ante nostram aetatem floruerunt,” as if ‘sainted,’ misses the allusion to 331 E, and is a little far-fetched: it is enough that μακάριος conveys the same ironical commendation as θεῖος: cf. (with Stallbaum) Men. 71 A .

ἐγὼ γοῦν . See cr. n. With Hartman, I adopt Bekker's restoration: cf. VII 527 D. For γοῦν A everywhere writes γοὖν .

Περιάνδρου κτλ. Periander, Xerxes and Perdiccas are taken as types of tyrants, and no tyrant is σοφός ( Rep. IX 587 D). It is noticeable that Periander does not appear in the list of the seven wise men in Prot. 343 A . The expedition of Xerxes against Greece is cited by Callicles in Gorg. 483 D in connexion with the doctrine that might is right. In Περδίκκου the allusion is to Perdiccas II, father of Archelaus ( Gorg. 471 B ): he died late in 414 or early in 413, three years before the probable date of action of the Republic ( Introd. § 3), after proving himself a fickle friend and foe to the Athenians during the Peloponnesian war. Ismenias is mentioned again in Men. 90 A as having become rich δόντος τινός—<*> νῦν νεωστὶ εἰληφὼς τὰ Πολυκράτους χρήματα. There can be no doubt that he is to be identified with the Ismenias who (see Xen. Hell. III 5. 1 ) in 395 took money from Timocrates the Rhodian, envoy of the Persian King, in order to stir up war against Sparta, and who in 382, when the Spartans had seized the Cadmea, was condemned on this charge among others ( Xen. Hell. V 2. 35 ; Plut. Pelop. 5. 2). Plato implies that Ismenias kept enough Persian gold to enrich himself. he was no true Greek if he did not. But what is meant by saying that he had received the money of Polycrates? This question has been much discussed. Possibly ‘the money of Polycrates’ (with allusion, of course, to the riches of the Samian tyrant) was a sarcastic expression current in Athens for ‘the money of Timocrates’: this is perhaps the more likely as we are informed that the Athenians got no share of it themselves ( Hell. III 5. 2). Plato would naturally avail himself of such a political gibe to express his dislike of a man who took gold from the natural enemy of Greece ( Rep. V 470 C) to stir up not war, but sedition (ib. 470 B), and withdraw Agesilaus from fighting with the barbarian: for his political ideal in foreign policy was that of Cimon. See also on V 471 B. It is not however likely, I think, that the present passage was written after Ismenias' death, for Plato is not given to reviling his contemporaries after their death. That the other three persons cited by Plato were already dead would only make his reproof of the living more marked and scathing. The present passage—so far as it goes—is on the whole in favour of Teichmüller's view ( Lit. Fehd. I p. 25) that the first book of the Republic was written soon after 395, when the disgraceful affair was still fresh in men's minds. See Introd. § 4.

οἰομένου is to be pressed (as in III 395 D, 409 C: cf. IV 431 C): their power is fancied, not real: they cannot even do the thing they want: cf. Gorg. 467 A ff. πῶς ἂν οὖν οἱ ῥήτορες μέγα δύναιντο ἢ οἱ τύραννοι ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐὰν μὴ Σωκράτης ἐξελεγχθῇ—ὅτι ποιοῦσιν ἃ βούλονται;— οὔ φημι ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς ἃ βούλονται. He alone (says Plato) is truly powerful who wills what is good and has the power to obtain it.

ὡς δὲ διεπαυσάμεθα . Cobet's suggestion ὡς δὲ δὴ ἐπαυσάμεθα misses the point. No doubt διαπαύομαι is (as he says) “intermitto orationem post aliquam moram denuo dicturus” (cf. Tim. 78 E , Symp. 191 C ), but this is precisely the sense required, for the question with which Socrates concludes ( τί ἂν ἄλλο κτλ.) shews that he desires to resume the discussion.

ταῦτ’ εἶπον refers to εἶεν—φαίη εἶναι.

συστρέψας ‐‐ διαρπασόμενος : ‘gathering himself up he sprang at us like a wild beast as though he would seize and carry us off.’ Thrasymachus comes down like a wolf on the fold. ἧκεν is not from <*>κω, but from ἵημι: this is also Ast's view (in his Lex. Plat.). The expression ἥκειν ἐφ’ ἡμᾶς would be too weak after συστρέψας ἑαυτὸν ὥσπερ θηρίον. The object to ἧκεν is ἑαυτόν, easily supplied from συστρέψας ἑαυτόν: lit. ‘he let himself go at us.’ Cf. Ar. Frogs 133 . It should be noted also that compounds of ἵημι occasionally drop ἑαυτόν altogether and become intransitive (e.g. VIII 563 A, Prot. 336 A ). Hartman's ᾖττεν for ἧκεν is not likely to find favour. For διαρπασόμενος Cobet would read διασπασόμενος. Plato however does not use διασπᾶν of harrying by wild beasts, but in the sense of disiungere, seiungere (VI 503 B, Laws 669 D): and even Cobet does not propose to change Pol. 274 B διηρπάζοντο ὑπ’ αὐτῶν (i.e. θηρίων). J. and C.'s citation of Il. XVI 355 αἶψα διαρπάζουσιν (i.e. οἱ λύκοι τὰς ἄρνας) seems to me (in spite of Hartman's wonder) strictly relevant, if only we take διαρπάζειν as ‘harry,’ and not (with J. and C.) as ‘tear in pieces.’

τίεὐηθίζεσθε κτλ. εὐηθίζεσθε refers to the readiness of the interlocutors to assent to one another's questions: cf. Charm. 175 C οὕτως ἡμῶν εὐηθικῶν τυχοῦσα ἡ σκέψις καὶ οὐ σκληρῶν.

ὑποκατακλινόμενοι : a metaphor, not from the wrestling schools, but from taking a lower or inferior seat at table or the like: cf. Symp. 222 E ἐὰν οὖν ὑπὸ σοὶ κατακλινῇ Ἀγαθών and Plut. quomodo adul. ab amico internoscatur 58 D τὰς τοιαύτας ὑποκατακλίσεις (alluding to men who take the front seats at theatres etc., in order to flatter the rich by giving up their seats to them). Thrasymachus' brutal frankness is not intended by Plato to be altogether wide of the mark: see App. II and 335 A note

μὴ ‐‐ φιλοτιμοῦ ἐλέγχων . A common reproach against Socrates: cf. Theae<*>. 150 C.

ὅπως μοι κτλ. This idiom is colloquial and abrupt, almost rude: cf. 337 B and the examples cited in Goodwin MT. p. 94. Thrasymachus will not tolerate the stale and barren platitudes— note ὕθλους below—of ordinary disputation: cf. [ Clitoph.] 409 C οὗτος μὲν—τὸ συμφέρον ἀπεκρίνατο, ἄλλος δὲ τὸ δέον, ἕτερος δὲ τὸ ὠφέλιμον, ὁ δὲ τὸ λυσιτελοῦν and Stewart's Nicomachean Ethics Vol. I p. 16, with the references there quoted.

εἰ μὴ πρότερος ‐‐ γενέσθαι . The θηρίον of 336 B has become a wolf. This is the earliest allusion in Greek literature to the belief that if a wolf sees you first you become dumb. Like Virgil Ecl. IX 53 the present passage favours Schaefer's emendation Αύκος εἶδέ ς); for Αύκον εἶδες in Theocr. XIV 22.

μὴ χαλεπὸς ἡμῖν ἴσθι : ἀεὶ θρασύμαχος εἶ, said Herodicus on one occasion to the sophist (Arist. Rhet. II 23. 1400^{b} 20).

ἐξαμαρτάνομεν ‐‐ ἁμαρτάνομεν : the preposition is often dropped in repeating a compound verb: cf. V 452 A, VII 533 A, X 608 A and my note on Prot. 311 A . I can see no sufficient reason for inserting τι before ἐξαμαρτάνομεν (with Π and some other MSS), although Stallbaum and others approve of the addition.

μὴ γὰρ δὴ οἴου κτλ. Cf. Laws 931 C, where there is a similar a fortiori sentence couched in the imperatival form.

ἑκόντας εἶναι . This phrase is used sixteen times by Plato, always in negative clauses, and generally in the nominative or accusative (Grünenwald in Schanz's Beiträge zur hist. Synt. d. gr. Spr. II 3. 1 ff.).

οἴου γε σύ, ὦ φίλε : i.e. ἡμᾶς σπουδάζειν ὅ τι μάλιστα φανῆναι αὐτό. For the justification of this view see App. IV.

εἰκός ἐστιν . There is no reason for omitting ἐστίν (with Hartman and apparently also Usener Unser Platotext p. 40).

χαλεπαίνεσθαι . This strained use of the passive of χαλεπαίνω in order to make the antithesis to ἐλεεῖσθαι formal as well as real is not found elsewhere in Plato. For parallels see Cope's Rhetoric of Aristotle Vol. 1 p. 299.

σαρδάνιον . Plato uses this expression as Homer does, of a sinister smile which bodes pain to others: Od. XX 301 f. μείδησε δὲ θυμῷ | σαρδάνιον μάλα τοῖον (of Odysseus among the suitors). Among later authors it more frequently denotes the forced smile which disguises the sufferer's own pain; and so apparently Simonides used the phrase ( Fr. 202 A Bergk). The explanations volunteered by the ancients apply only to the non-Homeric usage: the Scholiast, however, at the end of his note on this passage correctly remarks, μήποτε οὖν τὸ Ὁμηρικόν, ὅθεν καὶ ἡ παροιμία ἴσως ἐρρύη, “ μείδησε δὲ κτλ.,” τὸν ἀπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν χειλῶν γέλωτα καὶ μέχρι τοῦ σεσηρέναι γιγνόμενον σημαίνει. The spelling σαρδόνιον came into vogue through the popular etymology from the bitter Sardinian herb, ἧς οἱ γευσάμενοι δοκοῦσι μὲν γελῶντες, σπασμῷ δὲ ἀποθνῄσκουσιν (Schol.). The Scholiast's suggested derivation from σαίρειν ( ringi, as of an angry dog) suits the meaning which the phrase bears in Homer and Plato, and is probably right. Photius' σαρδάζων· μετὰ πικρίας γελῶν preserves the δ .

ποιήσοις is rejected by Cobet and Herwerden. “Post οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἤ, τί ἄλλο ἤ, πάντα μᾶλλον ἤ verbum omittunt” (says Cobet, quoting Theophr. Char. c. 25). ποιήσοις is not however otiose, but suggests the phrase πάντα ποιεῖν, ‘leave nothing undone,’ as in Euthyph. 8 C πάντα ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσι φεύγοντες τὴν δίκην: cf. Ap. 39 A .

ἐρωτᾷ . I formerly read ἐρωτῷ (with Goodwin MT. p. 277). A few inferior MSS have ἔροιτο. The optative is certainly the regular periodic construction in clauses of this kind: but the indicative may perhaps be allowed in loose conversational style.

τυγχάνει ὄν . Stallbaum explains ὄν as ‘being true,’ and τι as the subject to τυγχάνει. This view is perhaps less natural than to make ὄν the copula and τι the predicate: for the pronoun ‘it’ i.e. τὸ ἐρωτώμενον (Schneider) can be quite easily understood. For the use of τυγχάνει ὄν (‘really is’) cf. II 379 A, VII 518 E, Euthyph. 4 E with my note ad loc.

ὡς δή . The force of ὡς in this common ironical expression ( quasi vero, cf. Gorg. 468 E , 499 B) is referred by Jebb ( Soph. O. C. 809 ) to an ellipse: ‘(do you mean) forsooth that.’ An objection to this theory is that it will not explain ὡς δή τοι in cases like II 366 C, Phaedr. 242 C , Tim. 26 B . It seems better to explain these usages on the same principle. The view that ὡς is exclamatory will not account for II 366 C, and is not specially appropriate in the other places. Neither is it easy to make ὡς= ἐπεί (‘your illustration is excellent, seeing that the cases are so very similar!’ Tucker). Schneider (on II 366 C) regards ὡς as nearly equivalent to ὥστε (cf. note on II 365 D). Probably ὡς is in reality consequential (like the English ‘so’), the relative retaining its original demonstrative sense. This explanation will, I believe, suit all the passages in question.

περὶ δικαιοσύνης κτλ. περὶ δικαιοσύνης and τούτων are rejected by Herwerden, but the fulness of expression suits the arrogant tone of Thrasymachus.

τί ἀξιοῖς παθεῖν ; Here and in what follows there is a play on the judicial formula παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτεῖσαι, where παθεῖν refers to δεσμός φυγή θάνατος ἀτιμία, and ἀποτεῖσαι to fines. In a δίκη τιμητός, the defendant if found guilty would be asked in the words τί ἀξιοῖς παθεῖν καὶ ἀποτεῖσαι to propose an alternative penalty to that demanded by the accuser; after which it was the duty of the judges finally to assess ( τιμᾶν) the penalty: cf. Ap. 36 B and Laws 933 D. It is partly the paronomasia in the words παθεῖν μαθεῖν (cf. the ancient text πάθος μάθος Aesch. Ag. 176 ) which draws from Thrasymachus the mock compliment ἡδὺς γὰρ εἶ (‘you are vastly entertaining’) although (cf. ἆ <*>διστε 348 C) Thrasymachus is also jeering at the simplicity of Socrates.

πρὸς τῷ μαθεῖν καὶ ἀπότεισον . Hertz and Herwerden conjecture παθεῖν for μαθεῖν: but this would make Thrasymachus ignore Socrates' identification of παθεῖν with μαθεῖν. In ἀπότεισον ἀργύριον Plato no doubt satirizes (somewhat crudely, it must be allowed) the avarice of Thrasymachus and his class, in contrast with whom Socrates has no money, because his conversations are gratis.

εἰσοίσομεν . The metaphor is from a banquet to which each contributes his share: cf. Symp. 177 C ἐγὼ οὖν ἐπιθυμῶ ἅμα μὲν τούτῳ ἔρανὀν εἰσενεγκεῖν κτλ.

ἀπειρημένον αὐτῷ . See cr. n. The retention of εἴη after αὐτ ῷ can only be defended by regarding μὴ εἰδὼς μηδὲ φάσκων as equivalent to εἰ μὴ εἰδείη μηδὲ φάσκοι and carrying on the εἰ; but this is excessively harsh and no parallel has yet been adduced. Of the two alternatives, to insert an εἰ before ἀπειρημένον or εἴη, and to drop εἴη (with Bremius), I prefer the latter as simpler in itself and accounting more easily for the corruption. The accusative absolute may have been misunderstood and εἴη inserted by a negligent reader owing to εἰ in the previous line. Richter (in Fl. Jahrb. 1867 p. 137) inserts δ) before αὐτῷ and retains εἴη, regarding εἴ τι καὶ οἴεται and ἀπειρημένον δ’ αὐτῷ εἴη as coordinate clauses under the rule of the same εἰ; but to this there are many objections. Tucker's suggestion εἰ, ὅ τι καὶ οἴεται περὶ τούτων, ἀπειρημένον αὐτῷ εἴη κτλ. (‘if, in regard to whatever he thinks about them, it were forbidden’ etc.) strikes me as heavy and cumbrous.

μὴ οὖν ἄλλως ποίει : 328 B note

ἄκουε δή calls for attention, ostentatiously, like a herald: cf. X 595 C, Ap. 20 D , Prot. 353 C .

Πουλυδάμας ‐‐ ὁ παγκρατιαστής . οὗτος ὁ Πουλυδάμας ἀπὸ Σκοτούσσης ἦν, πόλεως θεσσαλίας, διασημότατος παγκρατιαστής, ὑπερμεγέθης, says the Scholiast. He was victor in the ninety-third Olympian games 408 B.C. Stallbaum refers to Pausanias (VI 5) and others for the wonderful stories of his prowess. His statue at Olympia by Lysippus was very famous. Cf. Boeckh Kl. Schr. IV p. 446.

τοῦτο τὸ σιτίον κτλ. Teichmüller ( Lit. Fehd. II p. 196) finds in this a confirmation of his belief that Plato was a vegetarian: but it is implied merely that a beef diet was not considered wholesome for persons out of training. Aristotle may have had this passage in view in Eth. Nic. II 5. 1106^{a} 36 ff., though his illustration is there taken from quantity, and not from quality, of food. Cf. also Gorg. 490 C .

ξυμφέρον ἅμα καὶ δίκαιον . The sophistry is undisguised. If βόεια κρέα is Polydamas' συμφέρον and δίκαιον, and δίκαιον is assumed to be everywhere identical with itself, it follows that βόεια κρέα is our δίκαιον, but not our ξυμφέρον, otherwise we are also κρείττονες. To avoid this, Wohlrab ingeniously takes ἐκείνου not with ἥττοσιν but with ξυμφέρον ἅμα καὶ δίκαιον, as if the meaning were ‘Polydamas' συμφέρον καὶ δίκαιον is also δίκαιον for us.’ This explanation is however linguistically harsh and comparatively pointless. On βδελυρὸς γὰρ εἶ Tucker aptly reminds us that the prevailing feature in Theophrastus' description of the βδελυρός ( Char. c. 11) is παιδιὰ ἐπιφανὴς καὶ ἐπονείδιστος (‘obtrusive and objectionable pleasantry’ Jebb).

κακουργήσαις . Cope observes that the word is used “of the knavish tricks and fallacies which may be employed in rhetorical and dialectical reasoning” ( Aristotle's Rhetoric Vol. 1 p. 17). Cf. Gorg. 483 A (cited by Tucker).

εἶτ’ οὐκ οἶσθα κτλ. ‘Do you mean to say you don't know’ etc. The division of constitutions into Monarchy, Oligarchy (for which Aristocracy is here substituted) and Democracy was familiar to everybody: see Aeschin. Ctes. 6, Tim. 4 ὁμολογοῦνται γὰρ τρεῖς εἶναι πολιτεῖαι παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, τυραννὶς καὶ ὀλιγαρχία καὶ δημοκρατία. Cf. Whibley Greek Oligarchies pp. 17, 24. Thrasymachus proceeds to define κρείττων as ὁ κρατῶν (not ὁ ἰσχυρότερος, as Socrates had insinuated): ‐κρατοῦνται in δημοκρατοῦνται and ἀριστοκ ρατοῦνται well brings out his meaning. Cf. Laws 714 B νόμων εἴδη τινές φασιν εἶναι τοσαῦτα ὅσαπερ πολιτειῶν, and C οὔτε γὰρ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον οὔτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὅλην βλέπειν δεῖν φασι τοὺς νόμους, ἀλλ) ἥτις ἂν καθεστηκυῖα ᾖ πολιτεία, ταύτῃ δεῖν τὸ ξυμφέρον ὅπως ἄρξει τε ἀεὶ καὶ μὴ καταλυθήσεται, καὶ τὸν φύσει ὅρον τοῦ δικαίου λέγεσθαι κάλλισθ) οὕτως. Πῶς; Ὅτι τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον ἐστί .

τίθεται δέ γε : Laws l. c. τίθεται δήπου, φασί, τοὺς νόμους ἐν τῇ πόλει ἑκάστοτε τὸ κρατοῦν. ἦ γάρ; Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. Ἆῤ οὖν οἴει, φασί, ποτὲ δῆμον νικήσαντα ἤ τινα πολιτείαν ἄλλην ἢ καὶ τύραννον θήσεσθαι ἑκόντα πρὸς ἄλλο τι πρῶτον νόμους <*> τὸ συμφέρον ἑαυτῷ τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ μένειν; Πῶς γὰρ ἄν; Aristotle makes it the distinguishing mark of his three perverted forms ( παρεκβάσεις) of constitution ( τυραννίς, ὀλιγαρχία, δημοκρατία) that they seek their own and not τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον: Pol. Γ 7. 1279^{b} 4 ff.

τὸν τούτου ἐκβαίνοντα κτλ. Laws 714 D οὐκοῦν καὶ ὄς ἂν ταῦτα τὰ τεθέντα παραβαίνῃ, κολάσει ὁ θέμενος ὡς ἀδικοῦντα, δίκαια ταῦτ) εἶναι ἐπονομάζων; Ἔοικε γοῦν. Ταῦτ) ἄῤ ἀεὶ καὶ οὕτω καὶ ταύτῃ τὸ δίκαιον ἂν ἔχοι. Φησὶ γοῦν οὗτος ὁ λόγος. νόμος and δίκαιον are identified by this theory.

ταὐτὸν εἶναι δίκαιον . Herwerden would expunge ταὐτόν, but ταὐτὸν is not more otiose here than τὸ αὐτὸ below.

ξυμφέρον γέ τι . There is here a hint of the main purpose of the Republic, which is to prove that δίκαιον is ξυμφέρον in the truest sense for the individual and the state.

οὐ ‐‐ μέντοι . “In interrogationibus haec particula” ( μέντοι) “ita cum οὐ negatione coniungitur, ut gravissima sententiae vox intercedat, quo modo aliquis eis quae ex altero quaerit summam veritatis ingerit speciem” (Hoefer de part. Plat. p. 34). μέντοι is simply ‘of course,’ ‘surely’: ‘surely you regard it as just to obey the rulers, do you not?’ The idiom is frequent in Plato. The other examples of it (cited by Stallbaum) in the Republic are infra 346 A, VII 521 D, IX 581 A, 584 A, X 596 E.

πότερον δὲ ἀναμάρτητοι κτλ. The reasoning echoes that of 334 C above.

τιθέναι ‐‐ τίθεσθαι : we should expect τιθέναι in both cases, as the ἄρχοντες according to the theory we are discussing are κρείττονες and supreme as legislators: but the middle of personal interest is naturally used in combination with τὰ ξυμφέροντα ἑαυτοῖς: cf. infra 341 A.

τί λέγεις σύ ; a favourite eristic formula: see Ar. Clouds 1174 τοῦτο τοὐπιχώριον | ἀτεχνῶς ἐπανθεῖ, τὸ τί λέγεις σύ;

τοίνυν : not ‘therefore,’ but ‘also,’ a frequent use in Plato. In the Republic it occurs 29 times, according to Kugler de particulae τοι eiusque comp. ap. Pl. usu p. 34.

ὅταν οἱ μὲν ‐‐ τοῖς δέ (i.e. τοῖς ἀρχομένοις). These two clauses depend, not on ὡμολογῆσθαι, but on ποιεῖν: it is just to do τὰ ἀξύμφορα τοῖς ἄρχουσιν as often as the rulers unwillingly prescribe what is evil for themselves and so long as Thrasymachus says it is just for subjects to do what the rulers have prescribed. Desire for brevity and balance leads Plato to put both clauses under the government of ὅταν, although ‘since’ rather than ‘whenever’ is the more appropriate conjunction for introducing the second: for Thrasymachus does not sometimes but always assert that it is just to obey the rulers. The suggested reading φῄς for φῇς would require us to take τοῖς δέ κτλ. as an independent sentence, and leave μὲν in οἱ μέν without a corresponding δέ.

αὐτό is ‘the matter,’ ‘the case before us’: cf. IV 428 A ( αὐτῷ), VII 518 B ( αὐτῶν), 524 E ( αὐτῷ ), Theaet. 172 E al. The text has been needlessly suspected by Madvig and other critics.

οὑτωσί : not ‘in that case’ (Campbell), but (with Jowett) simply ‘thus,’ as explained in δίκαιον—λέγεις: cf. Ap. 26 E οὑτωσί σοι δοκῶ; οὐδένα νομίζω θεὸν εἶναι;

ναὶ μὰ Δία κτλ. The interlude is intended to mark that the first stage has been reached in the refutation of Thrasymachus.

ἐὰν σύ γε is of course ironical. The disciples of the rival disputants now enter the fray.

τὸ γὰρ τὰ κελευόμενα κτλ. If this, and no more, had been Thrasymachus' definition, it would remain unrefuted; commands would be commands, whether expedient for the rulers or not.

δ ἡγοῖτο ‐‐ ξυμφέρειν . This explanation is involved in Clitophon's earlier statement τὸ τὰ κελευόμενα ποιεῖν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων: that which the rulers κελεύουσι is what they believe to be in their interests. Clitophon's defence finds no justification in the terms of Thrasymachus' definition; but it was the most obvious way of attempting to reconcile that definition with the admission that rulers are capable of erring.

τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον κτλ. Bonitz ( Zeitschr. f. öst. Gymn. 1865 p. 648), followed by Wohlrab, proposes to add the words τὸ ξυμφέρον after ξυμφέρον, “parum venuste,” as Hartman thinks. Neither is it well (with Hartman) to omit τοῦ κρείττονος. The apparent harshness of the construction (‘that which seems to be the stronger's interest to the stronger’) is justified by its brevity and precision, and by the desire to introduce the exact words of the original definition into its amended form.

συκοφάντης . Cf. (with Tucker) Arist. Soph. El. 15. 174^{b} 9 σοφιστικὸν συκοφάντημα τῶν ἐρωτώντων and Rhet. II 24. 1402^{a} 14 ἐπὶ τῶν ἐριστικῶν τὸ κατὰ τί καὶ πρὸς τί καὶ πῇ οὐ προστιθέμενα ποιεῖ τὴν συκοφαντίαν.

λέγομεν τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως . Bekker (with whom Shilleto on Dem. F. L. § 91 agrees) would insert μέν after λέγομεν: but (as Schneider remarks) the emphasis on τῷ ῥήματι does duty instead of the particle, and even otherwise, μέν is not essential: cf. III 398 A (where Shilleto would also add μέν), infra 343 C, II 363 E, X 605 C al.

τὸ δέ =‘whereas in point of fact’ is a favourite Platonic idiom: cf. IV 443 C, VII 527 A, 527 D al.

ἐπιλιπούσης . See cr. n. The present, which Stallbaum and others adopt, may be right, but the older reading is at least as good. The failure in knowledge must precede the actual error. For the mistake see Introd. § 5.

ἀποκρίνεσθαι . The imperfect infinitive, as Schneider remarks ( Addit. p. 6).

συκοφαντεῖν is explained in ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς—κακουργοῦντά σε, where κακουργοῦντα (as Schneider observes) is not used as in 338 D of putting an evil or sophistical interpretation on a theory, but of damaging a man's personal reputation and credit: “scilicet existimationis et pecuniae detrimentum facturus sibi videbatur sophista ideoque Socratem se, quamquam frustra, impugnare in sequentibus quoque criminatur.”

μὴ λαθών : “si non latueris” (Schneider). Stephanus conjectured μήν and Ast με for μή: but either change would destroy the antithesis between λανθάνειν and βιάζεσθαι—secret guile and open fraud: cf. II 365 D ἀλλὰ δὴ θεοὺς οὔτε λανθάνειν, οὔτε βιάσασθαι δυνατόν. Hirschig's excision of μὴ λαθών greatly impairs the emphasis.

τὸν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν . The only exact parallel to this use of ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν in Plato is Laws 656 E σκοπῶν δ’ εὑρήσεις αὐτόθι τὰ μυριοστὸν ἔτος γεγραμμένα ἢ τετυπωμένα οὐχ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν μυριοστὸν ἀλλ’ ὄντως. This idiomatic phrase is rare before Plato, who uses it 77 times with the meaning ‘to put the matter in a word,’ implying that other and possibly more exact means of describing the thing in question might be found. In 52 of these cases the phrase is combined with πᾶς or οὐδείς and their family of words, in the sense of fere, propemodum: its use in other connexions is in part a return to old poetic usage; cf. Aesch. Pers. 714 , Eur. Hipp. 1162 , Heracl. 167. See Grünenwald in Schanz's Beiträge zur hist. Synt. d. gr. Spr. II 3, pp. 21 ff. The other examples in the Republic are V 464 D, VIII 551 B, IX 577 C.

ὃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες : viz. in 340 E κατὰ τὸν ἀκριβῆ λόγον. The antecedent is the phrase ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ. The conjecture of Benedictus, ὅν for ὅ, though adopted by several editors, would (as Schneider remarks) leave it uncertain whether λόγῳ or τόν was referred to by the relative. There is no MS authority for ὅν.

ξυρεῖν ‐‐ λέοντα . παροιμία ἐπὶ τῶν καθ) ἑαυτῶν τι ἢ ἀδύνατα ποιεῖν ἐπιχειρούντων λεγομένη (Schol.). The proverb is very rare, and does not seem to occur elsewhere in classical Greek.

οὐδὲν ὢν καὶ ταῦτα : ‘though you were a nonentity at that too’: i.e. at bluffing me, as well as in other respects. So (I think) Schneider, rightly (“aber auch darin ist's nichts mit dir”). Others (e.g. Shorey in A. J. Ph. XVI p. 234) explain ‘and that too though you are a thing of naught.’ But in that case καὶ ταῦτα would surely precede οὐδὲν ὤν. Tucker can hardly be right in making καὶ ταῦτα simply ‘moreover’ ‘too,’ ‘and proved a failure, too.’ Nor (in spite of J. B. Mayor in Cl. Rev. X p. 110) is it quite enough to translate (with Campbell) ‘though here again you are nobody,’ i.e. ‘with as little effect as ever.’

καὶ λέγε ‐‐ ὄντα is expunged by Herwerden, but the emphatic reiteration is in keeping with the whole tone of the passage. For the sense we may recall the words of the so-called oath of Hippocrates εἰς οἰκίας δὲ ὁκόσας ἂν ἐσίω, ἐσελεύσομαι ἐπ’ ὠφελείῃ τῶν καμνόντων (Vol. 1. p. 2 ed. Kühn).

ἑκάστῳ τούτων : viz. τοῖς κάμνουσι, τοῖς ναύταις, and in general the sub jects upon whom the art is exercised. The expression is a little vague (cf. VIII 543 C note) but it is rash and unnecessary to insert εἴδει or write ἑκάστῳ <τῶν εἰδῶν> τούτων, as Tucker recommends.

ἆῤ οὖν ‐‐ τελέαν εἶναι . I have retained this reading, in deference to the MSS, but it is open to grave objection. As the sentence stands, the meaning is that every art (as well as every object of an art—this is implied by καί) has one συμφέρον, viz. to be as perfect as it can, but no other. In the sequel this is interpreted to mean that no art needs any additional ἀρετή; since it is ( qua art) perfect already: οὔτε γὰρ πονηρία οὔτε ἁμαρτία οὐδεμία οὐδεμιᾷ τέχνῃ πάρεστιν κτλ. (342 B). But the words of the sentence ἆρ’ οὖν—τελέαν εἶναι have to be taken very loosely in order to admit of this interpretation. We must suppose them equivalent to ‘No art has a συμφέρον of its own, unless you are to call the fact that it is perfect its συμφέρον.’ If Plato had written the passage as it stands in q and in the margin of Flor. U (both MSS probably of the fifteenth century), it would be open to no objection: ἆρ’ οὖν καὶ ἑκάστῃ τῶν τεχνῶν ἔστι τι ξυμφέρον ἄλλο <οὗ προσδεῖται>, ἢ <ἐξαρκεῖ ἑκάστη αὐτὴ αὑτῇ, ὥστε> ὅ τι μάλιστα τελέαν εἶναι; This reading was adopted by Bekker, and by Stallbaum in his first edition; and a careful study of the whole passage confirms the judgment of Schneider, “Platonem non solum potuisse, sed etiam debuisse vel haec ipsa vel consimilia scribere.” The same sense, expressed more briefly, may be obtained by the insertion of δεῖ before εἶναι: ‘has every art also a ξυμφέρον besides (i.e. besides the ξυμφέρον of its object), or must it be as perfect as possible?’ <*>κάστην does not require to be repeated any more than in 346 A below. The alteration is very slight; for δεῖ εἶναι, δεῖναι may have been written by mistake and δ afterwards ejected.

νῦν κτλ. : ‘has now been invented.’ The art of medicine is not coeval with body. I can see no reason for thinking (with Campbell) that νῦν is corrupt for ἡμῖν.

σῶμά ἐστι πονηρὸν κτλ. Lys. 217 B ἀναγκάζεται δέ γε σῶμα διὰ νόσον ἰατρικὴν ἀσπάζεσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν.

ὅπως ἐκπορίζῃ . This is said by Weber (Schanz's Beiträge II 2, p. 67) to be the only example in Plato of ὅπως with the subjunctive after a preterite tense.

ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς . Hartman proposes ἔτ’ αὐτοῖς. αὐτοῖς (sc. ὀφθαλμοῖς, ὠσίν) may be emphatic (ipsis), and ἐπί, ‘over and above,’ ‘besides’: ‘we require in addition to the organs themselves, an art’ etc. But it is perhaps simpler to make ἐπί=‘ to preside over’: cf. ἐφ’ οἷς ἔστιν VI 511 E note

εἰς ταῦτα means εἰς ὄψιν καὶ ἀκοήν. The art in question considers what is advantageous with respect to ( εἰς) seeing and hearing.

ἐκποριούσης . See cr. n. ἐκποριούσης appears in three Florentine MSS. The present is difficult, if not impossible, in so close a union with the future: cf. X 604 A and VI 494 D. See Introd. § 5.

ἢ αὐτὴ ‐‐ σκέψεται ; This question (which is of course to be answered in the negative) shews the awkwardness of the reading of A in ἆρ’ οὖν—τελέαν εἶναι (341 D), which might almost be construed to mean that each art does seek its own συμφέρον, viz. the perfection of itself.

ἕωσπερ κτλ. : ‘that is, so long as an art, taken in its strict sense’ (“streng genommen” Schneider) ‘preserves its essence entire and unimpaired.’ The predicate is ὅλη ἥπερ ἐστί, and ἀκριβής = ἀκριβὴς οὖσα in the sense which ἀκριβής bears throughout this passage (341 B al.). Hartman's insertion of ἡ before ἀκριβής is unsatisfactory; his alternative proposal to change ἀκριβής to ἀκριβῶς spoils the emphasis, and gives a wrong sense.

ἐπιστήμη is here a synonym for τέχνη. All arts rule: and ruling is itself an art or science, not a happy inspiration (cf. Mem. III 6). Like other arts, ruling seeks only the good of that which it rules.

ὡμολόγηται γὰρ ‐‐ χρηματιστής . Ast compares Arist. Pol. A 9. 1258^{a} 10 ff. ἀνδρίας γὰρ οὐ χρήματα ποιεῖν ἐστιν ἀλλὰ θάρσος, οὐδὲ στρατηγικἧς καὶ ἰατρικῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν νίκην, τῆς δ’ ὑγίειαν.

ᾧ ἂν ‐‐ βλέπων . ᾧ is of course ( τῷ) ὃ, and τῷ ἀρχομένῳ is also neuter (not masculine), like ἀρχομένου in D. Bremius took τῷ ἀρχομένῳ as masculine, and consequently changed (with inferior MS authority) πρὸς ἐκεῖνο into πρὸς ἐκεῖνον: he has been followed by Stallbaum and others. But as ᾧ must be neuter, it would be intolerable to make ἀρχομένῳ masculine, since both words (as denoting the same object) are covered by the same article, viz. τῷ before ἀρχομένῳ. ἐκείνῳ is of course neuter also.

εἰς τοὐναντίον . Justice has now become τὸ τοῦ ἥττονος (rather than κρείττονος) συμφέρον.

κορυζῶντα : ‘snivelling,’ μωραίνοντα, μυξάζοντα· κόρυζα γὰρ ἡ μύξα, ἣν οἱ Ἀττικοὶ κατάρρουν φασίν (Schol.). Ruhnken on Timaeus Lex. s.v. quotes among other passages Lucian Alex. § 20 ἦν δὲ τὸ μηχάνημα τοῦτο ἀνδρὶ μὲν οἵῳ σοι, εἰ δὲ μὴ φορτικὸν εἰπεῖν, καὶ οἵῳ ἐμοί. πρόδηλον καὶ γνῶναι ῥᾴδιον, τοῖς δὲ ἰδιώταις καὶ κορύζης μεστοῖς τὴν ῥῖνα τεράστιον καὶ πάνυ ἀπίστῳ ὅμοιον, and Horace Sat. I 4. 8 (of Lucilius) emunctae naris.

ὅς γε αὐτῇ κτλ. “Apte αὐτῇ interpositum; nam ipsi nutrici Socratis insipientiam opprobrio esse, Thrasymachus vult significare” Ast. Richter ( Fl. Jahrb. for 1867 p. 140) ought not to have suggested ὅς γε αὐτός. The sense is ‘for she cannot teach you to recognise even sheep or shepherd,’ not ‘you do not know either sheep or shepherd’ (J. and C.), which would require οὔτε— οὔτε. The phrase is clearly a half-proverbial expression borrowed from the nursery.

ὅτι οἴει τοὺς ποιμένας κτλ. Thrasymachus gives a new turn to the nursery saying. The illustration from the shepherd and his sheep (which is now for the first time introduced) was used by the historical Socrates to justify the opposite conclusion ( Xen. Mem. III 2. 1 ) ἐντυχὼν δέ ποτε στρατηγεῖν ᾑρημένῳ τῳ, Τοῦ ἕνεκεν, ἔφη, Ὅμηρον οἴει τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα προσαγορεῦσαι ποιμένα λαῶν; ἆρά γε ὅτι, ὥσπερ τὸν ποιμένα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖ, ὅπως σῶαί τε ἔσονται αἱ ὄϊες, καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἕξουσιν, οὕτω καὶ τὸν στρατηγὸν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖ, ὅπως σῶοί τε οἱ στρατιῶται ἔσονται, καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἕξουσι, καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα στρατεύονται τοῦτο ἔσται; So also Arist. Eth. Nic. VIII 13. 1161^{a} 12 ff. εὖ γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς βασιλευομένους, εἴπερ ἀγαθὸς ὢν ἐπιμελεῖται αὐτῶν, ἵν’ εὖ πράττωσιν, ὥσπερ νομεὺς προβάτων· ὅθεν καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα ποιμένα λαῶν εἶπεν. In Plato Pol. 271 D ff. the deities of the golden age are compared to shepherds, and the comparison of a good ruler to a shepherd is very frequent in Plato: see Ast's Lex. Plat. s. v. νομεύς. In Socrates' view ‘the shepherd careth for his sheep.’ With Thrasymachus' attitude should be compared the picture of the tyrant in Theaet. 174 D as a συβώτην ἢ ποιμένα ἤ τινα βουκόλον—πολὺ βδάλλοντα (he squeezes as much milk as he can out of his flock): also Solon ap. Arist. Rep. Ath. ch. 12 εἰ γάρ τις ἄλλος ταύτης τῆς τιμῆς ἔτυχεν, οὐκ ἂν κατέσχε δῆμον οὐδ’ ἐπαύσατο, | πρὶν ἀνταράξας πῖαρ ἐξεῖλεν γάλα. In the word ἀμοργοί or ἀμολγοί used by Cratinus in the sense of πόλεως ὄλεθροι (Meineke Fr. Com. Graec. II 1, p. 140) the image is the same. Compare the eloquent words of Ruskin in Sesame and Lilies § 43 and Milton's Lycidas 113—129.

ἡγεῖ διανοεῖσθαι . The conjecture διακεῖσθαι for διανοεῖσθαι is tempting in view of διατεθείη which follows, but διανοεῖσθαι is better suited to σκοπεῖν and βλέποντας just above. For the somewhat rare construction Schneider compares Laws 626 D αὐτῷ δὲ πρὸς αὑτὸν πότερον ὡς πολεμίῳ πρὸς πολέμιον διανοητέον, ἢ πῶς ἔτι λέγομεν; and 628 D.

πόρρω εἶ περί . πόρρω can hardly (I think) mean ‘far from’ (sc. knowing): this would require πόρρω εἶ <τοῦ τι εἰδέναι> περί, as Herwerden suggests: cf. Lys. 212 A οὕτω πόρρω εἰμὶ τοῦ κτήματος ὥστε κτλ. The meaning is (I believe) ‘so far on’; ‘so profoundly versed are you in justice’ etc.: cf. πόρρω ἤδη ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου Ap. 38 C and phrases like πόρρω σοφίας ἐλαύνειν: see also Blaydes on Ar. Wasps 192 . Such biting sarcasm is appropriate in the mouth of Thrasymachus.

ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν . Arist. Eth. Nic. V 3. 1130^{a} 3 f. διὰ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ δικαιοσύνη μόνη τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὅτι πρὸς ἕτερόν ἐστιν· ἄλλῳ γὰρ τὰ συμφέροντα πράττει, ἢ ἄρχοντι ἢ κοινωνῷ (with Stewart's note) and ib. 10. 1134^{b} 5.

τῷ ὄντι is not τῷ ὄντι δικαιῳ, but revera (as Stallbaum observes).

ὡς ἀληθῶς as well as ἀληθῶς, τῷ ὄντι, and the like, is used to indicate that a word is to be taken in its strict and full etymological sense ( εὐ‐ηθικῶν): cf. Phaed. 80 D εἰς Ἅιδου ὡς ἀληθῶς, and infra II 376 B, V 474 A, VI 511 B, VIII 551 E notes

τά γε οἰκεῖα ‐‐ μοχθηροτέρως . Wells aptly cites the refusal of Deioces in Herod. I 97 to continue as an arbiter: οὐ γάρ οἱ λυσιτελέειν τῶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐξημεληκότα τοῖσι πέλας δἰ ἡμέρης δικάζειν. Cf. also Ap. 23 B , 31 B. In like manner Aristotle mentions it as one of the safeguards of a democracy engaged in agriculture that the necessity of looking after their private interests will prevent the citizens from often attending the assembly ( Pol. Z 4. 1318^{b} 11). Plato is fond of the comparative ending in ‐ως (affected, says Cobet, by those “qui nitidissime scribunt”): see Kühner-Blass Gr. Gramm. I p. 577.

ἀπεχθέσθαι . ἀπέχθομαι as a present is not well attested in Plato's time; and the aorist ‘to incur the enmity of’ is at least as suitable in point of meaning here.

λέγω γὰρ ὅνπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον . Ast points out that nothing in what has been already said corresponds to the words τὸν μεγάλα δυνάμενον πλεονεκτεῖν, and reads ὅπερ on slight MS authority. But no special reference is intended: the words mean simply ‘I mean the man I meant just now.’ Thrasymachus asserts that he has all along been referring to τὸν μεγάλα κτλ.

ἢ τὸ δίκαιον : i.e. ἢ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι τῷ δικαίῳ. The reading αὑτῷ (found in A, but no dependence can be put on this MS in such matters) would require the omission of the article before δίκαιον (so Stallbaum and others). Tucker inclines to render ‘how much more he is personally benefited by being unjust than by justice,’ but the ordinary view is preferable.

ἣ οὐ κτλ. This laboured sentence is perhaps intended as a parody of some sophistic style: cf. Gorg. 448 C .

ὧν depends on

μέρει .

ἀνδραποδισταί : ‘kidnappers.’ The word is defined by Pollux III 78 as ὁ τὸν ἐλεύθερον καταδουλωσάμενος ἢ τὸν ἀλλότριον οἰκέτην ἀπαγόμενος. Thessaly had an evil name for this kind of crime (Blaydes on Ar. Plut. 521 ); but the frequent references to it in Attic literature shew that Greece itself was not exempt. See on IX 575 B and the article in Stephanus-Hase Thes. s.v.

τῶν τοιούτων κακουργημάτων is usually explained as depending on κατὰ μέρη, but as κατὰ μέρη is adverbial, this is somewhat awkward. It is perhaps better to regard the genitive as partitive, τι being omitted as in κινήσειεν ἂν τῶν ἀξίων λόγου νόμων IV 445 E, where see note.

πρὸς τοῖς ‐‐ χρήμασιν is virtually equivalent to πρὸς τῷ τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀφελέσθαι, and combined by zeugma with δουλώσηται. Cf. I 330 E note

εὐδαίμονες ‐‐ κέκληνται . The generic singular τις has become a plural, as in Phaed. 109 D , infra VII 536 A. Envy of tyranny and tyrants was common in the Athens of Plato's younger days: compare Gorg. 484 A , 470 D (where it is maintained by Polus that Archelaus of Macedon is εὐδαίμων, and Socrates says ὀλίγου σοι πάντες συμφήσουσι ταῦτα Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ξένοι 472 A) and Alc. II 141 A ff. The plays of Euripides in particular (see VIII 568 A) often eulogised the tyrant: e.g. Troad. 1169 ff., Fr. 252, Phoen. 524 ff. In earlier days Solon's friends had blamed him for not making himself tyrant of Athens: see the dramatic fragment (33 ed. Bergk), where the prevalent passion for tyranny is forcibly expressed in the lines ἤθελον γάρ κεν κρατήσας, πλοῦτον ἄφθονον λαβὼν | καὶ τυραννεύσας Ἀθηνῶν μοῦνον ἡμέραν μίαν, | ἀσκὸς ὕστερον δεδάρθαι κἀπιτετρῖφθαι γένος (4—6). See also Newman's Politics of Aristotle I pp. 388—392.

οὐ γὰρ ‐‐ τὴν ἀδικίαν . Cf. Gorg. 483 A φύσει μὲν γὰρ πᾶν αἴσχιόν ἐστιν, ὅπερ καὶ κάκιον, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, νόμῳ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν.

ἱκανῶς γιγνομένη : ‘realised on an adequate scale’ (D. and V.). For the construction of γίγνεσθαι with an adverb cf. (with Ast) Soph. 230 C and infra VI 504 C. After τὸ δ’ ἄδικον below, Herwerden would insert τό to go with ἑαυτῷ λυσιτελοῦν τε καὶ ξυμφέρον, but only τυγχάνει (and not τυγχάνει ὄν) is to be understood after ἄδικον; nor is the last clause intended as a strict and formal definition of injustice.

καταντλήσας . For the metaphor cf. infra VII 536 B, Lys. 204 D , Lucian Dem. Enc. 16 (imitated from this passage) and other examples in Blaydes on Ar. Wasps 483 .

ἐμβαλών : cf. Theaet. 165 D , Prot. 342 E . The whole expression recalls the Latin proverb scrupulum abeunti (Cic. de Fin. IV 80).

διαγόμενος . The use of this verb in Soph. El. 782 χρόνος διῆγέ με, Dem. 18. 89 πόλεμος—διῆγεν ὑμᾶς, Xen. Rep. Lac. I 3 and elsewhere is in favour of regarding διαγόμενος (‘living’) as grammatically passive and not middle both here and in Laws 758 A. Cf. Stephanus-Hase Thes. s.v. διάγω.

ἐγὼ γὰρ κτλ. I agree with Stallbaum and others in taking this sentence as interrogative: ‘do you mean that I think otherwise about this matter?’ i.e. think that it is not a question of βίου διαγωγή. J. and C. complain that this interpretation is “wanting in point.” It is surely much to the point to make Thrasymachus repudiate the imputation of trifling. His doctrine appears all the more dangerous when he confesses that it is no sophistic paradox, but a rule of life. I can see nothing to justify Apelt's conjecture ἔγωγ’ ἄῤ for ἐγὼ γὰρ ( Observ. Crit. p. 11).

ἤτοι ἡμῶν γε . ἤτοι or ἤτοι—γε= ‘or else’ (not ‘or rather’ as J. and C.). The regular construction is ἤτοι—ἤ, and ἤ—ἤτοι was condemned by the grammarians as a solecism, though it occurs in Pind. Nem. 6. 5. With the use of ἤτοι in this passage cf. III 400 C, IV 433 A τοῦτό ἐστιν—ἤτοι τούτου τι εἶδος ἡ δικαιοσύνη. Emendations have been suggested on all these passages of Plato: here ἤ τοι (van Prinsterer, Hartman) and in the other two passages ἤ: but we are not justified in altering the text. Cf. Kugler de partic. τοι eiusque comp. ap. Pl. usu p. 14.

ἔστω μὲν ἄδικος κτλ. The subject is ὁ ἄδικος, supplied from ἀδικίαν. To πείθει also ὁ ἄδικος is the subject; but ἡ ἀδικία or τὸ ἀδικεῖν is the subject of ἔστι. The effect is exactly as in the English ‘let him be unjust’ etc., ‘nevertheless he cannot convince me that it is really more profitable than justice.’ J. and C. understand τις before ἔστω, needlessly, as I think, and suppose that the “supposed impunity of injustice” is the subject to πείθει, but πείθει is much better with a personal subject. Although the sentence is a trifle loose, it is clear enough, and there is no occasion for reading πείθεις (with Vind. D and Ficinus).

ἐνθῶ . ἐντιθέναι (as Wohlrab points out) was used of nurses feeding children: cf. Ar. Knights 716 f., supra 343 A, and (for the general idea) Theognis 435 and Pl. Symp. 175 D . In μὰ Δία, μὴ σύ γε Socrates shudders at the prospect of having Thrasymachus for his intellectual nurse.

ποιμαίνειν . See cr. n. Cobet ( Mnem. IX p. 355) calls for πιαίνειν, but the “addita verba καθ’ ὅσον ποιμήν ἐστιν circa universum pastoris negotium errantem a Socrate Thrasymachum notari docent” (Schneider). How Thrasymachus errs is explained in οὐ πρὸς τὸ κτλ. πιαίνειν might perhaps be read, if the ἀλλά clause is taken closely with what precedes: you did not think it necessary (says Socrates) to adhere rigidly to the genuine shepherd, but think he fattens his sheep qua shepherd. In that case, however, we should expect ἀλλ’ οὐ—βλέπειν in place of οὐ—βλέποντα, to form the antithesis to πιαίνειν .

οὕτω δὲ ᾤμην . Some inferior MSS (with Eusebius Praep. Ev. XII 44. 2) read δή for δέ, and so Ast and Stallbaum. The connecting particle is better than the illative here, where Socrates is merely recalling his former train of reasoning: ‘and it was thus that I came to think’ etc.

οὐδεὶς ‐‐ μισθόν . Cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. V 10. 1134^{b} 5 ff. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀλλότριον εἶναί φασιν α<*>γαθὸν τὴν δικαιοσύνην—μισθὸς ἄρα τις δοτέος.

αὐτοῖσιν : see 330 B note

οὐχὶ ‐‐ μέντοι : 339 B note

παρὰ δόξαν is simply ‘contrary to your opinion’ (“gegen deine Ueberzeugung” Schneider) as in Prot. 337 B , cf. 349 A ἕως ἄν σε ὑπολαμβάνω λέγειν ἅπερ διανοεῖ and 350 E. The words could hardly mean an ‘unexpected or paradoxical’ reply (as Tucker construes). Socrates is appealing—note ὦ μακάριε— to Thrasymachus not to obstruct the discovery of the truth by want of candour and sincerity.

ἀλλὰ ‐‐ ἑτέρα sc. ἐστίν. The reading ἑτέραν is in itself equally good, but has inferior MS authority. Herwerden needlessly recommends the omission of ἑτέρα, or (as alternatives) ἀλλὰ τούτῳ, ἔφη, τῷ ἑτέραν, or ἀλλὰ τούτῳ, ἔφη, ἑτέραν, τῷ ἑτέραν .

οὐκοῦν κτλ. Aristotle agrees with this analysis: see Pol. A 3. 1258^{a} 10 ff. It should be noted that the antecedent to αὕτη is not μισθόν, but τὸ παρέχεσθαι μισθόν.

διὰ τὸ ξυμφέρειν . See cr. n. To ξυμφέρον there are two objections: first that διά with the participle used like διά with the infinitive is rare and dubious; second that ξυμφέρον is more naturally to be taken as a virtual adjective than as a participle. The last objection might be surmounted by reading ξυμφέρον<ὄν>, but the more serious flaw would still remain, and ξυμφέρειν is in itself so much superior, that (like most editors) I feel bound to adopt it.

οὐδέ γ’ οἶμαι τὴν μισθωτικήν sc. καλεῖς ἰατρικήν. The reasoning is somewhat subtle. ἰατρική, κυβερνητική, μισθωτική ( μισθαρνητική), says Socrates, are three distinct arts. κυβερνητική is not to be called ἰατρική, even if ἰατρική should accompany its operation, nor is μισθωτική to be called ἰατρική in a similar case. Nor is ἰατρική to be called μισθωτική, even if ἰατρική should be accompanied by μισθωτική.

κοινῇ ‐‐ προσχρώμενοι : ‘from the common use of some additional element which is the same in all.’

τὸ μισθὸν ἀρνυμένους . δέ γε as usual introduces the minor premise. The semi-poetic word ἀρνυμένους is used to suggest μισθαρνεῖν and μισθαρνητική, the word μισθόν at the same time bringing the product of the art well into view. As τὸ—δημιουργούς is the subject to γίγνεσθαι, the masculine τόν—so most MSS—for τό is impossible.

ἔλεγον μηδένα ἐθέλειν . μή with the infinitive after verbs of saying, thinking and the like “carries with it the emphasis of the witness on oath, so to speak the emphasis of desire” (Gildersleeve in A. J. Ph. 1 50). Cf. Theaet. 155 A , Euthyph. 6 B , Phaed. 94 C al., and infr. III 407 E, IV 419 A.

ὡς ἔοικε belongs to

ὧν ἕνεκα , and δεῖν is in indirect narration after ἔλεγον above. There would be no object in qualifying the force of δεῖν; it is not disputed that rulers must have their reward. Hence Stallbaum is wrong in regarding δεῖν as under the influence of ἔοικε, an illogical idiom which is common in Herodotus (Stein on 1 65), and found occasionally in Tragedy (Jebb on Trach. 1238) and in Plato ( Phil. 20 D , Soph. 263 D , Euthyd. 280 D ). That ὡς ἔοικε has no influence on δεῖν in this passage may also be seen from the fact that δεῖν (not δεῖ) would still be used if ὡς ἔοικε were removed. δεῖν is not for δέον; the late participial form δεῖν is not found in Plato: see my note on Euthyph. 4 D .

ἄρχῃ . The transition from plural to singular and conversely is common: see for examples III 408 B, 411 C, 413 D, E, IV 426 A, C, V 463 D, VI 496 C, 500 C, VIII 554 A, C, 558 A, IX 591 A, X 601 D, E, 604 D, and cf. Heindorf on Gorg. 478 C , Prot. 319 D .

ὡς ἐν μισθοῦ μέρει . ὡς is not (with Wohlrab) to be taken with <*>ν μισθοῦ μέρει, but stands for the indirect interrogative ὅπως.

αὐτοί = ‘by themselves,’ ‘ultro,’ should be construed with λαμβάνοντες. The conjecture αὐτόν for αὐτοί is very tame.

ὅθεν κινδυνεύει ‐‐ νενομίσθαι . These words are intended to indicate parenthetically that Socrates' thesis finds support in the common judgment of men. Good men, he says, require to be compelled to rule. This may be why ( ὅθεν) it is accounted a disgrace to enter on office willingly: that is to say, if you do so, you may be inferred to be, not ἀγαθός, but φιλότιμος or φιλάργυρος, which ὄνειδος λέγεταί τε καὶ ἔστιν 347 B. There is no good reason for rejecting the clause, as some have proposed to do.

πόλις ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν is the first express allusion to an Ideal City in the Republic. The principle here laid down—the reluctance of the best men to undertake the task of government—is fully recognised in Plato's commonwealth, where the ἄρχοντες are represented as unwilling to desert the life of contemplation for the cares of office. ‘Nolo episcopari’ is in fact one of the leading guarantees which Plato gives against the abuse of political power (Nohle Die Staatslehre Plato's in ihr. gesch. Entwick. p. 119). See VI 520 E, 521 A, where this topic is resumed. Cf. also Sesame and Lilies § 43 “The true kings—rule quietly, if at all, and hate ruling; too many of them make ‘il gran rifiuto.’”

τῷ ὄντι κτλ . τῷ ὄντι belongs to οὐ πέφυκε, not to ἀληθινός (as Ast supposes). Richter suggests ἁληθινός for ἀληθινός, but what is said of a single ruler applies to all: cf. (with Schneider) Laws 733 E λέγωμεν δὴ σώφρονα βίον ἕνα εἶναι καὶ φρόνιμον ἕνα καὶ ἕνα τὸν ἀνδρεῖον.

πᾶς ἂν κτλ. The articular infinitive with αἱρεῖσθαι is hard to parallel, and on this ground Richards would cancel τό. I once thought that τὸ ὠφελεῖσθαι might be taken as the object after γιγνώσκων (‘he who knows what being benefited is,’ i.e. virtually ‘who knows his own interests’); but this is harsh, and I now acquiesce in the usual interpretation. With γιγνώσκων ( intellegens) used absolutely cf. (with Schneider) Laws 733 E σώφρονα μὲν οὖν βίον ὁ γιγνώσκων θήσει πρᾶον ἐπὶ πάντα. For the sentiment cf. Soph. O. T. 584 —598, Eur. Ion 621 —632, Hipp. 1016—1020.

εἰσαῦθις σκεψόμεθα . The reference has been much discussed. Pfleiderer's idea ( Zur Lösung d. Pl. Fr. p. 72) that the words were introduced by Plato “bei der Gesammtredaktion des Werkes” to prepare us for the second half of Book X is most unlikely, because (among other reasons) Book X does not expressly revert to this topic at all. Siebeck ( Zur Chron. d. Pl. Dialoge pp. 121 ff.) holds that phrases of this sort always refer either to some future dialogue contemplated by Plato, or to a later part of the same dialogue. It is difficult to establish either alternative in the present case; nor has Siebeck, I think, succeeded in proving his point even elsewhere. It is simplest to suppose that such formulae (like εἰσαῦθις ἐπισκεπτέον in Arist. Eth. Nic. I 5. 1097^{b} 14) are in general only a convenient way of dropping the subject, although there may occasionally be a specific reference. Here there is none. So also Hirmer Entst. u. Komp. d. Pl. Polit. in Fl. Jahrb. Supplementband XXIII p. 607 note 2.

τὸν τοῦ ἀδίκου βίον ‐‐ δικαίου . In these words Socrates sums up the remarks of Thrasymachus from 343 B ( καὶ οὕτω πόρρω κτλ.) to 344 C ( λυσιτελοῦν τε καὶ ξυμφέρον).

ποτέρως ‐‐ λέγεσθαι . Ast's suggestion πότερον, ἦν δ) ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, αἱρεῖ; καὶ ποτέρως ἀληθεστέρως δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι; is now generally adopted, but (apart from its considerable divergence from the MS reading) the juxtaposition of ποτέρως and ἀληθεστέρως is unpleasing. The ποτέρως αἱρεῖ of A is quite unobjectionable: cf. VII 528 A οὕτως—αἱροῦμαι; and it is (I think) an objection to πότερον αἱρεῖ that it would represent Socrates as asking Glauco not which view he elected to take, but which life—the just or the unjust—he chose for himself. Schneider (after Bekker) retains the reading of the best MSS in πότερον ὡς ἀληθεστέρως, and explains the last two words as equivalent to ὥσπερ ὃ ἀληθεστέρως λέγεται: but ὡς ἀληθεστέρως could not (if written by Plato) be anything but the comparative of ὡς ἀληθῶς, and that is quite different in sense from ἀληθεστέρως. I have omitted ὡς (with Bremius and a few MSS of inferior authority), “ut ortum ex varia lectione πότερον et ποτέρως in ποτερόνως conflata” (Schneider). I am glad to find that Tucker adopts the same solution.

διῆλθε : i.q. διῆλθεν ὄντα or διελθὼν ἔλεξεν εἶναι (Schneider). Cf. II 363 A ἄφθονα ἔχουσι λέγειν ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ὁσίοις with note ad loc. In view of ἐν ἑκατέρῳ λέγομεν in B below, it is easy to suggest διῆλθεν <ἐν>; but the text is probably sound.

ἂν μὲν τοίνυν κτλ. The alternatives are between continuous speech and dialectic. By λόγον in παρὰ λόγον Thrasymachus' speech in 343 A ff. is meant: to this Socrates would reply, after which Thrasymachus would speak again, and finally Socrates. Thus each party would have delivered two speeches. In Athenian lawsuits there were often two speeches delivered by the accuser and two by the defendant (Meier und Schömann Attische Process p. 924), so that Plato's imagery is borrowed from the law-court, whence δικαστῶν τινῶν τῶν διακρινούντων just below. This point escaped Ast, who reads καὶ αὖθις οὗτος ἄλλον ἡμῖν (after Ficinus and Stephanus).

ἀντικατατείναντες is intransitive: cf. II 358 D κατατείνας ἐρῶ τὸν ἄδικον βίον ἐπαινῶν and 367 B: the notion (as in ξυντείνω, ξυντεταμένως and the like) is of nervous tension. The word cannot mean ‘replying to one another in set speeches’ (J. and C.). “Setting out alternative lists of advantages” (remarks Bosanquet) “was the well-known method of fable or poetry. See Book II” 361 D—362 C and 362 E— 365 A: “and compare Prodicus' Choice of Heracles (Xen. Mem. II 1) and the discussion between the Just and Unjust arguments in the Clouds of Aristophanes.”

ὁποτέρως is virtually indirect: translate ‘whichever you please, then.’ Hermann reads ποτέρως, but the text ought not to be changed either here or in Euthyd. 271 A τίς ἦν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ᾧ χθὲς ἐν Λυκείῳ διελέγου;—τίς ἦν; Ὁπότερον καὶ <*>ρωτᾷς, ὦ Κρίτων· οὐ γὰρ εἶς, ἀλλὰ δὔ ἤστην, i.e. (it depends on) which of these you are asking about etc. Cf. also <*>τις—αὐτῶν ἡ ἀρετή 353 C. In Rep. IX 578 E ἐν ποίῳ ἄν τινι καὶ ὁπόσῳ φόβῳ οἴει γενέσθαι αὐτόν and Gorg. 522 A , the ὁπόσῳ is perhaps due to the proximity of οἴει, which gives the question a certain semblance of indirectness; ὁποίῳ in Alc. I 110 C and ὁποίου infra 400 A may be similarly explained; while in Meno 74 D ἀλλὰ μή μοι οὕτως—ἀλλ’ ὅ τι ἐστὶν τοῦτο, it is casy to supply a verb of saying. Possibly (as Heindorf thinks) ὅτι (B ὃ τί) in Euthyd. 287 B is corrupt for τί, as <*>πως for πῶς in Charm. 170 C . In Lys. 212 C ὁπότερος οὖν αὐτῶν ποτέρου φίλου ἐστιν; ὁ φιλῶν τοῦ φιλουμένου—ἢ ὁ φιλούμενος τοῦ φιλοῦντος; we ought no doubt to read ὁ πότερος (with Hermann).

εἰκός γε ‐‐ τοὐναντίον . Thrasymachus' view of δικαιοσύνη is like Callicles' theory of ἀρετή in Gorg. 491 E ff. esp. 492 B τρυφὴ καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ ἐλευθερία, ἐὰν ἐπικουρίαν ἔχῃ, τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἀρετή τε καὶ εὐδαιμονία. The irony is clearly marked by ὦ ἥδιστε, and Hartman should not have revived Hirschig's proposal to read <οὔκουν> εἰκός γε .

ἀλλὰ τί μήν ; ‘Well, what else?’ Cf. (with J. and C.) Symp. 206 E .

πάνυ γενναίαν εὐήθειαν : ‘sublime simplicity.’ Such contempt for εὐήθεια recalls Thucydides' description of contemporary morals: cf. especially III 83. 1 καὶ τὸ εὔηθες, οὖ τὸ γενναῖον πλεῖστον μετέχει, καταγελασθὲν ἠφανίσθη.

εὐβουλία was preeminently a political virtue: cf. Alc. I 125 E πολιτείας κοινωνούντων τίνα καλεῖς ἐπιστήμην; Εὐβουλίαν ἔγωγε, Prot. 318 E , and infra IV 428 B. It is therefore fitly used by Thrasymachus to describe his theory, which is a theory of political rather than of private morality: cf. πόλεις τε—ποιεῖσθαι below.

ὑφ) ἑαυτοὺς ποιεῖσθαι . ἑαυτοῖς is found in some inferior MSS, but the accusative is also admissible. Cf. Thuc. IV 60 (cited by Schneider) εἰκὸς—αὐτοὺς τάδε πάντα πειράσασθαι ὑπὸ σφᾶς ποιεῖσθαι. In τελέως Thrasymachus recalls the τελέαν ἀδικίαν of 348 B.

σὺ δὲ οἴει ‐‐ λέγειν . Baiter (with Paris A) assigns these words to Socrates; but they come much more naturally from Thrasymachus: cf. 344 B. βαλλάντια and not βαλάντια is the spelling of A here and in VIII 552 D ( βαλλαντιοτόμοι): in IX 575 B ( βαλλαντιοτομοῦσι) the second λ is due to an early corrector. The double ‐λλ‐ has also the best MS authority in Gorg. 508 E , Symp. 190 E . See also Blaydes on Ar. Frogs 772 . For

ἦ δ’ ὅς below after ἔφη cf. Phaed. 78 A and VII 522 A.

ἤδη στερεώτερον : ‘still more stubborn.’ στερέος is like σκληρός in Theaet. 155 E σκληροὺς—καὶ ἀντιτύπους ἀνθρώπους, but stronger, suggesting castiron hardness and inflexibility.

ῥᾴδιον . See cr. n. Schneider refers to Laws 757 B τὴν δὲ ἀληθεστάτην καὶ ἀρίστην ἰσότητα οὐκέτι ῥᾴδιον παντὶ ἰδεῖν. ῥᾷον is not (I think) possible here: and a scribe might easily omit ΙΔ in ΡΑΙΔΙΟΝ. Cf. Introd. § 5.

εἰ γὰρ κτλ. Gorg. 483 C νόμῳ μὲν τοῦτο ἄδικον καὶ αἰσχρὸν λέγεται, τὸ πλέον ζητεῖν ἔχειν τῶν πολλῶν, καὶ ἀδικεῖν αὐτὸ καλοῦσιν. Dümmler ( Zur Comp. d. Pl. St. p. 13) goes so far as to assert that ὥσπερ ἄλλοι τινές is an express reference to Polus in the Gorgias; but nothing is gained by so hazardous a conjecture.

προσετίθεμεν : ‘used to attribute to,’ sc. before you announced your view—with ironical deference, like ἐλέγομεν in Prot. 353 C τί οὖν φατε τοῦτο εἶναι, ὃ ἡμεῖς <*>ττω ε<*>ναι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐλέγομεν; Stallbaum takes the imperfect as referring to 345 C, but neither there nor in 348 C (cited by Schneider) is there anything to justify a particular reference.

ἐμοὶ γὰρ ‐‐ λέγειν . A similar remark is made after Callicles has expounded kindred views in Gorg. 492 D σαφῶς γὰρ σὺ νῦν λέγεις ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι διανοοῦνται μέν, λέγειν δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσι.

τὰ δοκοῦντα κτλ. can only mean ‘what you think about the truth,’ not ‘what you think to be the truth’ (D. and V.) or ‘your real mind’ (Schneider and Jowett). We should expect ἀδικίας for ἀληθείας, as H. Wolf proposed to read, for it is Injustice, not Truth, which is the subject of dispute. But as ἀδικίας has not a vestige of support from the MSS, I have not ventured to make the change. The truth in question must be understood as the truth about justice and injustice. Herwerden's ἐπὶ τῆς ἀληθείας (for which he compares Dem. de Cor. 17, 226, and 294) will hardly command assent.

τί δέ ‐‐ ἐλέγχεις ; Cf. Charm. 161 C πάντως γὰρ οὐ τοῦτο σκεπτέον ὅστις αὐτὸ εἶπεν, ἀλλὰ πότερον ἀληθὲς λέγεται ἢ οὔ.

πλέον ἔχειν . The literal and derived significations of this phrase are treated as identical throughout the curious reasoning which follows. Primarily, πλέον ἔχειν refers to quantitative superiority; in its derived sense, it is used (together with πλεονεκτεῖν) more generally of ‘overreaching.’

τῆς δικαίας πράξεως . ‘To have more than the just action’ means ‘to do more than is just’ (cf. πλείω—αἱρεῖσθαι— πράττειν 350 A), outdo, overreach what is just in action. The notion of virtue as a μεσότης is implied.

οὐδὲ τῆς κτλ. See cr. n. I do not think that οὐδὲ τῆς δικαίας can be right. The whole emphasis (as οὐδὲ shews) must be on πράξεως, and the emphatic word should be expressed. οὐδὲ τῆς πράξεως τῆς δικαίας (sc. any more than the ἀνδρὸς δικαίου) gives exactly the emphasis required. In the cases quoted by Schneider ( Laws 754 B, 916 B, infra VII 516 B) the omitted word is unemphatic and easily supplied. For the error cf. Crito 50 B where the first hand of the Bodleian MS reads τὰς δικασθείσας by mistake for τὰς <δίκας τὰς> δικασθείσας. See also Introd. § 5.

οὐκοῦν καὶ ‐‐ λάβῃ . The ἄδικος πρᾶξις which the unjust man overreaches is to be regarded as ἄδικος because it has itself overreached (not fallen short of) the mean. ὡς with the subjunctive after verbs of striving does not seem to occur elsewhere in Plato: like its use in a pure final clause (of which there is only one example in Plato, viz. Tim. 92 A ) it is almost exclusively confined (among Attic writers) to Xenophon and the tragedians. See Weber's tables in Goodwin MT. p. 398, and cf. Gildersleeve in A. J. Ph. IV p. 419.

τοῦ μὲν ὁμοίου ‐‐ τοῦ δὲ ἀνομοίου . This generalisation of ‘like’ and ‘unlike’ into abstract notions, without regard to their relativity, is suggestive of (but does not of course presuppose) the Ideas of τὰ πρός τι which we meet with in Phaed. 74 A .

οὐκοῦν κτλ. A proviso which is made use of in 350 C ( ἀλλὰ μὴν —ἑκάτερον εἷναι ).

ὁ δὲ μὴ ἐοικέναι . ὁ δέ is simply ‘the other’ (as is marked in A by a pause after δέ), i.e. ὁ μὴ τοιοῦτος: cf. 339 E ( τοῖς δέ for τοῖς δὲ ἀρχομένοις), 343 D ὁ μὲν δίκαιος ἀπὸ τῶν ἴσων πλέον εἰσφέρει, ὁ δ’ ἔλαττον and IX 587 B. J. and C., with most of the editors, adopt the reading of Stephanus ( ὁ δὲ μὴ μὴ ἐοικέναι), which has the support of some inferior MSS; but the idiom is sufficiently well authenticated, and the collocation of the two negatives would be unpleasing. I am glad to see that Tucker takes the same view.

οἷσπερ ἔοικεν . Madvig's οἵοισπερ ἔοικεν is refuted by 350 C ὡμολογοῦμεν ᾧ γε (i.e. οἷος ᾧ γε) ὅμοιος ἑκάτερος εἴη, τοιοῦτον καὶ ἑκάτερον εἶναι. Cf. also Arist. Pol. H 13. 1332^{a} 22. The construction was supported by Schneider from Phaed. 92 B , but ὅ and not ᾧ is now read there on the authority of the best MS.

ἀλλὰ τί μέλλει (sc. εἶναι); A rare formula, occurring also in Hipp. Min. 377 D: cf. τί δ’ οὐ μέλλει; VIII 566 D, X 605 C. With the force of τί (‘what else’) cf. ἀλλὰ τί οἴει supra 332 C.

μουσικὸν δέ τινα κτλ. Here begin the usual Socratic illustrations from the arts, with the concomitant identification of virtue and knowledge ( ὁ δὲ σοφὸς ἀγαθός; Φημί 350 B).

δοκεῖ ἂν οὖν ‐‐ ἀξιοῦν πλέον ἔχειν . Socrates ignores the proverb καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ ἀοιδὸς ἀοιδῷ. Strictly speaking, however, it is not qua κεραμεύς, but qua moneymaker (or the like) that the κεραμεὺς κοτέει. J. and C. cite an admirable parallel from Shakespeare ( King John IV 2) “When workmen strive to do better than well, They do confound their skill in covetousness.” The words ἢ ἀξιοῦν πλέον ἔχειν have a suspicious look, and are rejected by Heller ( Fl. Jahrb. 1875 p. 171) and others, but such duplicate expressions are common in Plato, and as the illustration from the harp introduces a new and important stage in the argument, Plato may have wished to remind us that after all πλεονεκτεῖν is only the πλέον ἔχειν with which we started (349 B). It should be noted, too, that ἀξιοῦν is a little more than ἐθέλειν.

ἐν τῇ ἐδωδῇ ἢ πόσει refers of course to the patient's diet. Plato carefully writes πλεονεκτεῖν here in preference to πλέον ἔχειν. The ‘overreaching’ in such a case might well consist in giving the patient less.

ἢ πράττειν ἢ λέγειν . The idea of πλεονεκτεῖν in speaking has not been introduced before, nor is it made use of in the sequel. We must regard the addition of ἢ λέγειν as merely a rhetorical device to increase the emphasis: see on 333 D and 351 A.

τί δὲ ὁ ἀνεπιστήμων; κτλ. Proclus' commentary on these words is interesting, though he probably reads more into them than Plato intended here: καὶ ὅλως τῷ μὲν ἀγαθῷ τὸ κακὸν ἠναντίωται μόνον, τῷ δὲ κακῷ καὶ τὸ καλὸν (leg. κακὸν) καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν· ἀναιρετικὸν οὖν ἐστι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸ ἐναντίου κακοῦ ( in Alc. I p. 323 ed. Creuzer). The identifications in ὁ δὲ ἐπιστήμων σοφός and ὁ δὲ σοφὸς ἀγαθός below have been allowed before in the special cases of the μουσικός and the ἰατρικός (349 E).

ἀναπέφανται . Stallbaum naïvely reminds us that ἀναπέφανται is often used of a conclusion which “praeter exspectationem emergit et elucet.” The pervading fallacy in the discussion is akin to the a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter. Thus ‘like’ and ‘unlike’ are used absolutely, and each of them is equated with itself. The wise man is held to be good, because one is good in that in which one is wise (this might however be justified on the “stricter mode of reasoning”). Finally, the just man is inferred to be wise and good, on the principle that one is what one resembles: but whether the resemblance be in essence or in accident, we are not told. The argument should be regarded as a dialectical tour de force,— φιλόνικον μᾶλλον ἢ φιλάληθες. The reasoning in the next section of the argument strikes a deeper note.

ὁ δὲ Θρασύμαχος κτλ. ‘Now Thrasymachus’ etc. δέ is not “flat” (Tucker), but at least as good as δή, and much better supported by the MSS.

οὐχ ὡς ἐγὼ νῦν ῥᾳδίως λέγω . “Expectabam certe: οὐχ ὡς ἐγὼ νῦν λέγω ῥᾳδίως,” says Herwerden; but the antecedent in Greek is idiomatically attracted into the relative clause (Kühner Gr. Gramm. II p. 922). Translate ‘not in the easy way in which I now repeat them.’

ἅτε καὶ θέρους ὄντος . The action is probably laid in Hecatombaeon (roughly our July): see Introd. § 3. Bekker (following the punctuation of A) takes τότε with ὄντος, but πρότερον δὲ οὔπω shews that it belongs to καὶ εἶδον.

τότε καὶ is simply ‘then too’; I cannot see anything “mock-heroic” in the expression, as J. and C. do.

εἰ οὖν λέγοιμι κτλ. εἰ δ) οὖν is read by Ast: “sed sufficit externum, ut ita dicam. vinculum οὖν (Schneider).” δημηγορεῖν and εἰπεῖν ὅσα βούλομαι are the opposites of διαλέγεσθαι and βραχυλογία ( Prot. 336 B , 335 A).

ὥσπερ ταῖς γραυσί . Cf. Gorg. 527 A τάχα δ’ οὖν ταῦτα μῦθός σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι, ὥσπερ γραός, καὶ καταφρονεῖς αὐτῶν: Pol. 268 E ἀλλὰ δὴ τῷ μύθῳ μου πάνυ πρόσεχε τὸν νοῦν, καθάπερ οἱ παῖδες. παῖς for ταῖς was read before Ast on the authority of one MS; but ταῖς is quite satisfactory.

ὅπερ ἄρτι . The words ἔφαμεν δὲ δὴ καὶ ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι τὴν ἀδικίαν· ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι; (350 D), which are referred to in ἄρτι, involve the general question of the relation between justice and injustice; whence we have ὁποῖόν τι τυγχάνει ὂν δικαιοσύνη πρὸς ἀδικίαν. ὁποῖον depends on ἐρωτῶ, not on λόγον.

ἐλέχθη γάρ που : 344 C, 348 E. It has nowhere been expressly said that Injustice is δυνατώτερον than Justice, but καὶ δυνατώτερον is added for emphasis (see on ἢ λέγειν in 350 A); and indeed according to the theory of Thrasymachus δύναμις (power in a general sense) rests solely on ἰσχύς (physical strength). δύναμις and ἰσχύς are clearly distinguished in Prot. 351 A .

ἁπλῶς . The Platonic use of ἁπλοῦν has been investigated by Bonitz in Hermes II (1867) pp. 307 ff. Its antitheses are διπλοῦν, διάφορον, σύνθετον, πεπλεγμένον, ποικίλον, and the like, and it denotes that which is uniform, or single and simple, or true without any difference or qualifications. ἁπλῶς οὕτως means merely ‘in this simple or general way’ (“im Allgemeinen” Schneider): a more elaborate and profounder proof (thinks Socrates) is necessary.

καὶ καταδεδουλῶσθαι is rejected by Cobet, but successfully defended by Heller ( Fl. Jahrb. 1875 p. 172). There is in reality no pleonasm: we have first an attempt ( ἐπιχειρεῖν), then a successful attempt ( καταδεδουλῶσθαι), then the results of success ( πολλὰς δὲ καὶ ὑφ’ ἑαυτῇ ἔχειν δουλωσαμένην). A powerful city like Athens might, and often did, display her energy in all three directions simultaneously. For the collocation of δουλοῦσθαι and καταδουλοῦσθαι (middle) Heller compares infra IX 589 D, E and Menex. 240 A .

ἡ ἀρίστη . Thrasymachus refuses to withdraw from the position that ἀδικία is ἀρετή, in spite of Socrates' refutation. This is why Socrates says μανθάνω κτλ. ‘I understand: (you say so) because this was your theory.’ ὅτι is not ‘that’: see above on 332 A. Richter suggested κρατίστη for ἀρίστη on account of κρείττων just below; but κρείττων is said not by Thrasymachus, but by Socrates.

εἰ ‐‐ ἔχει . After ἔχει, εἰ is inserted by Stallbaum, following a suggestion of Baiter's. Cf. also J. B. Mayor in Cl. Rev. X p. 111. It so happens that ἡ is written in A over an erasure large enough to have contained εἰ ἡ, but there is no trace of εἰ, and mere erasures in A are seldom useful in determining the text. For ἡ Richter suggests ᾖ, which would however give a wrong meaning. Tucker also offers a variety of conjectures, but the text is perfectly sound: cf. II 359 B μάλιστ’ ἂν αἰσθοίμεθα, εἰ τοιόνδε ποιήσαιμεν τῇ διανοίᾳ· δόντες (i.e. εἰ δόντες ) ἐξουσίαν —εἶτ’ ἐπακολουθήσαιμεν κτλ. and IX 589 D εἴπερ τοιόνδε τι γίγνεται, λαμβάνων (i.e. εἰ λαμβάνων )— καταδουλοῦται.

ἢ λῃστὰς κτλ. Cf. (with Ast) Isocrates Panath. 226 οὐδεὶς ἂν αὐτοὺς ( τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας) διά γε τὴν ὁμόνοιαν δικαίως ἐπαινέσειεν, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς καταποντιστὰς καὶ λῃστὰς καὶ τοὺς περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀδικίας ὄντας· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ὁμονοοῦντες τοὺς ἄλλους ἀπολλύουσιν. There must be some honour even among thieves.

ὁμόνοιαν καὶ φιλίαν . The conception of δικαιοσύνη which meets us in Book IV 433 A—434 E is dimly outlined here.

ἐν ἐλευθέροις κτλ. : ‘whether it makes its appearance among freemen or among slaves.’ Plato wishes to emphasize the universality of the rule, and that is why he specifies the two classes into which society is divided. Cf. Gorg. 514 D , 515 A. It is less natural and easy to construe (with Tucker) ‘in a society where there are both freemen and slaves.’

ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις . So in 349 C above it is said that the unjust try to overreach both one another and the just.

ἐν ἑνὶ κτλ. The results of Book IV are foreshadowed more clearly in what follows. The notion that justice present in the individual keeps the individual at peace with himself is more fully developed in 441 D, and implicitly assumes a psychological theory like that in Book IV, where soul is shewn to have ‘parts’ (435 C ff.). Further, in Book IV, Plato first describes justice in the State, and afterwards justice in the individual, using the larger aggregate to assist him to find it in the smaller. The same method is observed here in the description of injustice, and afterwards in Books VIII and IX, where the varieties of ἀδικία in states and individuals are described. The present passage (351 A —352 A), in fact, contains the undeveloped germ of the whole method and doctrine of the Republic (with the exception of Books V—VII). Cf. Hirmer Entst. u. Kompos. d. Pl. Pol. p. 608.

μῶν μὴ (a strengthened num) occurs only twice in the Republic, here and in VI 505 C. In the later dialogues μῶν is especially frequent (Frederking in Fl. Jahrb. 1882 p. 539). A classified list of examples is given by Kugler de part. τοι eiusque comp. ap. Pl. usu p. 40.

οἵαν ‐‐ ποιεῖν . See cr. n. ποιεῖ would involve (as even Schneider admits) “durissimum et haud scio an vitiosum anacoluthon.” Cf. οἷοι μὴ ἀδικεῖν in 334 D. Tucker proposes to eject οἵαν and retain ποιεῖ, but the reading of II is preferable in every way. For the error see Introd. § 5.

παντὶ : i.e. whether just or unjust: cf. 351 E ἐχθροὶ ἔσονται (viz. οἱ ἄδικοι) ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις.

ἔστων . On the form see Introd. § 5.

τὰ λοιπά κτλ. : viz. the discussion which begins in D below.

ὅτι μὲν γὰρ κτλ. The whole sentence is summed up in ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει (352 D) and placed in this recapitulated form under the government of μανθᾴνω. The introduction of the antithesis ( ἀλλὰ δὴ κτλ.) to οἱ δὲ ἄδικοι οὐδὲν πράττειν μετ’ ἀλλήλων οἶοί τε, and of the explanations required by that antithesis, complicates the sentence, without, however, rendering it obscure. For similar anacolutha with ὅτι see V 465 A, VI 493 D notes and cf. Engelhardt Anac. Plat. Spec. III pp. 38, 40. The whole sentence forms a kind of transition to “the rest of the feast” by summing up what has been so far proved; viz. that Justice is wisdom and virtue ( καὶ σοφώτεροι καὶ ἀμείνους), and more capable of action than Injustice ( δυνατώτεροι πράττειν); even the difficulty raised in ἀλλὰ δὴ—ἀδύνατοι is not new, having been briefly explained in 351 C. Liebhold's ἔτι for ὅτι is an unhappy suggestion; nor should ὅτι be rendered ‘quoniam,’ as Hartman proposes.

μήτοι ‐‐ γε : a strong negative somewhat rarely used by Plato: cf. Phil. 67 A and infra III 388 B, C. See Kugler de part. τοι eiusque comp. ap. Pl. usu p. 11.

ὅντινα τρόπον χρὴ ζῆν . A reminiscence of the πῶς βιωτέον of Socrates: cf. 344 E.

ὃ ἂν ‐‐ ἄριστα . The political applications of this principle are developed from II 369 E onwards: cf. IV 433 A ff.

ἀκούσαις κτλ. The rapid succession of questions makes it possible to dispense with ἄν in the second: cf. II 382 E.

φαῖμεν . See cr. n. If φαμέν is retained, ἄν will belong to εἶναι (cf. VI 493 C), but it is inappropriate here to make εἶναι future or hypothetical. Schneider, while retaining φαμέν, refers ἄν to δικαίως, “ut sensus sit: οὐκοῦν, εἰ ταῦτα τούτων φαμὲν ἔργα εἶναι, δικαίως ἂν φαῖμεν”—a harsh and unnatural view. We may either drop ἄν and keep φαμέν, as (with one of Stobaeus' MSS Flor. 9. 63) I formerly did: or change φαμέν to φαῖμεν. The latter solution is easier and better. Similarly in φαῖμεν below (353 D) the ι is due to A^{2}. See also Introd. § 5.

ἀποτέμοις —see cr. n.—can hardly, I think, dispense with the particle ἄν. It should be noted that the illustrations are of two kinds—the first to illustrate ἢ μόνῳ ἐκείνῳ, the second to illustrate ἄριστα; after each division the conclusion is stated, in the second case more diffidently ( ἆρ’ οὖν οὐ—θήσομεν), perhaps because it is less obvious.

μόνον τι . Cornarius unhappily suggested τις for τι and Stephanus μόνῳ τις for μόνον τι (cf. 352 E). μόνον τι is of course the subject to ἀπεργάζηται .

οὐκοῦν ‐‐ προστέτακται . Cf. Men. 72 A οὐκ ἀπορία εἰπεῖν ἀρετῆς πέρι ὅ τι ἔστιν. καθ’ ἑκάστην γὰρ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῶν ἡλικιῶν πρὸς ἕκαστον ἔργον ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἡ ἀρετή ἐστιν. ὡσαύτως δὲ—καὶ ἡ κακία: also infra X 608 E with Arist. Eth. Nic. II 5. 1106^{a} 15 ff.

ἦν : ‘is, as we saw,’ viz. at 352 E: cf. infra IV 441 D, VI 490 A, VII 522 A.

ἀπεργάσαιντο . Heindorf (on Crat. 424 E ) would read ἀπεργάσαιτο, and Baiter adopts his suggestion; but (as Stallbaum observes) the use of ὀφθαλμοί just above may affect the construction. In the same way, perhaps, the occurrence of γυναῖκες καὶ τἄλλα θηρία immediately before causes Plato to write δεήσοιντο (the reading of A) rather than δεήσοιτο in Tim. 76 E . Of the other alleged cases of a plural verb after a neuter plural in Plato, some (e.g. Laws 634 E, 683 B) are not supported by the best MSS; one— ἐξ ὧν τά τε ὀνόματα καὶ τὰ ῥήματα συντίθενται (so AT) Crat. 424 E —is distributive; some refer to living objects, e.g. Laws 658 C (with which contrast κρίνοι just before) and Lach. 180 E ; at least one ( Phil. 24 E ) is perhaps corrupt. See also on Rep. II 365 B.

τυφλότητα κτλ. τυφλότης is also said to be the disease or vice of the eyes in Alc. I 126 B, a passage probably imitated from this. In the stricter discussion of X 608 E it is not τυφλότης but ὀφθαλμία which is the vice to which the eyes are subject.

οὐ γάρ πω ‐‐ ἐρωτῶ is ‘I do not, at this stage, enquire’; but the words do not, I think, contain an express promise that the subject will be afterwards resumed. Although the peculiar vice of the eyes is specified in Book X (l.c.), their virtue is not; and τοῦτο refers to ἥτις αὐτῶν ἡ ἀρετή. Cf. 347 E note

ψυχῆς ἔστιν τι ἔργον : cf. III 407 A and Arist. Eth. Nic. I 6. 1097^{b} 22—1098^{a} 17, where this discussion is closely imitated. That it is the ἔργον of soul (and in particular of νοῦς) to rule ( ἄρχειν, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, and the like), is continually asserted in Plato: see for example Phaedr. 246 B πᾶσα ἡ ψυχὴ παντὸς ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ ἀψύχου, Crat. 400 A , Phil. 30C, Laws 896 A. The same doctrine is made the ground of the subjection of body to soul which is inculcated in the Phaedo (80 A, 94 B), and in Alc. I 130 A. Cf. also Isocrates περὶ ἀντιδόσεως 180 ὁμολογεῖται μὲν γὰρ τὴν φύσιν ἡμῶν ἔκ τε τοῦ σώματος συγκεῖσθαι καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς· αὐτοῖν δὲ τούτοιν οὐδεὶς ἔστιν ὅστις οὐκ ἂν φήσειεν ἡγεμονικωτέραν πεφυκέναι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ πλείονος ἀξίαν· τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἔργον εἶναι βουλεύσασθαι καὶ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων καὶ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν, τοῦ δὲ σώματος ὑπηρετῆσαι τοῖς ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς γνωσθεἶσιν.

ἐκείνου . The reading ἐκείνης—see cr. n.—can only be defended by supposing that Plato was guilty of a strange confusion, unless we make a pause at ἄλλῳ, and take ἤ as ‘or,’ not ‘than’; but ἤ after ἄλλῳ would certainly here be understood as ‘than,’ and an alternative question should be less ambiguously expressed. After ψυχῇ the corruption to ἐκείνης was natural enough. Madvig would eject the word.

τὸζῆν is κατ’ ἐξοχήν the ἔργον of ψυχή in Plato: cf. Crat. 399 D , E τοῦτο ἄρα (sc. ψυχή), ὅταν παρῇ τῷ σώματι, αἴτιόν ἐστι τοῦ ζῆν αὐτῷ, τὴν τοῦ ἀναπνεῖν δύναμιν παρέχον καὶ ἀναψῦχον, ἅμα δὲ ἐκλείποντος τοῦ ἀναψύχοντος τὸ σῶμα ἀπόλλυταί τε καὶ τελευτᾷ· ὅθεν δή μοι δοκοῦσιν αὐτὸ ψυχὴν καλέσαι, and Phaed. 105 D . The influence of this idea makes itself felt in all the proofs of immortality in Plato, and not least in X 608 E ff. See notes ad loc.

συνεχωρήσαμεν κτλ. The reference is to 350 C, D: cf. also 348 C. In these passages Justice has been identified with Virtue, but not expressly with virtue of soul. For this reason Hartman would eject ψυχῆς. But as Plato has just been using ἀρετή ‘excellence’ in connexion with things other than soul (ears and eyes), it is important that he should now make it clear that in identifying δικαιοσύνη and ἀρετή, he meant soul's ἀρετή. Otherwise a soul may possess its ἀρετή without being just; in which case the conclusion which he is aiming at will not follow.

ὅ γε εὖ ζῶν κτλ. The ambiguity (as it appears to us) of εὖ ζῆν and εὖ πράττειν is frequently used by Plato to suggest that the virtuous life is the happy one, e.g. Charm. 172 A , 173 D: see note on 335 B. Aristotle says that Plato was the first to establish this identification: see the third fragment of his elegies vv. 4—6 ed. Bergk ὃς μόνος ἢ πρῶτος θνητῶν κατέδειξεν ἐναργῶς | οἰκείῳ τε βίῳ καὶ μεθόδοισι λόγων | ὡς ἀγαθός τε καὶ εὐδαίμων ἅμα γίνεται ἀνήρ.

εἱστιάσθω . The metaphor occurs again in 352 B, V 458 A, IX 571 D. It is one of the formal links connecting the Timaeus with the Republic: see Tim. 17 A . Cf. Shakespeare Macbeth Act I Scene 4 “In his commendations I am fed: It is a banquet to me.”

Βενδιδείοις . See Introd. § 3.

ὑπὸ σοῦ γε κτλ. Plato seems to be making the amende honorable to Thrasymachus: cf. VI 498 C, D μὴ διάβαλλε— ἐμὲ καὶ Θρασύμαχον ἄρτι φίλους γεγονότας, οὐδὲ πρὸ τοῦ ἐχθροὺς γεγονότας.

παραφερομένου . Casaubon's conjecture περιφερομένου is neat, but inappropriate, the reference being to the successive courses at a feast, which were not usually carried round among the Greeks. In Athen. IV 33 the carrying round of viands is mentioned as an Egyptian custom: τρίτη δ’ ἐστὶν ἰδέα δείπνων αἰγυπτιακή, τραπεζῶν μὲν οὐ παρατιθεμένων, πινάκων δὲ περιφερομένων .

ἐγώ μοι δοκῶ κτλ. Lys. 222 E δέομαι οὖν ὥσπερ οἱ σοφοὶ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις, τὰ εἰρημένα ἅπαντα ἀναπεμπάσασθαι.

ἐγὼ κτλ. λόγου is abstract = τοῦ λέγειν, not ‘the discussion’ (Jowett), which would be τοῦ λόγου. For τὸ δέ see on I 340 D.

ἦν ἄρα : ‘was after all,’ as in IV 443 C τὸ δέ γε ἦν ἄρα—εἴδωλόν τι τῆς δικαιοσύνης and Soph. Tr. 1172 τὸ δ’ ἦν ἄρ’ οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν θανεῖν ἐμέ. With προοίμιον cf. infra VII 531 D, Aesch. P. V. 740 f. ο<*>ς γὰρ νῦν ἀκήκοας λόγους | εἶναι δοκεῖ σοι μηδέπω )ν προοιμίοις, and Shakespeare Macbeth I 3 “As happy prologues to the swelling act Of the imperial theme.” For the sense see the last note on Book I. There is no good ground for supposing (with von Sybel De Platonis Proemiis Academicis) that either Book I of the Republic or the rest of Plato's dialogues were intended merely as προοίμια or ‘Programs’ to attract pupils to his lectures.

βούλει κτλ. The antithesis is between δοκεῖν πεπεικέναι and πεῖσαι, and βούλει is used in its natural sense, not (as Ast thinks) with the force of μᾶλλον βούλει.

λέγε γάρ μοι . Other classifications of ‘goods’ in Plato will be found in Laws 631 B ff. and 697 B ff. (with which compare Arist. Eth. Nic. I 8. 1098^{b} 12 ff.). See also Euthyd. 279 A ff., Gorg. 467 E , Phil. 66 A ff. The nearest parallels to the present classification are furnished by Stoicism, in which goods were classified as a τελικά, b ποιητικά, c both τελικά and ποιητικά, and the προηγμένα as a δἰ αὑτά, b δἰ ἕτερα, c καὶ δἰ αὑτὰ καὶ δἰ ἕτερα see D. L. VII 96, 107.

χαίρειν ‐‐ ἀβλαβεῖς . These ‘innocent pleasures’ are defined in Laws 667 E as those which bring no consequences in their train, good, bad, or otherwise (cf. καὶ μηδὲν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον διὰ ταύτας γίγνεται ἄλλο ἢ χαίρειν ἔχοντα). They are not quite identical with the ‘pure pleasures’ of Phil. 51 B , which are not necessarily devoid of all results, but only of pain. The same conception recurs in Aristotle, who regards the ἀβλαβεῖς ἡδοναί both as conducive to the ethical end and as useful for purposes of recreation ( Pol. Θ 5. 1339^{b} 25).

καὶ μηδὲν κτλ. The relative passes into a demonstrative ( ταύτας) in the second half of the sentence, as in III 412 D, VI 505 D, E, VII 521 B, and elsewhere. The idiom is regular in Greek, but the second pronoun is more usually some case of αὐτός than of οὗτος, e.g. III 395 D, VI 511 C, Gorg. 452 D , Theaet. 192 A . Cobet however ( Mnem. XI p. 167) goes too far in maintaining that αὐτός is alone permissible in this idiom. Cf. Engelhardt Anac. Plat. Spec. III pp. 41—43. μηδέν is used in preference to οὐδέν: for “cogitatione circumscriptum genus significatur” (Schneider). With the sentiment Muretus compared Arist. Eth. Nic. X 2. 1172^{b} 22 οὐδένα γὰρ ἐπερωτᾶν τίνος ἕνεκα ἥδεται, ὡς καθ’ αὑτὴν οὖσαν αἱρετὴν τὴν ἡδονήν.

ἔχοντα : sc. αὐτάς (so also Schneider), not the idiomatic ‘to continue rejoicing’ (as Campbell suggests). The essential mark of these pleasures, viz. that they give pleasure only while they last, is brought out by ἔχοντα, which recalls δεξαίμεθ’ ἂν ἔχειν just above, and is used without an expressed object as in 366 E.

τὸ φρονεῖν ‐‐ ὑγιαίνειν . ἀκούειν is added in 367 C. Cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. I 4. 1096^{b} 16 καθ) αὑτὰ δὲ ποῖα θείη τις ἄν; ἢ ὅσα καὶ μονούμενα διώκεται, οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἡδοναί τινες καὶ τιμαί; ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ καὶ δἰ ἄλλο τι διώκομεν, ὅμως τῶν καθ) αὑτὰ ἀγαθῶν θείη τις ἄν: also Met. A 1. 980^{a} 2 ff. Aristotle himself does not suggest that a special class should be made of things desirable both in themselves and for their results; but integri sensus and bona valetudo are included in the Stoic category of προηγμένα καὶ δἰ αὑτὰ καὶ δἰ ἕτερα (Cic. De Fin. III 56: cf. D. L. VII 107).

γυμνάζεσθαι κτλ. Cf. Prot. 354 A and Gorg. 467 C , D (where χρηματισμός is again said to belong to this class). ἰάτρευσις as an example of χρηματισμός (in spite of the ἀκριβὴς λόγος of I 342 B ff.) is suggested by ἰατρεύεσθαι. ὁ ἄλλος is ‘the rest of,’ and should not be taken (with Stallbaum) as praeterea: cf. Gorg. l.c. οἱ πλέοντές τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον χρηματισμὸν χρηματιζόμενοι and Crito 53 E.

μισθῶν θ’ ἕνεκα κτλ. Herwerden would read μισθῶν τε μὲν ἕνεκα, but for δέ without μέν preceding see I 340 D note The words διὰ δόξαν, which are condemned by the same critic, may no doubt be a gloss on εὐδοκιμήσεων ἕνεκα. I incline however to think them genuine. Plato is not averse to duplicate expressions of this kind (see Schanz Nov. Comm. Plat. pp. 12—15), and the emphatic addition of διὰ δόξαν helps in the absence of μέν to prepare us for the antithesis αὐτὸ δὲ δἰ αὑτὸ κτλ. Cf. 363 A below.

ψέγεται . See cr. n. The words ἀδικία δ’ ἐπαινεῖται are probably genuine: for the mention of ἀδικία seems to be necessary to justify the pronoun ἑκατέρου just below: cf. also in D βούλομαι καὶ σοῦ ἀκούειν ἀδικίαν μὲν ψέγοντος, δικαιοσύνην δὲ ἐπαινοῦντος. For the omission see Introd. § 5.

ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡς ἀγαθόν . Cf. infra 360 C and VI 493 C τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν ὅσον διαφέρει τῷ ὄντι κτλ.

ἀμείνων ἄρα . ἄρα disclaims responsibility for the theory: cf. 362 A, 364 B, E al.

Θρασυμάχου ‐‐ ἄλλων . See on I 337 A ff.

κατατείνας κτλ. : ‘I will speak vehemently in praise of the unjust life.’ The explanation of Photius and Suidas ( κατατείνας ἐρῶ· ἀντὶ τοῦ μακρὸν λόγον διεξελεύσομαι) does not suit II 367 B ὡς δύναμαι μάλιστα κατατείνας λέγω. For this intransitive use of κατατείνω cf. I 348 A and Boeckh's emendation of Eur. Iph. Aul. 336 οὔτε κατατενῶ ( καταινῶ MSS) λίαν ἐγώ.

εἴ σοι βουλομένῳ . In Crat. 384 A ἐστί is again omitted in this phrase. A still bolder example is cited by Stallbaum from Antipho 6. 8 ἐὰν ὑμῖν ἡδομένοις. See Schanz Novae Comm. Plat. pp. 31— 35.

οἷόν τέ τι . The reading of A τί ὄν τε καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε involves the separation of ὅθεν from γέγονε, and is otherwise much too harsh to be right. There is something to be said in favour of Schneider's περὶ τούτου ἅκουε τί οἴονται, καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε δικαιοσύνη (see cr. n.), especially as the confusion between οἷόν τε and οἴονται occurs rather frequently in Platonic MSS (see Schneider on 1 329 E), but the specific reference in ὃ ἔφην πρῶτον ἐρεῖν to 358 C πρῶτον μὲν ἐρῶ δικαιοσύνην οἷον εἶναί φασι καὶ ὅθεν γεγονέναι points to the presence of οἷον here. The reading οἷόν τε, adopted by Stallbaum, as well as by Jowett and Campbell, on the authority of three MSS (Vind. F, Flor. RT), is unexceptionable in point of sense, but fails to account for the presence of τί in the best MSS. I have ventured to read οἷόν τέ τι (SC. ἐστί), supposing that the confusion arose from the accidental omission of τι, which was afterwards (as τί) wrongly inserted before οἶόν (where it remained in Π), οἷον itself being afterwards changed to ὄν in order to provide a kind of construction (‘being what, and whence, it arises,’ J. and C.). This ὄν was itself fortified by τυγχάνει in Flor. B and the Aldine edition. Campbell's suggestion that “ τί ὄν τε may be a corruption of τί ἐστί” is improbable: still less can Herwerden and Hartman induce us to reject the whole clause. Few will approve of Tucker's conjecture τί τῷ ὄντι καὶ ὅθεν κτλ. Dr Jackson suggests ἄκουέ τι, οἷόν τε καὶ κτλ., and a reviewer of my Text of the Republic in Lit. Centralblatt 1898 p. 296 οἷόν τ’ ἐστί κτλ.

πεφυκέναι γὰρ ‐‐ κακόν . Cf. Gorg. 483 A φύσει μὲν γὰρ πᾶν αἴσχιόν ἐστιν ὅπερ καὶ κάκιον, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, νόμῳ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν. That the natural relation between man and man is one of war is a view expressed in Laws 626 A ἢν γὰρ καλοῦσιν οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰρήνην, τοῦτ’ εἶναι μόνον ὄνομα, τῷ δ’ ἔργῳ πάσαις πρὸς πάσας τὰς πόλεις ἀεὶ πόλεμον ἀκήρυκτον κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι. A similar theory is contained in the myth of Protagoras ( Prot. 322 B ff.).

τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις κτλ. : i.e. (according to the theory of Callicles) τοῖς ἀσθενέσι ἀνθρώποις καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ( Gorg. 483 B ). In place of δοκεῖ in 359 A I have adopted Ast's conjecture δοκεῖν. Throughout this paragraph Glauco consistently presents his view at second hand. For the collocation of infinitives cf. ἀδικεῖν, ἀδικεῖν 360 D, and for the error itself Introd. § 5.

ξυνθήκας αὑτῶν : ‘covenants between one another,’ ‘mutual covenants.’ Reading αὐτῶν, Tucker suggests that the meaning is, ‘they established laws and covenants concerning them,’ i.e. concerning matters connected with ἀδικεῖν and ἀδικεῖσθαι—a very improbable view.

νόμιμόν τε καὶ δίκαιον · φημὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ τὸ νόμιμον δίκαιον εἶναι, said Socrates ( Mem. IV 4. 12).

τοῦ μὲν ἀρίστου κτλ. Cf. the reasoning of Philus (whose position in Cicero's work corresponds to that of Glauco here) in Cic. de Rep. III 23 “nam cum de tribus unum esset optandum, aut facere iniuriam nec accipere, aut et facere et accipere, aut neutrum, optimum est facere, impune si possis, secundum nec facere nec pati, miserrimum digladiari semper tum faciendis tum accipiendis iniuriis.” Cicero is following Carneades ( ibid. 8), who may have been thinking of the present passage. ἀγαπᾶσθαι below (as J. and C. observe) “implies acquiescence rather than decided preference.”

ἐπεὶ τὸν δυνάμενον κτλ. is further elaborated with much vigour in Gorg. 484 A . With ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα should be compared the emphatic ἀνήρ in that passage ( ἐὰν δέ γε, οἶμαι, φύσιν ἱκανὴν γένηται ἔχων ἀνήρ), and Eur. Phoen. 509 ἀνανδρία γάρ, τὸ πλέον ὅστις ἀπολέσας | τοὔλασσον ἔλαβε.

εἰ τοιόνδε ‐‐ δόντες . δόντες κτλ. explains τοιόνδε. εἰ need not be twice expressed: cf. I 351 C note

νόμῳ ‐‐ παράγεται . The language is perhaps suggested by the lines of Pindar cited in Gorg. 484 B νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων— ἄγει δικαιῶν τὸ βιαιότατον ὑπερτάτᾳ χειρί κτλ. (cf. Prot. 337 D ). but the preposition in παράγεται adds the further notion that equality is not Nature's highway. For βίᾳ i.q. βιαἴως in conjunction with another dative Schneider cites VIII 552 E οὓς ἐπιμελείᾳ βίᾳ κατέχουσιν αἱ ἀρχαί. In the next line it is better to regard τοιάδε as explained by εἰ—γενέσθαι, than as balancing οἴαν, in which case εἰ αὐτοῖς γένοιτο would be superfluous. The opportunity ( ἐξουσία) of working their will comes from the possession ( εἰ αὐτοῖς γένοιτο) of a certain active faculty ( δύναμις) like that of Gyges.

τῷ Γύγου κτλ. Cf. X 612 B τὸν Γύγου δακτύλιον. In Appendix I I have given reasons for believing that the Gyges of the proverbial ‘Gyges' ring’ was not “Gyges the Lydian”—the hero of Herodotus' story (I 7), but a homonymous ancestor of his. If so, we must (on the hypothesis that the text is sound) suppose that Plato here omits the name of the original Gyges either because he wishes tacitly to contradict a prevalent misconception, or (more probably) because his readers might be presumed to know or to be capable of inferring that the ancestor of Gyges the Lydian was also called Gyges. The MS reading is supported by Proclus ( τῷ κατὰ τὸν Γύγου πρόγονον διηγήματι in Schöll Procli Comm. in Remp. Pl. part. ined. p. 60. 30). For other views of this passage see App. I.

ὡς φαίνεσθαι : with νεκρόν, as Schneider saw: “utrum vere mortuus fuerit, an specie, fabula incertum reliquit.” Stallbaum wrongly interprets ‘nimirum videbatur Gyges cernere’ etc.: this would be expressed by δοκεῖν. Ast connects the phrase with μείζω ἢ κατ’ ἄνθρωπον: but this is very weak in point of sense. The words are omitted by Cicero ( De Off. III 38).

ἔχειν . See cr. n. and (for the omission in A) Introd. § 5. ἔχειν in the sense of ‘have on’ ‘wear,’ i.q. φορεῖν, is tolerably frequent in Homer, though rarer in Attic: see Stephanus-Hase Thes. s.v. For the change of subject in ἔχειν—ἐκβῆναι cf. III 414 D note Other views on the text and interpretation of this passage are discussed in App. II.

χειρί . Herwerden's δακτύλῳ is unnecessary, and even unpleasant with δακτύλιον so near. Cf. χρυσόχειρες in Luc. Tim. 20. “Etiamnunc homines ita loquuntur” (Hartman).

ἵν’ ἐξαγγέλλοιεν κτλ. : ‘to report, as was done every month.’ The present expresses the habit (J. and C.).

σφενδόνην : the ‘collet’ or ‘bezel’ (Lat. funda or pala annuli)— which is as it were the sling in which the stone is set.

ὡς δόξειεν . “Optativus eandem vim habet, quam solet in oratione obliqua habere, efficitque, ut verba οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο οὕτως etc. ex aliorum ore missa videantur" (Schneider). This explanation appears to me better than any other, although I can discover no exact parallel in Greek. Glauco is most careful throughout the whole of this section to disclaim responsibility for the views he advocates: cf. ὡς ὁ λόγος 359 B, ἐπεὶ— ἀδικεῖν in C, ὡς φήσει κτλ. in D below: also 361 E al. Tucker would translate ‘as it might seem,’ defending the optative by Ar. Birds 180 ὥσπερ εἴποι τις and Eur. Andr. 929 ὡς εἴποι τις. Others erroneously hold that ἄν may be supplied from ἂν γένοιτο, while Ast is desirous of inserting the particle on conjecture. I do not think that the optative can be explained as an instance of irregular assimilation or attraction.

ἂν μείνειεν . For ἄν cf. Symp. 179 A and other examples in Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 934.

ἰσόθεον ὄντα . The halfconscious irony of ἰσόθεος foreshadows Plato's attack on the popular theology.

οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν δίκαιος here and in 366 D sums up the Thrasymachean theory in a phrase which suggests the Socratic and Platonic antithesis οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν πονηρός .

περὶ ‐‐ λέγων . περί can hardly be for ὑπέρ, nor dare we write ὑπέρ for περί (as Badham suggests). The words mean simply ‘qui de hoc argumento verba facit,’ ‘the exponent of such a theory.’ Cf. 362 D ἱκανῶς εἰρῆσθαι περὶτοῦλόγου. Muretus seems to have desiderated πατήρ for περί: cf. expressions like Phaedr. 275 E ( λόγος) τοῦ πατρὸς ἀεὶ δεῖται βοηθοῦ. On the strength of this Herwerden would read ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου, rejecting λέγων (“posteaquam ex πήρ factum est περί, corrector addidit λέγων”). The ‘father of the theory’ would mean Thrasymachus: see on ὦ παῖδες in 368 A. It is just possible that πατήρ was read by Ficinus (“ut sermonis huius perhibent auctores”), and if so, the variant may have some ancient authority now lost; but Herwerden's proposal is too drastic, and the text is probably sound.

ἀθλιώτατος . Apelt conjectures ἠλιθιώτατος, but cf. (with Hartman) I 344 A τοὺς δὲ—ἀδικῆσαι οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοντας ἀθλιωτάτους.

τὴν δὲ κρίσιν κτλ. αὐτήν opposes the third division of Glauco's speech to the other two (see 358 C), and marks it as the most important. A kindred use of αὐτός recurs at 370 E ἀλλὰ μήν,—κατοικίσαι γε αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν —ἀδύνατον. I formerly read αὖ τὴν for αὐτήν, but the MS reading is quite de fensible. It should be noticed that κρίσιν is at first a kind of pendent accusative, afterwards “resumed as a cognate accusative with κρῖναι” (J. and C.). Tucker strangely makes κρίσιν=‘choice.’ The word means of course (our) ‘judgment’ concerning etc. Cf. 361 D ἵν’ ἀμφότεροι —κρίνωνται and εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἐκκαθαίρεις.

εἰς goes with τέλεον: cf. δόξαν εἰς 361 A.

οὕτω ‐‐ λανθανέτω . ἐπιχειρῶν ὀρθῶς means of course attempting possible, and abstaining from impossible, ἀδικήματα. But as an ἀδίκημα is possible only if the ἀδικῶν is able to conceal it (the alternative of open violence is recognised later 361 B), it is necessary that the unjust man should escape detection. Hence λανθανέτω, although λανθάνειν was not attributed (because not essential) to the pilot and doctor (360 E).

φαῦλον means a ‘bungler’ (D. and V.). With the sentiment cf. Prot. 317 A τὸ οὖν ἀποδιδράσκοντα μὴ δύνασθαι ἀπξδρᾶναι, ἀλλὰ καταφανῆ εἶναι, πολλὴ μωρία καὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρήματος: also Laws 845 B, and the Spartan practice of punishing boys not for stealing, but for being caught (Xen. Rep. Lac. 2. 8). With ἐσχάτη γὰρ ἀδικία κτλ. the editors compare Cicero de Off. I 41 “totius autem iniustitiae nulla capitalior est, quam eorum, qui, cum maxime fallunt, id agunt, ut viri boni esse videantur.”

κατ) Αἰσχύλον ‐‐ ἀγαθόν . Sept. 592—594 (of Amphiaraus) οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἄριστος, ἀλλ’ εἶναι θέλει | βαθεῖαν ἄλοκα διὰ φρενὸς καρπούμενος, | ἐξ ἧς τὰ κεδνὰ βλαστάνει βουλεύματα. Herwerden would expunge ἀγαθόν (“mente repetatur ἁπλοῦν καὶ γενναῖον”), on the ground that if Plato had added any adjective, it would have been δίκαιον. (The Scholiast substitutes δίκαιος for ἄριστος in Aeschylus.) ἀγαθόν gives excellent sense, and is nearer to the poet's words.

εἴη is explained by Stallbaum as an optative of wish (though in a subordinate clause): ‘it is not clear therefore whether he is fain to be just,’ etc. This gives a fair sense, but the idiom is obscure, and unsupported by other examples. J. and C. remark that “the optative accords with the conditional nature of the case in an imagined future,” taking ἄδηλον as for ἄδηλον ἂν εἴη. But an omitted ἂν εἴη cannot be responsible for the mood of τοιοῦτος εἴη, nor could ἂν εἴη easily be omitted (see Schanz Nov. Comm. Pl. p. 33). Still less should we accept Hartman's ἄδηλον <ἂν> οὖν, sc. εἴη. Madvig ejects εἴη altogether, understanding ἐστι after τοιοῦτος. This may be right, but its intrusion is not easy to explain. I think the word is genuine, and means ‘was’: ‘it is not clear then, say they, whether he was just,’ etc. Glauco again disclaims responsibility: cf. 360 B note εἴη would in direct speech be ἦν: and the idiom is like that in III 406 E, where see note. For the sequence of moods and tenses cf. VI 490 A note Failing this interpretation, the word must (I think) be spurious. Herwerden's proposal— τοιούτῳ εἶναι, ἄδηλον ὄν (retaining εἴη)—does not surmount the difficulty and is also wrong in point of sense.

ἀπ’ αὐτῆς . See cr. n. The sense required is not ‘what is produced by’ ( ὑπό) ‘it,’ but ‘what results from it’: cf. γίγνεσθαι ἀπό (in a similar connexion) 357 C and 358 B. The scribe no doubt assimilated the preposition to the preceding ὑπό.

ἔστω . See cr. n. I formerly read ἴτω with A^{1} and the majority of editors, but I now agree with Schneider that ἔστω is right. ἴτω cannot be used by itself as a synonym for ‘live,’ or as a copula: we should require ἴτω διὰ βίου, instead of ἴτω μέχρι θανάτου (to transpose the two phrases would of course be too violent a change). The sole authority for ἴτω is the first hand in A: and this is certainly insufficient to outweigh the inherent superiority of ἔστω. Most MSS have ἤτω, a late form for ἔστω.

ἐκκαθαίρεις : not ‘polish up’ (J. and C.) but rather ‘scour clean’ (D. and V.), ‘purge’ from all extraneous matter: see 361 C γυμνωτέος δὴ πάντων πλὴν δικαιοσύνης.

ἀγροικοτέρως is said with reference to the exaggeration and coarseness of the description: cf. Ap. 32 D , Gorg. 509 A .

δεδήσεται : ‘will be kept in chains.’ δεθήσεται (so v and some other MSS) is required by Herwerden, and may be right. But in Xen. Cyr. IV 3. 18 δεδήσομαι is similarly combined with several first futures.

ἐκκαυθήσεται κτλ. Schneider refers to Hdt. VII 18 θερμοῖσι σιδηρίοισι ἐκκαίειν—τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς, and Gorg. 473 C ἐὰν—στρεβλῶται καὶ ἐκτέμνηται καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐκκάηται. That ἐκκαυθήσεται (and not ἐκκοπήσεται, the reading of some inferior MSS, and of the ancient authorities who cite this passage) is right here, is probable also from X 613 E ἃ ἄγροικα ἔφησθα σὺ εἶναι ἀληθῆ λέγων, εἶτα στρεβλώσονται καὶ ἐκκαυθήσονται, whether the last clause is genuine or not. It is not clear that Cicero ( de Rep. III 27) did not find ἐκκαυθήσεται in his text; for though he has effodiantur oculi, he adds afterwards vinciatur, uratur. Herwerden recasts the words of Plato to suit Cicero's translation, but Cicero is a much less trustworthy witness than Paris A.

ἄρα : see on 358 C. τῷ ὄντι in the same line belongs not to φήσουσι, but to τὸν ἄδικον—ἐθέλειν.

βαθεῖαν κτλ. : “reaping in his thoughts the fruit of the deep furrow, from which good counsel grows” (Verrall). Plato takes τὰ κεδνὰ βουλεύματα more concretely, and places in apposition thereto ἄρχειν and the other infinitives down to ὠφελεῖσθαι, δοκοῦντι being the dative of interest after βλαστάνει. For the change from the dative δοκοῦντι to the accusative κερδαίνοντα cf. Euthyph. 5 A and infra IV 422 B, C.

κοινωνεῖν . Cobet deletes this word, as well as καὶ κοινωνήματα in Laws 738 A πρὸς ἅπαντα τὰ ξυμβόλαια καὶ κοινωνήματα. In view of the same passage Platt ( Cl. Rev. III p. 72) would read καὶ κοινωνεῖν. No change is necessary, for κοινωνεῖν is a term of wider connotation than ξυμβάλλειν (see I 333 A note), and the asyndeton has a rhetorical effect: cf. III 407 B, V 465 C, VI 488 C, IX 590 A notes

πλεονεκτεῖν recalls I 343 D, E, 349 B ff., as τούς τε φίλους εὐ ποιεῖν κτλ. recalls the theory attributed to Simonides in I 334 B. Here however it is not Justice, but Injustice masquerading as Justice, which is said to benefit friends and injure enemies.

μᾶλλον προσήκειν . The comparative is attached to the verb as well as to the adjective, so as to combine the force of two expressions, viz. (1) ὥστε καὶ θεοφιλῆ αὐτὸν εἶναι μᾶλλον προσήκειν and (2) ὥστε καὶ θεοφιλέστερον αὐτὸν εἶναι προσήκειν. In cases like λαθραιότερον μᾶλλον Laws 781 A, μᾶλλον is quite redundant: in Hipp. Mai. 285 A ἔστι δέ γε—ὠφελιμώτερον—παιδεύεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ κτλ. it is resumptive. See on the whole subject Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 25.

παρεσκευάσθαι ‐‐ ἄμεινον . For ἄμεινον Richards would read ἀμείνον) or ἀμείνονα: cf. 358 C πολὺ γὰρ ἀμείνων ἄρα ὁ τοῦ ἀδίκου ἢ ὁ τοῦ δικαίου βίος. The change is tempting at first sight; but Plato generally uses ἀμείνω and not ἀμείνονα, and the adverb expresses what is virtually the same meaning, since a βίος ἄμεινον παρεσκευασμένος (cf. πόλιν εὖ παρεσκευασμένην Laws 751 B) is (according to the views here described) a βίος ἀμείνων. Hermann's χείρον) for χεῖρον in Phaed. 85 B , though adopted by Schanz, is also unnecessary, for ἔχειν may be intransitive.

ἔφη . See cr. n. ἔφη is present in the majority of MSS, and cannot be dispensed with, where the interlocutor is specified, as here. See Introd. § 5.

ἀδελφὸς ἀνδρὶ παρείη : frater adsit fratri. Ast proposed to insert ἂν before ἀνδρί, making the sentence interrogative. The rhythm would thus approximate to the usual paroemiac rhythm of proverbs: but the brevity and force of the proverb would suffer. If change were needed it would be better to adopt Shilleto's elegant suggestion ἀδελφεὸς ἀνδρὶ παρείη (note on Dem. F. L. § 262), but even if this was the original expression, it would be quite in Plato's manner to substitute the modern for the archaic word, in defiance of rhythm. The source of the proverb (with which compare συγγνώμη ἀδελφῷ βοηθεῖν F. L. § 264) is found by the Scholiast in Od. XVI 97 f. ἤ τι κασιγνήτοις ἐπιμέμφεαι, οἷσί περ ἀνὴρ | μαρναμένοισι πέποιθε, καὶ εἰ μέγα νεῖκος ὄρηται. Cf. also Il. XXI 308 f. and Xen. Mem. II 3. 19.

ἐναντίους . Adimantus' λόγοι are ἐναντίοι, because they praise Justice, and censure Injustice: whereas Glauco had done the reverse: κατατείνας ε<*>ρῶ τὸν ἄδικον βίον ἐπαινῶν (358 D).

αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην . Not αὐτοδικαιοσύνην (with the second hand in A), which would be the (chiefly postPlatonic) expression for the Idea of Justice (cf. αὐτοάνθ ρωπος and the like). αὐτό is ipsum, ‘by itself,’ as in αὐτοὶ γάρ ἐσμεν: cf. Theaet. 146 E γνῶναι ἐπιστήμην αὐτὸ ὄ τι ποτ’ ἐστιν, and infra V 472 C, X 612 B (cited by J. and C.). αὐτό may be thus used even when the feminine of the article is present, e.g. Prot. 361 A αὐτὸ ἡ ἀρετή: cf. also Crat. 411 D .

γίγνηται . The nominatives are treated as equivalent to a neuter plural, whence the singular verb. Cf. Symp. 188 B , Laws 925 E, Andocides I 145. γίγνεσθαι is the verb in each of these examples. See also infra V 462 E.

τῷ δικαίῳ . Schneider is right in refusing to change the δικαίῳ of A, II and most MSS to ἀδίκῳ, which has the authority of a few inferior MSS. The reference in διῆλθεν ἄρτι is no doubt to 362 B, where the benefits accrue to the man who seems to be just, although in reality he is unjust. But ὄντα etc. should be taken, not with διῆλθεν, but as part of the parents' exhortation. This yields a better rhythm, and much better sense. The parents exhort their children to be just, in order that ( ἵνα depends on χρὴ δίκαιον εἶναι) they may obtain the rewards ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν ὄντα τῷ δικαίῳ. They very properly assume that the surest way to seem to be just (and so to obtain the rewards of justice) is to be just: cf. Xen. Mem. II 6. 39 συντομωτάτη τε καὶ ἀσφαλεστάτη καὶ καλλίστη ὁδὸς—ὅ τι ἂν βούλῃ δοκεῖν ἀγαθὸς εἶναι, τοῦτο καὶ γενέσθαι ἀγαθὸν πειρᾶσθαι and ib. I 7. 1 with Heracl. Fr. 137 ed. Bywater συντομωτάτην ὁδὸν—εἰς εὐδοξίαν τὸ γενέσθαι ἀγαθόν. Glauco's picture of the just man as one who seems to be unjust is untrue to the facts of experience, as Socrates points out in X 612 D: nor did even Glauco go so far as to say that the unjust man, qua unjust, ηὐδοκίμει, but only ὁ δοκῶν δίκαιος εἶναι (who may, of course, be unjust). The divorce between appearance and reality is purely argumentative, and out of place in parental exhortations. Further, in order to make ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν ὄντα etc. represent what Glauco said, we should have to read τῷ ἀδίκῳ μὲν δοκοῦντι δὲ δικαίῳ: otherwise the words δοξαζομένων δὲ ἀδίκων in the corresponding phrase (363 E) might just as well be omitted. If ὄντα is construed with διῆλθεν, the words τῷ δικαίῳ must (with Ast) be expunged: but that the clause represents what the parents say is further proved by the exact correspondence of ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν ὄντα τῷ δικαίῳ with τὰς ἀπ’ αὐτῆς (sc. δικαιοσύνης ) εὐδοκιμήσεις, which is what the parents praise. I have dwelt on this point at some length because recent English editors (except Tucker) have wrongly deserted Paris A.

τοῖς ὁσίοις depends on ἀγαθά (‘good things for the pious’): cf. ἀγαθὰ διῆλθε τῷ τοῦ ἀδίκου I 348 A note This is much simpler than to punctuate ἀγαθά, τοῖς ο<*>σίοις ἅ as the other editors do. Such a postponement of the relative is rare, and here, I think, unduly harsh, in spite of the analogy of III 390 B and IV 425 C. Cobet felt the difficulty when in an unhappy moment he suggested ἀγαθά, ἃ τοῖς ὁσίοις κτλ.

Ἡσίοδός τε κτλ. Hesiod and Homer are appealed to as recognised theological authorities: see Hdt. II 53.

ἄκρας ‐‐ καταβεβρίθασι . OD. 232 f. τοῖσι (i.e. ἰθυδίκῃσιν ἀνδράσι) φέρει μὲν γαῖα πολὺν β<*>ον, οὔρεσι δὲ δρῦς | ἄκρη μέν τε φέρει βαλάνους, μέσση δὲ μελίσσας· | εἰροπόκοι δ’ ὄϊες μαλλοῖς καταβεβρίθασι. Further rewards of justice ( ἄλλα δὴ πολλὰ ἀγαθά) are enumerated in vv. 227—231, and 235—237. Many other illustrations in support of Plato's attack on Greek religion throughout this passage will be found in Nägelsbach's Hom. Theol. and Nachhom. Theol. passim.

ὥστε τευ ‐‐ ἰχθῦς . Od. XIX 109 ff. The ἤ before βασιλῆος is difficult: apparently the author intended to give two comparisons, but dropped the second. We are hardly justified, I think, in abolishing the anacoluthon by reading (with Platt) ὥστέ τεο βασιλῆος or (with Ameis) ὥστε τευ ἦ.

Μουσαῖος κτλ. By Musaeus' son Plato probably means Eumolpus (cf. Suidas s. vv. Εὔμολπος and Μουσαῖος). In this section of the argument Plato directs his attack against certain forms of the Orphic conception of a future life: see Lobeck Aglaophamus p. 807 with Rohde Psyche^{2} II pp. 127, 129 notes, and Dieterich Nekyia pp. 72 ff. 77 ff. notes Lobeck refers to Plut. Comp. Cim. et Lucull. 2 Πλάτων ἐπισκώπτει τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ὀρφέα τοῖς εὖ βεβιωκόσι φάσκοντας ἀποκεῖσθαι γέρας ἐν ᾅδου μέθην αἰώνιον and id. Ne suav. quidem vivi posse sec. Epic. 1105 B, where the allusion to Plato is less clear: also D. L. VI 4.

συμπόσιον τῶν ὁσίων . ὅσιοι was the regular appellation of the μύσται ( ὁσίους μύστας hymn. Orph. 84. 3 ed. Abel). For the συμπόσιον cf. [ Axioch.] 371 D συμπόσιά τε εὐμελῆ καὶ εἰλαπίναι αὐτοχορήγητοι καὶ ἀκήρατος ἀλυπία καὶ ἡδεῖα δίαιτα. The stock example in antiquity of earthly virtue rewarded by the delights of a sensuous paradise is Heracles: see e.g. Pind. Nem. I 71, Theocr. XVII 28 f. and Horace Od. III 3. 9 f., IV 8. 29 f. A somewhat higher note is struck in Pind. Ol. II 61 ff. and Fr. 129 f. Several of these passages shew traces of Orphic influence, but the special instance of Heracles is traceable to Homer ( Od. XI 602 f.).

μέθην αἰώνιον may be illustrated from the fragment of Pherecrates ap. Athen. VI 268 E ff.

ἀποτίνουσιν . See cr. n. The reading of A is defended by Stallbaum as an abbreviation for μακροτέρους λόγους ἀποτείνουσι περὶ μισθῶν παρὰ θεῶν; but no other example of this harsh condensation has been adduced, and the sense is far from satisfactory. A better meaning is conveyed by Schneider's translation, “Andere aber lassen die Belohnungen der Götter noch weiter reichen als diese”: for it is clear from the next clause that μακροτέρους (‘more extensive,’ not, of course, ‘greater,’ which would be μείζους) refers to the extension of the rewards of virtue beyond the personality of the individual concerned. But μακροτέρους ἀποτείνουσιν μισθούς is (to say the least) an obscure and difficult expression; and ἀποτίνουσιν (i.q. λέγουσιν ἀποτίνεσθαι) receives strong support from the parallel use of διδόασιν in C above, and κατορύττουσιν, ἀναγκάζουσι, and ἄγοντες below. The collocation of μακροτέρους with ἀποτίνουσι may easily have led to the corruption ἀποτείνουσι, owing to the frequency of such expressions as μακροὺς λόγους ἀποτείνειν. For the error see Introd. § 5.

παῖδας ‐‐ κατόπισθεν . The Scholiast remarks ἐξ Ἡροδότου (VI 86) ἀπὸ τοῦ δοθέντος χρησμοῦ Γλαύκῳ τῷ Λάκωνι ὡς Ἀνδρὸς δ’ εὐόρκου γενεὴ μετόπισθεν ἀμείνων. The story of Glaucus admirably illustrates the view herein expressed; but Plato is more probably thinking of Hesiod OD. 285 (a line which is identical with that quoted from the oracle), and also perhaps of some such lines as those of Tyrtaeus 12. 29 f. καὶ τύμβος καὶ παῖδες ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀρίσημοι | καὶ παίδων παῖδες καὶ γένος ἐξοπίσω.

εἰς πηλόν τινα κατορύττουσιν . τινα is contemptuous: ‘something which they call mud’: cf. 372 B infra and Symp. 210 D ( ἀνθρώπου τινός). The ‘mud’ is Orphic: see Abel Orphic. p. 247 and cf. Phaed. 69 C , Rep. VII 533 D, and the σκῶρ ἀείνων of Ar. Frogs 146 , with Blaydes' note. See also Rohde Psyche^{2} I p. 313 note and Dieterich Nekyia pp. 82 f. The employment of the Danaid legend in Orphic teaching is illustrated by Gorg. 493 B : cf. also Dieterich Nekyia pp. 69 f., 75.

δοξαζομένων δέ . For δέ without μέν see I 340 D note

ἄλλα δὲ οὐκ ἔχουσιν : sc. λέγειν τιμωρήματα. Adimantus means that they dissuade men from injustice merely on account of its results, ignoring τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ ἐνὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ (358 B). J. and C. aptly cite Theaet. 176 D , E ἀγνοοῦσι γὰρ ζημίαν ἀδικίας, ὃ δεῖ ἥκιστα ἀγνοεῖν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἣν δοκοῦσιν, πληγαί τε καὶ θάνατοι, ὧν ἐνίοτε πάσχουσιν οὐδὲν ἀδικοῦντες, ἀλλ’ ἣν ἀδύνατον ἐκφυγεῖν, viz. “that by their wicked acts they become like the pattern of evil.”

ἰδίᾳ has been understood of writing in prose, but the reference is only to the representations of private persons, e.g. parents, etc.)(to poets, who were in a sense the professional teachers of Hellas: cf. X 606 C, Laws 890 A ἰδιωτῶν τε καὶ ποιητῶν, and 366 E below.

καλὸν μὲν ‐‐ ἐπίπονον . See cr. n. For the omission of τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη see Introd. § 5. The sentiment may be illustrated by Hesiod OD. 289—292 and Simon. ap. Pl. Prot. 339 B ff. ἄνδρ’ ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπόν κτλ.; cf. also Simonides' imitation of Hesiod ( Fr. 58 ed. Bergk).

ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος : i.q. ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. So also Phaedr. 275 B . The sentiment recurs in Isocr. de Pace § 31.

πονηρούς is the substantive, and ἄλλας δυνάμεις ἔχοντας balances πλουσίους. πλούτους, parallel to ἄλλας δυνάμεις, and also dependent on ἔχοντας, might appear neater. But there is no reason for deserting the MSS, although Plato is fond of the plural of πλοῦτος (cf. e.g. VI 495 A, X 618 B, 619 A). The sentiment is best illustrated from Polus's description of the happiness of Archelaus in Gorg. 471 A ff.

ὡς ἄρα ‐‐ μοῖραν . ἄρα hints dissent: cf. 358 C note The gnomic poets often express themselves in this vein: e.g. Solon 15. 1 πολλοὶ γὰρ πλουτεῦσι κακοί, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ πένονται, Theogn. 373— 380. A kindred sentiment occurs in Sophocles Phil. 447—452. For the most part however it is held that Justice asserts herself in the end: see for example Solon 4. 15 f., 13. 7—32. Euripides expresses the general teaching of Greek tragedy on this subject when he writes ( Ion 1621 f.) ἐς τέλος γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἐσθλοὶ τυγχάνουσιν ἀξίων, | οἱ κακοὶ δ’ , ὥσπερ πεφύκασ’ , οὔποτ’ εὖ πράξειαν ἄν. There is no occasion to write (with Richards) πολλάκις τοῖς for πολλοῖς.

ἐπὶ πλουσίων θύρας ἰόντες . This semi-proverbial expression (cf. VI 489 B, C) stigmatises the avarice of seers and mendicant priests ( ἀγύρται from ἀγείρω, cf. infra 381 D). Plato's contempt for μαντική in general is expressed in the Euthyphro and sporadically in various dialogues (see e.g. Tim. 71 E , with Archer-Hind's note); but his attack is here particularly directed (cf. infra 364 E) against such Ὀρφεοτελεσταί or Orphic friars as Theophrastus speaks of in his description of the δεισι‐ δαίμων ( Charact. 16) καὶ τελεσθησόμενος πρὸς τοὺς Ὀρφεοτελεστὰς κατὰ μῆνα πορεύεσθαι μετὰ τῆς γυναικός, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ σχολάζῃ ἡ γυνή, μετὰ τῆς τίτθης καὶ τῶν παιδίων. The kind of ceremonies which they practised may be seen from Dem. de Cor. §§ 258 ff. Plato agreed with the more enlightened section of his countrymen in condemning such degrading cults and superstitions on the ground of their immoral tendency: see especially Foucart des Assoc. religieuses chez les Grecs pp. 153 —157, where the opinions of ancient writers on this subject are collected. On ἀγύρται in general reference may be made to J. H. Wright in Harvard Studies in Cl. Philol. VI p. 66 note

ἐάν τε ‐‐ βλάψειν is in oratio obliqua: ‘et si quis inimicum laedere velit, nocituros se parvo sumptu iusto pariter et iniusto’ (Schneider Addit. p. 11). This explanation (which Tucker also proposes without knowing that Schneider had forestalled him) is by far the best and simplest. For other views see App. III.

ἐπαγωγαῖς ‐‐ καταδέσμοις . ἐπαγωγαί are ἀγωγαὶ δαίμονος φαύλου ἐπί τινα γενόμεναι (Timaeus Lex. s.v.). The datives are usually construed with πείθοντες, and καταδέσμοις understood as the binding formulae “by which the seer compels the invisible powers to work his will” (Rohde Psyche^{2} II p. 88 note). But in the κατάδεσμοι which have been discovered it is the victim and not the god who is bound down; see e.g. CIG 538 (an Athenian inscription of about 380 B.C.)— καταδῶ Κτησίαν—καὶ Κλεοφράδην καταδῶ—καὶ τοὺς μετὰ Κτησίου ἅπαντας καταδῶ. This and other instances from leaden tablets found in graves are given by Wachsmuth Rhein. Mus. XVIII (1863) pp. 560 ff.: cf. also Marquardt Röm. Staatsverwaltung III p. 109 note 6. On this account I think it better to connect ἐπαγωγαῖς τισὶν καὶ καταδέσμοις with βλάψειν, exactly as in Laws 933 D ἐὰν δὲ καταδέσεσιν ἢ ἐπαγωγαῖς ἤ τισιν ἐπῳδαῖς ἢ τῶν τοιούτων φαρυακειῶν ὡντινωνοῦν δόξῃ ὅμοιος εἶναι βλάπτοντι—τεθνάτω. Plato is still alluding to the debasing forms of oriental superstition which had gained a footing in Greece in his day: see Foucart l. c. p. 172.

θεοὺς ‐‐ σφισιν ὑπηρετεῖν : whereas true religion consists in man's ὑπηρεσία τοῖς θεοῖς Euthyph. 13 D ff.

οἱ μὲν κτλ. : ‘some declaiming about the easiness of vice, how that’ etc. οἱ μὲν—ᾄδοντες recalls 364 A, while οἱ δέ refers to the ἀγύρται καὶ μάντεις of 364 B. The reference in the first case is as precise as possible: πάντες γὰρ ἐξ ἑνὸς στόματος ὑμνοῦσιν ὡς καλὸν μὲν ἡ σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη, χαλεπὸν μέντοι καὶ ἐπίπονον· ἀκολασία δὲ καὶ ἀδικία ἡδὺ μὲν καὶ εὐπετὲς κτήσασθαι, δόξῃ δὲ μόνον καὶ νόμῳ αἰσχρόν (364 A). Those who ὑμνοῦσιν ὡς—ἀκολασία—καὶ ἀδικία—εὐπετὲς κτήσασθαι can be accurately described as κακίας περὶ εὐπετείας ᾄδοντες, but scarcely by οἱ κακίας πέρι εὐπετείας διδόντες, because ‘to offer facilities for vice’ is not the same thing as to say that vice is easy. Stallbaum attempts to evade this difficulty by taking διδόντες as equivalent to διδόσθαι λέγοντες, but neither is ‘saying that facilities are offered for vice’ quite the same as ‘saying that vice is easy.’ It is also difficult to find another instance of the plural of εὐπέτεια. The verbal echoes seem to me very strongly in favour of περὶ—ᾄδοντες. For ᾄδοντες=‘harping on’ (like the ὑμνοῦσιν to which it refers) cf. Lys. 205 C ἃ δὲ ἡ πόλις ὅλη ᾄδει and 205 D ἅπερ αἱ γραῖαι ᾄδουσι (with reference to the proverbial γραῶν ὕθλος): the use of ᾄδειν in Laws 854 C is different, but akin. For the corruption of ᾄδοντες to διδόντες see Introd. § 5. The conjectures of Liebhold ( Fl. Jahrb. 1888 p. 107) and Zeller ( Arch. f. Gesch. d. Phil. II p. 694) κακίας πέρι εὐπετείας διελθόντες and κακίας πέρι εὐπέτειαν διδόντας have little in their favour.

ὡς τὴν ‐‐ ἔθηκαν . Hesiod OD. 287—289. ὡς is due to Plato: Hesiod has τὴν μέν τοι κτλ. For λείη the MSS of Hesiod read ὀλίγη: λείη (also in Laws 718 E, Xen. Mem. II 1. 20 and elsewhere) proves the existence of a different recension. Cf. G. E. Howes Harvard Studies in Cl. Philol. VI p. 165. The verses are partially quoted or referred to again in Laws 718 E, Prot. 340 D ; their influence is also seen in Phaedr. 272 C .

καί τινα ὁδὸν κτλ. : Hesiod OD. 290 μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρθιος οἶμος ἐς αὐτὴν | καὶ τρηχὺς κτλ. The last two words account for the marginal addition καὶ τραχεῖαν in A.

λιστοὶ ‐‐ ἁμάρτῃ . See cr. n. The words are spoken by Phoenix to Achilles in Il. IX 497—501. Plato edits the lines to suit his own purposes. For λιστοί our text of Homer has στρεπτοί. The word λιστοί (though implied in ἄλλιστος, τρίλλιστος) does not occur elsewhere, a fact which is strongly in favour of its genuineness here. We must suppose that the recension which Plato used had λιστοί. The theology contained in these lines meets us continually in ancient literature: cf. also the words of the king in Hamlet III 3 “And what's in prayer but this twofold force To be forestalled ere we come to fall Or pardoned being down?” Plato expresses his dissent in Laws 716 E ff., 905 D: in Alc. II 149 E we read οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι τοιοῦτόν ἐστι, τὸ τῶν θεῶν ὥστε ὑπὸ δώρων παράγεσθαι οἶον κακὸν τοκιστήν.

βίβλων ‐‐ ἐγγόνων . The allusion is to Orphic liturgies. Musaeus was the son of Selene, according to Philochorus quoted by the Scholiast on Ar. Frogs 1033 : cf. φαεσφόρου ἔκγονε Μήνης | Μουσαῖε in Abel Orphic. Fr. 4. Orpheus' mother was the Muse Calliope (Suidas s.v. Ὀρφεύς). There is no solid basis for the old view that ἔκγονος means ‘son,’ and ἔγγονος ‘grandson.’ The etymological form is ἔκγονος, but ἐκ‐ was often assimilated to ἐγ‐ before γ during the 4th century B.C., particularly in this word: cf. also ἐγγειτόνων etc. on Inscriptions. See Meisterhans^{3} p. 107. Elsewhere in the Republic ἔκγονος is the regular spelling.

καθ’ ἃς θυηπολοῦσιν : sacrificial liturgies. A θυηπολικόν is mentioned by Suidas (s.v. Ὀρφεύς) as one of the ‘works’ of Orpheus: see also Lobeck Aglaoph. p. 371 and Rohde Psyche^{2} II pp. 112, 113 notes

πόλεις : as for instance when Epimenides the Cretan purified Athens (see Grote III 85—89). Plato may be thinking of this event, which in defiance of chronology he placed ten years before the Persian wars ( Laws 642 D, E). Cf. also infra 366 A and Laws 909 B.

λύσεις ‐‐ καθαρμοί . λύσεις means ‘modes of absolution’ (Lobeck Aglaoph. p. 810): cf. 366 A οἱ λύσιοι θεοί and Arist. Pol. B 4 1262^{a} 32 τὰς νομιζομένας λύσεις. The Scholium on Ar. Frogs 1033 contains the remark: οὗτος (i.e. Musaeus) δὲ παραλύσεις καὶ τελετὰς καὶ καθαρμοὺς συντέθεικεν. For παραλύσεις Blaydes proposes λύσεις, while Rutherford reads περὶ λύσεις (apparently with the Ravenna Codex), inserting also on his own conjecture ποιήματα after συντέθεικεν. I have no doubt that the Scholiast wrote παρὰ λύσεις: ‘besides Absolutions, he has composed also τελεταί and καθαρμοί.’ καθαρμοί formed a distinct class of religious literature, and were written by Epimenides, Empedocles, and others: see Grote I p. 27 note 3.

παιδιᾶς ἡδονῶν : ‘pleasures of play.’ παιδιᾶς depends on ἡδονῶν, and is here used abstractly: cf. Thuc. III 38. 7 ἀκοῆς ἡδονῇ and (with Schneider) Paus. I 21. 7 θέας ἡδονήν. Madvig would eject ἡδονῶν, but without ἡδονῶν Plato would probably have written παιδιῶν (cf. Laws 829 B): other suggestions, such as καὶ παιδιᾶς καὶ ἡδονῶν, or καὶ παιδιᾶς διὰ ἡδονῶν, or καὶ παιδιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν are open to graver objection. For παίζειν and the like in connexion with religious celebrations Stallbaum cites Hdt. IX 11 Ὑακίνθιά τε ἄγετε καὶ παίζετε and VIII 99 ἐν θυσίῃσί τε καὶ εὐπαθείῃσι: add Phaedr. 276 B , Laws 666 B. Plato's point is that atonement if it is made a pleasure and not a penance sets a premium on sin.

τελευτήσασιν ‐‐ τελετάς . The Orpheotelestae connected τελεταί with τελευτᾶν, sometimes on the ground assigned by Plato here, sometimes because they alleged that the sensations of dying resembled those of initiation into the great mysteries (Plut. Frag. de An. 725). This and other ancient derivations are given by Lobeck Aglaoph. pp. 124, 126, 172. For περιμένει Cobet needlessly conjectures περιμένειν.

τιμῆς i. q. τοῦ τιμᾶν. Cf. (with J. and C.) 359 C above.

τί ‐‐ ποιεῖν . The subject to ποιεῖν is ταῦτα πάντα—λεγόμενα: ψυχάς is its secondary object. Cf. infra 367 B τί ποιοῦσα ἑκατέρα τὸν ἔχοντα κτλ. and 367 E. This view, which Schneider also holds, is better than to make ψυχάς subject to ποιεῖν and ταῦτα πάντα κτλ. dependent on ἀκουούσας.

ἐπιπτόμενοι . The image, as Jowett remarks, suggests a bee gathering honey: cf. Ion 534 B λέγουσι γὰρ—οἱ ποιηταὶ ὅτι ἀπὸ κρηνῶν μελιρρύτων ἐκ Μουσῶν κήπων τινῶν καὶ ναπῶν δρεπόμενοι τὰ μέλη ἡμῖν φέρουσιν ὥσπερ αἱ μέλιτται, Simon. Fr. 47 ὁμιλεῖ δ’ ἄνθεσιν (viz. the poet) ὧτε μέλισσα ξανθὸν μέλι κηδομένα and Pind. Pyth. X 53 f.

πότερον δίκᾳ ‐‐ ἀναβάς . The fragment (which appears tolerably often in ancient citations) is restored as follows by Bergk ( Fr. 213) Πότερον δίκᾳ τεῖχος ὕψιον | ἢ σκολίαις ἀπάταις ἀναβαίνῃ | ἐπιχθονίων γένος ἀνδρῶν | δίχα μοι νόος ἀτρέκειαν εἰπεῖν. It is, I think, unlikely that θεσπέσιος βίος and κύριον εὐδαιμονίας below “si non a Pindaro, certe ex poetis petita sunt” (Bergk).

ἐὰν καὶ μὴ δοκῶ has been commonly altered to ἐὰν μὴ καὶ δοκῶ on the suggestion of Dobree and Boeckh (with a few inferior MSS): but the text is sound. We are dealing with ταῦτα πάντα— λεγόμενα κτλ.; and it has not been said that it is useless to be just, unless one is also believed to be just ( ἐὰν μὴ καὶ δοκῶ). This would imply that it is useful to be just, if one is also considered just; but what has been urged is that Justice is in itself never advantageous, although its εὐδοκιμήσεις (363 A) are: see 358 C, E, 360 C ( οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν δίκαιος, ἀλλ’ ἀναγκαζόμενος, ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδιᾳ ὄντος), 362 A ( οὐκ εἶναι δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖν δεῖ ἐθέλειν). The words ἐὰν καὶ μὴ δοκῶ mean ‘if I also seem unjust,’ for οὐ δοκῶ δίκαιος εἶναι, not δοκῶ οὐ δίκαιος εἶναι, is the Greek idiom. This meaning suits exactly. What has to be established is that δοκεῖν prevails over εἶναι in human life ( οὐκοῦν—βιᾶται). The proof is as follows. To be just and seem unjust is misery (see 361 E): to be unjust, and seem just is bliss (see 362 A, C): therefore δοκεῖν is everything, and ἐπὶ τοῦτο τρεπτέον ὅλως.

φασιν . Is τὰ λεγόμενα the subject? or is the sentence an anacoluthon? (“nam quo modo res ipsa comparata sit, nescio: quae quidem vulgo dicuntur, talia sunt, ut iusto mihi commodi quicquam fore negetur” Schneider). The latter view is the more likely. Similar anacolutha are cited by Engelhardt Anac. Pl. Spec. III p. 40.

οἱ σοφοί . Simonides ( σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θεῖος ἀνήρ I 331 E) Fr. 76 B ergk. Plato himself sets no small store by a good name (coupled with virtue) in Laws 950 C.

πρόθυρα ‐‐ σχῆμα : ‘as my porch and trappings.’ The mixture of metaphors is thoroughly Platonic: cf. VII 527 D note With σχῆμα (any kind of external or adventitious means of impressing others or hiding one's own deficiencies) cf. Gorg. 511 E περιπατεῖ ἐν μετρίῳ σχήματι.

σκιαγραφίαν (‘perspective drawing’ VII 523 B, X 602 D) with its cognate words is continually used by Plato of things unreal, counterfeit, illusory: cf. infra IX 583 B note, 586 B al., and Wohlrab on Theaet. 208 E .

τοῦ σοφωτάτου κτλ. Archilochus seems to have canonized the fox as the embodiment of cunning in Greek literature: fragments are preserved of at least two fables of his in which the fox appears (86—88 and 89 ed. Bergk). In the second (89. 5, 6) occur the lines τῷ δ) (sc. πιθήκῳ) ἆρ’ ἀλώπηξ κερδαλέη συνήντετο | πυκνὸν ἔχουσα νόον. The κερδαλέαν καὶ ποικίλην of Plato corresponds in meaning to κερδαλέη—πυκνὸν ἔχουσα νόον, and may have ended one of the iambics in this or another Archilochean fable: it is at all events clear that they are from Archilochus. ‘The crafty and subtle fox of Archilochus’ means simply ‘the crafty and subtle fox of which Archilochus speaks’: the rest of the imagery is due to Plato. With the general sentiment cf. St Matth. vii 15 ἔρχονται πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐν ἐνδύμασι προβάτων (this is the σκιαγραφία ἀρετῆς), ἔσωθεν δέ εἰσιν λύκοι ἅρπαγες: with ἑλκτέον ἐξόπισθεν (opposed to πρόθυρα μὲν καὶσχῆμα) Milton Samson Agonistes 358— 360 “Why are his gifts desirable, to tempt Our earnest prayers, then, given with solemn hand As graces, draw a scorpion's tail behind?” Unnecessary difficulty has been caused by an erroneous gloss of Timaeus ( τὴν ἀλωπεκῆν· τὴν πανουργίαν), which seems to imply that he read ἀλωπεκῆν ‘fox's skin’ for ἀλώπεκα in this passage. Ruhnken (followed by Ast and Stallbaum) while retaining ἀλώπεκα explained it of the fox's skin; but it would be pointless to ‘drag behind a fox's skin.’ With ἀλώπεκα—‘fox’ for ‘foxiness’—cf. infra 382 D ποιητὴς—ψευδὴς ἐν θεῷ οὐκ ἔνι , Phaed. 77 E , and the well-known “astutam vapido servas sub pectore vulpem” Persius V 117.

ἀλλὰ γάρ ‘at enim,’ like ἀλλὰ δή (infra D, X 600 A al.), introduces an objection: cf. infra 366 A al.

οὐδὲ γὰρ ‐‐ μεγάλων : an audacious application of the proverb χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά .

ὡς ‐‐ φέρει . For ὡς we might expect ᾗ (Ficinus has quâ). ταύτῃ must be taken as referring to what precedes, though further explained by ὡς—φέρει. ἴχνη and φέρει shew that the metaphor is still the ὁδὸς βίου. The words ἴχνη φέρει may be from Archilochus. For the sentiment cf. III 394 D.

ξυνωμοσίας ‐‐ ἑταιρίας . An allusion to the political life of Athens: cf. Ap. 36 B , Theaet. 173 D , Thuc. VIII 54 ξυνωμοσίας, αἵπερ ἐτύγχανον πρότερον ἐν τῇ πόλει οὖσαι ἐπὶ δίκαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς. In the Laws, Plato would suppress all such secret clubs and cabals with a strong hand: see 856 B ff. The πειθοῦς διδάσκαλοι mentioned presently are the Sophists.

ὡς for ὥστε (except in idiomatic phrases like ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ὥς γε ἐντεῦθεν ἰδεῖν) is a curious archaism, tolerably frequent in Xenophon (e.g. Cyrop. I 2. 8, V 2. 5, VI 4. 16, VIII 5. 1 and 7. 27), but almost unexampled in Plato. The Protagoras (330 E) furnishes an instance with οὕτως preceding (cf. Xen. Cyr. IV 2. 13 ). ὡς in Phaed. 108 E is perhaps to be explained in the same way: cf. also Alc. II 141 B and Symp. 213 B παραχωρῆσαι γὰρ τὸν Σωκράτη ὡς ἐκεῖνον καθίζειν. See also on ὡς δή in I 337 C. As βιάζομαι can be followed by the simple infinitive, it might seem preferable to connect ὡς πλεονεκτοῦντες as a participial explanatory clause either with βιασόμεθα or with δίκην μὴ διδόναι (‘not to be punished for aggrandisement’); but the first alternative gives a wrong sense to πλεονεκτοῦντες, and the second involves too harsh an inversion.

οὐκοῦν κτλ. Cf. Laws 885 B θεοὺς ἡγούμενος εἰναι κατὰ νόμους οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὔτε ἔργον ἀσεβὲς εἰργάσατο ἑκὼν οὔτε λόγον ἀφῆκεν ἄνομον, ἀλλὰ ἓν δή τι τῶν τριῶν πάσχων, ἢ τοῦτο ὅπερ εἶπον οὐχ ἡγούμενος, ἢ τὸ δεύτερον ὄντας οὐ φροντίζειν ἀνθρώπων, ἢ τρίτον εὐπαραμυθήτους εἶναι θυσίαις τε καὶ εὐχαῖς παραγομένους. These three classes of heretics are severally refuted in 886 A—899 D, 899 D— 905 D, 905 D—907 B. It is clear both from this passage and from the Laws that the air was full of such heresies in Plato's day. The first was doubtless fostered by the sceptical attitude of Protagoras— περὶ μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἰδέναι οὔθ’ ὡς εἰσὶν οὔθ’ ὡς οὐκ εἰσίν (ap. D. L. IX 51): for the second cf. Aesch. Ag. 369 —372 οὐκ ἔφα τις | θεοὺς βροτῶν ἀξιοῦσθαι μέλειν | ὅσοις ἀθίκτων χάρις | πατοῖθ’ · ὁ δ’ οὐκ εὐσεβής: the third—the most pernicious of all, according to Plato Laws 948 C—furnished the raison d'être of a degenerate priesthood.

τί καὶ ἡμῖν κτλ. ‘If the gods do not care for us, why should we in our turn ( καί) care’ etc. For the text see cr. n. and App. III.

ἀκηκόαμεν ‐‐ ποιητῶν . The first ἤ is ‘or’ and the second ‘than.’ In λόγων Plato may be thinking inter alia of the works of early λογογράφοι like Pherecydes, who wrote genealogies of gods and heroes in prose; but there is no occasion to change λόγων into λογίων with Muretus. γενεαλογησάντων ποιητῶν refers to Homer and the Hesiodic and Orphic theogonies.

θυσίαις ‐‐ ἀγανῇσιν : see 364 D.

ἀπό : ‘from the proceeds of.’ Cf. Laws 906 C, D τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον ἀναγκαῖον λέγειν τὸν λέγοντα ὡς εἰσὶ συγγνώμονες ἀεὶ θεοὶ τοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀδίκοις καὶ ἀδικοῦσιν, ἂν αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀδικημάτων τις ἀπονέμῃ, καθάπερ κυσὶ λύκοι τῶν ἁρπασμάτων σμικρὰ ἀπονέμοιεν, οἱ δὲ ἡμερούμενοι τοῖς δώροις συγχωροῖεν τὰ ποίμνια διαρπάζειν.

ὑπερβαίνοντες καὶ ἁμαρτάνοντες are subordinate to λισσόμενοι: “by praying when we transgress and sin, we shall persuade them,” etc. There is again a reference to λισσόμενοι ὅτε κέν τις ὑπερβήῃ καὶ ἁμάρτῃ quoted in 364 E. The position of the participles is justified by the allusion to this line.

ἢ ‐‐ ἤ . It was a common Greek belief that the sins of the fathers are visited upon the children: see the passages cited by Nägelsbach Nachhom. Theol. pp. 34 ff. If we take Plato at his word, Adimantus represents this vicarious punishment as extending even to the other world.

ἢ παῖδες παίδων . Baiter conjectures <ἢ παῖδες> ἢ παῖδες παίδων, and so I formerly printed. But παῖδες παίδων means little more than ‘descendants’ (cf. Laws 927 B), and the text may stand. Similarly in Ruskin Modern Painters Ch. 1 “all those labours which men have given their lives and their sons' sons' lives to complete.”

ὦ φίλε ‐‐ λογιζόμενος . ὦ φίλε is the objector who urges ἀλλὰ γὰρ—παίδων. In φήσει Plato recurs to the singular of 365 B λέγοι γὰρ ἂν κτλ. λογιζόμενος is not ‘reasoning,’ but ‘making his calculation,’ ‘calculos subducens’: such a man's morality is nothing but a balancing of profit and loss. Hermann's devotion to Paris A led him to conjecture ἀλλ’ ὠφελήσουσιν ἁγνιζομένους αἰ τελεταί rather than admit a simple case of omission arising from homoioteleuton: see cr. n. Vermehren proposes ἀλλ’ ὠφελήσουσιν αἱ νομιζόμεναι τελεταί ( Plat. Stud. p. 90), but we should certainly follow Π here. See also Introd. § 5.

λύσιοι : ‘givers of absolution’: cf. 364 E. Certain Chthonian deities of the Orphic theology are meant, such as Hecate, Demeter, Dionysus λύσιος or λυσεύς, and above all Ζεὺς μειλίχιος. See Lobeck Aglaoph. p. 303.

θεῶν παῖδες : e.g. Musaeus and Orpheus ( Σελήνης τε καὶ Μουσῶν ἔγγονοι 364 E). Madvig's rejection of οἵ (so also Ficinus) before ταῦτα in the last clause seriously impairs the rhythm of the sentence.

ἄκρων . ἄκρος was a fashionable expression to apply to the élite of any profession or art: cf. Theaet. 152 E τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκατέρας, Pol. 292 E , supra 360 E, infra III 405 A, V 459 B.

ὡς δή τοι : see on I 337 C.

θείᾳ φύσει ‐‐ ἐπιστήμην . θείᾳ φύσει means a disposition which is good by divine grace or nature, not as the result of knowledge or compulsion. The virtue of such men is θείᾳ μοίρᾳ παραγιγνομένη ἄνευ νοῦ ( Men. 99 E ): they are ἄνευ ἀνάγκης, αὐτοφυῶς, θείᾳ μοίρᾳ ἀγαθοί ( Laws 642 C), resembling Wordsworth's “Glad Hearts! without reproach or blot, Who do thy work and know it not.” Cf. VI 493 A note ἐπιστήμην is scientific knowledge of the good in the Socratic, not yet in the Platonic, sense.

οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν δίκαιος gives the lie to the Socratic οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἄδικος: cf. 360 C. For ἀνανδρίας below see on 359 B.

ἡρώων . J. and C. think “Plato is referring to well-known tales and maxims, which the poets and logographers had put into the mouths of ancient heroes.” It is simpler to understand the expression of Orpheus, Musaeus, and other θεῶν παῖδες, ποιηταὶ καὶ προφῆται τῶν θεῶν γενόμενοι: see 366 B note So also Dreinhöfer Plato's Schrift üb. d. Staat nach Disposition u. Inhalt p. 2 note 16.

ἄλλως ἤ . Praise of the δόξαι of Justice is somewhat inaccurately spoken of as praise of justice itself: but it is unnecessary to insert διά (with Richards) before δόξας. Cf. 367 D τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀποδεχοίμην ἂν οὕτως ἐπαινούντων δικαιοσύνην καὶ ψεγόντων ἀδικίαν, δόξας τε περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ μισθοὺς ἐγκωμιαζόντων καὶ λοιδορούντων.

ἰδίοις : see on 363 E.

ἀλλ) αὐτὸς ‐‐ ξύνοικος ᾖ . This thesis is developed and elaborated in Gorg. 472 D —481 B.

ὑπέρ is here little if anything more than περί, cf. Laws 777 A ὑπὲρ τοῦ Διὸς ἀγορεύων. This usage, which appears on Inscriptions after 300 B.C. (Meisterhans^{3} p. 222), is very rare in Plato. It occurs occasionally in the Attic orators, especially with λέγειν, and is tolerably common in Polybius and later Greek: see Stephanus-Hase Thes. s. v. ὑπέρ and Jannaris Hist. Gr. Gr. § 1685. I do not think we are justified in translating (with Tucker) ‘on behalf of their view of the relations of justice and injustice.’

κατατείνας : 358 D note

ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν : I 343 C note

ὡμολόγησας : 358 A.

πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον . The sequence of δέ after τε is frequent in Plato with δὲ καί, εἰ δὲ βούλει, τί δέ, ἔτι δέ, μέγιστον δέ, τὸ δὲ κεφάλαιον and the like. For a classified list of examples see Hoefer de part. Plat. pp. 15—17.

ἀκούειν is added to Glauco's list (357 C) by Adimantus, who is also responsible for the exaggeration πολὺ μᾶλλον.

καὶ ‐‐ δή with ὑγιαίνειν marks it as different in kind from the other examples: cf. (with J. and C.) Men. 87 E καὶ πλοῦτος δή and infra 373 A.

γόνιμα : i.q. γνήσια, but more forcible: cf. Theaet. 151 E , Ar. Frogs 96 .

καὶ ἀδικία βλάπτει . The sense is: καὶ ψέγε τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ ἀδικίας ὃ αὐτὴ δἰ αὑτὴν τὸν ἔχοντα βλάπτει. Hartman would cancel the words, needlessly, although the zeugma is bolder than usual. For the stylistic effect cf. ἀδικία δ’ ἐπαινεῖται 358 A above.

ἀποδεχοίμην and ἀνασχοίμην are equally good Greek (cf. Prot. 339 D , Phaed. 92 A , E al.), but as ἀπο‐ is supported by both Α and Π, it is more probable that the error lies in ‐σχοίμην than in ἀπο‐, especially as ἀποδεχοίμην is found also in the margin of A. The ἀπο‐ is at least as old as the Scholium, which mentions the two readings ἀποσχοίμην and ἀνασχοίμην. The latter is an obvious correction of ἀποσχοίμην, and has survived in Ξ and a few inferior MSS besides.

ὦ παῖδες ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός . This curious phrase occurs once again in Plato viz. Phil. 36 D , where Protarchus is addressed in the words ὦ παῖ ἐκείνου τἀνδρός. Philebus has withdrawn from the discussion, his part in which he has bequeathed to Protarchus, who is therefore playfully called his son. That this is the meaning appears from Phil. 11 A , B, 11 C δέχει δὴ τοῦτον τὸν νῦν διδόμενον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, λόγον; Ἀνάγκη δέχεσθαι· Φίληβος γὰρ ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς ἀπείρηκεν, 12 A, 16 B, 19 A: cf. also 15 C and 28 B. In precisely the same way Glauco and Adimantus are the ‘children of Thrasymachus.’ They are διάδοχοι τοῦ λόγου as appears from 357 A, 358 B ( ἐπανανεώσομαι τὸν Θρασυμάχου λόγον), 367 A and 367 C, as well as from the substance of their arguments. This image is in fact one of the links by means of which Plato binds the dialogue together: as Polemarchus is heir to Cephalus (331 E), so Glauco and Adimantus are heirs to Thrasymachus. In explaining ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός of Thrasymachus, Stallbaum is therefore not “ridiculous” (as J. and C. assert) but right. See my article in Cl. Rev. X p. 237.

ὁ Γλαύκωνος ἐραστής may be Critias, as Schleiermacher supposed; but there is no evidence in support of the conjecture: see Bergk Poet. Lyr. Gr.^{4} II p. 283.

τὴν Μεγαροῖ μάχην : perhaps in 409 B.C.: see Diod. Sic. XIII 65. If so, Plato is guilty of a slight anachronism, supposing that the scene of the dialogue is laid in 410. See Introd. § 3.

παῖδες ‐‐ ἀνδρός . By Ἀρίστωνος, the author of the line of course meant Aristo, father of Glauco and Adimantus; but Ἀρίστων suggests ἄριστος (cf. IX 580 B) and the pun conveys a friendly, if halfironical, compliment to ‘his excellency’ Thrasymachus, whose παῖδες (so far as the argument is concerned) Glauco and his brother are: see on ὦ παῖδες above. In Symp. 174 B , when inviting Aristodemus to come as an uninvited guest to sup with Agathon, Socrates indulges in a similarly playful pun: ἕπου τοίνυν, ἔφη, ἵνα καὶ τὴν παροιμίαν διαφθείρωμεν μεταβάλλοντες, ὡς ἄρα καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐπὶ δαῖτας ἴασιν αὐτόματοι ἀγαθοί. (The διαφθορά consists in the substitution of ἀγαθῶν for δειλῶν, the form of the proverb which Plato had in view being αὐτόματοι δ’ ἀγαθοὶ δειλῶν ἐπὶ δαῖτας ἴασιν, as the Scholiast remarks. Arnold Hug is ill-advised in adopting Lachmann's suggestion to read Ἀγάθων) i.e. Ἀγάθωνι for ἀγαθῶν: see Cl. Rev. X p. 238.) Other plays on proper names in Plato are collected by Riddell Digest pp. 250 f. In κλεινοῦ Stallbaum finds a ‘lusus facetus’ on ἐκείνου; but this particular lusus (if it exists) is accidental and unmeaning.

θεῖον . The addition of τι (proposed by Herwerden) is unnecessary: cf. III 388 D note θεῖος is here used, like ἔνθεος, of inspiration: if the speaker does not understand or believe what he says, he is, like a rhapsodist or poet, nothing but the mouthpiece of the inspiring deity: cf. Phaedr. 245 A , Ion 533 E, 535 E— 536 D.

τί τέ ἐστιν ‐‐ ἔχει recalls the conclusion of Book I (354 B, C).

οἵανπερ ἂν sc. ἐποιησάμεθα, the verb being omitted as it frequently is with ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ.

ἕρμαιον ‐‐ τυγχάνει . I have followed Schneider in printing a colon before ἕρμαιον: for the sentence ἕρμαιον— τυγχάνει is not the grammatical apodosis to the εἰ clause, but a further result. The asyndeton with ἕρμαιον is the usual asyndeton of ampliative clauses. For the principle underlying the method of inquiry here enunciated, see Soph. 218 C ὅσα δ’ αὖ τῶν μεγάλων δεῖ διαπονεῖσθαι καλῶς, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων δέδοκται πᾶσι καὶ πάλαι τὸ πρότερον ἐν σμικροῖς καὶ ῥᾴοσιν αὐτὰ δεῖν μελετᾶν, πρὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς μεγίστοις and Pol. 286 A . (Contrast Phil. 48 B , where the opposite course is recommended.) In the special case of the State versus the Individual, the words ἐν σμικροῖς, ἐν ἐλάττοσιν are not applicable, but ἐν ῥᾴοσιν πρότερον δεῖ μελετᾶν is the essential part of the principle, and Justice in the State is ῥᾴων καταμαθεῖν (368 E) than in the Individual. Cf. also infra 377 C ἐν τοῖς μείζοσιν—μύθοις ὀψόμεθα καὶ τοὺς ἐλάττους. Illustrations from letters are tolerably frequent in Plato: cf. e.g. IV 402 A f., Theaet. 205 D —206 A, Pol. 277 E ff.

πρῶτον ‐‐ ἐπισκοποῦντες lays down the method to be pursued in the rest of the treatise, except in books V—VII, which are professedly a ‘digression,’ and X, which is of the nature of an epilogue. At each suc cessive stage in the exposition of his subject, Plato reminds us more or less explicitly of the method which he here proposes to follow:—at the end of the first sketch of a State 371 E; in connexion with the φλεγμαίνουσα πόλις 372 E; before entering on the theory of education 376 C, D and again in III 392 C, when he has finished the treatment of λόγοι; at Adimantus' objection IV 420 B, C; at the end of the picture of the just state IV 427 D ff.; in passing to Justice in the Individual IV 434 D ff.; at V 472 B ff., where the question is raised ‘Is this State possible?’; on beginning the account of the degenerate commonwealths and men in VIII 545 B; and finally when the whole argument draws to a head at IX 577 C.

τὴν τοῦ μείζονος ὁμοιότητα . Justice in the State is in fact to be used as a means of explaining Justice in the Individual, which is after all the real Justice: cf. IV 443 B ff. notes The relation between the two is that of a παράδειγμα and that which the παράδειγμα is intended to explain: see Pol. 278 C οὐκοῦν τοῦτο μὲν ἱκανῶς συνειλήφαμεν, ὅτι παραδείγματός γ) ἐστὶ τότε γένεσις, ὁπόταν ὂν ταὐτὸν ἐν ἑτέρῳ διεσπασμένῳ, δοξαζόμενον ὀρθῶς καὶ συναχθὲν περὶ ἑκάτερον ὡς συνάμφω μίαν ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἀποτελῇ; Φαίνεται. Plato has been severely blamed (as e.g. by Grote Plato III pp. 123 ff.) for representing the Commonwealth as the Individual “writ large.” Plato, however, laid stress upon this view, as tending to cement the union between the citizen and the State, which was rapidly dissolving in his day. This is well brought out by Krohn Plat. Frag. p. 5. Cf. also Pöhlmann Gesch. d. antik. Kommunismus etc. pp. 146 ff.

εἰ γιγνομένην ‐‐ ἀδικίαν . This would lead us to expect that we are to discover Justice and Injustice in the same State. In the sequel we find Justice only in the Ideal City: it is the degenerate Cities of VIII and IX that furnish the picture of Injustice. Plato does not expressly announce his change of plan till IV 420 B, C: ᾠήθημεν γὰρ ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ μάλιστα ἂν εὑρεῖν δικαιοσύνην καὶ αὖ ἐν τῇ κάκιστα οἰκουμένῃ ἀδικίαν—νῦν μὲν οὖν—τὴν εὐδαίμονα πλάττομεν—αὐτίκα δὲ τὴν ἐναντίαν σκεψόμεθα. The discrepancy must, I think, be admitted (see Krohn Pl. St. p. 32, and Kunert die doppelte Recens. d. Pl. St. pp. 10 ff.), but such corrections and developments of plan are characteristic of the dialogue as a form of literature, and do not establish the theory of a double recension of the Republic. Cf. Grimmelt de reip. Pl. comp. et unit. p. 19, and Westerwick de Rep. Pl. pp. 43—45.

γίγνεται ‐‐ πόλις κτλ. The present episode is ostensibly an historical account of the genesis of society, and from this point of view should be compared with Laws III 676 A ff. Some of the features are derived from an analysis of the industrial basis of society as it exists in civilised times: others (see 372 B—D), are semi-mythical and idyllic, recalling pictures of the golden age such as we find in Pol. 269 C ff., and in the caricatures of the comedians (e.g. ap. Athen. VI 267 E ff.). But the prevailing atmosphere is not historical or legendary, but idealistic (note δεῖ in 369 E and elsewhere), and Plato's πρώτη πόλις (Arist. Pol. Δ 4. 1291^{a} 17) should primarily be regarded as—in its essential features—a preliminary and provisional description of the industrial foundation on which the higher parts of his own ideal city are to rest. Cf. also on 372 B, D, Rettig Proleg. in Plat. remp. p. 42 and Steinhart Einleitung p. 156.

τυγχάνει as a mere copula is very rare in Attic prose, and it would be easy here to insert ὤν after πολλῶν: see Porson on Eur. Hec. 782 . In the Platonic dialogues this usage recurs in Phaedr. 263 C , Gorg. 502 B , Alc. I 129 A, 133 A, Hipp. Mai. 300 A, Laws 918 C, Tim. 61 C , nor is it possible in the last three examples to account for its omission by lipography. The idiom occurs in Sophocles and Euripides, once in Aristophanes ( Eccl. 1141), and (though condemned by Phrynichus) must also be admitted (though rarely) in prose: see the instances cited by Blaydes on Ar. (l.c.) and cf. Rutherford's New Phrynichus p. 342.

πολλῶν ἐνδεής . In the account of the genesis of society given in the Laws (676 A—680 E), more stress is laid on the social instinct of man: in Prot. 322 B ff the operating cause is man's defencelessness against wild beasts. Grote ( Plato III p. 139 note) censures Plato for not mentioning the “reciprocal liability of injury” among the generative causes of civic life; but this (as well as assistance against external aggression) is hinted at in βοηθούς.

ἄλλος ‐‐ χρείᾳ . The words are short for ἄλλος ἄλλον, τὸν μὲν ἐπ’ ἄλλου, τὸν δ’ ἐπ’ ἄλλου χρείᾳ (for the omission of τὸν μέν cf. Prot. 330 A , Theaet. 181 D al.): ‘one taking to himself one man, another another—the one man for one, the other for another purpose.’ Essentially the same meaning would no doubt be conveyed without τὸν δ’ ἐπ’ ἄλλου, which Herwerden following two inferior MSS would omit; but the fuller form of expression is chosen in order, I think, to prepare us for the principle of ‘One man, one work’ to be presently enunciated.

ταύτῃ τῇ ξυνοικίᾳ . Stallbaum rightly regards the sentence as an anaco luthon, the antecedent to ταύτῃ being the words from παραλαμβάνων to βοηθούς. If the subject to ἐθέμεθα (a gnomic aorist) were ἄλλος—δεόμενοι—ἀγείραντες, we should probably have had παραλαμβάνοντες for παραλαμβάνων: and besides, Plato is not yet describing the particular city which we are ποιεῖν λόγῳ (infra line 19), but laying down the law as to the γένεσις of cities in general. For the anacoluthon see Engelhardt Anac. Pl. Spec. III p. 40.

τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα : neuter, not masculine; otherwise Plato would have written θεραπευτῶν (as in q and some other MSS).

ἀναγκαιοτάτη πόλις . Referring to this passage, Aristotle ( Pol. Δ 4. 1291^{a} 10—19) attacks Plato for making the end of his city not τὸ καλόν, but τὰ ἀναγκαῖα. No doubt, the end of this ‘first city’— so Aristotle calls it—is primarily τὰ ἀναγκαῖα; but Plato would reply that the cities of the farmers, the auxiliaries, and the rulers, are in reality one city, γινομένη μὲν τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν, οὐσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν (Arist. Pol. A 2. 1252^{b} 29. Cf. Laws 828 D δεῖ δὲ αὐτὴν καθάπερ ἕνα ἄνθρωπον ζῆν εὖ).

ἕνα ἕκαστον κτλ. Cf. Charm. 161 E δοκεῖ ἄν σοι πόλις εὖ οἰκεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ· νόμου τοῦ κελεύοντος τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἱμάτιον ἕκαστον ὑφαίνειν καὶ πλύνειν, καὶ ὑποδήματα σκυτοτομεῖν, καὶ λήκυθον καὶ στλεγγίδα καὶ τἄλλα πάντα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον κτλ.;

οὕτω ῥᾷον ἢ )κείνως . οὕτω refers to the alternative which is more familiar, although mentioned first: cf. (with Ast) Xen. Mem. I 3. 13 τοῦτο τὸ θηρίον—τοσούτῳ δεινότερόν ἐστι τῶν φαλαγγίων ὅσῳ ἐκεῖνα μὲν ἁψάμενα, τοῦτο δὲ οὐδ’ ἁπτόμενον—ἐνίησί τι. On the corruption ῥᾴδιον for /ῥᾷον (also in Men. 94 E ) see Introd. § 5.

φύεται strikes the keynote of the City of Books II—IV. The first critic to lay sufficient stress on this point was Krohn: see Pl. St. pp. 59—62, where he collects the references to φύσις throughout Books I—IV. The City of II—IV is a κατὰ φύσιν οἰκισθεῖσα πόλις. What is meant by φύσις? Not inorganic Nature, but the ‘nature’ of a πόλις or aggregate of πολῖται, i.e. (as the unit in a city is the man) human nature, in other words, the nature of the human soul, which, according to Plato and Socrates, constitutes a man's true and proper individuality. It is not however human nature as it is, but as it ought to be, which is the foundation on which the Platonic State is built; so that, although the doctrine of transcendent Ideas is excluded from the first four books (see on III 402 C), Idealism at all events is present. See also Krohn Plat. Frage pp. 8—11, and (for the connotation of φύσις) Benn's article on ‘The Idea of Nature in Plato’ in Archiv f. Gesch. d. Phil. IX pp. 24 —49 and Pöhlmann l.c. pp. 110 ff.

ὅταν ‐‐ εἷς μίαν . This principle—the cardinal principle of the Republic, reiterated also with great emphasis in Laws 846 D—847 B—is deduced by Plato from φύσις, whose rule is specialization: cf. 370 C ὅταν εἷς ἓν κατὰ φύσιν—πράττῃ. Plato (as usual in the Republic) is thinking of Man's nature, one man being naturally fitted for one pursuit, another for another: cf. III 395 B, IV 433 A, 434 A, B. The principle of specialization had already been enunciated by Socrates: see e.g. Xen. Mem. III 9. 3 , 15, Cyrop. VIII 2. 5, 6. Aristotle widens it into a general law of Nature: οὐθὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ τοιοῦτον οἷον οἱ χαλκοτύποι τὴν Δελφικὴν μάχαιραν πενιχρῶς, ἀλλ’ ἓν πρὸς ἕν ( Pol. A 2. 1252^{b} 1 ff.). In its application to politics, the principle becomes in Plato's hands a weapon for attacking the foundations of Athenian democracy (see Gorg. 455 A —C), to which, in this respect, his own Ideal City was a kind of counterblast.

κάλλιον . Did Plato write καλλίω? κάλλιον γίγνεται may no doubt mean ‘are better made,’ which is fairly satisfactory in point of sense, but καλλίω forms a better balance to πλείω τε, and is more suited to καλόν just below. With ῥᾷον immediately following, the corruption would be easy. On the other hand the collocation καλλίω καὶ ῥᾷον is unpleasing, and it is probably safer to adhere to the MSS.

ἐπὶ τὸ ἀροῦν . See on 372 B.

αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν : ipsam urbem: the city as opposed to the inhabitants ( τέκτονες, χαλκῆς etc.). Cf. 360 D note It is not necessary to adopt Hermann's conjecture αὖ for αὐτήν, or (with Hartman) to eject τὴν πόλιν.

σχεδόν τι ἀδύνατον . Plato nevertheless endeavours to secure this advantage in the Laws: see 704 A—705 B. Cf. Arist. Pol. H 5. 1326^{b} 26 ff.

ὧν ἐκεῖνοι δέονται . All exchange with foreign cities is to be in kind: money is used only for transactions within the city: see infra 371 C ff. Here again Plato is constructing his city κατὰ φύσιν: cf. Arist. Pol. A 9. 1257^{a} 28 ἡ μὲν οὐν τοιαύτη μεταβλητικὴ οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν οὔτε χρηματιστικῆς ἐστὶν εἷδος οὐδέν.

ὧν ἂν αὐτοῖς χρεία . αὐτοῖς is of course emphatic ( ipsis). For the rare omission of ᾗ cf. III 416 D and Schanz Nov. Comm. Pl. p. 33 with Cope's Rhetoric of Aristotle Vol. II p. 328.

ὧν ἂν δέωνται . ὧν is masculine in spite of ὧν ἐκεῖνοι δέονται just above. The reading of q ἐκείνοις ἄξουσιν, οἳ μεταδώσουσιν ὧν ἂν δέωνται is a free correction (after 371 B) intended to make ὧν neuter.

τῆς ‐‐ ἐργασίας is not the work of a seaman (as Jowett seems to suppose), but a special department of ἐμπορία, viz. ναυκληρία: see Arist. Pol. A 11. 1258^{b} 21 ff. The ναύκληρος owned a ship and conveyed passengers and cargo for payment (cf. Gorg. 511 D , E): he is frequently mentioned along with the ἔμπορος, e.g. Pol. 290 A ἐμπόρους καὶ ναυκλήρους καὶ καπήλους, Laws 831 E, Xen. Vect. 3. 4, 5. 3.

ὧν δὴ ἕνεκα . ὧν can hardly (as J. and C. suppose) refer to μεταδώσουσιν: it must denote the same objects as the previous ὧν. The meaning is ‘for the sake of which things we established the principle of community and founded a city.’ Cf. 369 C κοινωνοὺς—μεταδίδωσι δὴ ἄλλος ἄλλῳ κτλ.

νόμισμα ‐‐ ἕνεκα . Cf. Laws 742 A νόμισμα δ’ ἕνεκα ἀλλαγῆς τῆς καθ’ ἡμέραν. See also 370 E note Plato regards coined money as a necessary evil— the offspring, not of φύσις, but of νόμος (cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. V 8. 1133^{a} 30 ff. διὰ τοῦτο τοὔνομα ἔχει νόμισμα, ὅτι οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ ἐστί and Pol. A 9. 1257^{b} 10 ff.), a mere conventional symbol, the private possession of which is denied to the highest classes of the State (III 416 D ff.).

οἱ ἀσθενέστατοι κτλ. Cf. Laws 918 A—920 C, where καπηλεία is confined by Plato to those ὧν διαφθειρομένων οὐκ ἂν γίγνοιτο μεγάλη λύμη τῇ πόλει (919 C).

καπήλους ‐‐ ἐμπόρους . Soph. 223 D τῆς μεταβλητικῆς οὐχ ἡ μὲν κατὰ πόλιν ἀλλαγή, σχεδὸν αὐτῆς ἥμισυ μέρος ὄν, καπηλικὴ προσαγορεύεται; Ναί. Τὸ δέ γε ἐξ ἄλλης εἰς ἄλλην πόλιν διαλλαττόμενον ὠνῇ καὶ πράσει ἐμπορική; Τί δ) οὕ;

ἀξιοκοινώνητοι : worthy of being admitted into the κοινωνία of our city. This explanation (Schneider's) is better than ‘worthy of one's society’ (L. and S.).

τὴν τιμὴν ταύτην . ταύτην is idiomatic for ταύτης: see I 333 B note

μισθωτοί . Plato does not admit slave labour in his city, unless perhaps in the persons of barbarians. The exclusion of slaves is also a touch of ‘Nature’: cf. Arist. Pol. A 3. 1253^{b} 20 τοῖς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν (sc. δοκεῖ) τὸ δεσπόζειν with Suse mihl and Hicks ad loc. If barbarians may be enslaved, it is because they are φύσει δοῦλοι: cf. V 469 B ff., with 470 C and Arist. Pol. A 2. 1252^{b} 9 ταὐτὸ φύσει βάρβαρον καὶ δοῦλον.

ἐν αὐτῶν ‐‐ ἀλλήλους . The reply is to the first question, not to the second: see on V 465 E. In so far as δικαιοσύνη can be said to exist in so elementary a state, Plato would have identified it with the performance by each class (farmers, artisans, etc.) of their own work and no more. This is the first view of δικαιοσύνη in the Republic: for the second see IV 432 ff., 441 D ff., and for the third or metaphysical VI 504 B note

ὑποδήματα . I have placed the mark of interrogation after ὑποδήματα, as it is only the present participles which belong to διαιτήσονται. ‘And when they have built themselves houses’ marks a fresh start, no longer interrogative, for which reason I have also departed from the usual punctuation after ἱκανῶς (in B) and πόλεμον (in C).

θρέψονται κτλ. The picture which Plato proceeds to draw represents the working of well-regulated ἐπιθυμία or appetite—the psychological groundwork of the third or lowest order in Plato's city. τὰ μέν is the wheaten meal ( ἄλευρα), τὰ δέ the barley-meal ( ἀλφιτα). Only the wheaten meal was (as a rule) baked ( πέσσειν or ὀπτᾶν) into loaves ( ἄρτοι): the barley-meal was “kneaded into a simple dough ( μάσσειν, whence μᾶζα), dried in a mould, and afterwards moistened with water and eaten” (Blümner, Gr. Privatalt. p. 218). μᾶζαι made of barley meal was the staple food of the common Greek: the wheaten loaf was a luxury. The double chiasmus ἄλφιτα, μάξαντες, μάζας )( ἄλευρα, πέψαντες, ἄρτους is noticeable: cf. Crito 47 C.

τὰ μὲν πέψαντες κτλ. The asyndeton (as usual) is ampliative. The punctuation in the text avoids the difficulty of the two verbs θρέψονται and εὐωχήσονται. Schneider places the colon before μάζας, but this is much less natural. For μάζας γενναίας, ‘noble bannocks’ (J. and C.), cf. (with Stallbaum) Laws 844 E τὰ γενναῖα σῦκα ἐπονομαζόμενα. κάλαμον is not ‘a mat of reeds’ (Jowett, with L. and S.), which would be much too artistic, but ‘reeds,’ κάλαμον being collective as in Arist. Hist. An. IX 36. 620^{a} 35; and τινα is contemptuous (cf. II 363 D note).

παραβαλλόμενοι is also contemptuous for the παρατιθέμενοι of civilised society: it suggests throwing food before animals (cf. 372 D).

στιβάδων : not ‘mattresses’ (L. and S.): why should they ‘strew’ mattresses? The whole point of the passage is that instead of reclining on manufactured couches they lie on natural ones of bryony and myrtle boughs: contrast 372 D. στρωννύναι στιβάδας is simply ‘to make couches of leaves’: cf. στορέσαι λέχος. The word μῖλαξ means bryony (as Schneider saw): cf. Sandys on Eur. Bacch. 107 χλοήρει μίλακι καλλικάρπῳ. The ‘yew’ of the English translators would make a sombre and lugubrious couch.

ἐπιπίνοντες . ἐπί means ‘after’: cf. Xen. Cyr. VI 2 28 μετὰ δὲ τὸν σῖτον εἰ οἶνον ἐπιπίνοιμεν. In Greek banquets there was little or no drinking during dinner. The conjecture ὑποπίνοντες (Stephanus-Hase Thes. s. v. ἐπιπίνω) is unnecessary.

ἢ πόλεμον . The origin of war is over-population (373 D).

ἄνευ ὄψου κτλ. ὄψον is meant by Glauco in its narrower sense of animal food (whether fish or flesh); Socrates on the other hand uses the word in its wider sense of anything eaten in addition to, or along with, bread, e.g. vegetables (see Blümner Gr. Privatalt. p. 223). A spirited and athletic Athenian like Glauco cannot tolerate a vegetarian diet: cf. 372 D.

ἑστιωμένους : sarcastic, with reference to εὐωχήσονται: ‘you call it feasting when they have nothing but dry bread!’ (J. and C.).

ἅλας ‐‐ ἑψήσονται . ‘Of course they will make salt and olives and cheese and vegetables whether wild’ ( βολβούς) ‘or cultivated’ ( λάχανα) ‘into such boiled dishes as can be prepared in the country.’ ἕψημα is not ‘something for boiling,’ but something boiled; and ἑψήσονται is used with two accusatives, one external ( ἅλας, &c.) and the other internal ( ἑψήματα). Plato hints that cookery in the country ( ἐν ἀγροῖς, cf. κατ’ ἀγρούς III 399 D) is inferior to that in the town. For the kind of dishes in question cf. Ath. II 64 E περὶ δὲ τῆς τῶν βολβῶν σκευασίας Φιλήμων φησὶ τὸν βολβόν, εἰ βούλει, σκόπει | ὅσα δαπανήσας εὐδοκιμεῖ, τυρὸν μέλι | σήσαμον ἔλαιον κρόμμυον ὄξος σίλφιον· | αὐτὸς δ’ ἐφ’ αὑτοῦ )στὶν πονηρὸς καὶ πικρός .

φηγούς : ‘acorns,’ not ‘beech-nuts’ (D. and V.): see Blaydes on Ar. Peace 1137 .

ὑποπίνοντες . Wine was sipped during dessert. ὑπο‐ in ὑποπίνοντες emphasizes the moderation already expressed in μετρίως: cf. Lys. 223 B ὑποπεπωκότες ἐν τοῖς Ἑρμαίοις. Dr Jackson connects πρὸς τὸ πῦρ with ὑπο πίνοντες, comparing IV 420 E, Ar. Ach. 751 al. This may be right, but the ordinary view seems to me somewhat more natural.

ὑῶν . The city of Pigs is supposed by Zeller^{4} II 1 pp. 325, 893, and Dümmler Antisthenica pp. 5 ff., Proleg. zur Pl. Staat p. 61, to be a contemptuous allusion to Antisthenes' ideal commonwealth (on which see Susemihl in Fl. Jahrb. 1887 pp. 207—214). This conjecture requires us to interpret Plato's first sketch of a State as wholly ironical and intended ‘to warn us against the false ideal of a Nature-City’ (Zeller l. c.). I agree with Henkel ( Stud. zur Gesch. d. Gr. Lehre vom Staat pp. 8 f.) in thinking that there is no solid ground for Zeller's theory. The πρώτη πόλις is not of course Plato's ideal republic, and his description of it is plentifully bestrewn with irony, but it is nevertheless the foundation on which his city is built, and, in point of fact, although some of its features are implicitly corrected or superseded in the sequel, it still remains on the whole, and as far as it goes, a not unpleasing picture of the life of the lowest stratum in Plato's city, and it is nowhere expressly cancelled or abolished. See also on 369 B and 372 E. The εὐχερὴς βίος ( Pol. 266 C ) of the πρώτη πόλις is fitly compared to that of pigs, the εὐχερέστατον γένος τῶν ὄντων (ib.); and it is appropriate that Glauco, who is nothing if not θυμοειδής ( Introd. § 2), should thus express his contempt for a life which hardly if at all rises above the level of ἐπιθυμία.

καὶ οἱ νῦν ἔχουσι : e.g. fish, flesh, fowl: see on 372 C. The words ἅπερ—ἔχουσι are to be taken with τραγήματα as well as with ὄψα. Glauco is thinking of delicacies like the preserved sorb-apples ( ὄα τεταριχευμένα) alluded to in Symp. 190 D . See Blümner Gr. Privatalt. p. 222 note 2.

τρυφῶσαν πόλιν . Krohn ( Pl. St. pp. 34, 72) thinks that Plato originally meant to look for ἀδικία in this τρυφῶσα πόλις: but see on 369 A.

ἀληθινὴ ‐‐ φλεγμαίνουσαν . There is a vein of irony in ἀληθινή: for the πρώτη τόλις is not the final form of Plato's city. The epithets τρυφῶσαν, φλεγμαίνουσαν are not however ironical (as Dümmler seems to hold Proleg. p. 62): see III 399 E.

εἰδ)αὖ ‐‐ ἀποκωλύει . I have adopted Richards' suggestion, and printed a comma after βούλεσθε, a colon before οὐδέν. The meaning is: ‘but if you wish it, let us contemplate also’ etc. The scribe in Paris A must have understood καὶ θεωρήσωμεν in the same way, for he assigns the words οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει to Glauco. We are hardly justified in making θεωρήσωμεν the subjunctive after βούλεσθε, in the absence of other examples in which the subjunctive follows a dependent βούλει ( βούλεσθε). A possible view would be to take θεωρήσωμεν as= δεῖ θεωρῆσαι and construe ‘but if you wish it and we are to contemplate’ etc., cf. Crat. 425 D εἰ μὴ ἄρα δἠ (MSS δεῖ)— καὶ ἡμεῖς— ἀπαλλαγῶμεν (‘unless we too are to get quit’), and Postgate in Transactions of the Camb. Philol. Soc. III Pt. I pp. 50—55. But Richards' proposal is a better one.

ταῦτα ‐‐ τισιν . γάρ is introductory and means not ‘for’ but ‘well.’ τισιν contains a sly allusion to Glauco: cf. V 465 E, VI 504 C.

καὶ ὄψα δή . For δή see 367 C note

ἑταῖραι . G. W. Nitzsch ( Rhein. Mus. 1857, pp. 471 f.), Richter ( Fl. Jahrb. 1867, p. 141), Madvig, and Stallbaum take offence at the juxtaposition of ἑταῖραι and πέμματα and suggest respectively ἀθῆραι (apparently an error for ἀθάραι, cf. Ar. Plut. 673 ), ἐραῖα (= ἑψήματα in Schol. on 445 C), ἐσχαρῖται ‘panes delicati,’ and ἕτερα (with the following καί deleted),—conjectures which are altogether needless and refute one another. The text is successfully defended by Hug ( Hermes 1876, p. 254), who cites an exact parallel in Ar. Ach. 1090 —1092 κλῖναι, τράπεζαι, προσκεφάλαια, στρώματα, | στέφανοι, μύρον, τραγήμαθ’ , αἱ πόρναι πάρα, | ἄμυλοι πλακοῦντες, σησαμοῦντες, ἴτρια | (varieties of πέμματα). Cf. also Amphis ap. Ath. XIV 642 A οἶνος ἡδύς, ᾠά, σησαμαῖ, | μύρον, στέφανος, αὐλητρίς and infra III 404 D, IX 573 D note From these passages it may fairly be doubted whether Plato's mention of ἑταῖραι is in any way even παρὰ προσδοκίαν (as the Oxford editors suggest): for αὐλητρίδες were almost as common a feature at dessert as the cakes ( πέμματα) etc. which accompany them here: see e.g. Xen. Mem. I 5. 4 , Symp. 2. 1, Pl. Symp. 176 E , Prot. 347 D . Vahlen ( Index Lect. per sem. hib. 1875—6 Berol.) quotes also Catullus'

(13. 1 ff.).

καὶ τὴν ποικιλίαν . ποικιλία means variety of colour as e.g. in embroidery: cf. 378 C, III 401 A, Euthyph. 6 C . On the omission in A see Introd. § 5.

χρυσὸν καὶ ἐλέφαντα : with reference to chryselephantine statuary. Note that (according to Plato) the demand for decorative arts does not arise till the physical necessities of man are satisfied. Cf. Nettleship Lectures and Remains, II p. 73.

μείζονά τε αὖ τήν . τέ is ἀνακόλουθον (Hoefer de part. Pl. p. 14): for other instances in the Republic see V 463 D, VII 522 B, IX 575 A. In this passage Richter would change τε αὖ τήν into τοιαύτην, comparing 372 E; but the text is sound, and τοιαύτην would be quite wrong. αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν (cf. 370 E), conjectured by Heller instead of αὖ τὴν πόλιν, is neat but needless.

πλήθους ἅ : i.e. πλήθους τούτων ἅ, as Ficinus understood the words. Stallbaum's alternative suggestion (that ἅ refers directly to ὄγκου and πλήθους) gives a poor sense. Cf. infra 373 E note

θηρευταὶ πάντες . The addition of πάντες shews that θηρευταί is used in a wide sense, including every variety of fishing as well as hunting: Laws 823 B θήρα γὰρ πάμπολύ τι πρᾶγμά ἐστί, περιειλημμένον ὀνόματι νῦν σχεδὸν ἑνί. πολλὴ μὲν γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἐνύδρων, πολλὴ δὲ ἡ τῶν πτηνῶν, πάμπολυ δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰ πεζὰ θηρεύματα. In Euthyd. 290 B —D, Soph. 219 E ff., and Laws (l.c.), Plato makes θηρευτική include ‘fishing for men’ e.g. in war, or by Sophists etc. This wider meaning clearly rests upon a Platonic—or rather Socratic (see Xen. Mem. II 6. 29 , quoted by J. and C.)—metaphor, and is not intended here. Cf. Benseler in Fl. Jahrb. 1881, pp. 236 ff. Aristotle on the other hand regards hunting as characteristic of the most primitive society ( Pol. A 8. 1256^{a} 35 ff.), and so too Plato himself in Laws 679 A.

ῥαψῳδοί ‐‐ ἐργολάβοι are the poet's servants. In Athens and elsewhere they formed regular guilds or σύνοδοι τῶν περὶ τὸν Διόνυσον τεχνιτῶν: cf. Arist. Probl. XXX 10. 956^{b} 11 οἱ Διονυσιακοὶ τεχνῖται. The ἐργολάβος contracted with the poet for the performance of his play, acting as a kind of financial agent or middleman between him and the σύνοδος to which he belonged. See Müller Bühnenalterthümer, pp. 392—414.

παιδαγωγῶν ‐‐ κουρέων . We infer that in the ‘healthy’ State fathers were παιδαγωγοί, mothers suckled ( τιτθῶν) and nursed ( τροφῶν) their own children, and the professional hair-dresser was unknown.

συβωτῶν . See on 372 B.

χρείαις . Cobet's χρείᾳ is not, I think, necessary. The plural (for which cf. 369 D al.) refers to the different occasions when we may require the help of doctors.

λέγομεν . λέγωμεν may be right, but the first hand of A was apt to err in these subjunctive forms ( Introd. § 5), and the Indicative is somewhat more natural here: cf. (with Schneider) 377 E ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγομεν καὶ ποῖα;

πολεμήσομεν . Stallbaum adds δή after πολεμήσομεν with some inferior MSS. The effect of its omission is to lay special stress on the first mention of πόλεμος in πολεμήσομεν, which should be pronounced with emphasis. Cf. IV 432 C, IX 583 C.

πολέμου ‐‐ γένεσιν . War then arises from the acquisition of territory and wealth: cf. Phaed. 66 C διὰ γὰρ τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτῆσιν πάντες οἱ πόλεμοι ἡμῖν γίγνονται, where war is farther traced to the body and its desires, to satisfy which we seek to multiply our possessions. Cf. Arist. Pol. A 8. 1256^{b} 23 ἡ πολεμικὴ φύσει κτητική πως ἔσται.

ἐξ ὧν ‐‐ γίγνηται defines γένεσιν. War comes ἐξ ὧν i.e. ἐκ τούτων ὧν κτλ. ( ὧν for ἐξ ὧν, according to the usual Greek idiom, cf. Euthyph. 10 C , and III 402 A ἐν ἅπασιν οἷς ἔστι al.), from that which involves both cities and individuals in calamities, viz. from the desire of money. Cf. 373 B note and (for the sentiment Laws 870 A ff. ἡ τῶν χρημάτων τῆς ἀπλήστου καὶ ἀπείρου κτήσεως ἔρωτας μυρίους ἐντίκτουσα δύναμις διὰ φύσιν τε καὶ ἀπαιδευσίαν τὴν κακὴν κτλ. The love of money —so Plato held—is the root of all evil. This explanation is due to Schleiermacher; others (Schneider, Stallbaum, J. and C. as an alternative) refer ἐξ ὧν to war and the like=‘ex cuiusmodi rebus’ (Stallbaum). It is an objection to such a view that it makes Plato say that evils come from War (and the like), directly after he has declined to say anything of the sort ( μηδέν γέ πω — ἐργάζεται). Further, if ὧν referred to war, the sentiment would in itself be a platitude and almost deserve to be expunged from the text, as it is by Herwerden. On the other hand ἐξ ὧν—γίγνηται is on Schleiermacher's view quite consistent with μηδέν γέ πω— <*>ργάζεται, for although war arises from that which harms a State, in itself it may (and does) actually do good. Good in other words may come out of evil; which is exactly the principle on which Plato evolves his ideal city out of the τρυφῶσα πόλις. ὅταν γίγνηται (sc. κακά) is equivalent (as J. and C. remark) to ἑκάστοτε: cf. Phaed. 68 D φόβῳ μειζόνων κακῶν ὑπομένουσιν αὐτῶν οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι τὸν θάνατον <*>ταν ὑπομένωσιν.

ὅλῳ . Herwerden's conjecture μεγάλῳ seems to shew that he connected σμικρῷ with στρατοπέδῳ, but the meaning is ‘not by a small amount, but by a whole army.’ For the datives cf. IX 579 C note

αὐτοὶ οὐχ ἱκανοί ; Glauco speaks as an Athenian citizen-soldier. In making war a profession, and citizens synonymous with soldiers, Plato is laconizing. The language which Isocrates ( Archid. 81) applies to Sparta might in point of fact be used of Plato's State: τῶν Ἑλλήνων διενηνόχαμεν οὐ τῷ μεγέθε<*> τῆς πόλεως, οὐδὲ τῷ πλήθει τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλ) ὅτι τὴν πολιτείαν ὁμοίαν κατεστησάμεθα στρατοπέδῳ καλῶς διοικουμένῳ καὶ πειθαρχεῖν <*>θέλοντι τοῖς ἄρχουσιν. Cf. Grote Plato III pp. 176, 209.

ὡμολογοῦμεν : without εἶναι as in X 610 C ἀθανάτους τὰς ψυχὰς ὁμολογεῖν, and Soph. 246 E . The analogy of these cases shews that ἀδύνατον here is not neuter but masculine, agreeing with ἕνα. The reference is to 370 B.

ἀλλ’ ἄρα . As διεκωλύομεν is certainly interrogative, Ast conjectured ἆρα for ἄρα, but ἄρα ( nimirum) is regularly present in a fortiori arguments of this kind, either in the δέ clause ( Ap. 34 C , 37 C, D, Crito 46 D) or in both ( Crito 50 E, Prot. 325 B , C). In place of the second ἄρα is here written δὴ ( τὰ δὲ δὴ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον κτλ.). For the combination ἀλλ’ ἄρα cf. Soph. 243 E ἀλλ) ἄρα τὰ ἄμφω βούλεσθε καλεῖν ὄν; Ἴσως.

ἀλλὰ σκυτοτόμον . See cr. n. and Introd. § 5. The homoioteleuton as well as the presence of the clause ἵνα—γίγνοιτο is in favour of the genuineness of these words: and the construction itself, which requires ἐκελεύομεν or the like to be supplied out of διεκωλύομεν (see Heindorf on Gorg. 457 C and Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 1072), is too idiomatic to have been readily invented by a scribe.

ἐφ’ ᾧ : with σχολὴν ἄγων (Schneider): cf. Ap. 36 D . The phraseology here recalls 370 B and C.

ἢ οὕτω ῥᾴδιον : singular in spite of the plural τὰ περί. Cf. (with Schneider) Hipp. Maior 299 A, Laws 708 D.

τε καὶ ὀργάνων is ejected by Herwerden, who is also inclined to denounce τὰ ὄργανα below. But it is just these words which “point the analogy: the weapons of the warrior are his tools.” (J. and C.) On similarly inadequate grounds τῶν νέων has been condemned in Euthyph. 3 A τοὺς τῶν νέων τὰς βλάστας διαφθείροντας: see my note ad loc. τινος ἄλλης μάχης below refers for example to ψιλοί or πελτασταί; the ἀσπίς (it should be remembered) was worn by the ὁπλίτης (whence ἀσπίδα μὲν λαβὼν—ὁπλιτικῆς). The necessity of special knowledge and training for success in war is insisted on by the historical Socrates in Xen. Mem. III 1.

φυλάκων . This is the first occurrence of φύλακες in the technical sense which it bears throughout the Republic. It is important to remember that the name includes not only the soldiers, but also—after they have been introduced— the rulers; when it becomes necessary to distinguish between the two classes, the former are called ἐπίκουροι (first named in III 414 B), the latter φύλακες παντελεῖς (III 414 B), τέλεοι φύλακες (IV 428 D) or the like, or more commonly ἄρχοντες (first alluded to in III 389 B, but not expressly separated off until 412 B ff., and finally and fully described only in Books VI and VII).

ὅσον γ’ ἂν δύναμις παρείκῃ . The phrase is not found elsewhere in Plato, although παρείκει is found with a personal subject ( ὁ θεός, θεοί) again in Theaet. 150 D , Laws 934 C. Herwerden would eject δύναμις (cf. Symp. 187 E καθ’ ὅσον παρείκει), but such a word is very unlikely to have been interpolated. δύναμις is simply ‘our powers’: the article is omitted as in the idiomatic κατὰ δύναμιν, εἰς δύναμιν.

σκύλακος . A play on σκύλαξ and φύλαξ is intended. Analogies from the animal kingdom were freely employed by the historical Socrates: for the dog in particular cf. Xen. Mem. IV 1. 3 καὶ τῶν κυνῶν τῶν εὐφυεστάτων, φιλοπόνων τε οὐσῶν καὶ ἐπιθετικῶν τοῖς θηρίοις, τὰς μὲν καλῶς ἀχθείσας ἀρίστας γίγνεσθαι—, ἀναγώγους δὲ γιγνομένας μᾳταίους τε καὶ μανιώδεις καὶ δυσπειθεστάτας. Cf. note on φύεται 370 A.

αἰσθανόμενον : ‘the moment he perceives.’ The present (where one might expect the aorist) emphasizes the rapidity with which pursuit follows upon sight.

ἀνδρεῖος . For ἀνδρεῖος applied to beasts cf. Isocr. 15. 211 εἰ περὶ τοὺς ἵππους καὶ τοὺς κύνας καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ζῴων ὁρῶντες τέχνας ἔχοντάς τινας, αἷς τὰ μὲν ἀνδρειότερα, τὰ δὲ πραότερα, τὰ δὲ φρονιμώτερα ποιοῦσι, περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσιν μηδεμίαν οἴονται τοιαύτην ηὑρῆσθαι παιδείαν κτλ. See also Lach. 196 D — 197 B and Arist. Eth. Nic. III 11. 1116^{b} 33 ff.

θυμοειδής . The technical term θυμοειδής is here for the first time used in the Republic. Plato probably inherited the word from Socrates (see Xen. Mem. IV 1. 3 τῶν τε ἵππων τοὺς εὐφυεστάτους, θυμοειδεῖς τε καὶ σφοδροὺς ὄντας κτλ.): in practice he employs it as the adjective corresponding to θυμός (see e.g. III 411 A, B), as ἐπιθυμητικός corresponds to ἐπιθυμία. The usual translation ‘spirited’ probably expresses the meaning as nearly as can be done by a single word. For a full discussion of the word reference may be made to P. Meyer ὁ θυμὸς ap. Arist. Platonemque (1876), whose conclusion (p. 65) is “ τὸν θυμὸν esse eam naturalem vim, qua ductus suam quisque propriam naturam explere studeat, quaque incitatus, quaecunque hanc naturam ipsi propriam tollere vel laedere conentur, fugiat, quae contra perfectiorem reddere possint, adpetat.” See also on IV 439 E.

ἄμαχόν ‐‐ ἀνίκητον . Ast may be right in supposing that Plato has in view the words of Heraclitus, often referred to in antiquity, θυμῷ μάχεσθαι χαλεπόν· ὅ τι γὰρ ἂν χρηίζῃ γίνεσθαι, ψυχῆς ὠνέεται ( Fr. 105 B ywater).

οὗ παρόντος ‐‐ ἀήττητος . Cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. III 11. 1116^{b} 26 ἰτητικὠτατον γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους.

ἐναντία γὰρ ‐‐ φύσις . Plato regarded this opposition as the fundamental antithesis of human character, and thought it a statesman's foremost duty to blend the θυμοειδές and πρᾶον harmoniously together: see Pol. 306 C — 311 C, infra III 410 B ff., VI 503 C, Theaet. 144 A , B.

ταῦτα ‐‐ ἔοικεν . Van Heusde ( Initia Phil. Plat. p. 471 note 1) somewhat hastily declares these words to be corrupt, and supplies ἀμφότερα ἔχειν after ταῦτα δέ. ταῦτα refers like τούτων simply to the two qualities πρᾶον and μεγαλόθυμον: ‘these’—meaning the combination of these as opposed to one of them—‘are apparently unattainable’: cf. VI 499 D οὐ γὰρ ἀδύνατος γενέσθαι, οὐδ’ ἡμεῖς ἀδύνατα λέγομεν.

ἐνοήσαμεν ‐‐ φύσεις . ἐνενοήσαμεν (with q) is read by most of the editors, quite unnecessarily, as Schneider shews. νοεῖν is not ‘putare,’ nor— I think—‘perpendere,’ but simply ‘animadvertere,’ ‘notice,’ as often. Such a meaning is peculiarly appropriate with ἴδοι following. Presently ἄρα is not ‘then’ (J. and C.), but ‘after all.’

τῷ φύλακι : not τῷ σκύλακι, as Groen van Prinsterer conjectured ( Plat. Prosop. p. 209). τῷ φύλακι of course depends on παρεβάλλομεν, and ἐν ᾧ is for ἐν τούτῳ ὃ.

αὐτῶν τὸ ἦθος . With αὐτῶν (unnecessary, but welcome, after τῶν γενναίων κυνῶν) cf. IV 428 A note

πρὸς μὲν ‐‐ τοὐναντίον . In Od. XVI 4—10 the dogs of Eumaeus do not bark at Telemachus, and Odysseus remarks (8, 9) Εὔμαἰ, ἦ μάλα τίς τοι ἐλεύσεται ἐνθάδ’ ἑταῖρος | ἢ καὶ γνώριμος ἄλλος, ἐπεὶ κύνες οὐχ ὑλάουσιν | ἀλλὰ περισσαίνουσι. See also Od. XIV 30, where they bark at the stranger Odysseus, and cf. Heracl. 115 (Bywater) κύνες καὶ βαύζουσι ὃν ἂν μὴ γινώσκωσι. In Aristotle similar characteristics are attributed to the lion: see Physiogn. 5. 809^{b} 34—36 μεγαλόψυχον καὶ φιλόνικον, καὶ πραΰ καὶ δίκαιον καὶ φιλόστοργον πρὸς ἃ ἂν ὁμιλήσῃ, and Hist. An. IX 44. 629^{b} 10—12.

πρὸς τῷ θυμοειδεῖ κτλ. There seems to be no other example in good Greek of προσγενέσθαι meaning ‘to become in addition’: but we may compare προσέσονται II 373 A, προσέχειν VII 521 D, προσείπωμεν X 607 B, and similar instances with other verbs. I formerly wrote φιλόσοφον for φιλόσοφος (‘that to the element of spirit nature should have added’— προσγενέσθαι, i.q. accessisse, cf. I 346 D —‘a philosophical temperament’). The accusative with infinitive has however a harsh effect. Herwerden cuts the knot by deleting the προς‐ of προσγενέσθαι.

ὅτι ‐‐ προπεπονθώς . Schneider justly observes that ὅτι is not likely to be an interpolation, and might easily have disappeared before ὅν, as it has in A (see cr. n.). In itself the presence of ὅτι is an improvement. For οὐδὲν δή v (supported also by Stobaeus Flor. 43. 149) reads οὐδέν, which may be right. Cobet's οὐδὲ ἕν is too emphatic.

οὐ πάνυ ‐‐ τὸν νοῦν : ‘I have hardly thought of the matter till now.’ μέχρι δεῦρο is more idiomatic than μέχρι τούτου in this sense, but Xen. Cyr. VIII 8. 9 and Dem. de Cor. 48 are closely analogous instances. The alternative rendering ‘my observation has hardly extended so far’ is (in view of οὔπ ω τοῦτο ἐθαύμασας;) less suitable.

ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφον . ὡς ἀληθῶς indicates that φιλόσοφον is to be taken in its etymological sense: cf. I 343 C note The dog shews ‘a love of knowledge’ because he loves the known, and hates the unknown. Brandt ( Zur Entwick. d. Pl. Lehr. v. d. Seelentheilen p. 10) ingeniously takes φιλόσοφον as= σοφὀν τοὺς φίλους: but the other interpretation is more natural and relevant. There is perhaps an allusion to the Cynics: see Schol. in Arist. ed. Brandis (Berlin 1836) 23^{b} 16 ff. τετάρτη δὲ (SC. αἰτία τοῦ κληθῆναι Κυνικοὺς) ὅτι διακριτικὸν ζᾧον ὁ κύων γνώσει καὶ ἀγνοίᾳ τὸν φίλον καὶ τὸν ἀλλότριον ὁρίζον· ὃν γὰρ γιγνώσκει, νομίζει φίλον εἶναι καὶ εἰ ῥόπαλον ἐπιφέροιτο, ὃν δὲ ἀγνοεῖ ἐχθρόν, καὶ εἰ δέλεαρ ἐπιφερόμενος εἴη. οὕτως οὗν καὶ οὗτοι τοὺς μὲν ἐπιτηδείους πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν φίλους ἐνόμιζον καὶ εὐμενεῖς ἐδέχοντο, τοὺς δὲ ἀνεπιτηδείους ἀπήλαυνον δίκην κυνῶν κατ’ αὐτῶν ὑλακτοῦντες, and Philoponus ib. 35^{a} 5—12. The Cynics were themselves very fond of pointing the moral from the lower animals to man (Dümmler Proleg. p. 58 note 2), and Plato here paints them not unkindly in colours of their own. It should be noted that throughout II—IV Plato uses φιλόσοφος and φιλοσοφία with less of an intellectual than of a moral connotation. In the earlier books the word is for the most part connected with a gentle considerate disposition or character, whether naturally implanted or the result of culture (cf III 410 E, 411 C, 411 E): in 407 C the sense is somewhat different. See Nettleship in Hellenica pp. 77—79, and Krohn Pl. St. p. 71. It is not until the latter part of Book V (473 B ff.) where Plato is proposing to enter on the third and final stage of his ideal city, viz. the κατάστασις τῶν ἀρχόντων, that the intellectual aspect of the word begins to predominate over the moral. Cf. IV 439 D note

φύσει is better taken with φιλόσοφον than with πρᾶος. Cf. 375 B.

ἆρά τι προὔργου κτλ. See on 368 E.

ἵνα μὴ ‐‐ διεξίωμεν . See cr. n. The omission in the text of A may be accidental (see Introd. § 5), but the sentence is certainly a difficult one. If the MSS are right, the meaning must be “For we do not want to be tedious,”— but συχνός is rather ‘lengthy’—“and we do not want to leave unsaid what is required for completeness” (J. and C., comparing for συχνός Theaet. 185 E , Phil. 23 B al.). The conjectures of Teuffel ( Rhein. Mus. 1850 p. 469) and Herwerden ( Mnem. N. S. XI p. 339)— ἵνα ἢ (so q) ἐῶμεν συχνὸν (so v) λόγον ἢ ἱκανὸν (so v) διεξίωμεν and ἵνα μὴ ἢ ἐῶμεν συχνὸν λόγον ἢ οὐχ ἱκανὸν διεξίωμεν— improve the antithesis, but are much too violent. It is safest to retain the MS reading until a thoroughly satisfactory emendation appears. Dr Jackson suggests ἵνα μὴ ἐῶμεν ἱκανὸν λόγον ἢ οὐχ ἱκανὸν διεξίωμεν.

τίς οὖν ἡ παιδεία; κτλ. The educational scheme contained in Books II and III contributes to the purgation of the τρυφῶσα πόλις, and thereby helps to complete Plato's second picture of an ideal city: see on 372 D ff. For the correct understanding of these regulations it is well to bear in mind (1) that Plato's object in this preliminary discipline is to train the character rather than the intellect (cf. IV 430 C note), and (2) that all the guardians have to pass through this curriculum. The higher scheme of education (in Book VII), on the other hand, is confined to those guardians who are to be made Rulers in the State, and its express aim is to educate the intellect rather than the will. See especially VI 502 E, VII 521 D—522 A notes The best discussion on Plato's theory of education in its broader aspects is still, I think, Nettleship's Essay in Hellenica pp. 67—180. Platon's Erziehungstheorie n. s. Schrift. dargestellt von Dr A. Drygas Schneidemühl 1880 is a useful summary. For Plato's criticism of poetry, we may refer in particular to Heine's excellent dissertation De rat. quae Platoni c. poet. Gr. intercedit etc. Vratislaviae 1880, and to Reber's Plato und die Poesie Leipzig, 1864.

ἔστιν δέ που — μουσική . The usual Greek view (see for example Isocr. 15. 180—185), corrected by Plato in III 410 C ff.

εἶπον . Richter ( Fl. Jahrb. 1867 p. 141) revives Muretus' conjecture εἶδος: but εἶπον is alone satisfactory. The confusion of ο and ω occurs in Inscriptions from the third century B.C. onwards (Meisterhans^{3} p. 24 note 128). See also Introd. § 5.

λόγων δὲ ‐‐ ἕτερον . The word ‘lies’ is here used by Plato in its popular sense of that which is false in fact: his own definition of the ‘veritable lie’ is different: see 382 B note ‘Lies’ are necessary—so Plato holds—in education: only they must be moral lies. Under ‘lies’ he includes stories ( μῦθοι) about the gods, about the daemons and heroes long since dead, about a future life—all of them subjects where the alleged facts cannot be verified. The ἀληθεῖς λόγοι are concerned with men, and are passed over by Plato, because he could not state his view without anticipating the conclusion which the Republic is intended to prove (see III 392 A—C). This point is missed by Krohn ( Pl. St. p. 12).

ἀληθῆ : i.e. truths of fact or history, not yet with reference to moral truth, for nothing has been said to change the connotation of ψευδής or its opposite ἀληθής. In Plato's view legend contains some elements of historical truth.

ἀρχὴ ‐‐ μέγιστον : semi - proverbial, with reference to ἀρχὴ ἥμισυ παντός: cf. Laws 753 E, and (for the application of the sentiment) ib. 765 E.

μάλιστα ‐‐ τύπον . See cr. n. To τύπος there are two objections: (1) the subject of πλάττεται and ἐνδύεται should be the same; but the subject of πλάττεται is not τύπος, but the νέῳ καὶ ἁπαλῷ ὁτῳοῦν, cf. πλάττειν τὰς ψυχὰς in C below: (2) it is more natural and correct to say that an object which ‘is being moulded’ ‘puts on’ a τύπος, than to say that the τύπος sinks into it. Reading τύπον we obtain the proper contrast between ἐνδύεται and ἐνσημήνασθαι: the youth puts on whatever impression or type the educator desires to stamp him with. The metaphor becomes more explicit in Plutarch De lib. educ. 3 F καθάπερ γὰρ σφραγῖδες τοῖς ἁπαλοῖς ἐναπομάττονται κηροῖς, οὕτως αἱ μαθήσεις ταῖς τῶν ἔτι παιδίων ψυχαῖς ἐναποτυποῦνται. Cf. also Theaet. 191 D and Hor. Epp. II 2. 8 argilla quidvis imitaberis uda.

ῥᾳδίως οὕτω : ‘carelessly, without more ado’: cf. 378 A and I 331 C. This idiomatic οὕτω is common with adverbs like ῥᾳδίως, εἰκῇ, ἁπλῶς, νῦν, ἐξαίφνης: for examples see Blaydes on Ar. Wasps 461 .

καλὸν : sc. μῦθον, which some MSS (including II) insert. For μῦθον understood from μυθοποιοῖς cf. III 399 D, where τοῦτο i.e. αὐλός is understood from αὐλοποιούς, 410 A, where αὐτοί (i.e. ἰατροί) follows ἰατρική, IV 421 E, and (with Schneider) Laws 886 C θεογονίαν διεξέρχονται, γενόμενοί τε (sc. οἱ θεοὶ) ὡς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὡμίλησαν.

πλάττειν κτλ. Mothers and nurses practised massage on the bodies of infants: cf. Laws 789 E τιθέντες νόμους τὴν μὲν κύουσαν περιπατεῖν, τὸ γενόμενον δὲ πλάττειν τε οἷον κήρινον ἕως ὑγρόν, καὶ μέχρι δυοῖν ἐτοῖν σπαργανᾶν, and Alc. I 121 D. A trace of massage practised for medical purposes appears in Zeno Fr. 180 (ed. Pearson).

ἐλεγέτην . The dual links together Homer and Hesiod as jointly responsible for Greek theology: see on 363 A. Among the first to rebel against their authority were Pythagoras, Xenophanes, and Heraclitus (D. L. VIII 21, IX 18, IX I). Xenophanes' protest was particularly famous in antiquity: see Sext. Emp. adv. Math. I 289 and IX 193 ap. Ritter and Preller Hist. Philos. Gr.^{7} pp. 76, 77. Plato's attack on the Olympian theology in this and the succeeding book was perhaps the severest blow that Paganism received before the Christian era, and pointed the way for those exaggerated diatribes against the heathen gods in which it afterwards became the fashion of early Christian apologists to indulge, beginning with the Apology of Aristides (cc. 8—11). Cf. X 607 B note

ὅπερ ‐‐ ψεύδηται . ὅπερ is τὸ εἰκάζειν κακῶς περἰ θεῶν etc. A distinction is drawn between mere lies and the lie which is in itself οὐ καλόν, unbeautiful and immoral in tendency, e.g. the story of Uranus and Cronus ( ὁ εἰπὼν οὐ καλῶς ἐψεύσατο in E below). Such legends not merely misrepresent the gods, but also corrupt mankind.

τῶν μεγίστων : masculine, not neuter: cf. 378 B.

Ἡσίοδος . Theog. 154—181.

τὰ δὲ δὴ κτλ . δή emphasizes the case of Cronus as the most important (cf. Prot. 311 D , 312 E): it is so because the delinquent is Zeus, the reigning king of gods and men. The example set by Zeus on this occasion was no doubt sometimes used to justify wrong-doing: see for example Aesch. Eum. 640 , 641, Ar. Clouds 904 —906 πῶς δῆτα δίκης οὔσης ὁ Ζεὺς | οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν τὸν πατέρ’ αὑτοῦ | δήσας ; ib. 1079 ff., Eur. H. F. 1317 — 1319, and especially Pl. Euthyph. 5 E — 6 A, where Euthyphro urges the analogy in all seriousness to justify his vexatious prosecution of his own father. The pernicious effect of such legends on human conduct is again pointed out in Laws 886 C, 941 B: cf. also Isocr. Bus. 38—43, Luc. Men. 3, and Grote Plato III p. 194 note

ῥᾳδίως οὕτω : 377 B note

θυσαμένους ‐‐ ἀκοῦσαι . ἀπορρήτων suggests the mysteries, whence the allusion to the ‘mystic pig’ ( Ar. Ach. 764 ). For ἄπορον, ‘unprocurable’ (Jowett), ἄπνρον has been suggested, absurdly enough. ἄπορον is further explained by ὅπως— ἀκοῦσαι. It should be noted that ὅπως with a past tense of the indicative in clauses of this kind is rare in Plato: it occurs again only in Laws 830 B, 959 C (where ἄν should be expunged). Cf. Weber in Schanz's Beiträge zur hist. Synt. d. Gr. Sprache II 2, p. 64.

οὐδ’ αὖ has been needlessly doubted by Richter ( Fl. Jahrb. 1867 p. 142), who suggests οὐδέν. The words ἀδικῶν—ποιοῖ correspond to the conduct of Uranus and Cronus towards their children: οὐδ’ αὖ—τρόπῳ to Cronus' treatment of Uranus, and Zeus' of Cronus. Cf Euthyph. 5 E —6 A. The Euthyphro presents so many parallels to § 378 that some have—erroneously, no doubt—supposed it to be a spurious elaboration of that section: see my edition of the dialogue p. xxix.

πολλοῦ δεῖ ‐‐ ποικιλτέον . πολλοῦ δεῖ is not adverbial (like ἥκιστα), as J. and C assert: otherwise δεῖ would be δεῖν (so Herwerden would read Mnem. N. S. XI p. 339). The asyndeton is justified by emphasis and the ampliative character of the sentence. The verbals are best explained (with Stallbaum) by supposing an ellipse of εἶναι: cf. Schanz Nov. Comm. Pl. p. 33.

ποικιλτέον . ποικίλλειν is used of depicting in a variety of colours (VIII 557 C), not necessarily by embroidery. Cf. 373 A note There is probably a special reference here to the πέπλος. At the greater, if not also at the lesser, Panathenaic festival, a robe woven by Athenian maidens and representing the triumph of Athena and the Olympians over the giants, together with other celestial fights, was carried in procession to the Acropolis, and presented to the statue of the goddess in the Erechtheum: cf. Euthyph. 6 B , C and Mommsen Feste d. Stadt Athen pp. 107 ff. The subject was depicted on the Parthenon frieze: see Baumeister Denkm. d. kl. Alterth. II p. 1185. The allusion to the ceremony is the more appropriate in this connexion, if, as appears to be probable, the action of the dialogue takes place just before the great Panathenaea of 410 B.C. See Introd. § 3.

ὡς οὐδεὶς κτλ. Plato desires to obtain a religious sanction for his institutions, as in the myth III 414 B ff. The best δημηγόρος, according to Socrates, is ὁ στάσεις τε παύων καὶ ὁμόνοιαν ἐμποιῶν ( Xen. Mem. IV 6. 14 ): and the Platonic State may from this point of view be regarded as “an attempt to determine the ways and means of securing political ὁμόνοια” (Krohn Pl. St. p. 369).

λεκτέα —see cr. n.—cannot be dispensed with. Madvig's suggestion, that μᾶλλον is corrupt for φατέον or ᾀστέον or the like, and Liebhold's μελητέον for μᾶλλον, are much less probable than the accidental omission of λεκτέα in A. See Introd. § 5. Vermehren ( Pl. Stud. p. 92), rejecting λεκτέα, would carry on μυθολογητέον or the like; but this solution is much too difficult.

καὶ πρεσβυτέροις γιγνομένοις . The dative goes with λογοποιεῖν (‘to make tales for them as they grow older’), and καί before τοὺς ποιητάς means etiam. This explanation was proposed by Richter ( Fl. Jahrb. 1867 p. 138) and Vermehren (l. c. p. 91), and is probably right. Cf. Ar. Frogs 1054 f. Others connect the words with καὶ γέρουσι καὶ γραυσί: old men, old women, and the boys themselves as they grow older, must tell such stories πρὸς τὰ παιδία εὐθύς. But it is difficult to understand τοῖς παιδίοις with γιγνομένοις unless πρεσβυτέροις γιγνομένοις is construed with λογοποιεῖν.

ὑέος . Hephaestus. Διός is a false reading derived from a mistaken reference to Il. XV 18 ff. The story (according to Clement ap. Suid. s. vv. Ἥρας δὲ δεσμοὺς ὑπὸ υἱέος) was in Pindar: παρὰ Πινδάρῳ γὰρ ὑπὸ Ἡφαίστου δεσμεύεται ἐν τῷ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ κατασκευασθέντι θρόνῳ—καί φασι δεθῆναι αὐτὴν ἐπιβουλεύσασαν Ἡρακλεῖ. Cf. Paus. I 20. 3.

Ἡφαίστου ῥίψεις . Il. I 586—594.

θεομαχίας ‐‐ οὐ παραδεκτέον . Homer Il. XX 1—74, XXI 385—513. Cf. Xenophanes Fr. 1. 19—22 (Bergk) and Pind. Ol. IX 43, 44 μή νυν λαλάγει τὰ τοιαῦτ’ · ἔα πόλεμον μάχαν τε πᾶσαν χωρὶς ἀθανάτων.

ἐν ὑπονοίαις : adverbial, like ἐν φαρμάκου εἴδει III 389 B (J. and C.). The allegorical interpretation of Homer probably originated in the desire to save his character for piety and morality: πάντη γὰρ ἠσέβησεν (says Heraclides Alleg. Hom. ad init.), εἰ μηδὲν ἠλληγόρησεν. Before the time of Plato it was practised by Theagenes of Rhegium, Anaxagoras, Metrodorus of Lampsacus, Stesimbrotos of Thasos and others: see Wolf Proleg. ad Homerum pp. 161—166 and Jebb's Homer p. 89. In Plato's day the Cynics were the chief exponents of this school of criticism, especially Antisthenes: examples may be found in Winckelmann's Antisth. Frag. pp. 16, 23—28: cf. also Dümmler Antisthenica pp. 16 ff. Dümmler, many of whose combinations are highly speculative, regards the present passage as directed against Antisthenes, whose rivalry with Plato is well known: but there is nothing to suggest any personal reference. The historical Socrates occasionally played with the same weapons, as appears from Xen. Symp. 3. 6, and Mem. I 3. 7: so also does Plato, but seldom, if ever, without irony, e.g. Rep. 1 332 B ἠνίξατο— ὁ Σιμωνίδης ποιητικῶς: cf. also Theaet. 194 C , Alc. II 147 B—D al. Plato's attacks upon Homer lent a great impetus to this method of exegesis—the only method, as it was thought, by which his animadversions could be met: cf. Schow's Heraclides pp. 223—234.

οἷος τυγχάνει ‐‐ ἐν μέλεσιν . τυγχάνει ὤν=‘really is’: cf. I 337 B note On the omission of ἐάν τε ἐν μέλεσιν in A see Introd. § 5.

ἀλλὰ μὴν κτλ. It is first proved that good is not the cause of evil ( ἀλλὰ μὴν—πῶς γάρ;), and next that good is the cause of εὐπραγία ( τί δέ;— ναί): the conclusions are then stated in the reverse order. The step by which each conclusion is reached—the identification of ἀγαθόν and ὠφέλιμον—is Socratic (cf. Xen. Mem. IV 6. 8 ); but it is doubtful if the historical Socrates ever went so far as to deny that God is sometimes the cause of real evil or adversity to man, in spite of his belief in Providence ( Mem. I 4 and IV 3; yet I 4. 16 οἴει δ’ ἂν τοὺς θεοὺς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δόξαν ἐμφῦσαι, ὡς ἱκανοί εἰσιν εὖ καὶ κακῶς ποιεῖν, εἰ μὴ δυνατοὶ ἦσαν;). The moral goodness of the Deity himself was proclaimed before Socrates and Plato by Xenophanes, Pindar, and the dramatists, but the inference, that God, because He is good, is never the cause of evil, is probably due to Plato. Bacchylides expresses a kindred sentiment in Fr. 29 (Bergk) Ζεὺς ὑψιμέδων, δ(\ς ἅπαντα δέρκεται, | οὐκ αἴτιος θνατοῖς μεγάλων ἀχέων. Read in the light of Book VI, the theology of this and the succeeding chapters gains, no doubt, in significance and depth; yet it is illegitimate to argue on this account (as Susemihl does Genet. Entwick. II p. 121) that the existence of the Idea of Good is already presupposed, unless it is shewn that Plato could not have purified his theology except by metaphysics. In point of fact, Plato might have written the end of Book III even if he had never thought of the Ideas at all.

οὐδ) ἄρα ‐‐ πάντων . Contrast Aesch. Ag. 1485 , 1486 Διὸς παναιτίου πανεργέτα. | τί γὰρ βροτοῖς ἄνευ Διὸς τελεῖται ; Suppl. 822—824 and many other examples in Nägelsbach Hom. Theol. pp. 26, 51 ff., and Nachhom. Theol. pp. 16, 18, 60 ff., 73 ff.

πολὺ γὰρ ‐‐ ἡμῖν . An old saying, as appears from Pind. Pyth. 3. 81 ff. μανθάνων οἶσθα προτέρων· | ἓν παρ’ ἐσλὸν πήματα σύνδυο δαίονται βροτοῖς | ἀθάνατοι, and Eur. Suppl. 196 , 7: cf. also Hom. Il. XXIV 527 ff., Philem. Fr. Inc. 65 (ed. Meineke). Plato and Aristotle make room for it in their philosophies: see e.g. Pol. 273 D , Laws 906 A, and Arist. Probl. X 45. 895^{b} 39 ff. ἡ φύσις φαῦλα μὲν πάντα ποιεῖ, καὶ πλείους καὶ πλείω, σπουδαῖα δ’ ἐλάττω, καὶ οὐ πάντα δύναται. The counterpart in the sphere of morals is Bias's οἱ πολλοὶ κακοί: with which may be compared Rep. IV 428 E, 431 A, 442 A, C, IX 588 D. It is a melancholy cry born of the age of iron: in the golden age—so Plato tells us Pol. 273 C —the balance was the other way.

ἄλλ) ἄττα ‐‐ τὰ αἴτια . The dualism should not be taken too seriously, in spite of the good and evil souls in Laws 896 E. Plato is not now constructing a philosophy, but casting moulds for theology and poetry.

δοιοὶ πίθοι . See Il. XXIV 527—532 δοιοὶ γάρ τε πίθοι κατακείαται ἐν Διὸς οὔδει | δώρων οἷα δίδωσι κακῶν, ἕτερος δὲ ἑαων· | ᾦ μέν κ’ ἀμμίξας δώη Ζεὺς τερπικέραυνος, | ἄλλοτε μέν τε κακῷ ὅ γε κύρεται, ἄλλοτε δ’ ἐσθλῷ· | ᾧ δέ κε τῶν λυγρῶν δώῃ, λωβητὸν ἔθηκεν | καί ἑ κακὴ βούβρωστις ἐπὶ χθόνα δῖαν ἐλαύνει. In our Homer there is apparently only one jar of good to two of evil (see Leaf ad loc. and cf. 379 C note): in Plato there is one of each. So great a difference is not likely to be due to Plato: it is easier to believe that he used a different recension from the Alexandrian. The use of κῆρες unpersonihed was apparently not admitted by the Alexandrian critics. Cf. Wolf Proleg. p. 37, and Howes in Harvard Studies in Cl. Phil. VI p. 204.

ἀγαθῶν ‐‐ τέτυκται is either from a lost line of Homer, or from some other poet (as Schneider inclines to think): note οὔτ’ ἄλλου ποιητοῦ just above. There can hardly be any reference to Il. IV 84 Ζεύς, ὅς τ’ ἀνθρώπων ταμίης πολέμοιο τέτυκται, as Howes imagines (l. c. p. 196). The sentiment is common: cf. e.g. Hes. O. D. 669 and Pind. Isthm. IV 52, 53 Ζεὺς τά τε καὶ τὰ νέμει, Ζεὺς ὁ πάντων κύριος.

σπονδῶν σύγχυσιν . Il. IV 69 ff.

θεῶν ἔριν τε καὶ κρίσιν . This is usually explained as referring to the Theomachy ( Il. XX 1—74), which was caused by Zeus and Themis in the sense that Zeus sent Themis to summon the gods to the council at which it was sanctioned ( v. 4). But (1) Themis' part in causing the Theomachy is very small, (2) the simplest and most natural meaning of κρίσις is not ‘contention,’ but ‘judgment’ or ‘decision,’ and (3) the Theomachy in Homer is not productive of evil to men, but only to the gods themselves: its citation here would therefore be quite irrelevant. W. R. Hardie (in Cl. Rev. IV p. 182) is, I believe, right in supposing that the strife of the goddesses three and Paris' judgment is meant. ἔρις and κρίσις are regularly thus used: e.g. Eur. I. A. 1307 κρίσιν—στυγνὰν ἔριν τε καλλονᾶς; cf. ib. 581, Hel. 708, Troad. 924. Hec. 644 f. Κρίσις was the name of Sophocles' play on the judgment of Paris ( Fr. 330). The poem referred to by Plato is the Cypria (so also Wilamowitz Hom. Unters. p. 367 note 46), which traced the war of Troy to the judgment of Paris, and that to Zeus' deliberations with Themis ( Ζεὺς βουλεύεται μετὰ τῆς Θέμιδος περὶ τοῦ Τρωικοῦ πολέμου Kinkel Epic. Graec. Fr. p. 17. Θέμιδος is Heyne's emendation for Θέτιδος: but it is scarcely open to doubt: for the marriage of Peleus and Thetis, at which the three goddesses quarrelled, was an episode of the poem, and Thetis could hardly therefore have been privy to the plot. See Kinkel l. c. pp. 20, 22 and Jebb's Homer p. 153). Themis was Zeus' ἀρχαία ἄλοχος (Pind. Fr. 30 B ergk), and still appears as one of the Olympians in Il. XV 87. The Cypria is quoted again by Plato in Euthyph. 12 A . We may fairly suppose that θεῶν ἔρις τε καὶ κρίσις was the heading of one of the introductory episodes in the poem: to this also the omission of the article with ἔριν τε καὶ κρίσιν seems to point. Mr Hardie thinks Plato may have attributed the poem to Homer; but Euthyph. l. c. ( ὁ ποιητὴς ὁ ποιήσας) does not favour this view.

θεὸς μὲν ‐‐ θέλῃ : Aesch. Fr. 160 . For other examples of this familiar Greek idea see Nägelsbach Hom. Theol. p. 321 and Nachhom. Theol. pp. 54 ff.

ἐν οἷς ‐‐ ἔνεστιν . I have left these words in the text, although they are certainly open to suspicion, and have been condemned by Platt ( Cl. Rev. III p. 72). The antecedent to οἷς is apparently τὰ τῆς Νιόβης πάθη: but the play was not called ‘The sufferings of Niobe’ but ‘Niobe,’ and the relative can hardly precede its antecedent in sentences of this kind. If οἷς is referred to ταῦτα understood after ποιῇ, then ἐν is difficult: ‘if any one puts into poetry topics in which these iambics occur’ gives no good sense. Unless Plato is writing very inaccurately, we must pronounce the clause a marginal gloss on τὰ—πάθη .

ὠνίναντο κολαζόμενοι . An earlier generation looked upon punishment as retributory— δράσαντι παθεῖν. This view appears in Hes. Fr. 217, ed. Goettling, and especially in Aeschylus, e.g. Ag. 1563 f., Choeph. 309—314, 400 —404, 886, 927: in Sophocles and Euripides it is rarer ( Ant. 1074—1076, El. 1411 f., 1495 f., Andr. 438, Suppl. 614 —616), and Euripides expressly argues against it in Or. 508 ff. Traces of a milder theory were however contained in the doctrine πάθος μάθος ( Ag. 176 ff.), as well as in the use of words like σωφρονίζειν, δικαιοῦν, εὐθύνειν, for ‘punish.’ In Plato punishment is remedial. Ignorance or vice is in the soul what disease is in the body (IV 444 C, cf. IX 591 A, B), and the judge is the soul's physician (III 409 E ff., Gorg. 478 D ): hence ( Gorg. 480 B ff.) the sinner should go before the judge as a patient visits his doctor, and we should even prosecute our guilty friends and relations. See also Laws 854 D, 862 E, 934 A, 944 D τὸν γὰρ κακὸν ἀεὶ δεῖ κολάζειν, ἵν’ ἀμείνων ᾖ. The punishment, again, which awaits the wicked after death is intended to cure their souls, unless they are incurable: and such as are themselves incurable, help to cure others by their deterrent example (X 616 A): so that in its deepest relations this doctrine reaches to the very roots of Plato's philosophy, with all due deference to Mr W. S. Lilly, who with much intemperance of language denounces those who attribute such a view to Plato ( Fortnightly Review N.S. XLVI p. 116).

ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ πόλει : ‘in one's own city,’ with reference to the subject of διαμαχετέον, not to τινα. Plato implies that the preachers of such theology must be suppressed in his ideal city. In all this Teichmüller ( Lit. Fehd. I p. 114) detects an assault upon Isocrates, but his evidence is of the slightest.

μυθολογοῦντα is rejected by Herwerden: Ast suggested μυθολογούμενα. The choice of the participle is determined by λέγειν, which is more important than ἀκούειν: for without saying hearing is impossible. μήτε νεώτερον μήτε πρεσβύτερον belongs both to λέγειν and to ἀκούειν.

νόμων τε καὶ τύπων . All laws are in Plato's view only moulds or outlines, within which our actions should fall. Cf. infra 383 C and especially Pol. 294 A ff.

ἆρα γόητα κτλ. Although the gods are constantly represented as deceivers in Greek poetry and legend, Plato was by no means the first to uphold the opposite view. In Pindar ( Ol. 10. 4) Truth is the daughter of Zeus, and the dramatists often teach a similar doctrine: see Nägelsbach Nachhom. Theol. p. 46. There is a close imitation of Plato's argument throughout this passage in Arist. Fr. 15. 1476^{b} 14 ff. ed. Rose.

αὐτόν is emphatic: the contrast is between actual and apparent transformations of the Deity. After αὐτόν, Herwerden would insert παντοδαπόν, comparing 381 E; before it, Richards adds ἄλλον, by which Benedictus and Ast replace αὐτόν. Hartman proposes <τι> γιγνόμενον. It has apparently escaped notice that γιγνόμενον, as well as ἀλλάττοντα τὸ αὑτοῦ εἶδος, belongs to εἰς πολλὰς μορφάς in the sense of ‘passing into’: cf. Tim. 57 A εἰς ἄλλο τι γιγνόμενον, infra III 400 B εἰς βραχύ τε καὶ μακρὸν γιγνόμενον, IX 588 C, and the frequent idiom γένεσις εἰς e.g. Phaed. 71 B , 71 E, Phil. 26 D , Tim. 49 C , 54 B.

ἁπλοῦν : one of the watchwords of Plato's State (370 B, C, 374 A—D al.): his citizens are to be nothing if not ἁπλοῖ. In making the gods a reflection of the type of human character which he desired to foster, Plato is acting strictly in accordance with the method of Greek theology, whose Olympus is an image of human society. The end of human action is ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν ( Theaet. 176 B ); and Plato's God, changeless and with ‘no shadow of turning,’ furnished the citizens of his ideal city with an abiding standard of human conduct. Cf. 383 C.

τί δὲ τόδε ; Steinhart ( Platon's Werke V p. 680) justly observes that the method of reasoning employed here— the disproof of each of the two members of the opposite alternative—recalls the arguments by which Parmenides established the attributes of Being (see RP.^{7} §§ 95, 98); but the resemblance is not close enough to suggest that Plato was thinking of Parmenides when he wrote this chapter. Although the unchangeableness of God was taught by Xenophanes and the Eleatics, there are few if any traces of such a doctrine outside the philosophers before Plato.

ὑπὸ μὲν ἄλλου κτλ . μέν has its counterpart in ἀλλ’ ἆρα αὐτὸς αὑτὸν κτλ. 381 B.

κινεῖται : a more general word for change than ἀλλοιοῦται: cf. Theaet. 181 D δύο δὴ—εἴδη κινήσεως, ἀλλοίωσιν, τὴν δὲ περιφοράν. The doctrine of the permanence and immutability of good enunciated here foreshadows, but does not presuppose, the metaphysical predominance of the Good in Book VI.

καὶ ἀμφιέσματα . See cr. n. and Introd. § 5.

ἀνάγκη : sc. ἐστίν. For ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ without ὡς see on I 332 E. Hartman needlessly suggests ἔμοιγε δοκεῖν.

θεοὶ ‐‐ πόληας . Od. XVII 485 f. Cf. Nägelsbach Hom. Theol. pp. 166—168.

Πρωτέως καὶ Θέτιδος . For Proteus see Od. IV 456—458. Aeschylus also wrote a satyric drama called Proteus: Fragg. 208—213. The transformations of Thetis to escape marrying Peleus had been celebrated by Pindar ( Nem. IV 62 ff.), Sophocles ( Fr. 548), perhaps also (as Stallbaum thinks) by Hesiod in his ἐπιθαλάμιον εἰς Πηλέα καὶ Θέτιν (see Goettling's Hesiod pp. XLIX and 304).

ὡς ἱέρειαν ‐‐ βιοδώροις : from Aesch. Ξαντρίαι (Schol. on Ar. Frogs 1344 ). Dindorf ( Aesch. Fr. 170 ) restores as follows: ὀρεσσιγόνοισι | Νύμφαις κρηνιάσιν κυδραῖσι θεαῖσιν ἀγείρω, | Ἰνάχου Ἀργείου ποταμοῦ παισὶν βιοδώροις. Herwerden's βιοδώρου is a wanton change: the sons of the river-god are his tributaries, and lifegiving like himself. It is not clear why Hera was disguised as a priestess. The incident in Inachus' history most suited to dramatic treatment was the persecution of his daughter Io by Hera in consequence of her intrigue with Zeus. As Io was a priestess of Hera, Hera may have disguised herself as another priestess in order to discover her husband's unfaithfulness: see Apollod. Bibl. II 1. 3 φωραθεὶς δὲ (sc. ὁ Ζεὺς) ὑφ’ Ἥρας, τῆς μὲν κόρης ἁψάμενος εἰς βοῦν μετεμόρφωσε λευκήν, αὐτὴν δὲ ἀπωμόσατο μὴ συνελθεῖν. The subject seems to have been treated by Sophocles in his satyric drama Inachus ( Fragg. 255—278). With ὡς ἱέρειαν ἀγείρουσαν cf. ἀγύρται in 364 B and note ad loc.

τοιαῦτα πολλά . For examples see Heyne's Virgil II pp. 146— 152 (cited by Ast on 381 D). πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἀοιδοί. said the proverb.

κακῶς : like οὐ καλῶς 377 E.

ὡς ‐‐ ἰνδαλλόμενοι . ἄρα expresses incredulity (358 C note) and τινες contempt. Plato is thinking, inter alia, of the bugbears of the nursery—Lamia, Mormo, and Empusa, whose power of self-transformation was unlimited: see Blaydes on Ar. Frogs 293 . ξένοις need not here be limited to the masculine gender. Cf. Strab. I 19 παισὶ προσφέρομεν—εἰς ἀποτροπὴν—τοὺς φοβεροὺς ( μύθους). ἥ τε γὰρ Λαμία μῦθός ἐστι καὶ ἡ Γοργὼ καὶ ὁ Ἐφιάλτης καὶ ἡ Μορμολύκη.

φάντασμα is said with reference to φαίνεσθαι just above, and should be taken both with λόγῳ and ἔργῳ. The φάντασμα λόγῳ is the spoken lie: an example of the φάντασμα ἔργῳ is a φαντασία or unreal appearance (382 E). The words ἔργῳ φάντασμα προτείνων must not be understood of actual self-transformations of the gods.

τό γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος κτλ. Cf. τοῦ ἀληθῶς ψεύδους Theaet. 189 C , and (for the sentiment) Laws 730 C.

οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν κτλ. With Plato, as with Socrates, vice is ignorance, and involuntary. The doctrine reappears below in III 413 A, IX 589 C: it is further implied by the entire scheme of education in Books VI and VII. For other assertions of this view in Plato see Simson der Begriff d. Seele bei Pl. p. 125 note 359. Cf. also Soph. Fr. 663 ἡ δὲ μωρία | μάλιστ’ ἀδελφὴ τῆς πονηρίας ἔφυ. The identification of ignorance and vice is in harmony with popular Greek psychology, in which the intellect was not clearly distinguished from the will; it can be traced in the moral connotation of words like ἀμαθής, ἀπαίδευτος, ἀγνώμων. In close connexion with this conception of vice is Plato's view of punishment as remedial: see 380 B note

τὰ ὄντα κτλ. τὰ ὄντα =‘the truth.’ The contrast between the act and state in ψεύδεσθαί τε καὶ ἐψεῦσθαι resembles I 351 B: ἐψεῦσθαι, moreover, suitably bridges the distance between ψεύδεσθαι and ἀμαθῆ εἶναι. ἔχειν τὸ ψεῦδος corresponds to ψεύδεσθαι, κεκτῆσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος to ἐψεῦσθαι: the contrast is between ‘holding, ready for use, that which is already possessed,’ and permanent possession: cf. Soph. Ant. 1278 and Jebb ad loc. The words ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ, ‘in such a case’ (i.e. ἐν τῷ ἐψεῦσθαι τῇ ψυχῇ περὶ τὰ ὄντα), are quite satisfactory (cf. III 393 C), and ought not to have caused Herwerden difficulty.

μίμημά τι ‐‐ ψεῦδος . τοῦ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθήματος must not be explained (with Bosanquet Companion p. 93) as the state of mind of him who tells a lie: for that is knowledge, and the spoken lie certainly is not an imitation of knowledge. They refer to the ‘true lie,’ which is a certain πάθημα in the soul of the ‘true liar,’ viz. ignorance, and of which the spoken lie is an imitation. It is a tolerably accurate definition of a lie to call it ‘an imitation of ignorance in the soul’: cf. IV 443 C note The spoken lie is ‘not a wholly unmixed lie,’ because it implies that the speaker knows the truth: in a certain sense therefore it is mixed with truth. It is ὕστερον γεγονός, because the spoken lie cannot be uttered until the truth is known. Inasmuch as the spoken lie is mixed with truth, it is better than the ‘veritable lie.’ We have here nothing but a special application of the old Socratic paradox ὁ ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνων ἀμείνων (see on I 334 A). I have placed a comma after γεγονός, to mark the antithesis between εἴδωλον and ἄκρατον ψεῦδος, and because εἴδωλον is not so much to be taken with τοῦ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθήματος: rather it stands for εἴδωλον ψεύδους, as οὐ πάνυ ἄκρατον ψεῦδος shews. The distinction between veritable and spoken lies savours, no doubt, of idealism: but it enables Plato to call his ideal archons ideally truthful, even when practically they tell lies, and it is with this object in view that the distinction is introduced. See III 389 B.

πότε ‐‐ μίσους ; τῷ is masculine: it is presently shewn that the spoken lie is useless to God. Plato does not permit a man to lie in his own interest. Ordinary Greek morality, in spite of Achilles' ἐχθρὸς γάρ μοι κεῖνος <*>μῶς Ἀΐδαο πύλῃσιν etc., probably did. The saying of Democritus ἀληθομυθεύειν χρεών, ὅπου λώιον (Stob. Flor. 12. 13) leaves us to infer that we may also lie ὅπου λώιον. Cf. Soph. Fr. 323 καλὸν μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστι τὰ ψεύδη λέγειν· | ὅτῳ δ’ ὄλεθρον δεινὸν ἁλήθεἰ ἄγει, | συγγνωστὸν εἰπεῖν ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ μὴ καλόν. The cynical immorality of Hdt. III 72 exceeds what Greek public opinion would have tolerated: cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. IV ch. 13. See also on III 389 B and Nägelsbach Nachhom. Theol. pp. 240 ff.

ἆῤ οὐ ‐‐ πολεμίους κτλ. Cf. I 331 E— 332 B.

τῶν καλουμένων φίλων depends on ἀποτροπῆς. If ὅταν διὰ μανίαν—τότε had been omitted, the construction would be quite clear: as it is, some difficulty has been felt. Schneider understands τινες as subject to ἐπιχειρῶσι: by Hermann ὅταν is changed to οἳ ἂν: by Herwerden ὅταν to οἳ ἂν and τότε to τοῦτο: while Stallbaum resorts to an anacoluthon, as if Plato had intended to say τῶν καλουμένων φίλων ἕνεκα. None of these expedients is so simple as to connect ἀποτροπῆς with φίλων. The clause ὅταν—πράττειν cancels out with τότε and does not affect the construction. καλουμένων, ‘so-called,’ involves a theory of friendship, viz. that no one who is ἀνόητος καὶ μαινόμενος can be a friend to man (any more than to God: cf. 382 E).

μυθολογίαις κτλ. Plato seems to have supposed that ancient history and mythology could be manufactured to order. Cf. Arist. Pol. B 9. 1269^{b} 28 and Susemihl ad loc. He attempts the task himself in III 414 B ff., Prot. 320 C —322 D (unless this is really an extract from one of Protagoras' own works), Pol. 269 A —274 E, Tim. 21 A — 25 D, Critias, and Laws 676 B—682 D.

εἰδέναι . The omniscience of the gods was no new doctrine: see Nägelsbach Hom. Theol. p. 23, Nachhom. Theol. pp. 23 ff.

ποιητὴς ‐‐ ἔνι . ‘There is nothing of the lying poet in God.’ Cf. 365 C note I can see no point in Stallbaum's notion that there is a play on the two senses of ποιητής—‘poet’ and ‘creator.’

ψεύδοιτο . ἄν is carried on: cf. I 352 E note

μαινομένων . Phaedr. 265 A μανίας δέ γε εἴο=η δύο, τὴν μὲν ὑπὸ νοσημάτων ἀνθρωπίνων, τὴν δὲ ὑπὸ θείας ἐξαλλαγῆς τῶν εἰωθότων νομίμων γιγνομένην. Plato refers here only to the first variety: the second is discussed in Phaedr. 265 B ff.

κομιδῇ ἄρα κτλ. The words ἁπλοῦν, οὔτε αὐτὸς μεθίσταται sum up 380 D—381 E (see on ἁπλοῦν in 380 D), the rest 382 A—D.

οὔτε κατὰ φαντασίας . See cr. n. and Introd. § 5. φαίνεσθαι and ἔργῳ φάντασμα προτείνων in 381 E, 382 A favour the view that these words are genuine.

ὕπαρ οὐδ’ ὄναρ . See cr. n. ὕπαρ οὐδ’ ὄναρ is not co-ordinate with οὔτε κατὰ φαντασίας etc., but subordinate to them: for φαντασίαι, λόγοι, and especially σημείων πομπαί might be vouchsafed either in waking moments or in dreams: see Stengel and Oehmichen in Iwan Müller's Handbuch V 3 pp. 37—47. For the doctrine cf. Xen. Mem. I 3. 4.

παράγειν . παράγοντας (conjectured by Richards) would be easier, but the slip, if such it be, is excusable. ὡς—ὄντας is not the accusative absolute: if it were, ὡς would express the reason, and here it does not. We are defining the τύπος: and the construction is (they must ποιεῖν) ὡς μήτε αὐτοὺς γόητας ὄντας, ‘represent the gods as neither themselves being sorcerers,’ etc. In παράγειν the construction is changed, but the change is natural, for our rule applies both to λόγος and ποίησις ( καὶ λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν), and λέγειν takes the accusative and infinitive. Both λέγειν and ποιεῖν affect the construction, which involves a sort of chiasmus. Cf. III 390 B note

τοῦ ἐνυπνίου πομπήν . Il. II 1— 34.

ἡ Θέτις κτλ. The verses are perhaps, as Schneider conjectures, from Aeschylus' Ὅπλων κρίσις, in which Thetis was one of the characters (Schol. on Ar. Ach. 883 ). Apollo with his harp ( ἔχων φόρμιγγα) appears as present at the marriage of Thetis also in Homer ( Il. XXIV 62, 63). Plato accommodates the beginning of the quotation to his own sentence: in Aeschylus perhaps it ran ὁ δ’ ἐνεδατεῖτο τὰς ἐμὰς εὐπαιδίας (so Butler, quoted by Schneider). ἐνδατεῖσθαι, ‘to dwell upon or emphasize,’ is elsewhere always used in an ominous sense (see Jebb on Soph. O. T. 205 ): and here too, perhaps, it strikes a foreboding note. The words μακραίωνας βίους were doubted by Stephanus, who suggested μακραίωνος βίου (so Euseb. Praep. Ev. XIII 3. 35) or μακραίωνας βίου: but Apollo's prophecies did not refer to Achilles only, so that the plural is justified. ἀπείρους should be taken not with εὐπαιδίας, but with βίους, which is in apposition to εὐπαιδίας. In the next line θεοφιλεῖς ἐμὰς τύχας depends on the compound expression παιῶν’ ἐπηυφήμησεν—a construction frequent in Aeschylus, especially with verbs which denote singing, celebrating, etc. ( Ag. 174, 175 al.): after enumerating all the blessings in store for Thetis ( ξύμπαντά τ’ εἰπών) Apollo raised a paean over her θεοφιλεῖς τύχας. This explanation— Schneider's—is much better than to connect ξύμπαντα adverbially with θεοφιλεῖς.

ἤλπιζον : ‘fancied,’ not ‘hoped’: cf. V 451 A, IX 573 C, and ἐλπίς in VII 517 B. This idiomatic usage is illustrated by Rutherford on Babrius 9. 2.

θεῖοι—οἷόν τε . The object of all worship and all religion, as of human action in general, is assimilation to God: cf. X 613 A note

πλούτου δὲ οὐδέν and Liebhold ( Fl. Jahrb. 1888, p. 107)

κόσμου δὲ ἄλλο μὲν <ἔχοντ)> οὐδέν for τοῦτον δὲ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν. Neither of these proposals has any plausibility, and it is best to regard this as one of the places where we owe the right reading to Π .

τὰ μὲν δὴ περὶ θεοὺς κτλ. Rettig ( Proleg. pp. 61 ff.) and others suppose that the virtue of ὁσιότης is alluded to here—a virtue which in the earlier dialogues is sometimes placed by the side of the four cardinal virtues ( Prot. 329 C , Men. 78 D , Gorg. 507 B ). But ὁσιότης is not specifically named (in spite of II 380 C), and it is clear from the words καὶ γονέας—ποιησομένοις that Plato is thinking at least as much of duty to man as of duty to gods: cf. II 378 B C, 381 E, 383 C. See also App. I.

ἀνδρεῖοι . Plato has in view chiefly courage in war: hence the importance which he attaches to removing the fear of death. Cf. Tyrtaeus 10 ( τεθνάμεναι γὰρ καλὸν κτλ.) and 12. 23 — 32. The poems of Tyrtaeus are not open to Plato's censure in this connexion. Pfleiderer ( Zur Lösung der Pl. Fr. p. 23) wrongly represents the present passage as tantamount (or nearly so) to a denial of the immortality of the soul, which is affirmed in Book X. It is possible to criticise the popular conception of immortality without disbelieving in a higher form of the same doctrine, and this is just what Plato does here.

καὶ περὶ τούτων τῶν μύθων should be taken with ἐπιστατεῖν rather than with λέγειν (sc. αὐτούς, i.e. τοὺς μύθους). Hartman, connecting the words with λέγειν, would expunge τῶν μύθων “cum poetae non de fabulis τὰ ἐν Αἵδου describentibus λέγειν soleant, sed ipsi Orci territamenta narrent”—a just criticism, and conclusive in favour of the construction which Hartman rejects.

λοιδορεῖν . The traditional literary picture of the Greek Hades deserves what Plato says of it (see the quotations in Nägelsbach Hom. Theol. pp. 397 ff., Nachh. Theol. pp. 396—398), although a brighter prospect was held out in the Eleusinian mysteries and the Orphic theology ( Nachh. Theol. pp. 398—407).

ἁπλῶς οὕτως . 11 377 B note

λέγοντας . For the accusative after the dative ἐπιχειροῦσι cf. Euthyph. 5 A , Crito 51 D. Before λέγοντας Ξ^{1} (with a few other MSS) adds ἄν, as if εἰ λοιδοροῖεν should be understood (cf. II 380 C); but we should supply not λοιδοροῖεν, but εἰ λοιδοροῦσι (Schneider).

τοῦδε τοῦ ἔπους κτλ. The singular ἔπος is sometimes used of more than one verse, e.g. Hdt. VII 143. The lines are addressed by the shade of Achilles to Odysseus: Od. XI 489—491. On the omission of ᾧ μὴ βίοτος πολὺς εἴη see Introd. § 5.

οἰκία ‐‐ θεοί περ . Il. XX 64, 65. The words in Homer are under the construction of δείσας—μή.

ὢ πόποι . The exclamation of Achilles when the ghost of Patroclus eludes his embrace: Il. XXIII 103, 104. On φρένες as the “physical basis of life” in Homer see Leaf ad loc.

οἴῳ ‐‐ ἀΐσσουσι . Tiresias retained in the other world something of the physical reality of his earthly existence: Od. X 493—495 τοῦ τε φρένες ἔμπεδοί εἰσιν· | τῷ καὶ τεθνηῶτι νόον πόρε Περσεφόνεια | οἴῳ πεπνῦσθαι· τοὶ δὲ σκιαὶ ἀΐσσουσιν. Plato allows the force of attraction to alter τοί to ταί: cf. Men. 100 A οἶος πέπνυται τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου, αἱ δὲ σκιαὶ ἀΐσσουσι.

ψυχὴ ‐‐ ἥβην . Il. XVI 856, 857. ῥεθέων, explained by the ancients as μέλη τοῦ σώματος (Hesych. s.v.), more probably denotes the mouth (as part of the face): cf. Leaf ad loc. and Il. IX 409. Leaf plausibly suggests that ἀν in ἀνδροτῆτα, ‘manhood’—found in all but two MSS of the Iliad—was only the written sign of the nasalis sonans, and counted as a short vowel.

ψυχὴ δὲ ‐‐ τετριγυῖα . Il. XXIII 100. “The voice,” says Leaf, “is as weak a copy of the living voice as is the εἴδωλον of the αὐτός”: whence τετριγυῖα and τετριγυῖαι again just below.

ὡς δ) ὅτε ‐‐ ᾔεσαν . Said of the souls of the suitors following Hermes down to Hades: Od. XXIV 6—9. Possibly we should read ἤισαν for ᾔεσαν (with Howes, Harvard Studies in Cl. Philol. VI p. 190).

ἐνέρους καὶ ἀλίβαντας . The Scholiast writes: ἐνέρους τοὺς νεκρούς, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἔρᾳ ( ὅ ἐστι γῇ) κεῖσθαι. Cf. ἔραζε. Early psychology scarcely separated the dead body from the surviving spirit: the latter still lived where the body lay ‘within the ground.’ Hence ‘those within the ground’ (opposed to the ἐπιχθόνιοι or living) became an expression for the spirits of the departed, and the denizens of the lower world in general: see Il. XV 188, XX 61. The Scholiast's derivation is more probable than that of Brugmann, who ( Grundriss II p. 180) derives the word from ἐν and a nominal suffix ‐ερο. Plato at any rate would have preferred the Scholiast. On ἀλίβαντας (not found in Homer or Hesiod) see Plut. Quaest. Symp. VIII 736 A (cited by Ast) ὁ δὲ ἀλίβας καὶ ὁ σκελετὸς ἐπὶ τοῖς νεκροῖς γέγονε, λοιδορουμένης ὀνόματα ξηρότητος. The ancients derived the word from ἀ and the root of λείβω λίψ etc., calling the dead ‘sapless’ διὰ τὴν τῆς λιβάδος ἀμεθεξίαν (Schol.). L. and S. object that the ἀ is long, relying perhaps on the line of Callimachus in Et. M. 63, 51 ἔβηξαν οἷον ἀλίβαντα πίνοντες (where ἀλίβαντα = ὄξος). There, however, the right reading may be ἁλίβαντα, i.e. οἱ ἀλίβαντα. But in Sophocles Fr. 751 ed. Dindorf the α is certainly long, unless the text is corrupt. Possibly the word is connected with ἠλίβατος; cf. Hesych. s. v. ἠλίβατον, where we are told that Στησίχορος Τάρταρον ἠλίβατον τὸν βαθὺν λέγει.

τούτου τοῦ τύπου . Instead of writing ἄλλα ὀνόματα ὅσα τούτου τοῦ τύπου ὄντα Plato writes ἄλλα ὄσα τούτου τοῦ τύπου ὀνομαζόμενα, with precisely the same meaning: τούτου τοῦ τύπου therefore depends on the copula involved in ὀνομαζόμενα. Stallbaum takes ὀνομαζόμενα as “quum pronuntiantur”; but this is pointless. The words mean simply ‘other names of this type which make all who hear them shudder’ etc.

φρίττειν δὴ ποιεῖ . The remark ὡς οἴεται, which appears in the best MSS— see cr. n.—after ποιεῖ gives no sense, and is admittedly corrupt. ὡς οἷόν τε, found in four inferior MSS besides q, is a rare phrase, occurring, I believe, nowhere else in Plato (except of course in combination with superlatives, e.g. III 412 B, VI 484 C), though found in Aristotle ( Pol. E 11. 1313^{a} 39, where Bekker conjectured οἴονται); but ‘to shiver as much as possible’ is painfully frigid. No emendation at all satisfactory has yet been proposed—neither Winckelmann's οἰκέτας, nor Hermann's ὅσα <*>τη (with reference to recitations of the rhapsodists!), nor Madvig's ὡς οἰητέα, nor Campbell's ὡς ἐτεά. Hertz ( Fl. Jahrb. 1872 p. 852) supposes the words to be a gloss by some Christian reader, meaning ‘as he’ (i.e Plato) ‘imagines.’ The author of the gloss wished to indicate that he at least could hear such tales without shivering. After ὡς οἴεται found its way into the text, it was probably altered to οἴονται (to suit the plural ἀκούοντας), from which οἷόν τε is a corruption: cf. 11 358 E, where q has οἴονται as against οἷόν τε of the best MSS. See also on VI 504 E.

καὶ ἴσως ‐‐ ἄλλο τι : “videlicet ad suavitatem et delectationem: v. p. 387 B, 390 A, 397 D, 398 A al.” (Stallbaum).

μὴ ἐκ ‐‐ ἡμῖν . φρίκη is a cold shiver, sometimes followed by sweat, whence ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης φρίκης θερμότεροι. Cf. (with Hartman) Phaedr. 251 A ἰδόντα δὲ αὐτόν, οἷον ἐκ τῆς φρίκης, μεταβολή τε καὶ ἱδρὼς καὶ θερμότης ἀήθης λαμβάνει, where Thompson remarks that φρίκη is used by Hippocrates of the ‘cold fit of a fever.’ In θερμότεροι καὶ μαλακώτεροι Plato is thinking of the softening effect of heat upon iron: cf. (with J. and C.) infra 411 B ὥσπερ σίδηρον ἐμάλαξε, Laws 666 C, 671 B καθάπερ τινὰ σίδηρον τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν πινόντων διαπύρους γιγνομένας μαλθακωτέρας γίγνεσθαι; see also Il. XVIII 468—477 and Whitelaw on Soph. Ajax 651 in Cl. Rev. v pp. 66, 230. In so far as it associates heat with cowardice, the comparison breaks down, for heat meant courage to the Greeks. For this reason Stephanus conjectured ἀθερμότεροι and Ast ἀθυμότεροι, a reading afterwards found in v. Ast's conjecture is thus refuted by Hartman (l.c.): “Astii coniectura inepta est, quum ἀθυμία vitium sit, non vero iusta ac temperata μαλακία (dixit enim μαλακώτεροι τοῦ δέοντος).” In the next sentence Hartman expunges φοβούμεθα without sufficient cause.

τῶν ἐλλογίμων ἀνδρῶν : a subjective, not an objective genitive: see E below, and 388 E, 390 D εἴ πού τινες— καρτερίαι—καὶ λέγονται καὶ πράττονται ὑπὸ ἐλλογίμων ἀνδρῶν with X 605 D.

ὁ ἐπιεικὴς ἀνὴρ ‐‐ προσδεῖται . This passage is full of Socratic colouring. οὖπερ καὶ ἑταῖρός ἐστι contains a suggestion that only good men can be comrades: cf. Xen. Mem. II 6. 19 , 20 and Pl. Lys. 214 C . That death has no terrors for the good man is laid down in Ap. 41 C ff. The self-sufficiency of virtue was illustrated in the person of Socrates himself ( Mem. 1 2. 14. IV 8. 11), and continually preached by him ( Mem. II 6. 2, cf. IV 7. 1). Steinhart appears to me to exaggerate the force of αὐτάρκης when he characterises the doctrine of this passage as anti-christian ( Einleitung p. 160).

ὑέος . The fortitude of Pericles on receiving the news of the death of his two sons was a case in point, and may have been known to Plato. It is commemorated in a fine fragment of Protagoras preserved by Plut. Consol. ad Apoll. 33. 118 E, F.

ὀδύρεται, φέρει . See cr. n. The infinitives ὀδύρεσθαι and φέρειν are explained by Stallbaum as dependent on λέγομεν, but this is too harsh. The rhetorical repetition of ἥκιστ’ ἄρα proves that like στερηθῆναι they should be under the government either of δεινόν itself, or of some notion supplied out of δεινόν. As the former alternative gives the wrong sense we must, if the text is sound, take refuge in the latter. Hartman by a tour de force resolves ἥκιστα δεινόν into ἥκιστα εἰκὸς αὐτὸν δεδιέναι, and carries on the εἰκός. It would be somewhat easier, I think, though still very harsh, to supply δεινός out of δεινόν, δεινός being used as in δεινὸς καταράσασθαι τῷ λίθῳ (Theophr. Char. 15, cf. infra 395 C): but it is difficult not to believe that the text is corrupt. In q, καί has been corrected to χρή, and the insertion of δεῖ before καί is suggested by Hartman. The question however is not what the good man ought to do, but what he actually does, and for this reason Richards' ἔοικε after ὀδύρεσθαι is better, although otherwise unlikely. Stallbaum's alternative proposal to read ὀδύρεται, φέρει δέ seems to me far the best both in point of sense, and because it might easily pass into ὀδύρεσθαι, φέρειν δέ under the influence of στερηθῆναι. For these reasons I have printed it in the text. Cf. Introd. § 5.

ἄλλοτ) ‐‐ ἀτρυγέτοιο . The picture of Achilles sorrowing for Patroclus in Iliad XXIV 10—12. Plato accommodates the Homeric narrative to his own ποιεῖν, and reads πλωΐζοντ’ — ἀτρυγέτοιο instead of δινεύεσκ’ ἀλύων παρὰ θῖν’ ἁλός, which appears in our Homer. πλωίζω elsewhere is always used of sail ing in the literal sense (yet ἐκ τοῦ νοῦ ἐκπλώειν in Hdt. VI 12), but it cannot bear such a meaning here. If the MSS are right, πλωΐζοντ) must be regarded (with Schneider) as a metaphor, the agitated movements of Achilles being compared to the unsteady motion of a ship upon the sea. Achilles is so to speak ‘at sea’ and shews it in his gait; cf. the metaphorical sense of χειμάζομαι. The picture savours of the burlesque, and Howes suggests that πλωίζων may be a deliberate parody on Plato's part ( Harvard Studies etc. VI p. 202). As no other example of such a use of πλωίζω has been adduced, the word is perhaps corrupt. Heyne's πρωΐζοντ) “matutinum se agentem” ( οὐδέ μιν ἠὼς | φαινομένη λήθεσκεν ὑπεὶρ ἅλα, says Homer) will never command a wide assent: still less πλώϊσοντ) (Benedictus), πρὼ| ἴοντ) (Ast), whose quantity is not above suspicion, or πρὼ| ἰύζοντ) (Liebhold Fl. Jahrb. 1888, p. 108). αἰάζοντ) (Herwerden and Naber) is better in point of sense, but the alteration is too great. I have thought of πόλλ’ ᾤζοντ) ( ᾤζεις ‘cry ὤ’ and not ὤζεις is the spelling of the Codex Mediceus in Aesch. Eum. 124 ), or ἀφλοίζοντ) (cf. ἀφλοισμός in Il. XV 607). Perhaps, however, πλωΐζοντ) conceals some word meaning ‘to rush wildly from his tent,’ ἐπὶ θῖν) being probably for ἐπὶ θῖνα, not for ἐπὶ θινί. There is apparently a contrast between Achilles' anguish within his tent and without, and some word is needed to mark his exit. Nothing can be made of the variant πλάζοντ) (in a few inferior MSS). In default of anything better we must (I suppose) provisionally acquiesce in Schneider's interpretation.

μηδὲ ‐‐ κεφαλῆς . Il. XVIII 23, 24.

ἐκεῖνος . Homer.

ἐγγὺς θεῶν . Zeus was Priam's seventh ancestor (Apollod. III 12). The phrase has a dash of old-world romance about it: cf. 391 E infra and Stallbaum on Phil. 16 C οἱ μὲν παλαιοί, κρείττονες ἡμῶν καὶ ἐγγυτέρω θεῶν οἰκοῦντες.

λιτανεύοντά τε ‐‐ ἕκαστον . Il. XXII 414, 415.

ὤμοι κτλ. Said by Thetis in Il. XVIII 54.

ὢ πόποι . Il. XXII 168, 169. The words are uttered by Zeus with reference to Hector. For ἄστυ our Homer has τεῖχος.

αἲ αἲ ‐‐ δαμῆναι . Il. XVI 433, 434. The only variant is ὤμοι for αἲ αἴ.

εἰ καὶ ἐπίοι αὐτῷ . καί is not ‘even’ (J. and C.), otherwise there would be too much emphasis on ἐπίοι, but ‘also’: ‘if it should also occur to himself’ (sc. as Homer says it occurs to gods). The emphatic word is αὐτῷ. For τοιοῦτον Hartman requires either τοιοῦτόν τι or τὸ τοιοῦτον; but cf. 416 B, IV 426 B, 429 E, IX 590 E and II 368 A note

σμικροῖσιν . See on I 330 B. ἐπὶ σμικροῖσι παθήμασι has a poetical rhythm, and may possibly be from a hexameter.

ἕως ἄν τις ‐‐ πείσῃ . Cf. Phaed. 85 C , D, Gorg. 527 A .

ἐφιῇ ‐‐ τοιοῦτον . See cr. n. The present ἐφιῇ is slightly better than ἐφῇ: for τὸ τοιοῦτον denotes the state or condition rather than the act. ἐφῇ comes rather nearer to the reading of A and II, and is preferred by Baiter and Hartman. For ζητεῖ H. Wolf conjectured ποιεῖ, Herwerden τίκτει or ἐντίκτει, in both cases needlessly: cf. with J. and C. ἐθέλει in 11 370 B. The sentiment is generalised in VIII 563 E.

οὔτε ἄρα . οὔτε followed by δέ is rare (examples in Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 832) but δέ follows τε very often, especially in πολὺ δέ, μέγιστον δέ etc.: see II 367 C note Cobet's οὔτἆρα i.q. οὔτοι ἄρα, though approved by Hartman, is therefore unnecessary.

οὐκοῦν ‐‐ λόγον . The lines are Il. I 599, 600. Hermann wished to read οὔκουν and reject ἀποδεξόμεθα περὶ θεῶν, placing τὰ τοιαῦτα under the government of ἀποδεκτέον. οὔκουν may be right, but the change is not necessary. τὰ τοιαῦτα does not refer specifically to the verses, but means τὸ κρατεῖσθαι ὑπὸ γέλωτος and the like; while the two verses are themselves the object of ἀποδεκτέον. I have accordingly placed a colon after θεῶν and removed the pause after ποιπνύοντα; a remedy which removes, I think, the objections felt by Hermann to ἀποδεξόμεθα περὶ θεῶν, and by Herwerden to περὶ θεῶν. The asyndeton in ἄσβεστος δ’ ἄῤ etc. is common in ampliative and illustrative sentences.

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀλήθειαν ff. On the place of this section in the general plan of the Republic see App. I.

θεοῖσι μὲν ‐‐ εἴδει . For the dative θεοῖσι see I 330 B note ἐν φαρμάκου εἴδει (cf. 11 382 C, D) implies the usual Socratic analogy between body and soul: see on II 380 B.

οὐχ ἁπτέον κτλ. Cf. Laws 916 E ff.

τοιούτους is omitted by Hartman, and is certainly open to doubt. The balance of MS evidence is in its favour, although a few inferior MSS and one MS of Stobaeus ( Flor. 46. 95), agree with A^{1} in omitting it. It must either mean rulers who act ἐπ’ ὠφελίᾳ τῆς πόλεως, or else such rulers as Plato's. The former alternative is not altogether satisfactory, and it is difficult not to believe that Plato was in reality referring to his own rulers. The serious objection to this view is that we have not yet heard anything of Plato's rulers: they are not described till 412 B. I think the solution may be that the present section on truth is a later addition made by Plato after he had written his first account of the rulers in Book III. See also App. I.

λέγοντι has caused difficulty, and Madvig would expunge the word. The explanation is simple enough. μὴ τἀληθῆ λέγειν should be repeated between ἤ and πρός, and μὴ τὰ ὄντα λέγοντι ὅπως taken closely together, ‘or to lie’ ( μὴ τἀληθῆ λέγειν understood) ‘to a pilot about the ship and its crew by misrepresenting the facts about one's own condition etc.’ One MS of Stobaeus (l.c.) has λέγοντα, which is also possible, and could only be explained in this way. I have removed the comma usually printed after λέγοντι.

λαμβάνῃ : sc. ὁ ἄρχων. Cf. 1347 A note λαμβάνῃς (Ficinus and Benedictus) gives a wrong sense.

τῶν οἳ ‐‐ δούρων . Od. XVII 383, 384. κακῶν is of course neuter. If Schneider could shew that this quotation refers to a case in which a chieftain in Homer did or did not punish a δημιουργός for lying, he would make out a prima facie case for his view that Plato is here prescribing canons for poetical representations, but there is nothing of this in Homer; and we must suppose that Plato is speaking here of his own citizens. See App. I.

ἐάν γε ‐‐ τελῆται does not mean ‘if our theory is carried out’ (J. and C.) or ‘if our ideal city is ever realised’ (Rettig). Such a remark would be frigid and superfluous. The meaning is merely that the ruler will first use words, but, if these fail, he will afterwards proceed to deeds i.e. κολάσει. The first γε assents: the second enters a caveat. ἔργα τελῆται= ἔργων τέλος γίγνηται.

σωφροσύνης δὲ ‐‐ μέγιστα : ‘for the mass of men, are not the cardinal points of temperance such as these?’ (Jebb on Soph. O. C. 20 μακρὰν γὰρ ὡς γέροντι προὐστάλης ὁδόν—a precise parallel). There is no authority for interpreting these words (with Stallbaum, Hartman etc.) as ‘plerumque’ ‘in universum.’ Plato is warning us not to regard his account of σωφροσύνη here as scientifically accurate and complete. It is the most obvious and conspicuous aspects of self-control which poets should chiefly impress upon the multitude, and to these Plato confines his attention. On the Greek conception of σωφροσύνη see the passages collected by Nägelsbach, Nachhom. Theol. pp. 227 ff.

Ὁμήρῳ . For this Ξ and a few other MSS read παρ’ Ὁμήρῳ. Schneider successfully defends Ὁμήρῳ by Arist. Pol. Θ 5. 1339^{b} 7 οὐ γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ᾄδει καὶ κιθαρίζει τοῖς ποιηταῖς. The line is addressed by Diomede to Sthenelus in Il. IV 412.

τὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα . The two verses which Plato here quotes do not follow τέττα, σιωπῇ κτλ., and do not even occur together in our Homer. ἴσαν— Ἀχαιοί is from Il. III 8 ( οἱ δ’ ἄρ’ ἴσαν σιγῇ μένεα πνείοντες Ἀχαιοί), σιγῇ—σημάντορας from IV 431. Some editors bracket the first verse, but (as Hartman points out) it is not likely that a scribe should have interpolated a line from Il. III before one from Il. IV. Plato may be guilty of ‘contamination,’ or the lines may really have occurred together in his text of Homer. J. and C. suggest that Plato perhaps did not mean the lines to be connected. The objection to this view is that σιγῇ (as in our text of Homer, though there it is in a different place) goes best with ἴσαν, and that ἴσαν μένεα πνείοντες Ἀχαιοί is not by itself an illustration of obedience to rulers, and therefore would not be relevant here. See on the whole subject of Platonic quotations from Homer, Howes in Harvard Studies etc. VI pp. 153—237, with whose conclusions (p. 210) I heartily agree.

οἰνοβαρὲς κτλ. Achilles to Aga memnon in Il. I 225. The point of this illustration is not in the abusive epithets, but in the insubordination which they and the rest of the speech ( τὰ τούτων ἑξῆς) express.

νεανιεύματα . See cr. n. The spelling seems established by the verb νεανιεύεσθαι: e.g. Gorg. 482 C . νεανισκεύματα has however some authority, for νεανισκεύομαι was used (Photius s.v.). νεανικεύματα, to say the least, is doubtful, nor is νεανικοῦν (Photius s.v.) enough to justify such a form, in spite of Schneider ( Addit. p. 19).

παρὰ πλέαι ‐‐ δεπάεσσι . Odysseus in Od. IX 8—10. Our text of Homer has παρὰ δἐ πλήθωσι. I have written παρὰ πλέαι for παράπλειαι or παραπλεῖαι of nearly all the MSS. Vat. r and Vind. B have ε ι περιπλεῖαι, Cesenas M παράπλειαι (sic). παράπλειαι (which Howes l.c. p. 205 thinks Plato found in his text of Homer) is in reality a vox nihili; even if it did occur, it could not mean ‘almost full,’ as L. and S. say: and such a meaning would be ludicrously inappropriate here. With παρὰ δἐ πλέαι cf. Anacr. 94. 1 ed. Bergk κρητῆρι παρὰ πλέῳ οἰνοποτάζων. See my article in Cl. Rev. XI p. 349.

λιμῷ δ) ‐‐ ἐπισπεῖν . Od. XII 342.

ἢ Δία ‐‐ ἐπιλανθανόμενον . μόνος ἐγρηγορώς refers to Il. II 1—4: the incident itself is narrated in Il. XIV 294 ff. For the postponement of the relative ἅ cf. IV 425 C. The effect is to throw emphasis on μόνος ἐγρηγορώς—that Zeus should forget what he had purposely kept awake to devise makes the scandal all the worse —and brings it into sharper contrast with καθενδόντων—ἀνθρώπων. ὡς must be taken with ἐπιλανθανόμενον, the construction being ἢ ποιεῖν Δία ὡς ἐπιλανθανόμενον: cf. II 383 A. Stallbaum explains ὡς μόνος ἐγρηγορώς as “ut solus vigil”: while J. and C. supply ἀκούειν after ἤ. Neither view seems to me at all satisfactory. The text has been often called in question. Instead of ὡς Hermann reads καί: Herwerden and Richards suggest ὅσα (dropping ἅ before ἐβουλεύσατο). The best emendation is perhaps Jackson's εἷς for ὡς ( Journal of Phil. IV p. 147), but I see no good reason why ὡς cannot be construed with ἐπιλανθανόμενον. The pause which on this view is necessary after ὡς helps still further to increase the stress on μόνος ἐγρηγορώς, which Plato certainly intended to emphasize.

βουλόμενον ‐‐ τοκῆας . βουλόμενον is not otiose after ἐθέλειν (as Hartman alleges): ‘to wish’ ( βούλεσθαι) and ‘to be willing’ ( ἐθέλειν) are different ideas. The same critic also rejects καί before λέγοντα “quia ea verba excusationem τοῦ ἐθέλειν humi consuescere continent”; but it is more effective to represent so gross an utterance as an additional part of the picture. For φοιτᾶν πρός cf. Lys. I 15, 19. where the meaning is the same. Herwerden should not have wished to replace the preposition by παρά. In Homer the line εἰς εὐνὴν φοιτῶντε φίλους λήθοντε τοκῆας ( Il. XIV 296) is not said by Zeus, as Plato—doubtless intentionally, to increase the effect—makes it appear to be.

Ἄρεως ‐‐ δεσμόν . Od. VIII 266 ff. δεσμόν is still under the government of πο<*>εῖν.

καὶ λέγονται καὶ πράττονται κτλ. : ‘are either described or done by famous men’ etc.: described e.g. in poetry by Homer's heroes, or done in actual life before our eyes. θεατέον refers to πράττονται, ἀκουστέον to λέγονται by the usual chiasmus. J. and C. translate “performed by famous men or told concerning them,” understanding περὶ ἐλλογίμων ἀνδρῶν with λέγονται, but this cannot be right.

στῆθος δὲ ‐‐ ἔτλης . Odysseus in Od. XX 17, 18.

δωροδόκους κτλ. The excessive love of money is a sign of ἀκράτεια: so that its mention here is relevant enough, although the vice was not specifically named in 389 D.

δῶρα ‐‐ βασιλῆας : an old saying attributed by some to Hesiod ( οἱ μὲν Ἡσιόδειον οἴονται τὸν στίχον Suidas s. vv. δῶρα κτλ.). It is referred to by Eur. Med. 964 πείθειν δῶρα καὶ θεοὺς λόγος. Cf. Nägelsbach Nachhom. Theol. II p. 64.

συμβουλεύων . Il. IX 515 ff. The gentitive μήνιος, for which a few MSS read μήνιδος, is natural in paraphrasing Homer. Cf. the form Θάλεω in X 600 A.

οὐδ’ ὁμολογήσομεν . “Dele futile interpretamentum” exclaims Hartman. The words are genuine, and add a new point: cf. 391 A φάναι καὶ ἄλλων λεγόντων πείθεσθαι.

δῶρα λαβεῖν . Il. XIX 278 ff. Plato is unjust to Achilles: see ib. 147 ff. (J. and C.).

τιμὴν κτλ. Il. XXIV 502, 555, 594.

ἄλλως ‐‐ ἐθέλειν is again unfair: see Il. l.c. 560.

ἔβλαψας ‐‐ παρείη . Il. XXII 15, 20.

ποταμόν . Scamander: Il. XXI 130—132, 212—226, 233 ff.

καὶ αὖ κτλ . ὡς should be repeated with ἔφη (J. and C.). Herwerden rejects both τοῦ and Σπερχειοῦ, the former because he thinks the article would suggest the Simois. Why should it not specify the other river towards which Achilles (according to Plato) shewed insubordination? Plato (as Hartman remarks) has just as much right to mention the river's name as that of Achilles' tutor (390 E). The reference is to Il. XXIII 140—151. Although the locks were ‘sacred to Spercheius,’ the vow was nevertheless conditional on Achilles' safe return, which he knew was hopeless. This is the reason which Achilles gives for offering his locks to the shade of Patroclus rather than to Spercheius: ib. 150. ὀπάσαιμι—‘suffer me to give’—is in reality a prayer to the Spercheius.

Ἕκτορος ἕλξεις . Il. XXIV 14 ff.

σφαγάς Il. XXIII 175 ff.

τρίτου ἀπὸ Διός . Peleus' father, Aeacus, was son of Zeus.

μηδὲ ‐‐ μηδέ . Bekker read μήτε— μήτε; but μηδὲ τάδε is of course ne haec quidem.

ὥρμησαν ‐‐ ἁρπαγάς . Pi rithous assisted Theseus to abduct Helen: and Theseus Pirithous in his attempt to carry off Persephone from the lower world. οὕτως belongs to δεινάς: the order is regular and idiomatic: cf. Ap. 36 A , Symp. 192 C al. Sophocles and Euripides each wrote a play called ‘Theseus’: but Plato is probably alluding to some epic Theseis. Cf. Kinkel Epic. Gr. Frag. p. 217.

αὐτά is censured by Heller, who conjectures τοιαῦτα, while Hartman keeps αὐτά but rejects ἔργα. Stallbaum says we should expect ταῦτα for αὐτά: but ταῦτα would be too precise. αὐτά means simply ‘the actions in question.’ Cf. I 339 E note The turn of the sentence recalls II 380 A ἢ οὐ θεοῦ ἔργα ἐατέον αὐτὰ λέγειν ἢ κτλ. Cf. also infra 408 C.

κακά . Hartman approves Cobet's conjecture κακούς, “cum γεννᾶν hic translaticiam vim non obtineat.” Why not? Cf. κακὰ γίγνεσθαι just below. κακούς would be extremely tame and commonplace.

ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν . II 378 B, 380 C.

ἄρα : II 358 C note

οἱ ‐‐ δαιμόνων . From Aeschylus' Niobe: see Dindorf Fr. 155. The passage is also quoted in part by Strabo (XII 8. 21), from whom it appears that Niobe is the speaker, and that οἱ θεῶν ἀγχίσποροι are her father Tantalus and his kindred ( οἱ περὶ Τάνταλον). ὧν—αἰθέρι means ‘whose is the altar to ancestral Zeus on Mount Ida high in heaven,’ i.e. their θεὸς πατρῷος is Zeus (who was Tantalus' father), and they worship him on the heights of Ida. Tantalus' territory extended to Ida: see Strabo l.c. ὁ Τάνταλος λέγει σπείρω δ’ ἄρουραν δώδεχ’ ἡμερῶν ὁδόν, | Βερέκυντα χῶρον, ἔνθ’ Ἀδραστείας ἕδος | Ἴδη τε μυκηθμοῖσι καὶ βρυχήμασιν | πρέπουσι μήλων. For ὧν κατ’ Ἰδαῖον πάγον Strabo has οἷς ἐν Ἰδαίῳ πάγῳ, a much inferior reading. καί before οὔπω may be Plato's (so Stallbaum and others),—in which case the last line is from a different part of the play,—but is much more likely to come from Aeschylus, the resolution of κοὔπω being due to Plato. The line follows naturally on the others, and is not sufficiently important to have been selected from a different context. The verses are complete in themselves, and present a stately picture of the sons of the gods, which is the only reason why they are cited here.

τί οὖν κτλ. This is the ἀληθὲς εἶδος λόγων. Plato has prescribed canons for the ψευδεῖς λόγοι or legends about gods etc.; but rules for ἀληθεῖς λόγοι, i.e. λόγοι relating to men and human affairs, cannot be drawn up without begging the conclusion which the Republic seeks to establish. See also on II 376 E.

ἡμῖν . See cr. n. Without ἡμῖν, we should have τοῖς λόγων πέρι ὁριζομένοις. I agree with Hartman and the majority of editors in retaining the word. See Introd. § 5.

ἀδύνατον δή . For δή Stallbaum approves Ast's conjecture δέ. δέ would be too weak, if the meaning were adversative, but it is not. δή is only ‘well’: cf. II 368 A (Schneider).

καὶ ποιηταὶ καὶ λογοποιοί . On λογοποιοί see II 365 E note; and for the statement itself Laws 660 E ff., 662 B.

ἀλλότριον ‐‐ ἀγαθόν . I 343 C note

ζητοῦμεν . Stallbaum's conjecture —see cr. n.—is now generally accepted. ἐζητοῦμεν would imply that the discussion had changed, but it has not. Cf. IV 420 C ὃ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν.

τότε διομολογησόμεθα κτλ. This is not “an ironical or fanciful excuse for varying the order of the subject” (J. and C.), for if Socrates declared at this stage that justice is a good for its possessor he would in point of fact be presupposing the results of the whole investigation. See IX 588 B—592 B. Others (e.g. Hirzel der Dialog p. 237 note) have taken τότε διομολογησόμεθα as a hint of the additional discussion on Poetry in Book X: but there is nothing either here or in that book to justify any such interpretation. Cf. X 595 A note What Plato's regulations about λόγοι περὶ ἀνθρώπων would have been may be easily gathered from the end of Book IX and X 608 C ff., although the subject is nowhere specifically and expressly resumed in the Republic. Cf. I 347 E note

τὸ δὲ λέξεως . Hartman approves the variant τὰ δὲ λέξεως: but the subject of λέξις is better treated as a unity until it has been subdivided.

μυθολόγων ἢ ποιητῶν . μυθολόγων is said so as to include writers of μῦθοι in prose: cf. 394 B and II 365 E note

ὥσπερ οὖν κτλ. Plato means that poor speakers cannot grapple with an abstract notion, but use a part of it, i.e. a concrete example. οὐ κατὰ ὅλον κτλ. may be illustrated from Symp. 205 B , C.

καὶ ἐλίσσετο ‐‐ λαῶν . Il. I 15, 16. Leaf. reads λίσσετο because “ λίσσομαι apparently had a second initial consonant, and is never preceded by a short vowel.” The word had probably been Atticised by Plato's time.

δοκεῖν ‐‐ ὄντα . δοκεῖν is here ‘to fancy’ not ‘to seem.’ Contrast II 381 E ἡμῖν δὲ ποιοῦσι δοκεῖν σφᾶς παντοδαποὺς φαίνεσθαι—a passage which is cited by Hartman to justify ποιῆσαι as against the variant πεῖσαι.

περί τε τῶν ‐‐ παθημάτων . This clause is rejected by Herwerden. The difficulty—which lies in the collocation of Ἰθάκῃ the place and Ὀδυσσείᾳ the poem—is no doubt lessened by reading (with Richards) καὶ ἐν or κἀν before ὅλῃ, but does not wholly disappear. Possibly the last twelve books of the Odyssey, in which the scene is Ithaca, were sometimes known collectively as Ἰθάκη.

ὅτι ἦλθεν ‐‐ βασιλέων paraphrases Il. I 12—16.

ὡς Χρύσης γενόμενος : ‘as if he had been transformed into Chryses,’ not merely ‘in the person of Chryses’ (Jowett). In ‘simple narrative’ he is Homer: when Chryses begins to speak, he becomes Chryses. Cf. 393 B ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ὢν ὁ Χρύσης (‘as if he himself were Chryses’).

ἐλθὼν ‐‐ αἰδεσθέντας . Il. I 17—21. The emphatic αὐτοὺς accurately represents Homer's ὑμῖν μέν. For λῦσαι H. Wolf conjectured ἀπολῦσαι; but Plato is closely following Homer, who has λύσαιτε. τὸν θεόν is Apollo.

ταῦτα δὲ ‐‐ βέλεσιν . Il. I 22— 42. The paraphrasis is accurate, and Plato leaves nothing essential out. There is no sign that his text differed from ours in this passage.

μὴ ‐‐ οὐκ ἐπαρκέσοι . ἐπαρκέσοι presupposes ἐπαρκέσει in the narratio recta: Homer has μή νύ τοι οὐ χραίσμῃ σκῆπτρον καὶ στέμμα θεοῖο. It is usual to regard this sentence as final: if so, it is the solitary instance in Plato where the future after a final μή must be admitted. See Weber in Schanz's Beiträge II 2, p. 60 and Goodwin MT. pp. 45, 91. The nearest parallel is Euthyph. 15 D ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἂν ἔδεισας παρακινδυνεύειν, μὴ οὐκ ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ ποιήσοις, where μή depends on a verb of fearing. It is better, both in point of grammar and of sense, to regard this sentence also as expressing apprehension (‘for fear lest’), although no verb of fearing is present. It is not final in any proper sense of the word. Bekker read ἐπαρκέσειε, saying that Θ has ἐπαρκέσειεν.

μὴ ἐρεθίζειν . Valckenaer's conjecture μή ἑ ἐρεθιζειν ( μή μ’ ἐρέθιζε in Homer) is attractive in view of τὰ ἃ δάκρυα in 394 A for Homer's ἐμὰ δάκρυα, and because it provides an object for ἐρεθίζειν. Plato uses the pronoun tolerably often (e.g. in I 327 B, X 617 E, Symp. 175 C , 223 B): other Attic writers seldom, if ever (Kühner-Blass Gr. d. Gr. Spr. I p. 592). It is not however clear that ἐρεθίζειν could not be used without an object expressed, and I therefore revert to the MS reading.

ἐν ναῶν οἰκοδομήσεσιν shews that Plato understood Homer's ἔρεψα ( εἴ ποτέ τοι χαρίεντ’ ἐπὶ νηὸν ἔρεψα) of building. According to Leaf, ἔρεψα seems to denote the most primitive form of temple —“a mere roof to protect the image of a god standing in a grove.”

τεῖσαι ‐‐ βέλεσιν . Ἀχαιούς is of course the subject to τεῖσαι (‘pay for,’ ‘expiate’): in Homer it is τίσειαν Δαναοὶ ἐμὰ δάκρυα σοῖσι βέλεσσιν. The translation ‘that he would avenge his tears upon the Achaeans’ (D. and V.) is wrong. ἅ is apparently a solitary instance of ὅς=‘suus’ in Attic prose (Kühner-Blass l.c. I 1, p. 602). Plato chooses the word because it expresses Homer's ἐμά briefly and neatly, rather than from any conscious desire to make the paraphrase archaic.

τραγῳδίας . Adimantus quotes a single concrete instance—‘tragedies’—to shew that he now apprehends the meaning of μίμησις. Socrates, out of politeness and because he wishes to make progress, interprets this as a recognition of the imitative character of Tragedy and Comedy in general ( ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις τραγῳδία τε καὶ κωμῳδία), as in point of fact it virtually is. ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις is not true in the beggarly literal sense of λέγειν, but it is sufficiently so for polite conversation. To insert—with Herwerden and Hartman— τε καὶ κωμῳδίας after τραγῳδίας seems to me unnecessary and pedantic.

εὕροις δ) ἂν ‐‐ διθυράμβοις . The dithyramb was at first purely narrative or nearly so; it afterwards became mimetic (Arist. Probl. XIX 15. 918^{b} 19). Only one of Pindar's dithyrambic fragments appears to be ‘mimetic’ ( Frag. 74). On the growth and decline of the Dithyramb see Smyth Greek Melic Poets pp. xliii—lviii.

τε ‐‐ δὲ καί . II 367 C note

εἴ μοι μανθάνεις : ‘if I can make you understand,’ with reference to μανθάνω in 392 C, 394 B, C. Heindorf's εἴ μου μανθάνεις (as in Phil. 51 C ) is attractive, but the corruption is not easy to explain, and the MS reading is sufficiently defended by I 343 A ὅς γε αὐτῇ οὐδὲ πρόβατα—γιγνώσκεις (so also Hartman).

τοῦτο ‐‐ αὐτό refers to ὅτι χρείη— μιμεῖσθαι, and ἔλεγον is ‘was saying’ i.e. ‘was trying to say,’ viz. when I digressed.

εἴτε παραδεξόμεθα κτλ. Krohn ( Pl. St. p. 13) declares this passage to be inconsistent with II 373 B, where ὑποκριταί, χορευταί, ἐργολάβοι are admitted. He forgets or ignores the fact that in § 373 Plato is describing the τρυφῶσα πόλις, which he is now engaged in ‘purging’ (399 E). See II 372 D note

ἴσως δὲ ‐‐ τούτων . In this remark J. and C. find “an anticipation of the condemnation of epic poetry in Book X.” I cannot see that it does more than prepare the way for ἀλλ’ ὅπῃ ἂν—ἰτέον. See on X 595 A.

πότερον μιμητικοὺς κτλ. The question is not ‘Are our guardians to become dramatic poets?’ but ‘Are they to have the imitative habit of mind?’ The answer is in the negative, and the drama is banished because it fosters this habit in spectators. Cf. 395 D note

ὅτι ‐‐ πολλὰ δ) οὔ explains τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν, as Hartman points out, and not τοῦτο, as D. and V. translate. ἔμπροσθεν refers to II 370 B.

πολλῶν κτλ. suggests, perhaps intentionally, πόλλ’ ἠπίστατο ἔργα, κακῶς δ’ ἠπίστατο πάντα. The words ὥστ’ — ἐλλόγιμος—equivalent to a neuter accusative—are undeservedly cancelled by Herwerden and Hartman. Translate ‘he will fail in all of them to attain creditable distinction’: cf. the adverb κακῶς in κακῶς δ’ ἠπίστατο πάντα.

οὐκοῦν κτλ. The reasoning is a fortiori: if two or more departments of merely imitative art cannot be represented by the same person, still less can imitation be combined with any serious pursuit ( σχολῇ ἄρα κτλ.).

οὐδὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα ‐‐ ποιοῦντες . The reverse is affirmed by Socrates in Symp. 223 D τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνδρὸς εἶναι κωμῳδίαν καὶ τραγῳδίαν ἐπίστασθαι ποιεῖν, καὶ τὸν τέχνῃ τραγῳδοποιὸν ὄντα καὶ κωμῳδοποιὸν εἶναι. The solution is that in the Symposium Socrates is applying to the drama the Socratic principle μία ἐπιστήμη s. δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων: theoretically, therefore, and ideally, the tragedian is also capable of writing a comedy. In the Republic, on the other hand, he is describing Greek dramatic art as he found it: for which reason he writes δύνανται and not δύναιντ’ ἄν (a corruption in v, wrongly adopted by Stallbaum). Cf. Ion 534 C. Aristophanes did not write tragedy, nor the tragedians comedy. The passage in the Symposium is interesting as an unconscious prophecy of the Shakespearian drama. Cf. Reber Plato u. d. Poesie p. 11.

μιμήματα . See cr. n. Former editors variously read μιμήματα or μιμήματε. Either is admissible, so far as concerns the Greek, but the plural was perhaps— owing to the proximity of τούτω—somewhat more likely to be corrupted to the dual in this instance than vice versâ. Cf. X 614 C δύο—χάσματα ἐχομένω ἀλλήλοιν with note ad loc. The reading μιμήματά τε represents the correction μιμήματα. This is, I think, a somewhat simpler view than to suppose that an original μιμήματε became μιμήματέ τε by dittography, and τέ was afterwards changed to τά. Roeper, however, pronounces in favour of the dual ( de dual. usu Pl. p. 14), and it must be admitted that duals are peculiarly liable to corruption in the MSS of the Republic. See Introd. § 5.

ῥαψῳδοί ‐‐ ὑποκριταί . Even ῥαψῳδοί seem to have generally confined themselves to a particular poet: see Ion 531 C, 536 B.

ἀλλ) οὐδὲ ‐‐ οἱ αὐτοί . This was true without exception till comparatively late times: see Müller Gr. Bühnenalt. pp. 185—188. κωμῳδοῖς and τραγῳδοῖς (literally ‘at the tragedians’ etc.) are local—almost adverbial—datives, regularly used to denote the exhibitions of comedies and tragedies: see e.g. Arist. Eth. Nic. IV 6. 1123^{a}23, Aesch. in Ctes. 36, and cf. the Latin use of ‘gladiatoribus’ for ‘at a gladiatorial show.’

ἢ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα πράττειν . καλῶς should be repeated with πράττειν, and ἤ is simply ‘or,’ not ‘or else.’ The alternative rendering given by J. and C. ‘or else—if able to imitate—is not able to do the things themselves,’ does violence to both grammar and sense.

δημιουργοὺς ἐλευθερίας . An artificial and somewhat strained expression, selected in order at once to compare and contrast the guardians with other artists. They too are artists, and their ἔργον is Freedom. To ἐλευθερία Plato attaches his own meaning: true freedom lies in the subordination of the lower to the higher, both in private conduct and in political life: cf. Xen. Mem. I 2. 5 , 6 and infra IX 577 D, E, X 617 E notes It is in this sense that ἐλευθέρους is used below.

τούτοις : viz. τοῖς δημιουργοῖς ἐλευθερίας τῆς πόλεως.

ἵνα μὴ ‐‐ ἀπολαύσωσιν reveals the object of this attack upon the drama: cf. II 383 C and infra 401 B. An admirable illustration of the sentiment is quoted by Susemihl from Plut. Sol. 29. 6 μετὰ δὲ τὴν θέαν προσαγορεύσας (sc. ὁ Σόλων ) αὐτὸν (viz. τὸν Θέσπιν) ἠρώτησεν, εἰ τοσούτων ἐναντίον οὐκ αἰσχύνεται τηλικαῦτα ψευδόμενος. φήσαντος δὲ τοῦ Θέσπιδος μὴ δεινὸν εἷναι τὸ μετὰ παιδιᾶς λέγειν τοιαῦτα καὶ πράσσειν, σφόδρα τῇ βακτηρίᾳ τὴν γῆν ὁ Σόλων πατάξας Ταχὺ μέντοι τὴν παιδιάν, ἔφη, ταύτην ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ τιμῶντες εὑρήσομεν ἐν τοῖς συμβολαίοις. To omit μή (with A and a few other MSS), and govern ἵνα by μιμεῖσθαι above is grammatically difficult, and gives an unsatisfactory sense. The genitive τοῦ εἶναι has been called in question by Hartman (following Ast) on the ground that “qui τοῦ εἶναι (sc. αἰσχροὶ) ἀπολαύσωσιν iam sunt turpitudine infecti.” This would be true, if Plato had written the present ἀπολαύωσιν, but the aorist is ingressive, and τοῦ εἶναι ἀπολαύσωσιν is virtually equivalent to γένωνται τοῦθ) <*> μιμοῦνται. Few will acquiesce in Ast's conjecture τὸ εἶναι, or in Stallbaum's view that τοῦ εἶναι is a partitive genitive.

καὶ κατὰ σῶμα ‐‐ διάνοιαν . For σῶμα Stallbaum conjectured σχῆμα, but Plato would surely have said σχήματα, as in 397 B. Hartman boldly ejects κατὰ φωνάς and reads καὶ κατὰ <τὸ> σῶμα καὶ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν, remarking that κατὰ τὸ σῶμα by itself includes “gestus, habitus, vocem, vultum, similia.” This is in a sense true, but there is no reason why one particular instance of physical resemblance should not be selected for special remark. Plato differentiates the external from the internal characteristics by combining σῶμα and φωνάς under a single preposition, and repeating κατά before τὴν διάνοιαν.

αὐτούς . For αὐτούς following ὧν see on II 357 B. The rule against the repetition of the relative in such cases is sometimes dispensed with for the sake of rhetorical emphasis, e.g. in II 374 B and perhaps Theaet. 192 B .

μιμεῖσθαι . In what sense can the guardians be said to ‘imitate’ in such a case, or in those specified in 396 A, B? Not as actors, but as spectators. Acting involves three elements—the character, the actor, and the spectator. In good acting the spectator identifies himself with the actor through sympathy; and as the actor ‘imitates,’ so does he. Such is Plato's theory, though merely glanced at here. Cf. X 605 C ff., Ion 533 D ff., and see the excellent remarks of Nettleship Lectures and Remains II pp. 100—104.

ἢ ἀνδρὶ κτλ. ἀνδρί is of course ‘husband,’ not simply ‘a man’ (D. and V.). Contemporary comedy doubtless furnished abundant illustrations. In πρὸς θεοὺς ἐρίζουσαν κτλ. Plato may be thinking of Aeschylus' Niobe (see on II 380 A). The emphasis on οἰομένην should be noted: cf. I 336 A note

κάμνουσαν ‐‐ ὠδίνουσαν glances at Euripides and his school: cf. Ar. Frogs 1043 , 1044 and 1080, with the Scholiast's remark on 1080 ἔγραψε γὰρ ( ὁ Εὐριπίδης) τὴν Αὔγην ὠδίνουσαν ἐν ἱερῷ. Plato's strictures throughout this passage tell much more heavily against Euripides than against the other two dramatists.

ἢ καὶ ἄλλα . ἄλλα must be coordinated with αἰσχρολογοῦντας, not with νήφοντας, so that Hartman's correction ( καί for ἢ καί), though scarcely necessary, is an improvement, and may be right.

μαινομένοις . As in the Eumenides, Ajax, Hercules Furens.

γνωστέον κτλ. cf. 409 A.

μιμητέον . See on μιμεῖσθαι 395 D.

ἵππους ‐‐ βροντάς . The reference is probably to stage machinery and musical effects etc. in dramatic poetry generally, as well as in the later and degenerate form of the dithyramb (see on 394 C). Cf. (with Nettleship Lect. and Rem. II p. 105) Laws 669 C ff. and Ar. Plut. 290 ff. The βροντεῖον and κεραυνοσκοπεῖον for producing thunder and lightning were familiar enough (Müller Gr. Bühnenalt. p. 157 note 2). It is clear, as Nettleship remarks, that “Plato felt strongly that Greek literature and music were declining” in his days: see Laws 659 A ff., 700 A ff., 797 A ff.

ὁ μὲν ‐‐ ἀνήρ . It seems difficult (as Schneider remarked) either to connect ὁ μέν with μέτριος ἀνήρ, or to understand ὁ μέν as ‘the one’ and suppose that μέτριος ἀνήρ is in apposition to it. If the latter alternative is right, we should expect μέτριος < ὢν > ἀνήρ, or < ὁ > μέτριος ἀνήρ, and in view of other cases in which the article is placed at some distance from its noun (e.g. ὁ δέ γε, οἶμαι, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, καταληφθεὶς θανάτῳ δίδοται VIII 566 C), I still prefer the former view. Some may be inclined to regard μέτριος ἀνήρ as a gloss. I have sometimes been tempted to make μοι δοκεῖ parenthetical (exactly=‘methinks’), in which case ὁ μέν can easily be connected with μέτριος. The idiom occurs in Phaed. 108 D ὁ βίος μοι δοκεῖ ὁ ἐμός—τῷ μήκει τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖ and Menex. 236 B : cf. also Crito 43 D, 50 B, and I 332 E note This solution would involve the change of ἐθελήσειν to ἐθελήσει—so v—and of αἰσχυνεῖσθαι to αἰσχυνεῖται just below, as well as again in D. Such a corruption, once started, ἔρχεται—as Plato might say — ὡς κύκλος αὐξανομένη; but I do not venture to change the text.

καὶ ἧττον is not superfluous with ἐλάττω. ἐλάττω means ‘in fewer respects,’ and ἧττον ‘to a less degree.’

σπουδῇ . Cf. ὅ τι μὴ παιδιᾶς χάριν in E and σπουδῇ 397 A.

ὅ τι μὴ παιδιᾶς χάριν . Cf. VII 518 B.

οἵᾳ . According to Van Cleef ( de Attract. usu Plat. p. 36), οἷος is not elsewhere attracted in Plato.

τῆς ἁπλῆς . See cr. n. The reading of the MSS τῆς ἄλλης ought strictly speaking to mean ‘the rest of διήγησις,’ i.e. besides μίμησις. A reference to 392 D will shew that the rest of διήγησις includes (1) simple διήγησις, (2) the mixed style. If the text is sound, Plato therefore says that the good man's λέξις will resemble Homer's in partaking of all three varieties. This is a cumbrous and unnecessary elaboration: for if style partakes both in μίμησις and in simple διήγησις, it is already ipso facto ‘mixed.’ To take ἄλλης as ‘besides’ may be admissible, but in any case it is desirable to define the kind of διήγησις meant. I believe that Plato wrote ἁπλῆς. The good man's style will resemble Homer's, which has already been said to partake of μίμησις (393 C) and of ἁπλῆ διήγησις (394 B). The corruption—common in uncial MSS—is illustrated by Bast Comment. Palaeogr. p. 730. Cf. my article in Cl. Rev. X pp. 384 f.

μέρος (as Schneider points out) depends on μετέχουσα: cf. Euthyd. 306 A ὦν ἀμφοτέρων μέρος μετέχουσι.

μιμήσεται . See cr. n. The choice of reading lies between this and Madvig's emendation <μιμήσεται ἢ> διηγήσεται. In favour of μιμήσεται is μᾶλλον, which correlates with ὅσῳ ἂν φαυλότερος ᾖ. The corruption doubtless arose from a misinterpretation of μᾶλλον. Thinking that an ἤ clause was needed to explain it, a scribe added ἢ διηγήσεται in the margin, and διηγήσεται was afterwards taken as a variant and ousted μιμήσεται. These arguments, which are Hartman's, seem to me conclusive in favour of μιμήσεται, which Schneider first restored.

σπουδῇ τε καὶ ἐναντίον πολλῶν : like the professional dramatist or actor.

τροχιλιῶν κτλ. Cf. supra 396 B note

σχήμασιν ‘gestures.’

ἔλεγον . 396 B, C.

πρὸς τὴν αὐτήν : sc. ἁρμονίαν, as Schneider saw. To supply λέξιν with Stallbaum, Hartman, and others is not satisfactory, nor is it easy to understand χορδήν (with Campbell). On the other hand ἁρμονίαν may be readily supplied in view of ἐν μιᾷ ἁρμονίᾳ following. ὁ λόγος qualifies τὴν αὐτήν. The somewhat vague expression πρὸς τὴν αὐτήν, where the musical sense of προς may be illustrated by πρὸς Λιβὺν λακεῖν | αὐλόν ( Eur. Alc. 346 ), is afterwards made more explicit and precise by ἐν μιᾷ ἁρμονίᾳ i.e. ‘in one musical mode’ (see on 398 E), as opposed to πασῶν—ἁρμονιῶν in C. μεταβολή was technically used of passing from one ἁρμονία to another: see Cleonid. Isag. Harm. 13 and Bacchius Isag. 53 ed. von Jan. We shall best apprehend the full meaning of the whole passage if we read it in connexion with 399 A, B. The general sentiment may be illustrated from Arist. Eth. Nic. IV 8. 1125^{a} 12 ff. καὶ κίνησις δὲ βραδεῖα τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ φωνὴ βαρεῖα, καὶ λέξις στάσιμος, Pl. Charm. 159 B , Dem. 37. 52 and elsewhere.

διὰ τὸ παντοδαπὰς ‐‐ ἔχειν . As the λέξις itself is full of variety, it requires for its proper or appropriate ( οἰκείως) expression every variety of mode and rhythm or musical time. μορφὰς τῶν μεταβολῶν is surely good enough Greek: I cannot see the point of Richards' μορφὰς ἐκ τῶν μεταβολῶν, still less why Hartman should eject τῶν μεταβολῶν or— as an alternative— μορφάς.

ἐπιτυγχ άνουσιν = ‘hit upon,’ ‘stumble upon,’ as if by accident and ἄνευ νοῦ, not ‘succeed,’ as J. B. Mayor is disposed to construe ( Cl. Rev. X p. 109). The same scholar proposes to change ξυγκεραννύντες into ξυγκεκραμένῳ, but the text is much more idiomatic as it stands.

τὸν ἕτερον : ‘one or other.’ Presently τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ‘the good man’ is said for ‘the good man's style of speaking’; see 398 B and cf. 399 B note Before ἄκρατον, many editors add τόν (with Ξ^{2}): but the position of ἄκρατον is normal: cf. τὰ ἐν ὕδασι φαντάσματα θεῖα VII 532 C and note ad loc.

παισί ‐‐ τῷ πλείστῳ ὄχλῳ . The expression recurs in Laws 700 C (quoted by J. and C.).

οὐκοῦν διὰ ταῦτα κτλ. There is probably a satirical reference to Athenian democracy: see Prot. 319 D .

αὐτός ‐‐ ἐπιδείξασθαι : ‘anxious to shew himself off together with his poems.’ ἐπιδείξασθαι is intransitive—i. q. ἐπίδειξιν ποιήσασθαι, cf. Lach. 179 E —with αὐτός, but transitive with ποιήματα. This explanation, which is due to Schneider, gives a much better sense than if we regard αὐτός τε καὶ τὰ ποιήματα as subject to ἀφίκοιτο, or translate ‘himself, and wanting to shew his poems’ (J. and C.). A reference to αὐτός τε καὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν παρακάλει in IV 427 D is therefore hardly to the point.

προσκυνοῖμεν . The insertion of μέν, recommended by Shilleto (Dem. F. L. § 91) and Richards, is unnecessary: cf. I 340 D note For προσκυνεῖν ‘to kiss the hand’ (adorare), as to the image or shrine of a god, see Cope's Rhetoric of Aristotle Vol. I p. 86.

οὔτ) ἔστιν ‐‐ οὔτε θέμις . It is perhaps better to correct οὐκ into οὔτ)—see cr. n.—than the second οὔτε into οὐδέ (with Bekker and the other editors).

μύρον ‐‐ στέψαντες . The idea suggested by προσκυνοῖμεν and ἱερόν, that the poet is a sort of θεός or θεῖος ἀνήρ, is now elaborated with ironical politeness. The images of the gods were anointed, and crowned with garlands, not only on great occasions (cf. Cic. Verr. IV 77), but also at other times, according to Proclus, who remarks on this passage μύρον αὐτῆς (sc. τῆς ποιητικῆς ) καταχέας, ὡς τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἁγιωτάτοις ἱεροῖς ἀγαλμάτων θέμις, καὶ ὡς ἱερὰν στέψας αὐτήν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐκεινα στέφειν ἦν νόμος ( in remp. p. 42 ed. Kroll). Schneider aptly compares Paus. X 24. 6 τούτου (a sacred stone) καὶ ἔλαιον ὁσημέραι καταχέουσι καὶ κατὰ ἑορτὴν ἑκάστην ἔρια ἐπιτιθέασι τὰ ἀργά. For other illustrations see Frazer on Paus. l.c., and Munro on Lucr. v 1199. Apropos of the present passage, Dio Chrysostom and other ancient writers cited by Ast refer to the anointing of swallows by Greek women: καὶ κελεύει μάλα εἰρωνικῶς (so Ast: MSS εἰρηνικῶς) στέψαντας αὐτὸν ἐρίῳ καὶ μύρῳ καταχέαντας ἀφιέναι παρ’ ἄλλους· τοῦτο δὲ αἱ γυναῖκες ἐπὶ τῶν χελιδόν ων ποιοῦσι (Dio Chr. Or. 53 p. 276 ed. Reiske). To this custom Ast supposes that Plato is alluding, the poets being as it were faithless and garrulous swallows (cf. χελιδόνων μουσεῖα), as well as to the Pythagorean precept ‘not to admit swallows into the house’ (Plut. Symp. VIII 727 B ff.), on which see Frazer in Cl. Rev. V pp. 1—3. This explanation lends an additional point to ἀποπέμποιμεν: and προσκυνοῖμεν might fairly be interpreted of the joyful salutations with which the Greeks hailed the advent of the swallow in the spring (see e.g. Baumeister Denk. d. Kl. Alterth. p. 1985). G. B. Hussey ( Proceedings of the American Philol. Association Vol. XXII pp. xliii ff.) thinks that Plato has in his mind the wellknown χελιδονισμός of which we read in Athenaeus (VIII 360 B ff.), remarking that in the swallow song ‘the custom seems to have been to carry some sort of symbolic swallow from house to house.’ It is perhaps more probable (as Mr J. G. Frazer suggests to me) that “the ceremony of anointing the swallows and crowning them with wool was performed on the children who went from door to door in spring, singing the swallow song and apparently personating the swallow.” But the tone of the whole passage, with its air of studiously exaggerated politeness and compliment, as well as the particular expressions προσκυνοῖμεν, ἱερόν, and θαυμαστόν, are strongly in favour of Proclus' interpretation, although Plato's thoughts may have dwelt for a moment on the practices connected with the χελιδονισμός when he wrote the words ἀποπέμποιμεν— στέψαντες.

κατ’ ἀρχάς . II 379 A ff.

τὸ περὶ ᾠδῆς κτλ. The discussion has hitherto confined itself chiefly to tragedy and comedy. It remains to discuss lyrical poetry also on its formal side. Now the chief formal characteristic of lyric poetry is its invariable association with music. It is therefore necessary to lay down canons for musical composition. This is the justification for the sections on ‘harmony’ and rhythm, which are wrongly pronounced to be irrelevant by Krohn ( Pl. St. p. 15).

τρόπου . Hartman suggests τρόπον, in view of τὸ περὶ ῥυθμούς 399 E; but cf. 392 C. τρόπος is not here used in its technical sense, for which see Monro l. c. p. 63.

συμφωνήσειν . The metaphor may be suggested by the subject under discussion: cf. Phaed. 92 C .

λόγου ‐‐ ῥυθμοῦ . In the best period of Greek music, lyric poetry was written only for music, and music only for poetry, the separation of the two being condemned as illegitimate: see Monro l.c. pp. 119, 120. The elements of music are ῥυθμός and ἀρμονία. The former ‘reconciles’ ταχύ and βραδύ by arranging a proper sequence of short and long notes and syllables, the latter ὀξύ and βαρύ by a proper arrangement of notes of higher and lower pitch ( Symp. 187 A —C). In the wider sense, therefore, any ὁμολογία of ὀξύ and βαρὐ is a ἁρμονία, but in practice the word was used specifically of certain scales or modes, and it is in this sense (according to Westphal) that Plato uses it here and in 398 E, where see note.

ὡσαύτως : i.e. ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ λέξει as defined in 396 E, 397 D.

καὶ μὴν κτλ. The poet should be his own musician, and write the music to suit the words, not vice versá. This was another characteristic feature of classical Greek music, although a change set in during the fourth century B.C. See Westphal Gr. Rhythmik p. 1 and Laws 669 D, E, 812 D.

ἁρμονίαι (according to the orthodox view) are ‘musical modes’ and not simply ‘keys.’ They differed from each other both in the arrangement of the intervals (like our major and minor modes) and also in pitch. It must have been the former difference which chiefly —though not perhaps exclusively—accounted for the different effects of different modes upon the character and emotions, just as we are ourselves affected in different ways by music written in major and in minor keys. See H. S. Jones in Cl. Rev. VIII p. 449.

μιξολυδιστὶ κτλ. The omission of the article has been questioned, but in merely naming the scales it can be dispensed with: cf. (with Stallbaum) Arist. Pol. Θ 5. 1340^{b} 1 ( τὴν μιξολυδιστὶ καλουμένην). On the ἁρμονίαι recognized by Plato see App. II.

Ἰαστὶ ‐‐ καλοῦνται : ‘there are also varieties of Lydian and Ionian which are called ‘slack’.’ Jowett and Campbell, reading αἵτινες (see cr. n.), remark that the “indefinite relative suits with Plato's affected ignorance”; but the speaker is Glauco, not Socrates, and Glauco is μουσικός. See note on 399 C. Richards condemns αἵτινες χαλαραὶ καλοῦνται as spurious because αἵτινες “cannot be used in this way in good Attic prose of Plato's date.” With the older and better attested reading αὖ τινες, which I have ventured to restore, everything is plain. The words αὖ τινες establish once for all what Westphal (l.c. p. 198) and von Jan (l.c. p. 816) detected even when αἵτινες was read, viz. that Plato is referring not to Ionian and Lydian, but to slack Ionian and slack Lydian, a point which escaped Monro (l.c. p. 7) but not his reviewer ( Cl. Rev. VIII p. 449). See also my article in Cl. Rev. X pp. 378 f. We learn from Aristotle that certain musical critics censured Plato for rejecting τὰς ἀνειμένας ἁρμονίας and for characterising them as μεθυστικαί, βακχευτικὸν γὰρ ἥ γε μέθη ποιεῖ μᾶλλον ( Pol. Θ 7. 1342^{b} 23—27). It was partly perhaps in deference to these criticisms that Plato altered his view of μέθη in Laws 666 Aff.: see also Grote Plato III p. 328 note

δωριστὶ καὶ φρυγιστί . The absence of the Aeolian mode is remarkable, for it must certainly have been known to Plato (see Pratinas quoted in App. II). Westphal agrees with Bellermann in supposing (l.c. p. 195) that αἰολιστί is included under δωριστί. Aristotle also ignores αἰολιστί, unless indeed (as Westphal holds ib. p. 196) it was identical with ὑποδωριστί. In Lach. 188 D φρυγιστί is excluded (perhaps because the speaker is Laches, whose ideal of courage is military rather than pacific), and Dorian, ‘the only national Greek mode,’ alone recognized.

ἐκείνην τὴν ἁρμονίαν : viz. Dorian, not Phrygian, as Ast seems to have thought.

μιμήσαιτο . Cf. Laws 798 D τὰ περὶ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς καὶ πᾶσαν μουσικήν ἐστι τρόπων μιμήματα βελτιόνων καὶ χειρόνων ἀνθρώπων and 397 B above.

καὶ ἀποτυχόντος . καί connects ὄντος and ἀμυνομένου. ἀποτυχόντος (which is itself logically subordinate to ἀμυνομένου) has three subordinate alternatives ( ἢ—πεσόντος), all of which are summarised in ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις .

ἄλλην : viz. Phrygian. Aristotle blames Plato for retaining the Phrygian mode, while rejecting the αὐλός, with which it was usually associated: ἄμφω γὰρ ὀργιαστικὰ καὶ παθητικά ( Pol. Θ 7. 1342^{b} 3). Plato, however, rejects the flute, not because it is orgiastic, but because it is πολυαρμόνιον (399 D). In Plato's opinion the Phrygian mode expressed sobriety and resignation: Aristotle thought it ecstatic and purgative (l.c. 1341^{a} 23). The difference of view is interesting and important as shewing that the ethical effect of different modes was a disputed point even among the ancients.

ἢ εὐχῇ ‐‐ ἄνθρωπον is subordinate to πείθοντός τε καὶ δεομένου.

ὑπέχοντα . ἐπέχοντα—see cr. n.— cannot, I think, be right. ἐπέχειν τὴν διάνοιαν ( Laws 926 B) certainly does not justify ἐπέχειν ἑαυτόν, and even if it did, ‘submitting to’ and not merely ‘attending to’ is the sense required. With ὑπέχοντα cf. Gorg. 497 B ὑπόσχες Σωκράτει ἐξελέγξαι ὅπως ἄν βούληται, where the reflexive pronoun is omitted, as often with παρέχειν. Here it is better to take ἑαυτόν with ὑπέχοντα than with μεταπείθοντι. By changing the construction and writing accusatives instead of genitives, Plato makes the man himself rather than his φθόγγοι appear the object of imitation (cf. 397 D note). This is natural enough, because the situations described in ἢ τοὐναντίον—ἀγαπῶντα give less scope for φθόγγοι. Stephanus wished to read the genitive throughout ( ὑπέχοντος, πράξαντος etc.: so also v and two Florentine MSS), but there is also inscriptional evidence for a genitive or dative participle followed by an accusative in the course of a long sentence: see Meisterhans^{3} p. 205.

κατὰ νοῦν : ‘to his liking’: cf. εὐτυχούντων below.

ταύτας ‐‐ λεῖπε . The style is intentionally weighty and formal, as befits a solemn pronouncement: cf. X 617 D, E. After ταύτας there is a slight pause: ‘Just these, two modes and none other.’ The insertion of τάς would impair the effect. besides suggesting that Socrates had in view two of the current modes, which, not being himself μουσικός, he professedly had not. It is Glauco's business to fit the cap (398 E, 399 A); Socrates only makes it. The indefinite αἵτινες (before φθόγγους) is therefore strictly appropriate in the mouth of Socrates, although it would not be in Glauco's. ἁρμονίας is rejected by Herwerden in both places (see cr. n.), but it is almost as indispensable here as it is wrong after ἀνδρείων, although Stallbaum rejects the word here and retains it there. The genitives δυστυχούντων etc. must depend on φθόγγους. For βίαιον, ἑκούσιον (‘one involuntary, one voluntary’), Ast suggests βιαίου, ἑκουσίου, Hartman βιαίων ἑκουσίων. A human being cannot however be called βίαιος because he is engaged ἐν βιαίῳ πράξει, although the mode which imitates his accents may be so described with propriety and even elegance: cf. (with Schneider) such expressions as φόνος ξυγγενής for the slaughter of kindred. The words δυστυχούντων—κάλλιστα simply define the meaning of βίαιον and ἑκούσιον (‘whatever musical modes they be that shall best imitate the accents of’ etc.): the relative is postponed in order to keep the essential marks of the ἁρμονίαι together, but the careful reader will note that Plato begins a chiasmus with δυστυχούντων, as if to separate the genitives from what precedes and prepare us to find their construction in the sequel. Had he written εὐτυχούντων, δυστυχούντων, ἀνδρείων, σωφρόνων the double chiasmus would have compelled us to connect the genitives with δύο ἁρμονίας.

οὐκ ἄλλας ‐‐ ἔλεγον . The Dorian to express ἀνδρεία, the Phrygian σωφροσύνη. These are the two contrasting virtues which Plato's μουσική endeavours to combine (410 E).

παναρμονίου . In Plato the noun παναρμόνιον occurs only here and in 404 D ᾠδῇ τῇ ἐν τῷ παναρμονίῳ καὶ ἐν πᾶσι ῥυθμοῖς πεποιημένη. In the latter passage it certainly does not denote a musical instrument of any kind. Here the word is sometimes understood of a particular and definite musical instrument, but a careful study of the context shews that it does not bear this meaning even here. Plato has decided to admit only two modes, the Dorian and the Phrygian. ‘Consequently,’ he continues, ‘we shall have no need in our songs and melodies of πολυχορδία or παναρμόνιον, and therefore ( ἄρα) we shall dispense with τρίγωνοι, πηκτίδες etc., with all instruments, in short, which are πολύχορδα and πολυαρμόνια.’ The prohibition of certain musical instruments is an inference from the general principle that πολυχορδία and παναρμόνιον are unnecessary, so that παναρμόνιον cannot itself be a particular musical instrument. Probably, as Mr Archer-Hind has suggested to me, the παναρμόνιον was “not a mode or modes, but a style of composition, in which the ‘Tondichter’ passed freely from δωριστί to φρυγιστί and λυδιστί and as many others as he chose. The name may even have been given to well-known compositions in this style—cf. νόμος πολυκέφαλος—the fantasia with many subjects. The effect, I should think, may have been analogous to a series of bold and sudden modulations in modern music.” See also on αὐτὰ τὰ παναρμονία in 399 D.

τριγώνων ‐‐ πηκτίδων . These were foreign instruments of high pitch, and many strings. The τρίγωνον in particular was associated with loose and voluptuous melodies. For an exhaustive account of both see Susemihl and Hicks' Politics of Arist. vol. 1 pp. 632—636 or von Jan's de fidibus Graecorum pp. 29 ff., 33 ff.

αὐλητἀς . The αὐλός resembled the clarinet. It had a “mouthpiece ( ζεῦγος) in which a vibrating reed ( γλῶττα) was fitted,” and was sometimes played in pairs. See Dict. Ant. s.v. tibia. Plato banishes the ‘flute’ and retains the Dorian mode, although Dorian melodies were often played on it, as Milton well knew: see the noble description of the “Dorian mood of flutes and soft recorders” in Par. Lost 1 550 ff. In Boeotia, where the αὐλός was highly esteemed, it was supposed rather to calm than to excite the feelings. See Rhys Roberts The Ancient Boeotians pp. 33— 35.

ἢ οὐ τοῦτο πολυχορδότατον; τοῦτο is that with which αὐλοποιοί and αὐληταί are concerned, viz. the ‘flute’: cf. II 377 C note οὗτος instead of τοῦτο would have been a trifle harsh. πολυχορδότατον has been repeatedly called in question, and there is the usual crop of emendations, intended to obliterate the metaphor. Schneider has however shewn that the MS reading is sound, by citing Pollux IV 67 Πλάτων δὲ καὶ πολύχορδον εἴρηκε τὸν αὐλόν, and Simon. Fr. 46 ὁ καλλιβόας πολύχορδος αὐλός, and comparing expressions like αὐλὸν κρέκειν, ἁρμόζειν, κρούειν. Many other illustrations are given by Smyth, Greek Melic Poets p. 326. Here the metaphor is intended to arrest attention by its boldness and prepare us for the theory of the origin of παναρμόνια in the next clause; but πολυχορδότατον in itself, like πάμφωνος in Pindar ( Pyth. 12. 19 al.), refers only to the number of different notes which the flute, thanks to various contrivances, such as plugs, wax, etc., was capable of producing. See Abdy Williams in Proceedings of the Musical Association 1897—8 p. 135. Plato objects to the multiplicity of strings and notes as admitting and even inviting change and fusion of modes. We are told by Paus. IX 12. 5 (cited by Monro l.c. p. 38: cf. Ath. XIV 631 E) that it was one Pronomus of Thebes who πρῶτος ἐπενόησεν αὐλοὺς ἐς ἅπαν ἁρμονίας εἶδος ἔχοντας ἐπιτηδείως. Down to his day there were three forms of ‘flutes,’ intended for the Dorian, Phrygian and Lydian modes respectively. On the means by which this change was effected see Dict. Ant. s.v. tibia.

αὐτὰ τὰ παναρμόνια : sc. ὄργανα, such as πηκτίδες and τρίγωνοι. Plato means those instruments on which panharmonic melodies could be played (cf. Proclus in remp. p. 63 ed. Kroll): but we must beware of translating (with D. and V.) ‘the panharmonium itself,’ for no single specific instrument is here intended, as some later lexicographers appear to have supposed. The gloss in Hesychius παναρμόνιον· εἶδος ὀργάνου, ἐξ ὅλου τεταγμένον is not quite clear, and may conceivably refer to a whole class of instruments, but Photius apparently thought that there was a special instrument called παναρμόνιον. His note (p. 388, 26 ed. Porson) is as follows: παναρμόνιον· ὄργανον μουσικόν· Ἄλεξις, ἐν ᾧ τὸ παναρμόνιον τὸ καινὸν ἔντεινον τεχνῶν ( Τέχνων Meineke). Photius may of course be right in his interpretation of Alexis' line: but παναρμόνιον in Plato never, I believe, refers to one particular instrument: and even Alexis may mean no more than ‘perform the new panharmonic melody,’ ἐντείνω being used as in τὸ κάλλιστον ἐντείνας μέλος, Dionys. Hal. de admir. vi dicendi in Dem. c. 48.

λύρα ‐‐ κιθάρα . The λύρα was the stringed instrument in common use; the κιθάρα was employed chiefly by professional musicians or κιθαρῳδοί. See Monro in Dict. Ant. s.v. Lyra, where illustrations of the two instruments are given, and von Jan de fid. Gr. pp. 5—26. By admitting the professional κιθάρα, Plato perhaps lends his sanction to musical festivals or contests in the approved modes.

καὶ κατὰ κτλ. After χρήσιμα supply ἐστίν. This is better than to eject καί (with Ast and—according to Bekker— Vat. Θ). Demetrius ( περὶ ἑρμ. § 185, cited by Schneider) finds in the words καὶ αὖ κατ’ ἀγροὺς τοῖς ποιμέσι (sic, not νομεῦσι) σύριγξ ἄν τις εἴη an imitation of the sound of the σύριγξ. “Ceterum Demetrii rationem me non perspicere fateor,” says Schneider. Demetrius' remark is, I believe, correct, and has reference to the sigmatismus in the words of Plato: cf. Laws 700 C τὸ δὲ κῦρος τούτων—οὐ σύριγξ (used for συριγμός) ἦν οὐδέ τινες ἄμουσοι βοαὶ πλήθους, καθάπερ τὰ νῦν. The σύριγξ was either μονοκάλαμος, resembling our flute, or πολυκάλαμος (like Pan's pipe): see Dict. Ant. s.v. The indefinite τις shews that Plato did not wish to specify which variety he intended.

οὐδέν γε ‐‐ ὀργάνων . Plato puts himself in the position of the Muses, who preferred Apollo's performance on the κιθάρα to that of Marsyas on the flute (Apollod. I 4. 2). This is the force of οὐδέν γε καινὸν ποιοῦμεν. The words τὰ τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ὄργανα must not be pressed; for although Apollo invented the cithara, the lyre was ascribed to Hermes (Paus. V 14. 8: cf. the Homeric Hymn to Hermes), and the syrinx to Pan. The discovery of the flute was also ascribed to Athena, especially by the Boeotians. A third account represents Marsyas as picking up the instrument after Athena had discovered and discarded it. This legend may be an attempt to reconcile the two conflicting stories, and probably dates from the decline of the flute as an instrument of education in Athens during the fourth century (Arist. Pol. Θ 6. 1341^{a} 32 ff. Cf. Preller Gr. Myth. p. 223). In making Marsyas its discoverer, Plato declares the flute a foreign instrument, and appropriately excludes it from his ‘Greek city’ (V 470 E).

νὴ τὸν κύνα . This peculiarly Socratic oath occurs only once again in the Republic (IX 592 A). In both passages it marks the highest degree of emphasis. On the oath itself see my note on Ap. 21 E and Blaydes on Ar. Wasps 83 .

ἄρτι : II 372 E note

βάσεις . The word βάσις in the technical writers on Rhythm generally means a dipody or combination of two feet under one main ictus: cf. Schol. in Heph. I 3. 1 p. 124 ed. Westphal βάσις δέ ἐστι τὸ ἐκ δύο ποδῶν συνεστηκός, τοῦ μὲν ἄρσει, τοῦ δὲ θέσει παραλαμβανομένου. Such a technical use of the word would be out of place here, especially in the mouth of Socrates; and the word is employed throughout as equivalent simply to ‘step’ or ‘foot.’ Even technical writers sometimes so use it: cf. the Scholiast already cited δέξεται δὲ (sc. the Iambic metre) ἐν μὲν τῇ πρώτῃ βάσει ἴαμβον καὶ σπονδεῖον II 5. p. 151 and Gleditsch l.c. p. 702.

κοσμίου τε καὶ ἀνδρείου recalls 399 C σωφρόνων ἀνδρείων, and would seem to point to the necessity of two kinds of rhythm, one to go with the Phrygian mode and express sobriety and self-control, the other to join the Dorian mode in expressing courage. On the ethical qualities of Greek rhythm in general, consult Westphal Gr. Rhythmik pp. 226—239 and Arist. Rhet. III 8, with Cope's notes.

μὴ λόγον ‐‐ μέλει . See 398 D note

τρἴ ἄττα εἴδη . Arist. Quint. I 34 ed. Meibom γένη τοίνυν ἐστὶ ῥυθμικὰ τρία· τὸ ἴσον (2/2), τὸ ήμιόλιον (3/2), τὸ διπλάσιον (2/1). To the first belong dactyls, spondees, anapaests: the second includes paeons, cretics, and bacchei: under the third fall trcchees, iambics, ionics. See Gleditsch l.c. p. 694.

ὥσπερ ‐‐ ἁρμονίαι . What are the τέτταρα εἴδη? The following answers (among others) have been given: 1. the intervals of the fourth, fifth, octave, and double octave (Ast): 2. the four notes of the tetrachord, which was probably the historical and at all events the ‘theoretical unit of the scale’ (Stallbaum, Jowett and Campbell): 3. “the four ratios which give the primary musical intervals—viz. the ratios 2:1, 3:2, 4:3 and 9:8, which give the octave, fifth, fourth, and tone” (Monro l.c. p. 106 note; cf. also Dict. Ant. II p. 193): 4. the four ἁρμονίαι Φρυγιστί, Λυδιστί, Δωριστί, Λοκριστί (Westphal Rhythmik p. 238). Ast's view cannot be right, unless we suppose that ἁρμονίαι here includes scales of double compass, which is most unlikely. Westphal's explanation is improbable, for Plato has said nothing of Λοκριστί, and (though perhaps no great stress should be laid on this) it is awkward to derive the ἁρμονίαι ( ὅθεν αἱ πᾶσαι ἁρμονίαι) from themselves. If the principle of Westphal's interpretation is right, I should be inclined to substitute Ἰαστί for Λοκριστί, having regard to 398 E, where see note Cf. Cl. Rev. X p. 379. (I have since found that Prantl also took this view: see note 116 in his translation.) I do not think that Stallbaum has hit the truth, for Plato's language is not suggestive of any allusion to the origin of the octave from the combination of two tetrachords, and a single tetrachord cannot produce a ἁρμονία ( ὅθεν αἱ πᾶσαι ἁρμονίαι). Possibly the τέτταρα εἴδη ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις denote simply the keynote, its octave, and the intervals of a tone and a semitone: for these are as it were the threads out of which all modes ‘are woven’ ( πλέκονται should be repeated with ἁρμονίαι), the difference between the modes depending on the difference in position of the tones and semitones. But Euclid lays the greatest stress upon the ratios 3:2 and 4:3 as the component elements of the octave: see for example Sect. Can. 6 τὸ διπλάσιον διάστημα ἐκ δύο τῶν μεγίστων ἐπιμορίων συνέστηκεν, ἔκ τε τοῦ ἡμιολίου καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιτρίτου and cf. ib. 8, 12, and for this reason I now believe that Monro's view has most in its favour.

ποῖα δ’ ὁποίου κτλ. On ὁποίου see I 348 B note, and for the error in Paris A Introd. § 5.

Δάμωνος . μετὰ Δάμωνος is almost a formula with Plato: cf. infra C, 424 C, and Lach. 200 B . Suseminl (on Arist. Pol. Θ 5. 1340^{b} 5) thinks that Plato is alluding to a special work by Damon on the ἦθος and πάθος of modes and rhythms. The word ἀκηκοέναι and the general tone of the passage seem rather to refer to an oral demonstration.

τίνας ‐‐ ῥυθμούς . In general, πόδες ἀπὸ ἄρσεως, or feet in which the θέσις (i.e. the syllable bearing the ictus) followed the ἄρσις, were believed to express more energy and life, than πόδες ἀπὸ θέσεως. See Gleditsch p. 694, and for details as to the ἦθος of the different rhythms ib. pp. 713, 721, 725, 730, 739, 744, 766.

οἶμαι δέ με κτλ. Schneider's δέ γε (found in some inferior MSS) is not appropriate here. The superfluous pronoun after οἶμαι is a well-established colloquialism: cf. Charm. 173 A , Symp. 175 E . οἶμαι, ἀκηκοέναι, and οὐ σαφῶς ὀνομάζοντος are just the words one might employ in giving one's recollections of an abstruse and half-understood lecture, and this is just what Plato is either doing or, more probably, affecting to do. A few technical terms and a vague idea ( οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅπως) of some of the processes are all that he remembers.

ἐνόπλιον ‐‐ ήρῷόν γε . ἐνόπλιος ξύνθετος, δάκτυλος, ἡρῷος are expressions from the lecture: in English they would be in inverted commas. The ἐνόπλιος is not ˘¯¯˘˘˘˘ (Proclus in remp. p. 61, if, as appears probable, by παριαμβίς he means the παρίαμβος or pyrrich), nor the cretic (J. and C.), nor, strictly speaking, the anapaestic foot (Hartman), but ᷋<*>˘˘<*>˘˘<*>, a common processional ( προσοδιακός) or marching rhythm, consisting of an ἰωνικὸς ἀπὸ μείζονος and a choriambus (Hephaestion c. 15), or (as the Scholiast on Ar. Clouds 651 measures it) a spondee, pyrrich, trochee and iambus. For examples we may cite Sappho's αὔτα δὲ σὺ Καλλιόπη ( Fr. 82) and Tyrtaeus' ἄγετ’ ὦ Σπάρτας ἔνοπλοι ( Fr. 16). See Gleditsch l.c. pp. 717, 722, and Bacchius Isag. 101 ed. von Jan, whose example is ὁ τὸν πίτυος στέφανον. ξύνθετος probably refers to the composite character of the rhythm. as described, for example, by the Scholiast on the Clouds. The later technical expression for this peculiarity was ἐπισύνθετος (Gleditsch p. 746). δάκτυλον must be understood as a foot, not as a rhythm, although the ἐνόπλιος ξύνθετος certainly, and probably also the ἡρῷος, are rhythms. There is no difficulty about this, provided we remember that Plato is quoting (or pretending to quote) isolated technical expressions from Damon's lecture. The ingenious, though hazardous, proposal of Blaydes, to read καὶ <κατὰ> δάκτυλον (cf. Clouds 651), would confine the instances to rhythms until we reach ἴαμβον. Dr Jackson suggests δακτυλικόν in place of δάκτυλον. It is tempting (with J. and C.) to take ἡρῷος as ‘spondee,’ but there seems to be no authority for such a use of the word. The ἡρῷος πούς is apparently a dactyl; although the ἡρῷος ῥυθμός admits of the spondee. Unless, therefore, we take ἡρῷος as a rhythm, the spondee seems to be altogether excluded. It is unnecessary to do more than allude to Hartman's excision of ξύνθετον καὶ δάκτυλον.

ἴσον ‐‐ τιθέντος . ἄνω and κάτω refer of course to the position of the arsis and thesis (cf. ὁ ἄνω, ὁ κάτω χρόνος said of the notes at which the foot or bâton is raised and brought down respectively), but Westphal's remark that Plato uses τ ὸ ἄνω and τὸ κάτω is misleading ( Rhythmik p. 104). The words must be taken as adverbs, and can only be explained by supposing that when Damon was demonstrating the equality of arsis and thesis he ‘placed’— τιθέντος is not ‘assuming’ as διακοσμοῦντος shews—the former in a diagram above the latter, in some such way as <*><*>. The position of the ictus — ἄνω καὶ κάτω, not κάτω καὶ ἄνω—shews that Plato is speaking of the dactyl and spondee which replace the anapaest in the anapaestic rhythm: for in the dactylic rhythm proper the ictus falls on the first syllable (see Gleditsch p. 693). Now the ἐνόπλιος is also anapaestic, so that it looks as if Damon had taken as the subject of his demonstration some passage like Persae 9, 10 ἤδη | κακόμαντις ἄγαν ὀρσολοπεῖται, and analysed it into an ἐνόπλιος ξύνθἐτος, a dactyl, and a spondee (included, as stated above, under the ἡρῷος ῥυθμός).

εἰς βραχύ ‐‐ γιγνόμενον . These words can only mean ‘passing into a short and a long,’ “mit kurzem und langen Ausgang” (Schneider), “so dass er sowohl in eine kurze als auch in eine lange Silbe auslief” (Prantl): see on II 380 D. The slight inaccuracy involved in saying γιγνόμενον, where τελευτῶντα (cf. VI 511 C) would have been more precise, is perhaps in keeping with the airy nonchalance of Socrates' description. The construction is missed by Westphal ( Rhythmik p. 237) and the English translators and editors. γιγνόμενον agrees with ἡρῷον: the ἡρῷος ῥυθμὸς γίγνεται εἰς βραχύ when it uses a dactyl, εἰς μακρόν when it uses a spondee (or anapaest), the two alternatives being denoted by τε καί. I have sometimes felt disposed to take the words as referring to the iambus, and place them just before ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, translating ‘and when it’ (the rhythm) ‘changed to a short and a long, I think he called it an iambus’: but although this interpretation gives a somewhat better sense to γιγνόμενον, I am not convinced that the MSS are wrong. Hartman also suggests the transposition of καί, but he might have spared his “minime audax coniectura” ἐκ βραχέων τε καὶ μακρῶν γιγνόμενον. See also the next note.

μήκη ‐‐ προσῆπτε . Hartman takes these words as explaining the trochee only, laying emphasis on the precedence given to μήκη; but the use of the plural shews that the iambus is also included. The meaning is simply ‘and he assigned them longs and shorts,’ i.e. to each one long, and one short. This clause is in favour of keeping εἰς βραχύ—γιγνόμενον in its place; if we transpose (as suggested in the last note), the short and long of the iambus will be alluded to twice.

ἀγωγάς . ἀγωγή is tempo (Gleditsch p. 688). The unit of measurement was the χρόνος πρῶτος or ¯: and hence the dactyl. for example, has usually a τετράσημος ἀγωγή, the iambus a τρίσημος, and so on. See Excerpta Neapol. in von Jan's Mus. Script. Gr. § 14. The duration of the χρόνος πρῶτος was of course relative, and not absolute, so that the time occupied in singing or declaiming a foot often varied, and we are told that ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ ἐν δισήμῳ (sc. ἀγωγῇ ) γίνεται δακτυλικὸς πούς ( Exc. Neap. l. c.). But it is clear that in general the ἀγωγαί of the different kinds of feet were different from one another. Hartman ejects τοῦ ποδός, “cum apud Platonem πούς et ῥυθμός non discrepent.” The distinction between πούς and ῥυθμός is not always preserved by writers on metre (e.g. Bacchius Isag. 100 ff. ed. von Jan), but Plato seems to make the πούς differ from the ῥυθμός as the unit from the whole.

ἤτοι . See on I 344 E.

εὐσχημοσύνης : grace or beauty of form in the widest sense. The word is introduced in view of the application of these principles to objects appealing to the eye: see 401 A.

ἀνάρμοστον . The article (which Baiter and Hartman require) is unnecessary. See on I 334 E.

ἀκολουθητέον (i.q. δεῖ ἀκολουθεῖν) has ταῦτα for its subject, as Stallbaum points out: cf. Laws 803 D τί παίζοντα ἐστὶ διαβιωτέον; and infra V 467 C.

τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ἤθει ἕπεται . Le style c'est l'homme. Conversely, thought is the dialogue of the soul with itself: see Theaet. 189 E (with Wohlrab's note) and Soph. 263 E . Cf. also IV 437 C note and Homer's διελέξατο θυμός.

ὡς εὐήθειαν is expunged by Herwerden; Baiter would omit ὡς. If ὡς belonged to εὐήθειαν (as these critics apparently supposed), it would deserve expulsion; but it goes with οὖσαν understood. The antithesis is between ἄνοιαν and εὐήθειαν: and if the sentence is read so as to lay stress on these two words, it will be seen how easily οὖσαν can be repeated after εὐήθειαν. The sense is: not the εὐήθεια which is really ἄνοια, but which we euphemistically designate as if it were εὐ‐ήθεια (i.e., as before, in the good sense of the word), but εὐήθεια in its true and etymological sense ( ὠς ἀληθῶς)—the εὖ τὸ ἦθος κατεσκευασμένην διάνοιαν. This explanation seems to me better than to regard ὡς εὐήθειαν as attracted for ὡς εὐήθεια (sc. ἐστίν), a construction for which we may compare Prot. 357 D : see my note ad loc. For ὡς ἀληθῶς cf. I 343 C note

τὸ αὑτῶν πράττειν . The principle of ἁπλότης, which is the corner-stone of Plato's city, presents itself in the education of the young, as the pursuit of εὐήθεια.

ἔστιν δέ γέ που κτλ. This lofty conception of ἁρμονία and ῥυθμός—for αὐτῶν shews that these are included no less than εὐσχημοσύνη—stretching throughout the whole domain of art and nature, may have been suggested by Pythagorean teaching: but the view of education as the pursuit and assimilation of all this beauty is due to Plato himself. Cf. 403 C note

ποικιλία . II 378 C note

τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κτλ. This famous section describes in glowing language, like that of the Symposium, Plato's ideal of art. He does not desire to banish art, as is sometimes asserted, but rather idealises it by effecting—as he believed—its reconciliation with beauty and truth. Art aspired to be καλόν in his day: Plato wished it to be so in the fullest sense of the word: and his idea of beauty is sufficiently comprehensive to include moral and spiritual beauty as well as physical. Plato was doubtless unfair in the application of his principle to some of the Greek artists and poets, but in itself his ideal—the love of spiritual beauty —is one to which the best and most enduring art—which alone can find a place in an ideal city—consciously or unconsciously ever seeks to conform. See Nettleship Lect. and Rem. II pp. 112— 116.

τοῖς ποιήμασιν κτλ. Cf. Laws 656 D, E. Nettleship ( Hell. pp. 117 f.) remarks on the fact that “Plato in his criticism of Greek art has almost ignored the painters and sculptors, and confined his assaults to the musicians and still more to the poets.” This is true, although the present passage shews that his canons were intended to regulate painting, sculpture, architecture, and the minor arts as well as music and poetry. Among other reasons, Nettleship plausibly suggests that Plato “did not see in the sculptors and architects of his time the signs of degeneracy which drew his attention to the poets and musicians.” Cf. 401 C.

ὁπόθεν ἂν κτλ. No Greek could read these words without thinking of Olympia; no Athenian without recalling the glories of the Acropolis. It was probably in the spirit of this ideal that Epaminondas—himself a man of Platonic sympathies, if not a Platonist— hinted to his countrymen that their city could not be truly great until the Propylaea crowned their citadel (Aesch. περὶ παραπρεσβείας 105. See also Nettleship Hell. pp. 115—123). Partly on grounds of style, and partly for grammatical reasons, I believe that Plato wrote τις and not τι (see cr. n.). ‘Whenever anything strikes on their eyes or ears from fair works of art’ sounds material and gross in a passage so full of poetic feeling; and in the second place ἄγουσα agrees with αὔρα, whereas it should be ἄγον and agree with τι if τι is right. Translate ‘Whensoever from beautiful works of art there smites upon their eyes or ears as it were a salubrious breath from healthful regions.’ In the same way a sort of ἵμερος flows into the soul from beauty, awakening love and admiration ( Phaedr. 251 C ). The melodious current of Plato's rhythmic utterance flows onward like the steady though gentle breeze which it describes. With αὔρα—ὑγίειαν cf. Arist. Probl. I 52. 865^{b} 19 πόλις ὑγιεινὴ καὶ τόπος εὔπνους ( διὸ καὶ ἡ θάλασσα ὑγιεινή). For the syntax of τις—ὥσπερ αὔρα· φερουσα cf. τὰς τῆς γενέσεως ξυγγενεῖς ὥσπερ μολυβδίδας VII 519 B, where a similar corruption occurs in some of the MSS: see note ad loc. Paris A has τί for τίς again in II 360 E.

ἐν μουσικῇ τροφή . The insertion of ἡ before ἐν (suggested by Rückert) is needless: cf. 404 B.

φέροντα : not ‘imparting’ (Jowett), but ‘bearing,’ ‘carrying,’ like φέρουσα in the simile: cf. Symp. 188 A ἥκει φέροντα εὐετηρίαν.

καὶ μὴ καλῶς . Herwerden's conjecture ἤ for καί misses the precise force of παραλειπομένων ‘falling short’: cf. Critias 107 D ὀξέως αἰσθανόμενοι τὸ παραλειπόμενον. The word is explained in καὶ μὴ—φύντων, where the contrast is between imperfections of art and imperfections of nature.

ἐκεῖ : i.e. ἐν μουσικῇ.

ὀρθῶς δὴ κτλ. I formerly (with Baiter and others) adopted Vermehren's proposal ( Pl. Stud. p. 94) to read ὀρθῶς δὴ <χαίρων και> δυσχεραίνων τὰ μὲν καλὰ· ἐπαινοῖ καὶ [ χαίρων καὶ ] καταδεχόμενος κτλ. The correction is certainly an attractive one, in view especially of Laws 653 B, C, where education is defined as μισεῖν μὲν ἃ χρὴ μισεῖν—στέργειν δὲ ἃ χρὴ στέργειν, and 654 1) τὰ μὲν ἀσπαζόμενος ὅσα καλά, τὰ δὲ δυσχεραίνων ὀπόσα μὴ καλά, and Arist. Eth. Nic. II 2. 1104^{b} 11 ff. But the MS reading, though less pointed and pregnant, is in itself satisfactory enough, if δυσχεραίνων be understood with reference to what precedes ( τῶν παραλειπομένων), and we are therefore hardly justified in altering the text. (The omission of χαίρων καί in q should not be used as evidence of dislocation.) Hartman (after Stallbaum) excises καί between χαίρων and καταδεχόμενος, but this too is unnecessary. We may translate (with Jowett) ‘and rejoicing in them’ (as opposed to δυσχεραίνων just before) ‘and receiving them into his soul.’ The preposition κατα‐ in καταδεχόμενος suggests that beauty is an exile coming home again: the return of exiled truth and beauty is indeed with Plato the aim of education and of life. Cf. Phaedr. 250 A —252 A.

τρέφοιτο . For the metaphor cf. Phaedr. 248 B ff.

γραμμάτων . See on II 368 D. The reference in εἴχομεν, however, is not to that passage, but to the actual experience of the speakers.

ἐν ἅπασιν οἷς ἔστιν : i.q. ἐν ἅπασιν ἐν οἷς ἔστι, by a common idiom: see on II 373 E and cf. VII 520 D, IX 590 C.

ὡς οὐ δέοι depends on the idea of thinking involved in ἀτιμάζομεν. Richards suggested δέον, “sine causa,” as Hartman observes.

εἰκόνας γραμμάτων . The reference to letters throughout this part of the Republic is only by way of illustration, and we must beware of reading more into Plato's words than they are capable of meaning in the context where they occur. No doubt it is true, as Dr Jackson remarks, that “this passage makes us acquainted with the relation of copy and model which is to become important later,” but Bosanquet goes too far when he asserts that “the expression ‘images of letters’ points forward to the classification of grades of knowledge, at the end of Book VI, the allegory of the cave at the beginning of Book VII, and the argument of Book X.”

αὐτά is emphatic: ‘the letters themselves’ as opposed to their εἰκόνες. There is of course no allusion to ‘Ideas’ of letters.

τὰ τῆς σωφροσύνης εἴδη κτλ. Are the εἴδη Plato's Ideas? So Zeller (II^{4} 1 p. 560 note), and many other critics, understand the word; nor can it be denied that the language of Plato, if interpreted in the light of Book VII, can bear this meaning. Nevertheless we are bound in the first instance to interpret this passage by itself, and not by Book VII, the more so as the doctrine of transcendent or separate ( χωρισταί) Ideas appears nowhere else in I—IV, and seems to be expressly reserved by Plato for his philosophical, as distinct from his musical education (see IV 435 D and VI 504 B note). What is meant by the words εἰκόνας αὐτῶν? The context shews conclusively that εἰκόνες refers to copies (sc. of the virtues σωφροσύνη etc.) represented in poetry and the fine arts (so also Krohn Pl. Frage p. 47). On any other interpretation the introduction of these εἰκόνες is irrelevant in a discussion on the rules which imitative art must obey. This being so, if εἴδη means the Ideas, Poetry will be a direct imitation of the Ideas, which is inconsistent with X 595 C —598 D. Or does Plato mean to suggest that Poetry and Art in his ideal city are really to imitate the Ideas directly? This is a bold and attractive solution, and there are several hints elsewhere to the same or nearly the same effect, but Plato expressly speaks of the εἴδη here only as immanent, and not transcendent ( ἐνόντα ἐν οἷς ἔνεστιν), and we must therefore suppose that the artist copies from the life (cf. ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καλὰ ἤθη ἐνόντα D). The word εἴδη is repeatedly used by Plato without reference to transcendent Ideas, as has been amply proved by Krohn ( Pl. St. pp. 65, 66), Pfleiderer ( Zur Lösung etc. p. 17), and Campbell (II pp. 296 ff.). Here it does not mean ‘varieties’ (as if there were more than one variety of σωφροσύνη), but simply ‘forms’ or ‘kinds,’ in the sense in which the immanent reality which every general notion attempts to express is a ‘form’ or ‘kind’—a genus or species—of the totality of things. Cf. IV 435 B note The genitives are genitives of definition. The use of εἴδη in the sense of “immanente Seinsformen” (Krohn) is interesting as a harbinger of the Ideal theory of VI and VII—a sort of half-way house between the Socratic λόγοι and Plato's ideas. It recurs in IV 434 D, 435 B, 437 D. See further Krohn Pl. Frage pp. 54—58, and cf. VI 504 D note But although the separatists have (as I think) made out their claim that transcendent Ideas do not appear in Books I—IV, I agree with Hirmer ( Entst. u. Komp. d. Pl. Pol. p. 645) in thinking their deductions from this fact unwarrantable.

μεγαλοπρεπείας . μεγαλοπρέπεια in Plato is ‘highmindedness,’ not, as in Aristotle, ‘magnificence’: cf. VI 486 A note In like manner Plato's ἐλευθεριότης denotes the virtue proper to an ἐλεύθερος, and is not restricted to liberality in spending money. Contrast Arist. Eth. Nic. IV cc. 2—6.

τῶν δὴ ‐‐ ἀσπάζεσθαι . Cf. Symp. 209 B and 210 B, C. The whole of Diotima's wonderful speech (210 D— 212 A) should be compared with the closing sections of this chapter. In point of language the words κάλλιστον θέαμα— ἐρασμιώτατον closely resemble Tim. 87 D .

ἀξύμφωνος : i.e. (as Glauco's answer shews) strictly speaking one whose soul and body do not harmonise in point of beauty, but the word also suggests “the man who has no music in his soul.” Cf. Symp. 206 C τὰ δὲ ( κύησις καὶ γέννησις) ἐν τῷ ἀναρμόστῳ ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι. With the sentiment in general cf. Tim. 87 D ff.

μανθάνω ‐‐ ὅτι : ‘I understand: (you say so) because’ etc.: see I 322 A note

οὐ προσοιστέον ἄρα . This somewhat extreme example of a common liberty in concord serves to increase the rhetorical emphasis by the energetic repetition of Glauco's ipsissima verba. The emphasis becomes still greater in Glauco's reply οὐ μέντοι, μὰ Δία, προσοιστεόν. The particle μέντοι is especially used in replies when the words of a previous speaker are repeated (Hoefer de part. Plat. p. 32). q and Flor. U have προσοιστέα.

φιλεῖν is ‘kiss’ (as Schneider rightly translates the word): cf. V 468 B and Arist. Pol. B 4. 1262^{a} 32 ff., where χρήσεις (as Hicks observes) means ‘endearments.’

ἅπτεσθαι κτλ. We think of Socrates and the ‘disciple whom he loved’ in the Phaedo: εἰώθει γάρ, ὁπότε τύχοι, παίζειν μου εἰς τὰς τρίχας (89 B).

ὥσπερ ὑέος . Herwerden's conjecture ὡς πατὴρ ὑέος (or ὥσπερ πατὴρ ὑέος) deserves the praise of ingenuity, but Plato's text is better and more expressive, because it represents the object of affection almost as the lover's very son. It should be noted that in Plato's ἔρως it is the elder who loves, and the younger who is loved; and that the aim and purpose of Platonic love is τόκος ἐν καλῷ ( Symp. 206 B )—the bringing to birth of noble thoughts and aspirations from the beautiful soul of youth. Socrates was the embodiment of Plato's ideal in this respect ( Symp. 216 D ff.). Some true and excellent observations on the subject will be found in Dugas L'Amitié Antique pp. 50—53 al.

τῶν καλῶν χάριν . Plato is resolved that Love, as well as Art, shall serve Virtue and not Vice.

τὰ δ) ἄλλα ‐‐ ξυγγίγνεσθαι . σπουδάζειν πρός τινα occurs with the same sense in Gorg. 510 C . Madvig's περὶ ὧν for πρὸς ὅν would give quite a wrong meaning. σπουδάζει has been suggested for σπουδάζοι (Ast, Richards, Hartman), but the optative puts the case more generally: any one in whom one may be interested. Cf. Soph. Ant. 666 ἀλλ’ ὃν πόλις στήσειε, τοῦδε χρὴ κλύειν, with Jebb's note. The previous sentence has told us what the actual relations of the pair of friends must be; and Plato now forbids all conduct likely in any way to occasion scandal or misapprehension: hence δόξει (‘be supposed to’). Such conduct is in bad taste ( ψόγον ἀμουσίας), rather than positively αἰσχρόν or immoral, like actual vice. μαργότερα τούτῳ (Herwerden) instead of μακρότερα τούτων is a singularly gross conjecture.

ὑφέξοντα . “Si ὑφέξοντα non sanum, corrige ὑφέξειν” (Hartman). This catches the point, but, as Hartman admits, the text can be defended as it stands. The participle agrees with the subject of ὁμιλεῖν, εἰ δὲ μή being all but adverbial, and therefore not followed by a main clause. Cf. Prot. 311 D .

δεῖ δέ που κτλ. The love of Beauty is φιλοσοφία ( Symp. 204 B ); so that the famous saying of the Phaedo (61 A) φιλοσοφία μεγίστη μουσική resembles this. I agree with Krohn ( Pl. St. p. 71) in holding that τοῦ καλοῦ is still beauty as it is revealed in Nature and in Art (see on 402 C), the πολὺ πέλαγος τοῦ καλοῦ of Symp. 210 D , and not yet the transcendent Idea of the Beautiful, the contemplation of which demands a still higher flight (ib. 210 D—212 A). But Plato leaves his μουσικός already knocking at the gates ‘of the blest promised Land.’

γυμναστικῇ κτλ. Plato's statements on γυμναστική have been carefully collected and expounded by Kanter Platos Anschauungen über Gymnastik, Graudenz 1886. Admirable remarks on the whole subject will be found in Nettleship Hell. pp. 132—134: cf. also his Lectures and Remains II pp. 123—126. Plato deals here chiefly with the hygienic aspect of gymnastic—a subject which was much discussed in his day: see Dict. Ant. I p. 929, where we are reminded that gymnasia were dedicated to Apollo, father of Asclepius, and himself a god of healing. In his interesting treatise Die Platonischen Dialoge in ihrem Verhältnisse zu den Hippokratischen Schriften (Landshut 1882) Poschenrieder has shewn that Plato was strongly influenced throughout this passage by the views of Hippocrates and his school. See also Häser Lehrb. d. Gesch. d. Med. etc. I pp. 94 ff. The athletics of Gymnastic are treated of in Laws 795 D ff., 833 ff.

ψυχὴ ἀγαθὴ ‐‐ βέλτιστον . No very recondite theory of the relation of body and soul is here involved. Plato simply means that the soul has more power over the body than the body over the soul. (The restriction in ὡς οἷόν τε should be noted.) On this principle some doctors held that to cure the body one should minister to the mind diseased: see the curious passage in Charm. 156 B —157 C. The general sentiment is well illustrated by J. and C. from Democr. Fr. Mor. 128 (Müllach) ἀνθρώποισι ἁρμόδιον ψυχῆς μᾶλλον ἢ σώματος ποιέεσθαι λόγον· ψυχὴ μὲν γὰρ τελεωτάτη σκήνεος μοχθηρίην ὀρθοῖ, σκήνεος δὲ ἰσχὺς ἄνευ λογισμοῦ ψυχὴν οὐδέν τι ἀμείνω ποιεῖ.

εἴπομεν . 398 E.

ἀθληταὶ ‐‐ ἀγῶνος . Cf. Laws 829 E ἀθλητὰς τῶν μεγίστων ἀγώνων, and Lach. 182 A .

τῶνδε means contemporary athletes: cf. IV 425 C note With Plato's strictures on Greek athletics cf. Arist. Pol. Θ. 4. 1338^{b} 10 (with Susemihl and Hicks' note) and especially Eur. Fr. 284 : for his attack on the diet and training of athletes cf. Dict. Ant. I pp. 98, 928 and the authorities there cited.

ἐὰν σμικρὰ ἐκβῶσιν κτλ. Poschenrieder (l.c.) cites the Hippocratean Praedictiones II c. 1 Littré τοὺς ἀθλητὰς γινώσκειν...ἤν τι τοῦ σιτίου ἀπολίπωσιν, ἢ ἑτεροῖόν τι φάγωσιν, ἢ ποτῷ πλέονι χρήσωνται, ἢ τοῦ περιπάτου ἀπολίπωσιν ἢ ἀφροδισίων τι πράξωσι· τούτων πάντων οὐδὲν λανθάνει, οὐδ’ εἰ σμικρόν τι εἴη ἀπειθήσας ὥνθρωπος.

ὥσπερ κύνας . II 375 A.

πολλὰς μεταβολὰς κτλ. Cf. [Hippocr.] de umoribus V p. 496 C. 15 Littré αἱ μεταβολαὶ μάλιστα τίκτουσι νοσηματα καὶ αι μέγισται μάλιστα καὶ ἐν τῇσιν ὥρῃσιν αἱ μεγάλαι μεταλλαγαὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖσι ἄλλοισιν: cf. also Aphorism. IV p. 486 § 1 al. and Pl. Laws 797 D ff. (Poschenrieder l.c. pp. 31 ff.)

ἁπλῆ ‐‐ πόλεμον . The sentence is usually explained by carrying on ἡ βελτίστη γυμναστικὴ ἂν εἴη and regarding ἁπλῆ—γυμναστική as the predicate both to ἡ βελτίστη γυμναστική and to ἡ τῶν περὶ τὸν πόλεμον. Besides its extreme cumbrousness, this view makes Plato say that the best gymnastic is good ( ἐπιεικής is practically synonymous with ἀγαθή), which is, to say the least, unnecessary. It seems to me much simpler and better to make ἐπιεικὴς γυμναστική the subject to ἁπλῆ. The meaning is: will the best course of training be sister to the music we described? How so? ἐπιεικὴς γυμναστική, like ἐπιεικὴς μουσική (this is the force of καί), is ( ἐστὶ understood) ἁπλῆ, and so above all is that of soldiers. Hartman, who saw that the passage must be taken in this way, would write ἡ for καί, and I once preferred καὶ <ἡ>, but the article can be dispensed with (cf. 401 D note), and καί is necessary. As the emphasis is primarily on γυμναστική, some may prefer to read γυμναστικὴ ἐπιεικής or γυμναστικὴ ἡ ἐπίεικής; but if the stress of the voice is laid on γυμναστική, and ἐπιεικὴς γυμναστική treated as a single expression (cf. V 453 A note), I think the text may stand.

οὔτε ἰχθύσιν κτλ. Cf. Eubulus ap. Athen. I 25 C (Jackson).

ἐν Ἑλλησπόντῳ is rejected by Cobet and Hartman; if the Homeric heroes were ἐν Ἑλλησπόντῳ, the fish forsooth would more easily have eaten them than they the fish! This is however so obvious that even Cobet's “scriba sciolus” would have seen it, and avoided the preposition ἐν. The fact is that Ἑλλήσποντος was constantly used to denote the whole coast stretching from the Pontus to the Aegean, including Bosporos and Propontis. See Stein on Hdt. IV 38 and cf. Thuc. II 9. The usage is also found in Inscriptions (Meisterhans^{3} p. 226. 16). An Athenian of Plato's day was much more likely to employ the name Ἑλλήσποντος in this idiomatic sense than a later copyist; and for this reason I have no doubt that the expression is genuine, although the words of Hartman “nihil refert utrum ἐν Ἑλλησπόντῳ an ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ sint” are nearly, if not quite, true. Plato may however intend to remind us that fish were plentiful in the region of the Hellespont: cf. Il. IX 360 and Athen. IV 157 B.

ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν . I 341 B note

καὶ ὀρθῶς γε ‐‐ ἀπέχονται . ὀρθῶς must be taken with both verbs: ‘Yes, and they do well in knowing it and in abstaining.’

Συρακοσίαν ‐‐ ὄψου . For δέ (‘autem’) Stallbaum unnecessarily reads δή. The Συρακοσία τράπεζα was proverbial: see Blaydes on Ar. Fr. 206 and the curious account of Syracusan gluttony in Pl. Epp. VII 326 B ff. There is no sufficient basis for Cobet's idea that Plato is here borrowing from some comic poet. Later scandal insinuated that it was the delights of Syracusan living that drew Plato thrice to Sicily (Hermann Gesch. u. System p. 116 note 133, where the authorities are cited).

Κορινθίαν κόρην . Cf. 11 373 A note Κορινθία κόρη is a grisette: see the commentators on Ar. Plut. 149 , and on the general subject Blümner Privatalt. pp. 254—256. φίλην is more refined for ‘mistress’ ( ἑταῖρα). The word κόρην has been doubted: “innocentem puellam eicere ex Platonis republica voluerunt triumviri praestantissimi Buttmannus, Morgensternius, et nuperrime Astius.” So says Stallbaum, her successful champion.

Ἀττικῶν πεμμάτων . The fame of Athenian pastry was as great as its variety: see Athen. XIV cc. 51—58 and other references in Blümner l.c. p. 220.

παναρμονίῳ . See on 399 C.

ἰατρεῖα were both dispensaries and consulting-rooms etc. See Laws 646 C and other references in Blümner l.c. p. 359. In some ἰατρεῖα patients were also housed and treated by doctors (Häser Lehrbuch d. Gesch. d. Med. etc. I pp. 86 ff.), so that in certain cases they resembled a sort of private hospital. For the remedial conception of punishment prevailing in the whole of this section see II 380 B note

δικανική . Cobet calls for δικαστική, and at first sight δικαστῶν just below seems to favour his view. But Plato deliberately selects the less reputable word, meaning by it the arts by which men try to lead the true δικαστής (cf. Ap. 40 A ) astray: see infra B, C. In his own city there is no δικανική, but only δικαστική (409 E, 410 A). It appears from Laws IV 720 C ff. that a doctor's assistants were usually slaves, and that slaves for the most part treated slaves, and freemen freemen, but the rule was not universal (see Blümner l. c. p. 359 note 1). Plato holds that the increase of citizen doctors points to the spread of self-indulgence among the free-born population.

καὶ ἀπορίᾳ οἰκείων has suffered severely at the hands of critics, who have bracketed καί (Ast and others), or read καὶ ἀπορία οἰκείων (Hermann), or δικαίων ἀπορίᾳ οἰκείων (Madvig), or finally denounced the words as a ‘futile interpretamentum.’ Schneider explains καί as “idque” (“und zwar” in his translation), and so also Prantl, and Shilleto (on Dem. F. L. § 101). This interpretation appears to me forced and unnatural. It is simplest to make ἀπορίᾳ as well as τῷ δικαίῳ depend on χρῆσθαι, and regard χρῆσθαι ἀπορίᾳ as equivalent to εἶναι ἄποροι, just as χρῆσθαι ἀμαθίᾳ (for example) means no more than εἶναι ἀμαθεῖς. The plural οἰκείων does not refer to δεσποτῶν, but is the genitive of οἰκεῖα, which means ‘resources of one's own,’ ‘personal resources’) ( ἐπακτῷ παρ’ ἄλλων. Cf. the use of τὰ οἰκεῖα in the literal sense for res familiaris I 343 E al.

ἦ δοκεῖ κτλ. Glauco has said that χρῆσθαι ἐπακτῷ τῷ δικαίῳ is the most disgraceful thing of all. Socrates asks him whether it ( τοῦτο) is more disgraceful than the other case ( τούτου) which he is about to mention; and Glauco's reply is ‘no: this other case is even more disgraceful than the first’ (infra C). The meaning was missed by the critic who (see Rev. de Philol. XV p. 83) ingeniously suggested the insertion of ἢ οὔ; after δικαστοῦ just before Glauco's reply. In what follows the litigiousness of the Athenian nature is satirised.

ἀποστραφῆναι : an expressive and epigrammatic condensation for ἀπολυθῆναι στρεφόμενος. λυγιζόμενος is rightly explained by the Scholiast as στρεφόμενος, καμπτόμενος, ἀπὸ τῶν λύγων· λύγος δέ ἐστι φυτὸν ἱμαντῶδες. The corruption λογιζόμενος (found in all MSS except A and—according to Rostagno —M) was easy and almost inevitable.

παρασχεῖν δίκην . The same phrase appears in Eur. Hipp. 49 , 50, and Herwerden should not have proposed ὑποσχεῖν. Plato's view in the Gorgias is that the guilty should denounce themselves to the judge and be cured by suffering punishment: see II 380 B note

φύσας τε καὶ κατάρρους . The order is chiastic, φύσας referring to πνευμάτων, and κατάρρους to ῥευμάτων. Plato clearly indicates that the medical use of these words was only beginning in his day, and it is the application of these words to diseases which he derides, not the words themselves when used of bellows, blasts, and torrents (see the Lexica). The experiment in language is better preserved by rendering ‘blasts and torrents’ than ‘flatulence and catarrh.’ For φῦσα cf. (with Poschenrieder l. c. p. 47) [Hippocr.] de flatibus VI p. 94 c. 3 Littré πνεύματα δὲ τὰ μὲν ἐν τοῖσι σώμασι φῦσαι καλέονται, τὰ δὲ ἔξω τῶν σωμάτων ἀήρ, and ib. c. 7 ὅταν οὖν τὸ σῶμα σιτίων πλησθῇ, καὶ πνεύματος πλησμονὴ ἐπὶ πλέον γίγνεται τῶν σιτίων χρονιζομένων· χρονίζεται δὲ τὰ σιτία διὰ τὸ πλῆθος οὐ δυνάμενα διελθεῖν· ἐμφραχθείσης δὲ τῆς κάτω κοιλίης, ἐς ὅλον τὸ σῶμα διέδραμον αἱ φῦσαι. Other examples of the use of the term in the Hippocratean corpus are cited by Stephanus-Hase Thes. s.v. With κατάρρους cf. Crat. 440 C ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ οἱ κατάρρῳ νοσοῦντες ἄνθρωποι. The word is found in the Hippocratean writings, and denotes “defluxionem aut omnem humoris ex capite ad os et asperam arteriam, atque per eam ad pulmonem, delationem ac descensum” (StephanusHase s. v., where examples are quoted).

τοὺς κομψοὺς Ἀσκληπιάδας . The epithets κομψοί and χαρίεντες were often applied to the more advanced and scientific sort of physicians (Blümner Privatalt. p. 358 note 2). The Ἀσκληπιάδαι were a well-recognised sect or college of physicians, with schools in Cyrene, Rhodes, Cos and Cnidos. See Günther in Iwan Müller's Handbuch V 1 p. 103, and Hug on Symp. 186 E .

καὶ μάλ) ‐‐ ὀνόματα : ‘Yes, indeed, these are truly’ etc. Glauco does not reply to οὐκ αἰσχρὸν δοκεῖ, but simply corroborates what Socrates has said about the new medical terminology. This is simpler than to place (with Schneider) a colon after ἔφη, and take καὶ μάλα with αἰσχρόν. The asyndeton on Schneider's view is too harsh, and would almost require the insertion of καί before ὡς, or (if ὡς ἀληθῶς were taken as ὡς ἀληθῶς αἰσχρόν) before καινά; neither of which alternatives is satisfying. For similar inexactness in replies see V 465 E note

οἱ ὑεῖς ‐‐ ἐπετίμησαν . In themselves these words can only mean that Machaon and Podalirius (the two chief army doctors to the Greek host, Il. XI 833) found no fault with the damsel who gave the wounded Eurypylus an inflammatory potion, or with Patroclus, who was curing him, for directing or permitting her to do so. In our Homer, however, the potion is given, not to Eurypylus but to the wounded Machaon, by Hecamede, Nestor's slave ( Il. XI 624); and this is correctly related in Ion 538 B. The inconsistency led Ast to suspect the genuineness both of Εὐρυπύλῳ—see however 408 A—and of οὐδὲ Πατρόκλῳ τῷ ἰωμένῳ; but there can be little doubt that the text is sound. We must suppose either that Plato is confused, or else that in his text of Homer such a potion was administered, not only to the wounded Machaon (as in the Ion l.c.), but also to the wounded Eurupylus, with Patroclus' sanction. The first alternative is possible, and approved by Howes ( Harvard Studies etc. VI p. 198): but as it is clear from the Ion— if the Ion is genuine—that Plato was familiar with the story of Machaon's treatment, I think it more likely that Plato's Homer related a similar incident in connexion with the treatment of Eurypylus also. For the healing of Eurypylus see Il. XI 844 ff., XV 394.

οἶνον Πράμνειον . Athenaeus, alluding to this passage, informs us that Pramneian wine was παχὺς καὶ πολυτρόφος (I 10 B).

φλεγματώδη : ‘inflammatory.’ Cf. [Hippocr.] περὶ νούσων IV c. 35 (VII p. 548 Littré) ἐπήν τις φάγῃ τυρὸν ἢ ὅ τι ἐστὶ δριμύ, ἢ ἄλλο τι φάγῃ ἢ πίῃ ὅ τι ἐστὶ φλεγματῶδες, αὐτίκα οἱ ἐπιθέει ἐπὶ τὸ στόμα καὶ τὰς ῥῖνας (Poschenrieder l.c. p. 49).

τῇ παιδαγωγικῇ ‐‐ ἰατρικῇ . Cf. Tim. 89 C παιδαγωγεῖν δεῖ διαίταις πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα—ἀλλ’ οὐ φαρμακεύοντα κακὸν δύσκολον ἐρεθιστέον.

Ἡρόδικον . Herodicus, a native of Megara, and afterwards a citizen of Selymbria, is mentioned by Plato again in Prot. 316 E and Phaedr. 227 D . He was one of the earliest to study scientifically the therapeutics of exercise and diet, and particularly recommended long walks, according to Plato ( Phaedr. l.c. τὸν περίπατον Μέγαράδε. Cf. Häser Lehrb. d. Gesch. d. Med. etc. I p. 94). The description of his health given here is confirmed by Aristotle Rhet. I 5. 1361^{b} 4—6 πολλοὶ—ὑγιαίνουσιν ὥσπερ Ἠρόδικος λέγεται, οὓς οὐδεὶς ἂν εὐδαιμονίσειε τῆς ὑγιείας διὰ τὸ πάντων ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἢ τῶν πλείστων (a passage curiously misunderstood by J. and C., who seem to take λέγεται for λέγει). Plato himself thoroughly appreciates the connexion between γυμναστική and ἰατρική: see for example Gorg. 452 A ff., 464 B ff., Soph. 228 E , Pol. 295 C .

νοσώδης γενόμενος . εἰς φθίσιν ἀνήκεστον πάθος ἐμπεσών, says Plutarch ( de his qui sero etc. 554 C).

μακρὸν ‐‐ τὸν θάνατον κτλ. Cf. Eur. Suppl. 1109 —1113 μισῶ δ’ ὅσοι χρῄζουσιν ἐκτείνειν βίον | βρωτοῖσι καὶ ποτοῖσι καὶ μαγεύμασι | παρεκτρέποντες ὀχετὸν ὥστε μὴ θανεῖν· | οὓς χρῆν, ἐπειδὰν μηδὲν ὠφελῶσι γῆν, | θανόντας ἔρρειν κἀκποδὼν εἶναι νέοις, and Aesch. Fr. 395 , Soph. Fr. 689 .

δυσθανατῶν : not “dum malam obit mortem” (Stallbaum), but ‘dying hard’ like δυσθνῄσκων.

καλόν . Because he was the first to profit by his own invention. The assonance γῆρας—γέρας is quite in Plato's manner: cf. IV 439 C, VI 487 C, VIII 557 C notes

οὐδενὶ σχολὴ κτλ. Steinhart ( Platon's Werke V p. 172) thinks it strange that so idealistic a thinker as Plato should not recognise the power of spiritual strength to rise superior to bodily weakness. This truth was not ignored by Plato (see infra 408 E and VI 496 B), although here, perhaps, he forgets that conspicuous examples of fortitude and resignation have a political as well as a private value: “they also serve who only stand and wait.”

καύσει ἢ τομῇ . The two methods of ancient surgery: see Blümner Privatalt. p. 353 note

μακρὰν has less authority than μικράν (see cr. n.), but is probably right. The contrast with the immediate remedies just described seems to require an allusion to the duration of the regimen: cf. also μακρὸν—τὸν θάνατον in B above. μικράν is not sufficiently defended by a reference to κατὰ σμικρόν in 407 D, nor by the allusion to πιλίδια καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἑπόμενα. Moreover σμικρός, and not μικρός, is the prevailing form throughout the Republic. μικρός appears to occur only in V 453 D and VI 498 D. On the inscriptional usage see Meisterhans^{3} p. 89.

πιλίδια . Felt caps were worn by the sick and delicate (see the references in Blümner l.c. p. 180 note 5); but as artisans and sailors usually wore felt caps too ( Dict. Ant. II p. 427), Plato perhaps alludes to some special coverings for the head prescribed by doctors from time to time in a course of medical treatment. The plural also points to this. If not, he uses the expression quite generally, as an example of the treatment he condemns. Well-to-do Greeks generally went bareheaded.

εἶπεν . The ‘momentary’ aorist well expresses the carpenter's decided businesslike tone. His view of life resembles that of the ‘meditative skipper’ in Gorg. 511 D ff.

ὑγιὴς ‐‐ ἀπηλλάγη . He regains his health on losing his doctor, or if he dies, dies without help. Cf. Plut. Apophth. Lac. 231 A τοῦ δὲ ἰατροῦ εἰπόντος αὐτῷ, Γέρων γέγονας, Διότι, εἶπεν, οὐκ ἐχρησάμην σοι ἰατρῷ. (The anecdote is told of Pausanias the Spartan king.)

ἦν . The carpenter is now dismissed: hence the imperfect ἦν, which should be retained in translating. Stallbaum (followed by J. and C.) explains ἦν as the ‘philosophic’ imperfect= ἐστίν, ὡς ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν (in 406 C). This is much less simple and lively. “Wohl weil er ein Geschäft hatte, bei dessen Unterlassung es ihm nicht erspriesslich war zu leben?” Schneider, rightly. Cf. II 361 C note

ἔργον προκείμενον . The view of work and duty here presented recalls I 352 E—353 E.

ἀκούεις . Phocylides, being dead, yet speaketh. The present ἀκούεις is just as legitimate as φησί, and well expresses the living voice of poetry in oral circulation. Heindorf (on Gorg. 503 C ) misses the point of the idiom when he says that ἀκούεις is for ἀκήκοας; while Stallbaum's explanation ‘probas’ is positively wrong. The line, as restored by Bergk Phoc. Fr. 10, is δίζησθαι βιοτήν, ἀρετὴν δ’ ὅταν ᾖ βίος ἤδη. The Horatian ‘quaerenda pecunia primum, | virtus post nummos’ gives the meaning, if primum and post are understood in a strictly temporal sense. Phocylides' maxim is one of the earliest expressions of the all but universal cry χρήματα χρήματ’ ἀνήρ (first in Alcaeus Fr. 49 B ergk), which Socrates and Plato continually preached against. It will be noticed that Plato for his own purposes represents Phocylides as laying the stress on ἀρετὴν ἀσκεῖν rather than on δίζησθαι βιοτήν, where it really falls.

τοῦτο : viz. τὸ ἀρετὴν ἀσκεῖν, as explained in the margin of A.

τῇ προσέξει τοῦ νοῦ is added as a kind of afterthought or additional specification, precisely like the infinitives in Gorg. 513 E ἐπιχειρητέον ἐστι τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς πολίταις θεραπεύειν, infra 407 C, IV 437 B, 443 B, V 450 B, X 598 B, Crito 52 B. The datives τεκτονικῇ etc. depend grammatically on ἐμπόδιον only, and have nothing to do with προσέξει. παρακέλευμα presently is of course the accusative, the subject to ἐμποδίζει being νοσοτροφία, and οὐδέν adverbial. Richter (in Fl. Jahrb. 1867 p. 140) should not have revived the reading of Bekker μελετῶντι ἢ νοσοτροφία· τεκτονικῇ μὲν γὰρ κτλ., which is lacking both in authority and point.

ναὶ μὰ τὸν Δία ‐‐ εἰκός γε, ἔφην (in C). See cr. n. With the MS reading εἰκός γ’ ἔφη, the distribution of the speeches causes difficulty. It will be enough to mention three alternatives, for no one has adopted or is likely to adopt the punctuation of A, where σχεδόν γέ τι —περὶ τοῦ σώματος is assigned to Socrates. We may give either (1) the whole speech ναὶ μὰ—περὶ τοῦ σώματος to Glauco, excising εἰκός γε, ἔφη with II q and some other MSS (so Schneider 1830); or (2) ναὶ μὰ—ἐπιμέλεια τοῦ σώματος to Glauco, and καὶ γὰρ—περὶ τοῦ σώματος to Socrates (Stallbaum); or (3) ναὶ μὰ—δύσκολος to Glauco, and τὸ δὲ δὴ—περὶ τοῦ σώματος to Socrates (Baiter and others, including Schneider 1842). The first view fails to account for the appearance of εἰκός γε ἔφη in A, but is right, I think, in assigning the whole speech to Glauco. Neither at καὶ γὰρ πρὸς οἰκονομίας nor at τὸ δὲ δὴ μέγιστον is it easy and natural to change the speakers. The simple expedient of writing ἔφην for ἔφη appears to me to set matters straight. For the corruption see Introd. § 5. οὐκοῦν ταῦτα etc. is also said by Socrates.

ἥ γε περαιτέρω κτλ. ‘This excessive care of the body, which goes beyond what sound bodily regimen permits.’ The Greek has a rhetorical effect like τὸ δεινόν, τὸ μέγα ἐκεῖνο—θρέμμα IX 590 A. With περαιτέρω and the genitive cf. Gorg. 484 C περαιτέρω τοῦ δέοντος. I once conjectured ἥ γε περαιτέρω γυμναστική, ἧς (‘cuius est’) etc. ( Cl. Rev. X p. 385), but Plato seems to mean that treatment of this kind has no claim to the name γυμναστική at all, and not that it is γυμναστική run mad. The MS reading is defended also by a reviewer of my Text of the Republic in Hermathena XX p. 252.

πρὸς ἑαυτόν : with μελέτας, as in μελετᾶν, φροντίζειν πρὸς ἑαυτόν etc.

διατάσεις , though its MS authority (see cr. n.) is slight, can hardly fail to be what Plato wrote. Similarly in 546 C A^{1} has ἕκαστον twice for ἑκατόν. See Introd. § 5.

ὅπῃ ‐‐ ἐμπόδιος . The reading of Ξ (followed by Stallbaum and the older editors) is certainly right. αὕτη (sc. ἔστιν) is νοσοτροφία; and ἐμπόδιος ἀρετῇ ἀσκεῖσθαι is exactly like ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ πόλει θεραπεύειν (see 407 B note). The presence of νοσοτροφία makes it impossible for virtue to be practised or tested, as when, for example, to take a pedant's illustration, a boy evades both lectures and examinations by cherishing a nervous headache. Recent English editors have followed Baiter, and read ὅπῃ ταύτῃ ἀρετὴ ἀσκεῖται καὶ δοκιμάζεται, taking ταύτῃ as ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, but this gives a much less satisfactory meaning. After αὕτη had been changed to ταύτῃ, the rest of the corruption was easy; but a trace of the original reading may survive in the ἀρετῇ (not ἀρετή) of A.

ἀποκεκριμένον : an isolated, local malady; “morbum separatum, non totum corpus afficientem” (Ast). Unnecessary difficulty has been raised. The word is in no sense technical, and ἀποκρίνω in the sense of ‘separate’ is common enough. The corruption ἀποκεκρυμμένον might have been foretold.

τούτοις μέν κτλ. The words τοὺς μὲν ὑγιεινῶς ἔχοντας led us to expect ἰᾶσθαι, but the construction changes in order to introduce the invention of medicine, and the ‘healing’ reappears in a different form in φαρμάκοις τε—δίαιταν. The sentence is bad grammar, but good conversational style of the looser kind. It is not easy to say whether τε after φαρμάκοις connects the clauses, or only φαρμάκοις with τομαῖς. The former use is comparatively rare in Plato (Hoefer, de part. Plat. p. 7). Partly on this ground, and partly because the union of the aorist καταδεῖξαι with προστάττειν is a little awkward, I prefer the second alternative. The asyndeton, which is of the usual explanatory or ampliative kind, is in keeping with the loose structure of the whole sentence, and seems to me to add a certain didactic impressiveness here: cf. 409 B. τὰ δ’ εἴσω—σώματα depends not so much on ἀπαντλοῦντα directly as on the composite notion ἀπαντλοῦντα καὶ ἐπιχέοντα, which expresses a certain mode of treatment, and is as it were a species of the general idiom ποιεῖν τινά τι. φυτεύειν must depend on ποιεῖν. Plato's sentences are seldom so disjointed as this: cf. however VI 488 B ff., VIII 558 A.

μὴ οἴεσθαι : for the negative (which is the more natural here, as it belongs logically to δεῖν, though grammatically to οἴεσθαι) see I 346 E note οἴεσθαι, like ἐπιχειρεῖν, depends on φῶμεν .

λυσιτελῆ is taken by Schneider as the accusative neuter in apposition to the idea in θεραπεύειν. If so, αὐτῷ for αὑτῷ must be written (with A). It is however so natural to take λυσιτελῆ as masculine that Plato would surely have expressed the other meaning in a less ambiguous way. The usual view yields a satisfactory sense, and should be preferred.

δῆλον κτλ. See cr. n. The awkwardness of taking ὅτι as ‘because’ was early felt and led to the insertion of δεικνύοιεν ἄν in several MSS ( καὶ· οἱ παῖδες αὐτοῦ δεικνύοιεν ἂν ὅτι τοιοῦτος ἦν)—a reading adopted by the older editors. Few will now dispute that δεικνύοιεν ἄν is a gloss. Besides Schneider's suggestion, which I adopt, two other proposals merit consideration: (1) δῆλοι, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, καὶ οἱ παῖδες αὐτοῦ ὅτι τοιοῦτος ἦν (Sauppe, comparing Crito 44 D), (2) δῆλον, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, καὶ οἱ παῖδες αὐτοῦ ὅτι τοιοῦτοι. ἢ οὐχ ὁρᾷς κτλ. (Madvig). The first, though regarded as possible by Schneider ( Addit. p. 25), involves what is, to say the least, a very exceptional use of δῆλος, with which “subiectum sententiae verbo ὅτι incipientis idem esse solet quod sententiae primariae” (Hartman). Sauppe's parallel from the Crito is a doubtful exception to Hartman's rule. Moreover οὐχ ὁρᾷς κτλ. is too lively: we should expect ἢ (so Π ^{2} Ξ^{2} and other MSS) οὐχ ὁρᾷς κτλ. Madvig's correction already involves two changes ( τοιοῦτοι and ἤ), but would be improved by making a third, viz. δῆλοι for δῆλον. The minimum of dislocation which yields a satisfactory sense is the reading which suggested itself to Schneider, although he did not himself adopt it. Some may be inclined to pronounce ὅτι τοιοῦτος ἦν a marginal gloss on δῆλον, as once occurred to Hartman.

ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω . ὡς is emphatic, ‘in the way I describe.’

αἷμ) ‐‐ ἔπασσον . Il. IV 218 αἷμ’ ἐκμυζήσας ἐπ’ ἄρ’ ἤπια φάρμακα εἰδὼς | πάσσε, said of Machaon only. Plato ingeniously accommodates the line to his own purposes. ἐκμυζήσαντ) is of course the aorist indicative ἐκμυζήσαντο, not the dual participle as J. and C. hold. This was pointed out by Schneider. Verbs denoting any kind of organic action are apt to be middle in Attic (Rutherford New Phrynichus pp. 138 ff.). It would be easy to write ἐκμύζησάν τ) (as I once did) and retain Homer's active, but it is not worth while.

κἂν εἰ has come to mean no more than καὶ εἰ: cf. infra V 477 A, IX 579 D, X 612 C and Jebb on Soph. El. pp. 224 f. The change from the plural πιόντες to the singular νοσώδη has been doubted by Herwerden; but see I 347 A note In illustration of κυκεῶνα πιόντες Schneider ( Addit. p. 25) refers to Hippocr. περὶ διαίτης ὀξέων II p. 304 f. Littré οἱ γὰρ ἀρχόμενοι τῶν ὀξέων νουσημάτων ἔστιν ὅτε οἱ μὲν σιτία ἔφαγον—οἱ δὲ καὶ κυκεῶνα ἐρρόφεον· ἅπαντα δὲ ταῦτα κακίω μέν ἐστιν ἢ εἰ ἑτεροίως τις διαιτηθείη κτλ.

Μίδου πλουσιώτεροι : with reference (as Stallbaum observes) to Tyrt. 12. 6 (Bergk): cf. Laws 660 E.

τραγῳδοποιοί τε καὶ Πίνδαρος . Aesch. Ag. 1022 f., Eur. Alc. 3 , Pind. Pyth. 3. 55—58 ( αἴθων δὲ κεραυνὸς ἐνέσκιμψεν μόρον).

πειθόμεθα was much more likely to be corrupted to πεισόμεθα (so q, with Stallbaum and others) than vice versâ, on account of φήσομεν. The present is more pointed and expressive; our rule has been laid down (391 D), and we abide by it now and always.

ὅσοι κτλ. Glauco's conception of the medical art resembles that of the later ἐμπειρικοί: see Celsus de med. Proem. pp. 5—9 ed. Daremberg, and infra 408 D note

καὶ μάλα ‐‐ λέγω . Socrates replies to ἆρ’ οὐκ—ἰατρούς; ignoring, or nearly ignoring, εἶεν δ’ ἂν—ὡμιληκότες: cf. V 465 E note καὶ μάλα is simply ‘certainly,’ and ἀγαθοὺς λέγω lays stress on ἀγαθούς: ‘that is, if they are really good,’ ‘ good ones, I mean.’ There is perhaps a hint that the good physician and the good judge must also be good men: cf. 409 C. To substitute with Hartman μάλιστα for μάλα (as in many MSS) is to mistake the force of λέγω.

ἰατροὶ κτλ. The combination of scientific knowledge ( πρὸς τῷ μανθάνειν τὴν τέχνην) and medical experience which Plato desiderates reminds us of the standpoint of the μεθοδικοί, whose principles were in some respects a compromise between those of the δογματικοί or Theorists, and those of the Empirics: see Celsus l.c. pp. 9—13 and Häser Lehrb. d. Gesch. d. Med. etc. pp. 245 ff., 268 ff.

ψυχῇ ψυχῆς . Cf. Gorg. 523 C —E.

αὐτήν : ipsam, not eam, as Jowett apparently translates it.

διὸ δὴ καὶ εὐήθεις . “For unstained thoughts do seldom dream on evil: Birds never limed no secret bushes fear” ( Rape of Lucrece). Cf. infra VII 517 D ff., Theaet. 174 C ff. The use of παραδείγματα recalls Theaet. 176 E , though the idea is somewhat different here. The word means ‘models,’ ‘standards,’ not ‘samples of experience’ (J. and C.), and τοῖς πονηροῖς is equivalent to τοῖς τῶν πονηρῶν παραδείγμασι. Cf. infra C, D, where παράδειγμα τοῦ τοιούτου is ‘a model’ (not ‘a sample’) ‘of such a character.’ So also Schneider, who translates by ‘Vorbild.’

ὀψιμαθῆ κτλ. The common taunt ὀψιμαθής is in such a case an epithet of praise.

οὐκ οἰκείαν κτλ. For the asyndeton see 407 D note δεῖ αἰσθάνεσθαι for διαισθάνεσθαι (Stob. Flor. 45. 96) is ingenious, but weak. As Steinhart remarks ( Einleitung p. 173), the scientific knowledge of virtue, according to Socrates and Plato, implies a knowledge of its opposite, viz. vice: see on I 334 A, and cf. infra 409 D.

οἰόμενος . Cf. Theaet. 173 B δεινοί τε καὶ σοφοὶ γεγονότες, ὡς οἴονται, and I 336 A note

καὶ πρεσβυτέροις κτλ. The touching allusion to Socrates' condemnation will not escape the sympathetic reader. Plato seldom talks in this vein without thinking of his master: cf. Theact. 174 C and the still more affecting words in VII 517 A. It is from incidental references such as these that we can best appreciate the profound influence which the death of Socrates exercised upon Plato. See also VIII 560 D note

πονηρία μὲν γὰρ ‐‐ λήψεται . See on 409 B and the suggestive remarks of Stewart on Aristotle's Eth. Nic. V 1. 1129^{a} 17. Strictly speaking, Vice cannot have scientific knowledge ( ἐπιστήμη) even of herselt, since Vice is ignorance (and scientific knowledge of Vice would imply a scientific knowledge of Virtue); but she recognises herself by ἐμπειρία οἰκεία: cf. 409 B.

ἀρετὴ δὲ κτλ. : ‘whereas Virtue will in course of time, if natural endowments are improved by education, attain to scientific knowledge at once of herself and Vice.’ The contrast between πονηρία μέν and ἀρετὴ δέ is much impaired if we connect ἀρετή with φύσεως (in the sense of ‘a virtuous nature’): and for this reason I now agree with Schneider in thinking φύσεως παιδευομένης a genitive absolute. I formerly accepted Richards' emendation παιδευομένη, which is decidedly more logical, if φύσεως depends on ἀρετή: but Schneider's view is better. χρόνῳ belongs to λήψεται, and not to παιδευομένης (as if ‘educated by time,’ Jowett): mere lapse of time will never give ἐπιστήμη. Cf. ὀψιμαθῆ and ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ διαισθάνεσθαι in 409 B.

ἀποθνῄσκειν ἐάσουσιν . Cf. Plut. Apophth. Lac. 231 A κράτιστον δὲ ἔλεγε (sc. Παυσανίας ) τοῦτον ἰατρὸν εἶναι τὸν μὴ κατασήποντα τοὺς ἀρρωστοῦντας, ἀλλὰ τάχιστα θάπτοντα. In laying down this law, Plato speaks from the standpoint of the Regal or Political Art, prescribing for the subordinate arts of Medicine and Justice the conditions under which it is good to live and good to die. See Grote Plato I p. 362.

αὐτοί = ipsi is said in opposition to the mere ‘permission to die’ which bodily disease requires. αὐταί (suggested by Richards) is unnecessary: see II 377 C note

ἆρ’ οὖν κτλ. This epilogue describes concisely the aim and underlying principle of Plato's earlier scheme of education. Its object is to produce citizens who shall combine gentleness and strength—sensibility and courage—intellectual activity and moral stedfastness. It is an ideal in which the distinctive virtues of Athens and Sparta—of Greece and Rome—are united and transfigured. See II 375 C and the passages referred to there. The ideal of Pericles ( φιλοσοφεῖν ἄνευ μαλακίας) in many ways resembles Plato's (Thuc. II 40). Cf. also Nettleship Hell. pp. 88—90 and Bosanquet Companion pp. 115—117. It is noteworthy that the doctrine of this section is best explained by a comparison with one of the dialogues often held to be late ( Pol. 306 C —311 C): see also Laws 773 C, D. This is not pointed out by Krohn in his otherwise acute analysis ( Pl. St. pp. 24—28).

ὁ μουσικὸς ‐‐ αἱρήσει . ὁ μουσικός is ὁ τῇ ἁπλῇ μουσικῇ χρώμενος, as defined in the last sentence. ἴχνη διώκων and αἱρήσει are metaphors from the chase: see II 375 A.

αὐτὰ μὴν ‐‐ ἰσχύν . The theory of gymnastic propounded here was apparently new in Plato's time (see on II 376 E), although the practice of athletics as an educative discipline, especially at Sparta, conformed to it in no small measure (see Plut. Lyc. 17 ff., Xen. Rep. Lac. 2 ff.).

μεταχειρίζονται . See cr. n. I have followed Hermann in adopting Galen's text. With οὐχ ( μὴ ) ὡς or ὥσπερ the verb should have for its subject the nominative contained in the ὡς clause: cf. VII 539 D, X 610 D. Symp. 179 E is in reality no exception to this rule.

τινες . It has been supposed that τινες refers to Isocrates, who in his Antidosis (180—185) expounds at length the usual Greek view of gymnastic. This is possible only if the present section was added within the last four years or so of Plato's life, which is most improbable. See Hirmer Entst. u. Komp. d. pl. Pol. p. 663, and Introd. § 4. In other passages the Antidosis has been held to presuppose the Republic: see Dümmler Chronologische Beitr. etc. pp. 12, 13.

καθιστᾶσιν . Cf. Dem. 24. 145 οὗτος γὰρ (sc. ὁ νόμος)— οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς κεκριμένοις—κεῖται, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀκρίτοις, ἵνα μὴ—ἀναγκάζοιντο ἀγωνίζεσθαι, and Phil. 34 C (where however it is easy to write λάβωμεν). In the first of these cases the reference is, as here, to the establishment of laws or ordinances. καθιστᾶσιν is used somewhat like φησί 407 A. Madvig's emendation καθίστασαν commends itself to Weber ( Entwick. d. Absichtssätze in Schanz's Beiträge II 2 p. 58) and others, but has not yet been proved to be necessary, and καθιστάναι below tells rather against it. For other examples of the idiom see Kühner Gr. Gr. II pp. 897, 898. Cases like Soph. O. C. 11 and El. 57, 760 are different, and have been justly emended. As regards the sentiment, it is characteristic of Plato to invent a historical sanction for his theories (cf. 414 B ff.); but he doubtless sincerely believed that the spirit of Greek gymnastics had degenerated.

ἦν δ’ ἐγώ . There seems to be no other case in which ἦν δ’ ἐγώ is so long deferred. Stallbaum and Bekker insert the words after σκληρότητος without any MS authority. If change is needed, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ had better be omitted (so q, whose reading is very different here). But it is better to note than to obliterate such peculiarities.

ἢ ὡς is not ‘pro simplici ἤ vel ὡς positum’ (Stallbaum), but=‘quam quomodo.’

αὐτοῦ . Does the pronoun mean τοῦ ἡμέρου or τοῦ φιλοσόφου? Four qualities are first distinguished: viz. the wild, the hard, the soft and the tame. The source of wildness is the spirited element, which if rightly cultivated becomes brave, if unduly strained, hard. So far, all is clear; but difficulties now begin. We should expect Plato to continue: τὸ ἥμερον is an attribute of τὸ φιλόσοφον, and τὸ φιλόσοφον —not τὸ ἥμερον—when relaxed becomes too soft, when rightly educated becomes κόσμιον (the virtue which contrasts with τὸ ἀνδρεῖον). At first sight, then, it looks as if αὐτοῦ meant ‘the philosophic temperament’ (so Stallbaum and J. and C.); but this is grammatically impossible, unless we make τὸ ἥμερον the subject to μαλακώτερον εἴη and therefore to ἥμερόν τε καὶ κόσμιον, which is hardly tolerable. We must therefore acquiesce in taking αὐτοῦ as τοῦ ἡμέρου, unless there is corruption somewhere. If Plato had written καὶ μᾶλλον μὲν ἀνεθὲν μαλακώτερον εἴη τοῦ δέοντος, καλῶς δὲ τραφὲν σῶφρόν τε καὶ κόσμιον, everything would be clear, but I do not venture to change the text. σῶφρον for ἥμερον is suggested also by Krohn ( Pl. St. p. 26). Apelt proposes ἔμμετρον ( Berl. Philol. Wochenschr. 1895 p. 969).

ἀμφοτέρα ‐‐ φύσει : viz. τὸ θυμοειδές and τὸ φιλόσοφον.

σώφρων τε καὶ ἀνδρεία . σωφροσύνη is the virtue of τὸ φιλόσοφον, ἀνδρεία of τὸ θυμοειδές: cf. 399 C and Pol. 307 C . The meaning would be caught more easily if Plato had written—as perhaps he did— σῶφρόν τε καὶ κόσμιον for ἥμερόν τε καὶ κόσμιον above, just as he wrote ἀνδρεῖον (410 D). ἄγροικος (implying, like ἀνελεύθερος, ἀνδραποδώδης, with which it is coupled in Laws 880 A, lack of power to control the feelings) is properly opposed to σώφρων here.

καταυλεῖν ‐‐ ἁρμονίας . καταυλεῖν (as Ast observes) does not govern ἁρμονίας, but is used absolutely: cf. Laws 790 E (of mothers singing and rocking their children to sleep) ἀτεχνῶς οἷον καταυλοῦσι τῶν παιδίων, καθάπερ αἱ τῶν ἐκφρόνων βακχειῶν ἰάσεις, ταύτῃ τῇ τῆς κινήσεως ἅμα χορείᾳ καὶ μούσῃ χρώμεναι. So expressive a word could ill be spared, although van Heusde's καταντλεῖν is ingenious enough. Cobet would read καταντλεῖν and cut out καὶ καταχεῖν, while Hartman inclines to eject καταυλεῖν καί, but the text is sound. ἁρμονίας depends on καταχεῖν. With χώνης cf. (with Hiller Fl. Jahrb. 1874 p. 174) Ar. Thesm. 18 δίκην δὲ χοάνης ὦτα: see Blaydes ad loc. The context in Aristophanes lends some colour to Hiller's notion that the comparison was taken from some earlier philosopher: cf. Theophr. de sensu § 9.

σίδηρον ἐμάλαξε κτλ. See on 387 C. Apparently then the first effect even of the μαλακαὶ ἁρμονίαι is good. This apparent inconsistency with 398 E ff. is emphasized by Krohn ( Pl. St. p. 25), but Krohn fails to observe that Plato is here describing the facts of common experience, whereas before he was making laws of his own. It is quite possible to admit that the relaxing modes are beneficial in moderation, and yet forbid them, because moderation in them is difficult to maintain.

ὅταν ‐‐ τήκει . The object of κηλῇ, τήκει and λείβει is τὸ θυμοειδές: that of ποιήσῃ is τὴν ψυχήν. So much is, I think, certain; but ἐπέχων is less easy. The word has been interpreted as (1) ‘listening to’ (Schneider, comparing 399 B, where, however, ὑπέχοντα should probably be read), (2) ‘pressing on,’ ‘persevering,’ ‘continuing’: cf. Theaet. 165 D ἐπέχων καὶ οὐκ ἀνιείς (J. and C.). The sense which Schneider gives to ἐπέχων is ill-supported: and we must accept the second alternative. Morgenstern's emendation ἐπιχέων (accepted by Herwerden and Hartman) is attractive but not quite convincing (“when he ceases not to pour the music in” etc.). ἐπιχέων would preserve the metaphor, which is clearly intended (in καταχεῖν, χώνης, and σίδηρον ἐμάλαξε) to suggest the process of smelting, and of which an echo still survives in τήκει, λείβει and ἐκτήξῃ. See Blümner Technologie etc. IV pp. 108 ff. notes The θυμοειδές is the iron which music softens and may even dissolve: farther than this the comparison is not to be pressed.

κηλῇ : as one might charm or fascinate a snake: Euthyd. 290 A , Phaedr. 259 A .

καὶ λείβει ‐‐ αἰχμητήν . For λείβει thus used cf. Ar. Knights 327 . μαλθακὸς αἰχμητής is said of Menelaus in Il. XVII 588.

ἐὰν ‐‐ λάβῃ : ‘if he has received,’ not ‘if he act upon’ (J. and C.). Plato means that if the individual in question received at the beginning a soul— ψυχήν is understood—naturally spiritless, he soon makes it a ‘feeble warrior.’ “Wenn er gleich eine von Natur zornlose Seele bekommen hat” (Schneider). The subject throughout is the τις with which the sentence began. For the usual Greek idiom, by which the person concerned is represented as acting on himself ( ἐκτήξῃ τὸν θυμόν etc.) instead of being acted on, cf. Eur. I. A. 187 φοινίσσουσα παρῇδ’ ἐμὰν | αἰσχύνᾳ νεοθαλεῖ with Headlam's note: also V 462 C, D notes and IX 572 A note

ἐρεθιζόμενον . ῥιπιζόμενον, suggested by Herwerden, is picturesque enough: but ‘provoked and extinguished’ is even more natural in Greek than in English, for ἐρεθίζω could readily be used of fanning a fire: see the lexica s.v.

ἀντὶ θυμοειδοῦς ‐‐ ἔμπλεοι . θυμοειδοῦς is of course masculine and not neuter (as J. and C. suggest). Even if we allow that the dative is neuter in cases like Symp. 195 C νέος—ἐστι, πρὸς δὲ τῷ νέῳ ἁπαλός, and Theaet. 185 E , the presence of the article makes all the difference. Ast (with Ξ) reads θυμοειδῶν. So harsh a change from plural to singular ( ὀργίλοι but θυμοειδοῦς) is remarkable, but hardly more so than ἀποθανουμένους ὅς in IV 426 C. Cf. also I 347 A note Krohn points out that ἀνδρεῖον is here represented as a μεσότης between σκληρόν and ὀργίλον ( Pl. St. p. 27).

εὐωχῆται : should be understood literally, of good living.

ὥσπερ θήριον ‐‐ διαπράττεται . If the MSS are right, πάντα is masculine. But although διαπράττεσθαι by itself can be used without an expressed object ( Prot. 319 C al.), it is strange to find διαπράττεσθαι πρός τινα so used: see Crat. 395 B , Alc. II 143 C. On this account διαπράττεται has been by some ejected (Hermann), by others emended into διαράττεται (Morgenstern), διατάττεται (Madvig and one Florentine MS); while others read θηρίον τὰ πάντα διαπράττεται (Lambrechts), or προσδιαπράττεται πάντα (Chandler), or expunge πρός (Bywater). Perhaps we should read ὥσπερ θηρίον πρὸς <θηρίον> κτλ. (‘attains all his ends by violence and ferocity, like one wild beast with another’). Cf. Shakespeare Rape of Lucrece “The rough beast that knows no gentle right.”

σκαιότητι . ‘Ineptitude.’ Cf. Soph. Ant. 1028 with Jebb's note.

ἀχαριστίας is ‘ungraciousness.’

εἰ μὴ εἴη πάρεργον occurs also in Phaed. 91 A (according to the Bodleian MS). Phrases of this kind seldom admit of variation; for which reason we should hesitate to admit the εἰ μὴ εἰ πάρεργον of Π^{1}.

ὅπως ἄν κτλ. The soul has, so to speak, two strings, the φιλόσοφον and the θυμοειδές, which make a kind of ἁρμονία when they are tuned to the proper pitch by Music and Gymnastic. The θυμοειδές is slackened ( ἀνίεται) by μουσική, tightened or braced ( ἐπιτείνεται) by γυμναστική (410 D, 411 A—E); conversely, we must suppose that the φιλόσοφον is slackened by γυμναστική, and tightened by μουσική. Music and Gymnastic are therefore both of them necessary for each of the two strings (cf. IV 441 E note), although the slackening of the θυμοειδές of itself also tightens the φιλόσοφον, which is likewise slackened when the tension of the other is increased. Cf. Tim. 88 B , C. The effect of all this musical imagery is to suggest that Character is the Music of the Soul: cf. Lach. 188 D .

τοῦ ‐‐ ἐπιστάτου . Some MSS (including Ξ and q) omit τοῦ, and no precise parallel has yet been adduced for ὁ τοιοῦτός τις used in this way. In IX 581 E, cited by Schneider ( Addit. p. 27), Paris A has ἐν τοιούτῳ τινί, not ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ τινί. The article may perhaps be justified by the description of the ἐπιστάτης in the last sentence, and τινὸς taken closely with τοιούτου (‘some such superintendent as we have described’); but there is certainly some ground for suspecting interpolation (with Bekker and others). The ἐπιστάτης, as Jowett observes, is a sort of minister of education, such as we find in Laws 765 D ff. The same function is in Pol. 308 D ff. assigned to the Regal or Political Art.

ὡς οἷόν τέ γε μάλιστα . I have placed a comma before ὡς; cf. Phaed. 74 B φῶμεν μέντοι νὴ Δἴ, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, θαυμαστῶς γε (Hoefer Part. Plat. p. 33).

χορείας ‐‐ ἱππικούς . See Laws 814 D ff., 822 D ff., 830 C ff., 832 D ff.

οὐκέτι : ‘not now,’ sc. when we have trained our Guardians. On such idiomatic uses of οὐκέτι and its opposite ἤδη see Cope's Rhetoric of Aristotle, Vol. I p. 13.

πρεσβυτέρους κτλ. The different principles on which rulers may be appointed are fully discussed in Laws 690 A ff.

φρονίμους κτλ. Intellectual ability and accomplishments, authority, and pa triotic sentiment are the three requisites of the Rulers as laid down here. In VI and VII it is the first which is emphasized, here it is the last. This is in harmony with the whole spirit of I—IV, in which, as Krohn remarks ( Pl. St. p. 29), “the intellect is subordinated to the moral powers, and with the education of the character in richly-endowed natures the fruits of insight ripen of themselves.”

καὶ ἐκείνου . See cr. n. Stobaeus ( Flor. 43. 152) reads καὶ ὅτι (or ὅ τι) μάλιστα ἐκείνου κτλ., which is good enough Greek, and would mean ‘whatever policy he thinks by bringing prosperity to the other brings prosperity also to himself,’ ὅ τι being an accusative of respect belonging to εὖ πράττοντος. If the principle of this interpretation is right, I should read ὅ τι ἄν for ὅταν, taking ἄν with ξυμβαίνειν. ἄν loves the shelter of a relative, particularly ὅ τι, and the corruption is the easier because ὅταν in A and other MSS is written ὅτ’ ἄν. But φιλεῖν cannot well be said of one's attitude to a policy or course of action; and Hermann's proposal gives a more satisfactory sense. The occurrence of ( τοῦτ) ό γ’ ἂν μάλιστα just before may be responsible for the slip. It is to be understood—though Plato has not expressly said so—that the guardians believe their own interests to be best consulted by promoting those of their country. μὴ δέ is μὴ δὲ εὖ πράττοντος, and τοὐναντίον is ξυμβαίνειν καὶ ἑαυτῷ κακῶς πράττειν.

ἐπιλανθανόμενοι helps out the idea in ἐκβάλλουσιν and forms a natural antithesis to φυλακικοί which, while playing upon φύλακες, also implies the notion of remembering: cf. φύλαξ μουσικῆς 413 E. The word has been undeservedly attacked, chiefly because in 413 B it receives a more special and precise signification. But each of the three temptations to be presently enumerated, κλοπή, βία and γοητεία, may be correctly described as varieties of forgetting; nor is it in Plato's manner to introduce a classification prematurely, as he would have done by writing μήτε γοητευόμενοι μήτε βιαζόμενοι — < μήτε > ἐπιλανθανόμενοι (with Heller), or adding μήτε κλεπτόμενοι before ἐκβάλλουσιν (with Hartman). Cobet, more suo, expunges the word.

ἑκουσίως ἢ ἀκουσίως : with reference to the usual Socratic theory that Knowledge or Virtue is voluntary, Ignorance or Vice involuntary: see on II 382 A.

τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν ‐‐ ἑκουσίως . See IV 438 A note

ἢ οὐ ‐‐ εἶναι . It is necessary expressly to equate ἀληθεύειν with ἀληθὴς δόξα, because ordinarily it means to speak rather than to think what is true. Cf. II 382 A. Hartman approves of Ast for bracketing the words “quod argumentationem turbant,” but the contrary is true. Men unwillingly relinquish what is good. ἀληθεύειν is good; and ἀληθὴς δόξα is ἀληθεύειν; therefore we unwillingly relinquish ἀληθὴς δόξα—which is just what we wished to prove.

τραγικῶς : i.e. ὑψηλολογούμενος, in lofty high-flown metaphorical language such as may well become obscure: cf. VIII 545 E. κλέπτειν thus used is tragic: cf. (with J. and C.) Soph. Ant. 681 εἰ μὴ τῷ χρόνῳ κεκλέμμεθα .

τοίνυν =‘praeterea’ here, not ‘igitur’: I 339 D note

τι δείσαντες =‘having some fear’ (J. and C.).

τοῦτο ὡς ποιητέον κτλ. : ‘that it is their duty to do that which on each occasion they think it is best for them to do in the interests of the State.’ I have provisionally retained the reading of the best MSS, although it is open to suspicion on several grounds. The position of τοῦτο is unusual, and αὑτοῖς ποιεῖν is, to say the least, superfluous. Gaisford (with whom Cobet agrees) wished to expunge the entire clause as a gloss on δόγματος. This solution, though drastic, may be right: for an explanation of δόγματος is hardly needed after 412 D, E, and τοῦτο looks like the commencement of an explanatory note ‘this, viz. that’ etc. A simpler alternative, adopted by most editors, is to cancel αὑτοῖς ποιεῖν, but it is difficult to see why a scribe should have introduced the words. The sentence, if genuine, seems to want the finishing touch. Cf. 407 D note

προθεμένοις ἔργα . It is clear that Plato is referring to specific tests, and not (as Bosanquet seems to think) to the duties of war and the public service generally. So also Susemihl ( Gen. Entw. II p. 143), and Steinhart ( Einleitung p. 173), the latter of whom compares, not very aptly, the tests of the Pythagorean brotherhood and the appalling spectacles displayed in the mysteries. Three kinds of tests are required: (1) κλοπή, (2) βία, (3) γοητεία. Examples of the second kind are furnished by the severer discipline of gymnastic, the chase etc.: cf. Laws 633 B ff., where the probationary value of these and similar exercises is appropriately insisted on by the Spartan stranger. It was fully recognised in the Spartan ἀγωγή (Plut. Lyc. 17. 4 ff.). The third order of tests may be illustrated from Laws 634 A, B, 635 C, 647 D ff., 649 A, 673 E ff. ἡ ἐν οἴνῳ βάσανος (649 D) consists in giving wine to test men's selfcontrol ( τοῦ σωφρονεῖν ἕνεκα μελέτης 673 E). Plato gives no account of the first variety; but a good illustration of one species of it (cf. τοὺς μεταπεισθέντας 413 B) is provided by the speeches of self-seeking statesmen and unpatriotic sophists and poets. It is a curious fact that Plato's κλοπή still leaves a loophole by which vicious poetry may creep in again. On the general question, Plato does well to insist on the educational value of temptation; the theory and practice of modern times recognises it in connexion with βία, but experience too often shews that κλοπή and γοητεία mean playing with fire. Cf. Grote Plato III p. 328.

τοῦ τῆς ‐‐ θεατέον . Two εἴδη of tests have been described, κλοπή and βία: the third is γοητεία. I incline to think that Stallbaum is right in restoring τοῦ τῆς: see cr. n. and Introd. § 5. τούτοις ‘misere languet,’ and if a dative were needed, it should rather be αὐτοῖς. Herwerden expunges θεατέον; but asyndeton before ὥσπερ is frequent in sentences of this kind.

δυσγοήτευτος . For the change from plural to singular cf. I 347 A note

λαγχάνοντα . The accusative recurs to φύλακα, and is all the easier because τιμὰς δοτέον is little more than τιμητέον. Plato's usage is lax in such matters, and it is better not to emend: cf. (with Schneider) Laws 760 E, 877 A and Engelhardt Anac. Pl. Spec. III p. 45.

ὡς ἐν τύπῳ ‐‐ εἰρῆσθαι . Cf. VI 502 D note

ἐπικούρους . Plato henceforward uses this expression when he wishes specifically to allude to the second class of his citizens. φύλακες remains the general term including both ἄρχοντες and ἐπίκουροι. See on II 374 D.

ὧν νῦν δή . See cr. n. Although νῦν occasionally refers to the immediate past (e.g. I 341 C, IX 592 A, X 611 B: see also Jebb on Soph. Ant. 151 ), neither here nor in οὓς νῦν δή just before can δὴ νῦν be retained: for δή “neque per se intelligi neque ad ὧν referri potest” (Schneider). The reference is to II 382 D, III 389 B.

μάλιστα μέν . See on 415 D.

μηδὲν καινὸν κτλ. We want no novelty, but something with which the Greeks are already familiar, for our city is a Greek city (V 470 E).

Φοινικικόν τι : because the story of the Σπαρτοί was Phoenician, Cadmus the Phoenician having sown the dragon's teeth from which they sprang (Apollod. III 4. 1). Cf. Laws 663 E. Steinhart ( Einleit. p. 177) and Susemihl ( Gen. Entw. II p. 144) find in Φοινικικόν a further hint that the institution of caste was something foreign and non-Hellenic: but the words cannot be thus interpreted. The Egyptian system of caste (see Hdt. II 164 ff.) differed from Plato's in essential points, and there is no real evidence to shew that he was influenced by it in any way: nor is ‘Phoenician’ (‘Sidonian’ in Laws l.c.) equivalent to ‘Egyptian.’ Cf. Hermann Gesch. u. Syst. p. 55 and notes Ψεῦσμα Φοινικικόν afterwards became a proverb, perhaps owing to this passage.

πολλαχοῦ γεγονός means simply ‘which has happened in many places.’ γεγονός and γενόμενον in themselves refer to the actual occurrences, which ὥς φασιν—πεπείκασιν reduces again to legend and matter of faith. πολλαχοῦ is plentifully illustrated in Preller Gr. Myth. pp. 79 ff. Presently οὐδ’ οἶδα εἰ γενόμενον ἄν (for which Herwerden neatly but needlessly suggests οὐδ’ οἶδ’ ἂν εἰ γενόμενον) hints that the age of miracles is past.

ὁποίᾳ ‐‐ ἢ ποίοις . Cf. 400 A note It is very exceptional to find the indirect interrogative preceding the direct: cf. Soph. O. T. 71 with Jebb's note.

ἐρῶ . I have removed the colon after ἐρῶ on Richards' suggestion.

ὥσπερ ὀνείρατα ‐‐ αὐτούς : lit. ‘all these things which they fancied themselves suffering and happening to them were so to speak dreams.’ ἐδόκουν is ‘imagined’ as in Aesch. Pers. 188 (also of a dream) and elsewhere. The object of πάσχειν, viz. ταῦτα πάντα, becomes the subject of γίγνεσθαι: cf. (for the change of subject) Ap. 40 A , Symp. 200 D and supra I 333 C, II 359 D, E, 360 A. It must be allowed that the effect of this idiom is here unusually harsh. I once conjectured ὑπάρχειν for πάσχειν, taking ἐδόκουν still as ‘fancied’: but the text is probably sound.

ὑπὸ γῆς κτλ. Herwerden bids us bracket either ὑπό or ἐντός: but Plato rarely if ever lets the preposition ἐντός follow its noun. ὑπό is ‘under,’ not ‘by’ (it is ὁ θεός, not ἡ γῆ, who πλάττει, infra 415 A), and ἐντός is adverbial; “drinnen unter der Erde” (Schneider). Mortal creatures are similarly moulded within the earth in Protagoras' prehistoric myth ( τυποῦσιν αὐτὰ θεοὶ γῆς ἔνδον 320 D): cf. also Symp. 191 C , Pol. 272 A , Tim. 42 D . The myth of the Politicus (269 A ff.) connects the autochthonous origin of man with the golden age, in agreement with a wide-spread tradition, which gave rise to a considerable literature (Dümmler Proleg. zu Platons Staat p. 46). It is in the spirit of this tradition that Plato here represents the first generation of his ideal city as autochthonous.

καί ‐‐ καί . The double καί marks “the correspondence of the two clauses” (J. and C.). As the Earth proved herself their mother, so they must shew themselves her sons. If the text is sound, it must be explained in this way; but exact parallels are rare. Thuc. IV 8. 9 (cited by Schneider Addit. p. 27) is different: see Classen ad loc. and on VIII 27. 5. More to the point is Soph. Ant. 1192 f. καὶ παρὼν ἐρῶ, | κοὐδὲν παρήσω τῆς ἀληθείας ἔπος: see Jebb ad loc. Ast expunges καί before ἡ γῆ, while Hermann alters it to ὡς (carrying on the ὡς of ὡς ἄρα). Neither change can be called satisfactory. I formerly suggested δημιουργουμένη ἔτι. ἤδη δὲ κτλ. ( Cl. Rev. X p. 385): cf. Symp. 220 C ἤδη ἦν μεσημβρία, καὶ ἄνθρωποι ᾐσθάνοντο. The change is slight, but ἔτι ‘languet,’ and it is better to retain the MS reading.

ὡς περὶ μητρὸς ‐‐ διανοεῖσθαι . Cf. (with J. and C.) Aesch. Sept. 10 —20, 412—416, and infra V 470 D. For the omission of the preposition before τῆς χώρας cf. VIII 553 B note ὑπέρ with τῶν ἄλλων is scarcely more than περί: see II 367 A note

ὡς φήσομεν . The sense (as Schneider observes) is ὡς ὁ μῦθος λέγει, ὃν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐροῦμεν. Hartman cancels ὡς, but it was more likely to have been wrongly omitted here than inserted.

χρυσὸν κτλ. The metals are borrowed from Hesiod ( O. D. 109—201), as Plato indicates in VIII 546 E. Hesiod enumerates five ages of men (interposing the age of heroes between those of copper and iron), but the older legend probably recognised four only: see Rohde Psyche^{2} I p. 87. Plato makes the golden and the other classes coexist—a truer and profounder view than Hesiod's. In other respects, the myth (as Jackson has pointed out in Susemihl and Hicks Politics of Aristotle p. 244) is not to be pressed: for “it does not recognise the promotion of ἐπίκουροι” to be ἄρχοντες. We should expect the φύλακες to contain admixtures, both of gold and silver, such as are to be Rulers receiving more gold than silver, and conversely; but the Greek does not favour this idea. Iron again seems to be exclusively (though less emphatically) reserved for the farmers, and copper for the artisans: cf. infra B, C, VIII 547 A, B, and Arist. Pol. B 5. 1264^{b} 14. It makes the ψεῦδος all the more γενναῖον and effective to tell the citizens that the classes are even more distinct than they really are.

ἅτε οὖν ξυγγενεῖς ὄντες is said with reference to the δέ clause, on which the stress falls. The fundamental kinship of the different classes will occasionally reassert itself in their offspring. So J. and C., rightly.

ἐξ ἀργυροῦ : sc. ἐκγόνου, which should also be supplied with χρυσοῦ. Plato sees in fancy the onward march of generations καθάπερ λαμπάδα τὸν βίον παραδιδόντες: cf. IV 424 A. Ast's proposal ἀργύρου should not have received the approval of Hartman; and D. and V. miss a characteristic touch by translating ἀργυροῦ “a silver parent.”

ἐάν τε κτλ. This provision is the corner-stone of Plato's State, and as soon as it gives way, the edifice is doomed (VIII 546 E—547 A). It is only by the elevation of the worthy and the degradation of the unfit that class-distinctions can be made to coincide with those of Nature (cf. IV 423 D); and unless they do, the foundation of the city, which is τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, is sapped. Hence the emphasis with which Plato introduces this subject. His theory, it should be noted, conforms at least as much to the interest of the individual as to that of the State; for it provides congenial work for all according to their natural capacities, and uncongenial labour, whether above or below one's powers, is a fertile source of misery and crime. Aristotle ( Pol. B 4. 1262^{b} 27) seems to doubt if Plato's scheme was feasible. Granted rulers who are φρόνιμοι εἰς τοῦτο, δυνατοί, and κηδεμόνες τῆς πόλεως (412 C), in a small city—a thousand warriors, says Plato, will suffice (IV 423 A, cf. Grote Plato III p. 206 note) —it could probably be worked without much difficulty. See also IV 423 E ff. We are not of course to suppose that the child was once for all assigned to his class at birth; he would be watched and tested again and again, before being finally disposed of, so that the likelihood of mistakes on the part of the Rulers is greatly lessened. Cf. Tim. 19 A .

τιμήσαντες : not “having estimated their values” (J. and C.): but simply ‘they will do him honour and’ etc. The suggestions ἀντιτιμήσαντες or τιμήσαντες κατ’ ἀξίαν will hardly command assent. τιμήν in τιμὴν ἀποδόντες above may also be translated ‘honour’ if τὴν τῇ φύσει προσήκουσαν is taken in its full force: the honour appropriate to his nature and no more.

ὅπως μέντ’ ἂν κτλ. Cf. Laws 663 E—664 A. Grote justly observes that “Plato has fair reason for his confident assertion that if such legends could once be imprinted on the minds of his citizens, as portions of an established creed, they would maintain themselves for a long time in unimpaired force and credit” (l. c. III p. 188). The first generation of citizens would remain incredulous, but the γενναῖον φεῦδος would be impressed upon their children, and soon be universally believed. It would require but little effort for a Greek city like Plato's (V 470 E) to entertain in course of time a view which has so many points of contact with Greek tradition. Here Plato seems to hint that even his Rulers (for οἱ τούτων ὑεῖς must include these also) will in time believe; the Rulers of VI—VII might teach the legend as an ἐν δέοντι ψεῦδος, but would themselves refuse their assent.

σχεδὸν ‐‐ λέγεις : viz. that the story is intended to form part of the city's permanent religious creed, and so encourage patriotism and fraternity.

τοῦτο ‐‐ ἀγάγῃ : ‘this will be as the vox populi shall determine’: i.e. it will depend upon φήμη whether our fable is believed or not. φήμη is not of course an oracle (as Ficinus supposed), but the half-personified voice of popular belief. Cf. Laws 838 C, D.

τούς τε ἔνδον κτλ. Henkel ( Studien zur Gesch. d. Gr. Lehre vom Staat p. 52 note 13) remarks that the prevention of faction inside the city is characteristically put in the foreground. The greatest danger to a Greek city was from internal dissension: cf. V 470 C ff. notes

στρατοπεδευσάμενοι . The Spartan government was compared to that of a στρατόπεδον (Isocr. 6. 81: cf. Gilbert Gr. Const. Ant. E. T. pp. 61 ff.). Plato's city is literally a camp. His proposals would probably strike the average Athenian as a dangerous and tyrannical exaggeration of Spartan usages. See Jowett Introd. p. 176.

διαφέρειν ἐκείνου is rejected by Herwerden; but Schneider's explanation hits the mark: “ αὖ alterum hoc de discrimine insolentius dictum notat: prius fuerat quod domos εὐνάς dixerat.”

κακουργεῖν . See 407 B note The idiom is abundantly attested, both in Plato and in other Greek authors, although Madvig and Cobet have done their best to expel it from Plato's text here and wherever else it occurs.

μὴ τοιοῦτον ‐‐ ποιήσωσι . For τοιοῦτον cf. 388 D note Richter conjectured μὴ τοιοῦτοι—ποιηθῶσι, “parum venuste,” as Hartman mercifully says.

ἀντὶ ξυμμάχων ‐‐ ἀφομοιωθῶσιν . For the usual ampliative or explanatory asyndeton cf. 409 B. Aristotle objects that Plato's regulations would virtually divide his city into two hostile camps ( Pol. B 5. 1264^{a} 24), and Grote does not see “what reply the Platonic Republic furnishes to this objection” (l.c. III p. 213). In reply to Aristotle, Plato might have pointed to his regulations about the interchange of classes (415 B ff.), which would have the effect of binding them together more securely. Moreover, where each individual has the work to do for which he is best qualified, one fruitful cause of discontent and sedition is removed. The wives and families of the lower class would also tend to keep them quiet. Nor does Aristotle's objection allow sufficient weight to the training by which Plato tries to protect his guardians from such ‘spiritual pride’ as would alienate their subjects.

καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον . See cr. n. καὶ ἔγωγ’ εἶπον, though generally retained, is surely wrong: it could only mean ‘I too, said I.’ No editor cites any other instance of ἔγωγε in this formula.

τοῦτο μὲν κτλ. prepares us for the second scheme of education in Book VII: cf. 412 B, 414 A notes

ἥτις ‐‐ ἐπαροῖ . αὐτούς is emphatic: “ipsos per se” (Schneider). The contrast is between the guardians in themselves, and in their dealings with the others. It is difficult to decide between παύσει—ἐπαρεῖ (Bekker and others) and παύσοι—ἐπαροῖ. The latter is exquisitius, and better supported on the whole. For the confusion between ‐ῃ (subjunctive) and ‐οι (optative) in A see Introd. § 5. Cobet calls for τοῦ instead of τούς before φύλακας, but φύλακας requires the article. παύειν with the infinitive is rare, and means ‘prevent,’ not ‘make to cease’: cf. Hdt. V 67 (with Stein's note) and Ar. Ach. 634 , where Reiske's conjecture πείσας should not be accepted.

πρῶτον μὲν κτλ. A certain measure of communism in property seems to have existed among the Pythagoreans (RP.^{7} p. 43); but there is no reason to suppose that Plato is deliberately borrowing from them here: cf. Steinhart Einleitung p. 179. The main object of Plato is of course to prevent the formation of private interests likely to compete with the claims of public duty. We remark that there has been no hint so far of common wives and children, although Blaschke ( der Zusammenhang d. Fam. u. Gütergemeinschaft d. pl. St. m. d. pol. u. phil. Syst. Platos p. 7) thinks he finds one in 415 A. Cf. 415 D note

ἂν μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη . For ᾖ omitted see II 371 A note The conjecture ἥν for ἄν (Herwerden) is elegant, but superfluous.

τὰ δ) ἐπιτήδεια ‐‐ μισθόν . It is fair that the lower classes should provide the others with the means of leisure, for it is they who ‘reap all the benefit of the laborious training bestowed on the guardians.’ They are the ‘ultimate and capital objects’ of Plato's solicitude. Grote justly adds that “this is a larger and more generous view of the purpose of political institutions than we find either in Aristotle or in Xenophon” (l.c. III p. 213).

ταξαμένους is strangely represented in Schneider's translation by “zu bestimmten Zeiten.” It refers to the fixing of fees or payments in return for services rendered. Cf. Men. 91 B .

ξυσσίτια . A Spartan feature: see Gilbert Gk. Const. Ant. E. T. p. 65. Cf. Laws 762 B ff.

χρυσίον κτλ. So also in Sparta, according to Xen. Rep. Lac. 7. 6; with which cf. Plut. Lys. 19. 6, where the ephors are said to have put to death a friend of Lysander λαβόντες ἀργύριον ἰδίᾳ κεκτημένον. Plato is keenly conscious of the corrupting influence of wealth: see Gorg. 525 D ff., and cf. II 373 E, IV 421 D notes His guardians are φύσει πλουσίω τὰς ψυχάς (VIII 547 B) and need no other riches.

ὑπὸ ‐‐ ἰέναι : as though Wealth communicated a taint, like a murderer sub isdem trabibus ( ὁμωρόφιος). The Greek is much more expressive and picturesque than Apelt's conjecture ὑπὸ τὸν αὑτῶν ὄροφον προσιέναι ( Observ. Cr. p. 11).

σῴζοιντό τ’ ἂν καὶ σῴζοιεν . Cf. 621 B μῦθος ἐσώθη—καὶ ἡμᾶς ἂν σώσειεν. σῴζεσθαι of moral salvation is common in Plato: cf. e.g. VI 492 E, 502 B.

ὁπότε δ) αὐτοὶ ‐‐ ἔσονται . From this sentence it seems clear that the community of goods does not extend to the lower classes, although Aristotle complains that Plato has not said anything precise upon the matter ( Pol. B 5. 1264^{a} 15). Aristotle seems, however, to have understood that they were not to have common wives, for he cynically observes that it would have been better if they had, as then they would have been more divided and less likely to combine against the guardians (ib. 4. 1262^{a} 40 ff.).

καὶ ὁ Ἀδείμαντος κτλ. Adimantus' objection is the dying echo of the view already advocated by Thrasymachus, that a ruler should rule for his own profit: cf. I 343 A, 344 B notes Socrates declines to discuss the question now, because it is irrelevant. In the further account of the communism of the ruling class, the difficulty solves itself. A higher happiness—so we are told— comes from self-victory than from indulgence (V 465 D ff.: cf. IX 583 C note). Compare the conversation of Socrates with Aristippus in Mem. II 1. 17 ff.

μή . On μή with the infinitive after verbs of saying see I 346 E note

δἰ ἑαυτούς : i.e. they have themselves to thank for not being εὐδαίμονες. Cf. V 465 E οὐκ οἶδα ὅτου λόγος ἡμῖν ἐπέπληξεν ὅτι τοὺς φύλακας οὐκ εὐδαίμονας ποιοῖμεν, οἶς ἐξὸν πάντα ἔχειν τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδὲν ἔχοιεν; and Solon 33 1 f. οὐκ ἔφυ Σόλων βαθύφρων οὐδὲ βουλήεις ἀνήρ· | ἐσθλὰ γὰρ θεοῦ διδόντος αὐτὸς οὐκ ἐδέξατο (he of his own initiative refused). διά is used exactly as in I 354 B. This view, which is Ast's, gives an excellent meaning, and Schneider, who at first proposed a subtler explanation, adopts it in his translation (“durch ihre eigene Schuld”). The various conjectures δή, αὐτοῖς ὧν (Stephanus), δὴ αὐτοὺς ὧν (Buttmann), αὐτοὺς δἰ ὧν (Herwerden) need no refutation.

ἄλλοι : not οἱ ἄλλοι (Bekker, Stallbaum, etc.), which might be taken as referring to the lower classes in Plato's State. Plato would not be likely to permit these to have οἰκίαι καλαὶ καὶ μεγάλαι. ἄλλοι means ‘other rulers,’ i.e. rulers in other cities; and κεκτημένοι belongs to οἱ δέ: ‘possessing, like other rulers, lands,’ etc. So Schneider, rightly. For the idiomatic position of οἷον ἄλλοι cf. VII 515 A, 528 B, IX 589 B al.

μισθωτοί is not otiose as Badham supposes. We should translate ‘just like paid auxiliaries.’ The emphasis on μισθωτοί prepares us for Socrates' correction when he says they do not, strictly speaking, even get μισθός.

ἐπισίτιοι . ἐπίσιτοι (which Cobet and Hartman call for) would be more in accordance with the analogy of παράσιτος etc.; but the longer form is established by fragments of comic poets (ap. Ath. VI 246 F—247 A, where ἐπισιτίων in the fragment of Timocles defies emendation).

οἱ ἄλλοι : sc. ἐπίκουροι or mercenaries.

ἀποδημῆσαι . Regulations about ἀποδημία are laid down in Laws 949 E ff.

οἷα δὴ κτλ. For οἷα Hermann once conjectured οἷ: neatly, but οἷ is too precise. οἷα δή= οἷα δὴ ἀναλώματα. With οἱ εὐδαίμονες δοκοῦντες εἶναι cf. III 406 C. It is εὐδαιμονία in the popular sense of ‘having a good time’ which Adimantus complains is denied to the guardians.

οἶμον . A poetic word. Plato is perhaps thinking of some such phrase as Pindar's ἐπέων ο<*>μος ( Ol. IX 47). The ‘way’ is simply that each class must do its own appointed work, if the city is to be a happy and harmonious whole: cf. 423 D.

εἰ καὶ οὗτοι κτλ. καί means ‘as well as the rest of the city.’ Aristotle misrepresents Plato when, in spite of this sentence and V 465 D ff., he says that the guardians are deprived of εὐδαιμονία ( Pol. B 5. 1264^{b} 15 ff., with Susemihl's note). They are happy not only because they triumph over self (465 D), but—like the others—because they do the work to which Nature has called them: cf. I 352 D —354 A.

ὅπως ἕν τι κτλ. Cf. Laws 715 B and Thuc. II 60. 2, where Pericles says ἐγὼ γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι πόλιν πλείω ξύμπασαν ὀρθουμένην ὠφελεῖν τοὺς ἰδιώτας ἢ καθ’ ἕκαστον τῶν πολιτῶν εὐπραγοῦσαν, ἀθρόαν δὲ σφαλλομένην.

ᾠήθημεν ‐‐ σκεψόμεθα . See on II 369 A.

οὐκ ἀπολαβόντες ‐‐ τιθέντες . ἀπολαβόντες is absolute, almost adverbial (cf. Gorg. 495 E ); and ὀλίγους goes with τιθέντες. So Schneider and others rightly explain the construction.

αὐτίκα δὲ τὴν ἐναντίαν κτλ. Here we have the first express promise of Books VIII and IX, although the promise is afterwards fulfilled in an ampler manner than is indicated here. See also 427 D.

ὥσπερ οὖν ἂν ‐‐ μέλανι . Cf. (with J. and C.) Hipp. Maior 290 B. ἀνδριάντας γράφοντας means ‘painting statues of men.’ Cf. Euripides Fr. 764. 2 γραπτοὺς ἐν ἀετοῖσι προσβλέπων τύπους. The question whether statues were ever painted in the best period is an old controversy, the echoes of which have hardly yet died away. Schubart ( Fl. Jahr. 1874, pp. 20 ff.) and others prefer to take ἀνδριάντας merely as ‘likenesses of men,’ but the word was regularly, if not indeed always, used of statues. That the surface of archaic statues was regularly painted is now no longer doubtful: see Gardner Handbook of Greek Sculpture pp. 28 ff. During the best period, in the case of marble or other polished surfaces, the painting was regularly confined to the eyes, eyelids, eyebrows, hair and the like. See on the whole subject Sittl's Arch. der Kunst (in Iwan Müller's Handbuch) pp. 413, 414. μέλανι does not necessarily mean jet black, but only some dark and quiet colour. In point of fact, the eyes of the early marble statues on the Acropolis “are painted with a dark pigment, almost black” (Gardner l.c. p. 30). The use—regular in Greek—of γράφειν for painting is an interesting survival of the time when decorative art was little beyond carving in relief (Sittl l.c. p. 416). The present passage is strangely ignored by Sertorius in his interesting article “Plato und die Malerei” in Arch. f. Gesch. d. Phil. IX pp. 123—148.

ξυστίδας . The name ξυστίς was given to various kinds of purple robes or mantles—among them those worn by kings upon the stage, and by riders in festal processions. The authorities are cited in Müller Gr. Bühnenalt. p. 234 note I. If the Scholiasts on Ar. Clouds 70 and Theocr. II 74 are to be trusted, we should write ξύστιδας, not ξυστίδας.

ἐπὶ δεξιά . Whether we read ἐπιδέξια or ἐπὶ δεξιά the word should be understood as ‘from left to right.’ At a Greek banquet, the guests were always placed ἐπὶ δεξιά, i.e. so that the guest on your right hand occupied a lower place ( ὑποκατακεκλιμένος) than you, and the wine circulated from left to right of the banqueters. See Blümner Privatalt. p. 237 note 7 and Darbishire Relliq. Philol. p. 78. The word suggests a banquet with all the formalities, and heightens the incongruity of the situation, like the purple robes and golden crowns of the farmers. Schneider's exhaustive discussion seems to me conclusive in favour of writing ἐπὶ δεξιά as two words. Casaubon has been followed by most of the editors (except Schneider) in taking ἐπιδέξια as an adverb=‘commode’ (Ast), ‘commode et eleganter’ (Stallbaum etc.), or ‘dexterously,’ ‘cleverly’ (J. and C.); but it may well be doubted if the word could mean ‘commode,’ and ‘dexterously’ is inappropriate. Cf. Darbishire l.c. p. 78 note I. ἐπὶ δεξιά goes with κατακλίναντες and πρὸς τὸ πῦρ (cf. Blaydes on Ar. Ach. 751 ) with διαπίνοντας. The fire is that by which the potters bake their pottery; their workshop has for the nonce become a hall of banqueting.

ἐξ ὧν : i.e. τούτων τῶν σχημάτων ἐξ ὧν. Cf. II 373 E note

καὶ αὖ : rursusque (Ficinus), i.e. sicuti et contra, as Ast observes.

εἰ μὲν οὖν ‐‐ λέγοι . This difficult passage has suffered severely at the hands of critics, but the text is probably nearly, if not quite, sound. If we take the words as they stand in A, they mean, broadly speaking, that if we are making true guardians, and he ( ὁ ἐκεῖνο λέγων means the τις in 419 A) is making something different, he cannot, like ourselves, be speaking of a πόλις, but of something else. This is logical and gives an excellent sense: cf. 422 E εὐδαίμων εἶ— ὅτι οἴει ἄξιον εἶναι ἄλλην τινὰ προσειπει—ν πόλιν ἢ τὴν τοιαύτην οἵαν ἡμεῖς κατεσκευάζομεν. Now we are making guardians in the true sense of the term, such as are least likely to harm the city; whereas the author of the other proposals is making (not guardians, but since he gives them ἀγροί 419 A) a sort of farmers (cf. III 417 B οἰκονόμοι μὲν καὶ γεωργοὶ ἀντὶ φυλάκων ἔσονται) and men who do harm their city, because they “for their bellies' sake, Creep, and intrude and climb into the fold.” The advocates of such a theory must mean something different from a city—something like the “shearers' feast” in Lycidas: cf. I 343 A note γεωργούς is possibly corrupt; if so, I think we should read λεωργούς to contrast with ἥκιστα κακουργούς. The word occurs in the Memorabilia, if not in Plato. See Cl. Rev. X p. 385. Other emendations are enumerated in App. I.

ἐκεῖνο κτλ. : i.e. to pursue the other policy, which we enjoin. ἐκεῖνο does more than merely anticipate ὅπως— ἔσονται.

ἐατέον . The infinitive, which would naturally follow ἐατέον, is ‘drawn into construction’ with ὅπως —ἀποδίδωσι. I once thought of ἑκτέον (i.q. δεῖ ἔχειν, cf. V 468 A), taking the genitive as in πῶς ἔχεις τοῦ μεταλαμβάνειν εὐδαιμονίας; But the MS reading is satisfactory enough.

ὥστε ‐‐ γίγνεσθαι : ‘so that they also become bad.’ These words, though expunged by Hartman, are welcome, if not necessary, in view of κακίων χυτρεὺς γίγνεται and χείρους δὲ αὐτοί in D and E. καὶ indicates that κακοὺς γίγνεσθαι is more than διαφθείρει; and so it is represented in the sequel. The reading of A (see cr. n.) perhaps points to a variant διαφθερεῖ.

πλουτήσας ‐‐ τέχνης . Ar. Plut. 510 —534 (cited by Ast) furnishes an excellent commentary on this text. See also on III 416 E.

παρέχεσθαι is ‘to provide out of his own resources’ (de suo praebere): cf. VIII 554 A. Cobet cancels the word; Herwerden and Hartman prefer πορίζεσθαι, for which there is no MS authority. πορίζεσθαι would imply that the χυτρεύς buys his ὄργανα ready-made from others, whereas παρέχεσθαι expresses no opinion on this point.

διδάξεται . Thompson, Cobet, and others peremptorily call for διδάξει. See however Riddell Digest of Idioms § 87. Riddell conclusively shews (1) that in Men. 93 D ἐδιδάξατο as well as ἐπαιδεύσατο is said of a parent teaching his own son (a passage misunderstood—I think—by Jebb on Soph. Ant. 356 : cf. Men. 93 C ), (2) that ἐδίδαξε is used of a parent getting his sons taught by others in Men. 94 B and 94 D (bis). Another example of the second usage is Prot. 324 D . The fact is that “the Active Voice is quite as susceptible as the Middle of the meaning ‘to get a thing done by another’; neither Voice, however, by any proper inherent force, but in virtue solely of the common principle, that qui facit per alium facit per se,” Riddell. Jebb (l.c.) observes that “once or twice ἐδιδαξάμην is merely ἐδίδαξα with the idea of the teacher's interest superadded”: it may be doubted if “once or twice” is strong enough, but at all events this is the usage here, and in V 467 E. The active διδάσκῃ is appropriately used of teaching others ( ἄλλους κτλ.); in διδάξεται the personal interest reappears, for it is the sons who are the prominent pupils (whence ἢ ἄλλους and not καὶ ἄλλους). Richter's view ( Fl. Jahrb. 1867 p. 147) that διδάξεται denotes the result of the action rather than the action itself is partly true, but it is not the middle which gives it this force. In Ar. Clouds 783 , as Socrates is not Strepsiades' father, we may accept Elmsley's emendation διδάξαιμ’ ἄν for διδαξαίμην without prejudice to the present case.

αὐτοί : viz. οἱ τεχνῖται: see II 377 C note We need not change τεχνῶν to τεχνιτῶν.

ποιοῦντος = ‘producing’ gives a satisfactory sense. Wealth and Poverty are not to be allowed παραδῦναι εἰς τὴν πόλιν, because—we have here the statement of a general law—they are the authors of luxury etc. ἐμποιοῦντος (in Ξ and other MSS) is an obvious ‘emendation,’ though adopted by Stallbaum and others: cf. 444 D.

κακοεργίαν . If the form is right, Plato must intend to draw attention to the etymology of the word. κακουργίαν appears in two or three inferior MSS, and (as ε seems to be written over an erasure) was perhaps the original reading in Paris A.

πολλάκις : not ‘perhaps’ (one of J. and C.'s alternative suggestions) but ‘frequently,’ ‘repeatedly.’ πολλάκις does not mean ‘perhaps,’ except after εἰ, ἐάν, ἵνα, μή and the like: see Ast's lex. Plat. III p. 144 and Heindorf on Phaed. 60 E .

τί δέ; κτλ. ἂν πρεσβείαν κτλ. has for its apodosis οἴει τινὰς κτλ. I have placed a mark of interrogation after τί δέ. The alternatives are to place it after τῶν ἑτέρων, or else to suppose with Ast that the construction is suddenly changed at οἴει. Neither solution is so simple as to write τί δ); Cf. 425 C, 426 A, and (for the elision before a pause) 428 C.

κυσί . In the game of πόλεις, the counters were called ‘Dogs’ (Pollux IX 98). The comparison of our auxiliaries to dogs prepares the way for the allusion in 422 E: where see note. This has been pointed out by Ridgeway ( Journal of Hell. Studies XVI p. 288), who gives illustrations of three ‘dogs’ of this description found in Egypt and now in the British Museum.

εὐδαίμων εἶ κτλ. : ‘you are fortunate to be able to think etc.’: cf. V 450 C. εὐδαίμων is less common in this ironical sense than μακάριος.

ἑκάστη γὰρ κτλ. : ‘for each of them is, as the saying goes, no city, but a-many cities.’ The phrase τὸ τῶν παιζόντων in Plato seems always to mean ‘as they say in the proverb’ or ‘proverbial saying’: see IX 573 C, Laws 780 C, and cf. ib. 723 D. Now it is probable from the position of τὸ τῶν παιζόντων that ἀλλ’ οὐ πόλις forms part of the proverb: so that the whole saying may have run πόλεις μέν εἰσι παμπόλεις, ἀλλ’ οὐ πόλις. (Herwerden, more suo, cancels ἀλλ’ οὐ πόλις, but we have of course no right to take this step.) The form παμπόλεις for πάμπολλαι may be allowed in a pun on πόλεις, especially as the Epic plural of πολύς is sometimes found with feminine nouns. It should be remarked also that the first hand in Paris A wrote πάμπολαι (see cr. n.), though this may be merely accidental. What the ordinary application of the proverb was, we cannot say: presumably it was generally employed, as here by Plato, in speaking of a city divided against itself. The origin of the saying is to be sought in the variety of πεττεία known as πόλεις παίζειν, an expression which, according to the Scholiast on this passage of Plato, as well as Suidas s.v. πόλις, and Hesychius s.v. πόλεις παίζειν, had itself also a proverbial signification. In this game the abacus was divided into 60 spaces, each of which was called πόλις in ancient times (Photius s.v. πόλεις παίζειν ed. Porson. Porson's alteration of ξ/ i.e. 60 into ζ/ is a gratuitous change, as Schneider hints. See also Eustathius on Od. I p. 29. 13 ff., ed. Lips., quoted by Schneider). The name πόλις was moreover sometimes applied to the game itself (Cratinus Δραπετίδες Fr. 3 ed. Meineke καὶ κύνα καὶ πόλιν ἣν παίζουσιν), as well as to the πλινθίον or abacus on which it was played (Pollux IX 98). There is also, I think, some reason for believing that each of the players' sides was called collectively his πόλις. In Susemihl and Hicks Politics of Aristotle p. 148 note, Dr Jackson remarks that the words πάμπολλαι πόλεις, ἀλλ’ οὐ πόλις make it likely “that a compact body of pieces was called πόλις.” If we may go further, and suppose that the whole of a player's side was called his πόλις, the words of Plato δύο μὲν—πολεμία ἀλλἡλαις, ἡ μὲν πενήτων, ἡ δὲ πλουσίων· τούτων δ’ ἐν ἑκατέρᾳ πάνυ πολλαί receive additional point by becoming an exact counterpart of the game. A defeated player, gazing ruefully at his depopulated squares, each of which, as well as the whole of his side, is a ‘city,’ might therefore well exclaim, ‘Cities upon cities, but no city!’ for there can be no city without men ( ἔρημος ἀνδρῶν μὴ ξυνοικούντων ἔσω Soph. O. T. 57 ). I have thought of other possibilities, but this hypothesis as to the origin of the proverb suits the words of Plato better than any other which I can devise. For a different view see Hoffmann in Fl. Jahrb. 1863 pp. 240 ff. Cf. also Meineke Fr. Com. Gr. II pp. 44 f. It should be mentioned that Stewart ( Cl. Rev. VII p. 359) thinks there need be no allusion to the game of πόλεις in this passage, but only a jest about making one into many (cf. Men. 77 A παῦσαι πολλὰ ποιῶν ἐκ τοῦ ἑνός, ὅπερ φασὶ τοὺς συντρίβοντάς τι ἑκάστοτε οἱ σκώπτοντες), while Schneider finds only a “lusus in verbis atque in consociatione singularis et pluralis.” Neither of these suggestions meets the situation.

δύο ‐‐ κἂν ὁτιοῦν ᾖ : ‘two, in any case,’ lit. ‘if there be even anything at all,’ i.e. ‘whatever there be.’ So also Schneider. The subject to ὁτιοῦν ᾖ is impersonal, and not the city, as Jowett seems to suppose.

πολεμία . On this—comparatively rare —termination of the dual feminine in Plato see Roeper de dual. usu Pl. pp. 3 ff. Cf. IX 587 B note

εὐδοκιμεῖν . Stallbaum and others read δοκεῖν with one inferior MS. But εὐδοκιμεῖν is at least equally good: ‘great, I do not say in fame, but great in the true sense of the word “great.”’ σωφροσύνη is a city's truest greatness, not aggression, and “the applauding thunder at its heels. Which men call Fame.”

χιλίων . Aristotle takes this seriously as fixing the number of Plato's ἐπίκουροι ( Pol. B 6. 1265^{a} 9), but it is only the minimum: see 423 B note We hear of constitutions of a thousand very frequently throughout Greek political history, especially in the Greek colonies of Italy; and Plato may have had some of these precedents in his mind, both here and in Pol. 292 E ἐν χιλιάνδρῳ πόλει. See Whibley Gk. Oligarchies pp. 134 ff. By Aristotle's time the ruling Spartans, it is interesting to notice, numbered under 1000 ( Pol. B 9. 1270^{a} 29—31). See Grote Plato III p. 206 note

καὶ πολλαπλασίας is the predicate to δοκούσας, and καί means ‘even.’ So J. and C. rightly.

μέχρι ‐‐ πέρα δὲ μή . The extent to which the city may safely increase beyond 1000 προπολεμοῦντες (and the necessary farmers etc.) is therefore left to the judgment of the guardians. Like every natural organism, it should grow to the limits prescribed for it by nature (cf. 424 A note); but Plato probably conceived of it even in its maturity as relatively small. The regulations about marriage and the interchange between the different classes would be easier to work if the State was not too large. See also on χιλίων in 423 A, and on the general subject Newman's Politics of Aristotle I pp. 313— 315.

μεγάλη δοκοῦσα : ‘seeminggreat’: see 422 E.

ἴσως points the irony, which is continued in φαυλότερον.

πρόσθεν . III 415 B, C notes

ἕκαστον : with ἕνα, not of course with ἔργον, as Hartman seems to suppose. With what follows cf. Laws 847 B ἀναγκαζόντων ἕνα μόνον ἀλλὰ μὴ πολλοὺς εἶναι and infra 443 E.

μία ‐‐ ἀλλὰ μὴ πολλαί . Aristotle's criticism ( Pol. B 2. 1261^{a} 17—^{b} 15) is interesting, but captious. Plato would entirely agree with him that τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς σῴζει τὰς πολιτείας. ‘The reciprocity of services and functions’ between the three classes is the very foundation of Plato's city, which is far from being an undifferentiated unity. It is rather a ἓν ἐκ πολλῶν, the πολλά being the three divisions of the State. See Susemihl and Hicks l.c. I p. 215. φύηται should be noted; unity of this kind is κατὰ φύσιν.

σμικρότερον is still ironical. In what follows Plato speaks his real mind: cf. Laws 813 D.

ἓν μέγα . ἓν balances πολλά: we need but one regulation, ‘the proverbial one great thing, or rather not great, but adequate.’ J. and C. err in translating ἱκανόν “to a sufficient extent”; and Stallbaum in making λεγόμενον “quod dicebamus.” ἓν μέγα is illustrated by J. and C. from Pol. 297 A .

εὖ παιδευόμενοι . Does this refer to the scheme of education already given, or is it a promise of the philosopher's training in Books VI and VII? Krohn takes the former view ( Pl. St. p. 127), and (if we have regard only to the preceding discussion) it must be allowed that this is the natural interpretation of Plato's words. At the same time, it is not easy to see how the musical education of II and III would enable the guardians to grasp such a conception as the community of wives and children. And in the later books Plato expressly declares that the training necessary for the Rulers was inadequately discussed before: see VI 497 C ff., 502 D. For these reasons we must, I think, suppose that Plato when he wrote these words was thinking of the education still to be provided. Cf. also III 414 A.

τήν τε τῶν γυναικῶν κτλ. is the first mention of communism in wives and children. According to an ingenious chorizontic theory, it was this sentence which inspired the Ecclesiazusae of Aristophanes, to whose caricature Plato replies in Book V (Stein de Ar. Eccles. arg. etc. and Brandt Zur Entwick. d. Pl. Lehre v. d. Seelentheilen, p. 6). See on the whole subject App. I to Book V. In γάμων and παιδοποιίας there is a kind of zeugma: for κτῆσιν suits only γυναικῶν. Plato marks the difference by placing τε after τήν and not after τῶν. γάμους (conjectured by Richards) would depend on διόψονται; but διόψονται γάμους καὶ παιδοποιίας is surely an impossible expression.

κοινὰ τὰ φίλων . “Locus brevitatem loquendi paullo insolentiorem habet, quam sic explico: δεῖ πάντα ταῦτα ὅ τι μάλιστα ποιεῖσθαι κοινά, <*>στε κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν κοινὰ τὰ φίλων εἶναι” (Schneider). Hartman's proposal to omit τὰ φίλων has much in its favour. It is more elegant to suggest than quote so familiar a proverb; and the note τὰ φίλων might well have been added by a scribe upon the margin. In V 449 C on the other hand the addition of τὰ φίλων is appropriate and right.

ὀρθότατα κτλ. Adimantus accepts the principle, both here and in V 449 C. The doubts which he expresses later concern not the principle, but the τρόπος τῆς κοινωνίας (ib.). It is obvious that the principle κοινὰ τὰ φίλων might be applied to marriage etc. in a sentimental kind of way, without involving such a kind of community as is afterwards described. As Rettig points out ( Proleg. p. 95 note), Adimantus takes ὅ τι μάλιστα as “in quantum fieri posset maxime.”

ἔρχεται κτλ. : ‘goes on growing like a circle.’ So Schneider, rightly. Others take κύκλος (1) as a hoop or wheel—“goes on with accumulating force like a wheel” (J. and C.), or (2) as an ever-widening circle in ruffled water (Krohn, Herwerden etc.). As to (2), κύκλος cannot mean a circle in water, unless we insert ἐν ὕδατι, which Herwerden has the audacity to do. If we adopt the first solution, we make κύκλος a specific kind of circle: but nothing in the context warrants this. It is also very doubtful if αὐξανομένη can= ‘with accumulating force’: certainly κύκλος αὐξάνεται could not bear this meaning; and to exclude αὐξανομένη from the comparison (as J. and C. also suggest) renders ὥσπερ κύκλος practically otiose. The fact is that the growth of a natural ( κατὰ φύσιν) city is just like the drawing of a circle in Plato's way of thinking. Like a circle it grows and expands, like a circle too, when its zenith is passed, it narrows to the inevitable end. Here it is only the growth which is dwelt upon; but ὥσπερ κύκλος seems to warn us of impending decay and foreshadow Books VIII—IX. For more on this point see my Number of Plato pp. 58—62. αὐξανομένη is ‘growing’ in the widest sense i.e. reaching its full maturity of size and strength and beauty; but in what follows Plato characteristically confines himself to what he conceived to be a city's truest growth, the improvement of the citizens.

τροφὴ γὰρ κτλ. Plato seems therefore to hold that acquired characters can be transmitted to posterity. The general sentiment may be illustrated by the quaint catches sung by choirs of old men, men in their prime, and boys at Sparta: (1) Ἁμὲς πόκ· ἦμες ἄλκιμοι νεανίαι, (2) Ἁμὲς δέ γ’ εἰμές· εἰ δὲ λῇς, πεῖραν λάβε, (3) Ἁμὲς δέ γ’ ἐσσόμεσθα πολλῷ κάρρονες (ap. Plut. Lyc. 21. 3). Cf. V 461 A.

εἰς τὸ γεννᾶν ‐‐ ζῴοις . Cf. V 459 A ff.

τούτου is not intended to anticipate the ὅπως clause, but means— like αὐτό below—our system of education. This is clear from διαφθαρέν, which is the antithesis to σῳζομένη above, and like it, is said of the παιδεία. τὸ μὴ νεωτερίζειν is in loose apposition to αὐτό.

τὴν ‐‐ ἀμφιπέληται . Od. I 351 f. τὴν γὰρ ἀοιδὴν μᾶλλον ἐπικλείουσ’ ἄνθρωποι κτλ. Plato's variant probably points to a different recension; for ἐπιφρονεύουσιν (sic) ἐπακούουσιν in Hesychius seems to refer to the same passage (Schneider). For the sentiment cf. Pind. Ol. 9. 48 αἴνει δὲ παλαιὸν μὲν οἶνον, ἄνθεα δ’ ὕμνων | νεωτέρων, Xen. Cyr. I 6. 38 and many other illustrations in Smyth Greek Melic Poets p. 174.

πολλάκις . 422 C note

τρόπον ᾠδῆς νέον . Pind. Ol. 3. 4 Μοῖσα δ’ οὕτω μοι παρεστάκοι νεοσίγαλον εὑρόντι τρόπον. Pindar would incur Plato's censure for these words.

ὑπολαμβάνειν : i.e. understand such to be the poet's meaning.

μουσικῆς τρόποι . In later musical theory τρόποι was technically used to denote the three varieties of musical composition— νομικός, διθυραμβικός, τραγικός. They were called τρόποι (according to Aristid. Quint. p. 30 Meib.) because they expressed different psychical characters ( διὰ τὸ συνεμφαίνειν πως τὸ ἦθος κατὰ τὰ μέλη τῆς διανοίας), because, in short, they were μιμήματα τρόπων. Plato's μουσικῆς τρόποι need not however be confined to Aristides' three varieties. On the connexion between musical and political changes see Laws 700 A—701 D. The connexion was recognised universally throughout Greece, and particularly at Sparta, where—as Pausanias (III 12. 10) tells us—Timotheus had his lyre confiscated for adding to it four new strings: cf. also Cic. de Leg. II 39. Wherever in the ancient Greek πόλις the conception of the individual is hardly separated from that of the citizen, moral and political changes are believed to go hand in hand; and the effect of music on morality is explained in III 400 D—401 A: cf. Laws 673 A τὰ μὲν τοίνυν τῆς φωνῆς μέχρι τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς ἀρετῆς παιδείαν οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅντινα τρόπον ὠνομάσαμεν μουσικήν. Bosanquet raises the question whether musical innovations are the cause or only the symptoms of political. Plato, I think, regarded them primarily as the cause ( Laws ll.cc.). We can better understand their effect if we remember that they were accompanied by changes not only in rhythm, but also in the quality, ethical and otherwise, of the words sung; and if we also bear in mind the enormous influence of the theatre in Greek life. The latter point is emphasized in this connexion by Plato (ll.cc.) and Aristoxenus (ap. Ath. XIV 31). See on the whole subject Newman's Politics of Aristotle I pp. 359—369 and Nettleship Hellenica pp. 123—130.

φησί ‐‐ Δάμων . III 400 B note

τοίνυν =‘also’: see I 339 D note

φυλακτήριον ‐‐ μουσικῇ . μουσική is at once the vital and the most vulnerable —see next note—part of our State; hence the guard-house must be built in Music. ἐν is quasi-local, as ἐνταῦθά που shews; we shall confuse the metaphor if we suppose (as some have done) that Music is itself the guard-house.

ἡ γοῦν ‐‐ αὕτη . αὕτη is ἡ ἐν μουσικῇ. Madvig's suggestion ταύτῃ should not be accepted; it would make παρανομία ‘lawlessness’ in general, whereas Socrates' reply and Adimantus' next remark shew that only ἡ ἄμουσος παρανομία ( Laws 700 D) is meant. παρανομία is aptly used of heterodoxy in music, thanks to the musical sense of νόμος. Cf. infra 424 E and Shorey in Chicago Studies in Cl. Phil. I p. 222 note 4. The position of αὕτη increases its emphasis.

ἐν παιδιᾶς γε μέρει . Plato is animadverting on the common view that music should be cultivated πρὸς παιδιάν rather than πρὸς παιδείαν. Aristotle allows a threefold use of music—for pastime ( παιδιά), education, and the rational employment of leisure: Pol. Θ 5. 1339^{a} 16 and^{b} 14 ff.

ὑπορρεῖ κτλ. : as a gentle river may become a destructive torrent before its course is ended. The sentence eloquently describes the decay of Athenian music, character, and politics from the simplicity of earlier times, as appears from Laws 700 A—701 D. See also on οἱ πρότερον 425 A. For πολιτείας Hartman would read the singular; but the plural is more forcible. Laws and constitutions are overthrown by the devouring flood. σύν in Plato (as in good Attic generally) is rare; one of its recognised uses is in modal phrases of this kind, especially where (as here and in VI 492 B, VIII 564 C, X 619 B) the style seeks elevation: cf. Lina De praep. usu. Plat. pp. 32 —34 and Mommsen Beiträge z. d. Lehre v. d. Gr. Praep. pp. 376 ff.

ὃ ‐‐ ἐλέγομεν : ‘as we were trying to say at the outset,’ i.e. of this discussion 424 A. No specific reference to an earlier part of the dialogue is intended: at all events II 377 B is not in point. According to Plato παιδιά should—(to borrow a saying of Aristotle's) — παιδεύειν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν—educate children in the spirit of their commonwealth: Laws 798 B ff. Conversely, Aristotle reminds us, education is itself the older boys' rattle ( Pol. Θ 6. 1340^{b} 30). It should be noted that παιδιᾶς (cf. παίξειν in 425 A) refers like παιδιᾶς in D above to music; if music is to be a pastime, it must be one which is ἔννομος. In ἐννομωτέρου and παρανόμου there may also be a play on the musical sense of νόμος: cf. 424 D note

τοιούτων : viz. παρανόμων.

)κείνοις : those whom Adimantus in effect described in 424 D. See also next note.

οἱ πρότερον : ‘their predecessors’ (Jowett), i.e. the predecessors of our citizens. The expression betrays the fact that Plato is now censuring the decay of Athenian manners, as of Athenian music and character in 424 D. In ἐξευρίσκουσιν —πάντα Plato speaks as if his regulations were a programme for the reform of his native city. Cf. Krohn Pl. St. pp. 32, 33.

σιγάς τε ‐‐ τοιαῦτα . Cf. Ar. Clouds 961 —1023. Aristophanes mentions the σιγαὶ τῶν νεωτέρων (963), the ὑπαναστάσεις (993), the γονέων θεραπεῖαι (994, 998), and various details of τοῦ σώματος σχηματισμός (973, 983).

κατακλίσεις means literally ‘settings down,’ i.e. causing or permitting others to sit down, as when the Spartans, for example, in the well-known story, made way for the aged stranger at the Panathenaea (Plut. Apophth. Lac. 52. 235 D). Cf. κατακλίναντες in 420 E and II 363 C. The word—which has been curiously misunderstood—is coupled with ὑπανάστασις also in Arist. Eth. Nic. IX 2. 1165^{a} 28. See also Xen. Mem. II 3. 16. After πρέπει supply σιγᾶν out of σιγάς. The older editors read ὡς for ἅς with several deterioris notae MSS.

καὶ ‐‐ γέ with κουράς marks the transition to a new class of particulars: cf. Crit. 47 B , Gorg. 450 D al. Hartman should not have suggested καὶ—τε. It was the Spartans who laid greatest stress upon the points enumerated here: cf. Xen. Rep. Lac. 3. 5, Plut. Cleom. 9. 1 ( κείρεσθαι τὸν μύστακα καὶ προσέχειν τοῖς νόμοις). See also Xen. Cyr. VIII 7. 10.

οὔτε γάρ ‐‐ νομοθετηθέντα . Plato means that specific enactments are powerless either to produce or to maintain civilities and proprieties of this kind. The flowers of civilisation must bloom naturally, or not at all. With the general sentiment of this passage cf. Isocr. Areop. 41 δεῖν δὲ τοὺς ὀρθῶς πολιτευομένους οὐ τὰς στοὰς ἐμπιμπλάναι γραμμάτων ἀλλ’ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἔχειν τὸ δίκαιον· οὐ γὰρ τοῖς ψηφίσμασιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἤθεσι καλῶς οἰκεῖσθαι τὰς πόλεις.

ὅποι ‐‐ εἶναι : “the bent given by education will determine all that follows” (D. and V.): “wohin einer die Richtung durch die Erziehung bekommen hat, dem auch das folgende entspricht” (Schneider). The sense is satisfactory, nor is the apparent correlation of ὅποι and τοιαῦτα a sufficient reason for impugning the text, as (in common with Dobree and others) I formerly did. ὅπῃ (so Ast with q) would convey the idea of direction more precisely than ὅποι, but as the route is determined by the goal, we may be satisfied. Of the various emendations— ὁποἶ (Heller), ὁποῖος (Stallbaum, who afterwards recanted), ὁποίας (Dobree)— that of Dobree deserves high praise for elegance and point. The meaning would be ‘as is the education from which one starts, so is the sequel’; and for ὁποίας = ἐξ ὁποίας we might compare III 402 A, VII 520 D. I once thought of ὁποία ἄν τις ὁρμὴ ᾖ, but am now content with the text as it stands.

τελευτῶν ‐‐ ἀγαθόν . Cf. 424 A ἐάνπερ ἅπαξ ὁρμήσῃ εὖ, ἔρχεται ὥσπερ κύκλος αὐξανομένη.

οὐκ ἂν ἔτι . On ἔτι see III 412 B note

τί δέ; κτλ. ‘Once more: in heaven's name, said I, these markettroubles about contracts which the different classes of citizens make with one another in the market-place etc.—shall we condescend to make laws about any of them?’ I have placed a mark of interrogation after τί δέ (quid vero?): cf. 422 D note and 426 A. This increases the emphasis on ὦ πρὸς θεῶν: cf. I 332 C ὦ πρὸς Διός, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, εἰ οὖν κτλ. Herwerden puts the pause after τάδε, where it is less suitable; others wrongly omit the word. ταδε (see cr. n.) cannot well be dispensed with: it means ‘these familiar’: cf. III 403 E, and for the omission in A Introd. § 5. Herwerden also cuts out ἀγοραῖα on account of κατ’ ἀγοράν, but the reduplication is quite in Plato's way. The postponement of ἅ throws emphasis on κατ’ ἀγοράν, and thereby helps to contrast ἀγοραῖα ξυμβόλαια with χειροτεχνικά etc.: cf. III 390 B. It is natural to see in this sentence a reference to the judicial and mercantile arrangements of Athens and her empire: see 424 D note

χειροτεχνικῶν κτλ. χειροτεχνικὰ ξυμβόλαια are contracts with builders and the like ( Laws 920 D).

δικῶν λήξεως means simply ‘the bringing of lawsuits’: originally ‘obtaining (by lot) one's rights,’ hence ‘obtaining leave to claim one's rights’ (Meier and Schömann Att. Process pp. 790—794). The reading λήξεις (see cr. n.) cannot be defended.

θέσεις : not ‘the imposition of taxes’ (L. and S.), but ‘the payments,’ as πράξεις is ‘the exactions.’

τὸ παράπαν means ‘in general,’ ‘generally.’ τὸ πάμπαν (see cr. n.) is never (I believe) so used, not even in Tim. 64 E cited by Baiter. Regulations on nearly all the points here specified are laid down in the Laws: on ξυμβόλαια 913 A ff., 920 D ff., on λοιδορία 934 E ff., on αἰκεία (unprovoked assault) 879 B ff., on δικῶν λῆξις 949 C, on δικαστῶν κατάστασις 767 A ff., 956 B ff., on ἀστυνόμοι and ἀγορανόμοι 763 C ff. There is no taxation in the city of the Laws (847 B).

καλοῖς κἀγαθοῖς . Cf. VI 489 E note

ὅσα δεῖ νομοθετήσασθαι shews that Plato does not wish to leave all these matters undefined by legislation; but the legislation is to come from the guardians he has educated. One reason is that laws on matters of this kind can never be final: cf. Laws 769 D. If the guardians are true to the spirit of Plato's commonwealth, they will easily frame such minor regulations, and re-adjust them—should it prove necessary—from time to time. The effort to obtain finality ( οἰόμενοι ἐπιλήψεσθαι τοῦ βελτίστου) in such matters is foredoomed to failure (cf. 426 E), and no one makes it, until he has forgotten the real foundation of a nation's greatness, and lost his sense of the proportion of things. This is Plato's meaning.

πλήν γε κτλ. If the text is sound we must take πλήν γε as πλήν γε ὅτι (which H. Wolf was wishful to restore) and καί before ἀεὶ ἐλπίζοντες as= idque (with Stallbaum), unless we supply διάγουσι or the like by a sort of zeugma after ἐλπίζοντες. As regards καὶ ἀεὶ ἐλπίζοντες, J. and C. hold that the participle is resumed from ἰατρευόμενοι; but the effect of this interpretation is very harsh, because ἰατρευόμενοι goes so closely with οὐδὲν περαίνουσι as almost to form a single expression. It is not ‘they make no advance, submitting to a cure and always hoping,’ but ‘they make no advance under treatment.’ The troublesome καί before ἐλπίζοντες is omitted by some inferior MSS, is dotted in q, and apparently erased in Ξ. I once conjectured ποιοῦντες, comparing Critias 109 B πλὴν οὐ—βιαζόμενοι, but it is perhaps safer to acquiesce in the MS reading. Dümmler ( Chron. Beitr. pp. 9—11) believes that Isocrates Antid. 62 expressly alludes to this passage. Isocrates at all events censures τοὺς ἐπιπλήττοντας τοῖς νῦν ἁμαρτανομένοις in words that might easily refer to Plato. See also on 426 C.

αὐτῶν ‐‐ μεθύων . On the plural passing into the singular see I 347 A note

τοιοῦτον . Cf. III 388 D note

προαγορεύουσι κτλ. Athens is plainly in Plato's mind. The Athenians carefully guarded their constitution by means of the γραφὴ παρανόμων and the εἰσαγγελία (see Gilbert's Gk. Const. Ant. E.T. pp. 299, 304 ff.); but nowhere were ψηφίσματα so common, and in these the demagogue found a wide field for exercising the arts of flattery and insinuation. Cf. Gilbert Beiträge zur innern Gesch. Athens pp. 73—93. With ἀποθανουμένους ὅς cf. III 411 C note, VIII 566 D ( πάντας ᾧ ἂν περιτυγχάνῃ).

ὃς δ’ ἂν σφᾶς κτλ. Dümmler (l.c.) takes this to be Isocrates, who is also—so he thinks—satirised in the similar passage VI 493 A ff., and elsewhere. If so, σοφὸς τὰ μεγάλα, οἴονται τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πολιτικοὶ εἶναι, and ἢ οἴει—περὶ αὑτοῦ (D, E) are sufficiently true and scathing. We must however observe that Plato is describing a type, and the type is that of the demagogue rather than the merely academic and sophistical rhetorician, as appears from δεινὸς ᾖ ἀποπληροῦν and 426 E. These two types are cast in similar moulds; and Dümmler may be right in supposing that Plato thought of Isocrates as he wrote this satire, and pointed his shafts accordingly. If so, they hit the mark, and rankled, as it was natural they should. Isocrates apparently attempts a reply in his Antidosis (Dümmler l.c. p. 9).

οὗτος ἄρα ‐‐ ἔσται . To insert ὡς after οὗτος (as Richards proposes) would spoil the effect, and be grammatically awkward. Plato wishes to suggest the language of a proclamation ‘he shall be a good man and true,’ etc. ἄρα is enough (as Hartman notes) to mark the indirect: cf. II 358 C note

ἀνδρείας ‐‐ εὐχερείας : ‘courage and complaisance.’ εὐχέρεια is not ‘dexterity (L. and S., with the English translators), a meaning which the word never bears in Plato; but ‘facilitas,’ ‘humanitas,’ kind, obliging behaviour. “Herzhaftigkeit und Gutmüthigkeit,” Schneider, rightly.

τετράπηχυς : ‘a six-footer.’ Dümmler (l.c.) questions this word, without saying why. It is more appropriate than a word expressing greater height; especially if any personal allusion is intended. Isocrates was not an intellectual giant, nor would even his applauding contemporaries (I think) have called him so.

οὐκ αὖ ‐‐ τοῦτό γε : sc. οἴομαι. The point of αὖ is that Adimantus returned an affirmative answer last time (426 D). οὐκ ἄν, which is generally read, has not sufficient authority, and is difficult to justify. For οὐκ αὖ cf. III 393 D and infra 442 A.

πάντων χαριέστατοι . To this perhaps Isocrates replies in Antid. 62 χαριέντως μὲν εἰρῆσθαι ταῦτα φήσουσι, τὸ γὰρ εὖ φθονήσουσιν εἰπεῖν (Dümmler l.c.).

νομοθετοῦντες κτλ. It improves the rhetorical effect to treat all the participles as coordinate, instead of making the first two dependent on the third, or the third subordinate to them. For this reason I have placed a comma after ἐπανορθοῦντες.

οὔτ) ‐‐ ᾤμην ἄν : ‘I should not have thought so’ were it not for these great authorities. Jowett misses the irony by neglecting the tense (‘I conceive that the true legislator will not trouble himself,’ etc.). τὸν ἀληθινὸν νομοθέτην and κἂν ὁστισοῦν εὕροι would strike home, if Isocrates is meant.

ἀνωφελῆ ‐‐ ἐπιτηδευμάτων . For ἀνωφελῆ Ξ has ἀνωφελές, an obvious ‘correction.’ The plural, as Schneider observes, is supported by τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν (where αὐτῶν is also neuter). ὅτι after τὰ δέ has been called in question by Stallbaum and Hartman. Taken strictly, it must depend on a verbal notion supplied out of πραγματεύεσθαι (Stallbaum) or κἂν ὁστισοῦν εὕροι; but in a halfadverbial phrase like τὰ δέ, we should not pry too closely into the grammatical construction. The effect is exactly like the English ‘because some of them, etc., in other cases, because,’ etc.

τί οὖν κτλ. With this section of the Republic we should compare V 461 E, 469 A, VII 540 C, and Laws 738 B ff. Plato would fain be no iconoclast: his object is to purify, rather than to abolish, the old religion. He tries, in short, to put new wine into old bottles. In particular, when he makes Apollo preside at the foundation of his city ( οἰκίζοντές τε πόλιν οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ πεισόμεθα), he is acting in accordance with the universal custom of the Greeks, who consulted the oracle at Delphi before planting colonies, and revered him as the universal ἀρχηγέτης and οἰκιστής (Preller Gr. Myth. p. 269). It is equally in harmony with Hellenic, and especially Athenian, usage to refer all matters of public worship to Apollo: see on 427 C. Delphi was the abiding centre of Greek religious and political unity; and it is therefore right that a Greek city (V 470 E), one of whose objects is to promote unity and comity among Greeks (ib. 469 B ff.), should attach itself to Apollo.

τῷ μέντοι Ἀπόλλωνι κτλ. Cf. Mem. I 3. 1 (of Socrates) φανερὸς ἦν καὶ ποιῶν καὶ λέγων, ᾗπερ ἡ Πυθία ἀποκρίνεται τοῖς ἐρωτῶσι, πῶς δεῖ ποιεῖν ἢ περὶ θυσίας ἢ περὶ προγόνων θεραπείας ἢ περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν τοιούτων. The answer of the priestess was ‘Serve the gods νόμῳ πόλεως’ (l.c. and IV 3. 16). The spirit in which we worship matters, rather than whom or how we worship. So large and tolerant a sentiment is worthy of the Delphic priesthood and of Plato.

τελευτησάντων τε . See cr. n. Asyndeton is indefensible here. We must either with all the editors (except J. and C.) read τε, or add καί after θεραπεῖαι.

ἐξηγητῇ ‐‐ πατρίῳ . πατρῴῳ instead of πατρίῳ is called for by Ast on slight MS authority. Ἀπόλλων was ancestor of the Ionians, being father of Ion ( Euthyd. 302 D ), and was worshipped by them as Ἀπόλλων πατρῷος (Preller Gr. Myth. p. 272). But (as Schneider observes) “Socrates hic non magis quam alibi in his libris tanquam Atheniensis loquitur, sed tanquam Graecus. Graecis autem omnibus πάτριος, hoc est, a maioribus traditus harum rerum arbiter et interpres erat Delphicus Apollo.” An allusion to the special connexion of Ionians with Apollo would be out of place, particularly as πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις follows. In Athens the ἐξηγηταί formed a college of three members, charged with religious duties. According to Schöll (in Hermes VI pp. 36 ff.) the members were partly chosen by Apollo in his capacity of πάτριος ἐξηγητής; apparently the Athenians chose nine, out of whom three were selected—one from each triad —by the representatives of the god: whence their designation πυθόχρηστοι. It is on this model that Plato perhaps frames his regulations in Laws 759 D.

πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις . Delphi is then a religious centre, not for Greeks only, but for all mankind. It was certainly the nearest approach to such a centre that antiquity provided, for it commanded the homage of barbarians as well as Greeks. See Middleton Journ. of Hell. Studies IX p. 308. Middleton cites Livy XXXVIII 48. 2 “commune humani generis oraculum,” Cicero pro Font. 30 “oraculum orbis terrae,” and gives examples of the offerings paid by foreigners at Apollo's shrine. Even now, perhaps, Plato would deny that the oracle is dumb, though—true to its own principle of worshipping νόμῳ πόλεως—it speaks through other voices, and of other gods. See also on V 470 C.

ἐν μέσῳ ‐‐ ἐξηγεῖται . Cf. Eur. Ion 5 , 6 ὀμφαλὸν | μέσον καθίζων Φοῖβος ὑμνῳδεῖ βροτοῖς. The ὀμφαλός was “a conical mass of ‘white marble or stone’” (Paus. X 16) in the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi, “said to mark the centre of the earth.” Two gold eagles stood at its sides, representing the eagles which, according to the legend, met there, having been despatched simultaneously by Zeus from the extreme East and West of the world (Strabo IX 3. 6). The ὀμφαλός is frequently represented as the seat of Apollo ( ἐπὶ τοῦ ὀμφαλοῦ καθήμενος), “especially upon coins, when he is represented in the character of the giver of oracles”: see for example ImhoofBlumner and P. Gardner in J. H. S. VIII p. 18, and Plate LXXIV vii. Middleton, on whose article “The Temple of Apollo at Delphi” (cited above) this note is chiefly based, thinks “the word ὀμφαλός was probably derived from ὀμφή, a voice, because the divine voice was heard there.” If this is true, the legends associating the shrine with the ‘navel’ or centre of the earth may be due to popular etymology. ὀμφαλός, ‘navel,’ is an Indo-Germanic word (Brugmann Grundriss II p. 187). Herwerden's excision of the words ἐν μέσῳ betrays ignorance of what the ὀμφαλός really was. See also Frazer on Paus. l.c.

αὐτός τε καὶ ‐‐ παρακάλει . For the idiom cf. (with Schneider) Phaedr. 253 B μιμούμενοι αὐτοί τε καὶ τὰ παιδικὰ πείθοντες.

ποῦ ἡ ἀδικία . If our city is τελέως ἀγαθή (427 E), it is useless to look for ἀδικία in it. On this difficulty see II 369 A note

πότερον . Herwerden's ποτέραν is quite unnecessary, as Hartman shews; cf. 428 A, 433 D, 434 C, 445 B, V 449 D.

ἐάν τε λανθάνῃ κτλ. recalls II 367 E.

ὡς οὐχ ὅσιον ‐‐ τρόρῳ : II 368 B, C.

σοφή ‐‐ δικαία . This is apparently the earliest passage in Greek literature where the doctrine of four cardinal virtues (if by cardinal virtues we mean those which make up the sum of perfect goodness) is expressly enunciated. The doctrine may of course be Pythagorean, but evidence is wanting, and it is doubtful whether Pindar's τέσσαρες ἀρεταί Nem. III 74 are to be interpreted as the cardinal virtues: see Bury ad loc. The nearest approach to the doctrine before Plato is in Xen. Mem. III 9. 1 —5 (as Krohn has pointed out Pl. St. p. 372), with which compare IV 6. 1—12, where Justice, Wisdom, and Courage are named, as well as other virtues, including εὐσέβεια. Cf. also Aesch. Sept. 610 σώφρων δίκαιος ἀγαθὸς εὐσεβὴς ἀνήρ. From other passages in Plato, none of which are so precise and technical as this, it would seem that ὁσιότης made a good fight for a fifth place: Prot. 329 C , Lach. 199 D , Men. 78 D , Gorg. 507 B . In Phaed. 69 C and Laws 631 C σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρεία and φρόνησις (not σοφία) are named together, without ὁσιότης, which in the Euthyphro (12 D ff.) is a subdivision of δικαιοσύνη. From Adimantus' ready assent (cf. V 476 A note), we may reasonably infer that the doctrine of four cardinal virtues was already a familiar tenet of the Platonic school. Schleiermacher thinks it may have been taken over “aus dem allgemeinen Gebrauch” ( Einleitung p. 26). There is however no evidence to shew that these four virtues and no others were regarded as the essential elements of a perfect character before Plato. If the theory was originated by Plato himself, it is possible enough that in restricting the number to four, Plato was not uninfluenced by the sacred character of the number four in Pythagoreanism, just as Aristotle has been supposed to have limited his categories to ten on similar grounds. An interesting conjecture is suggested by the remarks of Schleiermacher (l.c. p. 21). Our city is ex hypothesi perfectly virtuous. Its constituent elements are Rulers, Auxiliaries, Farmers and Artisans. Now the virtues which are exhibited in the lives and mutual relationship of these classes are, as Plato holds, Wisdom, Courage, Temperance, and Justice. Consequently these virtues are the component factors of moral perfection; in other words they are the cardinal virtues. We may admit that there is no petitio principii in such a method of investigation, which is, in fact, akin to the perfectly legitimate method described in Men. 86 E : cf. also V 458 A. If this suggestion is correct, the doctrine of four cardinal virtues will be directly descended from the arrangements of Plato's ideal city. But it is clear from what Plato himself says, both here and in 429 A, 430 D, 432 B, 433 B f., that the doctrine is already an accepted part of his ethical system, and not merely a provisional hypothesis which is intended to be confirmed by what follows. For the relative value and importance of the four cardinal virtues in Plato's way of thinking see Laws 630 D ff.

οὐκοῦν ‐‐ ηὑρημένον . Essentially the same method is used by Aristotle to reach his conclusion that virtue is a ἕξις ( Eth. Nic. II 4). Cf. also (with J. and C.) Lys. 216 D , E. Jowett observes that the true function of “this half-logical, halfmathematical method of residues” is in dealing with “abstract quantity” and “the laws of Nature.” It is undeniable that this method is much more likely to lead us astray in ethics than in mathematics or the natural sciences, owing to the nature of the subject; but it is valid if our analysis of the phenomena is exhaustive and exact. A similar method was frequently employed in the Eleatic school: see II 380 D note Plato not unfrequently extends the methods of mathematical reasoning beyond what we should consider their proper sphere: the whole of the preliminary studies, for example, in Book VII are to be pursued according to the methods of pure mathematics. See on VII 528 E ff. and the Appendix to Book VII “On the propaedeutic studies of the Republic.”

ὥσπερ τοίνυν ‐‐ αὐτῶν . For the logically superfluous (though welcome) αὐτῶν cf. II 375 E, infra 439 B, VIII 558 A, and Heindorf on Gorg. 482 D . Theaet. 155 E is a much harsher example, and has often been emended. The apodosis to the ὥσπερ clause is contained in οὐκοῦν— ζητητέον.

οὐκ ἄλλο ἔτι ἦν . On ἔτι (i.e. “after the other three were found” J. and C.) see III 412 B note

αὐτῷ . A corrector in q wrote αὐτῇ, which Schleiermacher preferred. Hartman suggests αὐτοῖς. αὐτῷ is, however, not the city, but simply ‘the matter,’ ‘the subject under discussion’; an idiomatic usage for which cf. I 339 E note For the neuter κατάδηλον cf. 427 D note Hartman's κατάδηλος is unnecessary.

σοφία as here described means φρόνησις—so it is called in 433 B, C— in its application to politics, not metaphysical knowledge of the Idea of Good. It deliberates for the good of the whole city (428 D), but the good is not yet elevated to the rank of an Idea. This point has been rightly emphasized by Krohn ( Pl. St. pp. 40, 362), who points out the essentially Socratic character of this virtue, comparing Xen. Mem. I 2. 64 and IV 1. 2 (a sentiment of which Books II—IV of the Republic are an amplification and exposition in detail). See also Prot. 352 B and Laws III 689 B. Commentators before Krohn (Steinhart for example Einleit. p. 185, and Susemihl Gen. Entw. II p. 153) did not sufficiently grasp the almost exclusively political character of σοφία here, although it is expressly dwelt upon by Plato throughout, and particularly in 429 A. I say ‘almost,’ because here, as elsewhere, Plato, as his manner is, contrives to drop some hints preparing us for a still higher conception of the virtue of the guardians. See on 429 C and 442 C.

ἄτοπον : because it is its smallest section which makes the whole city wise (428 E).

εὔβουλος . εὐβουλία was primarily a political virtue: see on I 348 D.

βουλευομένην . Heindorf's emendation (see cr. n.), which is accepted by Ast, Stallbaum, Baiter and Hartman, appears to me certain for these reasons. First, in τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ χαλκοῦ ἤ τινα ἄλλην τῶν τοιούτων below we must understand ἐπιστήμην βουλευομένην, so that βουλευομένην and not βουλευομένη must have been written before. Secondly, if we read βουλευομένη, we must write (with Hermann etc. and a few inferior MSS) ᾗ for ἥ before οὐχ ὑπὲρ τῶν below. Schneider retains βουλευομένη, but understands βουλευομένην before ἐπιστήμην— an indefensible construction, which Laws 807 C (to which he appeals in Addit. p. 31) in no way justifies.

τὴν ὑπὲρ ‐‐ τοιούτων . For the carrying on of the preposition (here διά) cf. (with Schneider) Phaed. 64 D ἐσπουδακέναι περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καλουμένας τὰς τοιάσδε, οἷον σιτίων κτλ. Ἥκιστά γε κτλ. Τί δέ; τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων;

ὅντιν) ἂν ‐‐ ὁμιλοῖ. ἄν cannot, I think, be dispensed with here. It is better to insert it after ὅντινα than (with Baiter) after ἄριστα, for (as Schneider shews by many examples) ἄν likes to attach itself to the relative in sentences of this kind. The political wisdom here described is akin to the βασιλικὴ τέχνη of Euthyd. 291 C ff. and elsewhere, as well as to Aristotle's view of πολιτική as the architectonic art ( Eth. Nic. I 1. 1094^{b} 27 with Stewart's note). It knows what is good and evil, and legislates for the other arts, but the good which it knows is a political and moral conception, not (as yet) the metaphysical Idea of Book VI.

νῦν δή . III 414 B ( φύλακας παντελεῖς).

τί τὴν πόλιν προσαγορεύεις . It should be noted that ‘wise’ (to confine ourselves for the present to the virtue of wisdom) is used (1) of the rulers in the State and the λογιστικόν in man, (2) of the city and the individual as wholes: cf. 441 D ff. Which of these two meanings is intended to be original and primary? This subject is admirably discussed by Hirzel Hermes VIII pp. 379 ff., who shews that the wisdom of the rulers and the λογιστικόν is the fundamental one: cf. Arist. Top. V 8. 138^{b} 1 ff., where τὸ πρῶτον φρόνιμον is said to be ἴδιον λογιστικοῦ. The same, mutatis mutandis, holds good of Courage; and also, though with a difference, of Temperance and Justice. In calling the whole city wise because the rulers are wise, Plato is influenced by its analogy with the individual man, whom we readily and easily call wise, although strictly speaking he is wise only by reason of the λογιστικόν within him. Comparing 443 C ff., we observe that the city is wise because its rulers are wise, and its rulers are wise because their λογιστικόν is wise. In other words the wisdom of the λογιστικόν is the unit out of which the wisdom of the whole city is constructed. See on 443 B ff.

πότερον οὖν . See cr. n. We have still to explain τι ἄτοπον in 428 B, for Adimantus' τί has not yet been answered. For this reason οὖν after πότερον is welcome, if not (as Schneider thinks) indispensable.

πολὺ ‐‐ χαλκέας . Cf. II 379 C note

ὅλη σοφὴ κτλ. The subject is πόλις κατὰ φύσιν οἰκισθεῖσα, ‘a city founded in accordance with Nature.’ On κατὰ φύσιν see II 370 A note

ἣν μόνην ‐‐ σοφίαν καλεῖσθαι . Pfleiderer ( Zur Lösung d. Pl. Frage pp. 46 ff.) compares Symp. 209 A ff. πολὺ δὲ μεγίστη—καὶ καλλίστη τῆς φρονήσεως ἡ περὶ τὰς τῶν πόλεών τε καὶ οἰκήσεων διακοσμήσεις, ᾗ δὴ ὄνομά ἐστι σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη. The difference in phraseology does not obscure the essential kinship of the two passages.

ὁ νομοθέτης ‐‐ παιδείᾳ . The δόξα is then prescribed by the legislator (i.e. in Plato's city, by Plato, cf. ὑπὸ νόμου below, νομίμου in 430 B, and σὺ ὁ νομοθέτης in VI 497 D), not by the rulers from time to time. It is important to notice this point, because it shews that the rulers are not here, as in a certain sense they are in VI—VII, in the position of the original legislator: see VI 497 C note Cf. however III 414 A note and infra 442 C note

ποίαν δὴ σωτηρίαν ; ποίαν expresses incredulity and wonder, which δή saves from falling into contempt. See I 330 A note On the definition of courage given here see 430 C note

γεγονυίας . Cf. γεγονυῖαν in 430 B.

αὐτῆς σωτηρίαν . See cr. n. αὐτήν of the MSS must mean either (1) the σωτηρία or (2) ἀνδρεία (so Hartman). In either case the αὐτήν which follows has a different antecedent viz. τὴν περὶ τῶν δεινῶν δόξαν, so that the sentence becomes both awkward and obscure. Moreover, in whichever way we understand αὐτήν, the MSS leave us with three accusatives ( αὐτήν, σωτηρίαν and the clause introduced by τό), the precise relationship of which is far from clear. Various suggestions have been made to escape these difficulties. Instead of αὐτήν Jackson suggests αὖ τήν ( J. Ph. IV p. 148); while Stallbaum and others read τῷ (eo quod) for τό, before which Hartman for his part wishes to insert διά. Hermann and Baiter cut the knot by expunging both αὐτήν and σωτηρίαν. Jackson's remedy is the simplest, but αὖ creates a difficulty. The new point in the explanation which he supposes it to mark is, I think, emphasized too much by αὖ; nor indeed is it quite easy to separate αὖ from ἔλεγον. I believe Plato wrote αὐτῆς. The words διὰ παντὸς αὐτῆς σωτηρίαν recall and correspond exactly to ἣ διὰ παντὸς σώσει τὴν περὶ τῶν δεινῶν δόξαν, and to 430 B σωτηρίαν διὰ παντὸς δόξης κτλ., and the meaning is ‘by preserving it perpetually I meant preserving it throughout when one is in pains and in pleasures’ etc. Grammatically, the infinitives are the direct object of ἔλεγον (‘I called’), and διὰ παντὸς αὐτῆς σωτηρίαν is its secondary object. The presence of αὐτῆς σωτηρίαν is necessary to correspond to διασῴζεσθαι αὐτήν, but διὰ παντὸς takes the first place, because it is the phrase requiring elucidation. The corruption of αὐτῆς to αὐτήν is of a piece with that of γεγονυίας to γεγονυῖαν (see cr. n.) and its all but inevitable consequence. The correction printed above is accepted by a reviewer of my Text of the Republic in Hermathena XXIV p. 252.

λύπαις ‐‐ φόβοις . III 412 E ff.

ἁλουργά =‘purple’: see Tim. 68 B , with Archer-Hind's note. Herwerden cuts out ὥστ’ εἶναι, but without these words the wool which we are dyeing would be purple, whereas it is white, and we are making it purple. See on ἐάν τε καὶ ταῦτα in E.

πρῶτον μὲν κτλ. As far as concerns the language and grammatical construction of this passage it is clear that the object of ἐκλέγονται should be the same as that of προπαρασκευάζουσιν, θεραπεύσαντες, and βάπτουσι, and identical with the subject of δέζεται. Now the object of βάπτουσι is the wool selected to be dyed; it is therefore the wool which is subjected to προπαρασκευή, and consequently white substances of wool are meant by μίαν φύσιν τὴν τῶν λευκῶν (so also Blümner Technologie etc. I pp. 221 ff.). That this interpretation is right, appears also from the application of the simile. The guardians are the white woollen substances specially selected (note ἐξελεγόμεθα 429 E), their education is the προπαρασκευή; and the δόξα περὶ δεινῶν κτλ. is the dye. This is expressly pointed out in 429 E—430 A. τοσούτων is strictly in point, for woollen substances may be of any colour, since they may have been already dyed. Plato informs us that dyers selected white woollen substances when they wished to impart a lasting purple hue. Cf. Tim. 50 D , E. The προπαρασκευή included the process called στύψις, i.e. steeping the wool in an astringent solution ( πρόστυμμα) to make it take the dye better (Arist. de Col. 4. 794^{a} 29 and Probl. XXII 11. 931^{a} 13 ff. προβρέχουσιν ἐν τοῖς στρυφνοῖς τῷ διεργασθὲν μᾶλλον δέχεσθαι τὴν βαφήν: cf. also Theoph. de Odor. 17 ὑποστύφουσι γὰρ πᾶν εἰς τὸ δέξασθαι μᾶλλον τὴν ὀσμὴν ὥσπερ τὰ ἔρια εἰς τὴν βαφήν). Aristotle uses a metaphor from dyeing in a similar way in Eth. Nic. II 2. 1105^{a} 3. Cf. also Cicero Hortens. Fr. 62 ed. Nobbe “ut ei qui combibi purpuream volunt, sufficiunt prius lanam medicamentis quibusdam, sic litteris talibusque doctrinis ante excoli animos et ad sapientiam concipiendam imbui et praeparari decet,” and see on the whole subject Blümner l. c. I pp. 221 ff., 238 ff.

θεραπεύσαντες . If the text is sound, we must suppose either that two processes of preparation are alluded to, viz. θεραπεία and προπαρασκευή; or else that θεραπεύσαντες is used for θεραπεύοντες. The first alternative is inadmissible: for προθεραπεύσας in E shews that the θεραπεία and προπαρασκευή are identical. As for the second, Schneider remarks “aoristum ipsum pro praesenti positum vix credo.” There are some instances in which “an aorist participle denoting that in which the action of a verb of past time consists may express time coincident with that of the verb, when the actions of the verb and the participle are practically one” (Goodwin MT. p. 52: cf. Kühner Gr. Gr. II pp. 161 ff.), but as προπαρασκευάζουσιν is a verb of present or universal time, Goodwin's rule is inapplicable here. Hartman ejects the participle, and Schneider is anxious to read θεραπεύοντες. In my edition of the Text, I had recourse to transposition, and placed θεραπεύσαντες before οὕτω δή (‘and they do not dip the wool till they have finished dressing it’). It is, however, safer to adhere to the MSS and regard θεραπεύσαντες as one of those ‘timeless aorists,’ of which many examples are quoted by F. Carter in Cl. Rev. V pp. 4 ff. The MS reading is supported not only by Stobaeus ( Flor. 43. 97), but also (as Jackson has pointed out to me) by Theo Smyrnaeus de utilit. math. p. 13 ed. Hiller.

τὸ ἄνθος : the colour, as appears from Arist. de Col. l. c. 794^{a} 34 et al. Though it is used of purple here, it was not confined to purple: see on VIII 557 C.

δευσοποιὸν ‐‐ βαφέν . δευσοποιόν· ἔμμονον καὶ δυσαπόπλυτον (Timaeus Lex. s. v. δευσοποιόν, where Ruhnken illustrates the word very fully). The point of course is that such προπαρασκευή rendered the colour proof against washing. δευσοποιός, ἀνέκπλυτος, and μόνιμος were constantly used in connexion with dyeing: see Blümner l. c. I p. 221 notes The words τὸ βαφέν are bracketed by Herwerden; but ὃ ἄν is not ‘quod,’ but ‘si quid’ (Schneider).

ῥυμμάτων . ῥύμματα is the generic word for detergents of any kind (Blümner Privatalt. p. 214 note 1): cf. παντὸς ἄλλου ῥύμματος 430 B.

ἐάν τε καὶ ταῦτα . ταῦτα is τὰ λευκά i.e. white substances: cf. τῶν λευκῶν in D above. Even white wool, unless specially prepared, will not retain the dye when it is dipped: much less other colours. This is the force of καί in καὶ ταῦτα. The words ἄλλα χρώματα refer to the colour of the wool which is dipped, not to the colour of the dye, as Herwerden supposes when he calls for τοῦτο: cf. note on ὥστ’ εἶναι in D above.

ἔκπλυτα καὶ γελοῖα : a sort of hendiadys: cf. VIII 558 A θεσπεσία καὶ ἡδεῖα. Stallbaum's suggestion ἀγελαῖα for γελοῖα is itself γελοιότερον. For τοιοῦτον cf. III 388 D note

ἐκπλύναι . Not ἐκπλύνοι (with Herwerden); for the action of ἐκπλύναι is more rapid than that of γίγνοιτο.

χαλεστραίου κτλ. χαλεστραῖον λίτρον (or νίτρον, but λίτρον is the Attic form) came from Χαλέστρα, a lake and city in Macedonia. λίτρον is supposed to be ‘native carbonate of soda’: see Blaydes on Ar. Frogs 712 . The spelling χαλεστραῖον is established (as against χαλαστραῖον in Tim. Lex. s. v. and the Scholiast) by Hdt. VII 123 ( χαλέστρα) and other authorities quoted by Schneider. κονία as appears from ψευδολίτρου κονίας in Ar. l. c. was a preparation of λίτρον, whence Plato couples them here. See on the subject generally Dict. Ant. I p. 881.

παντὸς ἄλλου ῥύμματος is cancelled by Badham and others. It is difficult however not to feel that something is wanted to balance χαλεστραίου and κονίας, especially as these are two specific detergents of the same class. Further, without παντὸς ἄλλου ῥύμματος Plato would probably have written καὶ λύπη κτλ. The sentence as it stands rings Platonic; nor was παντὸς ἄλλου ῥύμματος at all likely to be added by a scribe. The words were also in the text used by Stobaeus and Theo Smyrnaeus: see Flor. 43. 97 and de utilit. math. p. 14. I suggest the following interpretation. The action of pleasure differs from that of pain, fear, and desire, in being more gentle, and less violent ( βίαιος). Pleasure in short relaxes ( χαλᾷ) while pain (of which fear and desire as such are both varieties) contracts: cf. III 411 A on the effect of γλυκεῖαι ἁρμονίαι, Tim. 66 C and Stallbaum on Phil. 46 D . Now χαλεστραίου suggests χαλᾶν, and it is probably for this reason that Plato compares pleasure to it. Such a play on words is quite in Plato's manner: cf. Prot. 361 D . If we suppose that other ῥύμματα were harder, and less agreeable in their action, the point of comparing pain etc. with ‘every other detergent’ will appear.

τὴν ὀρθὴν δόξαν has been questioned, on the ground that beasts cannot have ὀρθὴ δόξα. It was no doubt a feeling of this kind which gave birth to the reading αὐτήν for ὀρθήν in some inferior MSS. Herwerden employs his favourite remedy of excision; and other equally unsatisfactory remedies will be found in Hartman. The text is quite sound. True opinion is in Plato the basis of action done in ignorance of what is right but in obedience to an authority which knows. A dog and a slave act from true opinion as often as they obey a master who orders them to do what is right. So also (among others) Rettig ( Proleg. p. 109) and Krohn ( Pl. St. p. 42) rightly understand the passage. Cf. note on πολιτικήν in C below.

οὔτε ‐‐ τε =‘not only not—but also’ lays stress on the second clause: cf. 427 C, VIII 566 D, E, IX 587 A al.

μόνιμον . See cr. n. The reading of some of Stobaeus' MSS ( Flor. 43. 97) (which Dobree and others approved) appears to me almost certainly right, although it has been adopted by no recent editor. νόμιμον, as Rettig shews ( Proleg. p. 110), must be used in precisely the same sense as in δόξης ὀρθῆς τε καὶ νομίμου just before. If so, Plato flatly (except for the οὔτε πάνυ) contradicts himself. For the only reason why a δόξα is ὀρθή is that it is νόμιμος ‘in accordance with the law’: nor is it possible for even a dog to possess an ὀρθὴ δόξα which is not νόμιμος. In obeying a just command, the δόξα of a dog is therefore not οὐ πάνυ νόμιμος, but wholly νόμιμος. On the other hand μόνιμον is not only appropriate but necessary in what is practically a résumé of Socrates' whole account of courage ( δοκεῖς γάρ μοι —καλεῖν). The only difference between the ὀρθὴ δόξα of a guardian and a dog lies in this, that the former has received παιδεία, while the latter has not. And it is precisely this difference which makes the guardian's δόξα lasting, as the whole of the simile from dyeing was intended to shew ( ἵνα δευσοποιὸς κτλ. 430 A). Finally, the soldier's ὀρθὴ δόξα has just been defined (in 430 B) as σωτηρίαν διὰ παντός κτλ. To διὰ παντός the words οὐ πάνυ μόνιμον are the necessary contrast: the δόξα is in both cases ὀρθή τε καὶ νόμιμος, only you can depend on the guardian always, ἔν τε λύπαις καὶ ἐν ἡδοναῖς καὶ ἐν ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ἐν φόβοις (429 D), but not always on your dog and slave. Cf. Men. 97 E f.

ἄλλο τε ‐‐ ἀνδρείαν . With the sentiment cf. Lach. 197 A ff., where however it is because they are destitute of knowledge that courage is denied to the lower animals. Isocrates Antid. 211 speaks of dogs etc. as brave.

πολιτικήν γε ‐‐ δίιμεν . In this passage πολιτικὴν ἀνδρείαν means, I think, primarily the virtue of a πόλις as opposed to that of an ἰδιώτης: cf. 442 D πόλεώς τε καὶ ἰδιώτου. Our πόλις is brave because her soldiers are brave (429 B); so that in describing the courage of the soldiers we have really and truly been describing that of our city. But the ἀνδρεία with which we are now concerned is πολιτική in another, and more important sense, being based on ‘correct opinion’ (cf. Phaed. 82 A , B), i.e. in this instance on opinion which is in conformity with the law of the πόλις (cf. Aristotle's πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία Eth. Nic. III 11. 1116^{a} 16 ff.), and not on ‘knowledge,’ like the scientific or philosophic virtue to which we are introduced in Books VI and VII. In this Platonic connotation of the term, δημοτική or πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία is inferior both to the courage which rests upon knowledge in the Socratic sense ( Lach. 195 A , 196 E ff., Prot. 349 D ff.) and to that which rests on knowledge of the Idea of the Good (cf. VI 506 A), although it is nevertheless on a much higher plane than the so-called courage of slaves and brute beasts, because it is μετὰ παιδείας γεγονυῖα. In αὖθις—δίιμεν Siebeck ( Zur Chron. d. Pl. Dial. pp. 126 ff.) finds a promise of the Laches. To this view it seems to me a serious objection that the Laches has nothing to say of the characteristically Platonic distinction between ἐπιστήμη and ὀρθὴ δόξα: for that very reason it is probably earlier than this passage. Courage in the Laches is little more than Socratic courage (cf. Mem. IV 6. 10 ff.), for the knowledge of the good into which it is finally resolved is not knowledge of the Idea. Others have found in αὖθις a reference to the account of Courage in the individual (442 B), or to V 467 A ff., or to VI 486 B. None of these references are in point; and it is simplest to take Plato at his word. He drops the subject because further discussion of it would be irrelevant; he will resume it on another occasion if Adimantus wishes, but Adimantus is content. Cf. VII 532 D note and see also on 1 347 E. The whole of this section of the dialogue is important because it emphatically reaffirms the principle that courage as well as the other virtues enumerated here rests on ὀρθὴ δόξα and not on ἐπιστήμη. We have already seen that Plato's earlier scheme of education aims at implanting only ὀρθὴ δόξα. Cf. II 376 E note

νῦν γὰρ ‐‐ ἐζητοῦμεν . νῦν=‘as it is’: so that Cobet's ζητοῦμεν (found also in one or two MSS) is unnecessary.

πρότερον is omitted by Richards as illogical. So slight a flaw is easy to forgive; and ἔτι in μηκέτι suggests that πρότερον is genuine. Nor could Adimantus well have said that in any event he did not wish Justice— οὗ δὴ ἕνεκα πάντα ζητοῦμεν—to be discovered.

εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ . Cf. X 608 D, 612 D, Charm. 156 A , Menex. 236 B . The translation “as I am an honest man” (D. and V.) is inaccurate; but Schneider's “ich thäte ja sonst nichts recht” hits the mark. In English we require an independent clause, ‘I have no right to refuse.’

ὥς γε ἐντεῦθεν ἰδεῖν : ‘seen from where we stand,’ i.e. on a first view: cf. ὡς ἐνθένδε ἰδεῖν Pol. 289 D , infra 432 B, X 595 B, and see Grünenwald in Schanz's Beiträge etc. II 3 pp. 1—37.

ξυμφωνίᾳ ‐‐ ἁρμονίᾳ . On ἁρμονία see III 398 E note In its musical application συμφωνία is used both of consonance as in the octave or double octave and also of other musical intervals: cf. VII 531 A and von Jan's Mus. Script. Gr. p. 102 and passim. The ξυμφωνία in which σωφροσύνη consists is apparently of the former kind: cf. 432 A note

ἡδονῶν ‐‐ ἐγκράτεια . It is chiefly this which is insisted on in the popular view of σωφροσύνη taken in III 389 D ff. Cf. Xen. Cyr. VIII 1. 32 , Isocr. 3. 44, and other passages cited by Nägelsbach Nachhom. Theol. II p. 233. Here the essential mark of σωφροσύνη is ξυμφωνία as to who shall be rulers, and who subjects; a point which is not mentioned in III. In other fundamental respects, also, the two descriptions differ; and Hirzel rightly insists that the σωφροσύνη of Book IV must be examined independently and by itself (l.c. p. 409).

κρείττω ‐‐ αὑτοῦ : a common formula in the popular acceptation of σωφροσύνη: see Nägelsbach l.c.

λέγοντες . See cr. n. λέγοντες is found also in Flor. A, in some MSS of Stobaeus ( Flor. 43, 97) and in Cesenas M. λέγοντες should (with Stallbaum) be taken as agreeing with the nominative of φασι, ‘as men say, calling one lord of oneself in some mysterious way.’ δή, ‘forsooth,’ helps out οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅντινα τρόπον. For other views on this passage see App. II.

κρείττω αὑτοῦ . Stallbaum reads κρείττων αὑτοῦ, and wishes to do so also in 431 A below. The accusative is more natural in both places, partly because it suggests τὸ κρείττω αὑτοῦ εἶναι (cf. ὁ γὰρ ἑαυτοῦ κρείττων καὶ ἥττων—ἂν αὑτοῦ εἴη), partly because of κρείττω αὑτοῦ just before.

τι ‐‐ τὸ μὲν ‐‐ τὸ δέ . For the subdivision of τις cf. V 463 B, VIII 560 A, Gorg. 499 C . Other examples of ‘partitive apposition’ are V 461 D, 477 C, VIII 552 C: cf. also VIII 556 B, IX 592 A, X 618 E.

τὸ κρείττω αὑτοῦ : sc. φαίνεταί μοι τοῦτο λέγειν. The expression κρείττω αὑτοῦ is the subject, and τοῦτο the object. τόν for τό (see cr. n.) is indefensible. See also on τοῦτο δέ below.

πλήθους τοῦ χείρονος . II 379 C note

τοῦτο δὲ ‐‐ διακείμενον . τοῦτο is the object of ψέγειν, whose subject is still strictly speaking τὸ κρείττω αὑτοῦ or (which is the same thing) οὗτος ὁ λόγος. In ψέγειν and καλεῖν the λόγος is halfpersonified: ‘this the phrase censures as something disgraceful, and calls the man who is in this condition a slave to himself and intemperate.’ For the recapitulatory τοῦτο δέ cf. Ap. 28 E with my note ad loc. Hartman's τοῦτο δή is an unhappy suggestion.

κρείττω ‐‐ αὑτῆς . Cf. Laws 626 E ff., where κρείττων αὑτῆς is similarly applied to a city and explained in the same way.

οὗ : not the adverb, as Stallbaum supposed, but a partitive genitive: ‘that whereof the better part rules the worse’ etc.

παισί . See cr. n. The corruption—an easy one in minuscule MSS—recurs in VI 494 B. See Introd. § 5 and Bast Comm. Pal. p. 705. The object of this part of the argument is to shew that our city is σώφρων not only as being κρείττων αὑτῆς but as being κρείττων ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν—a kindred, but not quite identical, notion: cf. 431 D. In adding γυναιξί Plato speaks from the ordinary Greek standpoint; in permitting some women to be guardians, he tacitly allows that in some cases their desires (unlike those of οἰκέται etc.) are μετὰ νοῦ. Cf. Laws 780 E ff.

λεγομένων is emphatic. No one is free who is a slave to his desires. Cf. 1 336 A note

τὰς δέ γε κτλ. I have returned to the MS reading. The accusative with τυγχάνω and its congeners is—except with neuter pronouns (Jebb on Soph. O. T. 1298 )—almost unexampled ( ἐπιτόσσαις with accusative in Pind. Pyth. 10. 33), and Herwerden reads the dative, an easy correction; but it is perhaps safer to take the accusative as a sort of anacoluthon “occasioned by the parallel of the previous sentence” τάς γε πολλὰς—εὕροι (J. and C.). Baiter brackets the verb ἐπιτεύξει.

καὶ μὴν ‐‐ σφόδρα gives a third feature of the σωφροσύνη of a city. We have shewn our city to be (1) κρείττων αὑτῆς. (2) κρείττων ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν. It is also (3) ὁμονοητικὴ περὶ τοῦ οὕστινας δεῖ ἄρχειν. (3) corresponds to κόσμος, (2) to ἐγκράτεια, (1) to κρείττω αὑτοῦ in 430 E. Thus the discussion in this chapter follows a chiastic order.

ἐν ἀμφοτέροις . Cf. 442 C, D. Aristotle and others seem to have supposed that σωφροσύνη was the special virtue of the lowest class in the State and the lowest element in the soul: see Top. V 6. 136^{b} 10 ff. and 8. 138^{b} 1 ff. and [Arist.] περἰ ἀρετῶν καὶ κακιῶν 1. 1249^{a} 30 ff. ἐν ἀμφοτέροις proves this view erroneous. The error arose partly perhaps from a desire to make the theory superficially symmetrical, partly perhaps from a notion that Plato's rulers would not be likely to dispute their own right to rule. But σωφροσύνη in Plato's sense is necessary for his Rulers as well as for their subjects; without it, they might nolle episcopari: cf. I 346 D note

δἰ ὅλης ‐‐ διὰ πασῶν . δἰ ὅλης sc. τῆς πόλεως, not λύρας, as J. and C. strangely suppose. διὰ πασῶν sc. τῶν χορδῶν should be taken with ξυνᾴδοντας (so also Schneider). ἡ διὰ πασῶν συμφωνία is the octave (Arist. Probl. XIX 35. 920^{a} 27 ff.), the καλλίστη συμφωνία, according to the Greeks (Arist. l.c.), readily sounding to the ear as absolute unison; hence the point of ταὐτόν, which is an accusative depending directly on ξυνᾴδοντας. See Arist. l.c. 14. 918^{b} 7 ff. διὰ τί λανθάνει τὸ διὰ πασῶν καὶ δοκεῖ ὁμόφωνον εἶναι, οἷον ἐν τῷ φοινικίῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ; The whole expression διὰ πασῶν ξυνᾴδοντας ταὐτόν therefore means that the concord of the citizens on the matter in question is absolute and complete. Further than this I do not think the comparison is to be pressed. If we seek to find analogies between ἀσθενεστάτους, ἰσχυροτάτους, μέσους and the ὑπάτη, νήτη and μέση of the scale, we are met by the difficulty that the μέση cannot be said to produce the same ( ταὐτόν) note as the ὑπάτη and νήτη, and we are not at liberty to suppose that Plato is thinking of ἡ δὶς διὰ πασῶν in the face of his own words, which refer only to a single octave ( διὰ πασῶν παρεχομ νη κτλ.). In talking of σωφροσύνη Plato usually distinguishes only between two classes—rulers and ruled: 431 D, E and infra χείρονός τε καὶ ἀμείνονος. See also on 443 D.

φρονήσει ‐‐ ἰσχύϊ ‐‐ πλήθει define ἀσθενεστάτους, ἰσχυροτάτους, μέσους. The equipoise and measured cadence of this stately sentence may well suggest a chorus of voices singing in unison. Cf. III 401 C. Cobet's excision of the second βούλει is sadly out of tune.

ταύτην τὴν ὁμόνοιαν prepares us for the definition about to follow. There are various ὁμόνοιαι: this one is agreement ὁπότερον δεῖ ἄρχειν etc.

χείρονος κτλ. : ‘concord between the naturally better and the naturally worse, on the question which should rule, whether in a city or in an individual.’ ἐν ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ anticipates 442 C f.; but is justified here by 431 A, B.

ὥς γε ‐‐ δόξαι . This phrase is apparently quite unique in Plato: see Grünenwald cited on 430 E.

ὥσπερ κυνηγέτας . The image is a favourite one with Plato: cf. Laws 654 E, Parm. 128 C , Lys. 218 C . Other examples may be found in Stallbaum's note on this passage. The particular kind of hunting from which Plato takes his illustration is clearly described in Xen. de Ven. 8. 4—8. A net was drawn round the bush where the hare was, and the hunters stood round, ready μεταθεῖν κατὰ τὰ ἴχνη, ἐὰν ἐκκυλισθῇ ἐκ τῶν δικτύων.

φράσῃς : ‘point out.’ There is no occasion to read (with Ast and q) καί μοι φράσεις.

μετρίῳ . See cr. n. μετρίως χρῆσθαι could only mean ‘to treat fairly,’ but this is not to the point. The only relevant meaning is ‘you will find me very tolerable,’ and μετρίῳ μοι χρήσει conveys this sense exactly. Cf. ἑπομένῳ χρῇ—καὶ δυναμένῳ and Xen. Cyr. III 2. 4 ὀλίγοις τε καὶ ἀσθενέσι χρησαίμεθ’ ἂν πολεμίοις, Symp. 2 9, 10. On the error see Introd. § 5.

εὐξάμενος : like a pious huntsman: cf. Xen. de Ven. 6. 13 εὐξάμενον τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι καὶ τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι τῇ Ἀγροτέρᾳ μεταδοῦναι τῆς θήρας. Cf. also (with Stallbaum) Phil. 25 B εὔχου δὴ καὶ σκόπει and Tim. 27 C . ἕπου οὖν (suggested by Richards) seems to me much less spirited and picturesque than ἕπου; and the cacophony is also unpleasing. For the asyndeton cf. II 373 E note

ἔστι γοῦν ‐‐ δυσδιερεύνητος has been objected to as adding little or nothing to δύσβατος—ἐπίσκιος. But δυσδιερεύνητος, ‘difficult to beat,’ said of beating or scouring the brake to rouse ( κινεῖν Xen. de Ven. 8. 7) the game and drive it out into the net, could ill be spared; so apt a word is much too good for a copyist. Cf. Menex. 240 B , where διερευνᾶσθαι is used of the famous ‘beating’ of Euboea by Datis' soldiers: and see also Laws 698 D.

ἰοῦ, ἰοῦ : ‘Joy! Joy!’ ἰού dolentis, ἰοῦ gaudentis, according to the Scholiast on Ar. Peace 318 : cf. Suidas s.v. Ancient authorities differed on the point (see Blaydes' critical note l.c.), but modern scholars for the most part agree with Suidas.

ἐκφευξεῖσθαι ‐‐ εὖ ἀγγέλλεις . The contracted form of the future of φεύγω is established by the authority both of the Paris MS, and also of Aristophanes and Euripides, as Schanz has proved (Vol. XII p. xvi). Schanz may be right in supposing that it is borrowed “ex ore populi.” For εὖ ἀγγέλλεις Phrynichus (S. V. εὐαγγελίζομαί σε) apparently read εὐαγγελεῖς, on which see Lobeck Phryn. p. 632 and Cobet N. L. p. 163. εὐαγγελῶ does not seem to be used in Attic prose. In Theaet. 144 B εὖ ἀγγέλλεις is read by B, εὖ ἀγγελεῖς by T.

ἤτοι . See 1 344 E note

τι εἶδος , like τρόπον τινά in 432 E and 433 B, hints, I think, that Civic Justice is not, after all, the true and original form of Justice. Hence, in 434 D, Plato is careful to warn us that the subject of Justice is not exhausted till individual Justice has been discussed. See on τοιοῦτο in 443 C.

ἐπιτηδειοτάτη . ἐπιτηδειότατα (Herwerden) is not good: cf. II 374 E and supra 430 A. A few MSS omit πεφυκυῖα, not unnaturally; but the reduplication in φύσις—πεφυκυῖα adds to the emphasis. Plato never tires of emphasizing the ‘natural’ features of his city in Books II—IV.

δικαιοσύνη has been questioned by Richards, on the ground that “the inference announced in τοῦτο τοίνυν κτλ. is already stated in καὶ μὴν ὅτι κτλ., which from its form ( καὶ μήν) is yet evidently only a step in the reasoning.” Richards suggests δίκαιον, and Hartman δικαιοσύνης, neatly but needlessly. τοίνυν in B does not express an inference, but is simply ‘well,’ as in II 369 B, III 413 C, IV 436 B and a host of other passages collected by Kugler ( de part. τοι etc. p. 35). Plato first states a popular view, and then proceeds to shew that it is mainly right on grounds presently to be stated (whence οἷσθ’ ὅθεν τεκμαίρομαι;). No stress should be laid on the fact that δικαιοσύνη is in one case the predicate, and in the other the subject: complete identity is predicated in both cases, as the abstract δικαιοσύνη shews. It might be different if we read δίκαιον, but for this there is no occasion. There is still however a difficulty in δικαιοσύνη: see next note.

εἰρήκαμεν γάρ . This has not been said in the Republic, nor (so far as I know) in any of Plato's earlier dialogues (if we except Alc. I 127 C), so that εἰρήκαμεν refers to ordinary conversation. Such a view has affinities with the legal view of Justice as the virtue which respects the rights of others (cf. 433 E and I 331 A ff.), and is natural enough, especially with the loose connotation which δικαιοσύνη had in popular language. It is however curious that in Charm. 161 B ff. precisely the same account is given of Temperance: ἄρτι γὰρ ἀνεμνήσθην ὂ ἤδη του ἤκουσα λέγοντος, ὅτι σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν: cf. Tim. 72 A εὖ καὶ πάλαι λέγεται τὸ πράττειν καὶ γνῶναι τά τε αὑτοῦ καὶ ἑαυτὸν σώφρονι μόνῳ προσήκειν. In its popular connotation, σωφροσύνη was not always distinguished from δικαιοσύνη, and even the philosophers (as Strabo VII 3. 4 observes) sometimes used the words in nearly an identical sense. See Nägelsbach Nachhom. Theol. p. 238. Steinhart and others find in the difference between this passage and the Charmides l.c. an indication of the Socratic and Platonic doctrine of the unity of Virtue. No doubt there is a certain sense in which virtue is one (see below on 434 C), but we must insist that the specific virtues are represented by Plato in the Republic as distinct; on any other hypothesis, the perfect City falls to pieces. Perhaps δικαιοσύνη after πολυπραγμονεῖν is an error for σωφροσύνη, and Plato is here deliberately correcting the popular view. If so, καὶ μὴν—γε means ‘and yet,’ i.e. in spite of what we now say that Justice is εἷς ἓν κατὰ φύσιν, ‘we and others have also said that Temperance is τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν.’ Adimantus assents. ‘Well,’ continues Socrates, ‘it is apparently (not Temperance, but) Justice which is τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν.’ This view gives a much better sense to καί in καὶ τοῦτο, and ἡ δικαιοσύνη receives the proper emphasis.

δοκεῖ ‐‐ εὕροιμεν . Things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another. Now (1) the Virtue which enables the others to take root, and (2) Justice, each= τὸ ὑπόλοιπον. Therefore Justice enables the other Virtues to take root. τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν. Consequently Justice is τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν.> Plato seldom leaves so much to be mentally supplied in his reasoning.

παρέχει . See cr. n. Former editors (except Ast) retain παρέχειν and explain it as depending directly on δοκεῖ. If this is right, καί before ἐγγενομένοις joins τοῦτο εἶναι and παρέχειν; but καὶ ἐγγενομένοις γε, following immediately on ἐγγενέσθαι, naturally suggests that παρέχειν and ἐγγενέσθαι are coordinate and both under the government of ὥστε. That this was felt in antiquity is proved by the variant ἐγγενόμενα for ἐγγενομένοις, preserved in Stobaeus ( Flor. 43. 98) and in Ξ. The author of the reading ἐγγενόμενα must have understood Plato to mean ‘which enabled them all to make their appearance in the city, and having done so, to keep it safe, so long as they are there,’ and this, I think, is the natural meaning of Plato's words, if παρέχειν is retained. But the sentiment is compara tively weak; and consequently Ast and Hartman wish to cancel παρέχειν, making σωτηρίαν depend upon παρέσχεν; but a present tense is necessary. παρέχει seems to me what Plato wrote, ‘aye, and after they have appeared it preserves them, so long as it is present in the city.’ A relative clause often passes into an independent sentence (see on II 357 B); and the idiom is appropriate here because it responds to the emphatic καὶ—γέ. For καὶ—γε cf. 425 B note

δούλῳ ‐‐ ἀρχομένῳ . On δούλῳ see V 469 C note Richards would insert καὶ γεωργῷ after δημιουργῷ, pointing out that the other words go in pairs; but the difference between δημιουργῷ and γεωργῷ is insignificant, since both artisan and farmer belong to the same class in the city.

εἷς ὤν . Most of Stobaeus' MSS ( Flor. l.c.) read εἷς ὢν ἕν. ἕν is unnecessary with καὶ οὐκ ἐπολυπραγμόνει following (Schneider).

σκόπει κτλ. This τεκμήριον turns on the judicial sense of δικαιοσύνη: cf. I 331 E ff. The judicial functions of the rulers follow naturally from 428 D, where it is said that σοφία βουλεύεται—ὅντιν’ ἂν τρόπον αὐτή τε (sc. ἡ πόλις) πρὸς αὑτὴν—ἄριστα ὁμιλοῖ κτλ. It is clear that no class except the rulers can be judges in the State, and judges are necessary: see III 408 D ff.

ἑαυτοῦ κτλ. ἑαυτοῦ is a possessive genitive depending on τοῦ. It should be noted that although ἕξις τοῦ οἰκείου is not the same thing as πρᾶξις τοῦ οἰκείου, the latter involves the former. Plato is looking for a point of contact between his own view of Justice and the popular judicial meaning of the word, and finds it in ἕξις τοῦ οἰκείου. Krohn ( Pl. St. p. 49) appears to me to attach too much weight to ἕξις τοῦ οἰκείου when he calls it a new “Begriffselement,” and complains that it is “weder sachlich erläutert, noch logisch streng abgeleitet.” Cf. 442 E. It should be mentioned that the poet Gray (with less than his usual critical acumen) conjectured τοῦ <ποιεῖν> τὸ οἰκεῖόν τε καὶ <τὸ> ἑαυτοῦ, comparing οἰκειοπραγία in 434 C.

πάντα τἄλλα means everything except what Socrates is about to mention, that is everything except the interchange of rulers and ruled. So J. and C., rightly, I think: cf. 421 A, VII 518 D and Laws 798 D. Other editors explain τἄλλα as “reliquorum opificum opera”; and so also q, reading ἢ πάντα τἄλλα τά γε τοιαῦτα; but it is difficult to extract this meaning out of τἄλλα without τά γε τοιαῦτα, and the asyndeton is also very harsh. Madvig's conjecture ταῦτα is improbable, though adopted by Baiter. Adimantus would catch the meaning all the more easily on account of the similar statement in 421 A, and because πάντα would be pronounced with emphasis, as the asyndeton also indicates. I have removed the comma usually printed after μεταλλαττόμενα; for πάντα τἄλλα includes within its scope all the cases mentioned, and is directly the subject of δοκεῖ.

ἀλλ’ ὅταν κτλ. Plato is probably thinking of Athens again: cf. supra 424 D note and Krohn Pl. St. p. 46. φύσει belongs to ὤν. Hartman needlessly expunges ὤν and reads φύς for φύσει. The subject to ὤν is simply the pronoun ‘he,’ used loosely, as often in English.

βουλευτικοῦ ‐‐ ὤν . “Valde miror editt. verba βουλευτικοῦ καὶ φύλακος ἀνάξιος ὤν concoxisse” cries Hartman. The genitives of course depend on τὸ ( εἶδος), and ἀνάξιος is used absolutely, as often.

μάλιστα κακουργία . μάλιστα is omitted in Ξ and one or two other MSS; but cf. VII 532 B ἔτι ἀδυναμία, VIII 564 A εἰς ἄγαν δουλείαν (with Stallbaum ad loc.), and other examples in Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 526. That μάλιστα should be taken with κακουργία is clear from μεγίστη βλάβη and κακουργίαν τὴν μεγίστην.

πάλιν : not ‘again,’ but ‘conversely,’ “umgekehrt” (Schneider).

ἑκάστου ‐‐ πόλει is cancelled by Herwerden as a marginal note on οἰκειοπραγία. The words add to the weight and impressiveness of the sentence, and have a decidedly Platonic sound.

τοὐναντίον ἐκείνου . ἐκείνου is ‘the other,’ i.e. πολυπραγμοσύνης (rather than ἀδικίας); and τοὐναντίον is probably nominative, and not adverbial accusative. So also Schneider. It is not necessary to add ὄν after τοὐναντίον as I formerly did. The style of argument is the familiar τόπος ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων (see Arist. Rhet. II 23. 1397^{a} 7 ff.).

παγίως ‐‐ λέγωμεν : cf. V 479 C παγίως νοῆσαι, Theaet. 157 A νοῆσαι —παγίως, Tim. 49 D . οὐκ ἔστι παγίως νοῆσαι was probably a phrase in vogue among Heraclitus' followers: see Wohlrab on Theaet. l.c.

ἰὸν τὸ εἶδος . εἶδος is not yet the Idea (III 402 C) but refers to οἰκειοπραγία. For ἰόν Richards conjectures ἰοῦσιν; but surely εἰς would then be wrong. How can ‘we’ be said to pass into an individual? The εἶδος is half personified (cf. ὅταν—ἐλθὸν ἐρώτημα ἔρηται VII 538 D); it is said to ‘pass into’ the individual merely because we have discovered it first in the State. See also on ἀπαμβλύνεται 442 D. The passage in Phaedr. 249 B is different, whether we accept Badham's conjecture ἰόντ) or not.

ἣν is a loose internal accusative, exactly like ὅ in 443 B below. The reference is to II 368 D.

ἐκεῖ . The reading ἐκεῖνο, found in Ξ and other second-rate MSS, would probably have been discarded sooner, if it had been known that A as well as Π reads ἐκεῖ. Campbell first pointed this out. ἐκεῖνο is not quite suitable because, although it must mean justice, it suggests something more remote. ἐκεῖ on the other hand helps out the antithesis between ἐν μείζονι—ἐχόντων and ἐν ἑνὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, and is in harmony with ἐκεῖ ἐφάνη below. δικαιοσύνην depends on θεάσασθαι, and τῶν ἐχόντων is ‘its possessors’: cf. II 367 B, D, E. In reciting the sentence, the voice pauses after ἐχόντων and pronounces ἐκεῖ with emphasis. ἐκεῖ (with which cf. ἐκείνου in Parm. 133 D ) was rightly retained by Stallbaum, who did not know that it was the reading of A.

τοῦτο : i.e. τὸ μεῖζον τῶν ἐχόντων δικαιοσύνην.

καθ’ ὁδόν . Cf. (with Schneider) infra VII 533 B and Crat. 425 B . μέθοδον for καθ’ ὁδόν (Herwerden) is a sorry piece of criticism.

μεῖζον ‐‐ ἔλαττον : ‘whether greater or smaller.’ The insertion of ὄν after ἔλαττον, suggested by Dobree, is unnecessary.

τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα εἴδη . εἴδη used in this sense is slightly confusing after εἶδος has just been applied to δικαιοσύνη; and τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων γενῶν would lead us to expect γένη. The psychological elements are called εἴδη, γένη, or μέρη: εἴδη in 435 B, C, E, 439 E, γένη in 441 C, 443 D, μέρη in 442 B, C and (by implication) 439 B, C, D and passim. Cf. Brandt l.c. p. 17 and Zeller^{4} II 1, p. 845. εἴδη ψυχῆς does not, strictly speaking, mean ‘ varieties of soul’ but rather ‘kinds’ belonging to or present in soul ( εἴδη ἐν ψυχῇ 439 E: see also on III 402 C), and much the same is true of γένη. There is some authority for holding that the Pythagoreans before the time of Plato recognised at least two ‘parts’ of soul— an ἄλογον and a λογικόν (see Diels Dox. Gr. pp. 389 f. and other evidence in Rohde Psyche^{2} II p. 170 note); but Zeller I^{5} pp. 447, 448 may be right in regarding the Pythagorean form of this theory as post-Platonic.

φαῦλον is of course ironical, although Glauco pretends to take it seriously. Cf. (with J. and C.) 423 C—E, 426 A, B.

καὶ εὖ γ) ‐‐ ἐξαρκέσει . The difficulties connected with this passage have led to much discussion: see for example Rettig Proleg. pp. 126 ff., Krohn Pl. St. pp. 128 ff., 144, Pfleiderer Zur Lösung etc. pp. 25, 73, Hirmer Entst. u. Komp. etc. p. 618. τοῦτο in ἀκριβῶς μὲν τοῦτο and in ἡ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἄγουσα ought, so far as grammar goes, to mean the question whether the soul has τρία εἴδη or not. But the μακροτέρα περίοδος in VI 504 B ff., where Plato expressly refers back to this passage, eschews the psychological problem altogether. The μακροτέρα περίοδος of Books VI—VII is in harmony with the present enquiry in so far as it seeks to determine the nature of Justice and the other virtues (VI 504 D, 506 A), but it is nowhere in the Republic expressly used either to confirm or to overthrow the triple division of soul which is here propounded. (The analysis of mental faculties in VI 509 D—511 E is introductory to the μακροτέρα περίοδος, not a result obtained by it; nor has that analysis, strictly speaking, any bearing on the question whether soul has three εἴδη or not: cf. Pfleiderer Zur Lösung etc. p. 25.) Krohn accordingly holds that the ‘longer ways’ of IV and VI are different and distinct ( Pl. St. p. 128); and Schleiermacher supposes ( Einleitung p. 71) that the πλείων ὁδός of IV is to be found in the psychology of the Timaeus; but that Plato meant the two ways to be identical is certain, for he explicitly says that they are (VI 504 B ff.). The only way out of these difficulties is to suppose that τοῦτο here was not intended by Plato to refer to the psychological, but to the ethical question, to which the psychological enquiry is introductory. τοῦτο must then be taken as δικαιοσύνης τε πέρι καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ σοφίας δ ἕκαστόν ἐστι (VI 504 A). This view becomes easy if we suppose that the words καὶ εὖ γε—ἐξαρκέσει were not written by Plato immediately after he wrote 435 C, but at a later time, when VI 504 A—D was composed. It is in itself highly probable that the most important passages referring forward or backward to one another throughout the dialogue were either written together, or at all events revised by Plato side by side. Cf. Brandt l. c. p. 13 note 3, where a kindred view is taken. In any case, we must adhere to our explanation of τοῦτο, if we would preserve the artistic unity of the Republic. See also on VI 504 A—D.

ἄλλη . See cr. n. ἄλλη is in itself much better, to say the least, than ἀλλά, and is confirmed by ἄλλη μακροτέρα— περίοδος in VI 504 B. The corruption was easy, owing to the frequency of ἀλλὰ γάρ .

ὅτι γε ‐‐ πόλει . Broadly speaking, what Plato says is true, that the predominant character of a State depends on the predominant character of the individual citizens (cf. Bosanquet Companion pp. 147 f.): but it does not necessarily follow, because a city contains three psychologically different classes of citizens, that each of us ( ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν) has within his soul the three corresponding psychological elements. In making this assertion, Plato relies upon the fundamental hypothesis of the Republic, viz. that the individual is a commonwealth writ small. See on II 369 A. γε after ὅτι, though omitted in Ξ, is strictly appropriate, and warns us of a further point— τόδε δὲ ἤδη χαλεπόν 436 A—on which agreement is not so easy.

οἳ δὴ ‐‐ αἰτίαν : ‘that is, among peoples who bear this reputation.’ ταύτην is τοῦ θυμοειδεῖς εἷναι. The phrase αἰτίαν ἔχειν is used both in a good and in a bad sense as the passive of αἰτιῶμαι: for the good sense cf. (with Ast) Gorg. 503 B . What follows is (as Teichmüller observes Lit. Fehd. I p. 146) conceived in the vein of Hippocrates' enquiries as to the influence of climate on character: see his treatise de aere aquis locis 12 ff. ed. Kuehlewein, and cf. also Arist. Physiog. 2. 806^{b} 15, Probl. XIV 8, 15, 16, and especially Pol. H 7. 1327^{b} 23—33 with Susemihl's note. Aristotle for his part represents the Greek nature as the mean between the two extremes of oriental διανοητικόν and τεχνικόν and northern θυμός. There is no good reason for supposing (with Steinhart Einleitung p. 191) that Plato was thinking of the wild races of the North when he instituted his second order of citizens, and of Egyptians etc. when he established his third. On the Phoenician and Egyptian characters cf. Laws 747 C ff.

τὸν ἄνω τόπον : ‘the Northern region,’ not ‘the highland country’ (L. and S.): cf. Arist. Meteor. II 5. 362^{a} 33 τὸν ἄνω πόλον and Hdt. I 142 al.

αἰτιάσαιτο . εἶναι should be understood. For the construction cf. X 599 E.

φιλοχρήματον is another name for ἐπιθυμητικόν, ὅτι διὰ χρημάτων μάλιστα ἀποτελοῦνται αἱ τοιαῦται ἐπιθυμίαι (IX 580 E).

τούτων ἕκαστα refers to the actions described in μανθάνομεν μὲν ἑτέρῳ etc. τούτῳ (see cr. n.) can only be defended by referring it (with Schneider) “to the subject of the triple predicate τὸ θυμοειδές, τὸ φιλομαθές, and τὸ φιλοχρήματον.” There is a certain obscurity in this construction, and τούτων ἕκαστα prepares us for μανθάνομεν μὲν ἑτέρῳ, θυμούμεθα δέ etc. better than ἕκαστα alone would do.

ταὐτὸν ‐‐ ἅμα is the earliest explicit statement in Greek literature of the maxim of Contradiction; cf. Theaet. 188 A , Phaed. 102 E , 103 B, Soph. 230 B and infra X 602 E. Plato may have been led to formulate it in opposition to Heracliteanism, which was supposed by some to be the negation of the principle (see Arist. Met. Γ 3. 1005^{b} 24 and Theaet. 152 D ff.), or against the Megarian puzzles (see RP.^{7} § 226), or as a counterblast to both. Many of the sophistries of the Euthydemus turn on the violation of this law. In Aristotle's formula ( Met. l.c. 1005^{b} 19) πρὸς ταὐτόν does not occur; and Hartman would cancel καὶ πρὸς ταὐτόν here and πρὸς τὸ αὐτό in 436 E, on the ground that it means the same as κατὰ ταὐτόν. But assuredly it does not. κατὰ ταὐτόν is ‘in the same part of it’ as the instances presently cited shew; while πρὸς ταὐτόν is ‘relatively to the same thing,’ viz. to something other than the subject of the proposition. πρὸς τὰ αὐτά and κατὰ ταὐτά are also both of them found in the parallel passage Soph. 230 B . πρὸς ταὐτόν covers such cases as are adduced in Theaet. 154 C —155 C: six dice are πλείους πρὸς τέτταρας, ἐλάττους πρὸς δώδεκα, but they are not ἐναντία πρὸς ταὐτόν. Cf. VII 524 A ff., and see also on ἢ καὶ εἴη in 437 A.

ἦν is not precisely ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ᾠόμεθα (Stallbaum); for the reference is actually to the past, and the past tense should be kept in translating it. See II 357 A note and cf. X 609 B. The so-called ‘philosophic imperfect’ gets credit for more than it deserves, because we are apt to suppose that the past excludes the present, which is not always true: cf. VI 497 C note

εἶεν by itself in replies is rare. It occurs (if the MSS are right) in Symp. 206 E , Crat. 410 C , Men. 75 C . In the last two passages, Heindorf (on Crat. l.c.) is inclined to rearrange the speakers; but it is safer, both there and here, to keep the traditional arrangement. See on I 332 D.

χαριεντίζοιτο ‐‐ κομψευόμενος may refer to some Megarian quibbles on this subject. Zeno's argument to shew that ἡ οἰστὸς φερομένη ἕστηκεν proceeded on a different principle: see Arist. Phys. VI 9. 239^{b} 30 ff.

ἢ καὶ ‐‐ δρᾷ . “Repetendum ὡς ex praegressis” (Stallbaum). Schneider connects δρᾷ with ὅταν: in that case we must understand after τοῦτο δρᾷ something like ὡς καὶ τοῦτο ὅλον ἕστηκέ τε ἅμα καὶ κινεῖται. Stallbaum's view is the simpler, and should, I think, be preferred. I have accordingly removed the comma usually printed after κινοῦνται .

ὡς οὐ ‐‐ φερομένων . This clause has proved a source of great perplexity. Schneider suggests that μενόντων is a partitive genitive, ἐστί being omitted; Stallbaum, that τὰ τοιαῦτα is adverbial, like τοιουτοτρόπως; while, according to J. and C., τὰ τοιαῦτα “is to be taken as cognate accusative with the participles.” Rather than accept any of these suggestions, it would, I think, be preferable to expunge τὰ τοιαῦτα altogether (with Ast), or to place it after ἀποδεχοίμεθα (as Gildersleeve suggests, A. J. Ph. VI p. 333 note 2), or even perhaps to read τῶν τοιούτων with Richards, although little short of a miracle could have corrupted τῶν τοιούτων to τὰ τοιαῦτα. The following interpretation, which appears to me right, has not, so far as I know, been hitherto suggested. ταὐτά goes closely with the partitive genitive ἑαυτῶν, and is a predicate to τὰ τοιαῦτα, which is also governed by κατά (cf. the familiar usage with ὥσπερ and a preposition in similes, e.g. Theaet. 170 A ὥσπερ πρὸς θεοὺς ἔχειν τοὺς ἐν ἑκάσταις ἄρχοντας etc.: see on VIII 553 B). μενόντων τε καὶ φερομένων is a genitive absolute. The sentence is in every respect an elegant and idiomatic piece of Greek, and means: ‘because such parts, in respect of which they both stand still and move on these occasions, are different parts of them.’ τὰ τοιαῦτα—the meaning of which is easy to catch after the examples given above —forms a welcome preparation for εὐθύ τε καὶ περιφερές in the following clause.

ἔστιν . I formerly rejected this word (with Galen de Hipp. et Plat. decr. IX Vol. V p. 799 ed. Kühn, Herwerden, and Flor. U). It is certainly more pointed to connect ἑστάναι with φαῖμεν ἄν, and Glauco's καὶ ὀρθῶς γε (sc. φαῖμεν ἄν) is easier without ἔστιν. But there is not sufficient ground for deserting the best MSS. For other examples of replies referring to the earlier part of the previous sentence see V 465 E note

ἢ καὶ εἴη . I agree with Bekker, Schneider, and J. and C. in retaining these words, which Galen l.c. also read, and only a few inferior MSS (with the majority of editors) omit. If the words are spurious, no satisfactory theory has yet been advanced to account for their presence in the text; certainly no scribe is at all likely to have added them. A fuller and more emphatic statement of the maxim is natural enough after the emphasis with which the sentence opens ( οὐδὲν—ἐκπλήξει), and Schneider truly observes: “obiter et quodam modo praeter exspectationem eius” (i.e. τοῦ εἶναι), “mentionem fieri adiectum καὶ indicat, quod semel positum mox sine offensione repetitur, omissis vero verbis ἢ καὶ εἴη ante ποιήσειεν non magis quam supra p. 436 B ante πάσχειν locum habiturum fuisset.” πάθοι and ποιήσειεν have reference to actions, εἴη to a state, and εἴη naturally follows πάθοι because e.g. πλείους γίγνεσθαι (an example of πάσχειν) leads up to πλείους εἶναι. It should also be observed that the meaning of πρὸς τὸ αὐτό, which the discussion has not yet brought out, is best apprehended in examples not of πάσχειν or ποιεῖν, but of εἶναι τἀναντία: see 436 B note

ἀλλ’ ὅμως κτλ. The usual Greek idiom, as shewn for example in ἀλγῶ τὴν κεφαλήν (cf. V 462 C ff.), rests on a psychological theory which is inconsistent with that now proposed by Plato. This may be one reason why Plato is at such pains to establish and emphasize his point.

λαβεῖν has been doubted: but see III 407 B note

ἂν (see cr. n.) is better inserted after ἐναντίων than after θείης (Ast) or τοιαῦτα (Hartman). Stallbaum (who formerly read ἂν θείης) in his last edition acquiesces, like Schneider, in the omission of ἄν; but few will agree with him. I have noted the—certain or probable— omission of ἄν in all or the best MSS in Phaed. 62 C , 109 E, Euthyd. 291 E (?), Rep. V 457 D, VII 516 E, VIII 558 D, where the omission is lipographical; also in Phaed. 72 B , Euthyd. 281 C , Crat. 389 E , 409 A, Alc. I 132 B, 133 E, Soph. 266 A , Phil. 47 B , H. Mai. 295 A. Sometimes (as occasionally after πρίν) the omission is perhaps a poetical touch: see my note in Cl. Rev. IV p. 103.

καὶ αὖ . Krohn ( Pl. St. p. 57) presses αὖ too much when he says that ἐθέλειν and βούλεσθαι are definitely represented as not belonging to the category of ἐπιθυμίαι. Plato expresses no opinion on this point; for αὖ, ‘also,’ merely marks the introduction of two new terms.

ἐθέλει ‐‐ ἐρωτῶντος . The difference between ἐθέλει, ‘is willing,’ and βούλεται, ‘wishes,’ is well brought out by the contrast between the more active process described in προσάγεσθαι and the passive assent which ἐπινεύειν expresses. The point is missed by translating (with J. and C.) ‘beckons this with a nod towards herself’: it is merely ‘nods assent to this in reply to herself.’ One part of the soul asks, and the other answers, the psychological process being compared to a kind of dialectic or question and answer inside the soul: see III 400 D note and cf. Isocr. Antid. 256. For the confusion of ἐρῶντος and ἐρωτῶντος—ἐρῶντος is found in several MSS— cf. [ Erast.] 132 D, and Euthyphr. 14 C . With the analysis of desire in this passage cf. Phil. 34 E ff.

ἀπ) αὐτῆς . ἀφ) αὑτῆς Hartman (with Vind. E only), but ἀπελαύνειν is active, not middle. The actions are described as though by a spectator ab externo.

ἐπιθυμιῶν : a defining genitive. For εἶδος see III 402 C note

ἆρ’ οὖν κτλ. This discussion (down to 438 E) is apparently regarded by Susemihl ( Gen. Entw. II pp. 163 f.) as unnecessary for the immediate purposes of the argument, but it is not so. Plato's object is to remove a difficulty which might be felt in holding that desire is restrained, and that by the λογιστικόν. Why should thirst be restrained? an objector might ask. You yourself, Socrates, hold that (1) desire is always of the good; consequently (2) thirst is always the desire of good drink, and (3) is therefore always good. See 438 A, where the gist of the objection is contained. Socrates would reply: The fallacy lurks in (2), for ‘good’ drink is ambiguous. If ‘good’ drink means drink which desire thinks good, then (2) is true; if it means drink which is in reality good, (2) is not true. Desire cannot know what is good. We must therefore amend (2) by omitting ‘good,’ for in reality it is sometimes good and sometimes bad to drink. To what then is the final appeal? To the λογιστικόν. It is this which decides on each occasion whether it is really good or bad to drink, and gives or refuses its assent accordingly (439 C). Bosanquet takes a somewhat similar view ( Companion p. 154). See also notes on 438 A.

οἷον δίψα ‐‐ ψυχροῦ . ‘Thus thirst is thirst—of hot drink, is it, or of cold?’ For the genitive with δίψα (which Richards doubts) cf. 439 A. The repetition of δίψα is like that of ἐπιστήμη in 438 C, and makes the statement formal and precise.

ψυχροῦ ‐‐ θερμοῦ . Hermann transposes these words and is followed by Stallbaum, Baiter, and others. “Palmaria emendatio,” cries Stallbaum; whereas J. and C. hold that it “makes nonsense of the passage.” It is not at first sight quite easy to decide between these conflicting views. The words ἐὰν μέν τις—προσπαρέχοιτ’ ἄν clearly mean that the desire of cold drink is due to thirst plus heat, i.e. thirst supplies the desire of drink, and the heat present in the thirst supplies in addition ( προσπαρέχοιτ’ ἄν) the desire of cold: see also on τοῦ δὲ—προσγιγνόμενα below. This is in harmony with common sense and also with the theory of Lys. 215 E ἐπιθυμεῖν γὰρ τοῦ τοιούτου (sc. ἐναντίου ) ἕκαστον, ἀλλ’ οὐ τοῦ ὁμοίου. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ξηρὸν ὑγροῦ, τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν θερμοῦ κτλ.: cf. also Symp. 186 B . But ἐὰν δὲ—πολλὴ ἡ δίψα ᾖ seems to proceed on the opposite or homoeopathic principle. The presence of πλῆθος produces a desire not for its opposite but for itself. The solution of the difficulty is to be found in the different character of the notions θερμότης and πλῆθος. θερμότης is something distinct from δίψος, though superadded to it, for which reason Plato does not use the expression θερμὸν δίψος; whereas πλῆθος is in reality πλῆθος δίψης, and πολλὴ δίψα, as experience shews, desires much drink. The common sense point of view is taken by Plato throughout, and is expressly justified by him in 438 E οὔ τι λέγω ὡς οἵων ἂν ᾖ, τοιαῦτα καὶ ἔστιν. For these reasons I heartily agree with the Oxford editors. Hermann's proposal is a product of the inveterate tendency to suppose that wherever we turn in Plato we rub against the theory of Ideas; but the use of παρουσία here (in spite of Peiper's Ontol. Pl. pp. 602 ff., Zeller^{4} II 1, p. 560 note, and many other critics) is not metaphysical, but logical, and πλῆθος is certainly not an Idea in this passage. See on this point 438 B, 438 C notes

αὐτοῦ πώματος : ‘merely of drink’ )( much drink, cold drink, etc. Cf. VIII 559 A αὐτοῦ σίτου τε καὶ ὄψου. For καὶ αὖ κτλ. Herwerden would expect καὶ αὐτὸ <τὸ> πεινῆν <αὐτοῦ> βρώματος. Further specification than Plato gives is unnecessary, for τὸ πεινῆν as well as αὐτὸ τὸ δίψος is subject to οὐ μή ποτε—οὖπερ πέφυκεν. The voice pauses slightly after πεινῆν.

τοῦ δὲ ‐‐ προσγιγνόμενα : as e.g. θερμότης, where it προσγίγνεται τῷ δίψει (cf. E above), is the desire of ψυχροῦ, ψυχρότης of θερμοῦ. The type of desires illustrated by the desire of ψυχρὸν πῶμα appears to Plato composite and not simple.

μήτοι has been doubted, and is not, apparently, elsewhere so used in Plato (Kugler de part. τοί etc. p. 11), though often in Tragedy. Here too it strikes, I think, a lofty note ‘Wherefore let not any’ etc. θορυβήσῃ is also highly dramatic. All this parade is affected because it is a deduction from one of his own favourite commonplaces which Socrates is about to parry: see next note.

πάντες γὰρ κτλ. γὰρ ἄρα—a rare combination—occurs also in Prot. 315 D , Symp. 205 B (according to Ven. T, but the Bodleian reads γάρ), Laws 698 D. ἄρα indicates that the objector is quoting another man's view (II 358 C note), and the doctrine that all men desire the good was in point of fact a commonplace in the Platonic school. See for example Gorg. 468 A , Men. 77 C ff., Symp. 204 E and Rep. III 413 A, VI 505 D. Here, as always, Socrates would of course concede that all men desire the good; but we need the λογιστικόν in each act of desire to specify what the good really is (437 D note). Moreover, according to our present theory, the desire of good drink is the product of two desires, viz. (1) thirst or the desire of drink, and (2) the desire of good. That (2) is in a certain sense universal, does not alter the fact that the two desires are logically distinct. See on τοῦ δὲ—προσγιγνόμενα 437 E.

αὐτὰ ἕκαστα . αὐτά is ipsa, i.e. by themselves, alone, without qualification: cf. αὐτὰ—μόνα αὐτῶν μόνων in D and αὐτοῦ πώματος etc. 437 E. Plato now proceeds to establish the universality of his rule. It is obvious that the reasons for believing the rule true of ἐπιθυμία are confirmed if we can shew that it is true universally. The phraseology of this passage— πλήθους παρουσία, αὐτὰ ἕκαστα, αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη— is no doubt interesting for the light which it throws on the origin of the terminology adopted in the Theory of Ideas (cf. VI 507 B note): but we could make no greater mistake than to suppose that Plato is here speaking of hypostasized Ideas. Cf. Pfleiderer Zur Lösung etc. p. 19.

τὸ μεῖζον ‐‐ μεῖζον . Cf. (with Stallbaum) Charm. 168 B ff., where the nature of relative notions is similarly defined: also Gorg. 476 B ff.

τὰ βραδύτερα . Stallbaum and others read βραδύτερα without the article (on slight MS authority), but praestat lectio difficilior. Cf. εἴτε ἐγγείων εἴτε τῶν ζῴων VI 491 D. τά is certainly not wrong, and the variety of expression is pleasing: ‘and heavier also to lighter, and swifter to that which is slower—do they not stand to one another in this relation?’ i.e. such that if βαρύτερα, for example, is qualified, κουφότερα is qualified too.

ἐπιστήμη μὲν αὐτή . ‘Knowledge and nothing more,’ as opposed to knowledge plus some specification, e.g. astronomical knowledge, literary knowledge etc. It is interesting and instructive to study Parm. 134 A ff. side by side with this passage. There αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη has for its object τῆς ὃ ἔστιν ἀλήθεια, i.e. the Ideas; here we do not soar so high, for μαθήματος αὐτοῦ is only ‘learning and nothing more’ )( e.g. physical learning, classical learning, etc.

ἐπειδὴ ‐‐ κληθῆναι . Plato's theory is very clearly conceived. οἰκοδομικὴ ἐπιστήμη is a combination of αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη and οἰκοδομία: ἐπιστήμη correlates with μάθημα, οἰκοδομία with οἰκίας ἐργασία, so that ἐπιστήμη οἰκοδομική is ἐπιστήμη οἰκίας ἐργασίας μαθήματος: it is therefore ποίου τινός (i.e. in this case οἰκοδομικοῦ) μαθήματος. Cf. note on τοῦ δὲ—προσγιγνόμενα in 437 E.

τῶν ὑγιεινῶν καὶ νοσωδῶν . If we carry the analysis less far than Plato, we can still make the added determinants the same by saying that ἰατρικὴ ἐπιστήμη is of ἰατρικὸν μάθημα. But this will not suit with κακή, for ‘bad knowledge’ is not ‘knowledge of bad things’; nor does it—in many cases— apply to desires. Cf. 437 E note

αὐτοῦ οὗπερ ‐‐ ἐστίν : i.e. μαθήματος αὐτοῦ. αὐτοῦ is emphatic and contrasted with ποιοῦ τινός.

τὸ δὲ δὴ δίψος κτλ. Here begins the application of the argument on Relativity.

οὐ τούτων κτλ. : i.q. οὐ θήσεις τὸ δίψος εἶναι τοῦτο, ὄπερ ἐστί, τούτων τῶν τινός sitim esse id, quod est, inter ea s. tanquam unum eorum, quae alicuius sunt (Schneider). We must, I think, acquiesce in this interpretation, if the text is sound; but there is grave difficulty in taking εἶναι twice over, as Schneider virtually does (‘is that which it is, and is one of,’ etc.). I am strongly inclined to think that Plato wrote οὐ τούτων θήσεις τῶν τινός, <καὶ τινὸς> εἶναι τοῦτο ὅπερ ἐστὶν κτλ. With this emendation the meaning is: ‘Well now, about thirst, will you not place it in this category of things relative, and hold that it is what it is—that is, of course, thirst—relatively to something? Yes, said he, relatively to drink.’ τὰ τινός i.e. ‘the things relative to something’ for ‘the category of things relative,’ is further explained in καὶ τινὸς —ὅπερ ἐστίν. ἔγωγε answers the first part of Socrates' question, and πώματός γε the second. For other views on this passage see App. III.

δίψος δ) οὖν κτλ. δ) οὖν=‘however,’ as in I 337 C. The reading δ’ αὖ ( q and some other inferior MSS) is unpleasantly cacophonous before αὐτό .

οὐ γὰρ δὴ ‐‐ πράττει . See cr. n. Ast's emendation πράττει is preferable to inserting ἄν or changing δή to ἄν (with Schanz). The particle δή could ill be spared. The infinitive πράττειν is read by Galen ( de Hipp. et Plat. decr. V p. 488 ed. Kühn) and two inferior MSS. Those who retain the MS reading suppose that ἄν is carried on from ἕτερον ἂν εἴη; but the instances cited in support (I 352 E, II 360 C, 382 D, III 398 A) are very much easier than this. περὶ τὸ αὐτό refers of course to the object of the action in question: πῶμα for instance in a case of thirst. Note that Plato betrays a sense of the unity of soul when he uses the expressions αὐτὴν—διψῶσαν, and τό γε αὐτὸ—πράττει. So also in D below ᾧ λογίζεται sc. ἡ ψυχή. See on 435 A ff.

αὐτοῦ . See 428 A note The illustration, as Bosanquet conjectures, may have been suggested by Heraclitus' παλίντροπος ἀρμονίη ὄκωσπερ τόξου καὶ λύρης ( Fr. 45 B yw.).

οὐκ ἐθέλειν : ‘refuse’: cf. infra τὸ κωλῦον—κρατοῦν τοῦ κελεύοντος. So also Bosanquet ‘decline to drink.’

ἐνεῖναι δέ . The repetition of ἐνεῖναι with μέν and δέ has almost the force of a conjunction: cf. Phaed. 83 A ἀπάτης μὲν μεστὴ ἡ διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων σκέψις, ἀπάτης δὲ ἡ διὰ τῶν ὤτων. It is quite unnecessary to insert καὶ after δὲ (with Ast and Hartman). For the verbal play in κελεῦον —κωλῦον cf. III 406 B note

ὅταν ἐγγίγνηται ‐‐ παραγίγνεται . See cr. n. The present ἐγγίγνηται is, I think, necessary, and the corruption (through ἐγγίνηται) easy enough. ὄταν ἐγγένηται could scarcely mean ἑκάστοτε, which is the meaning here required. The subject to ἐγγίγνηται is τὸ κωλῦον. It is not hinted that ‘all men have not right reason’ (J. and C.), but only that there is not on every occasion a conflict between reason and desire. See 431 C and 437 D note Reason readily acquiesces when it is good to gratify desire. τὰ—ἄγοντα καὶ ἕλκοντα is translated by Jowett ‘that which bids and attracts’: but ἄγοντα is said like ἄγοντος in 439 B and ἕλκοντα is ‘dragging.’ The plural should also be retained in the translation, otherwise τὰ ἄγοντα may be identified with the ἐπιθυμητικόν, which would be a mistake, for the appetitive part of soul is certainly not produced by παθήματα of any kind. τὰ ἄγοντα καὶ ἔλκοντα are in reality ‘impulses leading and dragging’ the soul, impulses engendered by ‘particular conditions and diseases’ (not ‘passive states’ or ‘passion,’ etc. with the English translators), i.e. in other words by abnormal bodily states favourable to desires, as for example fevers etc.: cf. Phil. 45 A , B. These impulses are no doubt special instances of the action of ἐπιθυμητικόν, but should be distinguished from the appetitive principle itself.

λογιστικόν . The φιλόσοφον of II and III shewed itself in moral rather than in intellectual relations: see II 376 B note λογιστικόν, though as yet directed only to moral questions, is intellectual more than moral. Intellect gradually asserts its predominance over will until in Books VI and VII it achieves its final triumph. Cf. 439 E, 441 E notes

τὸ δὲ δὴ τοῦ θυμοῦ κτλ. Hitherto θυμοειδές has been chiefly the source of courage and the natural antithesis of φιλόσοφον (II 375 A ff., III 410 D, 411 C). It now enters on a wider sphere as the ally of λογιστικόν, and becomes, thus far, more intellectual, as Krohn points out: note also the ὀρθὴ δόξα of 430 B. Its ethical connotation is also intensified; for it is not now simply spirit, but the sentiment of moral indignation at everything evil— “ein edler Unwille über alles Schlechte” (Krohn Pl. St. p. 55)—everything which tends to destroy the πολιτεία ἐν ἡμῖν. It becomes in short, as Brandt ( Zur Entwick. d. Pl. Lehr. v. d. Seelentheilen p. 18) says truly enough though ponderously, “leidenschaftlicher Selbsterhaltungs- und Selbstvervollkommnungstrieb.” Cf. Simson der Begriff der Seele bei Plato p. 110, and see also on II 375 A.

ἴσως κτλ. The θνητὸν εἶδος ψυχῆς of the Timaeus includes both the θυμοειδές and the ἐπιθυμητικόν: see 69 C ff. and cf. Pol. 309 C . Similarly in the Phaedrus the two lower faculties are figured as the two horses, and the highest as the charioteer of the soul's chariot (253 D): cf. Simson l.c. p. 109 notes

ποτὲ ‐‐ τούτῳ . The antecedent of τούτῳ is τι: ‘having once heard something I trust to this,’ i.e. ‘I rely on an incident which I once heard.’ πιστεύω means that he relies on it for a proof; and ὡς ἄρα goes with ἀκούσας. So Schneider correctly explains the Greek. The precise force of πιστεύω τούτῳ has, I think, been missed by most of those who have suspected corruption. For τι there have been various conjectures: ἔτι (Madvig), ἄρτι (Liebhold Fl. Jahrb. 1888 p. 110), τινος (Zeller Archiv f. Gesch. d. Phil. II p. 694)—all superfluous, and the first two very weak; while Campbell suggests that οὐ has dropped before πιστεύω, taking τούτῳ to refer to Glauco's suggestion. But in that case τοῦτο would be necessary.

Αεόντιος . “Ad hunc Leontium eiusque insanam cupiditatem spectat depravatissimus Theopompi comici Καπηλίδων locus” (Herwerden Mn. N.S. XI p. 346). The fragment is emended by Kock ( Com. Att. Frag. I p. 739) into Αεωτροφίδης ὁ τρίμνεως ( trium librarum homo, i.e. levissimus) Αεοντίῳ | εὔχρως τε φαίνεται χαρίεις θ’ ὤσπερ vεκρός. Bergk was the first to connect the two passages.

ὑπὸ ‐‐ ἐκτός : ‘close to the outer side of the North wall.’ Cf. (with Stallbaum) Lys. 203 A τὴν ἔξω τείχους ὑπ’ αὐτὸ τὸ τεῖχος. The North wall was the outer of the two walls connecting Athens with the Piraeus; the other, or South wall, was called τὸ διὰ μέσου τεῖχος, because it lay between the βόρειον and the φαληρικόν, which connected Athens and the Phalerum. See Gorg. 455 E and the other authorities cited by Milchhöfer Schriftquellen zur Topographie von Athen pp. CXIII ff., and Curtius u. Kaupert Atlas von Athen Bl. II.

παρὰ ‐‐ κειμένους : ‘lying by’ or ‘near the executioner’; not of course ‘at the executioner's’ as has been suggested. When seen by Leontius, the hangman was engaged in throwing the bodies into the pit ( ὄρυγμα or βάραθρον, from which he was often called ὁ ἐπὶ s. πρὸς τῷ ὀρύγματι). The βάραθρον into which the bodies of executed criminals were thrown, was a deep ravine outside the walls, in the deme Κειριάδαι. Leontius would pass near it, just before entering the city (probably by the Μελιτίδες πύλαι): see Curtius u. Kaupert l.c. Bl. II. The place is still pointed out to visitors to Athens on the western declivity of the Hill of the Nymphs. For the ancient authorities see Milchhöfer l.c. pp. I—II. Various suggestions have been made for δημίῳ. Valckenaer's δημιείῳ is a coinage of his own, and otherwise objectionable; Αυκείῳ (also Valckenaer) is topographically impossible, and so is Διομείῳ (Hemsterhuis), if it has anything to do with the Διομηΐς πύλη. The explanation which I have given seems also to have been held by Milchhöfer, for he quotes the present passage among the authorities for the βάραθρον .

ὦ κακοδαίμονες . ‘Confound you!’

τὴν ὀργήν . q reads τὸν θυμόν, which Ast and others have preferred. But, as Schneider observes, ὀργή is to θυμός, as ἐπιθυμίαι to ἐπιθυμητικόν. If anger fights with desire, the source of anger, θυμοειδές, must be different from that of desire, ἐπιθυμητικόν. This is the whole moral of the anecdote, which is intended to establish the difference between θυμοειδές and ἐπιθυμητικόν only, not also λογιστικόν.

ταῖς δ) ἐπιθυμίαις κτλ. αὐτόν is τὸν θυμόν. ἀντιπράττειν “ad singularem aliquam actionem referendum est, quam ratio suscipere eaque in re sibi repugnare prohibeat, quasi dictum sit: μὴ δεῖν τι πράττειν καὶ τοῦτο δρῶντα ἀντιπράττειν” (Schneider). The words γενομένου τοῦ τοιούτου refer to ταῖς— κοινωνήσαντα. The anacoluthon is an easy one. Plato means merely that θυμός does not unite with the desires against the reason. For αἱροῦντος λόγου cf. X 604 C note On other views on this passage consult App. IV.

ὅσῳ ‐‐ ᾐ . The restriction will be noted. It is not οἱ γενναῖοι who, as the saying is, hate those whom they have injured.

οὐκ ἐν τούτῳ κτλ. : ‘does not he then fume and chafe—and fight on the side of what he believes to be just—both at hunger and at cold and all such inflictions, and bide his ground and conquer, abating not his noble indignation, until he has either achieved his purpose, or perished, or has been called back and soothed by the reason within him, as a herdsman recalls his dog?’ The words καὶ διὰ τὸ πεινῆν—πάσχειν must be taken with ζεῖ τε καὶ χαλεπαίνει, but possibly καὶ ξυμμαχεῖ τῷ δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ has been displaced, and we should read ζεῖ τε καὶ χαλεπαίνει καὶ διὰ τὸ πεινῆν—πάσχειν, καὶ ξυμμαχεῖ τῷ δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ, καὶ ὑπομένων κτλ. νικᾷ is not merely ‘tries to conquer’ or ‘perseveres’ (Schneider), but ‘conquers,’ in spite of the pardonable inconsistency of this translation with τελευτήση— πραυνθῆ. τῶν γενναίων cannot mean “in the case of the noble’ (P. Shorey A. J. Ph. XVI p. 237), unless θυμός is the subject of λήγει, which is not, I think, the case. The meaning is caught the more readily by reason of οὐχ ὅσῳ ἂν γενναιότερος ᾖ in C, and we ought not to substitute ἀγανακτῶν or the like with Richards. See on the whole passage App. V.

καίτοι γε =‘and surely’ has no adversative force here. See Kugler de part. τοι etc. p. 18. Hartman emends, but see on I 331 E.

ἦ. See cr. n. εἰ in direct interrogation is unclassical, and ἐρωτῶ cannot be supplied. Nor can εἰ well be taken as conditional (with Stallbaum) and τὸ ποῖον as a sudden interruption. For the confusion of ει and η see Introd. § 5.

ἀρτίως . 439 E.

τίθεσθαι κτλ. : ‘defends the rational element.’ I have retained the accusative on the strength of CIA II 317. 9 λαβόντος τοῦ δήμου τὰ ὄπλα ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθ <ερί> ας καὶ παρακαλοῦ <ν> τος καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας τίθεσθαι πρὸς τὴν πόλιν. The inscription dates from about 280 B.C. Other editors read τοῦ λογιστικοῦ (with Ξ alone among the MSS), but do not cite any example of the phrase τίθεσθαι τὰ ὄπλα πρός τινος, although πρός with the genitive is common enough in similar expressions. Thucydides (II 2. 4) has παρά with the accusative like πρός here. The original meaning of the idiom was to take up a position in arms by the side of: see Schneider's Xen. Anabasis pp. 537—540 and the commentators on Thuc. l.c. For the metaphor cf. Arist. Pol. Ath. 8. 5. F. K. Hertlein (quoted in Hartman) also defends the accusative, citing Aen. Polior. 4. 3 ἐτίθεντο τὰ ὅπλα παρὰ τοὺς πολεμίους ὡς παρὰ φιλίους.

ἐὰν μὴ κτλ. See App. IV.

ἐκεῖ : ‘in the other place,’ viz. III 390 D. If Kühn is to be trusted, Galen (Vol. V p. 500) does not, as Hartman asserts, omit the word; and there is no good reason for suspecting corruption.

ὁμολογεῖται . ὡμολογεῖται (sic) q^{1}: ὡμολόγηται q^{2} (with Stob. Flor. 9. 64). The present, ‘we pretty well agree,’ is satisfactory enough.

ἀνδρείαν . See cr. n., and for the error in A cf. IX 573 B note

ἔχειν is intransitive, and not transitive as D. and V. suppose.

ὥσπερ ἐλέγομεν . III 411 E —412 A. This passage enables us to identify the λογιστικόν with the φιλόσοφον of Books II—III. See on 439 D, and cf. Krohn Pl. St. p. 57.

τὸ μέν : i.e. τὸ λογιστικόν, as τὸ δέ is τὸ θυμοειδές. As the subject to the participles is κρᾶσις, we see again that Plato did not intend ‘Music’ and Gymnastic each to affect one part of Soul exclusively. It is curious however that the participles here describe the effect of music only: for it is music ( not gymnastic) which ἐπιτείνει τὸ φιλόσοφον: see on ὄπως ἂν—προσήκοντος III 411 E. The partial ignoring of gymnastic in this passage is perhaps premonitory of the intellectualism of VI and VII: cf. on 439 D and E.

ἀνλεῖσα κτλ. : ‘slackening the other by soothing address, taming it,’ etc. The three participles are not coordinate, but παραμυθουμένη explains the action of ἀνιεῖσα. It is unnecessary to desert the best MSS (as I once did) and read ἀνιεῖσα, παραμυθουμένη καὶ ἡμεροῦσα with Ξ v and the older editors.

προστατήσετον κτλ. Bekker's emendation—see cr. n.—is now generally accepted. τούτω means λογιστικόν and θυμοειδές: so also in B below. On ὃ δὴ πλεῖστον etc. see II 379 C note

καλουμένων κτλ. καλουμένων is said because such pleasures are no true pleasures: cf. I 336 A note and (for the implication itself) IX 583 B ff., Phil. 36 C ff. On οὐκ αὖ see 426 E note The imagery of this passage suggests that the ἐπιθυμητικόν is a sort of θηρίον: cf. IX 588 E ff.

ὧν ‐‐ γένει : sc. ἄρχειν. “Dativus causam indicat, cur tertiae parti non conveniat duabus reliquis praeesse et imperare, eamque in ipsius genere et indole positam demonstrat” (Schneider). If this is the meaning, we should expect φύσει rather than γένει. Perhaps Plato wrote γενῶν (so q Flor. U, Stallbaum etc.): cf. γένη in 441 C. To προσῆκον Campbell prefers προσῆκεν, but the present ( προσῆκον sc. ἐστίν) is better here.

φυλαττοίτην . The two higher parts of soul are to be φύλακες both of the lower part and (in a different sense) ‘also’ ( καί) ‘of external enemies’: cf. III 415 D, E. Dobree's φυλαττοίσθην fails to give its proper force to καί before τοὺς ἔξωθεν. For φυλάττω used in this way cf. II 367 A οὐκ ἂν ἀλλήλους ἐφυλάττομεν μη ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ ἦν ἕκαστος φύλαξ.

ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου . In this particular the analogy between the city and the soul is not quite exact, otherwise it would be the rulers in the city who prescribe τὸ δεινόν τε καὶ μή, whereas it is the legislator (see on ὁ νομοθέτης 429 C). This point is emphasized, perhaps unduly so, by Krohn ( Pl. St. p. 43). Unless Plato made the Deity the οἰκιστής of the soul, as the original legislator is of the city, it was impossible for him to avoid placing the λογιστικόν in a position of even greater authority than the rulers. In Books VI and VII the inequality is redressed by making the power of the Rulers in the city commensurate with that of λόγος in the soul: see VI 497 C note

ἦρχέν τε κτλ. : ‘ruled within him and issued these instructions.’ The imperfect is used because the instructions must be given before they can be obeyed by θυμοειδές, as described in the last sentence. J. and C. say that ἦρχε refers to 428 E; but Plato is not there speaking of the individual, only of the State. Although a reference to 439 C or 441 E is barely possible, it is much simpler to regard the imperfect as real, and not ‘philosophic.’ See above on III 406 E. Schneider, to judge from his translation, takes the same view. With σμικρῷ μέρει cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. X 7. 1177^{b} 34 ff. εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῷ ὄγκῳ μικρόν ἐστι (sc. τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ) κτλ.

αὖ κἀκεῖνο κτλ. αὖ καί has been interpreted (1) as implying that the θυμοειδές also has a sort of knowledge: cf. 429 C and 439 E note: (2) as ‘like the rulers in the State’: cf. 428 B ff. The first view is slightly more natural on linguistic grounds, but I think Plato would hardly have attributed ἐπιστήμη in any shape to the θυμοειδές. Probably (2) is right, for the analogy between the city and the soul is in Plato's mind all through this section: see 441 C, D, and 442 D.

ᾧ πολλάκις κτλ. : ‘in virtue of our oft-repeated maxim and in that way’: i.e. τῷ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν. Ficinus seems to have read καὶ ὡς after λέγομεν. At first sight καὶ οὔτως appears to demand the insertion; but Plato is speaking with less formality and precision than in 441 C, D. The reading of Vind. E καὶ οὗτος (for καὶ οὔτως), i.e. ‘the individual, as well as the city,’ is attractive, but unnecessary. Hartman proposes ᾧ <πόλιν> πολλάκις <ἐ> λέγομεν, τούτῳ καὶ οὗτος ἔσται, a solution which will commend itself to few.

μή πῃ ‐‐ εἶναι . ‘Do we find Justice growing dimmer in any way? Does it appear something different from what it was discovered to be in the city?’ lit. ‘blunted, so as to appear’ etc. In the language of 434 D (to which Socrates' question refers) Justice has now ‘passed into’ the Individual; and no feature has been blunted, or lost its clearness of outline. We are therefore confirmed in our view of Justice, both civic and individual. Hartman would read ἀπήμβλυνται, taking ἡμῖν as ‘by us,’ but the present is more expressive, and (with ἡμῖν) represents us as in a certain sense spectators of the selfevolution of Justice: cf. ἐὰν μὲν ἡμῖν καὶ εἰς ἕνα ἰὸν τὸ εἶδος τοῦτο κτλ. 434 D. ἀπαμβλύνεται=‘retunditur’ (Schneider).

τὰ φορτικά . Plato tests his view of Justice by four criteria taken as it were de foro and turning on various popular associations of the word: cf. IX 573 B ff. Of these the first three are concerned with honesty and trustworthiness in public and private life; while the last ( μοιχεῖαι—ἀθεραπευσίαι) refers to morality in general, including the service of the gods. Taken together, they sum up the leading features of the perfect character, and shew that Plato's conception of private, as of political, Justice is in reality Righteousness or Moral Perfection, whereof the other virtues are the fruit. Plato's innovation lay in interpreting Righteousness as τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν, or rather in the peculiar meaning which he attached to this phrase: see on 434 C and infra 443 B note

παρακαταθήκην χρυσίου κτλ. Honesty and truthfulness were generally recognised as characteristic of the δίκαιος ἀνήρ: see the passages collected by Nägelsbach Nachhom. Theol. pp. 240—246.

τοῦτο αὐτόν . See cr. n. “Fortasse Plato τοῦτον αὐτό scripsit” (Schneider).

ἱεροσυλιῶν ‐‐ προδοσιῶν . See Nägelsbach l.c. pp. 293 ff., 298 f.

ἄπιστος ‐‐ κατἁ ὅρκους . εὐορκία was an indispensable element in Greek morality: see Nägelsbach l.c. p. 242, and the interesting monograph of Augustin Der Eid im Gr. Volksglauben u. in d. Pl. Ethik Elbing 1894.

μοιχεῖαι ‐‐ ἀθεραπευσίαι . Nägelsbach l.c. pp. 264 ff., 275 ff., 191 ff. The virtue of εὐσέβεια was commonly regarded as δικαιοσύνη ἡ τερὶ τοὺς θεούς (e.g. Euthyph. 12 E ), and εὐσέβεια is concerned with θεῶν θερατεία. See Euthyph. l.c. and cf. also the Stoic Zeno in D. L. VII 119 εἶναί τε τὴν εὐσέβειαν ἐπιστήμην θεῶν θεραπείας, and Sext. Emp. adv. Math. IX 123.

τέλεον κτλ. The language is suggested by Homer's οὐκ ὄναρ, ἀλλ’ ὕπαρ ἐσθλόν, ὅ τοι τετελεσμένον ἔσται ( Od. XIX 547). ὅ is a vague internal accusative: see on ἣν ᾠήθημεν in 434 D.

ἔφαμεν κτλ. The reference is to 433 A. On οἰκίζειν see III 407 B note For κινδυνεύομεν Hartman suggests ἐκινδυνεύομεν; but presents do not of course become imperfects in indirect.

τὸ δέ γε : ‘yes, but in point of fact.’ For τὸ δέ in this sense cf. I 340 D note τὸ δέ γε ἀληθές below expresses the same meaning more fully and emphatically.

δἰ ὃ ‐‐ οὕτως . The imperfect ὠφέλει (see cr. n.), ‘for which reason also it was of service to us,’ viz. in discovering the real or original justice, seems to me better than the present. See II 368 D ff. Plato is justifying himself for having taken so much trouble about a mere εἴδωλον; it was in order to learn the original through the copy. So also Hartman. The present could only mean ‘benefits the city’ (so Schneider, Rettig and others). Madvig, strangely enough, suspects the whole phrase. Civic Justice is an εἴδωλον of Justice in the soul as being its reflection in outward conduct. See also on 443 B ff. above.

τοιοῦτο takes its meaning from τὸ τὸν μὲν σκυτοτομικόν etc. ‘Justice was indeed something of this kind’ (i.e. a sort of τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν), but not περὶ τὴν ἔξω πρᾶξιν. The warning conveyed by εἶδος and τρόπον τινά in 433 A (where see note), 433 B and 432 E is now justified: for Justice is said to be περὶ τὴν ἐντὸς πρᾶξιν, and is therefore not, strictly speaking, that which we have called ‘Civic Justice.’

ὡς ἀληθῶς should be construed with περὶ ἑαυτόν. The soul is the true self, as Socrates continually maintained. It is better to regard περί before ἑαυτόν as coordinate with περί in περὶ τὴν ἐντός, than to translate “with internal actions which are in very truth concerned with himself” (J. and C.). ὡς ἀληθῶς περὶ ἑαυτόν etc. merely emphasizes and explains περὶ τὴν ἐντός.

ἕκαστον . Ast would read ἕκαστον τῶν; but the meaning is easily caught after τὰ ἑαυτοῦ just before.

τῷ ὄντι κτλ. : ‘having set his house in order in the truest sense.’ So Schneider, rightly. For οἰκεῖα cf. III 405 B note

ξυναρμόσαντα ‐‐ ἡρμοσμένον . Cf. 432 A, where a similar image is employed. The figure here is taken from the Octachord, the λογιστικόν being represented by the ὑπάτη or highest string (which gave out the lowest note), the ἐπιθυμητικόν by the νεάτη (an octave higher in pitch), and the θυμοειδές by the μέση or fourth. See Dict. Ant. II p. 195 or Gleditsch Die Musik d. Gr. p. 860. The single notes of a ἁρμονία could be called ὅροι because they were in reality terms in a proportion and depended on the relative length of the string: cf. Tim. 35 B , C. Hartman's correction of νεάτης, ὑπάτης, μέσης to νεάτην, ὑπάτην, μέσην is very attractive: for the genitives can only be explained as ὅρον νεάτης etc., and the effect is unpleasing, especially with ἁρμονίας coming between. Retaining the Greek nomenclature, we may translate: ‘having harmoniously joined together three different elements, just like three terms in a musical proportion or scale, lowest and highest and intermediate,’ etc. In ἄλλα ἄττα μεταξύ Plato indicates (as J. and C. observe) that his threefold division of soul may not be ‘strictly exhaustive’ (cf. VIII 548 D note). The missing faculties would thus correspond to the notes intervening between the ὑπάτη and μέση, and the μέση and νεάτη. It will be noted that the unity resulting is not that of unison, but that of a scale or mode. Nevertheless it is clear from the language used that the ἁρμονία which Plato describes is, as before, σωφροσύνη: cf. ἄρξαντα αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ with 431 A, B, φίλον γενόμενον with 442 C; κοσμήσαντα too suggests κοσμιότης, and the word σώφρονα itself is finally employed. Cf. 434 C note A different explanation is given by the Scholiast. Holding that Plato is referring to a system of two octaves ( δὶς διὰ πασῶν) he explains νεάτη, μέση and ὑπάτη as e.g. A', A, and b (not a, which is the προσλαμβανόμενος). His note is as follows: νεάτη ἤγουν νήτη ὑπερβολαίων ἡ ἐσχάτη χορδὴ τοῦ δὶς διὰ πασῶν συστήματος, ὑπάτη δὲ ἡ μετὰ τὸν προλαμβανόμενον (leg. προσλαμβανόμενον) φθόγγον πρώτη χορδὴ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τοῦ δὶς διὰ πασῶν συστήματος. μέση δὲ καὶ αὐτὴ ἤτοι φθόγγος ἢ χορδὴ ἡ τελευταία μὲν τοῦ πρώτου διὰ πασῶν, ἀρχὴ δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου, ὡς εἶναι τούτων κοινήν, ὡς Πτολεμαῖός τέ φησι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι μουσικοί. But in the δὶς διὰ πασῶν σύστημα, the ὑπάτη is not σύμφωνος with the νήτη ὑπερβολαίων, although the προσλαμβανόμενος of course is (see Gleditsch l.c. p. 861 and Euclid Sect. Can. 10 ed. von Jan): so that according to the Scholiast there is a serious breach of συμφωνία. It seems to me quite clear that in ὥσπερ ὅρους τρεῖς—μέσης Plato is thinking of three ξύμφωνοι φθόγγοι, and in the single octave or διὰ πασῶν, the ὑπάτη, μέση or fourth, and νεάτη were σύμφωνα ἀλλήλοις: see Cleonid. Isag. Harm. 5 ed. von Jan. In 432 A also, Plato contemplates only a single octave: see note ad loc.

ἕνα ‐‐ πολλῶν . Cf. 423 D note and [ Epin.] 992 B ἐκ πολλῶν ἕνα γεγονότα. The phrase εἷς ἐκ πολλῶν is a sort of Platonic motto or text (like the φωναί of post-Aristotelian ethics).

οὕτω δὴ ‐‐ ἤδη : emphatic, as Hirzel points out ( Hermes VIII p. 393): for the just man will not take part in practical affairs until he has ordered his own soul aright. Cf. Alc. I 113 B ff., Ap. 36 C , and Xen. Mem. III 7. 9 , IV 3. 1.

ἢ καί . Stallbaum and others add περί (with Ξ) before πολιτικόν, but τι πράττῃ περὶ πολιτικόν τι is very unpleasing. πολιτικόν depends directly on πράττῃ and is equivalent to περὶ πόλιν. The slight variety of expression is easy and elegant after ἢ καί ‘aut etiam.’

ἐπιστήμην ‐‐ δόξαν . This is, as Krohn points out ( Pl. St. p. 68), the first precise and explicit separation of ἐπιστήμη and δόξα in the Republic. Each of them, however, is still concerned with conduct, and not, as in the end of V, with the theory of knowledge.

τυγχάνει ‐‐ ὄν =‘really is’: I 337 B note

ἀδικίαν . Now that we have discovered Justice, it is necessary to look for Injustice, in order that we may compare the two and decide the question at issue, viz. πότερον δεῖ κεκτῆσθαι τὸν μέλλοντα εὐδαίμονα εἶναι, ἐάν τε λανθάνῃ ἐάν τε μὴ πάντας θεούς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους (427 D: cf. II 368 E note). The full exposition of Injustice is reserved for Books VIII and IX, where Plato takes the subject in its proper order, considering civic injustice first, and afterwards that of the individual. At present he contents himself with a preliminary or exoteric sketch of Injustice in the soul, representing it as unrighteousness in general, just as Justice, both in the State and in the individual, has been identified with righteousness or moral perfection (434 C, 442 E notes).

ἀλλὰ τοιούτου ‐‐ ὄντι . See cr. n. The reading of Ξ and other inferior MSS, which (in common with all the editors) I have printed above, seems to be an attempt to emend the older and more difficult reading preserved in Α and Π. Stallbaum supposes that A here represents a corruption of Ξ, αὖ δουλεύειν being presumably a correction (of αὐτῳ δουλεύειν) which has crept into the text; but this is unlikely in itself, and also leaves τοῦ δ) before αὖ δουλεύειν unexplained. The text of Ξ is not in itself quite satisfactory, as Richards has pointed out. οἵου πρέπειν αὐτῷ for ὥστε πρέπειν αὐτῷ seems unexampled, although οἵου δουλεύειν would of course be right. The expression τῷ τοῦ ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὄντι, ‘that which is of the ruling class,’ is also curious for the more direct and accurate τῷ ἀρχικῷ γένει. The reading of A and Π yields no tolerable sense, and certainly cannot come from Plato. Madvig (with Vind. E) proposes οἵου πρέπειν αὐτῷ δουλεύειν, τὸ δ’ αὖ <μὴ> δουλεύειν ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὄντι, which is intelligible, if weak. I have thought of οἵου πρέπειν αὐτῷ δουλεύειν, τῷ δ’ αὖ βουλεύειν (or δεσπόζειν, after Schneider) ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὄντι, but there are obvious objections. I should not be surprised if the whole clause ἀλλὰ —ὄντι, as it appears in A and Π, is only an attempt by some illiterate scribe to work out the antithesis of προσῆκον: lit. ‘being by nature such as to be proper for it to be a slave, and the slavery again to that which is of the ruling class.’ The clause, even as read in Ξ, adds nothing to the sense, and the references in τοιαῦτ’ ἄττα and τούτων just below are caught more easily without the obnoxious words. See 442 B ἄρχειν ἐπιχειρήσῃ ὧν οὐ προσῆκον αὐτῷ γένει. Cf. III 413 C note

τούτων : sc. τῶν γενῶν.

ταὐτὰ ‐‐ ταῦτα . μὲν οὖν corrects τοιαῦτ’ ἄττα: “immo haec eadem” (Schneider). For ταὐτά some prefer, with one MS of Stobaeus Flor. 9. 64, αὐτά (‘immo haec ipsa’), others τοιαῦτα, but there is not sufficient reason for deserting A.

δίκαια ‐‐ ἐμποιεῖ . Krohn ( Pl. St. p. 59) reminds us of Arist. Eth. Nic. II 1. 1103^{a} 34 ff. τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντες δίκαιοι γινόμεθα κτλ. On the Socratic analogy between body and soul cf. II 380 B note

ὑγίειαν ποιεῖν . Ξ (with a few other MSS) reads ἐμποιεῖν; and Stallbaum and others adopt this reading. ποιεῖν, ‘to produce,’ is however satisfactory: cf. 422 A.

τὸ δὲ νόσον ‐‐ ὑπ) ἄλλου . Here and in Tim. 82 A ff. Plato adopts the Hippocratean theory of the origin of disease: see de nat. hom. VI p. 40 c. 4 Littré ὑγιαίνει μὲν οὖν μάλιστα, ὁκόταν μετρίως ἔχῃ ταῦτα (sc. αἷμα καὶ φλέγμα καὶ χολὴ ξανθή τε καὶ μέλαινα) τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα κρήσιός τε καὶ δυνάμιος καὶ τοῦ πλήθεος, καὶ μάλιστα μεμιγμένα ᾖ. ἀλγέει δὲ ὁκόταν τι τουτέων ἔλασσον ἢ πλέον ᾖ ἢ χωρισθῇ ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ μὴ κεκρημένον ᾖ τοῖσι ξύμπασιν (Poschenrieder die pl. dial. in ihr. Verhältnisse zu d. Hippokr. Schr. p. 37). Cf. also Pl. Symp. 186 D with Hug ad loc. On κατὰ φύσιν see 443 B note

κάλλος ‐‐ εὐεξία : with reference perhaps to Thrasymachus' statement in I 348 E f. that Injustice is καλόν and ἰσχυρόν.

τὸ δὴ λοιπὸν κτλ. ‘What remains for us now to enquire is whether,’ etc. For the position of ἡμῖν cf. that of πάντων in 445 B. Herwerden suggests τόδε or τόδε δή, neither of which is necessary.

πότερον αὖ κτλ. See I 354 B, C, and note on 444 A.

ἐάν τε λανθάνῃ . Cf. 427 D and II 367 E.

βελτίων ‐‐ κολαζόμενος . II 380 B note

ᾧ ζῶμεν . Cf. I 353 D τί δ) αὖ τὸ ζῆν; ψυχῆς φήσομεν ἔργον εἶναι; μάλιστά γε and note ad loc. βιωτὸν ἄρα ἔσται should not be made interrogative. The sentence means: ‘if life, which men deem unbearable when the bodily constitution decays, even when they are surrounded by every variety of food and drink and wealth and power, shall be, forsooth, when tumult and decay affect the constitution of the very principle whereby we live, worth living, if so be we do what we desire, and take no steps to escape from wickedness and injustice, and acquire justice and virtue.’ Life is not (says Plato) βιωτός to the guilty man who works his will; it may become so if he takes steps to rid himself of vice, i.e. ἐὰν διδῷ δίκην καὶ βελτίων γίγνηται κολαζόμενος. For the sentiment cf. Crit. 47 D , E, Gorg. 477 B —E, Prot. 313 A , B.

ὅσον ‐‐ σαφέστατα . “Quam certissime fieri potest” is Ficinus' rendering, with which Schneider and later editors agree, taking κατιδεῖν as explanatory of ἐνταῦθα. But it is hard to find another instance of ὅσον οἶόν τε, although καθ’ ὅσον οἷόν τε and ὅσον δυνατόν (Thuc. I 22. 2) occur. ὡς οἷόν τε is the almost invariable phrase. For ὅσον Stephanus proposed ὅθεν, Ast ὅπου. I think the meaning is ‘now that we have come far enough to be able most clearly to descry that these things are so,’ ἐνταῦθα being equivalent to ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον, and ὅσον οἷόν τε to ὅσον ἐλθόντας οἷόν τέ ἐστιν.

ἀποκνητέον . I have reverted to the MS reading. Bekker's emendation ἀποκμητέον is very attractive, but ἀποκνητέον gives excellent sense (cf. I 349 A), and there is no real reason why Glauco should repeat the word employed by Socrates (see on V 465 E); nor does there appear to be any instance in Greek literature of the verbal of ἀποκάμνω.

ἄξια θέας . Plato does not claim that his enumeration of degenerate commonwealths is complete. Cf. VIII 544 D.

ἓν ‐‐ κακίας . An old Pythagorean principle, whence the parade with which Plato announces it. See Arist. Met. I 5. 986^{a} 22 ff. (RP.^{7} § 55) and Eth. Nic. I 4. 1096^{b} 6 with Stewart's note.

εἴδη ἔχοντες : ‘having’ (i.e. as we should say ‘forming’) ‘specific kinds’: cf. VIII 544 D.

ἐγγενομένου ‐‐ ἀριστοκρατία . Knowledge, not number, is the criterion of good government: cf. Pol. 292 C . Hitherto however the rulers have always been represented as a plurality, and we have heard nothing of a king. In the later books (from V 473 C onwards) we often hear of kingship; and in IX 576 D (as Newman points out Politics of Aristotle I p. 413 note) the ideal city is called βασιλευομένην, οἵαν τὸ πρῶτον διήλθομεν. With the present passage cf. VII 540 D ἢ πλείους ἢ εἷς and IX 587 D, where the ἀριστοκρατικός and the βασιλικός are identified. The fact is, as Henkel has pointed out ( Stud. zur Gesch. d. gr. Lehr. v. St. p. 57), that “Kingship is only a form of Aristocracy throughout the whole political theory of antiquity, and rests on no distinct and independent basis of its own.” It must be regarded as exceptional when in the Politicus (302 C ff.), probably a later dialogue, Plato distinguishes between kingship and aristocracy and places aristocracy on a lower plane. See also Whibley Gk. Olig. pp. 15 ff.

τῶν ‐‐ νόμων . For the genitive cf. (with Stallbaum) Gorg. 514 A δημοσίᾳ πράξοντας τῶν πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων, and infra VI 485 B.

ἰδιωτῶν ‐‐ κατασκευήν : ‘the organization of the character of the individual soul.’ ψυχῆς was doubted by Ast; but cf. IV 445 C τοσοῦτοι κινδυνεύουσι καὶ ψυχῆς τρόποι εἶναι, and for the collocation of genitives VII 525 C αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ῥᾳστώνης μεταστροφῆς, VIII 544 D, 559 E, 560 B, Tim. 24 B and other cases in Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 289. ψυχῆς τρόπου is practically a single word like ‘soul-character’ (“Seelenbeschaffenheit” Schneider).

σμικρὸν κτλ. explains ἐκτείνας τὴν χεῖρα: ‘paullo longius ab Adimanto, quam clandestinum colloquium requirebat’ or ‘paullo remotior, quam reliqui a suis vicinis,’ not “a little further away from Socrates than Adimantus” (J. and C.): for “cur propterea manum protenderit et Adimantum attraxerit, non apparet” (Schneider).

τί μάλιστα κτλ. ‘What particular thing is it that you decline to let off?’ ‘You,’ said he. ‘Because of what particular remark of mine?’ (lit. ‘because I said what in particular?’) There is not, as J. and C. suppose, a play on the two senses of τί μάλιστα — cur potissimum and quid potissimum: for it must be observed that ἀφήσομεν has no expressed object, and Socrates could not have known that it was intended to refer to him. The removal of the commas usually printed after ὅτι and εἶπον restores sense, I think, to the remainder of this passage. ἔτι for ὅτι (see cr. n.) can scarcely stand, for ἔτι ἐγὼ εἶπον cannot mean ‘I repeated’ (Jowett), nor can we read ἔτι, ἐγὼ εἶπον, τί μάλιστα ‘once more, said I’ etc. In none of the parallels hitherto cited does ἔτι mean merely ‘once more’ or ‘again.’ Those who print ὅτι, ἐγὼ εἶπον, τί μάλιστα (Stallbaum) mostly take ὅτι—τί μάλιστα as in I 343 A ὅτι δὴ τί μάλιστα; ἦν δ’ ἐγώ. Ὅτι κτλ. But in such cases (as Schneider points out) there must be a second ὅτι to introduce the answer, and here there is not.

ἐκκλέπτειν = ‘to cheat out of’ as in μὴ—ἐκκλέψῃς λόγον Soph. Trach. 436 f.: see Jebb ad loc.

κοινὰ τὰ φίλων . See IV 423 E, 424 A notes κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων is preferred by Ast and Stallbaum (with two late MSS), but the shorter form is far more racy of the soil, and occurs also in Lys. 207 C , Laws 739 C (Schneider on IV 424 A).

καὶ ὅλῃν κτλ. : i.e. καὶ ἐξηγήσεσθαι or the like, supplied from μνησθήσεσθαι. The construction cannot (as J. and C. suggest) go back to μὴ οὖν παρῇς.

μέγα κτλ. καί after φέρειν=‘or rather’ (atque) as in ὀλίγου τινὸς—καὶ οὐδενός ( Ap. 23 A ). For γιγνόμενον Liebhold proposes γιγνομένην, but see on IV 427 D. The feminine would be awkward after πολιτείαν, and κοινωνίαν—παίδων, though grammatically feminine, is logically neuter.

ἄλλης ‐‐ πολιτείας is explained by ᾖα τὰς ἐφεξῆς ἐρῶν (449 A). Stallbaum makes a curious slip: “quoniam ad alias πολιτείας partes considerandas celeriter accedis.”

τίθετε . Glauco addresses both Polemarchus and Adimantus. There is no occasion to write τίθει (with Hartman).

οἶον ‐‐ εἰργάσασθε κτλ. Chiappelli ( Riv. di Filologia etc. XI p. 195) finds in this and the following sentences a vaticinium ex eventu of Aristophanes' Ecclesiazusae. But the word παρῆκα shews that the ἐσμὸς λόγων does not refer to swarms of adverse criticism, but merely to the topics which Socrates must now discuss. See App. I, and (on the subject in general) Laws 779 E.

τότε . IV 423 E.

ἃ νῦν ὑμεῖς κτλ. : ‘in appealing to these topics now you’ etc. παρακαλοῦντες means literally ‘calling to you’: “das ruft ihr nun herbei” (Schneider). This interpretation is in harmony with ἐπεγείρετε, and gives the right antithesis to ἐάσοι. Neither “excitantes” (Ast), nor “in disputationem vocantes” (Stallbaum) is quite accurate. J. and C. give two alternative renderings (1) “and in now calling in this fresh argument,” (2) “and in now urging me to this.” But the antecedent can only be ταῦτα.

χρυσοχοήσοντας κτλ. Socrates shudders at the swarm of λόγοι to be encountered. ‘Why,’ says Thrasymachus, ‘it was precisely to listen to λόγοι, and not to smelt ore for gold, that we came here.’ χρυσοχοεῖν is a proverbial expression said of those who neglect their proper duty for some more fascinating— if less profitable—pursuit. Cf. Harpocr. s.v. χρυσοχοεῖον: Δείναρχος ἐν τῷ κατὰ Πυθέου· πάλιν παρ’ Αἰσχίνην ἀποφοιτήσας παρὰ τούτῳ δῆλον ὅτι χρυσοχοεῖν ἐμάνθανεν, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸ προκείμενον αὐτὸ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν. Here τὸ προκείμενον is λόγων ἀκούειν. The origin of the proverb is thus explained. A heap of gold-dust having been discovered on Hymettus, the Athenian populace deserted their usual avocations, and sallied out to seize it. But as it was guarded ὑπὸ τῶν μαχίμων μυκτήρων (cf. Hdt. III 102 ff. with the parallels cited by Stein), they failed. On returning ἔσκωπτον ἀλλήλους λέγοντες ‘σὺ δὲ ᾤου χρυσοχοήσειν.’ Cf. Suidas s.v. and Leutsch u. Schneidewin Paroem. Gr. I p. 464, II pp. 91, 727. A gloss in Bekker's Anec. Gr. I p. 316 (cited by Schneider) explains χρυσοχοεῖν in Dinarchus as proverbial for πορνεύειν; but it cannot have so offensive a meaning here, for (among other reasons) Thrasymachus and Socrates are now reconciled. Ast's explanation “aurum fundere proverbialiter dicitur, quem magna, quam animo conceperat, spes frustratur” expresses only one side of the proverb: the other—neglecting the duty which lies nearest—is more important and relevant here. “To find an Eldorado” (Warren) may perhaps meet the case. Thomas Gray's explanation is not altogether right: “a proverbial expression used of such as are idly employed or sent (as we say) on a fool's errand.”

μέτρον δὲ κτλ. An argumentum ad hominem, for the sentiment is Socratic: cf. VI 504 C. δέ γε=‘yes, but’ helps to bring out this point. ἀκούειν is the common epexegetic infinitive: cf. III 407 B note To insert τοῦ before τοιούτων (with Herwerden and Richards) is both unnecessary and inelegant.

τὸ μὲν ἡμἑτερον ἔα : ‘never mind us’: we are equal to a long discourse (so also J. and C.).

τῷ μεταξὺ χρόνῳ . The interval between γένεσις and παιδεία is nowhere defined in the Republic: in Laws 794 C it is reckoned at six years. For the regulations applying to this period see infra 460 B—D, and cf. Laws 788 D ff.

οὖν . See cr. n. It is admitted that Π is independent of A, so that οὖν (which most MSS have) may well be right. The tendency to confuse οὖν and ἄν may help to explain A's variants οὔκουν and οὐκ ἂν οὖν in I 333 E. Baiter reads δή. The confusion of ἄν and δή occurs no doubt in MSS, but its frequency has been much exaggerated, as for instance in Cl. Rev. VI p. 338.

ὦ εὔδαιμον . Cf. IV 422 E note

μὴ εὐχὴ κτλ. For εὐχή=an impossible aspiration, a Utopian or chimerical proposal, cf. 456 C, VII 540 D and see Susemihl and Hicks on Arist. Pol. B 1. 1260^{b} 29.

ἀγνώμονες : i.q. ἀνεπιστήμονες, as explained (with reference to this passage) in Bekker's Anec. Gr. I p. 334: cf. Phaedr. 275 A . Hence φρονίμοις in E below. The more usual meaning, ‘inconsiderate,’ ‘unkind,’ is less suitable here on account of δύσνοι.

φίλων κτλ. φίλων though neuter is of course intended to balance φίλοις. The conjecture φιλτάτων (Richards, Hartman) destroys the balance and is in itself superfluous: see Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 23. Note the characteristic chiasmus ἀσφαλὲς καὶ θαρραλέον—φοβερόν τε καὶ σφαλερόν.

ὀφλεῖν κτλ. The infinitive depends on φοβερόν, and is like the infinitive after φοβοῦμαι. In the antithetical clause Plato substitutes the more usual construction with μή. The future indicative ( κείσομαι) is rare after words of fearing (Goodwin MT. p. 132), and represents the danger as imminent. To regard οὔ τι γέλωτα ὀφλεῖν as a reference to the Ecclesiazusae is rash and unjustifiable: see App. I.

προσκυνῶ κτλ. The apology looks forward, and not backward; whence δέ rather than δή (which Herwerden would read).

Ἀδράστειαν . Adrasteia was originally, perhaps, a personification of ἀνάγκη in its relation to humanity and the issues of human conduct. This meaning survived in the Orphic theology (Abel Orph. Fr. 36, 109—111) and appears in Phaedr. 248 C . Specifically, she was viewed as a variety of Nemesis, θεά τις τοὺς ὑπερηφάνους τιμωροῦσα (Schol. on Aesch. Prom. 936 ), and in this sense Aeschylus (l.c.) writes οἱ προσκυνοῦντες τὴν Ἀδράστειαν σοφοί (the first mention of Adrasteia in Greek literature). Adrasteia is in a still more special sense the punisher of proud words; so that προσκυνῶ Ἀδράστειαν becomes, as here, a sort of apologetic preface to a bold assertion or rash utterance: cf. Eur. Rhes. 342 , 468 ( ξὺν δ’ Ἀδραστείᾳ λέγω). See Nägelsbach Nachhom. Theol. p. 47 and Seymour in the Proceedings of the Amer. Philol. Assoc. for July 1891 pp. XLVIII ff.

ἐλπίζω κτλ. ἐλπίζω is ‘I fancy,’ not ‘I expect’: cf. II 383 B note The omission of εἶναι is curious: Madvig would restore it after ἁμάρτημα. I can find no parallel to its omission with ἐλπίζω, but οἴομαι, ἡγοῦμαι and other verbs of thinking often dispense with it. For examples see Schanz Nov. Comm. Pl. p. 34.

καλῶν κτλ. : “concerning noble and good and just institutions” (D. and V.), not “about the beautiful, the good, and the just, in the matter of laws” (J. and C.). The latter explanation gives a good sense, but it is harsh to separate δικαίων from νομίμων, and still harsher to take καλῶν as equivalent to περὶ καλῶν. Schneider was inclined to treat δικαίων as a gloss on νομίμων. But ‘about things beautiful and good and institutions’ is an anti-climax; and, besides, it is of institutions in conjunction with, not as distinct from, justice etc. that Plato is about to speak. In his translation Schneider takes the right view.

εὖ . q has οὐκ εὖ, an obvious but audacious correction, suggested, no doubt, by καλῶς εἶχεν ἡ παραμυθία in 450 D. εὖ is ironical. Glauco had comforted Socrates by saying inter alia that his hearers were friendly ( οὔτε δύσνοι οἱ ἀκουσόμενοι 450 D). Excellent comfort! says Socrates: I had rather, in the circumstances, that they were enemies! Stallbaum and others read οὐκ εὖ, and Hermann οὐ, for εὖ, thinking the irony misplaced; but Glauco's smile ( γελάσας) favours the ironical interpretation, and so does the ‘Socratic irony’ with which the whole sentence is overflowing. I agree with J. and C. in rejecting the pointless alternative rendering ‘you do well to comfort me.’

ὥσπερ φόνου κτλ. See cr. n. καί before καθαρόν is absent from the great majority of MSS and can scarcely, I think, be sound: for the difference in meaning between καθαρόν and μὴ ἀπατεῶνα is hardly enough to carry off the double καί. ὥσπερ belongs to the whole expression φόνου καθαρόν, which is virtually one word. Hartman would expunge καὶ μὴ ἀπατεῶνα ἡμῶν, but it is quite in Plato's way to subjoin the interpretation of a metaphor or simile (cf. 470 C, VIII 553 D, 555 D, and my note on Prot. 314 A ), nor have we any right to excise such expressions wholesale, as many Dutch critics would do (especially J. J. Hartman de embl. in Pl. text. obviis 1898).

ἐκεῖ : viz. in cases of φόνος ἀκούσιος (so Schneider, Stallbaum, etc.), not (with D. and V.) ‘in the next world.’ κἀνθάδε is relevant only if it means ‘in this case too,’ i.e. ἐν τῷ ἀπατεῶνα εἶναι καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν κτλ.: and this fixes the meaning of ἐκεῖ.

ὡς ὁ νόμος λέγει is explained by Dem. πρὸς Πανταίνετον 58 καὶ γὰρ ἀκούσιοι φόνοι—καὶ πολλὰ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα γίγνεται· ἀλλ’ ὅμως ἁπάντων τούτων ὅρος καὶ λύσις τοῖς παθοῦσι τέτακται τὸ πεισθέντας ἀφεῖναι, and ib. 59. See also Laws 869 E.

ἀνδρεῖον δρᾶμα κτλ. There is probably a playful allusion to the mimes of Sophron, as was first pointed out by R. Förster in Rhein. Mus. XXX (1875) p. 316. According to Suidas (s.v. Σώφρων) and others, Sophron's mimes were classified as ἀνδρεῖοι μῖμοι and γυναικεῖοι μῖμοι. In the former, as may be inferred from Choricius' Defence of Mimes (first published by Graux in Revue de Philologie 1 pp. 209 ff.) Sophron represented male characters, in the latter female ( μιμεῖται μὲν ἄνδρας, μιμεῖται δὲ γύναια ib. p. 215). This is corroborated by many of the titles of his plays, such as ὁ ἀγροιώτας, ὁ θυνναθήρας, ὁ ἄγγελος contrasted with ταὶ ἀκ<*>στρίαι, ἁ νυμφόπονος, ἁ πενθερά etc. Sophron's mimes are called δράματα (cf. ἀνδρεῖον δρᾶμα) by Demetrius περὶ ἑρμηνείας § 156 σχεδόν τε πάσας ἐκ τῶν δραμάτων αὐτοῦ τὰς παροιμίας ἐκλέξαι ἐστίν. The point here is that just as custom required an ἀνδρεῖος μῖμος to precede a γυναικεῖος—this is not otherwise attested, so far as I can discover—, so it will be proper ( ὀρθῶς ἂν ἔχοι) for Plato's women to come on the stage after his men have played their part. Plato's partiality for Sophron is frequently mentioned by ancient authors, as for example by D. L. III 18, Quintil. I 10. 17: see Schuster in Rhein. Mus. XXIX (1874) pp. 605 ff., where these and other authorities are cited. Susemihl (Bursian's Jahresbericht 1874—1875 III p. 343) doubted whether Plato has Sophron in view here; but the allusion, which was admitted by Graux (l.c. p. 215 note), and successfully reaffirmed by Förster ( Rhein. Mus. for 1880 p. 472), is highly probable. I can see no point in making δρᾶμα γυναικεῖον an ironical reference to the Ecclesiazusae of Aristophanes (with Munk die nat. Ordnung d. Pl. Schr. p. 296, and Chiappelli l.c. p. 196), nor is it likely that the words allude to a dramatic caricature of Plato's policy by some other comedian, as is supposed by Bergk Gr. Literaturgesch. IV p. 462 note 134. On Sophron's prose-mimes as a preparation for the Socratic Dialogue see Hirzel der Dialog I pp. 20—26.

κατ’ ἐκείνην κτλ. : “in following out that original impulse which we communicated to them” (D. and V.).

ὡρμήσαμεν (sc. αὐτούς) is causative, and not intransitive, as Jowett supposes.

ἀγέλης . Cf. II 375 D and infra 460 C, 466 D notes

πλὴν κτλ. One MS inserts ταῖς μέν after πλήν; but, “ ταῖς θηλείαις utpote ex ipsa sententia et ex adjectivo ἀσθενεστέραις facile intelligendum enuntiatum non est” (Schneider). Schneider's explanation is more accurate than to say (with Stallbaum) that ταῖς μέν is idiomatically suppressed, like τὸ μέν before ἄλλο in Prot. 330 A ( ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο): cf. infra 455 E. This passage is thus criticised by Aristotle ( Pol. B. 5. 1264^{b} 4) ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῶν θηρίων ποιεῖσθαι τὴν παραβολήν, ὅτι δεῖ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιτηδεύειν τὰς γυναῖκας τοῖς ἀνδράσιν, οἷς οἰκονομίας οὐδὲν μέτεστιν. But, from Plato's point of view, the analogy holds; for he regards οἰκονομία as παρὰ φύσιν even for human beings, and aims at abolishing it.

μουσικὴ μέν . The particle μέν “Latino atqui non multo debilius” (Schneider, comparing I 339 B and III 412 C ὅτι μὲν πρεσβυτέρους τοὺς ἄρχοντας δεῖ εἶναι—δῆλον). Richards conjectures μήν, which would certainly be more usual (cf. 465 B): but no change is necessary. Although the position of τε (which a few inferior MSS omit) is irregular, we ought not to read γε: cf. infra 465 E note, and (with Schneider) Laws 800 A, 966 A ( ἢ καὶ ὅπως ἕν τε καὶ ὅπῃ). In these cases τε suffers hyperbaton, being attracted forward by καί. The reverse kind of hyperbaton is more usual with this word: see Prot. 316 D , with my note ad loc. Here it would be awkward to place τε after either μουσική or μέν. For ἐδόθη Richards proposes ἀπεδόθη, to correspond with ἀποδιδῷς above; but cf. δοτέον infra 457 A and see on I 336 E.

παρὰ τὸ ἔθος : ‘contra consuetudinem,’ not ‘respectu consuetudinis’ as Hartman thinks. The phrase specifies the particular variety of γελοῖα intended by Plato: ‘many ludicrous breaches of etiquette.’ It is not quite easy (with J. and C.) to understand πραττόμενα.

πράξεται . q has πεπράξεται, which is tempting, and may be right; but, as Schneider points out, ‘si peragentur’ is somewhat more appropriate than ‘si peracta fuerint.’ πράξεται as passive seems to occur only here in Attic.

ἤδη = demum adds emphasis to ἀλλὰ καί. We may translate: ‘but positively also the older women.’ On this use of ἤδη (‘now that we have reached this point’) and kindred words see Cope Aristotle's Rhetoric Vol. I pp. 13 ff. J. and C. (with other editors) suppose a hyperbaton for τὰς ἤδη πρεσβυτέρας (which Herwerden would actually read): but the hyperbaton is harsh, and no parallel has yet been adduced. The rules laid down by Plato in this passage are an exaggeration of Spartan usage: cf. Plut. Lyc. 14 and the passages cited by Paley on Eur. Androm. 596 ff. Σπαρτιάδων —αἳ ξὺν νέοισιν ἐξερημοῦσαι δόμους | γυμνοῖσι μηροῖς καὶ πέπλοις ἀνειμένοις | δρόμους παλαίστρας τ’ οὐκ ἀνασχέτους ἐμοὶ | κοινὰς ἔχουσι, and by Blaydes on Ar. Lys. 82 : cf. also Laws 813 E ff., 833 C ff. and infra 457 A. The words ὅταν ῥυσοὶ— φιλογυμναστῶσιν are a characteristically Hellenic touch: cf. Theaet. 162 B .

τῶν χαριέντων . It is tempting to see in this an allusion to the author of the Ecclesiazusae (with Krohn Pl. St. p. 81 and Chiappelli Riv. di Filol. XI p. 198). If —with the majority of modern critics— we hold that the Ecclesiazusae is earlier than Book V, and if we consider the play as at least in some measure directed against theories on communism and the position of women with which the Socratic school sympathised, it is easy to interpret Plato here as addressing a rebuke to the comic stage in the form of a further challenge. In any case, however, the words οὐ φοβητέον—ὀχήσεις are not a vaticinium ex eventu, for the Ecclesiazusae does not touch on any of the points specifically mentioned here. See also on 452 D, 455 A, 457 B, 464 B, and 473 E f. In each of these passages there is some prima facie ground for suspecting a personal or polemical motive of some kind. See on the whole subject App. I.

τὰ αὑτῶν πράττειν : i.e. παίζειν. Herwerden's conjecture τὰ τοιαῦτα παίζειν is both needless and inelegant.

οὐ πολὺς χρόνος κτλ. Stallbaum cites Hdt. I 10 παρὰ γὰρ τοῖσι Λυδοῖσι, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ παρὰ τοῖσι ἄλλοισι βαρβάροισι, καὶ ἄνδρα ὀφθῆναι γυμνὸν ἐς αἰσχύνην μεγάλην φέρει, and Thuc. I 6 ἐγυμνώθησάν τε πρῶτοι ( Λακεδαιμόνιοι ) κτλ.

γυμνασίων is used in its strict etymological sense of γυμνοὶ ἀγῶνες: we ought not to insert γυμνῶν (with Richards) or τοιούτων (with Herwerden) before γυμνασίων.

πρῶτοι ‐‐ Κρῆτες . Plato contradicts Thucydides l.c. Cf. [ Minos] 318 D, where Spartan institutions are derived from Crete, and see Hermann-Thumser Gr. Staatsalt. p. 141 notes

καὶ κτλ. καί begins the apodosis: ‘then too’ etc. The general idea is that when experience proved that it was better to take exercise in a nude condition, nudity also ceased to be ludicrous. Plato thus prepares the way for the identification to be presently made (see next note). The particle δή (‘forsooth’) hints that the eye is less trustworthy than the reason; and the contrast is further accentuated by the somewhat artificial balance between ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς and ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. D. and V. wrongly make the apodosis begin with καὶ τοῦτο (where τοῦτο is of course nominative).

μάταιος κτλ. I have (with the Oxford editors) retained the text of A. It at least affords an intelligible sense, and none of the numerous variants or emendations is at all convincing. The general drift of the passage is clear enough. Nothing is γελοῖον except what is κακόν ( μάταιος—κακόν), and, conversely, nothing is σπουδαῖον except what is ἀγαθόν ( καὶ καλοῦ—ἀγαθοῦ. σπουδαῖον is involved in σπουδάζει). Both inferences are expressed in such a way as to suggest a personal reference: cf. χαριέντων in B, and see App. I. γελωτοποιεῖν, especially after κωμῳδεῖν just above, points to the comic stage: and Aristophanes is perhaps intended. See on 452 B. The whole sentence means: ‘Foolish is the man who identifies the laughable with anything but the bad, and he who attempts to raise a laugh by looking at any spectacle as laughable except the spectacle of folly and evil aims in all seriousness also at another standard of beauty, which he has set up for himself, than the standard of the good.’ The analysis of τὸ γελοῖον, so far as it goes, is in harmony with Phil. 48 A ff.: cf. especially 49 A. With στησάμενος we must supply αὐτόν, i.e. τὸν σκοπόν. On the difficulties of this passage see App. II.

ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη was objected to by Cobet; but ἡ θήλεια alone would be too general: we are dealing only with ‘female human nature.’

καὶ κάλλιστα . Dobree conjectured κάλλιστα καί, neatly, but needlessly, for καλὴ τελευτή, like καλὴ ἀρχή, may be treated as a single notion. Cf. III 404 B note

κατοικίσεως : sc. τῆς πόλεως, but the antecedent is attracted into the relative clause ( ἣν ᾠκίζετε πόλιν), as often: cf. I 350 C note

ὡμολογεῖτε . II 369 E ff.

οὐ γὰρ εὐκόλῳ κτλ. The MS reading has been defended in two ways. Schneider prints a colon after ἔφη, and explains οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία as “minime, per Jovem, ”; but it is exceedingly difficult to supply the words in brackets. This difficulty induced Apelt ( Obs. Crit. p. 12) to suggest οὐ <μάτην> μὰ τὸν Δία, ἔφη· οὐ γὰρ κτλ. Others explain the oath as emphasizing οὐ γὰρ εὐκόλῳ ἔοικεν, and compare X 605 E οὐ μὰ τὸν Δἴ, ἔφη, οὐκ εὐλόγῳ ἔοικεν and Parm. 131 E οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, φάναι, οὔ μοι δοκεῖ εὔκολον εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον διορίσασθαι. But the whole difficulty centres round γάρ, and γάρ is absent from each of these passages. Hartman strangely explains γάρ as ‘profecto’; while Stallbaum inclines to cut it out. Groen van Prinsterer ( Prosop. Plat. p. 209) proposed to read οὐ γὰρ εὐκόλῳ ἔοικεν. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἔφη. Οὐ γάρ, εἶπον. It appears to me that the emphatic οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία is more appropriate in the mouth of Socrates, who is continually dwelling on the difficulty of his task, and I therefore think that Plato wrote Οὐ γὰρ εὐκόλῳ ἔοικεν, ἔφη. Οὐ γάρ, εἶπον, οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, although I have not ventured to change the text. εὐκόλῳ is of course neuter, not masculine, as Richter supposed ( Fl. Jahrb. 1867 p. 143).

κολυμβήθραν : a swimming tank. See Blümner Privatalt. p. 210 note 2. In what follows we have the first suggestion of the wave metaphor, which dominates nearly the whole of Book V: see on 449 A.

ἄπορον . As ἄλλην here means ‘other’ and not ‘else,’ the epithet ἄπορον (‘difficult to procure,’ cf. II 378 A) must be applicable to the dolphin also. The Platonic litotes seems delicately to suggest that the miraculous story of Arion and the dolphin is not above suspicion. Herwerden conjectured ἄτοπον, but no change is necessary.

κατηγορεῖτε . Socrates identifies his audience with the imaginary opponents of 453 A—C, and Glauco replies in their name. As ἡμῶν means primarily Socrates and Glauco (453 B), the situation is somewhat confusing: and some may wish to read κατηγορεῖται, as I formerly printed (with Vind. F, Flor. R T, Ficinus and Hartman). The confusion of ε and αι is of course common (see Introd. § 5), but it is better to adhere to the best MSS. Cf. VI 489 B.

ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης . ἀντιλογική is defined in Soph. 225 B as a variety of ἀμφισβητητικόν: viz. τὸ ἐν ἰδίοις—opposed to τὸ δικανικόν, which is δημοσίᾳ—αὖ καὶ κατακεκερματισμένον ἐρωτήσεσι πρὸς ἀποκρίσεις. It is described in Phaedr. 261 D ff., and practical illustrations are given in the sophisms of Euthyd. 275 C ff. The Ἀντιλογικοί are spoken of as almost a distinct sect in Plato's time: see Lys. 216 A and Isocr. περὶ ἀντιδόσεως 45 ἄλλοι δέ τινες περὶ τὰς ἐρωτήσεις καὶ τὰς ἀποκρίσεις—οὓς ἀντιλογικοὺς καλοῦσιν. Here Plato probably has in view some of the ‘Sophists’ (as in VI 499 A) as well as the Megarian school, whose well-known puzzles— ὁ ψευδόμενος, ὁ διαλανθάνων, Ἠλέκτρα, ὁ ἐγκεκαλυμμένος: see D. L. II 108—are excellent examples of verbal fallacies. The same class of people are also called ἐριστικοί and ἀγωνιστικοί: see Men. 75 C and cf. Theaet. 167 E , Phil. 17 A and Isocr. in Soph. 20 τῶν περὶ τὰς ἔριδας καλινδουμένων—τοιαῦτα λογίδια διεξιόντες οἷς εἴ τις ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων ἐμμείνειεν, εὐθὺς ἂν ἐν πᾶσιν ε<*>η κακοῖς. On the history and place of Eristic in Greek philosophy see E. S. Thompson's elaborate excursus in his edition of the Meno pp. 272—285.

κατ) εἴδη διαιρούμενοι . εἴδη is not of course ‘the Ideas’: but ‘species’ ‘kinds’: cf. Pol. 285 A κατ’ εἴδη— διαιρουμένους and Soph. 253 D κατὰ γένη διαιρεῖσθαι. That κατὰ γένη (s. εἴδη) διαλέγειν is the peculiar province of dialectic was the iew of Socrates as well as of Plato: see Xen. Mem. IV 5. 12 ἔφη δὲ καὶ τὸ διαλέγεσθαι ὀνομασθῆναι ἐκ τοῦ συνιόντας κοινῇ βουλεύεσθαι διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ πράγματα. See also on III 402 C.

κατ) αὐτὸ ‐‐ ἐναντίωσιν : lit. ‘pursue the contradiction of what has been said according to the name and nothing more’ i.e. ‘aim at the merely verbal contradiction of what has been said.’ We are told by Clement ( Strom. II 7. 968 B ed. Migne) that Critolaus called such persons ὀνοματομάχοι. With διώκειν ἐναντίωσιν cf. III 410 B γυμναστικὴν διώκειν. The implied antithesis to κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα is κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα: cf. Soph. 218 C δεῖ δὲ ἀεὶ παντὸς πέρι τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ μᾶλλον διὰ λόγων ἢ τοὔνομα μόνον συνομολογ(ήσασθαι χωρὶς λόγου.

ἔριδι ‐‐ διαλέκτῳ : a common opposition: cf. Men. 75 C ff. and Phil. 17 A .

τὸ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν κτλ. See cr. n. The omission of μή was perhaps due to the erroneous idea that διώκομεν below meant ‘to attack.’ In reality, it means ‘we are pursuing’ (the proposition that), i.e. ‘we are insisting that.’ The way for this somewhat strained use is prepared by διώκειν τὴν ἐναντίωσιν just above. Plato is in fact applying the expression τοῦ λεχθέντος τὴν ἐναντίωσιν to the special case before us. τὸ λεχθέν would in this case be that ‘different natures are to follow the same pursuits’ (453 E τὰς ἄλλας φύσεις τὰ αὐτά φαμεν νῦν δεῖν ἐπιτηδεῦσαι). Its ἐναντίωσις is that ‘different natures are not to have the same pursuits.’ For τὴν αὐτήν we must therefore read either <μὴ> τὴν αὐτήν or else τὴν ἄλλην (with Baiter). I prefer the former, both because it has some MS authority, and also because, if Plato had chosen to use ἄλλος, he would probably have written τὰς ἄλλας φύσεις as in 453 E. It is also true, as J. and C. observe, that “the opposition of μὴ τὴν αὐτήν, οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν is more like Plato than the conjectural reading τὴν ἄλλην.” Translate ‘we cling to the verbal point and insist that what is not the same nature ought not to have the same pursuits.’

ὡς ἔοικεν marks the irony. For ἡ ἐναντία in the next line a few MSS have ἐναντία, which Hartman approves. If ἡ αὐτή were predicative, Plato would have written ἐναντία, but, as it is, ἡ ἐναντία is correct, being, like ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις, the subject to an ἐστίν understood.

πρὸς ‐‐ τεῖνον corresponds to πρὸς τί τεῖνον in B above. On the corruption in A see Introd. § 5.

ἰατρικὸν κτλ. Plato is illustrating that particular variety of ὁμοίωσις and ἀλλοίωσις which πρὸς αὐτὰ τείνει τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα. As an instance of ὁμοίωσις he gives two ἰατρικοί (cf. I 350 A): these clearly have the same nature πρὸς αὐτὰ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, i.e. in this case πρὸς τὸ ἰατρεύεσθαι. ἀλλοίωσις he illustrates by the difference between an ἰατρικός and a τεκτονικός: these have different natures πρὸς τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, for the one is qualified ἰατρεύεσθαι, the other τεκταίνεσθαι. Nothing could be more clear; but the text has been plunged into confusion by the introduction of the words τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντα after the second ἰατρικόν. The reading of A—see cr. n.—is indefensible; and the majority of recent editors print ἰατρικὸν μὲν καὶ ἰατρικὸν τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντα with q. But τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντα adds nothing to ἰατρικόν. It has indeed been thought that ἰατρικόν by itself suggests a doctor in actual practice, whereas an ἰατρικὸς τὴν ψυχήν need not practise. If so, we may fairly doubt whether the two have the same nature; and at all events the difference between them renders them inapt illustrations of Plato's argument. Jowett and Campbell attempt to escape these difficulties by taking τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντα with the first ἰατρικόν as well as with the second; but the Greek does not permit of this solution. Similar objections apply to the readings of Bekker (and apparently Ficinus) ἰατρὸν μὲν καὶ ἰατρικὸν τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντα, of Stephanus and other early editors ἰατρικὸν μὲν καὶ ἰατρικὴν τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχοντα (partly supported by Θ), and also, with some modifications, to Richards' otherwise unhappy proposal ἰατρικὸν μὲν καὶ ἰατρικὸν <εὐφυᾶ> τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντα. Hermann reads ἰατρικὸν μὲν καὶ ἰατρικὴν τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντας, but the introduction of women is of course premature. I regard τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντα as a relic of ἰατρὸν τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντα, a marginal annotation on ἰατρικόν. Cf. Introd. § 5.

ἐλέγομεν : ‘we were saying,’ i.e. ‘we meant.’ Nothing of the sort was actually said before.

διαφέρον : ‘excelling’ rather than ‘differing’ (D. and V.): hence τοῦτο δὴ— ἀποδιδόναι. Richards proposes διαφέρειν, to avoid the singular. But the subjects are distributed, as appears from καὶ τό— καὶ τό, as well as from ἑκατέρῳ; and the infinitive is somewhat less suitable here than it is below. Translate ‘if either the male or the female sex plainly excels the other’ etc.

οὐκοῦν κτλ. ‘Is not our next step to invite?’ &c. Ξ reads κελεύωμεν, which may be right, but the indicative is quite defensible. With τὸν τὰ ἐναντία λέγοντα cf. infra 455 A. It is not likely that a specific allusion to Aristophanes is here intended (see Chiappelli Riv. di Filolog. XI p. 200), but there is some plausibility in the conjecture that the coming argument may be inspired in some measure by the Ecclesiazusae, where the essentially domestic qualities of women are contrasted with their incapacity for government. See App. I.

ὀλίγον πρότερον . 453 C.

τοῦ ‐‐ ἀντιλέγοντος . 454 E note

ἢ μακρολογῶμεν κτλ. Socrates is unwilling to bore us ( μακρολογεῖν) by enumerating the exceptions, which are —he implies—quite trivial. Cf. Xen. Mem. III 9. 11 ἐν δὲ ταλασίᾳ καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἐπεδείκνυεν ἀρχούσας τῶν ἀνδρῶν, διὰ τὸ τὰς μὲν εἰδέναι ὅπως χρὴ ταλασιουργεῖν, τοὺς δὲ μὴ εἰδέναι. It is hinted in οὗ—ἡττώμενον that, even in these, women may sometimes be excelled by men; but the general rule was the other way, otherwise the ridicule would be pointless. Grote somewhat exaggerates the significance of the clause οὗ —ἡττώμενον, when he suggests that Plato may have seen finer webs in Egypt— where weaving was performed by men— than in Greece (Plato III p. 200 note). Cf. Proclus in remp. I pp. 242, 253 ed. Kroll.

κρατεῖται is construed like ἡττᾶται, μειοῦται, νικᾶται and the like; but a parallel instance is hard to find. (In Aeschin. F. L. 152, cited by J. and C., the reading is ποίᾳ κρατηθεὶς ἡδονῇ;). Richards proposes κρατεῖ, in which case τὸ γένος would be the male sex—an awkward change of subject.

ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν . See I 341 B note The sentiment is illustrated by J. and C. from Crat. 392 C πότερον οὖν αἱ γυναῖκες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν φρονιμώτεραί σοι δοκοῦσιν εἷναι ἢ οἱ ἄνδρες, ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν γένος; Οἱ ἄνδρες.

πάντων μὲν κτλ. Plato, in short, makes government a question of capacity, and not of sex. With what follows cf. the passages cited above on 451 C. For the relative weakness of woman cf. infra 457 A and Laws 781 A.

ἐπὶ πᾶσι is doubted by Herwerden, who proposes ἐν πᾶσι or ἐν ἅπασι. ἐπί may however mean ‘with a view to,’ ‘for,’ as in 471 A.

ἡ δ) οὔ . ἡ μέν is idiomatically omitted: see 451 D note

ἄρα is better, I think, than ἆρα, though somewhat more difficult: the interrogative ἆρα is moreover generally elided before οὐ. The sentence (as J. and C. remark) is “an ironical negation with an interrogative tone.” The irony in this passage lies in ἄρα. As might be expected from the accumulation of negatives, late MSS shew a great variety of readings. Bekker follows q and reads καὶ γυμναστικὴ ἄρα καὶ πολεμική—an obvious but wholly superfluous attempt to simplify the authoritative text.

πλὴν ὅσα κτλ. For ὅσα Eusebius ( Praep. Ev. XII 32. 5) read ὅσῳ followed by ἀσθενεστέρα, ἡ δὲ ἰσχυροτέρα ἐστί, and the dative was also preferred by Schneider ( Addit. p. 38). The neuter plural of ὅσος is however used adverbially as well as the neuter singular; and the dative of ‘amount of difference’ is scarcely to the point. Instead of ἀσθενεστέρα ἢ ἰσχυροτέρα we might read (with A^{2}) ἀσθενεστέρα ἰσχυροτέρας. But the reading in the text is preferable, because it lays more stress on the identity of the male and female nature. It is the same nature, only it is stronger in men, and weaker in women. ἤ=‘or’ and not ‘than.’

ξυγγενεῖς ‐‐ τὴν φύσιν . J. and C. remark that “in the Politicus and Laws, on the other hand, the aim of the legislator is rather to unite in marriage opposite natures that they may supplement each other: Pol. 309, 310, Laws 773 ff.” Such a marriage law is unnecessary in the Republic, where the opposite qualities of strength and sensibility are already united in the character of each of the parents. See on II 375 C.

εὐχαῖς ὅμοια . Cf. 450 D note

κατὰ φύσιν . 449 A notes Plato's proposals — so he asserts — are ‘natural,’ because in harmony with the natural endowments of gifted women; and it is because they are natural that he calls them possible. The definition of δυνατόν is interesting and noteworthy: see 466 D and 471 C note Grote ( Plato III p. 201) has observed that Plato is here refuting a current objection to his theories: in the next sentence he turns his adversaries' weapon against themselves.

ἦν . 452 E.

ἀρετὴν ‐‐ ἀμφιέσονται : ‘they will clothe themselves with excellence instead of garments,’ viz. by thus stripping for exercise, because τοῦ βελτίστου ἕνεκα γυμνάζονται: see B below. Jowett's translation “for their virtue will be their robe” is incorrect, and would require the future perfect instead of ἀμφιέσονται. The correct explanation is given by Schneider on p. 300 of his translation. ἀμφιέσονται (for the usual Attic ἀμφιοῦνται, which Herwerden would write) has a certain archaic effect (cf. I 330 B note), and the saying may be borrowed or adapted from some earlier author. The same metaphor is found in Plutarch Praec. Coniug. 10. 139 C τοὐναντίον γὰρ ἡ σώφρων ἀντενδύεται τὴν αἰδῶ (with reference to Hdt. I 8, a passage which is hardly likely—as Ast supposed— to have suggested Plato's phrase), but Plutarch's meaning is different from Plato's. So—except for the metaphor— is Tennyson's in the line quoted by Warren from Godiva “Then she rode forth, clothed on with chastity.”

κοινωνητέον πολέμου κτλ. The wives of the Sauromatae are described by Herodotus (IV 116) as ἐπὶ θήρην ἐπ’ ἵππων ἐκφοιτέουσαι ἅμα τοῖσι ἀνδράσι καὶ χωρὶς τῶν ἀνδρῶν, καὶ ἐς πόλεμον φοιτέουσαι καὶ στολὴν τὴν αὐτὴν τοῖσι ἀνδράσι φορέουσαι. Cf. also Laws 804 E—806 B. See also on 451 C ff.

δοτέον . There is no reason whatever for thinking (as some critics have thought) that Plato is not serious in making these regulations. Stobaeus ( Flor. 43. 100) has ἀποδοτέον: but see 452 A note

γελῶν ἀνήρ . ἀνήρ is said with a fine touch of scorn. It is difficult to read this passage without suspecting a personal reference, perhaps to some representative of the comic stage. J. and C. remark that jests of the kind objected to by Plato occur in Ar. Lys. 80 —83. See also next note and App. I. Spartan precedents are cited by Hermann-Thumser Gr. Staatsalt. p. 180 note 3.

ἀτελῆ ‐‐ καρπόν : ‘plucking unripe fruit of laughter.’ Pindar ( Fr. 209 B ergk) satirised physical speculation ( τοὺς φυσιολογοῦντας) in the words ἀτελῆ σοφίας δρέπων καρπόν, where σοφίας is a defining genitive, denoting not the tree, but the fruit. Pindar means that their σοφία is ἀτελής or inconsummatc—misses its mark —is no real σοφία at all. More suo Plato adapts the Pindaric fragment to his own purpose. The object of his attack is Comedy, and Comedy cultivates, not σοφία, but τὸ γελοῖον. Hence—according to the reading of the text—Plato replaces Pindar's σοφίας by the words τοῦ γελοίου. The humour of his adversary is ἀτελές or inconsummate—no real humour at all: for οὐδὲν οἶδεν—ἐφ’ ψ(= γελᾷ οὐδ’ ὅ τι πράττει. Cf. 452 D μάταιος ὃς γελοῖον ἄλλο τι ἡγεῖται ἢ τὸ κακόν. This interpretation assumes that σοφίας in Plato is a gloss interpolated to complete the quotation. See cr. n. and App. III.

κάλλιστα κτλ. The doctrine of this famous sentence, which sounds like a manifesto, and was characteristically selected by Grote as one of the mottoes to his Plato, is essentially Socratic: see especially Xen. Mem. IV 6. 8 , 9 and other passages quoted by Zeller^{4} II 1. pp. 149—153. Utilitarianism of this kind pervades the Republic, as Krohn has amply proved ( Pl. St. p. 370), and asserts itself even in the highest flights of Plato's idealism ( ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα—ᾗ δίκαια καὶ τἄλλα προσχρησάμενα χρήσιμα καὶ ὠφέλιμα γίγνεται VI 505 A). But even Socrates ennobles his utilitarianism by placing soul far above body in dignity and worth. In Plato utilitarianism becomes transfigured by Idealism and the doctrine of Immortality. Here it should be noted that καλόν combines, as often, the ideas of artistic fitness or propriety, and propriety of conduct. The moral sense of the Greeks lay in their appreciation of the beautiful.

διαφεύγειν . The present is less presumptuous than διαφυγεῖν conjectured by Herwerden. It is proved to be right by διαφεύγεις below, which Herwerden more suo ejects.

γυναικείου ‐‐ νόμου . If γυναικεῖος is equivalent only to περὶ γυναικῶν, it is strangely used. I suspect that Plato is playing on the musical sense of νόμος, as in VII 532 A: cf. IV 424 D, E notes γυναικείου νόμου—a melody sung by women— is thus exactly parallel to the γυναικεῖον δρᾶμα (451 C note), which it is clearly intended to recall.

λέγε is changed to φέρε by Cobet, to ἄγε by Richards. ἄγε may of course be right: the confusion occurs in the MSS of Plato Theaet. 162 D and 169 C (see Schanz's critical notes on these two passages), and doubtless elsewhere also. But in default of MS authority, it is safer to retain λέγε. Praestat lectio difficilior. ‘Say on: let me see it’ gives an excellent meaning, and could not have been otherwise expressed. The hortatory subjunctive of the first person is occasionally used after imperatives other than ἄγε and φέρε, as in Eur. Hipp. 567 . See Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 185.

τὰς γυναῖκας κτλ. Plato imitates the emphasis and precision of a legal enactment. The Aristophanic parallel is καὶ ταύτας γὰρ κοινὰς ποιῶ τοῖς ἀνδράσι συγκατακεῖσθαι ( Eccl. 614, 615). See App. I.

οὐκ οἶμαι κτλ. Aristotle disappointed Plato's expectations: for he will not admit that such arrangements are even ὠφέλιμα ( Pol. B 1. 1261^{a} 2 ff.).

πλείστην ἂν κτλ. On the omission of ἄν see IV 437 B note and Prot. 316 C , with my note ad loc. Without ἄν, the reference must, I think, be to the past, in which case πλείστην—γενέσθαι will allude to some controversy which the doctrine of the community of wives may have occasioned before these words were written. But εὖ μάλ’ ἂν ἀμφισβητηθείη makes it pretty clear that Plato is thinking of the future.

λόγων σύστασιν : “sermonum conspirationem” Ficinus, rightly. The passage which follows is an excellent example of Socratic εἰρωνεία .

ὑφεκτέον ‐‐ δίκην : ‘I must pay the penalty,’ viz. for trying to run away. The natural penalty for running away is of course to have to stay and fight. Herwerden misses the point when he proposes to excise δίκην and understand λόγον .

ἔασόν με κτλ. For the metaphor in ἑορτάσαι and ἑστιᾶσθαι see I 354 A note ἑστιᾶσθαι ὑφ’ ἑαυτῶν is like our ‘castles in the air.’

πρὶν ἐξευρεῖν κτλ. Cf. Men. 86 E .

θέντες κτλ. εἶναι goes with θέντες: “das Dasein des gewünschten als gegeben annehmend” (Schneider). A few inferior MSS omit εἶναι; but “apparet εἶναι facile supervacaneum, minime vero explicationis gratia addendum videri librariis potuisse” (id.). To write ἤδη for εἶναι (with Vind. E: cf. also Postgate in J. Ph. XV p. 113) is too great a change, and otherwise objectionable, in view of the ἤδη which follows.

καὶ ὕστερον . καί is ‘and’ (Jowett), not ‘also’ (Campbell).

ᾗ δυνατά . Stallbaum (with q and a few late MSS) reads εἰ δυνατά, which is more accurate, no doubt. But in saying ‘how it is possible’ instead of ‘whether it is possible’ Socrates hints that he will be able to prove the possibility of his scheme. We have here in fact a sort of prophecy of 473 B ff. Schneider ( Addit. p. 39) cites a close parallel from Tim. 27 C ᾗ γέγονεν ἢ καὶ ἀγενές ἐστιν.

ὅτι πάντων κτλ. Cf. Ar. Eccl. 583 καὶ μὴν ὅτι μὲν χρηστὰ διδάξω πιστεύω. See App. I.

αὐτοὺς ‐‐ νόμοις . In issuing their commands, the rulers will either themselves obey the laws (i.e. issue such orders as the laws direct) or act in accordance with the spirit of the laws: see next note. αὐτούς=ipsos sc. as well as τοὺς ἀρχομένους. The reading αὐτοῖς (K and Ficinus) is intrinsically good, and may be right: for it accentuates the contrast between cases prescribed for by actual law, and such as are left to the rulers' discretion. But there is hardly sufficient ground for deserting A.

μιμουμένους : sc. τοὺς νόμους. In matters not actually prescribed for by legislative enactment, the rulers will ‘imitate,’ i.e. will issue commands in harmony with the spirit of, such laws as do exist. The reading of q^{2}, μὴ πειθομένους, recommended by Herwerden, gives a poor, if not actually an erroneous, meaning.

ὁμοφυεῖς . See on 456 B.

ἀναμεμιγμένων . ἀναμεμιγμένοι would be more usual, but the genitive lays more stress on the participial clause: cf. Thuc. III 13. 6 βοηθησάντων δὲ ὑμῶν προθύμως πόλιν τε προσλήψεσθε κτλ., and other examples quoted in Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 666. See also infra on 459 C. Here, too, it should be noted that the addition of a parenthetical οἶμαι helps to render ἀναμεμιγμένων independent of ἔσονται. The genitive absolute in ἰδίᾳ δὲ—κεκτημένου may also, as Jackson suggests, have influenced Plato's choice of construction in this clause. Plato perhaps thought of Sparta when he wrote the present sentence: cf. Plut. Lyc. 15. 1 ἦν μὲν οὖν καὶ ταῦτα παρορμητικὰ πρὸς γάμους· λέγω δὲ τὰς πομπὰς τῶν παρθένων καὶ τὰς ἀποδύσεις καὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας ἐν ὄψει τῶν νέων, ἀγομένων οὐ γεωμετρικαῖς, ἀλλ’ ἐρωτικαῖς, ὥς φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, ἀνάγκαις.

γεωμετρικαῖς γε : sc. ἀναγκαῖα, with which the dative goes, as in Soph. 252 D ταῖς μεγίσταις ἀνάγκαις ἀδύνατον (cited by J. and C.). We have here one of the earliest assertions of the famous doctrine which has played so large and important a part in the history of philosophy—the doctrine of the so-called ‘necessity’ of mathematical reasoning. See for instance Mill's Logic Book II c. 5. In the rest of this sentence Schneider suspects that Glauco is paraphrasing some passage of poetry. τὸν πολὺν λεών certainly sounds tragic.

γάμους ‐‐ ἱερούς . Cf. Laws 841 D ταῖς μετὰ θεῶν καὶ ἱερῶν γάμων ἐλθούσαις εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν. The nuptials of Zeus and Hera were known as the Θεογαμία, or ἱερὸς γάμος, and were celebrated by a special festival in Athens and elsewhere: see H. Graillot's article on ἱερὸς γάμος in Daremberg and Saglio's dictionary, where the authorities are cited, or Farnell's Cults of the Greek States I pp. 184—192. To Greek religious sentiment the marriage of Zeus and Hera was (as Graillot says) the ideal type of all human marriages, and for this reason Plato characteristically applies the expression ἱερὸς γάμος to his ideal of marriage in his ideal city. Cf. also Proclus in Tim. 16 B τῶν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγομένων ἱερῶν γάμων, οἶς καὶ ὁ Πλάτων εἰς δύναμιν ἐξομοιῶν περὶ τοὺς πολίτας καὶ τοὺς τῶνδε γάμους ἱεροὺς γάμους προσηγόρευσε, and see Abel Orphic. p. 243. It is clear from Plato's words that he would have repudiated with scorn the charge of seeking to abolish marriage. We have already seen that he endeavours to make the State into one vast family (457 B note); and it is in the same spirit that he now tries to raise marriage from a private into a public institution, without sacrificing any of the religious ceremonies and associations by which the union of the sexes was hallowed in the eyes of his contemporaries: cf. 459 E. If his vaulting idealism “o'erleaps itself and falls on the other,” that is no reason why we should impugn his motives, or refuse our homage to his unquenchable faith in the possibilities of human nature.

κύνας θηρευτικοὺς κτλ. Cf. 451 D and Plut. Lyc. 15. 12 πολλὴν ἀβελτερίαν καὶ τῦφον ἐνεώρα τοῖς περὶ ταῦτα τῶν ἄλλων νομοθετήμασιν· οἳ κύνας μὲν καὶ ἵππους ὑπὸ τοῖς κρατίστοις τῶν ὀχείων βιβάζουσι—τὰς δὲ γυναῖκας ἐγκλεισάμενοι φρουροῦσιν κτλ. See also on 451 C, 460 C.

γίγνονται : ‘prove themselves to be’ (J. and C.), rather than ‘grow to be’ (D. and V.): cf. III 412 C οἱ δὲ γεωργῶν ἄριστοι ἆρ’ οὐ γεωργικώτατοι γίγνονται;

γεννᾶται : viz. τό τε—γένος, not τὸ γεννώμενον (suggested as an alternative explanation by J. and C.). For the sense cf. Xen. Mem. IV 23 (Jackson).

ἄκρων εἶναι . εἶναι is omitted by q and Flor. U. Without it, however, as Schneider points out, σφόδρα might be taken with δεῖ; whereas the sense requires it to go with ἄκρων. We should expect ἄκρους εἶναι—τοὺς ἄρχοντας, but the accusatives are attracted into the genitive by δεῖ. For an analogous idiom see III 407 B note

ἰατρὸν δέ που κτλ. μέν after δεομένοις balances δέ in ὅταν δὲ δή, and not ἀλλὰ—ὑπακούειν, which merely explains φαρμάκων by stating its antithesis. There is consequently no sufficient reason for changing ἐθελόντων into ἐθέλουσιν (with some inferior MSS, Stephanus, Madvig, and others), although ἐθέλουσιν would no doubt be more usual. For the genitive absolute cf. 458 D note I agree with Schneider and Campbell in taking the participle as neuter and not masculine (so Stallbaum and Jowett). ὑπακούειν is not ‘submit to’ but ‘respond to’—‘are willing to respond to,’ i.e. be cured by ‘a course of treatment without drugs’: cf. Prot. 325 A , and for δίαιτα contrasted with drugs III 406 D.

ἡγούμεθα κτλ. See cr. n. If εἶναι is retained after ἡγούμεθα, we must (with Ast in his second edition) understand Plato to mean ἡγούμεθα ἐξαρκεῖν καὶ φαυλότερον εἶναι, i.e. καίπερ φαυλότερον ὄντα, or else suppose that ἰατρὸν καὶ φαυλότερον εἶναι is an accusative and infinitive forming the subject to ἐξαρκεῖν. Neither explanation is simple or natural; and Stephanus, Madvig, and others have in my judgment some reason for expunging εἶναι, although its intrusion is not altogether easy to explain. It is possible enough that Plato wrote ἀνδρειοτέρου δεῖ <εἶναι> τοῦ ἰατροῦ in line 19 (cf. δεῖ ἄκρων εἶναι τῶν ἀρχόντων in B above); and the possibility is raised, I think, into a probability, when we thus obtain a natural explanation of the erroneous εἶναι after ἡγούμεθα. εἶναι following δεῖ appeared difficult, and was omitted, as it is in B above by q; a later scribe reinserted it in the wrong place. I have therefore ventured to transpose the word.

ἀνδρειοτέρου . It needs more courage to use drugs than to prescribe a regimen, because the risk is greater. Nothing could be more appropriate than Plato's use of the word, although it has been doubted by Richards. who proposed αὖ δριμυτέρου at first, and afterwards ἀνδρικωτέρου. With the general sentiment Poschenrieder ( die Plat. Dial. in ihrem Verhältnisse zu den Hippokr. Schr. p. 57) compares [Hippocr.] de victus ratione VI p. 592 c. 67 Littré προκαταλαμβάνειν τὴν <*>γίειαν, ὥστε τὰς νούσους μὴ προσπελάζειν, εἰ μή τις μεγάλα πάνυ ἐξαμαρτάνοι καὶ πολλάκις· ταῦτα δὲ φαρμάκων δέεται ἤδη.

ἔφαμεν . III 389 B. Cf. also II 382 C, D.

τὸ ὀρθὸν τοῦτο : i.e. this which you call right, viz. τὸ ψεῦδος. The medicinal lie frequently appears ( γίγνεται οὐκ ἐλάχιστον) in connexion with the marriages of the guardians, as Plato proceeds to shew. τοῖς γάμοις should not be made general; the reference is specific.

δεῖ μὲν κτλ. “The case resembles that of a breeding stud of horses and mares, to which Plato compares it: nothing else is wanted but the finest progeny attainable” Grote Plato III p. 205. It is worth while to compare Plato's arrangements with those of Aristophanes in Eccl. 616—634, in spite of the comedian's lewdness and buffoonery.

τῶν δὲ μή . Cf. 460 C and 461 C. It seems to me certain from these passages that Plato in this book lends his sanction to infanticide. This has often been denied, but without sufficient reason. The subject is discussed in App. IV.

ἀκρότατον . Cf. (with Schneider) σφόδρα ἄκρων in B above and ὡς ἀκρότατον in Laws 730 E. Stephanus' ἀκρατότατον is neat, but unnecessary, in spite of καθαρόν in 460 C.

ἀγέλη , like ποίμνιον, is intended “to recall the analogy of the lower animals” (J. and C.). Cf. 451 C note αὖ serves the same purpose, by suggesting that ἀγέλη has another and a more primitive signification.

ἑορταὶ κτλ. As the ἱερὸς γάμος was celebrated with a procession and sacrifices, ending with the κλίνη τῆς Ἥρας, so Plato's ἱεροὶ γάμοι are attended with religious rites and ceremonies: see 458 E note Plato apparently does not intend these State-marriages to last beyond the duration of a single festival. At each successive festival fresh unions would be tried.

τὸν αὐτὸν ἀριθμόν . See IV 423 A note

γέρα κτλ. Special privileges seem to have been awarded at Sparta for bravery in the field (cf. Tyrtaeus Fr. 12. 35—44): it is certain at all events that cowardice was visited with every mark of disgrace (Xen. Rep. Lac. 9. 4—6 and other references in Gilbert's Gk. Const. Ant. E. T. p. 77). γέρα must be nominative, and δοτέον passive, in spite of its singular number: cf. Symp. 188 B πάχναι καὶ χάλαζαι καὶ ἐρυσῖβαι— γίγνεται. Examples like Crat. 410 C αἱ μὲν δὴ ὧραι Ἀττικιστὶ ὡς τὸ παλαιὸν ῥητέον (cited by Schneider and others) are not to the point, because αἱ—ὧραι means τὸ ὄνομα ‘αἱ ὦραι.’ It is scarcely possible to take δοτέον as active, and understand from it a passive δοτέα with ἐξουσία, because the connexion between γέρα, ἆθλα, and ἐξουσία—note ἄλλα τε καὶ κτλ.—is too close to permit of γέρα being in the accusative case.

ἐπὶ τούτων . For the construction cf. Dem. F. L. 298 τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς πολιτείας ἐφεστηκότας and de Cor. 247 τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων.

ἀμφότερα . q and some other MSS read ἀμφότεραι, which is quite wrong: cf. Lach. 187 A πείθωμεν ἢ δώροις ἢ χάρισιν ἢ ἀμφότερα.

καὶ ἀρχαί : sc. as well as the other duties of guardians. It has not yet been specifically said that magistracies are to be open to women as well as men. J. and C. observe that “Plato seems to betray a certain consciousness that the office immediately in question might be specially suitable for women.’ Kindred duties are actually assigned to a female vigilance committee in Laws 784 A, 794 A ff.

τὸν σηκόν . A σηκός is an enclosed pen or fold in which the young of animals may be reared. Hartman prefers τινα σηκόν (with q and a Florentine MS), because the σηκός has not been mentioned before. The way has, however, been prepared for it by 459 A, 459 B ( τί δὲ ἵππων κτλ.), ποίμνιον (459 E), ἀγέλη (ib.), and σύνερξις (460 A). The comparison with a sort of ‘breeding-stud’— see above on 459 D—runs through all this passage and supplies the metaphors. See also on 460 E. The whole discussion affords an excellent example of the uncompromising rationalism with which Plato carries out his theories to their logical conclusion.

ἀνάπηρον . Pollux (II 61) explains this word as ὁ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα πεπηρωμένος; but it is little more than πηρός: cf. ἀνάπλεως, ἀναπιμπλάναι etc. The present passage is not inconsistent with III 415 B, for ὑπόχαλκος and ὑποσίδηρος do not imply deformity.

ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ κτλ. is a euphemism for infanticide: see App. IV. Compare the Spartan usage: εἰ δ’ ἀγεννὲς καὶ ἄμορφον, ἀπέπεμπον εἰς τὰς λεγομένας Ἀποθέτας, παρὰ Ταΰγετον βαραθρώδη τόπον (Plut. Lyc. 16. 1). (The word for the exposure of infants was ἀπόθεσις.) See also Whibley Greek Oligarchies p. 113 notes

εἴπερ μέλλει . μέλλοι (see cr. n.) might possibly be defended, if it referred to a previous statement to the same effect (‘if, as we saw,’ etc.). But there has been no such statement, unless with Stephanus we write ἀκρατότατον for ἀκρότατον in 459 E. εἴπερ γε μέλλει, conjectured by Herwerden, would be in danger of meaning κατακρύψουσιν, εἴπερ μέλλει κτλ. As it is, εἴπερ μέλλει qualifies ὡς πρέπει ‘as is proper.’ Gl. ‘If the class of guardians is to be kept pure.’ Glauco, in fact, takes the words out of Socrates' mouth. On the meaning and usage of εἴπερ in Greek see E. S. Thompson's edition of the Meno pp. 258—264.

πᾶσαν μηχανὴν κτλ. Aristotle ( Pol. B 3. 1262^{a} 14 ff.) argues that no precautions would prevent parents from occasionally recognising their children. In such cases Plato might reasonably hope that the general weakening of parental sentiment would secure his city against serious harm.

ἄλλας . The mothers of the children who have been exposed.

αὐτῶν τούτων : viz. the mothers. This provision is conceived in their interests, rather than in the interests of the children, as the next clause also shews.

θηλάσονται . θηλάσωνται has more MS authority than θηλάσονται; but the future indicative (and not the aorist subjunctive) is the regular construction after ὅπως in semi-final clauses: cf. IV 429 D, VII 519 E. The exceptions are—besides this passage— Symp. 198 E , Phaed. 91 A , Gorg. 480 A , B, 510 A. In most of these places there is inferior MS authority for the future, which editors now for the most part read. See Weber Entwickelung d. Absichtssätze in Schanz's Beiträge II 2. p. 66; and for the confusion in Paris A of ο and ω Introd. § 5.

προὐθέμεθα . See cr. n. προὐθέμεθα is intrinsically so much better than προθυμούμεθα that we can hardly refuse to regard this as one of the passages in which v has preserved the right reading. See Introd. § 5.

ἔφαμεν . Cf. 459 B.

ἐξ ἀκμαζόντων . The same principle was observed in Sparta (Xen. Rep. Lac. 1. 6 and Plut. Lyc. 15. 4). It is possible, though I believe incapable of proof, that Plato's limits of age were in agreement with Spartan usage.

τὰ εἴκοσι ἔτη κτλ. A woman's ἀκμή lasts ‘the twenty,’ a man's the thirty' years. Glauco asks ‘which twenty and which thirty?’ and Socrates then explains. τά before εἴκοσι is correctly explained by Stallbaum: “articulum ponit de certo quodam cogitans temporis spatio quod deinceps definit accuratius.” The antecedent to αὐτῶν is not simply ἔτη (so J. and C., with the English translators), but the duplicate expression εἴκοσι ἔτη and τριάκοντα. In γυναικὶ μὲν κτλ. Socrates proceeds as if Glauco had not interrupted: the construction is μέτριος χρόνος ἀκμῆς—γυναικί, ἀνδρὶ δὲ τὰ τριάκοντα, γυναικὶ μὲν— τίκτειν, ἀνδρὶ δὲ—γεννᾶν. τὸ ποῖον, τὰ ποῖα and the like are idiomatically used in asking for further specification, and are sometimes only impatient interruptions, intended to draw attention to the important point and add liveliness to the style: see Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 540. Schneider takes τὰ εἴκοσι ἔτη and τὰ τριάκοντα as twenty and thirty years of age respectively, comparing τῶν ἐνενήκοντα ἐτῶν in Tim. 21 A , but χρόνος in χρόνος ἀκμῆς means duration, as is clear from ἀμφοτέρων—φρονήσεως below. It should be observed that in the Laws Plato fixes the inferior limit for men sometimes at 25 (772 D), sometimes at 30 (721 A, 785 B). By thirty-five he expected them to be married (ib.). Girls are to marry between 16 (785 B) or 18 (833 D) and 20 (ib.). Cf. Hesiod OD. 696 ff., pseudo-Solon Fr. 27. 9 and Arist. Pol. H 16. 1335^{a} 28. The Greeks seem generally to have recommended men to marry a little under or a little over thirty. See on this subject Blümner Privatalterthümer p. 36 note 1.

τίκτειν τῇ πόλει ‐‐ γεννᾶν τῇ πόλει . These phrases express concisely the Platonic view of marriage. They are equally applicable to the Spartan ideal, and may have been borrowed from Sparta. Cf. Plut. Pyrrh. 28. 5 τῶν δὲ πρεσβυτέρων τινὲς ἐπηκολούθουν βοῶντες· Οἷχε, Ἀκρότατε, καὶ οἷφε τὰν Χιλωνίδα· μόνον παῖδας ἀγαθοὺς τᾷ Σπάρτᾳ ποίει. “What Lucan observes about Cato of Utica, is applicable to the Guardians of the Platonic Republic: — Venerisque huic maximus usus | progenies: Urbi pater est, Urbique maritus” ( Phars. II 387 f.) Grote.

ἐπειδὰν ‐‐ ἀκμήν : ‘when he has outlived his swiftest prime of running.’ The expression ὀξυτατην δρόμου ἀκμήν is doubtless borrowed from some epinikian poet, perhaps Bacchylides or Pindar. The dactylic rhythm is not in itself enough to justify us in assigning the phrase (with Herwerden) to epic or elegy. The author of the quotation was probably speaking not of a man, but of a race-horse. By applying the phrase (of course in a metaphorical sense) to his bridegrooms, Plato contrives again to suggest the now familiar analogy of a ‘breeding-stud of horses and mares’: see on 460 C. The comparison gains in realism and point, if it was the custom of antiquity, as it is now, to bring a first-rate racer to the stud ( ἱπποφόρβιον, ἱπποτροφεῖον) when he ceased to run. This is probable in itself, and supported to some extent by a comparison of Plut. Lyc. 15. 12 ἵππους ὑπὸ τοῖς κρατίστοις τῶν ὀχείων βιβάζουσι, χάριτι πείθοντες ἢ μισθῷ τοὺς κυρίους with Virg. Georg. 3. 209—211. Just so Plato will not allow his guardians to marry until the fever in the blood has somewhat cooled: cf. Laws 775 B—776 B and J. B. Mayor in Cl. Rev. X p. 111. Stallbaum was the first to detect the poetical quotation. J. and C., though translating by “his swiftest prime of running,” follow Schleiermacher in understanding the phrase literally; but we may fairly doubt if Greek runners had passed their prime at 25, and, even if they had, “non hic erat tali designationi locus, nisi forte ob id ipsum, quod cursui minus idonei forent, ad nuptias idoneos visos credimus” (Schneider). παρῇ means ‘let go by,’ “hinter sich hat” (Schneider): cf. such expressions as παριέναι καιρόν (II 370 B al.), νύκτα μέσην παρέντες (Hdt. VIII 9), and especially Soph. O. C. 1230 εὖτ’ ἂν τὸ νέον παρῇ ‘when he hath seen youth go by’ (Jebb), and Bacchylides 3. 88 ed. Kenyon ἀνδρὶ δ) [ οὐ θ] έμις πολιὸν π[ αρ] έντα | γῆρας θάλ[ εια] ν αὖτις ἀγκομίσσαι | ἥβαν.

ἂν λάθῃ . “Si non latuerit foetus praeter legem susceptus, ne in lucem quidem edetur, sed antea opprimetur” (Schneider). Cf. C below.

γεννήσεται = ‘will be produced’ must, if right, refer to birth (“hervorkommen wird” Schneider), otherwise φύς is superfluous. Bekker and others are possibly right in reading γενήσεται with Ξ^{1} q, and some other MSS: cf. Hdt. VI 69, where Stein prints γεγενημένος in place of γεγεννημένος. See Introd. § 5.

φὺς ἅς . See cr. n. and Introd. § 5.

ἐξ ὠφελίμων κτλ. Cf. IV 424 A note

ὑπὸ σκότου . Cf. (with J. and C.) σκότιος=‘an unlawful child.’

γεγονώς =‘produced,’ ‘a product of,’ is cancelled by Hartman; but φύς is too far away, and γίγνεσθαι (‘to be produced’) is sufficiently accurate: cf. γένηται in 461 C.

ἀνέγγυον : ‘unauthorised,’ because the child of an irregular union. An ἀνέγγυος γάμος is a marriage without an ἐγγύη or contract between the parents of the betrothing parties (Blümner Privatalt. p. 262 note 2).

ᾧ. ᾗ is read by Ξ, Vind. E and Eusebius ( Praep. Ev. XIII 19. 18); but αὐτούς includes both sexes, and in such cases the masculine is preferred to the feminine. Hartman strangely thinks

ᾧ neuter.

θυγατρὶ κτλ. The cases enumerated are all in the direct line, and nothing is said forbidding unions between ‘brothers’ and ‘sisters.’ See however 461 E note Greek law permitted the marriage of uncles with nieces, aunts with nephews, and even half-brothers and halfsisters, provided they were not ὁμομήτριοι (Becker's Charicles E. T. p. 478, with the passages there cited). Some of Plato's contemporaries, notably the Cynics, entertained peculiarly revolting views on this subject, and the question was frequently agitated in his time: see Dümmler Proleg. zu Pl. St. pp. 52 ff. The Stoics agreed with the Cynics: see the authorities cited in Henkel Stud. zur Geschichte d. Gr. Lehre vom Staat p. 30.

καὶ ταῦτά γ’ ἤδη κτλ. : ‘and all this only after we have exhorted them’ etc. ἤδη goes with ἀφήσομεν (or the like) understood after πάντα. J. and C. wrongly connect πάντα with προθυμεῖσθαι (‘to use all diligence’). The voice should pause a little before διακελευσάμενοι.

μηδ’ εἰς φῶς κτλ. : ne in lucem quidem efferre. Much less shall we permit it to live if born: see App. IV. μηδέ prepares the way for ἐὰν δέ τι βιάσηται κτλ. Hartman strangely prefers μή, “cum post μάλιστα coniunctio μηδέ prorsus frigeat.” But μάλιστα μέν is, of course, ‘if possible.’

μηδὲ ἕν . See cr. n. μηδέ γ’ ἕν occurs in a few inferior MSS besides A, and is read by Baiter and others, but we do not find γε thus interposed between οὐδέ ( μηδέ) and εἷς.

γένηται κτλ. γένηται sc. κύημα. βιάσηται means ‘force its way’ sc. εἰς τὸ φῶς (J. and C.). The extreme emphasis shews what importance Plato attached to this provision. The procuring of abortion, though perhaps in certain cases punishable by law (Meier and Schömann Att. Process p. 381), was in practice common enough: see Blümner Privatalt. p. 76. Plato permits it also in the Laws (740 D). The general Greek sentiment on this matter is fairly represented by Aristotle when he says ( Pol. H 16. 1335^{b} 22 ff.) ὡρίσθαι γὰρ δεῖ τῆς τεκνοποιίας τὸ πλῆθος. ἐὰν δέ τισι γίνηται παρὰ ταῦτα συνδυασθέντων, πρὶν αἴσθησιν ἐγγενέσθαι καὶ ζωήν, ἐμποιεῖσθαι δεῖ τὴν ἄμβλωσιν· τὸ γὰρ ὅσιον καὶ τὸ μὴ διωρισμένον τῇ αἰσθήσει καὶ τῷ ζῆν ἔσται .

τιθέναι κτλ. : ‘so deal with them.’ τιθέναι is more delicate than ἐκτιθέναι, which was read before Bekker, although it has no MS authority. Herwerden suggests that τιθέναι means θάπτειν (as in 469 A), but Plato expresses himself with more refinement. τροφῆς does not mean, as some are fain to believe, merely the educational system reserved for the guardians: see on 459 E and App. IV.

πατέρας κτλ. : ‘how will they distinguish one another's fathers’ etc.? The Aristophanic parallel is here very close: Πῶς οὖν οὕτω ζώντων ἡμῶν τοὺς αὑτοῦ παῖδας ἕκαστος | ἔσται δυνατὸς διαγιγνώσκειν; Τί δὲ δεῖ; πατέρας γὰρ ἅπαντας | τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους αὑτῶν εἶναι τοῖσι χρόνοισιν νομιοῦσιν ( Eccl. 635—637). The question touches an obvious difficulty in any system of the community of children; but, as a link in the chain of evidence connecting the Ecclesiazusae and the Republic, the parallel deserves to carry weight, although it has sometimes been pressed too far. See on the one hand Teichmüller Lit. Fehd. 1 pp. 18—19 and Chiappelli Riv. di Filolog. XI p. 213, and on the other Zeller^{4} II 1. p. 551 note 2. Cf. also App. I.

δεκάτῳ κτλ. : ‘in the tenth month and also in the seventh month.’ δή (as J. and C. remark) draws attention to the more exceptional case: cf. II 367 C note The Greek cannot, I think, be taken as an inexact way of saying “from seven to ten months after” (J. and C.). In point of fact the majority of ancient writers on the subject denied that children were ever born in the eighth month of pregnancy: see Gellius Noct. Att. III 16 and Censorinus de die natali 7. 2.

ἐγέννων : ‘were engaged in begetting children’: cf. 460 E, and 461 B ( τῶν ἔτι γεννώντων). Richards has pointed out ( Cl. Rev. IV p. 7) that the imperfect refers “to the whole time of life during which father and mother were allowed, if the lot fell upon them, to take part in the regular unions.” Cf. Tim. 18 D νομιοῦσι δὲ πάντες πάντας αὐτοὺς ὁμογενεῖς, ἀδελφὰς μὲν καὶ ἀδελφοὺς ὅσοιπερ ἂν τῆς πρεπούσης ἐντὸς ἡλικίας γίγνωνται. Jowett's version—“all who were begotten at the time when their fathers and mothers came together”—mistakes both ἐν and ἐγέννων. Schneider translates the passage correctly.

ὥστε ‐‐ ἅπτεσθαι . I agree with Richards in understanding this of the “irregular unions which were last mentioned” (461 C). But in spite of the explicit reference in ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, Plato has not as yet forbidden such unions between ‘brothers’ and ‘sisters’: see 461 C note The discrepancy is hard to explain, especially as the list in 461 C seems intended to be exhaustive. The effect of the prohibition (owing to the meaning now given to ‘brother’ and ‘sister’) would be greatly to restrict, but not to abolish, unauthorised liaisons.

ἀδελφοὺς κτλ. refers only to State-marriages, as ὁ κλῆρος shews. Without this exemption Plato's proposals would (according to Richards l.c.) “have rendered all unions whatever practically impossible.” Surely not; although they would have unduly favoured the τηλύγετος παῖς. A son, for example, who is born when his mother is 21 and his father 26, cannot marry till he is 49, because he is 29 before his bride can possibly be born, and she cannot marry under 20; whereas a son, whose father is 54 and mother 39 when he is born, can marry a girl only one year younger than himself, because his father and mother retire at 55 and 40 respectively. Did Plato intend the sons of elderly couples to marry young, and those of young couples to marry late? Such an inference is unlikely, although it is the logical outcome of his theories. In any case Plato did well to introduce a saving clause. The κομψὸς κλῆρος, obedient to the archons, would couple ‘brothers’ and ‘sisters,’ whenever it seemed desirable in the interests of the State, so long as they were not really blood-relations. (This the archons of course would know.) Apollo's priestess would platonize. We must suppose that her assent is given in advance, and once for all (although προσαναιρῇ is present and follows ξυμπίπτῃ), unless she had an accredited representative on the spot, which there is nothing to indicate. On Plato's attitude to Apollo see IV 427 C note

ἑπομένη ‐‐ πολιτείᾳ . This topic was not specified in the original distribution of the subject (458 B), but it is closely connected with ὡς μακρῷ βελτίστη. Plato does not deal with it till 464 B.

βεβαιώσασθαι κτλ. Hirschig cancelled παρὰ τοῦ λόγου: but cf. (with Stallbaum) Gorg. 489 A ἵνα—βεβαιώσωμαι ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ. ‘The argument’ is personified, as often.

ἆρα . <εἰ> ἄρα was suggested by Dobree; but cf. (with Stallbaum) Gorg. 475 B πρῶτον μὲν δὴ σκεψώμεθα, ἆρα—ὑπερβάλλει κτλ. The exact translation is ‘to enquire, Do the institutions we have described’ etc.

ἔχομεν οὖν κτλ. Cf. IV 422 E. στάσις was the greatest evil which a Greek city had to fear, and Athens had suffered from it grievously. Now individualism was the peculiar pride and glory of the Athenian State (Thuc. II 37), so that we need not wonder if Plato traced στάσις to individualism, and rushed to the opposite extreme. Cf. Krohn Pl. Fr. p. 4, Pöhlmann Gesch. d. ant. Kommunismus etc. pp. 146—184, and see on II 369 A.

ποιῇ μίαν . J. and C. assert that Plato “has no idea of a unity of opposites or differences— τὸ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον,” and Aristotle argues to the same effect in Pol. B 2. 1261^{a} 22 ff. But it is in fact on such a unity that the entire fabric of Plato's city rests: see IV 423 D note, and cf. also 432 A, 443 D. The perfect city is a ἕν with three πολλά—rulers, auxiliaries, farmers and artisans, or, if rulers and auxiliaries are classed together as guardians, then with two. Plato's object throughout this episode is to keep the whole city ‘one’ by preventing one of its constituent factors, viz. the guardians, from becoming ‘many.’ If the guardians are united—so he holds—no danger to the city's unity need be apprehended from the others (465 B). With the sentiment generally cf. Ar. Eccl. 594 and 674 ( μίαν οἴκησίν φημι ποιήσειν συρρήξασ’ εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα | ὥστε βαδίζειν εἰς ἀλλήλους). See also on 463 E and App. I.

οἱ μὲν ‐‐ τῆς πόλεως . As when a national disaster is made the occasion of a party victory. Plato may be thinking of scenes which he had witnessed in his native city. Bosanquet cites an excellent illustration from Dem. de Cor. 217.

καὶ ‐‐ ταὐτά : i.e. ὅταν μὴ ἅμα φθέγγωνται—τό τε ἀλλότριον καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἀλλότριον. Hartman ejects καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου as a “futile interpretamentum” on τὸ οὐκ ἐμόν. There is nothing to prove that καὶ—ταὐτά was read by Aristotle ( Pol. B 3. 1261^{b} 18), Plutarch (140 D, 484 B, 767 D), Iamblichus ( de vita Pythag. 167) or Proclus ( in remp. ed. Kroll II pp. 78. 28, 365. 11), though Iamblichus uses the word ἀλλότριον instead of Plato's οὐκ ἐμόν. But as none of these authors pretends to be quoting Plato's ipsissima verba, the omission proves nothing. Although the words add nothing to the sense, they approach the matter from another point of view, and are in my judgment certainly genuine.

ἐν ᾗτινι κτλ. ‘Thus in whatever city the largest number of men agree in applying these expressions, “mine” and “not mine,” to the same thing,’ etc. τοῦτο agrees with the nearest of the two objects, viz. τὸ ἐμόν. For the use of ἐπί cf. Parm. 147 D . The reading ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό—see cr. n.—is as old as Iamblichus: see the passage referred to above, where Iamblichus has ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐμὸν φθέγγεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀλλότριον. It is retained by the majority of editors; but no other instance of λέγειν ἐπί τι has yet been adduced, and the expression is certainly very strange. φέρειν ὄνομα ἐπί τι ( Soph. 237 C , D: cf. also Tim. 37 E ), of which Schneider reminds us, is a different thing from λέγειν ὄνομα ἐπί τι. Various emendations have been proposed. The choice seems to me to lie between ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ and ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ. The latter emendation—which I once adopted—was (as I learn from Schneider) proposed by Küster instead of ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό in Iamblichus: cf. ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δακτύλου ἐλέγομεν VII 524 E (‘in the case of the finger’) al. Although the genitive may be right, the dative now seems to me slightly more natural and easy. Hartman ejects ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό altogether, but there is no occasion for the knife. Cf. IV 436 B note For the error see Introd. § 5.

καὶ ἥτις δὴ κτλ. δή is illative, and καί ‘also.’ καὶ—ἔχει (sc. ἄριστα διοικεῖται) is certainly interrogative, as Schneider pointed out: see in D below τοῦτο δ ἐρωτᾷς. Plato recurs to his favourite analogy between man and the State: cf. II 368 E f. notes

οἷον ὅταν κτλ. Poschenrieder ( Die Pl. Dial. in ihrem Verhältnisse zu d. Hippokratischen Schr. p. 67) cites a remarkable parallel from the author of the treatise de locis in homine (Littré VI p. 278 c. 1) εἴ τις βούλεται τοῦ σώματος ἀπολαβὼν μέρος κακῶς ποιέειν τὸ σμικρότατον, πᾶν τὸ σῶμα αἰσθήσεται τὴν πεῖσιν, ὁκοίη ἄν τις ᾗ, διὰ τόδε, ὅτι τοῦ σώματος τὸ σμικρότατον πάντα ἔχει, ὅσαπερ καὶ τὸ μέγιστον· τοῦτο δ’ ὁποῖον ἄν τις πάθῃ ἐπαναφέρει πρὸς τὴν ὁμοεθνίην ἕκαστον πρὸς τὴν ἑωυτοῦ, ἤν τε κακόν, ἤν τε ἀγαθόν ᾗ· καὶ διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἀλγέει καὶ ἥδεται ὑπὸ ἔθνεος τοῦ σμικροτάτου τὸ σῶμα, ὅτι ἐν τῷ σμικροτάτῳ πάντ’ ἔνι τὰ μέρεα καὶ ταῦτα ἐπαναφέρουσι ἐς τὰ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἕκαστα καὶ διαγγέλλουσι πάντα. The ‘sympathy’ of the different parts of the human body was a Hippocratean tenet ( ξυμπαθέα πάντα de alimento IX c. 23 Littré). Cf. Shakespeare Othello III 4. 146—148, “For let our finger ache, and it indues Our other healthful members ev'n to that sense Of pain.” Plato goes farther, and represents the partnership as extending also to the soul: see next note.

πᾶσα ἡ κοινωνία κτλ. : ‘the entire partnership pervading the body with the soul, organized into a single composite organization, viz. that of the ruling power in the partnership’ etc. Plato's language is precise, but difficult. I take ἡ—ψυχήν as defining the κοινωνία. κατὰ τὸ σῶμα is written rather than τοῦ σώματος, because the partnership is not only a partnership of body with soul, but also a partnership of the different parts of body with one another. τεταγμένη—see cr. n. and App. V —appears to suit σύνταξις better than τεταμένη. A σύνταξις is the ordered combination of two or more elements: cf. Tim. 24 C and Laws 903 D ψυχὴ συντεταγμένη σώματι. The words τοῦ ἄρχοντος define the σύνταξις; although neuter in gender, they really refer, not to the soul, but to the whole σύνταξις or σύνολον, i.e. ὁ ἄνθρωπος. It is ὁ ἄνθρωπος who rules in the partnership, although he is himself a partner only in the sense in which the whole is partner with its parts. The expression ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὸν δάκτυλον ἀλγεῖ is thus seen to be as exact as possible. The confusion between τεταγμένος and τεταμένος is easy: συντεταμένως, for example, and συντεταγμένως are often confused in MSS: see Ast's Lex. Plat. s.v. ξυντεταμένως and my edition of the Apology p. 127. Cf. also infra 474 A note

ἐν αὐτῇ : i.e. ἐν τῇ κοινωνίᾳ (so also Schneider), not (as Stallbaum) ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. Plato means that every single man ( ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου above) is a single organized whole—a partnership in which the whole is partner with, and rules, the parts. See also App. V.

ᾔσθετό ‐‐ ξυνήλγησεν : ‘momentary’ aorists: cf. Theaet. 156 E .

ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν : sc. besides the finger.

ἑνὸς δὴ κτλ. We may compare the Stoic doctrine “incommoda autem et commoda (ita enim εὐχρηστήματα et δυσχρηστήματα appello) communia (sc. inter sapientes) esse voluerunt” (see Cicero de Fin. III 69, and Madvig's note). Not a few of Plato's regulations in Book V foreshadow the communistic theories of Stoicism: see Dyroff Ethik d. alten Stoa pp. 211 f., 226—231. Plato however contrives to make his communism live; whereas the Stoics seldom did.

αὕτη . See cr. n. Schneider says αὐτή is “ea potissimum,” referring to VII 516 B, where however we should (I believe) read οὗτος. See note ad loc. Here αὕτη is required by the contrast with εἴτε καὶ ἄλλη τις μᾶλλον. For the error cf. VIII 552 A, where q and several MSS wrongly read αὐτή. See also Introd. § 5.

ἔστι . For the syntax see on II 363 A. ἔστι is a privileged verb in Attic prose: cf. Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 61.

δεσπότας . Demosthenes remarks that the subjects in an oligarchy are ‘cowards and slaves’ ( ἄνανδροι καὶ δοῦλοι). See in Timocr. 75 and Whibley Gk. Oligarchies p. 143.

ἄρχοντας . Plato is thinking of the Athenian Archons. The object of this chapter, which seems at first sight somewhat loosely constructed, is to prove that συμπάθεια prevails to a unique extent in the Platonic city. The appellations σωτῆρες and ἐπίκουροι, on the one hand, and μισθοδόται and τροφεῖς on the other, involve a greater degree of interdependence than is expressed by the corresponding names in other cities. The archons too are more than fellow-rulers: they are fellow guardians, their official designation among one another serving continually to remind them of their duty to the lower classes. Among themselves they use the terms of family relationship, and with these their actions correspond. Thus the distinction between meum and tuum is more nearly obliterated than in any other city. Everything is meum.

ἐπικούρους . The official designation of the second order is applied by the people to the ruling class as a whole. They are expected to look upon the ἐπίκουροι as ‘helpers of the people’ rather than as the rulers' auxiliaries, although it is the latter function which gave them their name (III 414 B). This is clear from σωτῆράς τε καὶ ἐπικούρους, both of which epithets are suggestive of protecting deities. See also on 464 B.

παντὶ γὰρ ‐‐ ἐντυγχάνειν . A slight exaggeration: see 461 D, E notes Cf. Hdt. IV 104 ἐπίκοινον δὲ τῶν γυναικῶν τὴν μῖξιν ποιεῦνται ( οἱ Ἀγάθυρσοι), ἵνα κασίγνητοί τε ἀλλήλων ἔωσι καὶ οἰκήιοι ἐόντες πάντες μήτε φθόνῳ μήτε ἔχθει χρέωνται ἐς ἀλλήλους and ib. 180 ad fin. Similar motives for domestic communism are mentioned by Diod. Sic. II 58. See also, for other traces, whether real or legendary, of community of wives and children in antiquity Xanthus Fr. 28, Ephorus Fr. 76 and Theopompus Fr. 222 (in Müller Frag. Hist. Gr. Vol. I), together with Arist. Pol. B 3. 1262^{a} 19.

περί τε κτλ. τε is ἀνακόλουθον: we should expect καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ξυγγενεῖς to follow. Instead, we have a change of construction, and καὶ περὶ πατέρων—καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυγγενῶν (line 27). Cf. II 373 B note ἤ=‘alioquin,’ as often after a verb of obligation (here δεῖν): cf. VI 489 E, 503 A.

νόμος : sc. ἔστι πράττειν.

αὐτῷ : though αὐτοῖς in C: cf. I 347 A note

φῆμαι . See on III 415 D. φήμη is the half-personified vox populi, vox Dei: cf. Nägelsbach Nachhom. Theol. p. 165. It is the quasi-personification of φῆμαι which accounts for the active ὑμνήσουσιν (‘will sing in the ears of’ etc.): cf. IX 573 A περὶ αὐτὸν βομβοῦσαι.

ὃ ‐‐ ῥῆμα is the object of ξυμφωνήσουσιν (Schneider), just as in IV 432 A ταὐτόν depends upon ξυνᾴδοντας. Aristotle's criticism deserves to be quoted ( Pol. B 3. 1262^{a} 1 ff.) οὕτως ἕκαστος ‘ἐμὸσ’ λέγει τὸν εὖ πράττοντα τῶν πολιτῶν ἢ κακῶς, ὁπόστος τυγχάνει τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὤν, οἷον ‘ἐμὸς ἢ τοῦ δεῖνος,’ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον λέγων καθ’ ἕκαστον τῶν χιλίων, ἢ ὅσων ἡ πόλις ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο διστάζων· ἄδηλον γὰρ ᾧ συνέβη γενέσθαι τέκνον ἢ σωθῆναι γενόμενον. There is a far deeper truth in Plato's saying than in Aristotle's animadversions thereupon, and “das schöne Wort, dass alle dasselbe mein nennen sollen, hat es nicht verdient, von Aristoteles mit logischen Regeln gehetzt zu werden. Die Geschichte hat überall wo eine erhabene Idee eine Gruppe von Menschen so durchdringen sollte, dass der Wille jedes Einzelnen nur auf dieses Gemeinsame gerichtet sei, dem platonischen Gedanken im Prinzipe Recht gegeben” (Nohle Die Statslehre Platos etc. p. 133). See also on 457 B ff.

ἔφαμεν κτλ. 462 B, C. οὐκοῦν—ἕξουσιν sums up. ὃ δὴ—ὀνομάσουσιν is parenthetical, ‘to which, as we have seen, they will apply the name “mine.”’

ἀπεικάζοντες κτλ. See on 462 C and App. V.

ἐπικούροις . Why not φύλαξι? The word φύλακες regularly includes both the ἄρχοντες and the ἐπίκουροι, but it is strange to find ἐπίκουροι including the τέλεοι φύλακες or rulers (see on II 374 D), as it appears to do here and in 466 A. The following explanations may be suggested. (1) Plato intends the community of wives and children to extend only to the Auxiliaries, and not also to the Guardians. This view is taken by Blaschke ( Familienu. Gütergem. d. Pl. St. p. 10), who asserts that the Rulers proper have already past the limits of age prescribed for matrimony. In point of fact, however, a man may become a τέλεος φύλαξ at 50 (VII 540 A, B), whereas he can marry till he is 55 (460 E). (2) As by far the largest number of husbands would be only Auxiliaries, Plato speaks somewhat loosely, as if matrimonial community were confined to them. This explanation is possible enough in itself, but fails to explain the usage in 466 A. (3) ἐπίκουροι is used with the new and deeper meaning given to it in 463 B (where see note), ‘helpers of the people,’ rather than in its original and technical sense of the rulers' auxiliaries. This suits all the passages, and is in my judgment what Plato intended. ἐπίκουρος is not the only term whose connotation deepens as the Republic proceeds: cf. II 376 B, III 392 C notes

ὡμολογοῦμεν . I formerly read <*>μολογοῦμεν with Ξ q^{2}, Stallbaum, and others; but Schneider, as I now think, is right in retaining the imperfect and referring it to the original mention of domestic communism in Book IV. The whole of this discussion may in fact be regarded as a defence in the form of an explanation of the sentence IV 423 E— 424 A. See also App. I.

τροφὴν λαμβάνοντας κτλ. summarises III 416 D, E.

ἑτέρους = μὴ τοὺς αὐτούς depends on ὀνομάζοντας understood. D. and V. make ἕλκοντα govern γυναῖκα— ἑτέρους, as Stallbaum formerly did, but Plato could not have said anything so ludicrous.

ὁμοπαθεῖς : ‘simultaneously affected by’ D. and V. ὁμοιοπαθής (Ast) would mean ‘of like passions with.’

ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν with οἰχήσεται=‘almost have disappeared,’ “so gut wie verschwunden sein” (Schneider): see on I 341 B. The English translators either omit or misinterpret the phrase. Aristophanes furnishes several pretty close parallels to Plato's reasoning here: cf. Eccl. 560—610 and especially 657 ( ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ δίκαι πρῶτον ἔσονται)—672. See Chiappelli Riv. di Filol. XI pp. 212 ff. and on the whole subject App. I.

οὐδὲ ‐‐ αὐτοῖς . The first οὐδέ is of course ne—quidem. Hoefer should not have conjectured οὔτε—οὔτε ( de part. Pl. p. 41).

δικαίως is ejected by Cobet and Herwerden, but δίκαιον just below supports it. There cannot justly be any lawsuits for outrages on the person, if we declare it just and honourable for a man to take the law into his own hands. This explanation is perhaps better than to translate ‘we may fairly suppose that there will not be’ etc.

ἥλιξι κτλ. Cf. (with J. and C.) Laws 879 E ἧλιξ δὲ ἥλικα—ἀμυνέσθω κατὰ φύσιν ἄνευ βέλους ψιλαῖς ταῖς χερσίν. It should be remembered that in cases of αἰκεία the guilty party was the one ὃς ἂν ἄρξῃ χει<*>ῶν ἀδίκων πρότερος (Meier u. Schömann Att. Process p. 648).

ἀνάγκην ‐‐ τιθέντες =‘curae corporum necessitatem imponentes,’ ‘compelling them to keep themselves in condition.’ Cf. Xen. Rep. Lac. 4. 6 ἀνάγκη δ’ αὐτοῖς εὐ εξίας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· καὶ γὰρ πυκτεύουσι διὰ τὴν ἔριν, ὅπου ἂν ξυμβάλωσι. It is probably of Sparta that Plato is thinking. I have now reverted to the best supported reading, although the use of τιθέντες as virtually equivalent to ἐπιτιθέντες is not free from difficulty. There is considerable MS authority (including II) for ἀνάγκῃ, and as ἐπιμέλειαν was read by A^{1} (see cr. n.) and several other MSS, I once conjectured <ἐν> ἀνάγκῃ σωμάτων ἐπιμέλειαν τιθέντες, taking ἐν ἀνάγκῃ as meaning ἀναγκαίαν; but this idiom is very rare except with ἐστί, ἦν and the like. Stobaeus ( Flor. 43. 102) and Stallbaum read ἀνάγκην σωμάτων ἐπιμελείας. In q and two other MSS the text runs ἀνάγκῃ (or ἀνάγκη) σωμάτων ἐπιμελείας τιθέντες. Does this mean ‘requiring them to guard against violence to the person’ ( ἀνάγκῃ σωμάτων)? If Plato meant to convey this meaning, it would be preferable to read ἀνάγκῃ σωμάτων ἐπιμέλειαν τιθέντες (for which there is also better MS authority), or possibly ἀνάγκῃ σωμάτων <*>πιμέλειαν <ἀντι> τιθέντες, but ἀνάγκῃ σωμάτων would be a fantastic expression, though perhaps intelligible after βιαίων and αἰκείας. On the whole, I think the reading printed above has most in its favour.

ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ : i.e. by a personal encounter.

πρεσβυτέρῳ κτλ. This too is probably Spartan: cf. Xen. Rep. Lac. 2. 10. Patriarchal discipline is in perfect harmony with Plato's conception of the State as a single family.

καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε κτλ. An anacoluthon, the construction being broken by οἶμαι δ’ οὐδὲ κτλ.: see I 352 B note and infra 471 C. Here the apodosis would have been δῆλον ἂν εἴη or the like: cf. Stallbaum on Laws 677 B. Schneider and others suppose that ὡς τὸ εἰκός is substituted ἀνακολούθως for εἰκός ἐστι— a tolerably common form of anacoluthon in Plato and elsewhere (I 347 A note): but such an idiom is awkward here. It is difficult again to supply δῆλον from Glauco's answer, though the presence of δῆλον may render the anacoluthon a trifle easier; nor can a governing verb be elicited from προστετάξεται. Others propose to abolish the anacoluthon: Ast by reading ὅ γε νεώτερος, Hartman by emending to προστετάξεσθαι <δῆλον>. Δῆλον. Καὶ μὴν κτλ. Neither alternative is satisfactory: and Hartman's is not even Greek. It should be noted that Aristophanes deals with the same subject in Eccl. 638 ff. See App. I.

ἄρχοντες . Stallbaum reads οἱ ἄρχοντες with q. “At varii sunt in civitate magistratus, neque semper eorundem nedum omnium est, tale quid mandare iunioribus” (Schneider).

τὸ ‐‐ βοηθεῖν . τό belongs to δέος, “ut sensus idem sit, ac si dictum esset δέος δὲ τὸ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων βοηθείας τῷ πάσχοντι. δέος ἐστὶ τοὺς ἄλλους βοηθεῖν quin recte dicatur, nemo ambigit: quidni etiam τὸ τοὺς ἄλλους βοηθεῖν δέος dicere liceat” (Schneider)? Cf. οὐ παρὰ φύσιν τὴν τοῦ θήλεος πρὸς τὸ ἄῤῥεν (466 D). Madvig's change of τό to τοῦ has met with much favour, and is accepted even by J. and C. To my mind it destroys the balance of the two clauses, by dropping the personification of δέος, while retaining that of αἰδώς. For the sense cf. Ar. Eccl. 641 —643 ἀλλ) <*> παρεστὼς οὐκ ἐπιτρέψει· τότε δ) αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἔμελ) οὐδὲν | τῶν ἀλλοτρίων (sc. πατέρων) ὅστις τύπτοι· νῦν δ’ ἢν πληγέντος ἀκούσῃ, | μὴ αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον (illum ipsum sc. suum ipsius parentem, as Blaydes explains) τύπτῃ δεδιὼς τοῖς δρῶσιν τοῦτο μαχεῖται. Aristophanes' verses illustrate τοὺς μὲν ὡς ὑεῖς exactly; the parallel could scarcely be closer. Cf. App. I.

οὐδὲν δεινὸν μή . This construction occurs only four times in the Platonic corpus: viz. in Ap. 28 A , Phaed. 84 B , Gorg. 520 D , and Epp. 7. 344 E (Weber in Schanz's Beiträge II 2, p. 50).

κολακείας κτλ. πένητες has been variously explained as (1) for <αἷς ἔνοχοι ἂν εἶεν> πένητες or the like (Schneider), (2) in partitive apposition with the subject of ἀπηλλαγμένοι ἂν εἶεν (one of J. and C.'s alternatives), (3) nominative to ἴσχουσι (Shorey in A. J. Ph. XVI p. 237). J. and C. also suggest that κολακείας is “genitive singular in the same case as ὧν.” If so, we should read ἀλγηδόνος with q: but there is no room for doubt that κολακείας is the accusative plural. Of these interpretations (1) is too difficult, while (3) is hardly possible, unless πένητες is placed after ἴσχουσι, as was once proposed by Ast, who afterwards preferred to read ἀπηλλαγμένοι ἂν εἶεν <πένητες>, and finally wished to excise the word altogether. (2) is, I think, defensible, if we remember the Greek partiality for this kind of construction (IV 431 A note), and the occasional irregularities of Platonic style. See also on VIII 556 C, D. Jackson conjectures πένητος (‘the poor man's flatteries of the rich’), Stallbaum πενίας in the sense of πενήτων. I think πένητες is probably due to Plato: but if not, the word may be a gloss on κολακείας τε πλουσίων or on ἴσχουσι .

οἰκετῶν : not= οἰκείων as the Scholiast says, but domestici, ‘those of the household’ ( οἱ κατὰ τὸν οἷκον πάντες Hesychius), including, of course, slaves. Where there is no οἰκία, as in Plato's eity, there can be no οἰκέται. Plato's communism involves the abolition of domestic slavery as well as of family ties. See also on 469 B, C.

τὰ μὲν ‐‐ παραδόντες : an interesting glimpse of the economic condition of the Athenian poor. Cf. Ar. Clouds 1172 ff. The agreement in tense makes it probable that πορισάμενοι, θέμενοι, and παραδόντες are grammatically coordinate; although the money must of course be procured before it is deposited. The asyndeton has a rhetorical effect: cf. II 362 B note Hartman would omit παραδόντες; but παραδιδόναι takes an infinitive more easily than τίθεσθαι .

ὅσα τε κτλ. : ‘and the various and manifold troubles which men suffer in connexion with such matters, all of them obvious enough and ignoble, and not worth spending words upon.’ δειλά τε for δῆλά τε δή has slight MS authority, but is only an absurd attempt to represent δἰ ἀπρέπειαν in C above. Still worse is the conjecture δοῦλά, which Herwerden approves.

ἀπαλλάξονται . I formerly adopted Cobet's conjecture ἀπηλλάξονται ( N. L. p. 243), which is attractive in itself, and also because of its correspondence with ἀπηλλαγμένοι ἂν εἷεν in C. But even on the score of meaning the change can hardly be called a necessary one, and there is no MS authority for the form ἀπηλλάξονται either here or (so far as I can discover) elsewhere.

ὀλυμπιονῖκαι κτλ. ‘To him that overcometh’ etc. Plato frequently borrows similitudes and phrases from the national games. Cf. VI 503 A, 504 A, IX 583 B note, X 613 B, C, 621 D, and Phaedr. 256 B . Here he sings a sort of paean in honour of his more than Olympic conquerors. νίκη, ἡ <*>κ τοῦ δημοσίου τροφή (cf. Ap. 36 D ), ἀναδοῦνται, γέρα (such as προεδρία Xenophanes Fr. 2. 7) and ταφῆς ἀξίας μετέχουσιν are each of them significant points in the comparison.

ὧν ‐‐ ὑπάρχει . The nominative of a relative pronoun is very rarely attracted into the genitive. Van Cleef ( de attract. in enunt. rel. usu Plat. p. 42) cites only two other certain instances in Plato, viz. Theaet. 158 A and Alc. II 148 A. περὶ πάντων ὧν γέγονε is found in an Attic inscription about the end of the fourth century B.C. (Meisterhans^{3} p. 238). In Phaed. 69 A the nominative passes into a dative: cf. also οἷς ἐξόν in 466 A and Gorg. 492 B .

ζῶντές τε . We should expect τε to follow γέρα, but cf. 452 A. Here, as there, one or two MSS (with Stobaeus Flor. 43. 102 ad fin.) omit τε. Hartman is suspicious of ταφῆς ἀξίας μετέχουσιν, especially as καὶ μάλα—καλά refers to γέρα. καλά might conceivably be the marginal comment of an approving reader; but this kind of looseness is not uncommon in replies (cf. II 372 A, III 405 D, IV 436 E, 468 A, VI 500 B, VII 535 C, VIII 558 A, B, Gorg. 467 E and elsewhere, with Riddell Digest of Platonic Idioms § 306), and the expression ταφῆς ἀξίας μετέχουσιν is much too quiet and refined for the ordinary scribe.

οὐκ οἶδα ὅτου : said with a glance at Adimantus, who had been the spokesman of these views (IV 419 A ff.). Cf. the use of τισίν in II 372 E.

ποιοῖμεν ‐‐ σκεψοίμεθα . See cr. nn. I agree with most of the recent editors in writing the optative. σκεψόμεθα is perhaps defensible, for we may regard τοῦτο μὲν—σκεψόμεθα as oratio recta; but ποιοῦμεν would be very awkward, if not positively wrong, in view of the optative ὡς οἷοί τ’ εἶμεν. It is noticeable that Plato did not expressly promise to examine this point; although the solution is already hinted at in IV 420 B.

οἷς ἐξόν . Hirschig would write οἵ for οἷς, but see 465 D note The same attraction is found in other authors besides Plato: see Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 925.

ἐπικούρων has now a more exalted sense than formerly (see 463 B, 464 B notes), and includes the Rulers. Aristotle perversely misrepresents Plato's position in regard to the happiness of the guardians when he remarks ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀφαιρούμενος τῶν φυλάκων, ὅλην φησὶ δεῖν εὐδαίμονα ποιεῖν τὴν πόλιν τὸν νομοθέτην ( Pol. B 5. 1264^{b} 15 ff.): see Susemihl ad loc.

ἐκεῖ . IV 420 ff.

διὰ δύναμιν : ‘because he has the power,’ “weil er kann” (Schneider). The possession of the power to do wrong is itself a temptation, according to Plato: cf. Gorg. 525 D οὗτοι (tyrants etc.) γὰρ διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν μέγιστα καὶ ἀνοσιώτατα ἁμαρτήματα ἁμαρτάνουσι, and ib. 526 A. Whibley points out that in the language of Greek politics and political science δύναμις was often used in a quasitechnical sense, denoting ‘power due to wealth, connexions,’ etc. ( Gk. Olig. p. 125 note 7), but it can hardly have such a meaning here. Madvig conjectures, absurdly enough, διαδῦναι.

Ἡσίοδον . OD. 40.

μενεῖ ἐπί : ‘will remain true to,’ as in VI 496 B.

συγχωρεῖς is followed first by the accusative κοινωνίαν and afterwards by the accusative with infinitive κατά τε πόλιν—ἄῤῥεν (J. and C.). Ast desired to cancel καί before παίδων, and is commended for this by Hartman, who remarks “quasi unquam παῖδες gigni possint sine mulieris et viri κοινωνίᾳ!” “Nodum in scirpo,” as Schneider caustically observes. Plato is speaking of κοινωνία περὶ παίδων not between one woman and one man, but between several women and several men ( τῶν γυναικῶν τοῖς ἀνδράσι). The children are common to all the guardians of either sex.

οὐ παρὰ φύσιν . Before taking leave of the subject, Plato reiterates the principle on which his communism rests. “Equal companionship in the work and interests of life is the natural relation of the sexes, whereas it is the existing relation which is unnatural” (Bosanquet). Cf. 456 C note

ὥσπερ ‐‐ ζῴοις . Cf. 451 D.

περὶ μὲν γὰρ κτλ. = ‘for as to war’ etc. is a dexterous way of making room for the episode on war, and at the same time postponing ‘the great peripeteia, the on-rushing of the third wave,’ which “is made more impressive by being delayed” (J. and C.). For μὲν γάρ cf. VIII 562 A note

ὥσπερ κτλ. Handicrafts were usually hereditary among the Greeks: cf. Prot. 328 A and Blümner Privatalt. p. 395 notes διακονεῖν should be taken with ἄξουσι. The change of construction is illustrated by Schneider ( Addit. p. 41) from Tim. 74 B ἐμηχανᾶτο, ἵνα—παρέχοι, τὴν δὲ σάρκα—ἔσεσθαι κτλ. Herwerden inserts δεῖ, and Richards διδάσκωνται, after θέᾳ, but the text is probably sound.

μαχεῖται ‐‐ τέκῃ . Cf. Xen. Cyr. IV 3. 2 and Tac. Germ. 7 quodque praecipuum fortitudinis incitamentum est —in proximo pignora, unde feminarum ululatus audiri, unde vagitus infantium.

ἀναλαβεῖν =‘to recover.’ This intransitive use of ἀναλαμβάνειν is especially common in medical writers: see Stephanus-Hase Lex. s.v. It arises from the omission of the reflexive pronoun, which is a common way of making transitive verbs into intransitive: see on I 336 B.

παῖδας τοὺς ἄνδρας. Ξ with several other MSS reads τοὺς παῖδας instead of παῖδας. But παῖδας is predicative, and goes with θεωρεῖν. “Socrates plurimum referre dicit, ut qui adulti bellicosi futuri sint, iam pueri res bellicas spectent” (Schneider). Hartman seriously weakens the contrast between παῖδας and ἄνδρας by reading ἄνδρας <τοὺς> πολεμικούς.

διαφέρει . We should at first sight expect <πολὺ> διαφέρει, and so Richards suggests. But (as Hartman points out) the introduction of οὐκ ἄξιον κινδύνου breaks the continuity between the original question and the reply. Hence, too, the reply has διαφέρει, not διαφέρειν (the reading of Ξ and a few other MSS, wrongly preferred by Hartman).

τοῦτο μὲν κτλ. ὑπαρκτέον= δεῖ <*>πάρχειν (intransitive), not ‘we must begin with,’ as J. and C. suppose. Cf. ἑκτέον 468 A. τοῦτο (accusative: see on III 400 D) is explained by θεωροὺς— ποιεῖν. With προσμηχανᾶσθαι, δεῖ or the like is understood out of ὑπαρκτέον: cf. Gorg. 492 D τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας φὴ|ς οὐ κολαστέον—<*>ῶντα δὲ αὐτὰς ὡς μεγίστας πλήρωσιν—ἑτοιμάζειν and Crito 51 C. Richards needlessly proposes to read προσμηχανητέον or to insert “something like δεήσει.”

εὐλαβήσονται : sc. ἄγειν.

παιδαγωγούς . The tutorial office in Athens was assigned to slaves. In Plato it is exercised by the very best of the citizens. Bosanquet justly emphasizes the revolution which Plato's arrangement would involve in the education of the young.

ἀλλὰ γάρ . II 365 C note

διδαξαμένους . Schneider reads διδαχθέντας, while preferring his own conjecture δεδιδαξομένους. The future διδαξομένους cannot be right: for the children would certainly be taught to ride, before going on such expeditions (J. and C.). It would be too hazardous in such a case ἐν πίθῳ κεραμεύειν. Against Schneider's conjecture it may be urged that the future perfect participle should not be used where the aorist participle is enough. διδαχθέντας is an obvious ‘correction.’ With διδαξαμένους the meaning is simply ‘when they have taught them to ride.’ The middle expresses personal interest; and does not imply that the ἐπίκουροι get them taught by others. See on this point IV 421 E note It may be noted that in Sparta great importance was attached to learning the accomplishment of riding (Müller Dorians II p. 316).

τί δὲ δὴ κτλ. This punctuation is better than to place the mark of interrogation after δή, and take τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον as an internal accusative with πῶς ἑκτέον κτλ., because τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον is already practically involved in the word στρατιώτας. I agree with Hartman that Richards' proposal— τί δὲ δή; εἶπον· τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον, πῶς— πολεμίους, ἆρα κτλ.;—is far from elegant.

ποῖα . See cr. n. ποἶ ἄν, which is generally read, surely cannot be right. Schneider remarks “ ποἶ ἄν breviter dictum accipio pro ποῖα ἂν ὄντα τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ὀρθῶς ἔχειν λέγεις.” J. and C. are content with supplying εἴη τὰ σοὶ καταφαινόμενα. But ellipses of this kind are too severe a strain upon the imagination. ποῖα δή is suggested by Richards, πῇ δή by Hartman: but is δή in place here? I think not. I take ποῖα sc. ἐστι to refer to τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον. Glauco addresses himself to the first of Socrates' questions: cf. 465 E note and Soph. Trach. 421 —423. The corruption is common enough: see Introd. § 5.

αὐτῶν = ‘ipsorum’ contrasts Plato's soldiers with their enemies (cf. πρὸς α<*>τούς τε καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους just before). μέν prepares us for the second part of this topic, beginning at 469 B. We certainly should not read μήν (with Hartman). Plato's treatment of cowardice in battle may be compared with the punishment of τρέσαντες in Sparta: see Gilbert Gk. Constit. Ant. E.T. p. 77. Cf. also Laws 943 D ff.

ἑλοῦσι . Van Leeuwen's emendation—see cr. n.—seems to me admirable. The contrast between ἁλόντα and ἑλοῦσι is precisely what is wanted: cf. Xen. Cyr. VII 5. 73 νόμος γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἀΐδιός ἐστιν, ὅταν πολεμούντων πόλις ἁλῷ, τῶν ἑλόντων ἐ=ναι καὶ τὰ σώματα— καὶ τὰ χρήματα. With the infinitive van Leeuwen compares Laws 879 A παραδότω τὸν δοῦλον—χρῆσθαι ὅ τι ἂν ἐθέλῃ. θέλουσι is not free from objection. Paris A generally has ἐθέλω, the usual Attic form; moreover, the word itself, if taken with χρῆσθαι, is too weak; nor can we (with J. and C.) readily understand ἔχειν. Plato's ordinances on this matter are far more drastic than anything known even in Sparta: see Müller Dorians II p. 238.

οὐκέτι σοι δοκεῖ : said with playful irony, for Glauco is an ἀνὴρ ἐρωτικός (474 D). A vein of irony runs through all this passage, as Dugas has pointed out ( L'Amitié Antique p. 121); but it is not wholly ironical. Plato may have been willing to allow more latitude to soldiers on a campaign than he would permit to others, without sanctioning the usual abuses of camp life (see Dugas l.c. p. 87). There is nothing in this passage which is necessarily inconsistent with the self-restraint enjoined in III 403 B, although in practice abuses might have arisen. See also Laws 636 C ff.

καὶ προστίθημί γε κτλ. Glauco's enthusiasm is in keeping with his character: see last note.

βούληται : sc. ὁ ἀριστεὑσας τε καὶ εὐδοκιμήσας.

ἐάν τις ‐‐ φέρειν . See Symp. 178 E — 179 B. The principle underlying Glauco's remark was widely accepted by Greek military authorities (see Hug on Symp. l.c. and Dugas l.c. pp. 90—104). The Theban Sacred Band, composed of ἐρασταί and ἐρώμενοι, is the best-known instance of its application in actual warfare (Athen. XIII 561 F).

αἱρέσεις means selections by the rulers (so also Schneider): cf. 460 B, to which εἴρηται ἤδη refers. J. and C.'s alternative rendering “success in winning such prizes” cannot stand: still less the translation of D. and V. “to exercise more than the usual liberty of choice in such matters.”

τῶν τοιούτων : i.e. τῶν ἀγαθῶν.

Ὅμηρος κτλ. Il. 7. 321 f. νώτοισιν δ’ Αἴαντα διηνεκέεσσι γέραιρεν | ἥρως Ἀτρείδης. In Plato, Αἴαντα is omitted by q, and three other MSS: one MS places it before νώτοισιν, and four after ἔφη. The word may be a gloss; but as it is present in ΑΠΞ, in the same position as in Homer, it is safer to retain it. Plato often makes his Homeric quotations complete, even at the cost of a little awkwardness: cf. II 363 B. Aristophanes, it may be noted, has the converse of Plato's proposal in Eccl. 680.

γε reminds us that Homer is not in other respects a persona grata in our city.

ἕδραις κτλ. ἕδρῃ τε κρέασίν τε ἰδὲ πλείοις δεπάεσσιν in Il. VIII 162 al.

στρατείας : not of course στρατιᾶς (Herwerden), for στρατιά is ‘army,’ στρατεία ‘campaign.’

τοῦ χρυσοῦ γένους . III 415 A. Cf. Heracl. Fr. 102 ed. Bywater ἀρηιφάτους θεοὶ τιμῶσι καὶ ἄνθρωποι.

τοῦ τοιούτου γένους . Plato compares his ‘golden citizens’ with the heroes of the Hesiodic golden age. He would fain surround them with some of the romantic and religious sentiment that clung around the golden age of Greek poetry and legend.

οἱ μὲν ‐‐ ἀνθρώπων . Cf. Crat. 397 E . The nearest approach to these lines in our Hesiod is to be found in OD. 122 f. τοὶ μὲν—the departed children of the golden age— δαίμονές εἰσι Διὸς μεγάλου διὰ βουλὰς | ἐσθλοί, ἐπιχθόνιοι, φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων.

τοῦ θεοῦ . Apollo, our πάτριος ἐξηγητής: see IV 427 B note

τιθέναι : ‘to bury.’

τίνι διαφόρῳ : ‘with what distinction’ (“mit welcher Auszeichnung” Schneider). The occurrence of θήκας διαφόρους in Laws 947 B is no ground for reading <θήκῃ> τίνι διαφόρῳ here, as Richards bids us read.

ὡς δαιμόνων ‐‐ θήκας is another link with Greek religion. Cf. Eur. Alc. 1000 ff. καί τις δοχμίαν κέλευθον | ἐμβαίνων τόδ’ ἐρεῖ | “ αὕτα ποτὲ προὔθαν’ ἀνδρός, | νῦν δ’ ἐστὶ μάκαιρα δαίμων. | χαῖρ’ ὦ πότνἰ, εὖ δὲ δοίης.” | τοῖαί νιν προσεροῦσι φᾶμαι, and other passages cited by Nägelsbach Nachhom. Theol. pp. 108—110.

Ἕλληνας ‐‐ ἄλλῃ . Ἕλληνας is the object, not, as is sometimes held, the subject, of ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι. It rightly occupies the emphatic place, because the point is that Greek cities should not enslave Greeks—no one objects to their enslaving barbarians,—and not that Greeks (as opposed to barbarians) should not enslave Greek cities. Cf. the order in 471 A οὐδ’ ἄρα τὴν Ἑλλάδα Ἕλληνες ὄντες κεροῦσιν. A further reason for taking this view is that Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις points the allusion to Plato's city, which is a Ἑλληνὶς πόλις (470 E), and therefore will not reduce Greeks to slavery. Finally, μηδ’ ἄλλῃ (sc. Ἑλληνίδι πόλει) is easy and natural only if Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις is treated as the subject. The difficulty of μηδ’ ἄλλῃ (on the usual interpretation) led to the correction μηδ’ ἄλλοις (Stallbaum with v and Flor. RT), and has recently caused Hartman to propose μηδαμῇ, on the ground that ἄλλῃ after Ἕλληνας could only mean βαρβάρῳ. In so saying, he goes. I think, too far; but my explanation removes the difficulty.

ἐθίζειν : sc. τοὺς Ἕλληνας.

ες)λαβουμένους agrees with the subject of φείδεσθαι rather than with that of ἐθίζειν. The Spartan Callicratidas agreed with Plato here: οὐκ ἔφη ἑαυτοῦ γε ἄρχοντος οὐδένα Ἑλλήνων εἰς τοὐκείνου δυνατὸν ἀνδραποδισθῆναι ( Xen. Hell. I 6. 14 ). To enslave barbarians, on the other hand, is just: for the barbarian is φύσει δοῦλος ( Eur. Iph. Aul. 1401 and elsewhere: Arist. Pol. A 2. 1252^{b} 9). See also on 470 C.

ὅλῳ καὶ παντί . So in Phaed. 79 E , Crat. 433 E . In VII 527 C we have τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ παντί, and even τῷ παντὶ καὶ ὅλῳ in Laws 734 E.

μηδέ : with ἐκτῆσθαι. They must neither enslave their countrymen ( ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι above), nor hold a Greek in slavery: cf. I 351 B. J. and C. wrongly translate μηδέ as ‘not even,’ and Hartman needlessly proposes μηδέν). Greek slaves were of foreign nationality, except such as had been sold into slavery on the destruction of their city by war (Blümner Privatalt. p. 87 note 1). Plato disapproves of the exception: does he mean to approve the rule, so far as his own city is concerned? Steinhart ( Einleitung p. 202) asserts that Plato expressly recognises slavery in his State. It is clear from the present section that Plato does not impugn the principle of slavery, so long as the slaves are of barbarian origin; but he nowhere says that his perfect city is actually to contain slaves, nor is it easy to see what there would be for them to do, unless they were employed to work under the farmers and artizans, or as personal attendants at the συσσίτια and the like. Slaves are present, of course, in the city of the Laws (776 C ff.).

σκυλεύειν ‐‐ καλῶς ἔχει . Cf. Xen. Hell. II 4. 19 (quoted by J. and C.) καὶ τὰ μὲν ὅπλ<*> ἔλαβον, τοὺς δὲ χιτῶνας οὐδενὸς τῶν πολιτῶν ἐσκύλευσαν. Such moderation was unusual.

ἀποπταμένου is (as Schulze pointed out in Fl. Jahrb. 1887 pp. 226 ff.) a reminiscence of Homer's ἀπὸ δ’ ἔπτατο θυμός ( Il. 16. 469 and elsewhere). Hence the poetic form, as in οἴχεται ἀποπτάμενος ( Symp. 183 E from Il. II 71). The ordinary aorist in prose is ‐επτόμην, as in II 365 A. Compare Phaed. 115 C f. and Eur. Fr. 176 . 3—6 τίς γὰρ πετραῖον σκόπελον οὐτάζων δορὶ | ὀδύναισι δώσει; τίς δ) ἀτιμάζων νέκυς, | εἰ μηδὲν αἰσθάνοιτο τῶν παθημάτων; and Plut. Apophtheg. Lac. 228 F.

αἳ ‐‐ ἁπτόμεναι . Aristotle read βάλλοντος, and not βαλόντος (see cr. n.), as appears from Rhet. III 4. 1406^{b} 33, where he refers to Plato's illustration as follows: καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος, ὅτι οἱ τοὺς τεθνεῶτας σκυλεύοντες ἐοίκασι τοῖς κυνιδίοις, ἃ τοὺς λίθους δάκνει τοῦ βάλλοντος οὐχ ἁπτόμενα. The present is more picturesque and true to nature: the dog worries the stones, while his tormentor amuses himself by throwing more. It is true that the simile is not quite accurate, because a ‘flown antagonist’ cannot continue to do mischief; but βαλόντος, which is generally read, though not by Schneider, is also inexact, because you cannot attack a vanished foe. In either case, the analogy is near enough. Moreover the consensus of all the other MSS, coupled with Aristotle, outweighs the authority of A where lipography is possible. See Introd. § 5.

ἀναιρέσεων . The laws of Greek warfare permitted ἀναίρεσις of the dead, unless the petitioning parties had forfeited their rights by robbing a temple or desecrating a shrine (Busolt Gr. Alterth. p. 55, where the authorities are cited).

οὐδὲ μὴν ‐‐ Ἑλλήνων : as was usual in Greece: see for example Thuc. III 114. 1. Plutarch however implies that the Spartans were an honourable exception to this rule ( Apophtheg. Lac. 224 B). With Plato's sentiment cf. “aeternum inimicitiarum monumentum Graios de Graiis statuere non oportet” (Cic. de Inv. II 70. Cicero is referring to an incident arising out of a war between Sparta and Thebes).

ἐὰν μή τι ‐‐ λέγῃ . Apollo might not wish to surrender his rights, and Plato would do no violence to the patron god of his city (IV 427 B). It was usual to dedicate a tithe of the spoil to the gods ( Xen. Hell. III 3. 1 ).

τί δέ; κτλ. So Schneider punctuates. Stallbaum and others place the mark of interrogation after ἐμπρήσεως, comparing VII 515 B, IX 582 C (where however see my notes), and other examples: but the analogy of 469 B and 469 C, as well as the emphasis on γῆς, is in favour of Schneider's view. We may compare the use of the genitive instead of περί with the genitive after verbs of speaking, asking about etc.; cf. IX 576 D and Jebb on Soph. Trach. 169 .

ὥσπερ καὶ ‐‐ δύο . Literally ‘as these names, war and civil discord, are named two, so also they are two.’ ὀνομάζεται δύο is opposed to εἷναι δύο, which means δύο οὐσίας εἶναι ‘are,’ ‘express two realities,’ as is further explained in ὄντα—διαφοραῖν. Instead of ταῦτα τὰ ὀνόματα, ταῦτα ὀνόματα—see cr. n.—is now usually read. With this reading, the sense would be ‘as these things’ (viz. War and Discord) ‘are called by two names, so also they are in reality two,’ ὄντα ἐπὶ κτλ. That is to say, ὄντα ἐπί would be said of things; but it is clearly intended to be said of names: cf. κέκληται ἐπί just below. Schneider noticed the difficulty, but thought the confusion between names and things excusable. It is surely a grave blemish in a passage which is written expressly to distinguish between the two. Richards would transpose and read ὥσπερ καὶ— στάσις, ὄντα ἐπὶ δυοῖν τινοῖν διαφοραῖν, οὕτω καὶ ε<*>ναι δύο, or make ὄντα—διαφοραῖν follow ὀνόματα. This solution effects, at great cost, what is only after all a partial cure.

ὄντα ἐπὶ κτλ. ἐπί governs διαφοραῖν, and δυοῖν τινοῖν, which is neuter, depends on διαφοραῖν. The literal meaning is ‘being applied to two kinds of disagreements, arising in two things.’ The two things—continues Plato—are τὸ οἰκεῖον ( ξυγγενές), and τὸ ἀλλότριον ( ὀθνεῖον). Disagreement—for διαφορά is substituted <*>χθρά—in τὸ οἰκεῖον is called στάσις, in τὸ ἀλλότριον, πόλεμος. ὄντα— διαφοραῖν is a marvellous example of Greek brevity, simplicity, and precision. Schneider, and J. and C., explain the words correctly; but D. and V. plunge everything into confusion by taking δυοῖν τινοῖν with διαφοραῖν.

φημὶ γὰρ κτλ. : a formal declaration of Plato's political faith in the Panhellenic ideal, which Cimon— Πανελλήνων πρόμος, as Cratinus calls him ( Archil. 1 ed. Meineke)—and Callicratidas (see Grote VII pp. 406—415) had striven to realise in fact, and which Isocrates as well as Plato constantly proclaimed in theory. See on I 336 A, and cf. Spengel Isokrates u. Plato pp. 7 ff. and Isocrates Panegyricus passim. The rallying points of Plato's Panhellenism are two—internally, the Delphic oracle (IV 427 B, C notes), and externally, hostility with Persia: cf. Menex. 245 C ff. See also on πολεμίους φύσει below.

πολεμεῖν μαχομένους . Hirschig and others transpose these words, on slight MS authority, including a marginal correction in A. But it is hard to see why they should have become displaced. By adopting the order in the text Plato restricts μαχομένους to πολεμεῖν: otherwise the participle would naturally go with πολεμίους φύσει too. The MS order also lays more stress on the emphatic πολεμεῖν than Hirschig's transposition would do. Cf. (with Stallbaum) Ap. 18 D .

πολεμίους φύσει . The universal Greek view: see e.g. Hdt. I 4 ad fin., Eur. Hec. 1199 , Isocrates Paneg. 158 al., and Nägelsbach Nachhom. Theol. pp. 305— 307. “We should bear in mind,” says Bosanquet, “that Greek civilisation was to Plato much what white civilisation is to us.” This is, in part at least, true; but sentiments of chivalry and romance were far more powerful factors in fostering the ancestral feud with Persia than any apprehensions for the safety of Greek civilisation. The idea of a war against Persia always stirred the pulse of Hellas with a sense of continuity with the heroic past; and it was more than a meaningless ceremony when Agesilaus sacrificed at Aulis, and Alexander visited Achilles' tomb. See Grote IX p. 81 and XI pp. 395—397. None the less, in spite of his emphatic expression of the old Greek policy of splendid isolation, it is difficult to overestimate the effect of Plato's writings, and especially of the Republic, in breaking down the barrier between Barbarian and Greek. See on 470 E.

νοσεῖν κτλ. Compare the melancholy picture of the state of contemporary Greece in Isocr. Paneg. 115—117. Hartman would cancel καὶ στασιάζειν; but see 451 B note

συγχωρῶ κτλ. ‘I agree to view the matter in this way.’ οὕτως ὀνομάζειν would be more pointed, but is unnecessary. We are hardly justified in making νομίζειν=‘to hold this language’ (with J. and C.): for φωνῇ νομίζειν, φωνὴν νομίζειν and the like have a somewhat different meaning. See StephanusHase Thes. s. v. νομίζειν.

ὅτι ‐‐ ὡς . ὡς can hardly be exclamatory, as J. and C. suppose. For the anacoluthon cf. Hdt. III 71 ad fin. ἴστε ὑμῖν ὅτι, ἢν ὑπερπέσῃ ἡ νῦν ἡμέρη, ὡς οὐκ ἄλλος φθὰς ἐμεῦ κατήγορος ἔσται and other examples cited in Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 886. τῇ—στάσει is not ‘that which we have acknowledged to be sedition’ (Jowett), but ‘that which, as things now are, is allowed to be sedition,’ viz. when one city is divided against itself ( διαστῇ πόλις). Plato, it will be observed, does not deny that the abuses which he condemns occasionally happened in Greek civil strife: they certainly often did. He only asserts (and the admission is interesting and important) that the public conscience of Greece condemned them. The conduct of Athens in emergencies of this kind was sometimes honourable and patriotic: see for example Grote VII p. 318, VIII pp. 69, 70.

τρόφον τε καὶ μητέρα . Cf. III 414 E. Not patriotism only, but filial love, such as Virgil felt for Italy ( Georg. II 136—176), inspires these words.

μέτριον εἶναι : sc. δοκεῖ. Plato is still describing Greek public opinion.

διανοεῖσθαι κτλ. The converse of Bias's maxim φιλεῖν ὡς μισήσοντας (D. L. I 87). ἐκείνης=‘than the other,’ viz. the γνώμη which διανοεῖται ὡς οὐ διαλλαγησομένων καὶ ἀεὶ πολεμησόντων. In view of Arist. Rhet. II 21. 1395^{a} 25, where an orator is recommended, if he wishes to seem amiable, to say οὐ δεῖ ὥσπερ φας<*>, φιλεῖν ὡς μισήσοντας, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον μισεῖν ὡς φιλήσοντας, it is tempting on a first glance to regard ἐκείνης as the maxim of Bias itself: but the other interpretation is more natural and relevant. On Bias' saying see Jebb's Appendix on Soph. Ajax 679 ff.

οὐχ Ἑλληνὶς ἔσται ; Plato speaks hopefully, as if his perfect city were but one Greek city among many— a living example to the brotherhood of Hellas. It may be admitted that the city of II—IV has not a few claims to be called Hellenic. But the ‘third city’— that of the philosopher-king—is not Hellenic, nor even, in any proper sense, an earthly city at all: it is an ideal, an ensample in the heavens — ἐν οὐρανῷ παράδειγμα τῷ βουλομένῳ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὁρῶντι ἑαυτὸν κατοικίζειν (IX 592 B). The animating spirit of V 473 B—VII is assuredly not Hellenic exclusiveness, but the enthusiasm of humanity, if by ‘humanity’ we understand (with Plato) the divine element in man, in virtue of which we are most distinctively and truly human. See on VI 501 B, IX 589 D. In a certain sense it is even true that Platonism is the “strongest protest ever raised against pre-Christian hellenism” (Krohn Pl. St. p. 33). But Plato's is no barren protest; for his city foreshadows the future while it passes judgment on the past. Cf. VI 499 C note and IX 592 B notes, with Zeller^{4} II 1. pp. 921—923 and the same author's article on Der platonische Staat in seiner Bedeutung für die Folgezeit in his Vorträge u. Abhandlungen I pp. 68—88.

οὐδὲ ὀνομάσσυσιν : much less consider it so.

σωφρονιοῦσιν . The word σωφρονίζω (‘make σώφρων,’ i.e. ‘chastise’) implies the remedial view of punishment: see on II 380 B.

οὐ πολέμιοι . A few inferior MSS read ὡς οὐ πολέμιοι, and ὡς appears also in the margin of A. Campbell suggests <καὶ> οὐ πολέμιοι, Förster <ὡς> σωφρονισταί; but neither suggestion is nearly so expressive and good as the reading of the best MSS.

αὑτοῖς . The ambiguity in αὑτοῖς can mislead nobody, and αὐτοῖς (Hartman, with A etc.) would be very unpleasing. In such cases the authority of Plato's MSS is nought. The behaviour of Athens in connexion with the Mitylenean revolt is a conspicuous example of the inhumanity which Plato here condemns: see Thuc. III 36 ff.

ἀλγούντων . “Significatur necessitas innocentibus quoque damnum inferendi, quo nocentes punire et ad pacem adigere cogantur” Schneider.

τοὺς ἐναντίους . “Graecos adversarios vocat, non hostes” Stallbaum. q has Ἕλληνας for ἐναντίους—an obvious ‘interpretamentum.’

πρὸς δὲ ‐‐ ἀλλήλους . A bitter commentary on the foreign policy of Greek cities. The ‘natural’ relations between Greece and Barbary had been reversed: not only did Greeks treat Greeks as enemies, but they had begun to treat barbarians as friends. Christ ( Pl. Stud. pp. 37—39) supposes that Plato wrote this passage in 374, when Plataea was destroyed by Thebes, and the surviving inhabitants fled to Athens ( Xen. Hell. VI 3. 1 , Isocr. Plat. 1 ff.). The same view is held by Hirmer Entst. u. Komp. etc. p. 662. Plato's rebuke would have been equally or even more telling in 386, when Greece was exhausted by the Corinthian war, and friendship with the ‘natural enemy’ had forced the peace of Antalcidas upon the Greeks, to the bitter grief and shame of patriots: cf. Isocr. Paneg. 120, 121. In any case νῦν should no doubt be referred to the time when Plato wrote these words, and not to the date of action of the dialogue. See also Introd. § 4.

ὡς δυνατή . In a certain sense, this has already been proved, for the city is κατὰ φύσιν: cf. 456 C, 466 D. We have, however, still to shew that the harmony with nature can be attained, and this is what Plato proceeds to do.

ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε κτλ. We should expect ὁμολογῶ after ᾗ γένοιτο, but anacolutha after ὅτι are so frequent that something of the sort may be mentally supplied: cf. I 352 B, V 465 A notes Richards would insert ὁμολογῶ in the text. I formerly proposed καὶ ἐγὼ λέγω, <καὶ> ἃ σὺ παραλείπεις ὅτι κτλ., ‘I too assert’ (sc. no less than you), ‘and also what you omit, that’ etc., but now acquiesce in the anacoluthon.

φόβων ‐‐ ἐχθροῖς . Cf. Laws 806 B.

στραγγευομένῳ . See cr. n. στρατευομένῳ could only be understood (with Stallbaum, who retains it, and Huber zu den Plat. Gleichnissen p. 10) as half-jocular for ‘de re militari disputanti.’ Such a usage is possible in itself (see on ἀποτίνουσι II 363 C); but ὤκνουν τε καὶ ἐδεδοίκη and μὴ διάτριβε (in B) are strongly in favour of στραγγευομένῳ. The same corruption—due to confusion of γ and τ, combined with lipography—occurs in the MSS of Ar. Ach. 126 , as well as in Hesychius ( στρατεύομαι· διατρίβω) and elsewhere: see Blaydes on Ar. l.c.

τὼ δύο κύματε . See 457 B, C. The first was ὡς δεῖ κοινῇ πάντα ἐπιτηδεύειν τούς τε φύλακας καὶ τὰς φυλακίδας; the second community of wives and children.

λέγειν λόγον τε . J. and C. read λόγον λέγειν τε with Ξ and Μ; but the other reading has far more authority, and is perhaps exquisitius. Cf. 452 A.

ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο ; See cr. n. γε after τοῦτο is certainly wrong. It has no MS authority except that of A^{2}, and (as Stallbaum shews) ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο is the regular form of this phrase in Plato: cf. Gorg. 497 E , Charm. 164 A . In both these cases the reply is Οὐδέν, followed by ἀλλά, as here.

παραδείγματος κτλ. παράδειγμα is not here an ‘illustration,’ but a ‘model’ or ‘standard’ (“Musterbild” Schneider) exactly as in IX 592 B and Theaet. 176 E .

αὐτό ‐‐ δικαιοσύνην : ‘justice by itself’: see II 363 A note Here however the expression means ‘abstract justice’ rather than merely ‘justice apart from its consequences.’ It is not yet a metaphysical ‘Idea’ in the sense of VI and VII: see on III 402 C, and cf. Pfleiderer zur Lösung etc. p. 19 with Susemihl Gen. Entw. II pp. 176 f.

καὶ ἄνδρα κτλ. : ‘and the man who is perfectly just if he should come into existence, and what his character would be if he did.’ εἰ γένοιτο must be understood as a kind of protasis to τὸν τελέως δίκαιον (i.q. τὸν τελέως ὄντα or ἂν ὄντα δίκαιον). Schneider's explanation is less simple: “virum perfecte iustum quaesituri ea conditione rem susceperant, si fieri et existere talis posset.” We must beware of translating ‘num existeret’ (Stallbaum): for it is just in order to shew the irrelevancy of the question, ‘Can such a man exist?’ that Plato wrote this sentence. Madvig omits καί before οἷος. In that case εἰ γένοιτο goes with the following clause (cf. IV 419 A note), and the meaning is: ‘if he should come into existence, what his character would be when he did.’ By this means we obtain an exact parallel between δικαιοσύνην οἷόν <*>στι and ἄνδρα—οἷος ἂν εἴη. It must be admitted, I think, that the emendation is an improvement: but the MS reading may stand. Campbell needlessly questions εἰ γένοιτο, thinking it a gloss on γενόμενος. The pleonasm is characteristic: cf. 471 C εἰ γένοιτο, πάντ’ ἂν εἴη ἀγαθὰ ᾗ γένοιτο.

καὶ ἀδικίαν αὖ κτλ. See IV 420 C note

ἵνα ‐‐ ἕξειν . Cf. VIII 544 A.

ἐκείνοις . See cr. n. ἐκείνης, which Schneider alone retains, can hardly be defended. For the error see Introd. § 5.

τοῦτο μέν . On μέν without δέ see 475 E note

οἴει ‐‐ ἄνδρα . For οἴει <*>ν Richards reads οἴει δή: but δή is unpleasing here. See also on 450 C. After ἂν—εἶναι we might expect δς ἂν—μὴ ἔχοι, ‘who would not be able,’ and so Ξ, q and several other MSS actually read. The irregularity is however no more than ‘cannot’ for ‘would not be able to’ in English. I have restored οἷος (which used to be read before Bekker) for οἷον (see cr. n.). The corruption is easy, and in such cases the relative regularly agrees with its subject: see Phil. 29 E with Stallbaum's note. It is also wrong in point of sense to refer the relative to παράδειγμα here. Art is credited with higher possibilities in this passage than in Book X, unless we suppose that the painter's κάλλιστος ἄνθρωπος is only an artificial combination of individual features imitated from human beings. But in that case the illustration is less apposite; for Plato's perfect city is more than imitation of the actual. See also on X 598 A, and cf. Xen. Mem. III 10. 2 and Arist. Pol. γ. 11. 1281^{b} 10—15.

παράδειγμα κτλ. Cf. Laws 713 B and 739 C—E.

δυνατώτατα κτλ. “Superlativus facultatem, quam relativam dicunt, indicat” Schneider. It is important to observe that Plato does not expect a perfect realisation even when philosophers become kings: cf. 473 E. Why he does not, is explained in 473 A. πάλιν refers to 472 C.

κἂν εἰ μή τῳ δοκεῖ shews that Plato is contradicting a common view: cf. IX 577 D. Most men would of course admit that a perfect scheme must usually be modified if it is to be put in force. But they would not allow that λέξις has more truth than πρᾶξις; for the truth of a theory—they would say —is best tested by experience. Not so Plato, according to whom the world of Mind is not only more perfect, but truer than the world of Matter: cf. ἡ παντελῶς ἀληθής VI 502 D and note ad loc. The pointed ἀλλὰ σύ invites the assent of Glauco as a Platonist: cf. infra 475 E.

δεῖν κτλ. δεῖν is tautological after ἀνάγκαζε, but the addition of τοῦτο μέν makes it easier. Π has δεῖ, perhaps a mistake for δή, which was read by Stobaeus Flor. 43. 109. For γιγνόμενα Bywater ( J. Ph. X p. 73) would write γιγνόμεν’ ἄν or ἂν γιγνόμενα. The categoric statement is however more in harmony with ἆρ’ οἷόν τέ τι—ἐφάπτεσθαι. ‘Do not compel me to shew that what we described in words is in all respects reproduced by experience.’ See also on ἐπιτάττεις below.

φάναι : infinitive for imperative as in VI 508 B, 509 B, all of them examples of φάναι, although Plato is not averse to φάθι (VI 508 E) and ξύμφαθι (VII 523 A). The imperatival infinitive is very common in Attic inscriptions (Meisterhans^{3} p. 244).

ἐπιτάττεις : sc. γίγνεσθαι. It is hardly possible to understand ἐξευρεῖν ὡς δυνατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι (with J. and C.). As in γιγνόμενα above, so also here Socrates represents Glauco as requiring that the city should be made into a reality: cf. ἣν σὺ πόλιν οἰκίζεις in 470 E.

πειρώμεθα : subjunctive, i.q. δεῖ πειρᾶσθαι: cf. λέγωμεν δή, ὡς ἔοικεν ( Theaet. 173 C , quoted by J. and C.).

ἐπ) αὐτὸ ‐‐ εἶμι : ‘well, said I, I will enter on the very topic which’ etc. Cf. Thuc. II 36. 4 εἶμι καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν τῶνδε ἔπαινον. I have returned to the most authoritative reading, though previously I read (with Richards) ἐπ’ αὐτῷ δὴ —εἰμί. In point of sense, εἶμι is only a sort of quasi-future, and should be compared with ἀλλ’ εἶμι in the mouth of characters just about to leave the stage (e.g. Soph. Trach. 86 ). Cf. also Phaed. 100 B ἔρχομαι —ἐπιχειρῶν—καὶ εἶμι πάλιν ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνα— καὶ ἄρχομαι κτλ. According to KühnerBlass ( Gr. Gr. I 2, p. 217) the present use of εἶμι is found only in poetry and late prose; but ἀνίασιν in VII 531 C is a certain case, and so also in my opinion are ἐπίασιν and ἀπίασι in Thuc. IV 61. 3, 8. It should also be remembered that Plato by no means abjures archaic and poetic forms and idioms: see I 330 B note Vind. F reads ἐπ’ αὐτῶ (i.q. αὐτῷ) δ’ εἰμι, and εἰμί was the reading of q ^{1}. ἐπ’ αὐτῷ δή εἰμι is highly idiomatic and may be supported (with Richards) by VI 490 D, Pol. 274 B ; but it is safer to follow the MSS, which are all but unanimous.

εἰ καὶ ‐‐ κατακλύσειν : ‘even al though it is likely—just like a wave with its cachinnations—to swamp me with laughter and disgrace.’ Hartman would insert < με> before μέλλει, but the object is easily supplied; and με before μέλλει is very cacophonous. For other views of this passage see App. VI.

ἐὰν μὴ κτλ. Cf. Laws 709 E ff. Plato's famous and often quoted paradox is not in its essence so paradoxical as it appears. The abiding truth of Plato's suggestion is “that somehow or other the best and deepest ideas about life and the world must be brought to bear on the conduct of social and political administration if any real progress is to take place in society” (Bosanquet). But it was a paradox in the Athenian democracy, or so at least Plato, like Socrates, thought: hence πολὺ παρὰ δόξαν ῥηθήσεται 473 E. See for example Prot. 319 A —323 A and Gorg. 514 A —519 D: and cf. Krohn Pl. St. p. 93. Political evil is in Plato's view the result of a divorce between political power and knowledge of the good; it can only be cured by effecting their reconciliation. In the Politicus Plato's remedy is to make the philosopher (who is the true king) act through the statesman (305 C ff.: cf. Nohle Die Statslehre Platos pp. 82, 88, whose interpretation is—wrongly, as I think—questioned by Zeller^{4} II 1, p. 901 note 5): but in the Republic the union between Thought and Action is complete, and the philosopher is himself a statesman. Whether even then he would be strong enough to found the perfect city of the Republic, depends upon the amount of resistance which he would be likely to encounter: see on VI 499 B and IX 577 A.

λεγόμενοι . Though called kings and potentates, they are so in nothing but the name: cf. I 336 A note True kingship belongs only to the scientific ruler: Euthyd. 291 B ff. It is probable that Plato was already thinking throughout this passage of the hopes which he seems to have formed of the Syracusan dynasty: see Epp. VII and XIII with note on VI 499 B.

τοῦτο κτλ. : ‘unless this coalition of political power and philosophy come to pass,’ lit. ‘unless this coalesce,’ i.e. unless there be this coalescence, viz. ‘political power and philosophy.’ For a somewhat similar idiom see VII 527 B note δύναμις—φιλοσοφία is in explanatory apposition to the whole phrase τοῦτο—ξυμπέσῃ, rather than to τοῦτο alone. Otherwise we must suppose that τοῦτο is virtually for ταῦτα, the singular number emphasizing by anticipation the union of political power and philosophy (so J. and C.). But on this explanation the singular τοῦτο goes ill with εἰς ταὐτὸν ξυμπέσῃ, and with ἑκάτερον; nor are we justified in writing ταῦτα (with Richards). The dual τούτω might easily have been corrupted into τοῦτο, but τούτω ξυμπέσῃ is hardly defensible, in spite of εἰ ἔστι τούτω διττὼ τὼ βίω ( Gorg. 500 D ): cf. Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 57.

τῶν δὲ νῦν κτλ. : ‘while the numerous natures who at present pursue either to the exclusion of the other are forcibly debarred,’ sc. from exclusively pursuing either. The genitive τῶν— πορευομένων is not partitive (Schneider, Stallbaum, and others), but rather possessive, and depends on φύσεις. Had Plato meant to say ‘most of those who pursue’ he would have written οἱ πολλοί instead of α<*> πολλαὶ φύσεις, as Hartman points out. There is moreover no reason to suppose that Plato wishes to allow any exceptions whatever to his rule. Nor is πολλαί ‘volgares’ (Baiter), or ‘commoner’ (Jowett), but simply ‘numerous,’ ‘plentiful’: cf. the usage of ό πολύς in II 376 E τῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ χρόνου ηὑρημένης ( παιδείας) and τὸν πολὺν λεών 458 D. Exclusive devotion either to politics or φιλοσοφία was common, but by no means universal, as the examples of Pythagoras, Solon, and many others sufficiently attest: see Arist. Rhet. II 23. 1398^{b} 16—19. Various emendations have been proposed for πολλαί, such as χωλαί (Madvig), πονηραί (Liebhold), and πολιτικαί (Apelt), but the above explanation removes the difficulty. As regards the sentiment, it should be noted that Plato refuses to sanction the exclusive pursuit of knowledge as well as of politics. He holds “that a specialised study of merely abstract questions unfits a man for the true grasp of life and character which is the centre of real philosophy” (Bosanquet), and on this ground he would probably have condemned the one-sided enthusiasm which many persons now profess for what is usually called by them ‘research.’ Cf. VI 497 A note and 499 B.

εἰς τὸ δυνατόν . See 472 E note

πολὺ παρὰ δόξαν . 473 C note

ἐκβέβληκας =‘have let fall’ is more appropriate here than ἐμβέβληκας, which Hartman (with Flor. T) prefers, on the strength of I 344 D and other passages. ἐκβάλλειν in this sense is half-poetic, and suits well with Glauco's excited mood.

πάνυ πολλούς τε κτλ. Chiappelli (l.c. p. 202) supposes that the allusion is to Aristophanes and the comic stage. Comedy would doubtless join in the outcry; but the loudest clamour would be raised by the ‘practical politician’ to whom philosophy is foolishness, and worse: see Gorg. 484 C —486 C and cf. Theaet. 172 D —175 B. The attitude of Isocrates and his adherents would also be hostile and contemptuous (Dümmler Chron. Beiträge pp. 43—45). Glauco clearly anticipates a combined assault from different quarters.

νῦν οὕτως : “jetzt ohne weiteres” (Schneider). οὕτως is used as in ἐξαίφνης οὕτως and the like: cf. II 377 B note

ῥίψαντας τὰ ἱμάτια is illustrated by Blaydes on Ar. Wasps 408 .

διατεταμένους . Here and in VI 501 C Ξ (with a few other MSS) reads διατεταγμένους, which is less appropriate: “nulla enim τάξις in turba tumultuantium” (Stallbaum). Cf. 462 C note

ὡς ‐‐ ἐργασομένους : “intending to do heaven knows what” (Jowett). The phrase is idiomatic in Plato for any excess of ill-regulated zeal: cf. Ap. 35 A with my note ad loc.

τῷ ὄντι ‐‐ δίκην : ‘you will learn to your cost what flouting means.’ τῷ ὄντι indicates that τωθαζόμενος is to be taken in the fullest sense of the word: cf. IX 579 D, I 343 C, VI 511 B notes τωθάζω always implies personal abuse, often of an indecent kind: see Cope's interesting account of the word in Aristotle's Rhetoric Vol. II pp. 49 f.

ἀμύνεσθαι . The promise is fulfilled in VI 501—502 C.

ἐννοῶ : i.q. νῷ ἔχω, ‘remember,’ not ‘understand’ (as D. and V.). Cf. Euthyphr. 2 B , Polit. 296 A . The illus tration which follows is all the more appropriate because the φιλόσοφος is himself an ἐραστής, in love with Truth: cf. VI 490 B.

πάντες οἱ ἐν ὥρᾳ κτλ. So in Charm. 154 B (cited by J. and C.) Socrates, an ἀνὴρ ἐρωτικός ( Symp. 177 D ), confesses ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ λευκὴ στάθμη εἰμὶ πρὸς τοὺς καλούς· σχεδὸν γάρ τί μοι πάντες οἱ ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ καλοὶ φαίνονται.

ὁ μέν, ὅτι σιμὸς κτλ. The point is that the ἀνὴρ ἐρωτικός, loving πάντας τοὺς ἐν ὥρᾳ, finds beauty even where there is none. He ‘sees Helen's beauty in a brow of Egypt.’ The passage has often been imitated, and may have suggested the well-known satirical outburst of Lucretius (IV 1160—1170).

ἐπίχαρις : ‘pleasing,’ χάριν ἔχουσα πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν Arist. Pol. E 9. 1309^{b} 24. With τὸ γρυπὸν βασιλικόν cf. Phaedr. 253 D and Arist. Physiog. 6. 811^{a} 36 οἱ δὲ γρυπὴν ἔχοντες ( τὴν ῥῖνα ) καὶ τοῦ μετώπου διηρθρωμένην μεγαλόψυχοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀετούς. Neither τὸ σιμόν nor τὸ γρυπόν are marks of beauty; the straight nose is the fairest (Arist. Pol. l.c.).

λευκοὺς δὲ θεῶν παῖδας is in harmony with Laws 956 A χρώματα δὲ λευκὰ πρέποντ’ ἂν θεοῖς εἴη καὶ ἄλλοθι καὶ ἐν ὑφῇ. See also Dieterich Nekyia pp. 39 ff.

μελιχλώρους κτλ. : ‘and honey-pale darlings, with their name—do you suppose they are the creation of anybody but a fond and euphemistic lover, who readily excuses pallor, if appearing on the cheek of youth?’ Plato is ridiculing the idea, as well as the name, μελίχλωρος: there never was a μελίχλωρος except in the lover's brain. The word is not, apparently, earlier than Plato, and does not occur again till Aristotle ( Physiog. 6. 812^{a} 19): Theocritus uses it hypocoristically of the silkworm (10. 27). It is difficult, if not impossible, to connect τοὔνομα with μελιχλώρους, as is usually done, translating, ‘and the name honeypale, too,’ etc. Hartman proposes μελίχλωρος, which is ungrammatical, Richards μελιχλώρου. μελιχλώρου (which the poet Gray had already conjectured) is harmless enough: but emendation is unnecessary if καί is ‘and.’ μελιχλώρους—see cr. n.— has less MS authority than μελαγχλώρους, though supported by the Scholiast on VI 485 B, by μελίχλωρος in Aristotle and Theocritus (ll. cc.), and by the suitability of the word in the mouth of an ἐραστὴς ὑποκοριζόμενος. μελίχρους was apparently read by Plutarch ( de recta rat. audiendi 45 A) and other ancient authorities: see Schneider's note.

ἐπ’ ἐμοῦ : ‘in my case,’ ‘taking me as your example’: cf. VII 524 E ὡσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δακτύλου ἐλέγομεν and X 597 B.

τριττυαρχοῦσιν . If they cannot become (not ‘be’ as J. and C.) στρατηγοί, they are glad to be τριττύαρχοι. In time of war, a στρατηγός was commander in chief; next to him came the 10 ταξίαρχοι, or “commanders of the 10 τάξεις of hoplites corresponding to the 10 φυλαί”; under the ταξίαρχοι were the τριττύαρχοι, who each commanded the hoplites of a single τριττύς. There were in all 30 τριττύες, 3 in each tribe. See Gilbert's Gk. Const. Ant. pp. 209 f. and Sandys on Arist. Pol. Ath. 61 §§ 1—3.

τὸν ἄρα κτλ. Cf. Lach. 182 D ἀλλ’ ἔστι μὲν—χαλεπὸν λέγειν περὶ ὁτουοῦν μαθήματος, ὡς οὐ χρὴ μανθάνειν· πάντα γὰρ ἐπίστασθαι ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι and Xen. Mem. IV 1. 2.

καταμανθάνειν . Apelt conjectures καλὰ μανθάνειν, but the text is free from objection.

τοιοῦτοι εἶναι : i.e. φιλοθεάμονες εἶναι, not φιλόσοφοι εἶναι, as the English translators appear to suppose. Glauco has clearly indicated that he does not consider such men philosophers. But as it is the love of learning which produces them, they will have to be included, unless Socrates narrows his definition, as Glauco is in fact inviting him to do. σοφία in φιλο‐σοφία is presently defined so as to exclude sense-perception: hence ‘lovers of sights and sounds’ are not ‘lovers of knowledge.’ See also on ὁμοίους μὲν φιλοσόφοις in E.

πρὸς μὲν λόγους κτλ. Cf. Prot. 347 C , D with my note ad loc. ἐπακοῦσαι should be taken with ἀπομεμισθωκότες.

οὔτε ‐‐ κώμας . Hartman would read πόλιν for πόλεις, “verum non Atticis solis urbana et ruralia erant Dionysia” (Schneider, quoting Laws 637 A, B). In Attica rural Dionysia were held during the month of Poseidon in many κῶμαι, e.g. Eleusis, Phlya, etc. “Prizes were offered by the different demes, and companies seem to have been formed in Athens for the purpose of travelling about the country and taking part in these provincial competitions” (Haigh Att. Theatre pp. 42 ff. Cf. Mommsen Fest. d. Stadt Athen pp. 349—359).

τοὺς τῶν τεχνυδρίων : sc. μαθητικούς, or rather perhaps φίλους or the like, supplied from the termination of μαθητικούς. Cf. φιλοτέχνους in 476 A. Athenaeus (X 452 C) wrongly connects τούς with φιλοσόφους.

ὁμοίους μὲν φιλοσόφοις . μέν without δέ is common enough after ἀλλά, the antithesis being contained in the preceding negative: cf. Prot. 344 A and Crito 43 D. It is also found in other cases where the antithesis is easy to supply: cf. IV 421 A, V 472 D, and Heindorf on Theaet. 161 E . Such men resemble φιλόσοφοι as the shadow resembles the substance; for the objects of sense, which they love, are shadows or copies of the objects of knowledge. The phrase receives its fullest interpretation from the simile of the Cave in Book VII.

οὐδαμῶς ‐‐ τοιόνδε . Cf. 473 A note Socrates again appeals to Glauco as one Platonist to another. We are to infer that the Theory of Ideas was already familiar in the school of Plato.

δύο αὐτὼ εἶναι should not be translated ‘that they are two things’ (D. and V.), but simply ‘that they are two.’

καὶ περὶ δικαίου κτλ. This is the first appearance of the Theory of ‘Ideas’ properly so called in the Republic. It should be carefully noted that Plato is not attempting to prove the theory: Glauco, in fact, admits it from the first. The Theory was approached from two directions, from the side of Mind or Thought ( οἱ λόγοι οἱ ἐκ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν Arist. Met. 19. 990^{b} 12), and from the side of Existence ( τὸ ἓν ἐπὶ πολλῶν l.c. Cf. Zeller^{4} II 1, pp. 652 ff.). It is the first of these methods which is followed throughout the present investigation. The εἴδη provide objects for Knowledge, as opposed to Opinion, and they are capable of being known: see 476 C, E ff., 478 A, 479 E. Throughout a large part of the following discussion, we are not much concerned with the Ideas as strictly transcendent entities or χωριστά, existing apart not only from particulars but also from the knowing Mind, for it is only in so far as he knows the Ideas that the philosopher-king can make use of them (cf. VI 484 C, D): he cannot possibly frame political institutions on the model of Ideas which he does not know. We must admit that the philosopher's apprehension of the Ideas is the relevant consideration here (cf. VI 484 C ἐναργὲς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔχοντες παράδειγμα), but it is none the less true, and the fact cannot be too strongly insisted on, that the Ideas themselves are not mere concepts of the mind, but have a separate and independent existence of their own. See the Appendix to Book VII ‘ On Plato's Dialectic.’ The translation ‘Class’ for εἶδος (Jowett) is inappropriate on many grounds: ‘Form’ is better: but it will be most convenient to retain the usual expression ‘Idea,’ although it is not a translation, but a transliteration, whose unfortunate identity with the English word ‘idea’ is responsible in no small measure for many imperfect and erroneous interpretations of Plato's Ideal Theory. The German translators mostly render by ‘Begriff.’ The further specifications of the Ideal Theory in this passage are as follows. Each Idea is, in and by itself, one (476 A), changeless (479 A, 479 E), and perfect (VI 484 C, D), contrasting, in each of these respects, with the phenomena which ‘partake’ of or ‘imitate’ it (476 D note). Plato does not now touch on the question how it is that Mind has knowledge of a perfection above and beyond what can be derived from observation and experience. This faculty of Mind is elsewhere—in the Meno and the Phaedo—explained by the pre-existence of the Soul. See on 476 C.

αὐτὸ μὲν κτλ. : ‘each is, in itself’ (i.e. viewed apart from its association with πράξεις etc.), ‘one, but by reason of their partnership with actions and bodies and one another, they each of them make their appearance everywhere and appear many.’ The εἷδος of Beautiful, for example, is, in itself, one, but by κοινωνία with e.g. an act of heroism, a sunset, a river, etc., it appears many. Similarly the εἷδος of Beautiful appears many by κοινωνία with other εἴδη, as when we say ‘the Good is beautiful,’ the ‘Useful is beautiful’ etc. The expression πανταχοῦ φανταζόμενα is better suited to describe Ideas allied with sensible particulars, than Ideas allied with Ideas; but statements involving the κοινωνία of Ideas with Ideas ‘make their appearance everywhere’ as well as those which connect the objects of sense with Ideas. In all such cases the statements themselves are of course true or false according as the κοινωνία is real or imaginary; but whether they are false or true, the appearance of plurality which they give to the Idea is always fallacious. Cf. Zeller^{4} II 1, p. 738 note 3 and see on 479 D. The words ἀλλήλων κοινωνία are further discussed in App. VII.

πρακτικούς : ‘men of action.’ These were not mentioned in 475 D, but they clearly belong to the same category.

τὴν φύσιν . Krohn ( Pl. St. p. 95) justly observes that the φύσις τοῦ καλοῦ of III 401 C is “the true beauty, which has an adequate external form, whereas that of Book V is the essence of Beauty, which is never fully expressed in any outward form.” The contrast significantly marks the greater Idealism of Books V—VII. Cf. X 597 B note

καλὰ ‐‐ πράγματα . πράγματα is a sufficiently general term to include all the φαινόμενα πολλά which are specified in 476 A. The persons in question may be willing to assert that a σῶμα, a πρᾶξις, τὸ δίκαιον, τὸ ἀγαθόν etc. are καλά. But they refuse to go beyond isolated observations of this sort and admit that Beauty itself exists αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ μεθ’ αὑτοῦ μονοειδὲς ἀεὶ ὄν ( Symp. 211 B ); and hence their notions of beauty are uncoordinated, inconsistent, unstable.

ἄν τις ἡγῆται κτλ. Cf. Symp. 210 A .

ἐάν τε ἐν ὕπνῳ κτλ. It is the pre-existence of the soul which qualifies her by nature to distinguish between the Idea or Original, and the phenomenon or copy. But as we lost at birth our ante-natal knowledge of the Idea, we cannot distinguish between Ideas and phenomena until we recover that knowledge. To effect this recovery is the aim of education. The uneducated wander in a sort of dreamland, taking shadows for realities, the copy for the Original. Cf. Phaed. 74 A —76 D, Men. 81 A ff., Symp. 209 E —212 A.

μετέχοντα . Cf. Phaed. 100 D . The words by which Plato describes the relation of Ideas and particulars are of necessity figurative. κοινωνία is the vaguest, and least metaphorical; side by side with it comes παρουσία (of the Idea) and μέθεξις (of the particular). A somewhat different figure is involved when the Idea is regarded as the Original (Urbild), and the particular as its likeness. Plato does not scruple to use both figures side by side: here, for example, the Idea was a παράδειγμα just above ( αὐτὸ—ᾧ ἔοικεν 476 C: cf. VI 500 E ff., X 596 B).

οὗτος . Dümmler ( Antisthenica p. 42) supposes that Plato means Antisthenes. There was undoubtedly no love lost between the two philosophers: see the authorities cited in Urban Ueber die Erwähnungen der Phil. d. Antisthenes in d. Pl. Schr. (Königsberg 1882), and Zeller^{4} II 1, p. 296 note 2. Antisthenes was in particular a bitter opponent of the Theory of Ideas. The passage of arms between Plato and him is well known: ὦ Πλάτων, ἵππον μὲν ὁρῶ, ἱππότητα δὲ οὐχ ὁρῶ, καὶ ὃς εἶπεν ἔχεις μὲν ᾧ ἵππος ὁρᾶται, τόδε τὸ ὄμμα, ᾧ δε ἱππότης θεωρεῖται, οὐδέπω κέκτησαι (Simplicius in Schol. Arist. 66^{b} 44 ed. Brandis, and other authorities quoted by Urban l.c. p. 3). It is no doubt true, as Stein observes in his Geschichte des Platonismus, that Plato's “Kunst verallgemeinert nicht bloss das Historische, sondern individualisiert auch das Allgemeine”; but Antisthenes himself could scarcely deny that the cap fits. The deictic οὗτος is in favour of Dümmler's view, which certainly adds point to the whole passage; note in particular χαλεπαίνῃ, παραμυθεῖσθαι, πείθειν ἠρέμα (allusions perhaps to the ferocity of his opponent: Antisthenes had nicknamed Plato Σάθων! cf. Ath. V 220 D), οὐχ ὑγιαίνει (‘is barely sane’), οὐδεὶς αὐτῷ φθόνος, and the delightful innuendo ἄσμενοι ἂν ἴδοιμεν εἰδότα τι. Antisthenes himself wrote a work περὶ δόξης καὶ ἐπιστήμης (D. L. VI 17), and Plato may well be thinking of it here: see next note. But we must be careful to note that Plato, even if we allow that Antisthenes is in his mind, does not refer to Antisthenes alone; he merely individualizes the type in him.

πῶς γὰρ ‐‐ γνωσθείη ; ‘for how can something which is not, be known?’ Cf. Parm. 132 B , C ἓν ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν νοημάτων, vόημα δὲ οὐδενός; Ἀλλ’ ἀδύνατον, εἰπεῖν. Ἀλλὰ τινός; Ναί. Ὄντος ἢ οὐκ ὄντος; Ὄντος. Οὐχ ἑνός τινος, ὃ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν τὸ νόημα ἐπὸν νοεῖ, μίαν τινὰ οὖσαν ἰδέαν; Ναί. “Quod Parmenides simpliciter dicit ταὐτὸν δ’ ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ οὕνεκέν ἐστι νόημα, id sibi prorsus probari Plato plus semel significat” Bonitz Disput. Plato. duae p. 11. That everything which is known exists in a certain sense, is of course a truism. But when Plato says that the objects of knowledge ‘are,’ the kind of οὐσία which he means is substantial, selfexistent οὐσία. If it is really Antisthenes for whom Glauco is answering ( ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου ἀποκρίνου), the words πῶς—γνωσθείη are exceedingly well chosen; for Antisthenes (perhaps in his περὶ δόξης ἢ ἐπιστήμης, perhaps in Σάθων, ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν) had argued in almost exactly the same way to prove the impossibility of contradiction. See Proclus in Crat. 37 (Zeller^{4} II 1 p. 302 note 1) Ἀντισθένης ἔλεγεν μὴ δεῖν ἀντιλέγειν· πᾶς γάρ, φησί, λόγος ἀληθεύει· ὁ γὰρ λέγων τὶ λέγει· ὁ δὲ τὶ λέγων τὸ ὂν λέγει· ὁ δὲ τὸ ὂν λέγων ἀληθεύει and cf. Plat. Crat. 429 D . It is by no means improbable that Plato has this or some similar argument of Antisthenes in view, and feathers his arrows from his victim's wing. Antisthenes and his friends would not of course admit the connotation which Plato gives to ὄν, but Plato is not attempting to prove the Ideal theory. The object of the whole investigation is to shew that his opponents possess only δόξα, on the assumption that the theory of Ideas is true: cf. 476 A note

κἂν εἰ ‐‐ σκοποῖμεν . Further investigation from other points of view cannot weaken the conviction which Socrates and Glauco have already formed. The phrase is another indication that we are not here proving the Ideal Theory: see last note. Hartman should not have revived Ast's conjecture ἔχομεν <ἢ> καὶ πλεοναχῆ σκοπῶμεν.

εἰ ἐπὶ κτλ. See cr. n. Hermann's conjecture, that ἐπεί has been lost before ἐπί, has met with most favour. But ἐπεὶ ἐπί has an unpleasing sound, and εἰ might just as easily have disappeared as ἐπεί. Schneider and Stallbaum (with Ξ and the older editors) read οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ μὲν—ἐπὶ τῷ μεταξὺ δὲ κτλ., but the reading of q is intrinsically better, and the error an easier one. The reference in ἦν (‘is, as we saw’) is to 476 e—477 A.

κατ) αὐτὴν ‐‐ αὑτῆς : ‘each of them in accordance just with its own peculiar power,’ i.e. in accordance with this, and nothing else. αὐτήν is ipsam in the sense of solam. Cf. 477 D, where it is shewn that δυνάμεις should be classified on this same principle: also 478 A ἐφ’ ἑτέρῳ ἄρα ἕτερόν τι δυναμένη ἑκατέρα αὐτῶν πέφυκεν. The reading κατὰ τὴν αὐτήν—see cr. n.—gives precisely the wrong sense. Schneider and others— perhaps rightly—omit αὐτήν (with Vind. F), while Baiter adopts Hermann's ἄλλην —a very improbable correction. It is best, I think, to follow Schmidt, supposing that αὐτήν was accidentally omitted, and afterwards wrongly replaced.

μᾶλλον δὲ κτλ. Socrates had somewhat awkwardly called δόξα a δύναμις, and at the same time spoken of it as possessing a δύναμις. The present sentence introduces a sort of πάρεργον in which the notion δύναμις is more accurately defined. We may infer that δυνάμεις in the sense of (the intellectual) ‘powers’ was unfamiliar at the time when this section was written. It was perhaps— like ποιότης for example—one of Plato's experiments in language. ‘Faculties’ is, I think, too concrete to be a right translation.

αὐτήν is difficult. It is not quite easy to understand the word as ipsam, especially as it is so far from ἐπιστήμην. Had Plato written αὐτὴν τὴν ἐπιστήμην, or ἐπιστήμην—καὶ αὐτήν there would have been little or no difficulty. As it is, if the text is right, we should probably (with Schneider and others) regard αὐτήν as tautological: cf. IV 428 A note Should we perhaps read Δεῦρο δὴ πάλιν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὦ ἄριστε, <ἐπὶ> ἐπιστήμην. πότερον κτλ.? The conjecture is not convincing, although it was at ἐπιστήμη that the digression began in 477 B. “If I were to make any change” says Jackson “I would put αὐτήν before or after τίθης.”

οἴσομεν . Θ with two Vienna MSS reads θήσομεν, which is also a correction in Cesenas M. θήσομεν was likewise conjectured by Cobet. A precise parallel is hard to find; but φέρειν is used elsewhere of the operations of the mind (cf. 478 B), and θήσομεν would not be likely to suffer corruption, especially as εἰς τί γένος τίθης occurs just before.

δόξα . Instead of δόξα O. Schneider ( Versuch ein. genet. Entw. d. Pl. ἀγαθόν p. 13) would read δύναμις, but δυνάμεθα should of course be taken in its full etymological sense.

πῶς γὰρ ἂν ‐‐ τιθείη . The infallibility of knowledge is a cardinal principle with Plato: cf. Gorg. 454 D and Theaet. 152 C , 186 C ff. See Zeller^{4} II 1, p. 591.

δοξάζει . See cr. n. The same conjecture had occurred to Jackson. δοξάζειν is in itself defensible and seems at first sight required by the balance of clauses ἐπιστήμη μέν γέ που—δόξα δέ. But the introduction of φαμέν breaks the balance, and suggests a new departure. The real reason for writing δοξάζει is the occurrence of ἆρ’ οὖν τὸ μὴ ὂν δοξάζει (SC. δόξα); in 478 B. Unless δοξάζει is read here, it is very difficult to supply the subject of δοξάζει there. Reading δοξάζει, again, we supply after ἦ ταὐτόν not δοξάζειν (as must be done if the infinitive is read), but δοξάζει. This too is an improvement, because it provides an exact balance to γιγνώσκει. If Plato had meant ἢ ταὐτὸν δοξάζειν, we should expect him to have written not γιγνώσκει, but γιγνώσκειν. On the corruption see Introd. § 5.

ἀμφότεραί ἐστον . The union of a plural subject with a dual verb is tolerably frequent in Plato: cf. Euthyd. 278 E , 303 C. These and other examples are quoted in Roeper de dualis usu Plat. p. 30.

ἆῤ οὖν ‐‐ δοξάζει ; J. and C. understand ὁ δοξάζων: but δόξα is more appropriate in itself, and much more easily supplied, especially if δοξάζει is read in 478 A: see note ad loc.

ἢ ἀδύνατον κτλ. Cf. Theaet. 189 B οὐκ ἄρα οἷόν τε τὸ μὴ ὂν δοξάζειν, οὔτε περὶ τῶν ὄντων οὔτε αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτό. μὴ ὄν is here the bare negative—absolute not-being. Cf. Bosanquet Companion p. 212.

μὴ ὄν γε : i.q. τὸ μὴ ὄν γε (cf. μὴ ὄντι just below), not εἰ μὴ εἴη γε (as Stallbaum and Campbell suppose). Schneider and Jowett take the right view.

δοξάζει . The subject is δόξα rather than ὁ δοξάζων, in spite of ὁ δοξάζων above. δόξα was the subject of the verb where the two stages of the argument began (478 A ἦ ταὐτόν sc. δόξα δοξάζει and 478 B ἆρ’ οὖν τὸ μὴ ὂν δοξάζει), and ought to be so in the conclusion also.

σαφηνείᾳ ‐‐ ἀσαφείᾳ . The full significance of these words does not appear till VI 508 D ff., where the relation between Light and Truth is explained. See note ad loc. and VI 511 C note

ἐντὸς δ’ ἀμφοῖν . Hartman (with Ast) prefers ἐντὸς δὴ ἀμφοῖν. It is much better to regard the expression as a step in the argument, leading to the conclusion μεταξὺ ἄρα κτλ.

οἷον ‐‐ ὄν . οἷον is adverbial; if it were an adjective the infinitive would follow. The qualification suggests that in the ultimate analysis it is inaccurate to say that phenomena ‘both are and are not’: the truth is that they lie somewhere between being and not being. Hence also οὕτως ἔχει ὡς εἶναί τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι in 477 A. See also on καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα κτλ. in 479 C. It should be noted that Plato now adds ἅμα: in 477 A it was absent. See on 479 A τούτων γὰρ δὴ κτλ.

ὁ χρηστός . Antisthenes is perhaps in Plato's mind (Dümmler Antisth. p. 42). Others have thought of Isocrates, but with less reason. λεγέτω μοι, φήσω, καὶ ἀποκρινέσθω certainly sounds like a personal challenge. See also on 476 D and 480 A.

ἰδέαν τινά . ἰδέα has not yet been used in the Republic of the Idea; hence τινά. Krohn ( Pl. St. pp. 64, 96) has pointed this out, but makes too much of it. In ἰδέα, as Cohen remarks ( Platons Ideenlehre u. d. Mathematik p. 12), “das ἰδεῖν pulsirt”: cf. 475 E τοὺς τῆς ἀληθείας —φιλοθεάμονας, VI 486 D and Symp. 211 D .

ἀεὶ ‐‐ νομίζει . μέν after ἀεί—see cr. n.—is retained by Schneider and others. It is however much harsher than the ordinary cases of μέν without δέ (see on 475 E), and the majority of MSS agree with II in omitting it. Madvig would delete the article before καλά; but its retention provides a better antithesis to ἄν τις ἓν τὸ καλὸν φῇ εἶναι. τὰ καλά is here the plural, not of καλόν τι, but of τὸ καλόν; and Plato means that the φιλοθεάμων has many standards of beauty: cf. 479 D notes

ἐκεῖνος ‐‐ καί . These words are certainly genuine, though omitted in Ξ, and supposed by Hartman to be a marginal note on ὁ χρηστός. οὐδαμῇ ἀνεχόμενος by itself would be comparatively tame.

τούτων γὰρ δή κτλ. The many καλά ‘are’ and ‘are not,’ because they are beautiful and not-beautiful. We may infer, on the other hand, that the αὐτὸ κάλλος always ‘is,’ because (among other reasons) it is always beautiful. In other words, the essence of an Idea consists in its eternal unity and identity with itself. Cf. Symp. 211 A , where the αὐτὸ καλόν is said to be οὐ τῇ μὲν καλόν, τῇ δ’ αἰσχρόν, οὐδὲ τότε μέν, τότε δ’ οὔ, οὐδὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ καλόν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ αἰσχρόν, οὐδ’ ἔνθα μὲν καλόν, ἔνθα δὲ αἰσχρόν, ὡς τισὶ μὲν ὂν καλόν, τισὶ δὲ αἰσχρόν. This passage will explain what Plato means by saying that there is not one of the πολλὰ καλά which is not also αἰσχρόν. Cf. also Bosanquet Companion pp. 213 f. Krohn ( Pl. Fr. p. 73) argues that this passage is inconsistent with the Maxim of Contradiction as laid down in IV 436 B. But Plato does not mean that τὰ πολλὰ καλά are αἰσχρὰ κατὰ ταὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς ταὐτόν, nor should ἅμα in 478 D be interpreted in this sense. A particular καλόν is ἅμα καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν, ὡς τισὶ μὲν ‐ὂν καλόν, τισὶ δὲ αἰσχρόν. Cf. Zeller^{4} II I, p. 627 note 2.

τὰ πολλὰ διπλάσια are πρὸς μὲν τὸ διπλάσια, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ἡμίσεα, whereas the αὐτὸ διπλάσιον is always and in every relation διπλάσιον: see last note and VII 523 C ff., Phaed. 102 B , C. The examples of διπλάσια, μεγάλα, βαρέα are examples and nothing more; the others, καλά, δίκαια, ὅσια, are relevant in a wider sense, for the aim of the philosopherking is to frame his καλλίπολις on the model of the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν. See on 476 A.

ἀμφοτέρων ἕξεται : “utrisque adhaerescet” Stallbaum.

τοῖς ἐν ταῖς κτλ. ἐπαμφοτερίζουσιν is certainly neuter, as Schneider shews, and not masculine: cf. ταῦτα ἐπαμφοτερίζει below. The word is very frequently used in agreement with neuter or inanimate subjects: see Stephanus Hase Thes. s.v. The ‘children's riddle’ is (according to one of the two versions given by the Scholiast) αἶνός τίς ἐστιν ὡς ἀνήρ τε κοὐκ ἀνὴρ | ὄρνιθα κοὐκ ὄρνιθ’ ἰδών τε κοὐκ ἰδών, | ἐπὶ ξύλου τε κοὐ ξύλου καθημένην | λίθῳ τε κοὐ λίθῳ βάλοι τε κοὐ βάλοι. Athenaeus (X 452 C) assigns it (on the authority of Clearchus) to Panarces. The interpretation is “a eunuch aimed at a bat which he saw imperfectly sitting upon a reed with a pumice-stone and missed him” (J. and C.). This riddle was used as an exercise in logic among the Stoics (Dümmler Antisth. p. 43), but that is not a sufficient reason for supposing (with Dümmler) that they took it from Antisthenes.

τῆς βολῆς πέρι κτλ. The MSS apparently read περί: πέρι is due to Benedictus. Stephanus wishes to delete the second, Richards the first preposition, but the whole sentence is loosely constructed, as if a mere child's riddle was not worth remembering or dwelling on: ‘the children's riddle about the eunuch, don't you know, about hitting the bat, what it was the riddle says he struck it with, and on what it was sitting.’ ᾧ and not ὡς (as Baiter supposed) is the reading of A.

καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα κτλ. ταῦτα is of course τὰ πολλά, as Jowett and others rightly explain. Campbell appears strangely to take it of the children's riddle. I agree with Ast that ἐπαμφοτερίζειν—see cr. n.—must be wrong. It is usual to supply ἔοικε, but this is very difficult, and the categoric affirmative is much more to the point. For the error see Introd. § 5. Hartman hastily pronounces οὔτ’ ἀμφότερα οὔτε οὐδέτερον spurious on the ground that “illas res οὐδέτερον esse modo ( οὔτε εἶναι—νοῆσαι) dictum est,” and that “non verum est illas res non esse ἀμφότερα.” The text is perfectly sound. Phenomena, says Glauco, cannot be ‘fixedly conceived of’ as either a being or b not being, nor yet as c neither of the two. The fourth alternative is to ‘fix them in the mind’ as d both being and not being. This too is impossible, although we may say that they ‘both are and are not’ (477 A, 478 D). The reason is that they are not, in the last analysis, ‘both being and notbeing,’ but something between the two, as Socrates presently points out. (See also on οἷον in 478 D.) Phenomena cannot be fixedly conceived ( παγίως νοῆσαι) in any kind of way, because they have no fixity themselves. They are in a constant state of Heraclitean flux: cf. κυλινδεῖται, πλανητόν in D and (for παγίως) IV 434 D note

τὰ τῶν πολλῶν κτλ. : “the multitude's multitudinous formulae” Bosanquet. The words refer to general rules, standards, canons, believed in by the multitude (cf. τὰ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματα VI 493 A), who have on every single subject many such standards ( πολλὰ νόμιμα), mutually inconsistent and uncoordinated, because they do not know that τὸ καλόν, τὸ ἀγαθόν etc. are each of them ἕν. They say, for example, ‘τὸ ἡδύ is καλόν,’ ‘τὸ συμφέρον is καλόν,’ ‘τὸ ἀγαθόν is καλόν,’ and so on. Such assertions give the appearance of plurality to τὸ καλόν, by connecting it, not indeed with the objects of sense, but with other εἴδη (cf. 476 A, 476 C notes). The form in which Plato expresses his conclusion ( τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλὰ νόμιμα καλοῦ πέρι and not simply τὰ πολλὰ καλά) prepares us for VI 484 C, where the whole purpose of this enquiry is disclosed. It is the business of the philosopher-king to bring order out of chaos by remodelling the νόμιμα of the many in conformity with the Idea. He must not allow them to predicate κοινωνία of εἴδη unless the εἴδη really intercommunicate.

πολλὰ καλά . Is καλά the plural of ‘ the beautiful,’ or of ‘ a beautiful’? This question is raised by Bosanquet, who answers it thus: “the sentence about formulae leads me to interpret it in the former sense=‘many standards,’ or cases accepted as standards, ‘of beauty.’” Cf. 479 A, where however we have πολλὰ τὰ καλά, and its antithesis ἓν τὸ καλόν. The expression πολλὰ καλά must, I think, be taken in its usual sense, as the plural of καλόν τι; but it includes not only the objects of sense, but also νόμιμα περὶ καλοῦ, which are themselves πολλὰ καλά, because they connect αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν with another εἶδος. See last note.

αὐτὰ ἕκαστα : the generalised expression including αὐτὸ καλόν, αὐτὸ δίκαιον and all the Ideas. Cf. VI 507 B note

ἔφαμεν . 476 B.

ἆρα ‐‐ λέγωμεν ; See Isocrates de Soph. 8 πλείω κατορθοῦντας τοὺς ταῖς δόξαις χρωμένους ἢ τοὺς τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν ἐπαγγελλομένους. To this (according to Teichmüller Lit. Fehd. I p. 103) Plato here replies, and the retort is supposed to be the more telling, because Isocrates, in spite of the sentence just quoted, aspired to the name φιλόσοφος: see Spengel Isokrates u. Platon pp. 13, 22 ff. Dümmler, on the other hand, supposes that Antisthenes is meant, as before (see on 476 D). I can see no sufficient reason for holding that Plato is here thinking specially of either, although the cap fits both.

φιλοσόφους . The connotation of φιλόσοφος has greatly altered or developed since Book II: see II 376 B note, and cf. Krohn Pl. St. pp. 9, 20, 102. Krohn is fully justified when he calls the concluding part of Book V “the turning-point” of the Republic (ib. p. 107). Plato's hitherto ‘Hellenic city’ is now well on the road to become an ‘ensample in the Heavens.’

διὰ μακροῦ ‐‐ λόγου : ‘through the conclusion of a somewhat lengthy argument.’ διεξελθόντος is intransitive, as Schneider saw: cf. Laws 805 B ἀλλὰ γὰρ εἶπον τὸν μὲν λόγον ἐᾶσαι διεξελθεῖν, εὖ διελθόντος δὲ οὕτω τὸ δοκοῦν αἱρεῖσθαι δεῖν. (The reference in εἶπον is to 799 E κἂν ἡ διέξοδος αὕτη ὅλη σχοῦσα τέλος ἱκανῶς ἂν μηνύσειε κτλ.) Cf. also Dem. in Mid. 84. The word διεξελθόντος is not otiose, because it is not till the very end of the argument that the φιλόσοφος is discovered (V 480 A). The mistaken notion (held by Stallbaum) that the word must be transitive induced Herwerden ( Mnem. N. S. XIX p. 333) to propose διεξελθοῦσι, a conjecture repeated also by Richards. Baiter (after Hermann and Ast) reads διεξελθόντες with three inferior MSS, as if the philosophers had “run the gauntlet of the argument through which their nature is revealed” (J. and C.). τοῦ λόγου (found in a few MSS) is favoured by Stallbaum, and suggested as an alternative also by Herwerden, as if διὰ μακροῦ τινὸς could mean ‘at some length.’ The first hand in Ξ omits διά, but it occurs in all the other MSS. None of these expedients is nearly so good as the reading of the best MSS, if Schneider's explanation be adopted. μακροῦ has also caused difficulty, since the investigation extends over only six pages of Stephanus: see Krohn Pl. St. pp. 105 ff. By Pfleiderer ( Zur Lösung etc. p. 54), who maintains (in partial agreement with Spengel) that V 471 C—VII (inclusive) embodies the dialogue Φιλόσοφος announced in the beginning of the Politicus and Sophist, μακροῦ is hailed as a significant lapsus calami, and referred to the investigations of the Sophist, Euthydemus and Politicus. But μακροῦ is qualified by τινός, and surely 474 C—480 A may be described as ‘a somewhat lengthy enquiry.’ There is no allusion to the proverbial μακρὸς λόγος of which Aristotle speaks in Met. N 3. 1091^{a} 7 ff. ὁ Σιμωνίδου μακρὸς λόγος· γίγνεται γὰρ ὁ μακρὸς λόγος ὥσπερ ὁ τῶν δούλων, ὅταν μηδὲν ὑγιὲς λέγωσιν .

οἵ is found only in A and Π^{1}: all the other MSS have οἷοι. For οἵ cf. (with Schneider) 493 B and VIII 559 A.

πολλὰ κτλ. Herwerden conjectures πολλὰ <ἦν>, which would weaken the emphasis on πολλά. For the omission of ἦν see Schanz Nov. Comm. Pl. p. 33. From the standpoint of Books VI and VII it is impossible to say what ‘just life’ means unless we know the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ etc. (see 506 A): hence πολλὰ τὰ λοιπὰ διελθεῖν.

πάντως κτλ. παντοίως was conjectured by Ast and is read by Stallbaum. It occurs as a late correction in Π as well as in A (see cr. n.), and has some insignificant MS authority besides. The difference is like that between ὅς and οἷος: see 484 A note With πλανώμενοι cf. πλανητόν in V 479 D. It is the fluctuation of the Object which makes the Subject fluctuate.

καθιστάναι : “sc. λέγοντες h.e. κελεύοντες” Schneider.

τυφλῶν . They who cannot see the Ideas are blind: cf. Plato's retort to Antisthenes quoted on V 476 D.

καὶ μηδὲν κτλ. A transcendental παράδειγμα of which he knew nothing would be useless to the philosopherking. It does not however follow that the Ideas are not αὐτὰ καθ’ αὑτά, but merely that we are concerned with them in so far as they are known by the φιλόσοφος. See on V 476 A. ὡς οἷόν τε ἀκριβέστατα admits that he may not see them in all their fulness and purity.

εἰς τὸ ἀληθέστατον κτλ. Cf. 500 C, 500 E—501 C (where the same figure is employed). The political value of the philosopher's knowledge of the Idea is here for the first time explicitly affirmed and explained: see V 479 D note

ἐκεῖσε : because truth is ‘yonder’— in the Heaven of the Ideas. The philosopher must call it from Heaven to Earth, by assimilating to it ‘the earthly canons’ ( τὰ ἐνθάδε νόμιμα).

οὕτω δή =‘then and not till then’ suggests that it is otherwise in existing States.

ἐὰν δέῃ τίθεσθαι . If he has the happiness to be born ‘in his own country’ (IX 592 A), whose institutions are already modelled on the Ideas, he need only guard ( φυλάττοντες suggests the φύλακες) and preserve what is already established. Otherwise he must himself become a legislator. Cobet's excision of τίθεσθαι is wholly gratuitous: his omission of τά in τὰ κείμενα is even worse, for the laws need not be of the philosopher's own making.

διαφέρει . It would be easy to write διαφέρειν (with q etc.), but διαφέρει may be impersonal, or Glauco may be substituting the singular for the plural: see on I 347 A and V 465 E. Cf. also infra 496 A.

ἐλλείποιντο . Cf. Xen. Mem. II 6. 5 μὴ ἐλλείπεσθαι εὖ ποιῶν τοὺς εὐεργετοῦντας ἑαυτόν and Soph. 258 B .

κἀκεῖνα : viz. τἄλλα, as defined in ἐμπειρίᾳ—ὑστεροῦντας.

ταῦτα : i.e. ‘the special attributes of the philosopher’ (J. and C.).

ἐλέγομεν . V 474 B.

δεῖ . See cr. n. and Introd. § 5.

ἐκείνης τῆς οὐσίας . For the genitive cf. IV 445 E note

γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς have not yet been employed in this half-technical sense (Krohn Pl. St. p. 112). The substance of the Ideas always ‘is’: that of phenomena ‘is driven to and fro by generation and destruction’—by generation when it becomes determined in one particular direction (e.g. καλόν, ἵππος, ἄνθρωπος), by destruction when it loses that particular determination and puts on another. Cf. V 479 A, B. Plato's form of expression seems to imply that there is a sort of οὐσία or substratum in phenomena. At a later stage he seems to have identified this with space—the ἐκμαγεῖον —κινούμενόν τε καὶ διασχηματιζόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν εἰσιόντων, φαίνεται δὲ δἰ ἐκεῖνα ἄλλοτε ἀλλοῖον ( Tim. 50 C ): but of this there is no hint here. Cf. Zeller^{4} II 1. p. 725.

πάσης αὐτῆς : i.e. οὐσίας τῆς ἀεὶ οὔσης, not (as Ast) ἐπιστήμης or μαθήσεως.

οὔτε τιμιωτέρου κτλ. Cf. Parm. 130 C —E.

πρόσθεν . V 474 D—475 B.

τὴν ἀψεύδειαν κτλ. Cf. III 389 B.

ἑκόντας εἶναι is ‘voluntarily,’ not ‘if it can be helped’ (D. and V.): cf. I 336 E note

ψεῦδος should be understood in its strict Platonic sense, as ‘ignorance in the soul respecting the truth’ (II 382 B notes). The politician who knows not the Ideal is, according to Plato, a liar, not the statesman who employs for example κλῆροί τινες κομψοί to attain his Ideal. There is absolutely no reason to suppose (with Bosanquet) that Plato means to withdraw from the regulations of V 460 A.

τὸν ἐρωτικῶς κτλ. Love me, love my friend. The Philosopher loves Wisdom, and Truth is Wisdom's kinswoman and familiar friend.

ὥσπερ ῥεῦμα κτλ. The simile becomes almost an identification, as often in Greek: the desires are as it were a stream diverted εἰς ἕν τι. Cf. III 401 C (reading τις—ὥσπερ αὔρα), VII 519 A τὰς τῆς γενέσεως ξυγγενεῖς ὥσπερ μολυβδίδας and VII 534 D note To explain ἀπωχετευμένον as for ἀπωχετευμέναι (with Stallbaum and others) is to obtrude our standpoint upon the Greeks. Schneider formerly agreed with Stallbaum, but afterwards drew back ( Addit. p. 45) and translated “wie ein dorthin abgeleiteter Strom.”

τὰς δέ . τάς is probably an ‘internal accusative’ depending on ἐκλείποιεν, though rendered easier by the occurrence of περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν—εἶεν ἄν just before. Schneider carries on περί, but the preposition is difficult to supply when the two clauses have different verbs. Cf. IV 428 C note

σώφρων κτλ. Cf. III 389 D —390 E.

ὧν γὰρ ἕνεκα : i.e. such bodily and other delights as money can buy.

χρήματα ‐‐ δαπάνης : ‘wealth with its accompaniment of lavish outlay.’ μετὰ πολλῆς δαπάνης should not, I think, be taken with σπουδάζεται (Schneider, D. and V., J. and C., although Jowett's translation takes the correct view), but rather with χρήματα. Herwerden formerly explained δαπάνης as= τῆς τοῦ δαπανᾶν ἐπιθυμίας, but afterwards ( Mnem. N. S. XIX p. 333) took it to mean “pecunia cuius ope sumptus fieret” comparing inter alia VIII 550 D and Laws 718 A. This view agrees closely with mine, but it is not necessary to suppose that δαπάνη means more than simply ‘outlay.’

ἀνελευθερίας . ἀνελευθερία or σμικρολογία is in Plato the antithesis of ὑπερηφανία: cf. II 391 C and Critias 112 C. The virtuous mean is μεγαλοπρέπεια, which is a sort of highmindedness (cf. 503 C): hence μεγαλοπρέπεια just below and μεγαλοπρεπής in the summary at 487 A. Plato does not, like Aristotle ( Eth. Nic. IV cc. 4—6), restrict μεγαλοπρέπεια and its opposing vices to pecuniary dealings, although φιλοχρηματία, for example, is a symptom of ἀνελευθερία (II 391 C).

τοῦ ὅλου καὶ παντός . Cf. Theaet. 173 E ff. This and the following sentence admirably describe the peculiar genius of Plato himself. See the eloquent words of Longinus περὶ ὕψους 35, and compare them with Goethe's noble characterisation of Plato: “Er dringt in die Tiefen, mehr um sie mit seinem Wesen auszufüllen, als um sie zu erforschen. Er bewegt sich nach der Höhe, mit Sehnsucht seines Ursprungs wieder theilhaft zu werden. Alles, was er äussert, bezieht sich auf ein ewig Ganzes, Gutes, Wahres, Schönes, dessen Forderung er in jedem Busen aufzuregen strebt.”

ᾗ ‐‐ διανοίᾳ . ᾧ—διανοίας (the reading of q and some other MSS, followed by Ast and Stallbaum) is an obvious ‘emendation,’ to suit τούτῳ below. It is much less elegant, notwithstanding the irregularity involved in τούτῳ, for which Schneider compares Gorg. 523 B , a precise parallel, in spite of Stallbaum's assertion to the contrary. Cf. also X 606 B note ᾗ οὖν is moreover found in the quotation of this passage by Marcus Aurelius, according to the text of Vaticanus A: see Stich's edition p. 87 note

μέγα τι δοκεῖν . Cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. IV 7. 1123^{b} 32 τίνος γὰρ ἕνεκα πράξει αἰσχρά, ᾧ οὐθὲν μέγα (of the μεγαλόψυχος).

θάνατον κτλ. Cf. III 386 A ff.

ἀλαζών is a special case of φιλοψευδής (485 D). Cf. 489 E.

ἄδικος is used of course in the popular sense, not with the meaning assigned to it in Book IV.

ἥμερος ‐‐ ἀγρία . Cf. II 375 B ff.

εὐμαθὴς κτλ. J. and C. wrongly supply εἰ ἄρα. πότερον is often omitted in such sentences: cf. Phaedr. 270 D and other examples in Ast's Lexicon s.v. πότερον.

αὐτὴν ‐‐ εἶναι . The text is successfully defended by Vahlen ( Hermes 1877 p. 196) who compares II 375 E οὐ παρὰ φύσιν ζητοῦμεν τοιοῦτον εἶναι τὸν φύλακα and (for the pleonasm) Phaed. 101 E ἱκανοὶ γὰρ—δύνασθαι αὐτοὶ αὑτοῖς ἀρέσκειν. Madvig's proposal (adopted by Baiter) αὖ ἣν ζητοῦμεν δεῖ εἶναι is neat but unnecessary; still less should we (with Herwerden) bracket δεῖν εἶναι. With the sentiment Krohn ( Pl. St. p. 363) compares Xen. Mem. IV 1. 2.

ἀσχήμονος . Herwerden should not have conjectured ἀμνήμονος. We are passing to a fresh point. ἀμουσία and ἀσχημοσύνη (‘bad form’) tend to ἀμετρία ‘excess,’ ‘extravagance’ in behaviour (cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. IV 8. 1125^{a} 12—16); and extravagant behaviour is a form of untruth, because it makes a man appear what he is not. The love of truth will therefore save the philosopher from selfassertion and bad manners.

φύσει κτλ. The antecedent of ἥν is διάνοιαν: and φύσει (‘by nature,’ ‘naturally’) should be taken with the adjectives ἔμμετρον and εὔχαριν. It might seem possible to translate: ‘Let us insist, then, on a modest and agreeable habit of mind for a nature whose innate disposition is to make it easy to lead to the Form of each essential Being,’ making φύσει the antecedent to ἥν: but the ordinary view gives a better sense. The preceding note will explain how ἐμμετρία inclines one to the love of Truth or the Ideas. Stallbaum connects ἑκάστου with τὸ αὐτοφυές, but cf. V 480 A ad fin. and 484 D ( ἕκαστον τὸ ὄν). ἰδέαν is, I think, ‘Form,’ ‘Idea’ (so Schneider etc.), rather than ‘contemplation’ (as Stallbaum translates). The word however suggests ἰδεῖν: see on V 479 A.

ἑπόμενα ἀλλήλοις is fully justified. The love of Truth begets the love of Wisdom (485 C) and the love of Wisdom Temperance (485 D, E). Highmindedness is connected with the contemplation τοῦ ὅλου καὶ παντός (486 A), of which Courage is also a result (486 A, B). Justice and Kindness accompany the other moral virtues (486 B). Aptness to learn, memory, and the virtue of a modest and agreeable disposition also fit one for the study of the Ideas: cf. 486 D note It will be noticed that all the Virtues receive an intellectual colouring from their connexion —direct or indirect—with ‘amor intellectualis’: see above on 485 A ff.

μνήμων κτλ. The summary is complete, μεγαλοπρεπής being the opposite of ἀνελεύθερος and σμικρόλογος (486 A note).

οἱ ἀκούοντες ‐‐ λέγεις : ‘those who from time to time hear what you now say.’ The text has been suspected, but is, I think, sound. Adimantus implies that the philosopher-king was one of Socrates' favourite themes, as—in one form or another—it certainly was: see on V 473 C. The effect produced by Socrates' usual way of reasoning on the subject is illustrated by a general description of the unsatisfying nature of Socrates' dialectic; and λέγω δ’ εἰς τὸ παρὸν ἀποβλέψας recalls us to the special case. The looseness lies chiefly in the use of ἅ, where οἷα—Steinhart's conjecture — would be expected; but ἅ need not be taken too strictly. Ficinus omits νῦν .

ἡγοῦνται κτλ. Cf. Euthyph. 11 B —D, Men. 80 A , B and the description of the elenchus quoted by J. and C. from Soph. 230 B ff.

μέγα ‐‐ ἀναφαίνεσθαι . For the anacoluthon cf. Ap. 21 C καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, ἔδοξέ μοι, Laws 686 D and Xen. An. III 2. 12. In all these cases the verb used is ἔδοξε, and ἀναφαίνεσθαι is a word of the same kind. Other examples of similar anacolutha are cited by Engelhardt Anacol. Pl. Spec. III p. 39. Richards would read παραγομένοις, but παραγομένοις could hardly mean παραγομένοις ἑαυτοῖς .

ἀποκλείονται κτλ. The simile is probably taken from the game of πόλεις, on which see IV 422 E note φέρωσιν is technical of a move at draughts: cf. Laws 739 A. The balance φέρωσιν— λέγωσιν deserves notice: in both words, stress should be laid on the first syllable. Cf. III 406 B note and Phaed. 83 D with Geddes ad loc. ἐν is used as in Euthyph. 11 C τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔργα ἀποδιδράσκει καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλει μένειν.

ταύτῃ =‘isto modo,’ ‘as you say.’ The simile is imitated by the author of the Eryxias (395 B).

ἔργῳ δὲ ὁρᾶν κτλ. expresses a widely prevalent view in ancient as well as in modern times. It is enunciated with admirable force and vigour by the Platonic Callicles in Gorg. 484 C —486 C: cf. also Theaet. 173 C ff. and Phaed. 64 B . Although Isocrates called himself a φιλόσοφος, he was in general agreement with the popular verdict on Philosophy in the Platonic sense of the term ( τήν τε γεωμετρίαν καὶ τὴν ἀστρολογίαν καὶ τοὺς διαλόγους τοὺς ἐριστικοὺς καλουμένους, as he calls it Panath. 26): see adv. Soph. 1—8, 20, Antid. 258—269 ( διατρῖψαι μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς παιδείας ταύτας χρόνον τινὰ συμβουλεύσαιμ’ ἂν τοῖς νεωτέροις, μὴ μέντοι περιιδεῖν τὴν φύσιν τὴν αὑτῶν κατασκελετευθεῖσαν ἐπὶ τούτοις κτλ. 268) and Panath. 26— 32 (Spengel Isokr. u. Plato pp. 15 ff., Dümmler Chron. Beitr. pp. 43 ff. and Teichmüller Lit. Fehd. I p. 103. Teichmüller supposes that τις in νῦν γὰρ φαίη ἄν τις κτλ. above is a specific reference to Isocrates, but this is very improbable). The well-known sentiment of Ennius' Neoptolemus “philosophari est mihi necesse, at paucis; nam omnino haut placet. Degustandum ex ea, non in eam ingurgitandum censeo” (ap. Gell. Noct. Att. V 15. 9, 16. 5: cf. Cic. Tusc. Disp. II 1. 1 ff. al.) is probably translated from Euripides, but it admirably expresses the ordinary Roman view. See also on V 473 C, D.

ἀλλοκότους . They have, as we should say, ‘a twist.’

σὺ δέ γε is of course ironical, as σκώπτεις shews. Müller in his translation (p. 53) strangely misses this point.

ὡς γλίσχρως εἰκάζω : ‘how greedy I am of parables’ (lit. ‘how greedily I make parables), not (as J. and C.) ‘what a poor hand I am’ at similes, an interpretation which deprives ἔτι μᾶλλον of all its force. γλίσχρος (connected with γλία ‘glue’ and γλίχομαι) is used as in Ar. Ach. 452 γλίσχρος προσαιτῶν λιπαρῶν τε. ‘Niggardly,’ ‘stingy’ is a secondary meaning, as for example in VIII 553 C and Crat. 414 C . The idea is that a man must be greedy of similes when he runs all over the world to find one ( ἐκ πολλῶν ξυναγαγεῖν). αὐτό should be taken with εἰκάζοντα, by an easy hyperbaton.

τραγελάφους and similar fantastic creations were of frequent occurrence in Oriental art. The word is fully illustrated by Blaydes on Ar. Frogs 937 .

μιγνύντες should be taken with γράφουσι: ‘as painters paint goat-stags and the like by fusing creatures together.’

τοιουτουὶ κτλ. There is no occasion to read τοιοῦτόν τι: see III 388 D note For γενόμενον Richards would write γιγνόμενον, because of ὁρῶντα etc. in B ff. and γιγνομένων in 488 E. But Plato rightly asks us to conceive of the completed scene, although the scene itself must of course be described by present participles.

ναύκληρον κτλ. The ναύκληρος is the Demos, as Aristotle observed ( Rhet. III 4. 1406^{b} 35): cf. also Olympiodorus Proleg. 27 ed. Hermann. Cope on Arist. l.c. erroneously asserts that the ναύκληρος is the ‘governor or governors of the unruly mob of citizens’; and Windelband's identification of the ναύκληρος with the younger Dionysius is a strange freak of fancy: see Hirmer Entsteh. u. Komp. etc. p. 620. As the ναύκληρος owned his own ship (II 371 B note), it is right that the Demos should be ναύκληρος in a democracy. For the frequent comparison of the State to a ship in Greek literature see Smyth's Gk. Melic Poets p. 215. With ὑπόκωφος cf. Ar. Knights 42 , 43 Δῆμος πυκνίτης, δύσκολον γερόντιον ὑπόκωφον and Blaydes ad loc. Plato's picture of the Δῆμος is not unamiable: cf. 499 E ff. Though unwieldy, sluggish, and dullwitted (cf. Ap. 30 E ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νωθεστέρῳ καὶ δεομένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπὸ μύωπός τινος), he is placid, and not deliberately vicious. It is the δημαγωγοί (in the widest sense of the term, including demagogues, sophists etc.), and not the δῆμος who are here attacked. With μεγέθει καὶ ῥώμῃ cf. μεγάλου καὶ ἰσχυροῦ 493 A.

μήτε μαθόντα ‐‐ ἐμάνθανεν . See V 473 C note and Xen. Mem. IV 2. 4 —7. Politics, according to both Socrates and Plato, is a science: see especially Mem. III 9. 11. The heaviest count in their indictment of Athenian democracy was its practical denial of this fact.

φάσκοντας κτλ. The thesis that ‘Politics cannot be taught’ was (in Plato's view) the theoretical basis of Athenian political life: see Prot. 319 A —320 D. We are here invited to suppose that it was actually maintained in so many words by sophists, demagogues, and others. Something of the sort is asserted by Isocrates adv. Soph. 14, 21; but it is unlikely that Plato is alluding to Isocrates in particular, as Teichmüller supposes ( Lit. Fehd. I p. 104).

τὸν λέγοντα κτλ. as Socrates and Plato constantly did. ἑτοίμους κατατέμνειν admirably expresses the vindictive fury of the insulted demagogues, but should not be taken as an allusion to Socrates' fate. Plato felt his master's death too deeply to exaggerate on such a subject. See VII 517 A note

αὐτῷ is ejected by Herwerden “quod omni vi caret.” Bywater ( J. Ph. X p. 73) proposes αὖ. The translators for the most part ignore the word, except Schneider, who translates ‘him, the master of the ship.’ Perhaps αὐτῷ is ‘by himself,’ ipsi in the sense of soli, as in αὐτοὶ γάρ ἐσμεν, and we should translate ‘while they themselves constantly swarm around the solitary master of the ship.’ Failing this explanation we must follow Schneider; unless we venture to take αὐτῷ in the sense of ‘the Master’ (cf. I 327 B note) and regard τῷ ναυκλήρῳ as an explanatory gloss. On the whole I am inclined to think that Schneider is right.

περικεχύσθαι : an anacoluthon, like ἄρχειν and πλεῖν below: we should expect περικεχυμένους. For a parallel see Laws 686 A. Here, doubtless, the change of construction is in order to avoid too many participles.

ἀποκτεινύντας . On the orthography of this word see Introd. § 5. ἀποκτεινῦντας ( sic) in v and Vind. F may also be a trace of the spelling with ει. The reference in ἀποκτεινύντας ἢ ἐκβάλλοντας is of course to the slaying or banishment of rival candidates for office: cf. Gorg. 466 B .

μανδραγόρᾳ κτλ. False rulers dull the senses of the Demos by the opiate of Pleasure, and so escape detection. With μανδραγόρᾳ cf. [Dem.] Phil. 4. 6 ἀλλὰ μάνδραγόραν πεπωκόσιν ἤ τι φάρμακον ἄλλο τοιοῦτον ἐοίκαμεν ἀνθρώποις.

πίνοντάς τε κτλ. They are the ἑστιάτορας εὐδαίμονας of IV 421 B, where see note. For ὡς τὸ εἰκός Cobet writes ὡς εἰκός, and so also Herwerden, who suggests as an alternative that we should bracket τοὺς τοιούτους. The expression ὡς εἰκός would refer to πίνοντάς τε καὶ εὐωχουμένους (“and pass their time at sea in drinking and feasting, as you might expect with such a crew” D. and V.); but with ὡς τὸ εἰκός (sc. πλεῖν) the meaning is “make just such a voyage as might be expected of men like them” (J. and C. with Schneider, comparing Pol. 302 A and Laws 906 D), i.e. make shipwreck.

ἐπαινοῦντας is omitted by Cobet, but (as Richards points out) ψέγοντας supports it. Richards would transpose and read μὲν ναυτικόν. But ναυτικὸν μὲν καλοῦντας etc. is only an explanatory reduplication of ἐπαινοῦντας: hence μέν is placed where it would have been if ἐπαινοῦντας had been omitted. In any other position it would have failed to mark the antithesis between ναυτικόν (with its companion epithets) and ἄχρηστον. For the rhetorical asyndeton cf. II 362 B note An alternative (less good) is to take ἐπαινοῦντας as logically subordinate to καλοῦντας (‘in awarding praise they call’ etc.).

ὃς ἂν ξυλλαμβάνειν κτλ. Jackson suggests that Isocrates is intended ( Proceedings of the Camb. Phil. Soc. XI 1882, p. 13). Possibly: but for my own part I do not think the description is sufficiently apposite to justify the identification.

ἐπαΐοντες . I should adopt the accusative with Stallbaum and others were it not for οἰόμενοι. Schneider is fully justified in saying “si Plato ἐπαΐοντες scripserat et οἰόμενοι, fieri vix poterat, quin prius vitiosum quibusdam et in accusativum mutandum videretur: alterum ipsa distantia tutum erat.” This is precisely what has happened, for while q (with some other MSS, but not Π or Ξ) has ἐπαΐοντας, all the MSS, without exception, have οἰόμενοι. The anacoluthon is not harsher than other instances in which the best MSS have the nominative of the participle instead of the accusative, e.g. Phaedr. 241 D , Soph. 219 E , Laws 885 D, Phaed. 81 A . See also Classen on Thuc. II 53. 4, where many parallel instances are quoted from Thucydides. A long and unperiodic sentence like the present is peculiarly liable to anacolutha: and one has occurred already in 488 C. For these reasons I now agree with Schneider and others that the text is sound. The nominatives πείθοντες and βιαζόμενοι may have suggested the change to Plato: “ ψέγοντας propter ἐπαινοῦντας tenuit, mox velut impatiens tenoris diu servati paullisper de via deflexit” (Schneider). Similar ungrammatical anacolutha are found occasionally also in Inscriptions, when the sentence runs to a considerable length: see Meisterhans^{3} pp. 203, 205.

ὅπως δὲ...κυβερνητικήν . The sailors, Plato has already told us, have not the smallest idea that the true pilot must study the year and the seasons etc., if he is to be truly qualified to rule a ship (that is to say, from Plato's point of view, if he is to know how to steer), but as for how he shall steer—let people wish him to or no—of that they think it impossible to acquire either art or study and therewith (lit. ‘at-once-and’) the art of steersmanship. We may translate the sentence thus: ‘but art or system of how to steer, let alone whether people wish him to steer or no—that they think it impossible to acquire, and therewithal the art of steering.’ The true pilot, according to Plato, is one who knows how to steer. Whether others wish him to steer or no, is wholly irrelevant; see Pol. 293 A ff., where this principle is declared to be of universal application, and illustrated as follows from the case of doctors: ἰατροὺς δὲ οὐχ ἥκιστα νενομίκαμεν, ἐάν τε ἑκόντας ἐάν τε ἄκοντας ἡμᾶς ἰῶνται— πάντως οὐδὲν ἧττον ἰατρούς φαμεν, ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐπιστατοῦντες τέχνῃ—σῴζωσιν οἱ θεραπεύοντες ἕκαστοι τὰ θεραπευόμενα. Cf. ibid. C ἀναγκαῖον δὴ καὶ πολιτειῶν— ταύτην ὀρθὴν διαφερόντως εἶναι καὶ μόνην πολιτείαν, ἐν ᾗ τις ἂν εὑρίσκοι τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἀληθῶς ἐπιστήμονας καὶ οὐ δοκοῦντας μόνον, ἐάν τε κατὰ νόμους ἐάν τε ἄνευ νόμων ἄρχωσι, καὶ ἑκόντων καὶ ἀκόντων κτλ. The expressions ἐάν τε ἑκόντας ἐάν τε ἄκοντας, and καὶ ἑκόντων καὶ ἀκόντων in these two passages, the general drift of which is the same as Plato's argument throughout this part of the Republic, exactly correspond to ἐάν τέ τινες βούλωνται ἐάν τε μή, and enable us to interpret that clause, as Schneider has already pointed out. Cf. also 296 E— 297 B. Plato, indeed, is ready to go farther still, and would maintain that he who knows how to steer is a true pilot, even although he does not touch the helm (cf. ibid. 292 E). If others wish for his services, it is their business to apply to him, not his to sue for the opportunity of doing them a service (infra 489 B, C). A like principle holds good in the government of cities, and the Platonic Socrates, though abstaining from political life, may fairly claim ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ καὶ πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ μόνος τῶν νῦν ( Gorg. 521 D ). The foolish sailors, on the other hand, desire only to get the helm into their hands (488 C): how to handle it, they know not, and deny that it is possible to learn ( μήτε τέχνην— λαβεῖν). What of ἅμα καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικήν? These words should be taken closely with what goes before. The literal translation is (to acquire) ‘at once and the art of steering’: cf. Phil. 22 D ὁ βίος οὗτος γέγονεν αἱρετὸς ἅμα καὶ ἀγαθός ‘this life is at once choiceworthy and good.’ Now ‘to acquire at once the art of how to steer ( ὅπως κυβερνήσει, τούτου τέχνην) and the art of steering’ is merely a way of saying ‘to acquire the art of how to steer and therewith the art of steering.’ He who learns the art and study of how to steer necessarily learns therewith the art of steering (“quarum qui compos factus sit, simul gubernatoriam artem teneat” Schneider): for κυβερνητική is, according to Plato, simply and solely the art of how to steer. τὴν κυβερνητικήν, in short, is nothing but the τέχνη and μελέτη τούτου ὅπως κυβερνήσει, expressed from Plato's point of view. Thus in denying that it is possible to learn either τέχνη or μελέτη of how to steer, the sailors are in effect emphatically denying that it is possible to learn κυβερνητική in Plato's sense of the word at all: cf. 488 B φάσκοντες μηδὲ διδακτὸν εἶναι. So much for the meaning of this passage as a whole. In regard to details, it should be noted that ὅπως means ‘how’: ‘ ὅπως ad τούτου spectans modum et rationem potius quam finem significat’ (after Schneider). With Schneider also I understand κυβερνήσει as ‘shall steer’ and not ‘shall get possession of the helm.’ μελέτη is ‘study’ (in the more concrete sense of the word), rather than actual exercise or practice: cf. III 402 B ἔστι τῆς αὐτῆς τέχνης τε καὶ μελέτης. With τέχνην λαβεῖν cf. Pol. 300 E .

οἰόμενοι . οἰομένους is read by Stallbaum and others, but see note on line 25.

μετεωροσκόπον κτλ. A frequent taunt: cf. e.g. Pol. 299 B μετεωρολόγον, ἀδολέσχην τινὰ σοφιστήν, Phaedr. 270 A , Parm. 135 D , Ap. 18 B , Isocrates adv. Soph. 8, Antid. 262, and Ar. Clouds 228 , 1480 with Blaydes' note. The implication is that ὁ μετεωροσκόπος is blind to τὰ ἐν ποσίν: cf. Theaet. 174 A . Cobet revives Porson's conjecture μετεωροκόπον (after μετεωροκοπεῖς in Ar. Peace 92 ), but the text is perfectly good: cf. μετεωρολέσχας in 489 C.

ἐξεταζομένην : ‘cross-examined.’

καὶ ὅτι ‐‐ λέγεις . ‘And also that what you say is true’ etc. Socrates identifies Adimantus with his hypothetical objector in 487 D; cf. σε λέγειν in D below. Another possibility—less good, I think—is to take ὅτι as introducing a direct address: “and say to him also ‘You speak truly, when you say’” etc. λέγειν is found in a few inferior MSS; and λέγει, which Stallbaum and Baiter adopt, occurs in Par. D. λέγειν is indefensible, and the corruption of λέγειν or λέγει to λέγεις is exceedingly improbable here. On τοίνυν=‘also’ see I 339 D note

τοὺς μὴ χρωμένους . Those who will not use them are to blame for their uselessness. The etymological figure is of course intentional.

οὐ γὰρ ἔχει φύσιν κτλ. See 488 D note

τοὺς σοφοὺς κτλ. “The learned pate Ducks to the golden fool” ( Timon of Athens IV 3). See also VIII 568 A note The author of the saying was, according to Aristotle ( Rhet. II 16. 1391^{a} 8 ff.), Simonides. Being asked on one occasion by Hiero's queen whether it was better to be a man of genius ( σοφός) or rich, he replied “Rich; for men of genius are found at the court of the rich”—a characteristic reply, by which the courtliest of ancient poets contrived to flatter the queen without forgetting himself. (It should be remembered that σοφός often means ‘poet’.) There is no reason for supposing (with e.g. Teichmüller Lit. Fehd. I p. 102) that Plato attributed the saying to Aristippus, although a witticism on the subject is ascribed both to him (D. L. II 8. 69) and to Antisthenes (Winckelmann Antisth. Frag. p. 58). Plato liked to get his knife into Simonides: see I 331 E ff.

δεῖσθαι is governed by the idea of obligation carried on from ἀναγκαῖον. The alternative suggested by J. and C., that the infinitive depends on πέφυκεν, is impossible.

ἐν τούτοις . τούτοις is neuter, like τούτων: otherwise ὑπὸ—ἐπιτηδευόντων is hardly necessary. The balance of clauses —‘in consequence of these circumstances, and amid these circumstances’—is also in favour of this—Schneider's—view.

οὓς δή ‐‐ λέγειν : ‘of whom it is that you say the accuser of philosophy declares that,’ etc. For τὸν ἐγκαλοῦντα see 487 C note

ἰόντων ἐπί almost=‘woo her’: cf. 495 C ff., Symp. 210 A . πλησιάζω is similarly used in 490 B.

τὴν ἀνάγκην should be taken strictly. There is no possibility of escape: the majority must inevitably succumb. Cf. 492 E note

ἐκεῖθεν ‐‐ ὅθεν . As ἀναμιμνῄσκομαι takes the genitive of a noun, so it can be followed by a genitival— originally ablatival—adverb. ὅθεν is attracted for οὗ: cf. Soph. Tr. 701 and other examples in Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 915.

καλόν τε κἀγαθόν . The fashionable Greek phrase καλὸς κἀγαθός for an ἐλευθέριος, or gentleman, was continually used by Socrates and his followers to express their ideal of what a man should be. An excellent discussion of the Socratic connotation of the word will be found in Döring Die Lehre des Sokrates pp. 398—415: for its usual implications reference may be made to Schmidt Ethik d. alten Griechen I pp. 328—334. In politics, the expression was applied to the wealthy or oligarchical party (cf. VIII 569 A and Thuc. VIII 48. 6). It is therefore probable that Socrates' habitual use of καλὸς κἀγαθός fostered the not unwarranted suspicion that he and his friends were out of sympathy with democracy, and so contributed in some measure to his condemnation and death.

νῷ ἔχεις : ‘you remember.’ ἐν νῷ ἔχεις (as in some inferior MSS) would mean ‘you intend.’ Compare Euthyph. 2 B with Ap. 20 B . The reference is to 485 B—487 A.

ἤ =‘alioquin.’ Cf. V 463 D note

οὕτω κτλ. οὕτω “ex Adimanti verbis repetitum et praecise dictum est pro οὕτω λεγόμενον ἦν.” If the word is genuine, it must be taken in this way. J. and C. translate “to say no more,” comparing ῥᾳδίως οὕτω and the like (see on II 377 B). But there appears to be no other instance of this idiomatic οὔτω with the adverb σφόδρα. οὑτωσὶ σφόδρα in Ar. Frogs 88 is quite different, in spite of Blaydes on Ar. Wasps 461 . It is just possible that οὕτω is an interpolation from οὕτω just before.

παρὰ δόξαν . By selecting this form of expression Plato “opinionibus opinionem tribuit” (Schneider), loosely enough, but the words are practically equivalent to ἐναντίον. παράδοξον would be somewhat easier, but the text is probably sound. For a similar pleonasm see my note on Crito 44 C.

δοκουμένοις . With the passive cf. X 612 D.

αὐτοῦ is masculine, and means Plato's καλὸς κἀγαθός, i.e. the philosopher, whom popular opinion regards as an ἀλαζών, if not as a liar.

ἆρ’ οὖν δὴ κτλ. ‘Shall we not then fairly plead that the true lover of learning was disposed by nature to strive towards Being and tarried not at the many particulars which are opined to be’ etc.? Socrates has just said that Truth is the leading attribute of the Philosopher. This proposition is challenged by public opinion ( παρὰ δόξαν τοῖς νῦν δοκουμένοις), and in support of it Socrates urges, what he had asserted before (485 A—C) that the philosopher is a lover of τὸ ὄν. εἴη (‘was,’ i.e. ‘is, as we saw’) would be the ‘philosophic imperfect’ in direct speech. For the rare change from ἦν to εἴη after a primary tense cf. Xen. Mem. I 2. 34 δῆλον (sc. ἐστὶν) ὅτι ἀφεκτέον εἴη τοῦ ὀρθῶς λέγειν, where εἴη stands for ἦν (the usual ‘erat’ for ‘esset’ with words denoting obligation or necessity) of the direct, and Plato Charm. 156 B λέγουσί που ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε αὐτοὺς μόνους ἐπιχειρεῖν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἰᾶσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἀναγκαῖον εἴη ἅμα καὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν θεραπεύειν. (Madvig's insertion of ἄν after ἀναγκαῖον in this passage is without authority.) Cf. also II 361 C note The sequence is all the more easy with the philosophic imperfect because its very nature involves a reference to the past. Ast's conjecture ἀπελογησάμεθα is incorrect; for the philosopher's zeal for Being has not yet been urged in defence of the statement—now for the first time formally challenged— that Truth is his leading characteristic. Madvig conjectures ἀπελογισάμεθα, which Baiter adopts, although the word is wholly inappropriate here. Cf. X 607 B note

ξυγγενεῖ . νοῦς is akin to Being and the Eternal: cf. Phaed. 79 D , Tim. 90 A —C and infra X 611 E.

ᾧ πλησιάσας κτλ. : ‘whereby having come nigh unto and married with true Being, begetting Reason and Truth, he attained unto knowledge and enjoyed true life and nourishment, and then but not before ceased from travail of the soul.’ The mystic union of the Soul with Being is here described in passionate and glowing language. Cf. Phaedr. 246 E —247 D, Symp. 210 A —212 A, and many parallels in Plotinus, for whom, as for the Neoplatonists generally, the mystic side of Platonism had an extraordinary fascination: see Zeller^{3} III 2, pp. 611—618. The imagery should be compared with Theaet. 156 A ff. where the phenomena of Perception are thus analysed. The Subject unites with the Object, and from this union are born two children, one the αἴσθησις e.g. Sight, the other the αἰσθητόν e.g. τὸ μέλαν. The former belongs more peculiarly to the Subject, the latter to the Object. Similarly with the phenomena of Knowledge. The Subject unites with the Idea, and the children of this union are νοῦς (or rather, strictly speaking, νόησις i.e. the action of νοῦς), on the side of the Subject, and the νοητόν, i.e. Truth, on the side of the Object. We miss an essential point if we take νοῦν as the object of Knowledge; it is the faculty of Reason, no longer dormant, but suddenly called into actuality. Plato means that Reason does not really live until it lays hold on the Idea. γνοίη corresponds to νοῦν; it is by the begetting of νοῦς that we come to know. The aorist denotes the instantaneous act; cf. Symp. 210 E πρὸς τέλος ἤδη ἰὼν—ἐξαίφνης κατόψεταί τι θαυμαστὸν τὴν φύσιν καλόν κτλ. See also on 508 D and cf. VII 517 C. In like manner ἀληθῶς ζῴη balances ἀλήθειαν: there is no true life without knowledge of the Truth. ἀληθῶς goes also with τρέφοιτο: cf. Phaedr. 247 D and 248 B, C. With ὠδῖνος cf. Phaedr. 251 E ( ὠδίνων ἔληξεν) and Symp. 206 E . It is tempting to suppose that in ὠδῖνος Plato is thinking not merely of the lover's pangs, but also of the pangs of birth. The knowledge of the Idea is indeed in Plato's view an intellectual and moral regeneration. But ἀπολήγοι τοῦ ἔρωτος shews that ὠδῖνος means the throes of love; and the further view introduces a confusion of ideas which is alien to the peculiar character of Plato's ‘mysticism.’

μετέσται . With μετέσται cf. X 606 B λογίζεσθαι γὰρ—ὀλίγοις τισὶ μέτ‐ εστιν and Theaet. 186 E . τι is adverbial and does not go with ψεῦδος. There is no occasion for Madvig's conjecture ἐπιμελὲς ἔσται: nor need we write ψεύδους, as I formerly proposed.

ἡγουμένης κτλ. ‘Now where Truth was leader’ (as we saw it was with the φιλόσοφος) ‘we shall never, I think, allow that a quire of evils joined her train.’ ἡγουμένης is not the present, but the imperfect participle (cf. ἡγεῖτο δ’ αὐτῷ—ἀλήθεια 490 A): the ‘philosophic’ past is carried on from the earlier sentence. The tense is strictly to the point, for our ἀπολογία is not yet finished: see 490 A note We ought not to regard ἀκολουθῆσαι (with Goodwin MT. p. 55) as a gnomic aorist: still less should we read ἀκολουθήσειν with q, or φαμεν for θαῖμεν (Stobaeus Flor. 11. 18 and Vind. F), taking ἄν with ἀκολουθῆσαι (as I formerly suggested). The past tense is the only one appropriate to the situation both in Greek and in English. See also on line 17.

ἦθος : sc. ἀκολουθῆσαι. These ‘joined the train’ of virtue at 486 B.

καὶ δὴ κτλ. καί is ‘also’ and goes with τὸν ἄλλον: cf. καὶ—δή in 494 A.

ἀναγκάζοντα has been doubted. It is read by all the MSS except Ξ, which has ἀναλαμβάνοντα (cf. 490 D). Stallbaum accepts ἀναλαμβάνοντα, while Baiter adopts Madvig's picturesque conjecture ἀναβιβάζοντα. The text is perfectly sound. ἀναγκάζοντα is ἀναγκάζοντα τῷ λόγῳ, i.e. λέγων ἀναγκαῖα εἶναι, ‘insisting on their necessity’: see on II 363 D ( ἀποτίνουσιν) and cf. X 611 B and Theaet. 153 C (where Cobet wrongly brackets ἀναγκάζω). Much the same view is taken by Jackson ( J. of Ph. XIII p. 218), who compares 486 E μή πῃ δοκοῦμέν σοι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα ἕκαστα διεληλυθέναι. J. and C.'s translation “compelling your assent” is scarcely accurate here.

φαίη . In 487 C we have φαίη ἄν τις, and Richards would add ἄν here. But the hypothetical critic (with whom Socrates himself agrees 487 E) is now treated as what he really is—the exponent of opinions held by all. We should translate ‘after you objected that all men would be compelled to agree with what we say, but when they set words aside, and looked at the actual people of whom the argument spoke, they declared that’ etc. For φαίη after ἀναγκασθήσεται (rather than ἀναγκασθήσοιτο) see Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 1061.

τῆς διαβολῆς . Π and the majority of MSS have τῆς ἤδη διαβολῆς. If ἤδη is right, it must, I think, be taken with τῆς διαβολῆς in the sense of ‘ea διαβολή quae iam apparebat et in conspectum venerat, cum antea animadversa non fuisset’ (so Bernhardy and Schneider Addit. p. 46). Even so, it is harsh, but not so harsh as if we take it with ἐπισκοποῦντες, as Stallbaum—and formerly Schneider—did. So extreme a hyperbaton would be more difficult than that in Soph. O. T. 1245 , and scarcely admissible in prose. Perhaps Plato wrote τῆς διαβολῆς ἤδη. Otherwise we must suppose that A and other MSS are right in omitting the word.

τὰς μιμουμένας κτλ. Plato distinguishes between two kinds of πονηρία, that which results from the corruption of the truly philosophic nature, and the πονηρία of pretenders to philosophy. It is the latter—so we are told—which is responsible for the prejudice under which Philosophy labours (cf. 489 D): but the former is by far the more serious evil (491 E, 495 B), though engendered, not by Philosophy, but by the seductive influence of public opinion.

ἀνάξιον =‘too good for’: cf. Prot. 355 D and Soph. Phil. 1009 . ἀντάξιον (Benedictus) and ἀνοίκειον (Herwerden) are unhappy conjectures.

ἐπὶ πάντας : ‘all the world over.’ Cf. ἐπ’ ἀνθρώπους in Tim. 23 B .

ἐ ‐‐ γενέσθαι . Cobet, who formerly proposed γενήσεσθαι, afterwards rejected the whole clause. The aorist infinitive with μέλλω is rare, but thoroughly established in Plato, if any reliance is placed on the best MSS: see the examples collected by Schanz Vol. V p. vii.

ὀλιγάκις ‐‐ ὀλίγας . ὀλιγάκις καὶ ὀλίγας is half-proverbial. For καὶ ὀλίγας Stephanus conjectured καὶ ὀλίγοις or καὶ ἐν ὀλίγοις, Richards κἀν ὀλίγοις, comparing Arist. Eth. Nic. VII 11. 1151^{b} 30 διὰ το τὴν ἑτέραν ἐν ὀλίγοις καὶ ὀλιγάκις εἶναι φανεράν. But ἐν ὀλίγοις would be inelegant after ἐν ἀνθρώποις, and Plato could not have written ὀλίγην. A similar but easier change from the generic singular to the plural occurs III 408 B and infra 500 C. Translate, keeping the anacoluthon; ‘that such a nature—one possessed of all the qualities’ etc.—‘such natures are few and far between among mankind.’

ὃ ‐‐ ὅτι . Cf. I 330 B note

ἀπόλλυσι κτλ. Krohn ( Pl. St. p. 114) asks how courage and temperance can tend to corrupt the character. The answer is given by Plato in 494 B ff. They bring their possessor to the front, and therefore expose him to the solicitations of selfish and unscrupulous men. It should be carefully borne in mind that ἀνδρεία and the other virtues are here regarded, not as the result of education, but as natural qualities, derived from the philosopher's native love of truth. We are in fact dealing with the potentiality of the τελέως φιλόσοφος (491 A). It is this which suffers corruption, not the actualized philosopher. Cf. Krohn l.c. p. 115 and Pfleiderer Zur Lösung etc. p. 26.

ἔχεις γὰρ ‐‐ λέγω : not “now I have given you an outline of my meaning” (D. and V.), but ‘you understand the general type of the things I mean,’ that is, the general character of things which φθείρει καὶ ἀποσπᾷ, though in themselves advantages or even virtues. Adimantus assents, but would like to have them specified more precisely. In reply, Socrates bids him grasp the notion of them correctly as a whole ( αὐτοῦ is neuter and ὅλου αὐτοῦ is practically equivalent to τύπου), and it will become clear to him, and τὰ προειρημένα περὶ αὐτῶν (viz. that they ἀπόλλυσι καὶ ἀποσπᾷ —φθείρει καὶ ἀποσπᾷ B, C) will not appear ἄτοπα as before ( ἄτοπον—ἀκοῦσαι in B). The passage is somewhat loosely written; but αὐτῶν is certainly neuter and not ‘the philosophic natures,’ as J. and C. suppose.

ἐγγείων ‐‐ ζῴων . These are possessive genitives. Richards says that “ τῶν should probably be omitted before ζῴων or added before ἐγγείων.” Cf. however IV 438 C note In this instance I think Plato wrote τῶν ζῴων in order to call special attention to ζῷα as opposed to ἔγγεια. They are not on the same level of importance, as far as the argument is concerned, for it is the degeneration of ζῷα, not of ἔγγεια, which Plato has to explain.

πλειόνων is much more elegant than Madvig's conjecture πλεῖον. Plato's position on this matter, in the way in which he states it, is open to objection. It might be argued that the naturally strong nature is the best fitted to resist the corrupting influences of its environment. But the philosophic nature is remarkable for sensibility as well as strength, and the sensitive plant needs careful fostering. The general sentiment of this passage is Socratic, as Hermann ( Gesch. u. System p. 330 note 33) and Krohn ( Pl. St. p. 365) have pointed out: cf. Mem. IV 1. 3, 4 τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς εὐφυεστάτους ἐρρωμενεστάτους τε ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὄντας—παιδευθέντας μὲν καὶ μαθόντας ἃ δεῖ πράττειν, ἀρίστους τε καὶ ὠφελιμωτάτους γίγνεσθαι —ἀπαιδεύτους δὲ καὶ ἀμαθεῖς γενομένους κακίστους τε καὶ βλαβερωτᾴτους γίγνεσθαι.

τὴν ἀρίστην φύσιν κτλ. The contrast is between the ἀρίστη φύσις and the φαύλη, where both are subjected to ( οὖσαν ἐν cf. 495 A) bad τροφή. The former ‘comes off worse,’ ‘suffers more’ ( κάκιον ἀπαλλάττειν), because the τροφή is more alien to its nature than to that of the others: cf. τοσούτῳ πλειόνων ἐνδεῖ τῶν πρεπόντων. So Schneider correctly explains the passage. Cf. generally Dante Inferno VI 106—108 “Ritorna a tua scienza, Che vuol, quanto la cosa è più perfetta, Più senta 'l bene, e così la doglienza.” Van Heusde's ἐν ἀλλοτρίῳ τραφεῖσαν misses the point. Even more unhappy is Boeckh's κακίον’ ἀπαλλάττειν, which Stallbaum adopts. κάκιον ἀπαλλάττειν is simply the comparative of κακῶς ἀπαλλάττειν: see Cobet in Mnem. XI p. 168, where Stallbaum is severely rebuked.

ἐκ νεανικῆς κτλ. : “out of a fulness of nature ruined by education” Jowett. Plato's attitude on this subject is highly characteristic. The educator's whole efforts are to be directed towards saving and improving strong and gifted natures: cf. VII 519 A, B. Weak natures may be almost neglected, without serious injury to the State. They will never do anything great—whether good or evil: see 495 B. For this and other reasons Plato does not trouble to lay down rules for the education of the lower classes in his city.

μὴ ἐν προσηκούσῃ : i.q. ἐν μὴ προσηκούσῃ (which Stephanus wrongly read), by a common hyperbaton: cf. Crito 47 D and other examples in Braun De Hyperb. Pl. p. 15. With προσηκούσῃ it is usual to supply μαθήσει. I think Plato intentionally selects a vague expression, intending ἐν προσηκούσῃ to be taken with σπαρεῖσα—φυτευθεῖσα as well as with τρέφηται: for it is just as important that the philosophic nature should be sown and planted in a proper soil (491 D), as that it should receive proper education. Morgenstern, who formerly proposed προσηκούσῃ <γῇ>, afterwards adopted much the same view as this: see Schneider Addit. p. 46.

θεῶν . See on θεοῦ μοῖραν 493 A.

ἢ καὶ σὺ ἡγεῖ κτλ. This passage is appealed to by Grote (VIII pp. 200 ff.) in his famous defence of the Sophists. Plato certainly implies that the Sophists did not independently corrupt the young ‘to any extent worth mentioning’ ( ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον λόγου). It is the Demos which is the primary source and fount of corruption; the Sophists are only the mouthpiece of a disgraceful public opinion which it is their profession to flatter and court (493 A—D). But from Plato's point of view this is itself a sufficiently grave indictment to bring against a professional teacher of Morality (see 493 C), so that the present attack on the Athenian people is far from being an apology for the Sophists.

ξυγκαθεζόμενοι κτλ. The Athenians sat at an Ecclesia: see Ar. Ach. 24 f. with Blaydes' note. For πολλοί I formerly read οἱ πολλοί with Hermann; but ἁθρόοι πολλοί is sound, and means ‘in large numbers together,’ like πολλοὶ ἁθρόοι in Gorg. 490 B . The subject is of course οἱ ταῦτα λέγοντες, i.e. οἱ πολλοί (492 A). The mention of numbers is to the point: how can one man stand against so many? Cobet is wrong in deleting πολλοί.

ξύν . See on IV 424 D.

ὑπερβαλλόντως . Cf. VIII 561 C ff. Exaggeration and excess are characteristic marks of democracy.

πρὸς δ’ αὐτοῖς κτλ. Plato is doubtless thinking of the Acropolis and the Dionysiac theatre. Cobet does ill to bracket τοῦ ψόγου καὶ ἐπαίνου: for Plato characteristically makes the rocks themselves applaud. Cf. VIII 563 C. Translate ‘Yea, and besides themselves, the rocks and the place wherein they are resound and give forth a reduplicated uproar of censure and applause.’ Cf. Euthyd. 303 B ἐνταῦθα δὲ ὀλίγου καὶ οἱ κίονες οἱ ἐν τῷ Λυκείῳ ἐθορύβησάν τ’ ἐπὶ τοῖν ἀνδροῖν καὶ ἥσθησαν.

τίνα ‐‐ ἴσχειν . ‘Where, think you, is a young man's heart?’ For the saying cf. Isocr. Trap. 10 τίν’ οἴεσθέ με γνώμην ἔχειν; and Dem. adv. Aphob. II 21 τίν) οἴεσθε αὐτὴν ψυχὴν ἔξειν; καρδία as the seat of courage is colloquial and rare: cf. Archil. Fr. 58. 4 καρδίης πλέος and Plut. Reg. et imp. apophthegmata 185 E τοὺς δὲ Ἐρετριεῖς—ἔλεγεν ὥσπερ τευθίδας μάχαιραν μὲν ἔχειν, καρδίαν δὲ μὴ ἔχειν. q has τίνα ἂν οἴει, and Bywater and Herwerden propose τίν’ ἂν οἴει, but the MS reading is better and more picturesque.

ποίαν ἄν . I agree with Goodwin ( MT. pp. 66, 68, 71) and others that ἄν with the future was occasionally used by the best Attic prose writers. In Plato it occurs Ap. 29 C , 30 B, Symp. 222 A , Rep. X 615 D, Crito 53 D, Euthyd. 287 D , Phaedr. 227 B , and probably also elsewhere. All these instances have been ‘emended,’ and it is possible enough that some of them are corrupt. Here ἄν is in all the MSS, and is therefore better retained, although it may of course be an erroneous repetition of the last syllable of ποίαν (as Cobet and others suppose). We may regard the idiom as one of Plato's numerous half-poetical efforts: see X 615 D note Richards proposes δή: but see V 450 C note

καὶ φήσειν κτλ. In oratio recta the whole sentence would have run ποία ἂν αὐτῷ παιδεία ἰδιωτικὴ ἀνθέξει, ἢ οὐ κατακλυσθεῖσα—οἰχήσεται φερομένη—καὶ φήσει—καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσει—καὶ ἔσται τοιοῦτος; i.e. (literally translated) ‘what private training of his will stand fast, which will not be swamped by such censure or praise, and carried down the stream wherever the stream leads, and he will say’ etc. (The metaphor is from a mole or breakwater swept away by a flood.) In this there is nothing but the common passage of a relative into a main sentence (see II 357 B note and cf. Ap. 40 A with my note ad loc.), coupled with an easy change of subject, as in Crito 46 A. The sentence assumes the form which it has in the text, because both subordinate and main clauses can take the accusative with infinitive in Greek oratio obliqua: see Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 1056. Stallbaum (followed by J. and C.) understands οὐκ οἴει to account for φήσειν, but the negative cannot be supplied, and if it could, it would give a wrong sense. Schneider's translation is correct, but not his note in the text. With the sentiment cf. Gorg. 510 D ff.

σοφισταί . The Demos is the Arch-Sophist: cf. 492 A note οὗτοι is the contemptuous isti: ‘these teachers and sophists of yours.’

θανάτοις . The fate of Socrates was the most conspicuous example of this in Plato's time, but it is hardly likely that Plato is specifically alluding to it here (as Steinhart and Susemihl suppose). The description is quite general. Contrast VII 517 A note

οὔτε γὰρ κτλ. Plato has just declared that it would be the height of folly in a teacher even to attempt to make a young man run counter to public opinion. The present sentence explains why. There is not, never has been, and never will be produced a character different (from the Many) in respect of virtue, by having been educated on principles opposed to the education which the Many provide (the force of public sentiment, expressed in assemblies etc.). Consequently every attempt to produce such a character by means of education in the teeth of public opinion is foredoomed to failure. The statement appears at first sight extraordinary; but from Plato's point of view it is, with the limitations which he makes, strictly correct. Cities are either actual or ideal. In the ideal city, education does not produce a type of character which conflicts with public opinion, because public opinion is itself formed by education. In actual cities, education must conform to the same standard if it is to exist at all: for τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον ἀτιμίαις τε καὶ χρήμασι καὶ θανάτοις κολάζουσι (492 D). How then are we to explain the presence of great and good men in existing cities? They are θεῖοι ἄνδρες, saved from corruption by grace of God: see on 493 A. In these circumstances, what is the political reformer to do? He must break with all existing cities (497 B), and found—as Plato now wishes to do—a new commonwealth in which sound education and public opinion no longer differ, but agree. In other words, his policy must be to make the Philosopher King. For other views of this passage see App. II.

ἀνθρώπειον : sc. <*>θος: ‘a merely human character.’ Plato makes an exception in favour of a θεῖον ἦθος, playing on the proverb τὸ θεῖον ἐξαιρῶ λόγου, for which cf. Symp. 176 C Σωκράτη δ ἐξαιρῶ λόγου , Phaedr. 242 B Σιμμίαν Θηβαῖον ἐξαιρῶ λόγου (a delicate way of hinting that Socrates and Simmias are θεῖοι ἄνδρες), and Theaet. 162 D . Any ἦθος which in existing cities conspicuously transcends the public standard of morality (and is thus ἀλλοῖον πρὸς ἀρετήν) is θεῖον, and for that very reason sporadic and exceptional (see next note).

θεοῦ μοῖραν is best explained by Men. 94 B ff. and 99 C, D. Distinguished statesmen like Pericles, Themistocles etc. are θεῖοι, just as much as the χρησμῳδοί, μάντεις, and ποιητικοί: they are ἐπίπνοι—καὶ κατεχόμενοι ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅταν κατορθῶσι λέγοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πράγματα (99 D). Education did not produce them, nor have they any scientific knowledge of statesmanship; for which reason also they cannot teach their sons to be statesmen ( Men. 94 B , Prot. 320 A ). It was by this theory that Plato accounted for the fact that good men appear from time to time even in corrupt States: εἰσὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἄνθρωποι ἀεὶ θεῖοί τινες, οὐ πολλοὶ—φυόμενοι οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐν εὐνομουμέναις πόλεσιν ἢ καὶ μή ( Laws 951 B). There is more than a touch of irony in the epithet θεῖος when Plato applies it to Themistocles, Pericles and other successful politicians with whom he had little sympathy, but θεοῦ μοῖραν is not ironical here (cf. 492 A), nor is Plato ever otherwise than grateful for the birth of statesmen who are truly θεῖοι. But they do not solve the difficulty, for the scientific knowledge of πολιτική is not only better and more stable in itself, but guarantees the permanent prosperity of a State, because it can be transmitted to posterity. Nor can we be sure that our statesmen ‘by grace of God’ will appear when they are most wanted. For a full discussion of θεία μοῖρα in Plato see Zeller^{4} II 1, p. 594 note 4.

ἕκαστος : sc. δοξάτω. Cf. I 334 B note and Phaed. 80 A , B, where ψυχή, the reading of the best MSS, should be retained. Baiter is certainly wrong in reading ἕκαστον (with Stephanus and v): for with personal subjects δοκεῖ is used personally. Dümmler ( Chr. Beitr. p. 12) and Teichmüller ( Lit. Fehd. I p. 104) suppose that Plato means Isocrates in particular. It is possible enough that he had Isocrates in his mind, but the description applies to many besides him: cf. IV 426 C note

δοξάζουσιν = ‘opine’ is technical: cf. V 479 E. With θρέμματος etc. cf. “The beast with many heads Butts me away” Shakespeare Coriol. IV 1; and a similar figure in Solon ap. Arist. Ath. Pol. 12 ad fin. and Theaet. 174 D .

ἑκάστας . See cr. n. Van Prinsterer's emendation is now universally accepted.

οἵας αὖ κτλ. The party-cry.

καλέσειεν (though κατεμάνθανεν) is written because of καταμαθὼν δέ, after which ἐκάλει would be less suitable. The situation is now treated as a possible one, after the picture has once been allowed.

ὡς τέχνην συστησάμενος . Cf. the Stoic definition of τέχνη as a σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων κτλ. (Zeno Fr. 12 Pearson).

ὀνομάζοι κτλ. : ‘employs all these terms in accordance with’ (literally ‘in dependence on’) ‘the opinions of the mighty Beast.’ This interpretation is better than to suppose with Stallbaum that Plato means ‘applies all these names to the opinions’ etc., though ὀνομάζειν τι ἐπί τινι is idiomatically used in that way.

τἀναγκαῖα ‐‐ καλοῖ . τἀναγκαῖα does not mean “the physical necessities and exigencies of the great beast's nature” (J. and C.), but simply ‘the inevitable.’ Whatever happens, a public teacher or Sophist must conform to the opinions of the Beast (492 D). In what follows there is a hint of the profound philosophical view that the Works of Necessity are evil (cf. Tim. 29 E , 47 E ff.), and that Moral Freedom consists in following what is good. See on X 617 E.

δοκεῖ . Ast would read δοκοῖ, but ἄν of course goes with εἶναι: cf. IV 422 B. See for this idiom my note on Prot. 351 B and Blaydes on Ar. Wasps 1405 .

ὁ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν κτλ. Jackson thinks of Isocrates again ( Proceedings of the Camb. Philol. Soc. II 1882 p. 13). See above on 493 A.

ὅτι μὲν γὰρ κτλ. An anacoluthon. The apodosis which requires to be supplied is ‘that much is certain’ or the like: cf. V 465 A note I formerly thought the anacoluthon too harsh, and proposed to read ὅ τι μὲν γὰρ ἄν—ἐπιδεικνύμενος, ἢ κτλ., taking ὅ τι as the object of ἐπιδεικνύμενος, and ἢ ποίησιν (‘either poetry’ etc.) as in apposition to ὅ τι: but the text is better as it stands. Richards' proposal to read ἔστι for ὅτι is very unpleasing.

ποίησιν . Compare a striking passage in Laws 659 B, C, where Poetry is said to have deteriorated after she accepted οἱ πολλοί as her judge. See also Laws 700 E, 797 B, Gorg. 502 B ff. and infra X 605 A.

κυρίους αὑτοῦ . We should certainly (with Schneider and the majority of editors) read αὑτοῦ and not αὐτοῦ (which Stallbaum and others adopt, referring it to ποίησιν etc.). The MSS (except q) mostly read αὐτοῦ, but their authority in this matter is of no account. Cobet would read αὐτούς and eject τοὺς πολλούς—on what ground, it is difficult even to conjecture.

πέρα τῶν ἀναγκαίων . By coming forward in a public capacity as a poet or statesman or the like, he ‘makes the Many his masters more than is necessary.’ In a private station, he is, comparatively speaking, independent; but even then the Many are (in a certain sense) of necessity his masters: see 496 D. Ast and Stallbaum take the phrase with ἡ Διομήδεια ἀνάγκη. “Iungenda sunt verba sic: ἀνάγκη ( ἐστὶν ) αὐτῷ πέρα τῶν ἀναγκαίων (ultra necessaria quae progrediatur) ἡ Διομήδεια λεγομένη, ut vocabulis ἡ λεγομένη Διομήδεια istud πέρα ἀναγκαίων declaretur” (Stallbaum). If this is what Plato meant, he expresses it in a harsh and dangerously ambiguous way, and it would be preferable to cancel πέρα τῶν ἀναγκαίων (with Cobet and Herwerden). But there is fortunately no occasion for such drastic treatment.

ἡ Διομήδεια κτλ. Most of the MSS write Διομηδεία (sic), but Διομήδειά γε at the end of a line in Ar. Eccl. 1029 makes it clear that the word is proparoxyton, unless, as Schneider supposes ( Addit. p. 47), Aristophanes shortens the final syllable by poetic license. The proverb, which is used of an overmastering necessity, is illustrated by Leutsch u. Schneidewin Paroem. Gr. I p. 59, II p. 367, and also by Blaydes on Ar. l.c. Two explanations of it were given. According to the first, which is adopted by the Scholiast on this passage, the phrase originated in the treatment meted out by Diomede to Odysseus, when they were returning from Ilium to the Greek camp after stealing the Palladium. Odysseus attempted to kill Diomede, but failed, and Diomede paid him out by tying his arms together and driving him home with blows from the flat of his sword. The Scholiast on Ar. l.c. explains differently. Διομήδεια: ὅτι Διομήδης ὁ Θρᾴξ, πόρνας ἔχων θυγατέρας, τοὺς παριόντας ξένους ἐβιάζετο αὐταῖς συνεῖναι ἕως οὗ κόρον σχῶσι καὶ ἀναλωθῶσιν οἱ ἄνδρες. ἃς καὶ ὁ μῦθος ἵππους ἀνθρωποφάγους εἶπεν. I agree with Schneider that the proverb is more likely to have originated from the first story than from a euhemeristic explanation of the man-eating mares of Diomede of Thrace.

αὐτῶν . The μισθαρνοῦντες ἰδιῶται, not ‘the Many.’ Plato is probably thinking of actual eulogies of the Athenians by Isocrates and others like him.

ἀναμνήσθητι . See V 475 E.

φιλόσοφον ‐‐ εἶναι . The theory of Ideas is not a democratic philosophy. With Plato's attitude here to οἱ πολλοί cf. Gorg. 474 A τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι.

καὶ ‐‐ δή . Cf. 490 C note

ὡμολόγηται . See 486 C, 486 A, B: and cf. also 490 C.

παισίν . See cr. n. πᾶσιν is retained by Schneider, who takes it as masculine and ἅπασιν as neuter. Herwerden also approves of πᾶσιν: but εὐθὺς ἐν παισίν (which most of the editors adopt) gives the only correct antithesis to ἐπειδὰν πρεσβύτερος γίγνηται (‘when he is growing older’). α and αι are easily interchanged in ninth century MSS: see Introd. § 5.

φυῇ . Herwerden proposes φύσῃ προσφερές, comparing Soph. Ajax 1077 κἂν σῶμα γεννήσῃ μέγα, but no change is necessary, as Herwerden himself allows. For προσφερής, some inferior MSS have προσφερές, an easier, but less elegant and idiomatic reading. Schneider also points out that if Plato had written προσφερές, he ought to have added αὐτοῦ with τὸ σῶμα.

ὑποκείσονται =‘they will lie prostrate at his feet’ is the future perfect of ὑποπίπτω. ὑποπεσοῦνται, which Herwerden conjectures, would be less expressive, and denote an act, or series of acts, instead of a never-wearying attitude of supplication and adoration. They so to speak besiege his soul with flatteries and prayers.

ἐὰν τύχῃ κτλ. It has long been admitted that this picture is drawn chiefly from Alcibiades. In antiquity Plutarch seems to have suspected something of the sort, for he describes Alcibiades' degeneration in language adapted from the present passage ( Alc. 4. 1). But the personal touches must not blind us to the fact that Plato is portraying the type, although Alcibiades sits for the portrait.

πλούσιος ‐‐ μέγας describe Alcibiades exactly: cf. Alc. I 104 A, B, Thuc. VI 16 1—3, Isocr. περὶ ζεύγους 25 ff., Plut. Alc. 1. 4, 4. 1 and elsewhere. The Greeks thought tallness essential to beauty: see e.g. Arist. Eth. Nic. IV 7. 1123^{b} 7 and Pol. VII 4. 1326^{a} 33.

ἡγούμενον κτλ. Plutarch ( Alc. 17. 2, 3) declares that Alcibiades intended the Sicilian expedition to be a step towards an almost universal empire: Sicily was to be merely the ἐφόδια τοῦ πολέμου. Alcibiades says nearly as much himself in Thuc. VI 90. 2, with which compare 15. 2. Grote (VII p. 79) is inclined to deny that even Alcibiades dreamt of anything beyond the conquest of Sicily, but the ancient historians thought differently: cf. also Alc. II 141 B ff. Many of the Athenians, probably not without reason (though Plutarch l.c. 35. 1 leaves the point unsettled), suspected him of aiming at a τυραννίς (Thuc. VI 15. 4 and Isocr. περὶ ζεύγους 38).

ἐξαρεῖν κτλ. See cr. n. ἐξαρεῖν appears also in several MSS besides v. The present, though retained by Schneider, is very difficult after πληρωθήσεσθαι. For the interchange of αι and α cf. Introd. § 5. Alcibiades' φρόνημα was notorious: see for example Alc. I 104 A, Thuc. V 43. 2, VI 16 ff., Plut. Alc. 34. 6 and the highly characteristic anecdote in 23. 8. Plato's words appear to embody an extract from some tragic poet (probably Euripides), as may be inferred both from the rhythm ( σχηματισμοῦ—κενοῦ) and the language. ἄνευ νοῦ is declared by van Prinsterer, Cobet and others to be a gloss on κενοῦ. Possibly they are right; but (as Schneider remarks) ὅτι νοῦς οὐκ ἔνεστιν αὐτῷ is in favour of retaining the words, and they occur in all the MSS.

οὕτω διατιθεμένῳ : not “while he is in this frame of mind” (D. and V.), but ‘when he is sinking into this condition.’

ἐάν τις κτλ. As Socrates often did to Alcibiades: see VIII 560 D note and Symp. 215 D ff. “The two conversations with Alcibiades are an example of this” (Thomas Gray).

τὸ δέ is not here the idiomatic τὸ δέ (as in IV 443 C), but ‘hoc autem’ i.e. νοῦς (Stallbaum).

τὸ ξυγγενὲς κτλ. : i.e. the affinity of what is said with his nature, “weil die Reden mit ihm verwandt sind” (Schneider). D. and V.'s translation “an inborn taste for philosophic inquiry” is wrong.

εἷς has often been doubted; but Schneider's explanation is certainly right, that τῷ οὕτω διατιθεμένῳ is the individual typifying a class, and that εἷς denotes one of the class. The idiom is analogous to the plural after a typical or generic singular: see on I 374 A. The emendations proposed ( διαισθάνηται for εἷς αἰσθάνηται Stallbaum, εἰσαῦθις Richter, εἴσω Madvig, εἰσακούων or εἰσακούσας Richards) are not only superfluous, but indefensible in themselves. Plato hardly expects more than one such person to pause at all on his downward career. Here again we naturally think of Alcibiades, whose interviews with Socrates (according to Symp. 215 D ) profoundly impressed him for the moment, but failed to effect a permanent reform in the midst of so many temptations (ib. 216 B). Perhaps Socrates once hoped that Alcibiades would be his ‘scientific ruler,’ and bring back true prosperity to Athens. A tone of sorrow for the ‘lost leader’ seems to make itself felt in Plato's words.

τοὺς ἡγουμένους : i.q. οἳ ἡγοῦνται, whence the article, which Herwerden wrongly rejects. The voice should pause a little between ἐκείνους (which refers to 494 C) and τοὺς ἡγουμένους.

λέγοντάς τε κτλ. We should expect the future indicative, and on this ground the insertion of διατελεῖν has been proposed by Richards (Stephanus had previously desiderated διατελέσειν). So serious an alteration lacks every element of probability. Ast must be wrong in making λέγοντας etc. depend on οἰόμεθα. If the text is sound, we should supply πάντα δράσειν or the like after οὐ, and regard the participles as agreeing with the subject of δράσειν. (Schneider and J. and C. take nearly the same view). δράσειν is of course easy to understand, but it is less easy to dispense with πάντα. Could Plato have written οὐ <πᾶν>, πᾶν μὲν ἔργον κτλ.? Cf. IX 575 E and πᾶν ποιεῖν in Ap. 39 A and Gorg. 479 C . I prefer the anacoluthon.

τὸν πείθοντα . Such was Socrates, and he was brought to trial. Plato may well have thought of his master when he wrote δημοσίᾳ εἰς ἀγῶνας καθιστάντας. The most fatal count in the charge against Socrates was that he corrupted the youth ( Ap. 24 B ), and Alcibiades was held to be a case in point ( Xen. Mem. I 2. 12 ). Plato now turns the tables on the Athenian people. He says in effect ‘It was you who corrupted Alcibiades: and you impeached Socrates for trying to save him.’

ἐλέγομεν . 491 B ff.

εἰς should be taken with ὄλεθρος and διαφθορά, as Schneider points out. They are spoiled ‘with reference to’ or ‘for’ the best of all vocations. Jowett wrongly connects εἰς with βελτίστης.

φαμέν . 491 A, B.

ἐκ τούτων κτλ. Corruptio optimi pessima.

οἱ ‐‐ ἐργαζόμενοι was true of Alcibiades: see Grote VIII p. 116 and Lysias In Alc. I 16, 30, 35 ff. Isocrates' attempt in his περὶ ζεύγους to make out that Alcibiades was a benefactor to his city is a futile and fantastic performance.

ῥυέντες κτλ. With the metaphor cf. 485 D. For σμικρὰ—δρᾷ see 419 E note

προσήκει : sc. φιλοσοφία: “nam philosophia cum virgine ἐπικλήρῳ comparatur, qualem in matrimonium ducere proximis cognatis aut permissum aut iniunctum fuit” (Stallbaum). See Meier u. Schömann Att. Proc. pp. 614—617.

ἀτελῆ κτλ. ἀτελῆ is said with reference to the rites of marriage: cf. Philostrat. Vit. Apoll. IV 45 ἐπ’ ἀτελεῖ γάμῳ and Soph. Ant. 1240 f. τὰ νυμφικὰ | τέλη λαχὼν δείλαιος ἔν γ’ Ἅιδου δόμοις. With τε followed by δέ cf. X 611 D and other examples quoted by Hoefer de part. Pl. p. 16.

ἀληθῆ is like ἀληθῶς ζῴη in 490 B, a passage where the same kind of imagery is employed.

ᾔσχυνάν τε κτλ. Is the aorist gnomic or past? It is usually taken as gnomic, but Plato may be thinking of his own times, in which Philosophy had come to shame, because the unworthy had defiled her.

σὺ φῄς . Cf. 489 D and 487 C, D.

ἐκ τῶν τεχνῶν κτλ. It has been supposed that Plato has in view Antisthenes and the Cynic Diogenes, the latter of whom apparently started life as a moneychanger (D. L. VI 20). But the description which follows applies to sophists and sophistical rhetoricians rather than to the Cynic philosophers. The poet Gray says “this seems to be aimed at Protagoras, who was an ordinary countryman and a woodcutter” (see Gellius Noct. Att. V 3 and other authorities cited by Frei Quaest. Prot. pp. 6 ff.). Hermann ( Gesch. u. Syst. p.628) cites Euthydemus and Dionysodorus as cases in point (cf. 496 A note). Each of these sophists had formerly taught the art of fighting in full armour ( Euthyd. 271 C — 272 B, 273 E). As speech-writing and rhetoric generally were counted among the arts, we may think also of Isocrates, who loved above everything to call himself a φιλόσοφος ( Antid. 271 ff.). But although these and other examples may be quoted in illustration of what Plato here says, the tone of the whole passage shews that Plato is describing a familiar phenomenon of his own times, when clever and ambitious young men were in the habit of forsaking their handicrafts and devoting themselves to ‘culture.’ Cf. Prot. 318 E τὰς γὰρ τέχνας αὐτοὺς πεφευγότας ἄκοντας πάλιν αὖ ἄγοντες ἐμβάλλουσιν εἰς τέχνας (sc. Hippias etc.), λογισμούς τε καὶ ἀστρονομίαν καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ μουσικὴν διδάσκοντες, and my article in Cl. Rev. XV p. 220.

ἐφιέμενοι κτλ. is an anacoluthon. The natural flow of the sentence is interrupted by the question ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη; which is intended to obtain Adeimantus' assent to τὰς ψυχὰς—τυγχάνουσιν. On resuming, Plato interposes a comparison, and to this the general idea which forms the logical predicate to πολλοί is accommodated in ποἶ ἄττα—φαῦλα. The sentence was thus understood by the editor of q; for τυγχάνουσιν, which seems a difficulty on this theory, is in q τυγχάνοντες. But τυγχάνοντες would be extremely inelegant; and Plato writes τυγχάνουσιν to correspond to λελώβηνται. Even in other cases a finite verb sometimes replaces a participle in the second of two contrasted clauses, e.g. Ap. 21 E . J. and C. explain the passage in nearly the same way, as well as (apparently) Schneider and Stallbaum. It is impossible for many reasons to connect τυγχάνουσιν with ἐφιέμενοι and so escape the anacoluthon. I formerly suspected the text, and proposed <ἀπο> τυγχάνουσιν (‘miss the mark,’ i.e. fail to win the distinction which they covet). Another solution might be to place the troublesome τυγχάνουσιν after πολλοί. But neither change is in any degree probable; and it is better to acquiesce in the reading of the MSS. Plato's anacolutha are a device for imparting life and reality to his dialogues. A careful translation should preserve them all.

ἀποτεθρυμμένοι : lit. ‘broken off’ i.e. ‘truncated,’ ‘maimed.’ The word is rare, and apparently used only here by Plato. Schneider thus explains the preposition: “quorum animis quasi arboribus cacumina defracta et vires ad enitendum necessariae debilitatae sunt.” A comparison of Theaet. 173 A πολλὰ κάμπτονται καὶ συγκλῶνται and Prot. 325 D ὥσπερ ξυλον διαστρεφόμενον καὶ καμπτόμενον εὐθύνουσιν ἀπειλαῖς καὶ πληγαῖς makes it not unlikely that the metaphor is as Schneider supposes. On the vox nihili ἀποτεθρυωμένοι (in the margin of Flor. A) see Ruhnken on Timaeus Lex. s.v. Timaeus seems to have found it in his text of the Republic.

διὰ τὰς βαναυσίας . Cf. Xen. Oec. 4. 2 αἵ γε βαναυσικαὶ καλούμεναι (sc. τέχναι)— καταλυμαίνονται—τὰ σώματα τῶν τε ἐργαζομένων καὶ τῶν ἐπιμελομένων, ἀναγκάζουσαι καθῆσθαι καὶ σκιατραφεῖσθαι, ἔνιαι δὲ καὶ πρὸς πῦρ ἡμερεύειν. τῶν δὲ σωμάτων θηλυνομένων καὶ αἱ ψυχαὶ πολὺ ἀρρωστότεραι γίγνονται. It is probable that βαναυσία was “primarily a military conception, dependent for its origin on the obvious fact that certain modes of life and the exercise of certain trades disqualify from prowess in the field” (Greenidge Gk. Const. History p. 22, quoting in support Hdt. II 165—167). “Sedentary and within-door arts,” says Bacon (quoted by Newman Politics of Aristotle I p. 105), “have in their nature a contrariety to a military disposition.” In practice the term is freely applied by the writers of the best period to every kind of mechanical or illiberal labour or pursuit. Aristotle defines βαναυσία in these words: βάναυσον δ’ ἔργον εἶναι δεῖ τοῦτο νομίζειν καὶ τέχνην ταύτην καὶ μάθησιν, ὅσαι πρὸς τὰς χρήσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄχρηστον ἀπεργάζονται τὸ σῶμα τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν ( Pol. Θ 2. 1337^{b} 8 ff.). See also Whibley Gk. Olig. pp. 42 ff. and Newman l.c. pp. 104—115. The ancients mostly derived the word from βαῦνος ‘a furnace’ and αὔω, “quasi βάναυσος qui caminum accendit” (Stephanus-Hase Thes. s. v.). In view of the Boeotian βανά= γυνή and βανῆκας· γυναῖκας Βοιωτοί in Hesychius, I have conjectured in Cl. Rev. VII p. 112 that βάναυσος, which does not look like an Attic word, may be connected with βανά. If so, the word perhaps originally meant ‘effeminate’ ‘unmanly’: cf. θηλυνομένων in the extract quoted from Xenophon. In any case, however, the ancient etymology can hardly be right.

δοκεῖς οὖν τι κτλ. In the ‘little bald tinker’ several critics have recognised Isocrates: see for example Teichmüller Lit. Fehd. I p. 105 and Jackson's article on the Sophists in the Enc. Brit. ἐκ δεσμῶν λελυμένου—ἐν βαλανείῳ δὲ λελουμένου is an admirable example of rhetorical παρομοίωσις, and satirises the tricks of style for which Isocrates was notorious. But all the sophistical rhetoricians of the school of Gorgias affected meretricious ornaments of this kind (see Hug on Symp. 194 E ff. and especially Cope's Rhetoric of Aristotle III pp. 105, 106), and Plato's shafts are not levelled at Isocrates alone. As usual, he individualises the type, and if the resultant picture resembles Isocrates, so much the worse for him. Plato would not be sorry (cf. Euthyd. 305 ff., with Spengel's Isokr. u. Pl. pp. 36—40), and doubtless intended his readers to think of Isocrates, as they certainly would. See also on 498 E.

ἀργύριον κτλ. Cf. Cratin. Seriph. 2 Meineke ἀνδρῶν νεοπλουτοπονήρων | αἰσχρῶν .

φαλακροῦ καὶ σμικροῦ . Was Isocrates bald and short? The bust of him in the Villa Albani is not bald, and it would be pressing the personality to the verge of absurdity to take these words so seriously. The poverty ( πενίαν etc.) and loneliness is of course the daughter's (cf. 495 C ἔρημον καὶ ἀτελῆ φιλοσοφίαν λείποντες), not her father's, as D. and V. suppose. In other words τοῦ δεσπότου belongs only to τὴν θυγατέρα.

διαφέρει . See on 484 D. Herwerden ejects the word, quite needlessly, as usual.

ποἶ ἄττα ‐‐ δόξας . Cf. Symp. 210 D πολλοὺς καὶ καλοὺς λόγους καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τίκτῃ καὶ διανοήματα ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἀφθόνῳ. τίκτειν or γεννᾶν ἐν is the usual expression for begetting on or out of: cf. τόκος ἐν καλῷ Symp. 206 B .

προσήκοντα κτλ. : ‘deserving to be called sophisms.’ The fallacies in the Euthydemus are cases in point : cf. 495 D note With φρονήσεως ἀληθινῆς ἐχόμενον cf. Euthyd. 306 D . ἄξιον, which occurs in A after φρονήσεως, is probably, as Cobet supposed, a marginal note directing attention to this vigorous and highly elaborated passage: cf. 504 E note and see the curious description by Diogenes Laertius (III 65 f.) of the different σημεῖα by which it was customary to draw attention to noteworthy or difficult places in the text of Plato. Schneider and Jowett can hardly be right in retaining the word. Stephanus' conjecture οὐδὲ ἄξιον οὐδὲ φρονήσεως ἀληθινῆς is awkward and not likely to be correct. Campbell neatly conjectures ἀξίως, but Cobet's solution, which Ast foreshadowed, is more probable.

ὑπὸ φυγῆς καταληφθέν : ‘arrested by exile,’ so as not ἐκπεσεῖν ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος (495 A): cf. κατασχεῖν below. Stallbaum's explanation ‘overtaken by exile,’ which D. and V. apparently accept, is in my judgment wrong. The reading καταλειφθέν ( q and several other MSS, followed by Ast and one or two other scholars) is less expressive and picturesque, though it gives a fair sense if interpreted as καταλειφθὲν τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ. Van Heusde's conjecture ἀπὸ φυγῆς καταλειφθέν would (as Schneider observes) mean ‘those who survived after exile’ and is wholly inadmissible, as well as ἀπὸ φυγῆς καταληφθέν (‘debarred from exile’), which Herwerden proposes, inserting also ἤ after ἦθος. Has Plato any special instances in view? Steinhart ( Einleitung p. 208) thinks of Anaxagoras, and even of Plato himself. But it cannot be said that either of them was saved by exile from deserting Philosophy, and Plato was hardly exiled, even metaphorically speaking. Krohn ( Pl. St. pp. 117, 384) declares for Xenophon. It is however more than doubtful, even after Boeckh's attempt to overthrow the tradition about unfriendliness between Xenophon and Plato ( De simultate quam Pl. c. Xen. exercuisse fertur 1811), whether Plato would have gone out of his way to pay a compliment to his fellow-disciple. Can Plato be thinking of his friend Dio? If so, this passage must have been written in or after 367 B.C., the year of Dio's banishment from Syracuse. A personal reference is easily combined with the description of a class, and a tribute to Dio would be very pleasing here. I have lately found the same conjecture in Thomas Gray's notes on the Republic. See also Introd. § 4 and (for Plato's connexion with Dio) Grote X pp. 332 ff. See also 499 B note

ὅταν κτλ. There is no reason to suppose (with e.g. Steinhart Einleitung p. 208) that Plato means Euclides of Megara. Heraclitus is a good instance, although Ephesus was hardly a σμικρὰ πόλις .

βραχὺ δέ πού τι κτλ. Some have thought of Phaedo of Elis, and Simon the Athenian, both of whom were members of the Socratic circle (Steinhart l.c. p. 208). The latter (whose very existence has been denied by some recent critics, but—as Hirzel Der Dialog pp. 102 ff. shews—on wholly inadequate grounds) was once a shoemaker (D. L. II 122). We may also in some respects compare the architect-philosopher Hippodamus of Miletus: see Susemihl and Hicks' Politics of Aristotle I pp. 331—334. Zeller^{4} II 1, p. 52 note 1 thinks Plato may have had Socrates himself in view, but the δαιμόνιον σημεῖον accounts for him.

Θεάγους . Cf. Ap. 33 E , where it is implied that Theages died before Socrates. The tribute which Plato pays to his memory is all the more touching because Greek literature too seldom recognises that physical weakness may be combined with mental and moral strength: see III 406 C note Plutarch ( de tuenda san. praecepta 126 C, quoted by Stallbaum) remarks καὶ γὰρ φιλοσοφεῖν ἀρρωστίαι πολλοὺς παρέχουσι—a reminiscence, perhaps, of Plato.

τὸ δαιμόνιον σημεῖον . Socrates regarded his divine sign as a special if not unique revelation from God, without submitting it to further analysis. As here, so in Ap. 31 D , it is this which forbids him to enter on political life ( τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ὅ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν). What the phenomenon really was, is a question which different writers have answered differently, according to their different points of view: see Zeller^{4} II 1 pp. 75—91. The subject is treated with great fulness in Ribbing's Socrat. Stud. II pp. 1 ff. and in Riddell's edition of the Apology pp. 109—117. τῶν ἔμπροσθεν γέγονε does not deny that such a sign may be vouchsafed to others in the future. Schneider conjectures that Plato added this limitation with a view to himself—an unlikely supposition, although no doubt the present passage is in some measure intended as a defence of Plato's abstention from political life: cf. 496 D note

ἢ γάρ που κτλ. Cobet and Herwerden reject ἄλλῳ, because ἤ τις ἢ οὐδείς is the regular phrase: cf. Ap. 17 B and Hdt. III 140. But the separation of ἤ from τινι makes ἄλλῳ desirable to help out the meaning of τινι, and to ἄλλῳ in itself there cannot possibly be any objection.

τούτων ‐‐ γενόμενοι : ‘those who have become members of this small band.’ J. and C. quote an exact parallel from Thuc. III 56. 6 ὧν ἡμεῖς γενόμενοι: cf. also supra II 360 A, Phaed. 69 D , Parm. 127 D ( τὸν τῶν τριάκοντα γενόμενον) and Laws 754 D. γευόμενοι is found in some inferior MSS, and was accepted till Schneider, who restored the true reading. Liebhold absurdly conjectures ἑλόμενοι .

ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν . See on I 341 B.

τῷ δικαίῳ was restored by Schneider instead of τῶν δικαίων, on the sole authority of Vind. F. It has since been found that τῷ δικαίῳ is actually the reading of A. ἡ τῶν δικαίων βοήθεια would mean something quite different, as Schneider shews; viz. “auxilium vel a iustis vel rebus in iustis, vel contra iustos seu iusta latum vel ferendum.” With the general sentiment cf. Ap. 31 E —32 A, a passage which proves —if proof were needed—that Liebhold's extraordinary proposal to read σπουδάζοι for σῴζοιτο is untenable.

εἰς θηρία ἄνθρωπος κτλ. Herwerden would read ἀνθρώπους ‘among men who are as beasts.’ But the point is that the philosopher in existing commonwealths is like a lonely human being in the midst of wild beasts. Cf. Timon of Athens IV 3 “The commonwealth of Athens is become a forest of beasts.” The comparison may have been suggested to Plato by Pherecrates' Ἄγριοι, to which he alludes in Prot. 327 D . In Pherecrates' play the Ἄγριοι were savages, to whom apparently some Athenians betook themselves, in the hope of finding more happiness than they enjoyed in Athens: see Kock's Com. Graec. Fr. I pp. 146—150. Plato points out that there are savages enough at home. In πᾶσιν ἀγρίοις the emphasis is on πᾶσιν: we should translate ‘to hold out alone where all are savages.’ Cf. ὑπὸ πάντων πολεμίων IX 579 B. Herwerden weakens the effect by adding οὖσιν after ἀγρίοις.

λαβών : singular, in spite of γενόμενοι in 496 C. Cf. I 347 A note

οἷον ἐν χειμῶνι κτλ. Jowett construes χειμῶνι with κονιορτοῦ; but χειμὼν κονιορτοῦ for ‘a storm of dust’ is scarcely a Greek idiom. κονιορτοῦ—φερομένου is of course a descriptive genitive absolute. In this way Schneider also took the passage. ζάλη is ‘tempestuous rain’ μετὰ ὄμβρου πνοή, as Hesychius explains. χαλάζης was once conjectured by Ast, but he afterwards rightly withdrew the suggestion. Herwerden proposes οἷον ἐν ζάλῃ κονιορτοῦ ὑπὸ κτλ., and Richards ἐν χειμῶνι καὶ κονιορτοῦ ζάλῃ (or ζάλῃ κονιορτοῦ). Neither proposal is supported by any of the ancient citations, except that of Themistius ( Or. VIII p. 104 C) whose reproduction of this passage is in other respects, as in this, extremely inaccurate: see Schneider's note. And ζάλη κονιορτοῦ is, to say the least, a questionable phrase. It is not well to mar the wonderful force and beauty of writing such as this by tasteless and inept conjectures. The passage has often been compared with Lucretius' “Suave mari magno,” but the difference is greater than the resemblance. The Platonic philosopher is content ( ἀγαπᾷ), if he can keep his own soul pure, because he cannot, as things now are, save both himself and others. But it is no pleasure for him to see “quibus ipse malis careat,” for he would fain help others if they would but let him. That they will not is a misfortune, not for others only, but for him ( αὐτός τε μᾶλλον αὐξήσεται κτλ.). We seem to catch in Plato's words a certain tone of sorrow, as if he had not himself attained the highest of which he was capable, because he could not find a philosophic city in which to dwell: see Morgenstern De Plat. rep. p. 161, where reference is made to Ap. 31 E and to the Platonic Epistles V 322 A, B, VII 324 B—326 B, 330 C—331 D: cf. also Gorg. 515 A — 522 E, and Susemihl Gen. Entw. II p. 190.

προσηκούσης . The only city suited to the philosophic nature is Plato's: cf. IX 592 A.

κατάστασιν πόλεως is treated as a single noun: cf. πόλεως διοίκησις in Prot. 319 D and Pol. 296 E .

ὥσπερ ‐‐ ἐκπίπτειν explains and amplifies στρέφεσθαί τε καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι. Asyndeton is regular in such cases, and Stephanus ought not to have proposed the insertion of καί before ὥσπερ: cf. IV 432 D, VIII 557 C and Prot. 311 E , where more illustrations are cited in my note. Stallbaum's punctuation is here, I think, preferable to that of Schneider, who prints only a comma before ὥσπερ.

εἰς τὸ ἐπιχώριον : as though ‘a foreign geranium, allowed to run wild in England’ were to ‘degenerate into one of the English wild geraniums.’ The illustration is due to Bosanquet. Plato's botanical error, such as it is, does not affect the argument.

ἦθος is read by Π as well as Α. The majority of MSS read εἶδος, which was accepted till Schneider restored the better and more authoritative reading.

δηλώσει =‘experience will shew’ is idiomatic. See Blaydes on Ar. Frogs 1261 .

ἦν . The past does not exclude the present: cf. IV 436 C note

τίς ‐‐ πολιτεία : i.e. what the best constitution is. Adimantus was about to ask whether the ἀρίστη πολιτεία is not the one which they have described. The reply is yes, provided that the position and status of the Rulers is made clearer. As it stands it is not the best: cf. VIII 543 E καλλίω ἔτι ἔχων (imperfect participle) εἰπεῖν πόλιν τε καὶ ἄνδρα (the Philosopher's City and the Philosopher), where see note.

ὅτι δεήσοι κτλ. : ‘that there would always have to be present in the city a certain factor possessed of a reasoned theory of the constitution, identical with that possessed by you, the legislator, when you made the laws.’ The rulers must understand the constitution and not merely accept it on the legislator's authority, if the spirit of the original legislator is to survive his death. ὀρθὴ δόξα is not enough; in order to fill the place of the founder of the city they require ἐπιστήμη. Plato confesses that he did not make this clear enough before ( οὐχ ἱκανῶς ἐδηλώθη), and his confession is most true. In one passage (IV 429 C note), indeed, he seems expressly to imply that the Rulers do not fill the legislator's shoes. But there are also some hints or traces of the later view: see on III 414 A, IV 423 E (to which, perhaps, ἐρρήθη is intended to refer, although the reference is hardly justified), and 442 C. Cf. 502 D, 503 A, 504 D notes

ὧν κτλ. : i.e. ἐκείνων ὧν κτλ. The literal translation is ‘through dread of the topics to which cleaving you have shewn that the demonstration thereof is long and difficult.’ (So also Schneider.) ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι (the opposite of ἀφιέναι as used in V 449 B and infra 504 E) refers to Adimantus' and the others' resolute determination not to let Socrates slur over the questions relating to women and children (V 449 B ff.) and to the possibility of realising the perfect city (471 C ff.). Cf. infra 505 A. φόβῳ is explained by V 450 C ff., 457 C, 473 E. J. and C. take ὧν as “ ἐκείνων ἅ (cognate accusative),” understanding ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι as ‘objecting to’ or ‘attacking,’ but no objections were made by Glauco and Adimantus. They merely asked for further explanation, and were in fact favourably disposed rather than otherwise (V 450 D, 451 B). Herwerden's conjecture ὡς for ὧν refutes itself.

αὐτοῦ (like the subject of ἐδηλώθη) refers to the position of the Rulers in Plato's city—with everything that it involves, including the Community of wives and children, the Philosopher-king and all the leading topics discussed in V—VII; and τὸ λοιπόν is what remains of this topic —the rest of VI and VII in fact.

πάντως . Bekker's πάντων (cf. Laws 779 E οὐ πάντων εὐκολώτατον) is a neat emendation, which Baiter and others have accepted. But οὐ πάντως ῥᾷστον ‘not in every respect quite easy’ (with the usual Greek litotes), is quite unobjectionable, as Schneider points out, and the confusion of ς and ν is rare.

τὸ λεγόμενον κτλ. D. and V. wrongly make τῷ ὄντι part of the proverb. Translate ‘and it is true, as the proverb says, that beautiful things are hard.’ Cf. IV 435 C and (for τῷ ὄντι) VIII 563 E.

οἱ καὶ ἁπτόμενοι κτλ. καί =‘at all.’ Cf. ἐὰν καὶ—ἐθέλωσιν 498 A.

τὸ μεταξύ means ‘in the interval before entering upon’ (Richards in Cl. Rev. II p. 324). The correlating or contrasting notion is idiomatically omitted: cf. note on περιαγωγῆς in VII 518 E. Plentiful examples of this usage are supplied by Shilleto on Dem. F. L. 181, and Blaydes on Ar. Ach. 434 μεταξὺ τῶν Ἰνοῦς and Birds 187. With the sentiment cf. 487 C note Richards was, I believe, the first to point out the true meaning of this passage: see also Solomon in Cl. Rev. VII p. 11. The traditional view, that μεταξὺ κτλ. means ‘in the spare moments of housekeeping and business,’ though still given as an alternative by J. and C., is untenable.

οἱ ‐‐ ποιούμενοι : ‘and they it is, forsooth, who are regarded as accomplished in philosophy.’ Sarcasm is often expressed by an appositional participial clause at the end of a sentence: cf. e.g. Ap. 34 A , Crito 51 A. ποιεῖσθαι here is the passive of ποιεῖν in the sense of ‘to construct in fancy,’ ‘represent,’ as e.g. in Theaet. 197 D and infra X 609 C. The usage is at first sight strange, but occurs again in VIII 538 C, IX 573 B and 574 D, where no other meaning is suitable. Stallbaum's attempt to explain the passages differently is unsuccessful, and the proposed emendations (such as Ast's δοκούμενοι for ποιούμενοι) are unsatisfactory in each of the four cases. See notes ad ll.

ἐὰν καί goes with ἐθέλωσιν (Schneider): ‘if they do consent’ (cf. καὶ ἁπτόμενοι above). It is implied that many, or most of them, do not.

μεγάλα κτλ. Plato distinguishes three stages. In the first, τὸ περὶ λόγους is a man's ἔργον after boyhood until he begins practical life; it then becomes his πάρεργον, and he ‘thinks it great things’ to go to an occasional lecture: towards old age all but very few neglect philosophy entirely. The proper study of philosophy reverses all this ( πᾶν τοὐναντίον) as is shewn in B and C.

τοῦ Ἡρακλειτείου ἡλίου . Heraclitus Fr. 32 B ywater νέος ἐφ’ ἡμέρῃ ἥλιος. Heraclitus meant the saying to be taken literally, and not merely as an expression of the universal law of change: see the authorities cited by Bywater ad loc. and Zeller^{5} I p. 684 note 2.

φιλοσοφίαν κτλ. φιλοσοφίαν in its wider sense denotes any ‘liberal’ training or study: cf. Theaet. 143 D , 172 C, and Prot. 335 D with my note ad loc. D. and V. are in error (as Bosanquet remarks) when they translate παιδείαν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν by ‘a course of training in philosophy.’ Nor is Susemihl ( Gen. Entw. II p. 187) right in supposing that the reference is to the musical education of the earlier books. Plato explains what he means in VII 536 D, E.

ἀνδροῦται . The early editors read ἁδροῦται (with Ξ). ἁδροῦμαι is a rare and somewhat obscure word, nowhere found in Plato; and it is better to retain ἀνδροῦται, although the subject is not μειράκια, but σώματα.

ὑπηρεσίαν φιλοσοφίᾳ κτωμένους sums up in a single phrase the Platonic theory of athletics: see on III 410 A ff. and cf. IX 591 C, D.

ἐν ᾗ . Richards would write ἐν ᾧ as in ἐν ᾧ βλαστάνει above, asserting that “ ἡ ἡλικία is their years, not any particular time of life”; but ἡ ἡλικία is often so used, e.g. Symp. 209 B and Men. 89 B . Nor is ἐν ᾧ, ‘while,’ appropriate here. Translate ‘when the years advance, in which the soul begins to reach its maturity.’

γίγνηται κτλ. The subject is still ἡ ῥώμη, ‘their physical strength,’ not τις (as J. and C. assert). In ἀφέτους νέμεσθαι the metaphor (as observed by Heindorf on Prot. 320 A ) is taken de grege numini alicui consecrato: cf. Critias 119 D ἀφέτων ὄντων ταύρων ἐν τῷ τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος ἱερῷ. νέμεσθαι is properly ‘to graze.’ The effect of the Greek may be conveyed by rendering ‘they roam the sacred fields at will,’ although ἀφέτους of course agrees with the subject of νέμεσθαι .

ἀντιτείνειν κτλ. I formerly read ἀντιτενεῖν with Stephanus and others; but the present, which is in all the MSS, gives a good sense and makes a better balance with λέγειν προθύμως. Translate ‘offer a still more enthusiastic opposition, being not in the least likely to agree.’ The majority of editors retain the present.

ἀπὸ Θρασυμάχου κτλ. Thrasymachus was not likely to agree with so fierce an onslaught on his profession: see 493 A ff., 495 C ff.

οὐδὲ ‐‐ ὄντας . Cf. 1 354 A note

αὖθις γενόμενοι ‘born again’ implies the re-incarnation of the Soul, as described in the end of Book X: see on 608 D ff. It is from casual allusions like the present, made in all seriousness, that we can best understand how profound and practical was Plato's belief in immortality. The seed sown here may bear its fruit in another life, so that the educator need not despair.

εἰς μικρὸν κτλ. is not merely ironical but incredulous. We need not therefore (with J. and C.) be surprised at Glauco's incredulity and wonder in X 608 D. For οὐδέν ‘a mere nothing’ ‘nought,’ the much less expressive οὐδένα was conjectured by Hirschig and others. An exact parallel may be found in X 608 C. The grandeur and elevation of this passage recall VI 486 A.

τοιαῦτ’ ἄττα κτλ. Plato is here alluding to epideictic harangues by sophistical rhetoricians of the school of Gorgias. τοιαῦτ’ ἄττα ῥήματα=‘expressions of this sort’ refers to the jingle in γενόμενον—λεγόμενον, which is an example of the rhetorical device called παρομοίωσις: see Arist. Rhet. III 9. 1410^{a} 24 ff. παρομοίωσις δ’ ἐὰν ὅμοια τὰ ἔσχατα ἔχῃ ἑκάτερον τὸ κῶλον, e.g. ἐν πλείσταις δὲ φροντίσι καὶ ἐν ἐλαχίσταις ἐλπίσι, and many other examples: see Cope ad loc. In ἐξεπίτηδες—ὡμοιωμένα, ‘assimilated to one another of set purpose,’ the same device is meant. Isocrates and his literary brethren employed it constantly: see the references on 495 E.

ἀλλ) οὐκ ‐‐ συμπεσόντα κτλ. : ‘instead of spontaneously chiming together, as in the present case’ etc., where the παρομοίωσις of γενόμενον and λεγόμενον is ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου (‘natural,’ ‘spontaneous,’ ‘accidental’ as opposed to ἐξεπίτηδες). παρισωμένον and ὡμοιωμένον are said with a reference to παρίσωσις (the equality of clauses, as for example in Isocr. Paneg. 76: see Cope l.c. p. 106) and παρομοίωσις. The Many have had quite enough of παρίσωσις etc. in words; but they have never seen a Man παρισώμενον τῇ ἀρετῇ. Plato means that the time for mincing Rhetoric is past; we want a Man ( ἄνδρα is emphatic), “with heart head hand, One still strong man in a blatant land, Who can rule, and dare not lie” (Tennyson). It is highly probable, as Dümmler holds ( Chron. Beitr. p. 14), that Plato has specially in view Isocrates' Panegyricus throughout this passage. The contemptible devices which Plato here ridicules are extraordinarily common in that harangue. For other views of this passage see App. III.

δόξαν is ‘seeming,’ ‘appearance’)( τὸ ἀληθές above (Schneider): cf. 505 D. The rendering ‘applause’ (D. and V.) or ‘fame,’ is, I think, less likely to be right. For ἔριν cf. V 454 A note

τότε . V 473 D.

οὔτε ‐‐ οὔτε ‐‐ οὐδέ γε is a common sequence where stress is laid on the last alternative: cf. 492 E and X 608 B. οὐδέ γ’ ἀνήρ=‘no, nor yet an individual man’ is said because even the philosopher is not τέλεος except in the philosopher's city: cf. 497 A. ὁμοίως means simply ‘in like manner,’ ‘likewise,’ and should not be construed with τέλεος in the sense of ‘equally perfect,’ as J. and C. translate.

ἀνάγκη ‐‐ παραβάλῃ . See cr. n. παραβάλλειν means accedere (not, as has been asserted, accidere): cf. VIII 556 C and Lys. 203 B . The word is not however quite appropriate here: and I should much prefer a convincing emendation of the text of Α, Π and other MSS ( ἀνάγκη—περιβάλῃ). As it stands, περιβάλῃ must either be intransitive, or else the infinitive ἐπιμεληθῆναι serves as its object in place of an accusative. Neither view is supported by any evidence. I formerly conjectured ἀνάγκην τις ἐκ τύχης περιβάλῃ ‘until some one happens to compel these philosophers’ etc., but τις ἀνάγκη—γέγονεν in C does not favour this remedy. It is perhaps safest to read παραβάλῃ provisionally and pro tempore. With ἐκ τύχης cf. IX 592 A ἐὰν μὴ θεία τις ξυμβῇ τύχη and Ep. VII 327 E.

κατηκόῳ . Schleiermacher's conjecture is accepted by Madvig, Baiter, and J. and C. Stallbaum was inclined to read κατηκόοις. If κατήκοοι is right, it must stand for κατηκόοις, the nominative being due to the interposition of εἴτε βούλονται κτλ. But the construction is difficult, and the sense unsatisfactory. We require some guarantee that the city will obey (cf. 502 B), and κατηκόῳ is the only reading which provides it.

τῶν νῦν ‐‐ ὑέσιν . “I do not doubt but that this was meant as a compliment and incitement to the younger Dionysius (see Plato Epist. 7, p. 327). And I understand what follows p. 502 in the same manner. Hence it seems that this part of the dialogue was written after his first voyage to Sicily, and probably not long before his second, about Ol. 101, 3, when the elder Dionysius was just dead” (Thomas Gray Works ed. Gosse IV p. 251). In the parallel passage V 473 D Plato speaks of kings and δυνάσται, but not yet of kings' sons. The substance of Gray's conjecture is confirmed by recent criticism (see e.g. Hirmer Entst. u. Kompos. etc. p. 668): but Dionysius I died in Ol. 103, 2 (367 B.C.) and not in Ol. 101, 3 (374 B.C.), and Plato's second visit to Sicily seems to have taken place just after the old tyrant's death (Grote X pp. 346—356). See also on V 473 D, VI 496 B and Introd. § 4.

τούτων δὲ πότερα κτλ. Grote pronounces the Platonic commonwealth impossible because “we cannot understand from whence the force is to come, tending and competent to generate” it at the first. Once begun, he holds, “there is no reason why it might not have continued.” That the real difficulty is in starting it, Plato himself clearly understands (cf. 501 A note). He would not however allow that the difficulty is insurmountable; since a θεία τις τύχη (IX 592 A) may well occur. But the true fulfilment of Plato's Ideal, as he himself foretells in IX 592 B, is to be sought, not in any single earthly commonwealth, but in its influence, direct and indirect, upon the moral, political, religious, and intellectual progress of mankind: see V 470 E note and Zeller's dissertation on Der platonische Staat in seiner Bedeutung für die Folgezeit in his Vorträgen und Abhandlungen^{2} pp. 68 ff.

ἄλλως κτλ. For ἄλλως ‘merely’ cf. Theaet. 176 D γῆς ἄλλως ἄχθη. On εὐχαῖς see V 450 D note

βαρβαρικῷ ‐‐ ἐπόψεως . Cf. Phaed. 78 A . Touches of this kind are rare in Plato and generally full of pathos, as if the hope of mankind no longer lay in Hellas. The present sentence is a confession of the fact that the foundations of Plato's city are not laid in Hellenism, but in Humanity, understood as Plato himself understands the word in 501 B. See on V 470 E.

ἕτοιμοι . The ellipse of the first person of the copula is rare, except when ἐγώ or ἡμεῖς is expressed, but ἕτοιμος is a privileged word: cf. Parm. 137 B and other examples in Schanz Nov. Comm. Pl. p. 35.

αὕτη ἡ Μοῦσα . Philosophy.

μὴ πάνυ κτλ. Plato's attitude to οἱ πολλοί (as Krohn remarks Pl. St. p. 118) has somewhat altered since 492 B ff., partly, perhaps, because his wrath has been diverted against the false philosophers. But this attempt to soothe the many-headed Beast should not be taken too seriously: see 501 E— 502 A note

ἀλλοίαν τοι κτλ. See App. IV.

ἢ καὶ κτλ. ‘Or even if they view them in this light, will you deny that they will change their opinion?’ Baiter's correction—see cr. n.—is, as I now think, the simplest, and best explains the corruption. I can see no ground for writing ἐὰν οὕτω αἴσθωνται or ἐὰν τοῦτ’ αἴσθωνται with Richards. With οὐ φήσεις cf. VII 534 B. For other views on this passage see App. IV.

πρᾶον is an allusion to the universally admitted πραότης of the Athenian δῆμος; see Arist. Ath. Pol. 22. 4 τῇ εἰωθυίᾳ τοῦ δήμου πραότητι (where Sandys quotes Dem. Timocr. 51) with Isocr. Antid. 20, 300. Hence (as Schneider points out) δημοτικόν τι καὶ πρᾶον in Euthyd. 303 D . Cf. also Soph. O. C. 1126 f.

ἐν ὀλίγοις τισίν . Dümmler ( Chr. Beit. p. 45) thinks of Isocrates, but there is nothing to suggest a specific reference here.

τοὺς ἔξωθεν κτλ. Isocrates seems to have taken this as a personal attack, as perhaps it was intended to be. His reply may be found in Antid. 260 ff. περὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς λόγους ἡμεῖς ὄντες, οὓς ἐκεῖνοί φασιν εἶναι φιλαπεχθήμονας (cf. φιλαπεχθημόνως ἔχοντας here), πολὺ πραότεροι τυγχάνομεν αὐτῶν ὄντες· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀεί τι περὶ ἡμῶν φλαῦρον λέγουσιν, ἐγὼ δ’ οὐδὲν ἂν εἴποιμι τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ ταῖς ἀληθείαις χρήσομαι περὶ αὐτῶν κτλ. See the interesting discussion in Dümmler l.c. pp. 8 ff.

αὑτοῖς and not αὐτοῖς is certainly what Plato wrote. False philosophers, like bad scholars, are always abusing one another. The middle, which is reciprocal, is also decisive in favour of αὑτοῖς: cf. Charm. 154 A λοιδορουμένους ἀλλήλοις. J. and C. (with Stallbaum and the editors generally, except Schneider) read αὐτοῖς, remarking that “it was by no means an uncommon practice of the old philosophers to abuse the people.” Plato is not speaking of the old philosophers at all, but only of sophists and pretenders, who do not abuse, but flatter and cajole the people (493 A ff.).

ἀεὶ περὶ ἀνθρώπων κτλ. The seeker after Truth does not indulge in personalities (cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. IV 9. 1125^{a} 5 ff. and Rhet. II 4. 1381^{b} 7), or scandal ( Theaet. 173 D : cf. 174 E ff.). His singleminded pursuit of Truth leaves him neither time nor inclination to talk about people.

πολύ γε : sc. ἥκιστα. Adimantus accommodates his answer to the last clause of Socrates' question. See on V 465 E.

σχολή . Cf. Theaet. 172 D ff.

εἰς τεταγμένα ἄττα κτλ. With the general sense cf. Theaet. 174 D ff., Phaed. 79 C , D, Tim. 47 B , C and Euripides Fr. 902 ὄλβιος <*>στις τῆς ἱστορίας | ἔσχε μάθησιν | μήτε πολιτῶν ἐπὶ πημοσύνην | μήτ’ εἰς ἀδίκους πράξεις ὁρμῶν | ἀλλ’ ἀθανάτου καθορῶν φύσεως | κόσμον ἀγήρων, πῇ τε συνέστη | καὶ ὅπῃ καὶ ὅπως. | τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις οὐδέποτ’ αἰσχρῶν | ἔργων μελέτημα προσίζει. Euripides' lines are conceived in the spirit of Plato and exactly illustrate his meaning, especially if, as is usually supposed, they refer to the philosopher Anaxagoras. An eloquent modern parallel may be found in Stevenson's ‘ Virginibus puerisque’ p. 260.

ὁρῶντας . For the change from singular to plural cf. I 347 A note

κοσμίῳ . It has been thought that there is a play on κόσμος in the sense of the Universe or Heavens. But the philosopher's gaze outsoars the Heavens, and is fixed on the ὑπερουράνιος τόπος, where the Ideas dwell ( Phaedr. 247 C ).

διαβολὴ κτλ. ἐν πᾶσι is neuter, ‘albeit misrepresentation is rife everywhere,’ “there is always detraction going on” (J. and C.).

ἂν οὖν τις κτλ. Cf. 484 C.

δημοτικῆς ἀρετῆς . Not scientific virtue, because its intellectual basis in the minds of the people is ὀρθὴ δόξα, and not ἐπιστήμη. See IV 430 C note, and on δημοτικὴ ἀρετή generally Zeller^{4} II 1, pp. 593—601, and Archer-Hind's edition of the Phaedo App. I. The ‘demotic virtue’ which the philosopher constructs is of course the best of its kind.

ὃ οὐ πάνυ ῥᾴδιον . Cf. 499 C note Plato's κάθαρσις is sufficiently drastic. He would rusticate the entire population above ten years of age, and bring up the remainder in the principles of his καλλίπολις (VII 540 E ff. note).

διενέγκοιεν . See cr. n. Schneider retains διενεγκεῖν, comparing other passages in which ὅτι is followed by an infinitive. Instances of this irregularity occasionally occur (Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 877), but it is unusually awkward here, and the majority of editors are probably right in following q. With the sentiment cf. Laws 735 B—736 C, where the necessity of an initial κάθαρσις is equally insisted on, and various forms of legislative purgation are described.

μήτε ἰδιώτου κτλ. The individual is cleansed by the Socratic elenchus, which purges him of his false persuasion of knowledge: cf. Soph. 230 B —E, where this kind of κάθαρσις is expounded in detail. Gildersleeve ( A. J. Ph. III p. 201) points out that the ‘articular infinitive’ with ἄν is rare in Plato.

γράφειν νόμους : ‘to paint or draft laws.’ Richards is inclined to cancel μηδὲ—νόμους as involving “a most awkward and inartistic confusion of the figure (painting) with the thing figured (legislation).” Nothing is more usual in Plato than such a ‘confusion,’ if the phrase employed bears, like γράφειν νόμους, or is capable of bearing, like ἀνδρείκελον below, a meaning of its own as well as an application in the simile, and it is a narrow conception of art which pronounces the idiom inartistic. Cf. 507 A note and Euthyph. 3 A with my note ad loc., and see also on V 451 B. Cobet's ἐγγράφειν νόμους, which Baiter adopts, is another unsuccessful attempt to obliterate this characteristic feature of Plato's stvle.

παραλαβεῖν καθαράν . Plato would cite as examples a tutor who is entrusted with the sole authority over a child, and legislators who (as in the Laws 702 B ff.) receive autocratic power in order to found a colony. Cf. 499 B note

τὸ φύσει δίκαιον is assuredly the Idea of Justice, as opposed to τὸ νόμῳ δίκαιον ‘conventional justice’: cf. 500 C and (for φύσει) V 476 B. See also on X 598 A. Bosanquet ignores the most essential and characteristic feature of Plato's teaching when he remarks that “the ‘natural’ principles of justice and other moral qualities are no doubt those which Plato believes himself to have found present, in various degrees, throughout inorganic and organic nature and the animal world, and culminating in the life of man.” It is better to let Plato soar where we cannot follow him than thus to clip his wings. See the Appendix to Book VII On Plato's Dialectic.

καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο κτλ. The legislative painter looks now at his model (the φύσει δίκαιον etc.), now at his picture (the δίκαιον etc. which he is implanting among men), rubbing out one part and painting another in again ( τὸ μὲν—ἐγγράφοιεν), till he is satisfied with the result. He combines and mixes various ἐπιτηδεύματα or institutions, till he produces the true ἀνδρείκελον or ‘colour and likeness of true Manhood’; just as the painter mixes various colours to produce his ἀνδρείκελον or flesh-tint. ἀνδρείκελον in painting was a sort of flesh-colour, made by mixing various colours together: see Crat. 424 E , Xen. Oec. 10. 5, Arist. de gen. an. I 18. 725^{a} 26 and Ruhnken on Timaeus Lex. s.v. To this Plato of course alludes, but he intends us also to take the word in its etymological signification, as is clear from θεοείκελον below. The stress in ἀνδρείκελον, as in θεοειδές and θεοείκελον, is on the first part of the compound: it is not the mere ἀνθρωποειδές, but the Man-like, at which the legislator aims: cf. the force of ἄνδρα in 498 E. ἀνδρείκελον might be translated by ‘the human form divine,’ except that ‘form’ suggests a wrong notion. For other views on this passage see App. V.

θεοείκελον . Il. I 131 et al. It is pleasing to meet with so cordial and spontaneous an acknowledgment of Homer as a kindred spirit in a passage so full of Plato's characteristic idealism. There is more than a grain of truth in Longinus' observation: μόνος Ἡρόδοτος Ὁμηρικώτατος ἐγένετο; Στησίχορος ἔτι πρότερον ὅ τε Ἀρχίλοχος, πάντων δὲ τούτων μάλιστα ὁ Πλάτων ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὁμηρικοῦ κείνου νάματος εἰς αὑτὸν μυρίας ὅσας παρατροπὰς ἀποχετευσάμενος ( περὶ ὕψους 13. 3). By the words τὸ ἀνδρείκελον—θεοείκελον Plato means to suggest that Man is then most manlike when he most resembles God: and (as Tennyson says) “then most godlike being most a man.” Cf. IX 589 D note This sure and abiding conviction of the presence of a divine element within us, rendering our nature essentially and truly human, makes itself felt in nearly all the dialogues of Plato. It is the ultimate source of all his idealism, religious and metaphysical, no less than moral and political, and may well be considered the most precious and enduring inheritance which he has bequeathed to posterity.

ὅ τι μάλιστα should be taken with ποιήσειαν, and εἰς ὅσον ἐνδέχεται with θεοφιλῆ: ‘until, as far as possible, they have made mere human characters as dear to God as human characters can be.’ For the σχῆμα ἐκ παραλλήλου see Schanz, Nov. Comm. Pl. pp. 12—15. Schneider can hardly be right in connecting ὅ τι μάλιστα with ἀνθρώπεια. For θεοφιλῆ Badham conjectured θεοειδῆ—a most arbitrary change, though approved by Cobet and Baiter. How could θεοειδῆ have degenerated into θεοφιλῆ, which is in all the MSS? The opposite corruption was far more likely. Plato means us to understand that God loves those most who most resemble Him: cf. X 612 E and Laws 716 C.

ἔφησθα . V 474 A.

αὐτό : viz. the statement ὡς τοιοῦτος —αὐτούς with its interpretation in the preceding exposition.

φήσει . We should expect φήσουσι, but the transition from plural to singular is common (see on 1 347 A), and Plato is probably thinking of the objector in 487 C ( φαίη ἄν τις κτλ.): cf. 489 D and 490 D. οὐκ ἀγαθήν just above (instead of μὴ ἀγαθήν as in μὴ τὴν φύσιν) prepares the way for φήσει, by shewing that the infinitives are beginning to escape from the sway of ἀμφισβητῆσαι. φήσει in φήσει λογιζόμενος II 366 A furnishes an exact parallel to φήσει here. The best MSS—see cr. n.—read φήσειν, which is retained by Schneider and others. If φήσειν is right, we must either (1) refer it to ἕξουσι, and suppose that the future is “ob ἔσεσθαι pro φάναι receptum” (Schneider, Stallbaum), or (2) supply an οἴει (J. and C.). Neither explanation is in my judgment possible. φήσεις, the reading of q and editors before Bekker, may be defended from 489 B and 489 D, where Adimantus is identified with the antagonist of 487 C, but the corruption is not a very likely one. Madvig, more suo, expels the word. Cf. Introd. § 5.

μὴ ἧττον . Herwerden would insert χαλεπούς or πικρούς, Richards ἀγρίους or ἀγριαίνειν. If ἧττον is pronounced with emphasis, its meaning is easily caught, after ἧττον in Adimantus' reply. It is virtually a quotation: “wollen wir nicht statt dieses weniger” etc. (Schneider).

πεπεισμένοι ἔστων . See on 499 E. Plato's attempt to conciliate the Many is obviously half-hearted. The Multitude can never be philosophers (494 A), and are not likely to believe in the Philosopher-king. But it was necessary to prove or postulate some degree of assent or at least quiescence on their part in order to demonstrate the possibility of the perfect city. Cf. 502 C note

τις . τίς is read by A, but Adimantus's reply makes it probable that the indefinite pronoun is correct.

βασιλέων ἔκγονοι . See on 499 B.

εἷς ἱκανὸς κτλ. Krohn ( Pl. St. p. 125) justly sees in this sentence “an expression of the convictions which led Plato to Sicily” in 367 B.C. Cf. Grote Plato I p. 126 and supra 499 B note Richards would read “ <σῶς> γενόμενος or γενόμενός <τε καὶ σῶς γενόμενος> or something similar.” <περι> γενόμενος would give the same sense, and be better Greek. But γενόμενος= εἰ γένοιτο, ‘should he arise,’ is sufficient. He could not be said to be ἱκανός if he were corrupted.

ἅπερ ἡμῖν δοκεῖ : i.e. the arrangements of Plato's καλλίπολις, as J. and C. point out. A ruler may arise who will approve of these, and frame laws accordingly. Plato is trying to prove that his ideal city is not impossible.

οὐ μέντοι ἀδύνατά γε . ‘Not impossible’ is the final verdict which Plato's readers, like Plato himself, will pass upon his city. His tone is far less hopeful than in Books II—IV, and even in V 473 B ff. he is, I think, more optimistic. It is impossible not to feel that 501 C—502 C is written, in some measure, invita Minerva. Plato is glad to escape from so difficult and uncongenial a topic into his native element again. He is beginning to see that the Perfect City is in truth a παράδειγμα ἐν οὐρανῷ (IX 592 B). See on V 470 E, VI 499 C, 499 E, 502 A and VII 540 D— 541 B, and cf. Hirmer Entst. u. Komp. etc. p. 638.

ἐνέσονται . ἐγγενήσονται is conjectured by Richards, who compares 521 C and VIII 552 E, 557 C. The proposal is attractive, but involves too great a departure from the MSS. ἐνέσονται moreover is better suited to καὶ κατὰ ποίας—ἁπτόμενοι than ἐγγενήσονται would be. τίνα τρόπον ἐνέσονται means, I think, not how they will be produced (that is expressed in ἐκ τίνων—ἐπιτηδευμάτων), but how they will be in the city, i.e. the whole subject of their position and standing in the State. It is this, as well as their education, which is described in the sequel. The present sentence is intended as a full and accurate forecast of the rest of VI and VII. Ξ has ἔσονται, which was read till Bekker restored ἐνέσονται.

οὐδὲν κτλ. Cf. 497 C, D notes There, as here, the κατάστασις τῶν ἀρχόντων and the position of women and children etc. are treated as parts of one and the same question. The first obscure hint of this connexion is in IV 423 E, but it is not till V 471 C ff. that we begin to see the intimate relation between the two subjects. In V 450 C Socrates for the first time touches on the question ‘Are our proposals about women’ etc. ‘possible?’ The same question reappears in 471 C, but with a larger scope ‘Is the perfect city possible as a whole?’ The reply is ‘Yes, if Philosophers are Kings’; and thus is re-opened the whole subject of the κατάστασις τῶν ἀρχόντων. Plato is therefore justified in connecting, as he does, the two topics here mentioned. But he overstates the case when he asserts that the κατάστασις τῶν ἀρχόντων has been omitted in Books III and IV (see III 412 B ff.), or slurred over in the same way as the Community of Wives and Children, in spite of various hints of a fuller treatment still to come (III 414 A: cf. IV 442 C note). See also on 503 A and Krohn Pl. St. p. 127, Pfleiderer Zur Lösung etc. p. 28, with the replies of Grimmelt de reip. Pl. comp. et unit. p. 49 and Westerwick de rep. Pl. comm. pp. 54 ff.

τὴν ‐‐ κατάστασιν =‘the appointment of the Rulers’ is equivalent, as in the title or heading of a chapter, to τὸ περὶ τῆς—καταστάσεως. Of this subject the Rulers' education naturally forms the most important part; but we ought not to explain τῶν ἀρχόντων as brachylogical for τῆς τῶν ἀρχόντων παιδείας (with Krohn Pl. St. p. 126).

παντελῶς ἀληθής . The adjective should be translated literally, so as to suggest that the best κατάστασις is also the truest. The ideal is the true in Plato: cf. V 473 A note

τὸ δὲ ‐‐ δεῖ . Plato admits that the subject of the Rulers requires to be reinvestigated practically from the beginning. Their strictly intellectual needs have hitherto been almost ignored: see 497 C note But Plato does not propose to supersede the earlier education in Music and Gymnastic, nor are the two schemes theoretically incompatible, as Krohn appears to hold ( Pl. St. p. 127). We are clearly intended to suppose that the Rulers receive the moral as well as the intellectual training, although in practice, no doubt, some modifications might be necessary, so long as the two proceeded simultaneously. See VII 536 D and II 376 E notes

ἐλέγομεν . III 412 C—414 B.

τὸ δόγμα τοῦτο . The patriot's creed: see III 412 E, 413 C.

ἤ =‘alioquin.’ Cf. V 463 D note

καὶ ἆθλα is ejected by Cobet. The precise words do not occur in III 414 A, but they are unobjectionable, and end the sentence well. Cf. V 460 B καὶ γέρα δοτέον καὶ ἆθλα, and see also on V 465 D.

παρακαλυπτομένου : ‘putting on her veil.’ The λόγος is personified, as often.

κινεῖν τὸ νῦν παρόν . There is perhaps a hint of the proverb εὖ κείμενον κακὸν μὴ κίνει. No one who reads III 412 B —414 B without reference to the present passage would detect that the λόγος ‘leaves the high road’ in 414 B because she is afraid to raise the question of the Philosopher-king. The words ὡς ἐν τύπῳ, μὴ δἰ ἀκριβείας, εἰρῆσθαι would not suggest to him anything of the kind; and the impression which the earlier account of the Rulers leaves on us is that it was intended by Plato himself to be complete in outline, though not in detail. From the standpoint of Book VI it is certainly even in outline incomplete. Cf. Krohn Pl. St. p. 126, where the case is somewhat overstated; and see on 497 C, 502 D. But there is nothing in all this to justify any chorizontic inference, if only we have regard to the laws of the Dialogue as a form of literary art. See Introd. § 4.

ὄκνος κτλ. Examples of the omission of ἦν will be found in Schanz Nov. Comm. Pl. p. 33. q^{2} has ὤκνουν: but cf. V 450 D.

ὅτι ‐‐ καθιστάναι : lit. ‘that we must appoint philosophers in the persons of our most perfect guardians,’ i.e. that the rulers we appoint must be philosophers. The ἀκριβέστατοι φύλακες are the same as the τέλεοι φύλακες of IV 428 D: and the whole expression is equivalent to ὅτι φιλοσόφους δεῖ εἶναι τοὺς ἀκριβεστάτους φύλακας οὓς καθίσταμεν. To read καθεστάναι for καθιστάναι (with v) is much less elegant; still less should we follow D. and V. in transposing φύλακας and φιλοσόφους. For the sense of ἀκριβεστάτους cf. (with Jackson) I 341 B, 342 D.

διεσπασμένη . Cobet proposes διεσπασμένα, which he wrongly asserts to be the reading of A. But the parts of the philosophic φύσις are not torn asunder; it is the φύσις itself which is in partes disiuncta. Bywater's διεσπαρμένα avoids this difficulty; but διεσπασμένη is much better, because it suggests that the disjunction is ‘unnatural’ (in the Platonic sense of παρὰ φύσιν): see on IV 443 B. The philosophic nature ought to be born whole.

εὐμαθεῖς κτλ. ‘The faculty of learning easily, memory, sagacity, quickness, and so on, together with spirit and high-mindedness, are, as you know, not often naturally combined with the disposition to live soberly in quiet and stedfast ways’ etc. Plato means that natural intelligence and vivacity, with their accompaniments of spirit and highmindedness, rarely go with moral stedfastness. A good illustration is afforded by the contrast between “the Athenian and the Spartan, the former ‘neither resting themselves nor letting anyone else rest, the latter so slow that aggression can hardly rouse them to repel it’” (Bosanquet). Cf. Thucyd. I 70. For other views on the text and interpretation of this difficult passage see App. VI.

ὑπὸ ὀξύτητος κτλ. Theaet. 144 A οἵ τε ὀξεῖς—καὶ ἀγχίνοι καὶ μνήμονες—ᾄττοντες φέρονται ὥσπερ τὰ ἀνερμάτιστα πλοῖα.

τὰ βέβαια κτλ. Theaet. 144 B οἵ τε αὖ ἐμβριθέστεροι νωθροί πως ἀπαντῶσι πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις καὶ λήθης γέμοντες.

ἔφαμεν . 484 D—487 A.

ἀμφοτέρων is explained in 503 C note

αὐτῷ is probably masculine (Schneider), in spite of αὐτό (the philosophic ἦθος) immediately following. We can hardly speak of assigning concrete τιμή or ἀρχή to an ἦθος. The pronoun refers to the philosophic guardian that is to be. See on δυνατὴ ἔσται 503 E.

ἐλέγομεν . III 413 A ff.

δυνατὴ ἔσται : sc. ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν. φύσις was last employed in 503 B, since when it has been represented both by the individual and by the ἦθος ( αὐτῷ and αὐτό in 503 D). We must bear in mind that the Greek inflexions of gender made it easier for them than it is for us to tolerate such irregularities. No Greek could possibly misunderstand the reference, as soon as he heard the ‐η of δυνατή. A tolerably close parallel will be found in Phaedr. 254 B (not D, as Stallbaum prints). See also 508 D and X 605 C notes Bywater conjectures δυνήσεται, but δυνήσεται is unlikely to have been corrupted into δυνατὴ ἔσται.

ἄθλοις . See cr. n. Orelli's emendation has met with considerable favour; but Schneider, Stallbaum, and J. and C. still retain ἄλλοις. With the MS reading we must, I think, translate ‘in the other cases’ i.e. in the πόνοι etc. spoken of just before. (If Plato merely meant ‘in other kinds of effort’ it was not worth his while to insert the clause at all.) But ὥσπερ certainly suggests something more than a mere comparison between flinching at moral, and flinching at intellectual tests; and nothing could be more appropriate, or more in Plato's way, than an allusion to the games: see on V 465 D. That <*>θλοι in this sense is half-poetic, “occurring only in the Timaeus and the Laws” (J. and C.), is scarcely an objection in Plato. ἄθλοις also suits well with γυμνάζειν. In [ Axioch.] 365 A occur the words ὡς γὰρ ἀγωνιστὴς δειλός, ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις γενναῖος φαινόμενος, ἀπολέλοιπας ἐν τοῖς ἄθλοις. The author of the Axiochus may have been thinking of the present passage, and if so, he certainly read ἄθλοις. See also the fine anecdote in Plut. Them. 11. 3.

διαστησάμενοι . IV 436 A ff.

ξυνεβιβάζομεν : ‘we drew conclusions,’ viz. in IV 441 C ff. The use of συμβιβάζειν as a synonym for συμπεραίνεσθαι, συλλογίζεσθαι, is common in Aristotle: for examples see Bonitz Ind. Ar. s. v.

ἐλέγομεν . See IV 435 D note

ἦν : “ut ἐχρῆν et similia dictum” (Schneider). There is no reason to eject the word (with Madvig) or to write εἴη: why should not the mood of the oratio recta be retained? εἴη would be unpleasing with εἴη following so soon. Liebhold's ὡς μὲν δυνατὰ ᾖ is unclassical: see on I 349 C. Richards conjectures ὡς μὲν <ὡς or ὅσον or εἰς τὸ> δυνατὸν κάλλιστα κτλ., taking ὡς with κατιδεῖν. But we ought not to multiply instances of ὡς for ὥστε in Plato (II 365 D note). The infinitive means simply ‘for descrying,’ ‘in order to descry them in the best possible way’: see Goodwin MT. p. 308 and Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 586.

αὐτά is of course the four cardinal virtues, like ταῦτα in 504 D. The ‘longer circuit’ is the educational training necessary in order to enable the guardians to obtain scientific knowledge of the virtues by discerning their relation with the Idea of Good: cf. 506 A. In Book IV Justice, Temperance etc. were regarded as psychological qualities or relations; but the philosophic Guardians must learn their metaphysical import. Throughout the rest of VI and VII Plato, in short, discards Psychology for Metaphysics. Thus much is clear; but many difficult and interesting questions arise in connexion with this passage, as Krohn and others have pointed out. The μακροτέρα περίοδος mentioned in IV 435 D appears to be a longer way of determining, not the essential nature of the virtues, but whether Soul has ‘parts’ or not. (A solution of this difficulty is suggested on 435 D). Socrates' shorter road, again, is not a way by which the Guardians are to go, but a method employed by himself in studying primarily the Soul, and secondarily the virtues. Finally, what is the relation between the psychological conception of Virtue and the metaphysical? And does the metaphysical conception involve a revised psychology or not? The last question is touched on in the notes to X 611 B, where Plato himself appears to raise it. For the last but one see on 504 D.

ἑπομένας : ‘corresponding with’ ‘on a level with’ (Jowett) viz. in point of ἀκριβεία: cf. IV 435 D τῶν γε προειρημένων τε καὶ προεσκεμμένων ἀξίως, where see note. For the genitive with ἑπόμενος cf. (with Stallbaum) Pol. 271 E and Laws 899 C ( ὁπόσα τούτων ξυνεπόμενα, according to the best MS). Bywater would read ἐχομένας here and ἐχόμενα in the Politicus, but it is safer to make no change, although the reverse corruption of ἐχόμενα for ἑπόμενα apparently occurs in Gorg. 494 E , if Bekker's restoration is correct.

ἀλλ’ ὦ φίλε κτλ. Socrates σοφίζεται περὶ τὸ ὄνομα (509 D)—plays on the etymological sense of μετρίως. In effect he says “Don't say ‘ μετρίως’: short measure in such cases is no measure at all: for—if ‘Measure’ be rightly understood—there can be no imperfect measure of anything.” Etymologically, for example, ἀτελὲς μέτρον ὕδατος is a misnomer, for the measure must be exactly commensurate with the water. Hence the μέτρον τῶν ἀκριβεστάτων must itself be ἀκριβέστατον (cf. 504 E). The essential perfection of μέτρον, τὸ μέτριον and the like is expounded in Pol. 284 A ff., Phil. 64 D ff. and 66 A: cf. also Laws 716 C ff., where we read that God, not Man, is the Measure of all things. The translation ‘Nothing imperfect is the measure of anything’ (Jowett and others) suggests, I think, a wrong idea, and is not so well adapted to μέτρον—γίγνεται.

τισιν : with reference, perhaps, to Adimantus and the others (J. and C., comparing II 372 E. Cf. also V 465 E). Adimantus betrays no consciousness of the allusion in his reply.

ἤ =alioquin. Cf. V 463 D note

νῦν δή . The reference (somewhat loose, as usual) is to 503 E.

καὶ μεῖζον κτλ. κοὶ—καί=‘not only—but also.’ αὐτῶν τούτων is ‘harum ipsarum virtutum.’

οὐχ ὑπογραφὴν ‐‐ ὥσπερ νῦν is as clear a proof as we could wish that Justice and the other virtues, as described in Book IV, are not the transcendental αὐτὰ καθ’ αὑτὰ εἴδη: see on III 402 C. They are only a ὑπογραφή or ‘adumbratio’ of the Ideas, being, we may suppose, simply the psychological relations which result from the παρουσία of the Ideas in certain particulars, viz. in human souls, during their union with human bodies. ὥσπερ νῦν admits moreover that the Rulers of III and IV (apart from a few suggestions to the opposite effect: see on 497 C) had only ‘correct opinion’ and not ‘knowledge’ (in the strict Platonic sense): it was their duty to accept and carry out the precepts of Plato, the founder of the city (IV 429 C note).

παριέναι . The present is better than παρεῖναι, which Herwerden conjectures.

καὶ μάλα . See cr. n. The words ἄξιον τὸ διανόημα are not strictly suitable to ἢ οὐ γελοῖον, and although διανόημα is of course a Platonic word, it is questionable whether Plato could have used it in this way. Perhaps we owe the comment to a gratified monk, who may have applied the observation to systematic theology. The comment is at all events a just one. Cf. 496 A note Plato's remark is best illustrated by the case of the exact sciences; and in a certain sense it may be said that he wished to make Politics into an exact science.

ὃ μέντοι κτλ. : lit. ‘but that which you call the greatest study, and that which you call its subject whatever it be—do you suppose any one would let you off without asking what they are?’ Richards finds a difficulty, but there is none, if only we take ὅ τι not as interrogative, but as the indefinite relative. For εἶναι omitted see Schanz Nov. Comm. Pl. p. 33. The μέγιστον μάθημα is Dialectic; and its subject the Idea of Good, though of course the latter can itself be called the μέγιστον μάθημα, as in 505 A. For ἐρωτᾷ Richards neatly conjectures ἐρωτᾷς, but the text (‘You may ask it yourself if you like’) is better. See next note.

ἀντιλαμβανόμενος : ‘by holding on fast to me,’ ‘refusing to let me go,’ is the opposite of ἀφεῖναι: cf. VIII 544 B note ‘By raising objections’ (D. and V.) is incorrect: see on 497 D. Socrates means ‘you intend to bother me as before’— αὖ refers to V 449 B ff.—‘by not letting me off, but on this occasion you won't succeed, for I have the answer ready, so ask away!’ Cf. ἐρώτα in Gorg. 448 B .

ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα κτλ. It is clear from πολλάκις ἀκήκοας that the supremacy of the Idea of Good was already a recognised tenet of the Platonic school. No proof of the doctrine is here attempted by Plato (cf. V 475 E note): it is merely expounded and explained. τὸ Πλάτωνος ἀγαθόν was in antiquity a proverb for any dark or obscure saying: see Amphis ap. D. L. III 27 ἧττον οἶδα τοῦτ’ ἐγώ, | ὦ δέσποτ’ , ἢ τὸ Πλάτωνος ἀγαθόν. (Another allusion occurs in Alexis ap. Athen. VIII 354 D). Some account of the enormous literature of the subject will be found in Zeller^{4} II 1. pp. 709 ff., 718 note 1. In addition to Stumpf's treatise to be presently named, I have found the monograph by Biehl Die Idee des Guten bei Platon Graz 1870 particularly good and useful. Other special treatises are also referred to in the course of the notes. The majority of interpreters are now agreed in identifying Plato's Idea of the Good with his philosophical conception of the Deity. The best and fullest proof of the identity is still, I think, Stumpf's exhaustive dissertation Das Verhältniss des Platonischen Gottes zur Idee des Guten Halle 1869. There is only one passage in his works where Plato himself appears expressly to identify the two, viz. Phil. 22 C , but on the principle that things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another, the identification is complete, and I have therefore thought myself at liberty throughout the notes occasionally to illustrate Plato's metaphysics by his theology.

δίκαια καὶ τἄλλα . It is only by κοινωνία with the Idea of Good that δίκαια, καλά etc. become good i.e. useful and beneficial (synonyms of ‘good’: see V 457 B note). Otherwise they are altogether useless. δίκαια does not of course mean the Idea of Justice, but τὰ πολλὰ δίκαια in the widest sense of the term, including νόμιμα περὶ δικαίου: see on V 476 A, 476 C, 479 D. Baiter's δὴ καί for δίκαια καί occurs in one or two inferior MSS, but is certainly wrong: s<*>e on 506 A.

ὅτι ‐‐ ἴσμεν . Cf. 506 D ff., VII 517 B ff., 532 E ff. and Tim. 28 C , where much the same is said of the πατὴρ τοῦ παντός.

εἰ δὲ μὴ ἴσμεν κτλ. : ‘and if we know it not, and should know all else excepting it never so well’ etc. Cobet does ill to expunge εἰ δὲ μὴ ἴσμεν. The repetition of εἰ before ἐπισταίμεθα is necessary because, while ἴσμεν expresses a fact, ἐπισταίμεθα is only an improbable supposition: see next note. The sentiment is one of Plato's commonplaces: see for example Alc. II 144 D ff. (where it is expounded in detail), 147 B, Charm. 173 A ff., Euthyd. 280 E ff., 289 A ff., 291, and cf. also Lach. 199 C , Lys. 219 B ff., Phaed. 69 B . Stumpf das Verhältniss etc. p. 87 note compares also the language about the Gods in Laws 905 C. The Euthydemus and Charmides already forecast the city of the Philosopher-king, in which the Knowledge of Good shall ‘sit alone in the helm of the state’ ( Euthyd. 291 D ): see Nohle die Statslehre Pl. pp. 39—48.

κεκτήμεθα . To possess a thing ἄνευ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ is matter of common and daily occurrence; to know everything (except the Good) is not. Hence the indicative κεκτήμεθα is as appropriate now as the optative ἐπισταίμεθα was before. I formerly read κεκτῄμεθα with Π and the majority of editors, but now agree with Schneider that there is no reason to depart from the text of A.

φρονεῖν ἄνευ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ . The last three words were suspected by Morgenstern and bracketed by Stallbaum and others. If we take these words (like ἄνευ ταύτης above) with τἄλλα, they are not superfluous; ‘eo enim quod quis reliqua omnia excepto bono intelligit, efficitur ut nihil, quod pulchrum et bonum sit, intelligat’ (Schneider). That some writers might have omitted the phrase is no ground for interfering with Plato's characteristic fulness of expression.

τοῖς μὲν πολλοῖς κτλ. We need not (with Tietzel Die Id. d. Guten u. d. Gottesbegriff p. 9) find in this an allusion to Aristippus and the Cyrenaics. Plato means what he says and no more. Pleasure is always the summum bonum of the Many: cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. I 3. 1095^{b} 16. In τοῖς κομψοτέροις Dümmler ( Antisth. p. 43) and others have recognised Antisthenes: cf. RP^{7} § 218 B note b. Hermann ( Gesch. u. System p. 329 note 323) interprets the words—more correctly, I think—of Socrates (cf. Xen. Mem. IV 5. 6 ) and his immediate followers, Antisthenes included. The Megarians sometimes held the same view (D. L. II 106). See also next note.

ἐπειδὰν κτλ. : “when they utter the mysterious word ‘good’.” For φθέγγεσθαι of a high-sounding, oracular, impressive utterance cf. VII 527 A, VIII 568 A, Prot. 342 E , Phaedr. 238 D , Ar. Clouds 315 . Plato's criticism applies to himself, in common with the other pupils of Socrates, and was doubtless intended to do so. He constantly declares that ‘knowledge of the good’ is the all-important possession for man: see on εἰ δὲ μὴ ἴσμεν 505 A. The present discussion removes the petitio principii by explaining what the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ really means.

ἢ οὐ καὶ οὗτοι κτλ. This is exactly what happens to Callicles in Gorg. 495 A —499 C. If Plato is referring to any dialogue at all, the Gorgias l.c. illustrates his point much better than the Philebus (13 A—C), to which Zeller^{4} II 1. p. 548, Susemihl Gen. Entw. II p. 192, and others of the older generation of scholars suppose that Plato is alluding. But there is nothing to suggest any crossreference at all. On the question whether the Philebus is or is not prior to the Republic see Jackson in J. Ph. XXV pp. 65—82.

τόδε οὐ φανερὸν κτλ. The contrast is between δίκαια, καλά on the one hand, and ἀγαθά or ὠφέλιμα (V 457 B note) on the other. All men desire the reality of good (cf. IV 438 A note), but many are content with the semblance of honour. Cobet expunges τὰ δοκοῦντα, and καί before δοκεῖν, thereby leaving a very crabbed piece of Greek. Ast's καὶ διώκειν for καὶ δοκεῖν is on a higher plane of criticism. The text is nevertheless sound. δοκεῖν ‘to seem’ is used absolutely, as in II 361 B, and prepares the way for δόξαν ‘seeming’ (cf. 499 A) below. So also Schneider and Stallbaum understand the passage. For ἔτι and ἤδη see on III 412 B.

ὃ δὴ διώκει κτλ. With ὃ followed by τούτου cf. II 357 B note Cobet's ὅτου for τούτου is an unlucky venture. Stumpf justly observes that the Idea of Good is here regarded as the final cause: cf. Phaed. 98 B ff. and Phil. 20 D , 54 C. For a striking theological presentation of the same view see Laws 715 E ff. and 903 B—D. Plato's ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ laid “the foundations of the teleological view of the world” (Krohn Pl. St. p. 131).

ἀπομαντευομένη . Cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. X 2. 1173^{a} 4 f. ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις ἔστι τι φυσικὸν [ ἀγαθὸν ] κρεῖττον ἢ καθ’ αὑτά, ὃ ἐφίεται τοῦ οἰκείου ἀγαθοῦ. ἀπομαντευομένη implies the same instinctive, half-unconscious, divination of something beyond our grasp.

διὰ τοῦτο κτλ. See 505 A note

καὶ ἐκείνους : i.e. as well as οἱ πολλοί. For καί cf. VII 519 B.

οἶμαι γοῦν κτλ. No one who does not know the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ can possibly know in what respect or how far particular δίκαια (such as, for example, a particular νόμιμον περὶ δικαίου: see V 479 D note) are good, because it is the παρουσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ in them which makes them good (505 A note). And no one who is ignorant ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἀγαθά ἐστιν can possibly defend δίκαια (such as for example the δίκαια ἐπιτηδεύματα of Plato's city), because he is at the mercy of anyone who attempts to shew that they are bad. Nor, until we know how far particular δίκαια are good ( πρότερον), can we adequately know these δίκαια themselves, i.e. know which of these really is δίκαιον and which not, for we do not know how they stand in relation to the ultimate source of all justice, viz. the Idea of the Good. It is this which, in the last resort, is the true ‘measure of all things’ ( Laws 716 C ff., where Plato employs the language of theology). Hence the supreme necessity for our Guardians to know the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Bekker first restored the true reading of this passage, which had been strangely mutilated in earlier editions. Stallbaum reads μηδ’ ἂν ἕνα with q, but instances of the future with ἄν—see on 492 C—should not be wilfully multiplied.

τούτων : i.e. τὰ δίκαιά τε καὶ καλά, ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἀγαθά ἐστιν.

πότερον ἐπιστήμην κτλ. Even if it could be shewn that the Philebus is earlier than the Republic— and recent critics take the opposite view —there would be no sufficient reason for holding (with Zeller^{4} II 1. p. 708 note) that Plato is referring to that dialogue, although he there denies that either Knowledge or Pleasure is the Chief Good (20 B ff., 60 E). See also on 505 C and 506 E.

οὗτος κτλ. καλῶς has in reality— see cr. n.—more and better MS support than καλός, which Schneider retained in the belief that A read καλός. Used in this way, καλῶς is colloquial (Jebb on Soph. O. T. 1008 καλῶς ε<*> δῆλος οὐκ εἰδὼς τί δρᾷς).

δοκεῖ σοι δίκαιον κτλ. The sentence is ironical, as is clear from ἐξὸν παρ’ ἄλλων (the Sophists forsooth) ἀκούειν φανά τε καὶ καλά in D below. Plato frequently feigns ignorance and self-distrust before expounding some great principle of whose truth he is himself profoundly convinced: cf. V 450 D. The notion that he really lays claim only to δόξα or even ὀρθὴ δόξα of the Good is hardly to be entertained, although he does not claim to have perfect knowledge: to that we may, perchance, attain hereafter. See 505 A note

ἢ δοκοῦσί τί σοι κτλ. On ὀρθὴ δόξα see Men. 97 A —98 A, Theaet. 201 C , Tim. 51 D , E. Correct opinion believes, but does not know, and is therefore blind and insecure. Its ethical correlate is πολιτικὴ or δημοτικὴ ἀρετή: cf. 500 D and IV 430 C notes See in general Zeller^{4} II 1. pp. 588 ff.

σκολιά =‘crooked,’ ‘awry’ is objected to by Hermann on the ground that ὀρθαὶ δόξαι may be blind, but cannot be ‘crooked.’ This is true, but αἱ ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης δόξαι may be both blind and awry; and αἰσχρά, which looks back to αἰσχραί, shews that it is not correct opinions, but opinions without knowledge generally, which are described in τυφλά— σκολιά. Socrates' mock humility will not pretend to more than δόξα, let alone ὀρθὴ δόξα. If you wish for ‘science,’ go to your sophistical rhetoricians, forsooth, and ‘hear things bright and beautiful.’ φανά τε καὶ καλά may be an allusion to the ‘lumina orationis’ of Isocrates and his friends: see 498 E note σκότια, which Hermann conjectures, is apparently not used by Plato.

ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τέλει ὤν : not ‘just as you are reaching the goal’ (Jowett), but ‘as if you were at the end.’ Jowett practically omits ὥσπερ in his translation.

ὁρμήν . The idea is as of a start or impulse which enables one to clear the obstacles in the way: cf. V 451 C.

τὰ νῦν should be taken with ἐφικέσθαι. If we take it with δοκοῦντος, we must suppose that Socrates intends to suggest that his view of the matter may change (so D. and V.). He is hardly likely to have made such a suggestion, even ironically. ἐάσωμεν τὸ νῦν εἶναι is also in favour of connecting τὰ νῦν with ἐφικέσθαι. Cf. Tim. 48 C f. τὴν μὲν γὰρ περὶ ἁπάντων εἴτε ἀρχὴν εἴτε α<*>ρχὰς—τὸ νῦν οὐ ῥητέον, δἰ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν, διὰ δὲ τὸ χαλεπὸν εἶναι κατὰ τὸν παρόντα τρόπον τῆς διεξόδου δηλῶσαι τὰ δοκοῦντα κτλ. The emphasis on τὸ νῦν εἶναι and τὰ νῦν seems to hint that a description of the ἀγαθόν, as it is in itself, may be expected on some future occasion. But there is no dialogue in which the Idea of Good is so clearly described as in the Republic, and it is not without reason that every historian of Philosophy regards this passage as the locus classicus on the subject. O. Schneider ( Versuch einer genet. Entw. d. Pl. ἀγαθόν p. 15) thinks of the Philebus; Susemihl ( Gen. Entw. II p. 193) of the Φιλόσοφος, which was perhaps planned, but probably never executed (see on 484 A). The Philebus is unsuitable; and of the Φιλόσοφος we know nothing. I am inclined to think—in view especially of βουλοίμην ἂν κτλ. below—that, although Plato may have cherished the idea of describing the Good without the aid of a simile— εἴδεσιν αὐτοῖς δἰ αὐτῶν—, he never, at all events in any of his dialogues, did so. In a certain sense, perhaps, the Timaeus describes the Good (see Archer-Hind's edition p. 27), but even there, we study the ‘Father of all’ not in himself so much as in his works. I agree with Stumpf's conclusion (l.c. p. 75) that Plato could hardly have depicted the Idea of Good at all except by means of a comparison. Certainly nothing else could have made it equally clear; and, in point of fact, ‘es wird nirgends Mehr gegeben’ (Stumpf, l.c. p. 59 note). See also next note.

ὃς δὲ ἔκγονος κτλ. The ἔκγονος is the Sun, as presently appears. Socrates' procedure in Phaed. 99 C —E is in some respects like his procedure here. A nearer parallel is Phaedr. 246 A , where, before describing the soul, Socrates observes οἷον μέν ἐστι, πάντῃ πάντως θείας εἶναι καὶ μακρᾶς διηγήσεως, ᾧ δὲ ἔοικεν, ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ ἐλάττονος. The Idea of Good, like the Soul, is best described by one man to another in a figure. On εἰσαῦθις see last note and IV 430 C note

τοὺς τόκους . The comparison, which is already suggested in ἀποτείσεις, ἀποδοῦναι (‘pay’ as well as ‘render’), and κομίσασθαι, culminates in the word τόκος (‘interest’ and ‘offspring’). See on γράφειν νόμους 501 A and (for a similar play on τόκος) cf. VIII 555 E and Ar. Thesm. 842 —845. κίβδηλον below is a metaphor from counterfeit coinage.

διομολογησάμενός γε . γε (‘yes,’ ‘not until’: cf. with Schneider Phaedr. 228 D δείξας γε πρῶτον κτλ.) was restored by Bekker from the best MSS. Stephanus (with Ξ etc.) read δέ.

ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν . Cf. V 475 E note

εἶναι is not of course used in its technical sense, otherwise it would be inconsistent with the end of Book V. Socrates means only that the Platonist distinguishes between two categories— τὰ πολλά, and the Ideas.

καὶ αὐτὸ δὴ κτλ. The literal meaning of the text above printed is as follows: ‘So likewise a Beautiful itself, and a Good itself and similarly about all which we formerly took’ (or ‘postulated’) ‘as many: reversing our procedure ( πάλιν αὖ), we postulate also one Idea of each, believing that there is but one, and call it the essential so-and-so.’ καὶ—ἐτίθεμεν is best explained as still under the influence of φαμέν—λόγῳ. τότε (as Schneider observes) refers ‘ad eam, quae modo facta est, multorum commemorationem’: cf. 510 B. Stallbaum is mistaken in supposing that the allusion is to V 475 E ff. Plato's meaning will appear from a single example. We postulate both πολλὰ δίκαια and also ἓν δίκαιον, viz. the ἰδέα μία δικαίου, and we call the latter ὃ ἔστιν δίκαιον: cf. Phaed. 75 B τοῦ ὃ ἔστιν ἴσον, Symp. 211 C and elsewhere. We postulate only one ἰδέα δικαίου, because we believe that there is but one: see X 597 C, D, where Plato shews why there cannot be more. For αὐτό used of the Ideas, see on IV 438 B, 438 C and V 476 A note Instead of καὶ ἰδέαν, the MSS— see cr. n.—read κατ’ ἰδέαν ( κατιδέαν Vind. F.). For the interchange of καί and κατά see Schaefer's Greg. Cor. p. 234 note 26. An unduly sloping accent is enough to account for the corruption of ΚΑῚΙΔΕΑΝ into ΚΑΤΙΔΕΑΝ (as in uncial MSS it would be written: see Thompson Gk. Palaeogr. p. 127). See also my article in Cl. Rev. XIII p. 100. Other views on the text and interpretation of this difficult passage are discussed in App. VII.

ἆρ’ οὖν κτλ. On the unique position of Sight among the senses see Phaedr. 250 D and Bonitz on Arist. Met. A 1. 980^{a} 23: cf. also Phaed. 65 B , Tim. 47 A ff., Hipp. Maior 297 E ff. It is the costliest ( πολυτελεστάτη) because it requires an additional precious or valuable element ( μὴ ἄτιμον 508 A) beyond what is necessary for the operation of the others, viz. Light: cf. Tim. 45 C , D and Arist. de An. II 7. 418^{b} 2 ff.

ἔστιν ὅ τι κτλ. Steinhart (p. 689 note 213) and others remark on Plato's error in denying that a medium is necessary in Hearing etc. Aristotle was well aware of this fact (see his de An. II 7. 419^{a} 25 ff.), and there are several indications that it was not altogether unknown to Plato. In Tim. 67 B , for example, air is regarded as in a certain sense the medium of sound. Here, however, where a scientific analysis of perception is not proposed, Plato takes his stand upon the broad fact of experience, that whereas we can hear, touch, etc. either in light or in darkness, we can see only where there is light.

οὐδ’ ἄλλαις πολλαῖς . ‘Non αἰσθήσεσι supplendum est, quippe quae non amplius tres supersint, sed δυνάμεσι vel δυνάμεων συζεύξεσι’ (Schneider). It may be added that the antecedent of ἄλλαις is the same as that of τινα and τὴν τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ, and τὴν is certainly for τὴν δύναμιν: cf. τὴν τοῦ ὁρᾶν τε καὶ ὁρᾶσθαι δύναμιν in C. Plato is thinking quite generally of δυνάμεις τοῦ ποιεῖν τε καὶ πάσχειν: cf. Theaet. 156 A .

ἐν αὐτοῖς κτλ. If ἐν αὐτοῖς is right, αὐτοῖς must be interpreted as τοῖς ὁρωμένοις, for it is clear from 508 C ὧν ἂν τὰς χρόας τὸ ἡμερινὸν φῶς ἐπέχῃ that colour is here regarded as inherent in the object. Grammatically, however, αὐτοῖς can scarcely mean anything except τοῖς ὄμμασιν, and in my edition of 1897 I accordingly proposed to read ἐν αὐτοῖς <τοῖς ὁρωμένοις>. Ficinus translates praesente item colore, omitting ἐν αὐτοῖς altogether. For other views see App. VIII.

τίνος ‐‐ τούτου ; The genitive has been variously explained as (1) dependent on γένος (Schneider), (2) in agreement with παραγενομένου understood (Stallbaum, Campbell), (3) like ἵππων in τί δὲ ἵππων οἴει; V 459 B (Jowett). (2) is in my opinion grammatically impossible. For (3) cf. V 470 A note Jowett's view is perhaps possible, but we should have expected simply τί δὴ λέγεις—τοῦτο; Schneider's explanation (‘Pray what is this whose γένος you mention?’) is, I think, the least unsatisfactory. Perhaps we should read δεῖν for δή .

ὃ δὴ σὺ καλεῖς . Herwerden needlessly writes ὃ δὴ καὶ σὺ καλεῖς.

οὐ σμικρᾷ κτλ. ἰδέα, ‘kind,’ ‘class,’ is here a synonym for γένος as in Theaet. 184 D , Pol. 289 B . The dative expresses the ‘amount of difference’ after the comparative τιμιωτέρῳ (‘more precious:’ cf. πολυτελεστάτην in 507 C). Cf. II 373 E and IX 579 C τοῖς τοιούτοις κακοῖς πλείω καρποῦται with note ad loc.

τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ θεῶν : the heavenly constellations, which form the οὐράνιον θεῶν γένος ( Tim. 40 A ). Plato's description of the sun is instinct with religious feeling. The ‘clear god and patron of all light, From whom each lamp and shining star doth borrow The beauteous influence that makes him bright’ claims adoration from Plato not merely as an οὐράνιος θεός, like the other stars, but as the symbol and scion ( ἔκγονος) of the Supreme Idea or God. Cf. Bonitz Disp. Plat. duae, p. 6 note 3, and especially Paul Shorey in Chicago Studies in Cl. Phil. Vol. I pp. 224 ff. The sunworship of some of the Neo-Platonists was inspired in no small measure by this passage of the Republic; see in particular Julian's ‘Address to the Sovereign Sun’ ( εἰς τὸν βασιλέα ἥλιον) Or. IV. Cf. 508 D note

ἡλιοειδεστάτην . The Eye is the Body's Sun: cf. Ar. Thesm. 16 , 17 ᾧ μὲν βλέπειν χρὴ πρῶτ’ ἐμηχανήσατο | ὀφθαλμὸν ἀντίμιμον ἡλίου τροχῷ. A similar idea appears in St Matth. 6. 22 ὁ λύχνος τοῦ σώματός ἐστιν ὁ ὀφθαλμός. Conversely, the Sun is often in Greek poetry called the Eye of the World or of Day, and Shakespeare invokes the Sun in the words ‘O eye of Eyes!’ ( Rape of Lucrece): cf. also Milton Par. Lost V 171 ‘Thou Sun! of this great world both eye and soul.’ Both comparisons rest ultimately on the favourite Greek idea of the Universe as the Macrocosm, and Man as the Microcosm. See on this subject Zeller^{3} II 2. p. 488, III 2. pp. 136, 397 notes, and Stein Psych. d. Stoa I pp. 205—214.

οὐκοῦν κτλ. Pindar Fr. 107 (Bergk) expresses the same idea in the language of poetry: Ἀκτὶς ἀελίου, τί πολύσκοπ’ ἐμήσαο, θοῶν μᾶτερ ὀμμάτων.

τὴν δύναμιν is of course τὴν δύναυιν τοῦ ὁρᾶν, ‘the power of seeing.’ The translation ‘faculty’ (D. and V.) for δύναμιν is incorrect; for the faculty of ὄψις is supposed to be present in the eyes even when there is no light (507 D). But the eye has no ‘power’ to see, i.e. cannot exercise the faculty of ὄψις unless such a power is constantly dispensed ( ταμιευομένην) to it from the Sun. Cf. Biehl die Id. d. Guten p. 52, where the same view is taken. The word ἐπίρρυτον (‘flowing over,’ ‘overflowing it,’ cf. Tim. 80 D ) as well as ταμιευομένην unmistakably points the allusion to Light. See also on ὅταν μὲν κτλ. and τοῦτο τοίνυν κτλ. in 508 D.

φάναι . Cf. 473 A note

ὅ τί περ ‐‐ ὁρώμενα explains ἀνάλογον ἑαυτῷ, which should be understood in its strict sense of proportionate or ‘geometrical equality’: see Gorg. 508 A ἡ ἰσότης ἡ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ ἐν θεοῖς καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις μέγα δύναται.

τοῦτον after τοῦτο is needed to balance αὐτό (cf. 511 E): in construction, it depends, like ὅν, on ἐγέννησεν (Schneider). τοῦτο itself, like ἀνάλογον ἑαυτῷ, is predicative (‘ut hoc esset’). Stallbaum erroneously supplies φάναι με λέγειν to govern τοῦτον.

ὧν ἂν ‐‐ ἐπέχῃ . ἐπέχῃ ‘occupat’ as in the Homeric ἑπτὰ δ’ ἐπέσχε πέλεθρα and the like. With ἐπί of light cf. Mimn. 2. 8 ἐπὶ γῆν κίδναται ἠέλιος. The Greek will not admit of D. and V.'s translation ‘upon which the light of day is shedding colour’; and Plato moreover, both here and in Tim. 67 C , looks on Colour as something inherent in the Object, not imparted by Light, although Light is of course necessary in order to see it. Cf. 507 D note

φῶς ‐‐ φέγγη : ‘lux — lumina.’ The words are constantly interchanged, but, when contrasted with φέγγος, φῶς denotes a natural or primary, φέγγος an artificial or derivative light. See Neil on Ar. Knights 1319 . Plato knew that the Moon's light is borrowed from the Sun (X 616 E).

ὧν ὁ ἥλιος κτλ. ‘The Sun’ is here said loosely for ‘the Sunlight’ or ‘light of Day’ ( τὸ ἡμερινὸν φῶς above); for, as appears from 508 E, 508 A, it is not the Sun, but Light, which is to be equated with Truth and Being ( οὗ καταλάμπει ἀλήθειά τε καὶ τὸ ὄν in D). See also on τοῦτο τοίνυν κτλ. in 508 D. Instead of καταλάμπει, καταλάμπῃ is read by a majority of editors, with several MSS, including Ξ: but ὅς for ὃς ἄν is, to say the least, extremely rare in prose, and the corruption καταλάμπῃ was easy after ὅταν. καταλάμπει was, if I mistake not, originally the reading of A (see cr. n.), and is at least as well supported by the other MSS as καταλάμπῃ. J. and C., reading καταλάμπῃ, strangely observe that ‘ ἄν would be felt as superfluous after ὅταν .’

ἐνοῦσα φαίνεται : sc. καθαρὰ ὄψις, supplied from καθαρᾶς ὄψεως above. ‘ <ὄψις> ἐνοῦσα <σαφὴς> lubens suppleverim’ says Herwerden, and ὄψις is found in a few MSS, including q. But the feminine inflexion prevents the possibility of mistake: cf. 503 E note The initial syllable of ἐνοῦσα should be emphasized to point the contrast with οὐκ ἐνούσης, where οὐκ is also emphatic.

ὅταν μὲν κτλ. ἀπερείσηται=‘is stayed upon’ (cf. IX 581 A), not ‘has fastened upon’ (D. and V.), which suggests an altogether different and much less appropriate idea. Cf. Phaed. 79 D πέπαυται τοῦ πλάνου, Plot. XX 4 Kirchhoff παύσασα δὲ τῆς περὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν πλάνης ἐνιδρύει τῷ νοητῷ, and Dante Parad. 4. 124, 125 Io veggio ben che giammai non si sazia Nostro intelletto, se 'l ver non lo illustra. The soul can find no rest except in that ‘whereon Truth and Being shine’: elsewhere she is tossed to and fro with every wind of doctrine ( ἄνω—μεταβάλλον. For ἄνω καὶ κάτω see Heindorf on Gorg. 495 A ). Instead of οὗ, van Heusde proposes ὅ, but οὗ is proved correct by ὧν above. With ἐνόησέν τε καὶ ἔγνω cf. 490 B note Here, as there, the aorists denote instantaneous action. The faculty of νοῦς is suddenly actualized into νόησις by being turned upon its proper object. Then and not till then does the Soul ‘appear to have reason,’ for Reason has hitherto lain dormant within. Cf. (with Biehi l.c. p. 51) Tim. 37 C , Parm. 136 E and VII 518 C—519 A. See also on τοῦτο τοίνυν κτλ. below, and 508 E note

κεκραμένον . The suggestion κεκρυμμένον forgets that τὸ γιγνόμενον is not total darkness but only twilight. It is ἀμφοτέρων μετέχον, τοῦ εἶναί τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι (V 478 E: cf. also 479 C)—a halfway house between absolute Not-Being and absolute Being.

δοξάζει is explained by V 476 D ff.

τοῦτο τοίνυν κτλ. The following equations are involved:

τὴν δύναμιν sc. τοῦ γιγνώσκειν is not the faculty of Knowledge or Reason, but the power to exercise that faculty, hardly different, indeed, from the actual exercise of Reason (‘die thatkräftige Aeusserung’ Biehl l.c.). Hence γνώσεως (‘the exercise of knowledge,’ cf. ὅρασις, νόησις and the like) below. Plato's exposition suffers somewhat from the want of a strict philosophical nomenclature. Aristotle would have expressed the same meaning by saying that ὄψις and νοῦς are two δυνάμεις, which ἐνεργοῦσι through Light and Truth respectively, becoming in the one case ὅρασις, in the other νόησις. Plato's τὴν δύναμιν, in fact, is nearly equivalent to Aristotle's τὴν ἐνέργειαν. Cf. Biehl l.c. pp. 50—53.

αἰτίαν κτλ. ‘And being the cause of Knowledge and Truth, I would have you conceive of it as apprehended, no doubt, by Knowledge, but beautiful as is the act of Knowledge, and beautiful though Truth be, you will be right in thinking that it is something other and even more beautiful than these.’ The words αἰτίαν—ἀληθείας sum up and carry on τὸ—ἀποδιδόν. ὡς γιγνωσκομένην is in predicative agreement with αἰτίαν after διανοοῦ (cf. Pol. 258 C πάσας τὰς ἐπιστήμας ὡς οὔσας δύο εἴδη διανοηθῆναι): the words are the counterpart of ὁ ἥλιος— ὁρᾶται ὑπ’ αὐτῆς ταύτης (sc. τῆς ὄψεως) in the simile 508 B. μέν after γιγνωσκομένην balances δέ after οὕτω: though apprehended by Knowledge, and therefore in some sense subject thereto, the Idea of Good is (as being the cause of both) more beautiful than Knowledge and Truth. I have (with van Heusde) altered γιγνωσκομένης of the best MSS— see cr. n.—to γιγνωσκομένην. On other interpretations of this difficult passage see App. IX.

τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕξιν : i.q. τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὡς ἔχει (J. and C.).

οὐ γὰρ δήπου κτλ. is said in view of the question in 506 B. There is certainly no allusion to the Philebus: see 505 C note

τὸν ἥλιον κτλ. The Good has been shewn to be the cause of Knowledge: Socrates now proceeds to shew that it is also the cause of Being. In the philosophy of Plato, Knowledge is the epistemological counterpart of Being, Being the ontological counterpart of Knowledge: see V 476 E ff. notes The final unity in which both Knowledge and Being meet is the Idea of the Good, which is therefore the supreme and ultimate cause of the Universe. See also on οὐκ οὐσίας κτλ. below and the Appendix to Book VII On Plato's Dialectic.

οὐ γένεσιν αὐτὸν ὄντα . See on οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ below.

φάναι . V 473 A note

ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναι κτλ. Cf. Arist. Met. A 6. 988^{a} 10 τὰ γὰρ εἴδη τοῦ τί ἔστιν αἰτία τοῖς ἄλλοις, τοῖς δ’ εἴδεσι τὸ ἕν. Plato identified τἀγαθόν and τὸ ἕν: see the anecdote in Aristox. Harm. § 30 Marquard.

οὐκ οὐσίας κτλ. has occasioned a vast amount of discussion. Krohn boldly declares that ‘Die ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ist keine Idee, denn sie hat keine οὐσία, sondern es ist eine Macht, die mit unserer Denkweise nur als die Gottheit begriffen werden kann’ ( Pl. St. p. 146). Fouillée La Philosophie de Platon II p. 109 draws an over-subtle distinction between εἶναι and οὐσία, holding that although the Good is not οὐσία, it nevertheless is ὄν (cf. VII 518 C). Others have suspected the text, O. Schneider, for example, proposing οὐ <μόνον> οὐσίας κτλ. ( Versuch einer genet. Entw. d. Plat. ἀγαθόν p. 16). That the text is right, the balance with οὐ γένεσιν—ὄντα conclusively shews. The Sun, said Socrates, is the cause of γένεσις, though not himself γένεσις. Just so the Good is the cause of οὐσία, though not itself οὐσία, but (to use a Neoplatonic expression) ὑπερούσιος. Plato's meaning is as follows. The Sun is not γένεσις in the sense in which the objects which he produces are γιγνόμενα. Yet in a certain sense he too is γένεσις, for he is ὁρατός: see VII 529 C ff. and Tim. 28 B . (Bosanquet cannot be right in denying that Plato regards the Sun as a γιγνόμενον). As the cause of γένεσις, we may, in fact, regard the Sun as the only true γένεσις, for all γιγνόμενα are derived from him. Similarly the Good is not οὐσία in the sense in which the Ideas are οὐσίαι; but in a higher sense it is the only true οὐσία, for all οὐσίαι are only specific determinations of the Good. The ὑπερουσιότης of the Good is merely Plato's way of saying that the first Principle of all existence must itself be underived. See on ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον 510 B and cf. Biehl l.c. p. 62 and Fouillée l.c. II pp. 105—111, where the matter is very clearly explained. The doctrine of the ὑπερουσιότης of the Highest afterwards became a cardinal point with the Neoplatonists: see Plotinus ap. RP.^{7} p. 528, and for other references Hermann Vind. disp. de id. boni pp. 40 note 84, 41 note 87, Zeller^{3} III 2. pp. 490 ff., Fouillée La Philosophie de Platon III pp. 289, 291 notes, and Shorey Chicago Studies in Cl. Phil. I p. 188 note 1. It is highly characteristic of Plato's whole attitude that he finds the true keystone of the Universe—the ultimate fountain from which both Knowledge and Existence flow—in no cold and colourless ontological abstraction, like Being, but in that for which πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις συστενάζει καὶ συνωδίνει ( Rom. 8. 22)—viz. τὸ ἀγαθόν. Cf. Phaed. 97 C ff. and see also on 508 D. The conception is poetical and religious no less than philosophical, and may be compared with Dante's ‘L’ Amor che muove il Sole e l' altre Stelle' and Tennyson's ‘For so the whole round world is every way Bound by gold chains about the feet of God,’ as well as with Aristotle's πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον Met. Λ 7 et al.

καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων κτλ. “Glauco exclaimed, very comically, ‘Save us all, what an amazing transcendence!’” It is Glauco's προθυμία which is γελοῖον: see 506 D. ὑπερβολῆς is not ‘exaggeration’ (Jowett), but refers to ὑπερέχοντος: cf. ἀμήχανον κάλλος λέγεις 509 A. A ὑπερβολή which transcends existence may well be called δαιμονία (‘supernatural,’ ‘miraculous’).

εἰ μή τι, ἀλλὰ κτλ. Stephanus proposed ἄλλο for ἀλλά (as in 501 E), but cf. Men. 86 E εἰ μή τι οὖν, ἀλλὰ σμικρόν γέ μοι τῆς ἀρχῆς χάλασον.

αὐτώ : the Sun and the Idea of the Good.

ἵνα μὴ οὐρανοῦ κτλ. “I do not say ‘of heaven,’ lest you should imagine that I am etymologising on the name.” The Sun might well be called βασιλεὺς οὐρανοῦ. Socrates pretends to avoid the word οὐρανός, lest by thus equating it with ὁρατόν (for the contrast with νοητοῦ would suggest that οὐρανοῦ= ὁρατοῦ) he should be accused of deriving οὐρανός from ὁρᾶν, as certain clever people did in Plato's time ( Crat. 396 B . The same derivation is given by Philo Jud. de mund. opif. 10). For σοφίζεσθαι in this sense cf. σοφία in Crat. 396 C , D. E. S. Thompson ( Proceedings of the Camb. Phil. Soc. 1888 p. 14) takes σοφίζεσθαι simply as ‘pun’ and thinks that the pun is between νοῦ (suggested in νοητοῦ above) and οὐρα‐νοῦ, quoting ἀπ’ ὄνου πεσεῖν, and the anecdote in D. L. II 118, VI 3: cf. also Isocrates Apophth. Fr. 8 ed. Blass. But such a pun is both far-fetched and pointless, and in view of the passage from the Cratylus there should be no doubt that Plato more suo is merely scoffing at a well-known contemporary etymology. The reading οὐρανόν—see cr. n.—would be fatal to Thompson's theory, but οὐρανοῦ (which most MSS read) is more pointed and idiomatic, and perhaps right, though the accusative is not indefensible.

ἄνισα . It appears from the Scholiast that even ancient critics debated whether ἄνισα or ἴσα ( εἰς ἴσα v) should be read. Proclus ( in Plat. remp. I p. 288 Kroll) and the author of the third Quaest. Plat. in Plutarch (1001 C ff.) read ἄνισα: ἴσα appears in a grammarian cited by Stallbaum from Villoison Anecd. Gr. II p. 199. The dispute still reigns, Stallbaum and some others preferring ἴσα, others, such as Richter ( Fl. Jahrb. 1867 p. 145) and Dümmler ( Antisth. p. 80) ἀν’ ἴσα, others even ἂν ἴσα (which is certainly not Greek, though found in a few inferior MSS); but there should be no question that Plato wrote ἄνισα. If the line is bisected, all four segments are equal, and the elaborate proportions drawn in 510 A, 511 E, VII 534 A represent no corresponding relations between the different segments of the line. The inequality, as Schneider and Steinhart point out, is intended to represent the difference in σαφήνεια or ἀλήθεια between the δοξαστόν (or ὁρατόν) and the γνωστόν (or νοητόν): cf. σαφηνείᾳ καὶ ἀσαφείᾳ below and 510 A. (So also Benson in Nettleship's Lect. and Rem. II p. 239 note). For this reason the νοητόν should be represented by a longer segment. Others assign the larger part to the ὁρατόν, as being the region of τὰ πολλά (Plutarch l.c. and Espinas in his edition of Book VI), but the length of the two main segments should follow the primary and fundamental principle of Plato's classification. The relevant consideration is not at present multiplicity versus unity, but different degrees of clearness and truth. Beckman's excision of ἄνισα τμήματα ( num Plato artefactorum ideas statuerit p. 38) needs no refutation. See also next note.

πάλιν τέμνε κτλ. See Figure 1 on p. 65.

καί σοι ἔσται κτλ. : ‘and when classified according to their relative clearness and obscurity, the different segments will represent—in the visible sphere, segment 1, Images’ etc. The datives, like ἀληθείᾳ in 510 A, are causal, and state the principle on which the entire classification (of νοητά as well as ὁρατά) rests. With ἐν μὲν τῷ ὁρωμένῳ Socrates begins to describe the contents of the particular segments. This is interrupted by the definition of εἰκόνες, and resumed, in a different form, at τὸ τοίνυν ἕτερον in 510 A. μέν before τῷ ὁρωμένῳ contrasts with σκόπει δὴ αὖ in B, much as τὸ τοίνυν ἕτερον balances the second μέν. On σαφηνείᾳ see below 511 C note

ὅσα πυκνὰ κτλ. Cf. Tim. 46 A ff. πυκνά ) ( μανά is ‘of close texture,’ ‘close grained’ (D. and V.), not exactly ‘solid’ (as Jowett).

πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον . Although the productions of imitative art and the like must be held to belong to this category (see App. I to Book VII), there is nothing to shew that Plato was thinking of them when he wrote this sentence.

ᾧ τοῦτο ἔοικεν : ‘whereof this is an image.’ ἔοικεν corresponds to εἰκόνας above.

αὐτό : viz. τὸ ὁρώμενον, with reference to ἐν μὲν τῷ ὁρωμένῳ above.

ὡς τὸ δοξαστὸν κτλ. i.e.

ᾗ κτλ. With ᾗ cf. Theaet. 172 D . τὸ μέν is CE.

τοῖς τότε μιμηθεῖσιν : i.e. the objects represented by CD, which were ‘imitated’ or copied in AD. They were originals then, but are only images now: this is the force of the collocation μιμηθεῖσιν—εἰκόσι. Cf. 510 E ἃ πλάττουσίν τε καὶ γράφουσιν, ὧν καὶ σκιαὶ καὶ ἐν ὕδασιν εἰκόνες εἰσί, τούτοις μὲν ὡς εἰκόσιν αὖ χρώμενοι, 511 A εἰκόσι δὲ χρωμένην αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπεικασθεῖσι, and for the meaning of μιμηθεῖσιν X 599 A τό τε μιμηθησόμενον καὶ τὸ εἴδωλον and Laws 668 B. I have restored the reading of A, μιμηθεῖσιν, with which Proclus ( in Plat. remp. I p. 291 Kroll) also agrees. τμηθεῖσιν, which appears to be adopted by all other editors, occurs in all the available MSS except A. But τοῖς τότε τμηθεῖσι would include AD as well as DC, and the illustrations employed in the inferior νοητόν are drawn solely from DC, as is proved by 510 E (cited above), as well as by the actual facts of the case. The sole objection to μιμηθεῖσι is that the word is generally used only of “artificiosa imitatio” (Schneider): yet in Pol. 293 E , 297 C, Phil. 40 C and Arist. Hist. An. II 8. 502^{b} 9 the ‘imitatio’ can hardly be called ‘artificiosa.’ 511 A seems to me sufficient by itself to prove that A is right. Schneider ( Addit. p. 51) refers to a dissertation by Mommsen published in 1842 as taking the view here advocated.

ἐξ ὑποθέσεων . ὑπόθεσις is correctly defined in the Platonic ὅροι (415 B) as ἀρχὴ ἀναπόδεικτος, a starting-point which is not demonstrated, but taken for granted, assumed, postulated. The arithmetician, for example, ὑποτίθεται the odd, the even, etc., i.e. assumes that his definition of odd, even, etc. is correct, and draws conclusions from his ὑπόθεσις of the odd, the even, etc. by means of exclusively deductive reasoning: cf. H. Sidgwick in J. Ph. II p. 100. If we attack his ὑπόθεσις, as Lucian for example does ( Hermot. 74, quoted by Stallbaum), he must, quâ arithmetician, throw up the sponge, for the ὑποθέσεις of the inferior νοητόν can be demonstrated (or overthrown) only by Dialectic. Cf. generally Men. 86 E ff. Schneider may be right in supposing that Aristotle had the present passage in view when he wrote εὖ γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων ἠπόρει τοῦτο καὶ ἐζήτει, πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς ἐστιν ἡ ὁδός, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀθλοθετῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέρας ἢ ἀνάπαλιν ( Eth. Nic. I 2. 1095^{a} 32), though it is perhaps better (with Zeller^{4} II 1, p. 587 note 2) to suppose that he is alluding to Plato's oral instruction.

τὸ δ) αὖ ἕτερον κτλ. τὸ ἕτερον is EB. The article after ἕτερον (see cr. n.) stands self-condemned, although its intrusion is difficult to explain. ὅ, which Schneider proposes, is also difficult, though in harmony with Ficinus (alterum vero, quod excogitat animus), for the verb of the relative clause can hardly be omit ted. λόγῳ, once proposed by Hermann, has nothing in its favour. ζητεῖ must be supplied to govern τὸ ἕτερον.

ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον . The only ἀρχὴ ἀνυπόθετος is the Idea of the Good: cf. VII 532 A f. Towards this the Dialectician travels, starting from ὑποθέσεις. He may begin, for example, by ‘assuming’ the ‘just.’ In such a case he assumes that his definition of ‘just’ is correct, i.e. corresponds exactly to the Idea of ‘Just.’ But whereas the arithmetician treats his ὑπόθεσις as an ultimate truth, and proceeds deductively to a conclusion, making use of sensible images by way of illustration, the dialectician treats his hypothesis as purely provisional, testing, revising, rejecting (VII 533 C note), and reconstructing, and gradually ascending step by step to the first principle of all ( τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχήν), without employing any sensible objects to illustrate his reasoning. The one gives no account of his ὑπόθεσις ( οὐδένα λόγον—φανερῶν in C below); the other not only does, but must do so, just because he is a dialectician: cf. VII 533 C ff. He connects his ὑποθέσεις with others, subsuming them under higher and yet higher —better and truer— ὑποθέσεις, until at last he has traversed the whole region of νοητά. Such of his ὑποθέσεις as survive will be improved at each stage in the ascent, and finally, as soon as the Idea of Good is reached, all his surviving ὑποθέσεις will actually have become perfect counterparts of the Ideas which they have hitherto been only assumed to represent. In the meantime the ἀρχὴ τοῦ παντός, which Plato himself described dogmatically δἰ εἰκόνος in 507 A—509 C, will have ceased to be a mere ὑπόθεσις: it will have become, in the fullest sense of the term, an ἀρχὴ ἀνυπόθετος: for the highest rung of the ladder is not reached until the entire domain of the knowable has been exhausted, and shewn to be the expression of the Idea of Good. Plato's ideal—it is no more—is a comprehensive and purely intellectual view of the totality of νοητά, in which every department is seen in its connexion with every other, and all in their dependence on the Good, which is in itself ἀνυπόθετος and ὑπερούσιος—ἀνυπόθετος because higher than all ὑποθέσεις and itself proved by an exhaustive scrutiny of all νοητά, ὑπερούσιος because higher than, and the cause of, all existence. See also on 511 B and the Appendix to Book VII On Plato's Dialectic, together with Jackson J. of Ph. X pp. 145 f., where the distinctive peculiarities of the two methods are very clearly explained.

ὧνπερ ἐκεῖνο εἰκόνων : i.q. ἄνευ τῶν αἷσπερ ἐκεῖνο ( ζητεῖ) εἰκόνων. I formerly read τῶν περὶ ἐκεῖνο εἰκόνων (with q), but now think (with Schneider and others) that A is right. The attraction of a relative in the dative case is rare, but not unexampled. Van Cleef ( de attract. in enunt. rel. usu Plat. p. 45) cites Gorg. 509 A , Prot. 361 E , Theaet. 144 A , Rep. VII 531 E (all examples of ἐντυγχάνω, whose proper construction in the sense of ‘fall in with’ is the dative, not the genitive), and Ep. VII 327 A (with προσέτυχον); for examples in other authors see Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 914. If ἄνευ and ἐκεῖνο are pronounced with emphasis, the meaning, I think, is easily caught. Stallbaum reads ὧν περὶ κτλ. with one Vienna MS, understanding, I suppose, χρῆται .

αὐτοῖς ‐‐ δἰ αὐτῶν . αὐτοῖς ( ipsis= solis) is further accentuated by δἰ αὐτῶν (‘through themselves alone’): cf. 511 C. The εἴδη of the dialectician do not employ the adventitious aid of εἰκόνες: see on 511 B. The use of εἴδεσι here must not be held to imply that even the dialectician's conceptions of the Ideas are correct before he has reached the Idea of the Good. Till then, they are only ὑποθέσεις, though the false ὑποθέσεις are weeded out (VII 533 C note), and the hypothetical character of the survivors is gradually eliminated in the course of the ascent. See on ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον above, and contrast 511 C.

ἀλλ’ αὖθις κτλ. ‘Then have it over again, said I.’ The ellipse has a colloquial effect. Ast's εὐθύς for αὖθις is unlikely: nor does Cobet's < ἐρῶ> after ἐγώ sound right. If Plato had written ἐρῶ, he would, I think, have placed it after αὖθις. μάνθανε, or the like, supplied from ἔμαθον, suits the con text ( ῥᾷον γὰρ—μαθήσει) best. Similarly in D below, οἶσθα is understood out of Glauco's reply. Cf. also ἀλλ’ ὧδε in I 352 E.

οἱ περὶ κτλ. In CE, as will afterwards appear, are included five sciences, which form the προοίμιον (VII 531 D) or προπαιδεία (ib. 536 D) to Dialectic, represented by EB. They are the Science of Number, Plane Geometry, Stereometry, Astronomy, and Harmonics: VII 522 C—531 C. In each of these the method, according to Plato, is the same. Certain ὑποθέσεις are taken for granted, and inferences drawn from them by purely deductive reasoning, aided by the use of sensible likenesses or illustrations. See also App. I to Book VII.

ὡς εἰδότες . They have no knowledge of their ὑποθέσεις, otherwise they would be able to give an account of them: see VII 533 C and 531 E μὴ δυνατοί τινες ὄντες δοῦναί τε καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι λόγον εἴσεσθαί ποτέ τι ὧν φαμὲν δεῖν εἰδέναι; Οὐδ) αὖ, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε.

ὁμολογουμένως =“folgerechterweise” (Cohen Pl. Ideenl. u. d. Math. p. 29) refers to the agreement between premises, intermediate steps, and conclusion: cf. VII 533 C, where ὁμολογία is used in the same way. “With perfect unanimity” (D. and V.) is incorrect and pointless.

τοῖς ὁρωμένοις εἴδεσι κτλ. They use the ‘visible kinds,’ i.e. visible squares, visible diagonals, etc., but they are thinking about mathematical squares and diagonals etc. Cf. generally Euthyd. 290 B οἱ δ’ αὖ γεωμέτραι καὶ οἱ ἀστρονόμοι καὶ οἱ λογιστικοί· θηρευτικοὶ γάρ εἰσι καὶ οὗτοι· οὐ γὰρ ποιοῦσι τὰ διαγράμματα ἕκαστοι τούτων ἀλλὰ τὰ ὄντα ἀνευρίσκουσιν, and VII 527 A.

ἔοικε . Visible σχήματα are imperfect copies of ‘mathematical’ σχήματα: cf. VII 526 A and App. I to Book VII.

τοῦ τετραγώνου αὐτοῦ κτλ. : ‘for that with a view to which they are discoursing is the square itself and a diagonal itself, not this which they draw’ etc. αὐτοῦ (‘by itself,’ i.e. apart from its embodiment in perceivable squares) is ambiguous, and might (so far as language is concerned) refer either to the Idea of Square (cf. v 476 A ff.) or to the Mathematical Square (cf. VII 525 D, E notes), which—see App. I to Book VII—Plato holds to be distinct from the Idea. But the ambiguity is resolved as soon as we are shewn (in 511 C ff.) how to interpret διανοούμενοι and διανοίᾳ (511 A), and we then see that Plato is here speaking of the mathematical square. The singular τοῦ τετραγώνου is generic (cf. ὁ σοφιστής for the whole class of Sophists), for there are many ‘mathematical’ squares, diagonals etc. (VII 526 A note and App. I to Book VII). It is conceivably for this reason that Plato drops the article with διαμέτρου (‘a diagonal itself’), thereby also getting a more precise antithesis to ἀλλ’ οὐ ταύτης, or else (if this suggestion is hypercritical) διαμέτρου is also generic. Sidgwick is, I think, mistaken when he says ( J. Ph. II p. 103) that the language of this passage “in no way supports the interpolation of intermediates (Aristotle's τὰ μεταξύ) between particulars and Ideas”: for διανοούμενοι involves διάνοια, and since διάνοια is intermediate between νοῦς and δόξα (511 D), we may reasonably suppose that its objects are likewise intermediate between the higher νοητά and δοξαστά. See App. I to Book VII.

πλάττουσιν : with reference to models of geometrical figures, orreries etc., all of which belong to CD, and may themselves have shadows and likenesses in AD.

ὡς εἰκόσιν αὖ χρώμενοι . See 510 B note The anacoluthon in αὐτὰ μὲν ταῦτα—τούτοις μὲν χρώμενοι is illustrated by Engelhardt Anac. Pl. Spec. III p. 8: cf. also VII 520 D.

ζητοῦντές τε . Instead of τε, I formerly read δέ (on slight MS authority), with Ast and Stallbaum; but the corruption of δέ to τε is exceedingly improbable here. The antithetical force of the clause ζητοῦντες—ἰδεῖν is weakened by the occurrence of the words ὡς εἰκόσιν αὖ in the μέν clause. If the objects in question are used as images, the further statement that the real object of investigation is their originals ( αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα) loses its antithetical force, and becomes a sort of adjunct. Hence τε following ζητοῦντες is more appropriate than αὐτὰ δὲ ἐκεῖνα ζητοῦντες ἰδεῖν, which would be the natural way of expressing an antithesis. Cf. Laws 927 B ὀξὺ μὲν ἀκούουσι βλέπουσί τε ὀξύ (where the order is the same as here), Phaedr. 266 C and other examples cited by Hoefer de part. Pl. pp. 17 f.

τῇ διανοίᾳ . See on τοῦ τετραγώνου αὐτοῦ 510 D.

ἔλεγον . 510 B.

ἀναγκαζομένην . For the participle we might expect ἀναγκάζεσθαι. But ἀναγκαζομένην gives a better balance with νοητόν, and the meaning is ‘Accordingly I described this class as intelligible indeed, but the soul as compelled’ etc.

τῶν ὑποθέσεων ‐‐ ἐκβαίνειν : ‘to step out of and above assumptions,’ viz. by reaching the ἀρχὴ ἀνυπόθετος: cf. 510 B note

αὐτοῖς τοῖς κτλ. αὐτοῖς is ‘the actual things,’ ‘the originals,’ as in αὐτὰ μὲν ταῦτα 510 E: ‘employing as images the originals from which images were made’ (lit. ‘the imaged-from’ “abgebildet” Schneider) ‘by the objects below,’ i.e. employing as images the originals in CD, which were copied by the shadows etc. in AD. For ἀπεικασθεῖσι in this sense cf. ἀπεικασθῆναι in Tim. 48 C and (with J. and C.) εἰκασθέντος in Phaedr. 250 B . Other views of this passage are discussed in App. X.

καὶ ἐκείνοις κτλ. : ‘those also, in comparison with those remoter objects, being esteemed and honoured as palpable and clear.’ καί is ‘also’ and not ‘and,’ as some have supposed. ἐκείνοις is DC, and ἐκεῖνα AD. Plato uses the pronoun ἐκείνοις to indicate that the objects in CD are less near to the mind of the mathematician than those in CE, which are the immediate object of his study (cf. Sidgwick in J. Ph. II p. 98). He could not, even if he had wished to, have written καὶ αὐτοῖς (et ipsis) without sacrificing αὐτοῖς just before. ἐκεῖνα is said because AD is remoter still. See also App. X.

δεδοξασμένοις means, I believe, ‘esteemed,’ ‘valued’ as in Polyb. VI 53. 9 τῶν ἐπ’ ἀρετῇ δεδοξασμένων ἀνδρῶν: cf. the regular use of δοξάζειν for ‘glorify’ in the N. T. No other certain instance of this usage appears to occur in Plato, or even in classical Greek: at all events neither Thuc. III 45. 6 nor Dionys. Thesm. 1. 24 Meineke, cited by L. and S., is a case in point. But the collocation with τετιμημένοις makes it probable that the usage, though rare, is Platonic; and every other interpretation of the word is beset with serious difficulties, as is shewn in App. X.

τετιμημένοις . τετμημένοις is read by Schneider, with several MSS (see cr. n.), and understood as ‘cut off’ (abgeschnitten); but, as J. and C. observe, this does not suit δεδοξασμένοις, and it is doubtful if the objects can be said to be ‘cut,’ although the line is: see on τοῖς τότε μιμηθεῖσιν 510 B.

ταύτης in spite of γεωμετρίαις because Geometry is itself one art: cf. VII 533 C γεωμετρίας τε καὶ τὰς ταύτῃ ἑπομένας. The plural γεωμετρίαις does not mean the ‘various branches of geometry’ (as D. and V. suppose), but geometrical investigations: cf. λογισμούς for ‘Arithmetic’ in 510 C.

αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος κτλ. : ‘the argument grasps by itself, through the power of dialectic.’ λόγος is not the faculty of reason (“Vernunft” Schleiermacher), which is νοῦς, or even ‘thought’ (“Gedanke” Schneider), but rather “the impersonal reason, or drift of the argument” (Bosanquet), the instrument by which νοῦς works (Krohn Pl. St. p. 140). ὁ λόγος is of course personified, as it constantly is in this sense.

δυνάμει should not be translated ‘faculty,’ but simply ‘power’ (cf. 508 E note): the argument, unaided by εἰκόνες ( αὐτός ‘by itself,’ cf. αὐτοῖς εἴδεσι 510 B note), grasps its object by the inherent power of dialectical argumentation ( διαλέγεσθαι), and nothing else. In spite of Grimmelt ( de reip. unit. etc. p. 52) it is certainly an error to identify ὁ λόγος with νοῦς. Why does Dialectic dispense with all sensible images or illustrations? Plato (it should be remembered) holds that the intrusion of any element of sense-perception, however small, impedes the exercise of thought: see Phaed. 79 C ff. The ὑποθέσεις of the dialectician may be and often are generalisations from αἰσθητά, but a generalisation, regarded in itself, is wholly νοητόν. These ὑποθέσεις it is the province of Dialectic to test in every possible way, to demolish where necessary (VII 533 C note), to correct by one another, to classify according to their mutual coherence and interdependence, until by an exhaustive scrutiny of all νοητά we grasp the unifying principle of all existence—the Idea of the Good. Cf. VII 517 C note and see on τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου below and the Appendix to Book VII On Plato's Dialectic.

τῷ ὄντι indicates that we are to take the word in its literal etymological signification, ‘literally hypotheses or underpositions, stepping-stones as it were and starting-points.’ For this use of τῷ ὄντι and kindred expressions see I 343 C, V 474 A notes and W. G. Headlam On editing Aeschylus pp. 138 ff. With ἐπιβάσεις cf. Symp. 211 C ὥσπερ ἐπαναβαθμοῖς χρώμενον.

τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου . See on ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον 510 B. Plato makes no attempt in the Republic to classify Ideas in such an ascending scale as he here suggests, though it is probable from 509 A that Knowledge and Truth would rank near to the Good. Nor is there any dialogue in which an exhaustive classification is even attempted. Such hints as Plato gives us throughout his writings are enumerated in Stumpf das Verhältniss etc. pp. 50, 56, 76, and in Zeller^{4} II 1, pp. 704—707: cf. also Fouillée La Philosophie de Platon II pp. 99—104. We must suppose that each higher Idea will excel all the lower both in range and in excellence. These two characteristics are, from Plato's point of view, the same. The wider an Idea is in range and extension, the greater will be the sum of existences of which it is the cause. But the Idea of Good is the cause of all existence, so that each higher Idea will be better than all below it, because it contains more of Good. Beyond this it is perhaps safer not to go. A systematic attempt to correlate all intelligibles among themselves and in their connexion with the Good would have been premature in Plato's day, and is premature still. The permanent value of Plato's conception lies in the ideal which it sets before every succeeding generation of investigators.

πάλιν αὖ κτλ. The dialectician's progress involves both an ascent and a descent—an ascent ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν, and a descent ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐπὶ τὴν τελευτήν (cf. Aristotle quoted on 510 B). By the time that he reaches the Idea of the Good, all his surviving ὑποθέσεις have become exact counterparts of the Ideas which are their objective correlates; the others have all of them been demolished (VII 533 C note). The conclusions ( τελευταί) of dialectic are therefore impregnable; ψευδὴς ἐπιστήμη is a contradiction in terms (V 477 E note). For more on this subject see the Appendix to Book VII On Plato's Dialectic.

εἴδεσιν ‐‐ εἴδη . On αὐτοῖς δἰ αὐτῶν see 510 B note εἴδεσιν may now be taken in its full force; for after the Idea of Good has been reached, the dialectician's conception of each εἶδος is accurate and complete: see last note. I formerly read αὐτοῖς δἰ αὑτῶν, rejecting εἰς αὐτά as superfluous on account of καὶ τελευτᾷ εἰς εἴδη. But αὑτῶν is certainly wrong (cf. 510 B), and εἰς αὐτά, which may well be taken loosely with καταβαίνῃ or a participle supplied from it, merely states that the conclusions of dialectic are likewise εἴδη: whereas καὶ τελευτᾷ εἰς εἴδη seems to lay emphasis on the fact that dialectic never descends below εἴδη to particulars (“und bei Begriffen endigt” Schneider). We may translate ‘and with Ideas end.’ Plato means to emphasize the fact that the Dialectician quâ Dialectician does not draw conclusions as to particulars: if he did, he could scarcely be said αἰσθητῷ παντάπασιν οὐδενὶ προσχρῆσθαι. See the Appendix to Book VII On Plato's Dialectic.

ὅτι μέντοι κτλ. There is no anacoluthon as Engelhardt ( Anac. Pl. Spec. III p. 9) supposes, but ὅτι depends on μανθάνω. With σαφέστερον cf. V 478 C and 509 D above. σαφής, originally ‘clear,’ often=‘true’ in Greek. Plato's comparison between Light and Truth in 507 C ff. gave a new and profound significance to the equation. The present passage should be compared with Phil. 57 B ff., where Dialectic is said to excel mathematical and all other sciences in respect of ‘the clearness’ ( τὸ σαφὲς καὶ τἀκριβὲς καὶ τἀληθέστατον) of its object. In general, the higher a science is, the greater (according to Plato) is the amount of truth or knowability which its subjectmatter contains. Plato's theory on this subject is the source of Aristotle's doctrine of ἁπλῶς γνώριμα or γνωριμώτερα φύσει, for which see Stewart on Eth. Nic. I 4. 1095^{b} 2.

τὸ ‐‐ καλουμένων . καλουμένων implies that τέχναι (‘Arts’) sometimes bore the specific meaning of ‘mathematical sciences’ as early as the time of Plato. This use of the word may have been introduced by some of the Sophists, perhaps Hippias: cf. Prot. 318 E , where Protagoras says οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι λωβῶνται τοὺς νέους· τὰς γὰρ τέχνας αὐτοὺς πεφευγότας ἄκοντας πάλιν αὖ ἄγοντες ἐμβάλλουσιν εἰς τέχνας, λογισμούς τε καὶ ἀστρονομίαν καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ μουσικὴν (the medieval quadrivium) διδάσκοντες— καὶ ἅμα εἰς τὸν Ἱππίαν ἀπέβλεψεν. If we can understand μουσικήν as ‘theory of Music,’ Hippias' quadrivium is identical with Plato's, except that Plato would like to add Stereometry. Cf. also Theaet. 145 A, B and see Tannery L'Éducation Platonicienne in Rev. Philos. X p. 523, the Appendix to Book VII On the propaedeutic studies of the Republic and my article in Cl. Rev. XV p. 220, where I have tried to shew that our use of the word ‘Arts’ in ‘Bachelor of Arts’ etc. is an inheritance from the Platonic Academy.

καὶ ‐‐ θεώμενοι . The relative sentence passes into a main clause, as in II 357 B, where see note.

αὐτά : viz. the subject-matter of the so-called ‘Arts’: cf. VII 518 B.

καίτοι ‐‐ ἀρχῆς : ‘although they are intelligibles with a first principle.’ The mathematician does not ascend to an ἀρχή, and therefore does not exercise— for ἴσχειν in its original half-inchoative sense cf. IX 585 B and Kühner-Blass Gr. Gr. I 2, p. 434 note— νοῦς on his subject, but nevertheless his subject is νοητόν (as we have been told before 510 B, 511 A, C) and has an ἀρχή, viz. his ὑποθέσεις ( αἷς αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαί above). καίτοι is not found elsewhere in Plato for καίπερ with a participle (Hoefer de part. Pl. p. 28) but occurs in Simonides ap. Prot. 339 C , in Axioch. 364 B and Lysias 31. 34. To write καίπερ (with Kugler de part. τοι etc. p. 18) would be rash. For other views on this difficult clause see App. XI.

καλεῖν μοι δοκεῖς . See 510 D note

ὡς ‐‐ οὖσαν . διάνοια is the most general word for a state ( ἕξις) of mind or mode of thought in Greek; and the limitation here introduced is entirely Plato's own. Plato apparently attempts to fortify his innovation by etymology, hinting that the word διάνοια is by derivation that which is between ( διὰ μέσου) νοῦς and δόξα. So also J. and C. Cf. εἰκασία (with allusion to εἰκόνες) in E. On δόξης see 510 A note

νόησιν is used in its strict sense of νοῦς in actual exercise, not merely the faculty of νοῦς: cf. 508 E note The exercise of νοῦς is correctly spoken of as a πάθημα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γιγνόμενον, but the faculty itself could hardly be thus described.

πίστιν κτλ. If we strictly limit DC to ὁρατά, πίστις must be understood as the state of mind which believes only in visible, palpable ( ἐναργῆ) things ( τὰ περὶ ἡμᾶς ζῷα καὶ πᾶν τὸ φυτευτὸν καὶ τὸ σκευαστὸν ὅλον γένος 510 A): ‘seeing,’ as we still say, ‘is believing.’ But Plato has already spoken of AC as δοξαστόν (510 A note); so that πίστις should not be confined to the objects of sight. It is in fact a subdivision of δόξα, superior in point of ‘clearness’ ( σαφήνεια) to εἰκασία. We may regard it as the normal condition of the average uneducated mind. εἰκασία is the state of mind in which εἰκόνες are held to be true. Here again, if εἰκόνες are strictly limited to images of ὁρατά (cf. 509 E, 510 A), εἰκασία must be similarly confined in its scope, and loses all metaphysical interest and importance: see VII 517 A note But since the εἰκόνες are a lower grade of δοξαστά (510 A note), εἰκασία should be understood as a lower variety of δόξα (as in VII 534 A), viz. the state of mind which accepts as true that which is a copy of a copy ( τρίτον πρὸς ἀλήθειαν). In this sense εἰκασία (with a play on εἰκόνες) is a new coinage of Plato's. The translation ‘conjecture’ is misleading, for conjecture implies conscious doubt or hesitation, and doubt is foreign to εἰκασία in Plato's sense. Plato may however have intended to suggest that such a state of mind is in reality no better than conjecture. See also X 598 A note and Bosanquet Companion pp. 261 f. with Nettleship Lect. and Rem. II pp. 242—246.

ὥσπερ ἐφ’ οἷς κτλ. : “attributing to them such a degree of clearness as their objects have of truth” J. and C. Liebhold's ἐφ’ ὅσον for ἐφ’ οἷς is an unhappy suggestion: cf. VII 534 A. A corrector in q changed the first μετέχειν to μετέχει, which, in deference to Schneider's arguments, I formerly printed. But the text is quite sound. Stated categorically, the clause would run ὥσπερ ἐφ’ οἷς ἔστιν ἀληθείας μετέχει, οὕτω ταῦτα σαφηνείας μετέχει. Under the government of ἡγησάμενος, the first as well as the second μετέχει becomes μετέχειν; for the accusative with infinitive may be employed even in the subordinate clauses of Indirect. See on 492 C. The jingle μετέχειν— μετέχειν is inoffensive: cf. X 614 A, 621 B.

ἰδὲ γὰρ κτλ. Empedocles spoke of the terrestrial region as a cave ( ἠλύθομεν τόδ’ ὑπ’ ἄντρον ὑπόστεγον 31 ed. Karsten), and similar expressions occur in the Orphic verses e.g. ταῦτα πατὴρ ποίησε κατὰ σπέος ἠεροειδές (ap. Procl. in Tim. 95 D): see Rohde Psyche^{2} II p. 178 note and Dieterich Nekyia p. 159 note There is however nothing to shew that Plato borrowed the underlying idea, much less the details, of his simile from any previous writer: for the metaphorical application of ἄνω, ὑψόθεν and kindred words in connexion with true παιδεία is a favourite usage of Plato's (cf. Theaet. 175 B , Soph. 216 C , Phaed. 109 A ff.), and the simile might easily have been elaborated from such a metaphor. For a strikingly eloquent imitation see Cic. de nat. deor. II 95 (translated from Aristotle: see Frag. 14. 1476^{a} 34 ff.). With the life of the cave-dwellers Bosanquet aptly compares the account of uncivilized humanity in Aesch. Prom. 447 —453. A kindred though not identical figure is employed in Fitzgerald's Omar Khayya/m LXVIII: “We are no other than a moving row Of magic Shadow-shapes that come and go Round with the Sun-illumined Lantern held In Midnight by the Master of the Show.”

ἀναπεπταμένην κτλ. Herwerden suspects corruption, on the ground that the cave is dark, except for the light of the fire. But unless the entrance to the cave is open to the light of day, how are the prisoners ever to emerge, as they ultimately do (515 E)? The εἴσοδος is long ( μακρά) and steep (515 E), so that the daylight cannot reach the cave in any case. Prantl is right, I think, in understanding μακράν of length and not width, although Schneider and the English translators apparently hold the other view. See next note.

παρ’ ἅπαν τὸ σπήλαιον should (I believe) be taken separately from μακράν. The words define the width of the entrance, which is ‘along the whole of,’ i.e. ‘as wide as,’ the cave. The reason will appear later: see on ὅρα τοίνυν 514 B. The translation “extending along the entire length of the cavern” (D. and V.) seems to render μακράν altogether otiose. See Fig. ii on p. 65.

μένειν τε αὐτοῦ . See cr. n. Hirschig's emendation, which Cobet approves and Hermann and others adopt, I now think right. μένειν is not, I believe, used absolutely in the sense of μένειν αὐτοῦ, which is the meaning required here. It might be possible to understand μένειν as equivalent to μένειν ἀκινήτους, in view of Crat. 426 E and Phaedr. 261 D , but ‘remain motionless’ is not quite suitable in point of sense. Still less does the possible rendering ‘remain by themselves’ fit the situation. On the other hand μένειν τε αὐτοῦ ‘remain where they are,’ ‘remain in one place’ (cf. I 327 C, II 371 C), corresponds exactly to ἐν δεσμοῖς τὰ σκέλη, just as εἴς τε τὸ πρόσθεν μόνον ὁρᾶν echoes ἐν δεσμοῖς τοὺς αὐχένας. The τε—τε after καὶ—καί suggests that Plato intended this correspondence. There is nothing to be said for Herwerden's proposal to insert ἀκινήτους.

ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ κτλ. “Puerile interpretamentum” says Herwerden, quite superfluously. Hirschig's ἀδυνατοῦντας for ἀδυνάτους is no improvement. The word, like ὄντας, depends of course on ἰδέ. For καόμενον, Hirschig, with Cobet's approval, conjectures καομένου, and so Baiter also reads: but καομένου leaves αὐτοῖς out in the cold. “Vide ne φῶς πυρὸς ita in unam notionem coalescant, ut alterius attributum simul etiam alteri conveniat” Hermann. This explanation is correct: cf. 517 B.

ἐπάνω ὁδόν . ἐπάνοδον (Badham), which means ‘ascensum,’ is out of place here. ἐπάνω means only that the road is at a higher elevation than the prisoners (so also Schneider): it should not be taken with ὁδόν in the sense of a ‘raised way’ (Jowett). There is no reason why the ὁδός should be raised above the level of the ground, and it is unnecessarily harsh to construe the adverb with the noun. The fact that verbal nouns occasionally take an adverb in Plato (see on IV 434 C) does not justify Jowett's construction in this passage.

ὥσπερ τοῖς θαυματοποιοῖς κτλ. As in a Punch and Judy show. Cf. [Arist.] de Mundo 6. 398^{b} 16 ff. οἱ νευροσπάσται μίαν μήρινθον ἐπισπασάμενοι ποιοῦσι καὶ αὐχένα κινεῖσθαι καὶ χεῖρα τοῦ ζῴου καὶ ὦμον καὶ ὀφθαλμὸν κτλ. (Blümner, Privatalterth. p. 503 note 5, where other references are given). I agree with the Oxford editors in holding that τῶν ἀνθρώπων denotes the performers, and not, as Schneider and others translate, the spectators. οἱ ἄνθρωποι could not, without further specification, stand for the spectators, and no further specification is given. But Jowett and Campbell are, I think, in error when they distinguish between the θαυματοποιοί and the ἄν‐ θρωποι, and suppose that the θαυματοποιός is “not the actual exhibitor or puller of the strings, but the master of the show.” The ἄνθρωποι and the θαυματοποιοί are the same, and Plato might, if he had been so minded, have written ὥσπερ τοῖς θαυματοποιοῖς πρὸ ἑαυτῶν κτλ. The substitution of τῶν ἀνθρώπων for ἑαυτῶν puts the matter in a more objective way, and has also a contemptuous effect.

ὅρα τοίνυν κτλ. τοίνυν is ‘also’ (I 339 D note). The low wall which crosses the εἴσοδος at a point between the prisoners and the fire intercepts the shadows of the παραφέροντες: but the σκεύη which they carry, presumably on their heads, overtop the wall, and are reflected on the wall of the cave in front of the prisoners. See Fig. ii on p. 65. Plato adopts various devices in order to suggest a due proportion between the objects inside and outside the cave in point of reality. Thus (1) the typical examples ἀνδριάντες etc. are themselves images of the natural objects of the superior ὁρατόν: (2) the originals of the Cave are all (except the prisoners themselves 515 A) σκευαστά, whereas those of the superior ὁρατόν are —primarily speaking— φυτευτά (for the significance of this see 532 C note): (3) the contents of the Cave, both originals and shadows, may be regarded as less luminous and true than the ὁρατά outside, because they derive their light and truth, not from the Sun, but from an artificial Fire (see also on 517 C). The interpretation of the simile is to be sought in the δοξαστόν generally as well as in the ὁρατόν in particular (see on 517 A), but we need not suppose that every detail is significant. Comparisons have been made between the παραφέροντες and (in the ὁρατόν) δαίμονες (Campbell II p. 16, comparing Tim. 43), or (in the δοξαστόν) Sophists etc. (Shorey, Idea of Good etc. p. 238). The latter analogy is the more fruitful, but neither of them is altogether free from difficulty, and Plato may have intended the παραφέροντες only as part of the machinery of his similitude. If the Cave is to represent the world of τὰ πολλά, it must have a semblance of life and motion; and without the παραφέροντες the shadows would be motionless and dead.

οἷον εἰκὸς should be taken with what follows: cf. IV 419 A note

φθεγγομένους merely prepares the way for 515 B εἰ καὶ ἠχὼ κτλ., and beyond this, it has, I think, no meaning. It certainly does not “prepare for the science of harmonics” (as J. and C. hold): see 532 B note and App. I.

τῶν παραφερόντων (bracketed by Baiter) is natural enough, παρὰ τοῦτο τὸ τειχίον φέροντας being too distant to cause difficulty.

τί δέ; τῶν παραφερομένων κτλ. After τοῦτο supply οἴει ἂν ἑωρακέναι αὐτούς. I have placed a mark of interrogation after τί δέ, in order that τῶν παραφερομένων may have its proper emphasis: cf. V 470 A note

οὐ ταῦτα κτλ. : ‘do you not suppose they would believe that they were naming these particular passing objects which they saw?’ They have never seen anything of the real παριόντα (or παραφερόμενα): therefore ( οὖν) they suppose themselves to be naming, i.e. using the name of, not (as is in point of fact the case) the real παριόντα, but only these παριόντα which they see. For example, they call the shadow of a table ‘a table,’ and in so doing they are, without knowing it, naming, not, as they suppose, the shadow, but the substance. J. and C. remark that “ παριόντα is rather confusing as it might signify either the shadows” (cf. 516 C) “or the realities” (cf. 515 D). True: but ταῦτα τὰ παριόντα, ἅπερ ὁρῷεν can signify only the shadows. The corruption παρόντα for παριόντα (see cr. n.) is easy, and occurs in some MSS at 516 C (where παριόντα again= παριοῦσαι σκιαί). Plato means (to interpret the allegory) that what the ἀπαίδευτος calls a substance is only a shadow. For other views of this sentence see App. IV.

εἰ καὶ ἠχὼ κτλ. The voices heard by the ἀπαίδευτος are as shadowy as the forms he sees: βλέποντες ἔβλεπον μάτην, | κλύοντες οὐκ ἤκουον, ἀλλ’ ὀνειράτων | ἀλίγκιοι μορφαῖσι τὸν μακρὸν βίον | ἔφυρον εἰκῆ πάντα (Aesch P. V. 447—450).

νομίζοιεν κτλ. νόμος, not φύσις, is the watchword of ἀπαιδευσία .

σκευαστῶν is said by J. and C. to be “diminutive images of ordinary artificial objects,” but the word does not convey this meaning. For the purposes of this simile σκευαστά are reckoned as less real than φυτευτά: see on ὅρα τοίνυν κτλ. 514 B and φαντάσματα θεῖα 532 C. Plato takes no account of the fact that the prisoners also see shadows of themselves (515 A).

λύσιν κτλ. According to 532 B (where see note), λύσιν—τῶν ἄλλων εἴδωλα (516 A) symbolizes Plato's προπαιδεία or inferior νοητόν.

εἰ φύσει τοιάδε κτλ. φύσει has been variously interpreted as follows. (1) ‘ φύσει est revera’ (Ast, Stallbaum): (2) ‘si res et natura ferret,’ ‘in the course of nature’ (Schneider, J. and C., D. and V.): (3) ‘ φύσει, no one knows how’ (Nettleship Lect. and Rem. II p. 260). None of these explanations is either linguistically easy or altogether suitable in point of meaning. It should be remembered that the condition of the prisoners, shut out as they are from light and truth amid the darkness of the Cave, is ‘unnatural’ ( παρὰ φύσιν) in the Platonic sense of the word (see IV 443 B note). Their release is therefore a return to their true nature, and may for this reason be described as ‘natural.’ This, I think, is what Plato means to suggest by φύσει. It is true, as we are presently told (515 E βίᾳ), that force has to be employed in order to drag the prisoners on high; but their deliverance is none the less ‘natural’ in Plato's way of thinking. Schleiermacher and Herwerden wish to read οἵα τις ἂν εἴη φύσει, εἰ τοιάδε κτλ. The fact that εἰ was omitted by A^{1}, and is absent from five other MSS, may appear to favour this conjecture. We might suppose that εἰ fell out by ὁμοιοτέλευτον after φύσει, disappeared altogether from several MSS, and was wrongly replaced in A. (The evidence of Π is unfortunately wanting here.) But on this view it is difficult to see what φύσει adds to οἵα τις ἂν εἴη, and for this and other reasons I prefer the solution which I have given.

τὸ φῶς is the light of the fire (514 B): contrast αὐτὸ τὸ φῶς 515 D.

ἀναβλέπειν . ἀνα‐ is appropriate, for the fire is ἄνωθεν (514 B). Education always points upward in Plato (514 A note).

ἐγγυτέρω . It is needless to add < ὢν>, as I formerly did (with Richards, who compares I 330 E). The copula is easily supplied, especially with τετραμμένος following.

ὀρθότερον and not ὀρθότερα (as seems to be generally believed, even by J. and C.) is the reading of A. The adverb (‘more truly sees’) can alone be justified. For the meaning see VI 490 B note

βλέποι . The indicative βλέπει (which I formerly read, with q, Flor. U, Bekker and others) would be more usual, “in an indirect quotation depending on an optative which refers to the future” (Goodwin MT. p. 61). But the rule which excludes the optative in such cases is not absolute, as appears from Dem. 16. 5 (cited by Goodwin l.c.), and ἔχοι in VIII 544 A is in principle the same as βλέποι here. For the collocation of indicative ( ἑώρα) with optative Schneider quotes Phaed. 96 B and 95 D.

καὶ δὴ κτλ. ἀπορεῖν is almost a technical term of Socrates' dialectic (cf. Xen. Mem. III 10. 7 and Theaet. 149 A ff.), but Plato has in mind the effect of his own προπαιδεία, as appears from 532 B, C.

φεύγειν ἀποστρεφόμενον κτλ. As when a bewildered disputant takes refuge again in the fallacious position from which he has been dislodged: see I 334 B note For δύναται Richards would read δύναιτο, comparing ἅπερ ὁρῷεν in 515 B. δύναται treats the simile as a reality, exactly like ἀμβλυώττει in 516 E: compare also 538 A note, and (for the construction) Phaed. 67 E οὐ πολλὴ ἂν ἀλογία εἴη, εἰ μὴ ἅσμενοι ἐκεῖσε ἴοιεν, οἷ ἀφικομένοις ἐλπίς ἐστιν οὗ διὰ βίου ἤρων τυχεῖν .

ἕλκοι κτλ. Cf. Theaet. 175 B ὅταν δέ γέ τινα αὐτός, ὦ φίλε, ἑλκύσῃ ἄνω κτλ. The alliteration of ἀν‐ ( ἀναβάσεως, ἀνάντους, ἀνείη, ἀγανακτεῖν) should be noticed: see on 514 A. With αὐγῆς ἂν ἔχοντα κτλ. we may compare Theaet. 175 D βλέπων μετέωρος ἄνωθεν ὑπὸ ἀηθείας ἀδημονῶν τε καὶ ἀπορῶν καὶ βαρβαρίζων κτλ.

πρῶτον μὲν κτλ. πρῶτον μὲν—εἴδωλα (the lower ὁρατόν of the line) symbolizes the higher stages of Plato's προπαιδεία, and ὕστερον δὲ αὐτά—οἷός ἐστιν (the higher ὁρατόν) corresponds to the higher νοητόν. See 532 B, C notes αὐτά, τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ—νύκτωρ and τὸν ἥλιον represent an ascending scale of Ideas up to the Good: cf. note on τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου VI 511 B. It may be doubted whether in point of fact the released prisoner would not be able to look on the heavens by night sooner than upon ‘objects themselves’ ( αὐτά) by day. But the simile holds good in so far as the eye mounts ever higher: and the moon and stars are nearest to the sun ( ἡλιοειδῆ, says Proclus in remp. I p. 294. 6 Kroll), which is the ultimate goal.

συλλογίζοιτο κτλ. should be interpreted by VI 509 B (the Good as the cause of Being). οὗτος is preferred by Stallbaum and others to αὐτός (see cr. n.), in which J. and C. find “a solemn emphasis.” There is no difficulty about the repetition ( αὐτοῦ—αὐτός), but αὐτός ‘ipse’ is less suitable here than the deictic οὗτος: cf. αὕτη in 517 C and VI 462 E note

τῷ ὀξύτατα καθορῶντι κτλ. “Induction conceived as inference from particulars to particulars, its test being prediction (not explanation), and its method being association of images or unanalysed likenesses, by contiguity in co-existence or succession” Bosanquet. Plato is thinking chiefly of the empirical politician and political adviser, who foretells the future from the present and the past (cf. Thuc. I 22), but limits his intellectual horizon by his own experience, and knows nothing of the real determining causes of events. The vast majority of Athenian statesmen belonged in Plato's opinion to this category: see on V 473 C and VI 488 B.

αὐτῶν does not of course depend on πρότερα (as D. and V. translate), but is a partitive genitive after ὅσα.

τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου κτλ. I formerly proposed to omit πεπονθέναι, but a precise parallel is furnished by Symp. 198 C ἀτεχνῶς τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου ἐπεπόνθη. ἄν makes πεπονθέναι equivalent to the future perfect—a more vigorous form of expression than the future (or aorist with ἄν) would be. The quotation (which is from Od. XI 489, cf. supra III 386 C) “has a curious felicity, being the words of Achilles in expressing his detestation of the world of shades (lit. shadows) in comparison with the world of human life” (Bosanquet). It is better, I think, to connect ἄλλῳ with θητευέμεν (Ameis on Od. l.c.) than with παρά (as Schneider does).

καὶ ὁτιοῦν κτλ. ἄν (which Richards would alter to δή) is as suitable here as before, since ἂν πεπονθέναι depends in both cases directly on δοκεῖς. The confusion of ἄν and δή is not so frequent as some have thought: see on V 450 C.

δοξάζειν =‘opine’ is technical: for the cave is an allegory of τὸ δοξαστόν (514 A note).

ἄν . See cr. n. and IV 437 B note Stallbaum proposes ἂν πλέως, but Baiter's solution (which Cobet and Herwerden also recommend) is easier and better. ἀνάπλεως suggests contagion: see Ruhnken on Tim. Lex. s. v.

σχοίη as usual is inchoative or ingressive (‘get’): cf. 520 D and 527 B.

γνωματεύοντα : ‘discriminating,’ ‘distinguishing,’ ‘judging,’ as explained by the Scholiast ( διακρίνοντα, διαγιγνώσκοντα ἀκριβῶς), Suidas and Timaeus (if with Ruhnken we read γνωματεύοντα for γνωμονεύοντα). A similar explanation appears in the margin of A ( γρ κρίνοντα γρ γιγνώσκοντ’ ἀκριβῆ). The word is derived of course from γνῶμα (‘means of judging,’ ‘test’), for which see Jebb on Soph. Tr. 593 . γνωματεύω occurs only here in good Greek, but became more frequent afterwards (for instances see Ruhnken in Tim. Lex. s. v.). Here, as J. and C. remark, it seems to be “used with some degree of contempt” (like τευτάζω in 521 E).

ἀμβλυώττει . For the mood see 515 E note ἀμβλυώττοι occurs in q and Flor. U, and is read by Bekker and others. Herwerden adds ἔτι after ἀμβλυώττει, comparing 517 D, but the text is sound.

οὗτος δ’ ὁ χρόνος κτλ. is still under the influence of εἰ. With ἆρ’ οὐ γέλωτ’ ἂν κτλ. cf. Phaedr. 249 D ἐξιστάμενος δὲ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων σπουδασμάτων, καὶ πρὸς τῷ θείῳ γιγνόμενος, νουθετεῖται μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ὡς παρακινῶν, ἐνθουσιάζων δὲ λέληθε τοὺς πολλούς, Theaet. 172 C , 174 C—175 B, Soph. 216 D and infra 517 D.

οὐκ ἄξιον κτλ. The prisoners are almost relieved to find themselves able to suppress their higher promptings and sink back into indolence and self-complacency.

καὶ τὸν ἐπιχειροῦντα κτλ. is a mani fest and touching allusion to the death of Socrates, whose fate was the most conspicuous example in Greek history of the principle here laid down. See Zeller^{4} II 1, pp. 223—227 and cf. VI 496 C, D notes Read in the light of another and even more momentous sacrifice, the sentence assumes a kind of prophetical import, like the famous passage about the λόγος θεῖος in the Phaedo (85 C, D). See Geddes's Phaedo of Plato pp. 280—283. The text is difficult to determine. If we retain λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτιννύναι ἄν, we must either a regard ἆρ’ οὐ— λέγοιτ’ ἄν as equivalent to ἆρ’ οὐκ οἴει γέλωτ’ ἂν αὐτὸν παρασχεῖν καὶ λέγεσθαι ἄν, and take λέγεσθαι ἄν as equivalent to ἐκείνους ἂν εἰπεῖν, carrying on ἐκείνους as subject to ἀποκτιννύναι ἄν (Schneider), or b supply οὐκ οἴει, although these words do not occur after 516 C (J. and C.). The second solution is preferable to the first, but either is a tour de force. No satisfactory explanation of the infinitive ἀποκτιννύναι ἄν appears to be possible, and the immediate juxtaposition of the two forms of the infinitive is also in itself suspicious. A few inferior MSS read ἀποκτενεῖν for the ἀποκτείνειν and αὖ for the ἄν of A: but otherwise there is no important variant. The emendations proposed are (1) λαβεῖν, κἂν ἀποκτείνειαν (Ast), (2) λαβεῖν, καὶ ἀποκτείνοιεν ἄν (Stallbaum), (3) λαβεῖν, κἂν ἀποκτιννύοιεν (Cobet), (4) λαβεῖν, καὶ ἀποκτείνειαν ἄν (Baiter). The correction in the text appears to me not only easier, but more in harmony with Plato's fulness of expression. I suppose that the error arose thus. A scribe accidentally omitted ἀποκτιννύναι, and the infinitive was wrongly replaced after, instead of before, ἀποκτείνειαν. This would give λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποκτείνειαν, ἀποκτιννύναι ἄν, from which the change is inevitable to the text of A.

ταύτην κτλ. If we interpret the lower section of the line as ὁρατόν and nothing more, the following comparisons are involved:—(1) Fire=Sun: (2) Shadows of ἀνδριάντες and other σκευαστά cast by Fire = Shadows etc. of φυτευτά and σκευαστά cast by the Sun: (3) ἀνδριάντες and other σκευαστά in the Cave= φυτευτά and σκευαστά in the ὁρατόν: (4) the ascent from the Cave into the ὁρατόν=the ascent from the ὁρατόν into the νοητόν. The second comparison is of little or no importance, for the ἀπαίδευτος, of whose condition the Cave is an allegory, does not contemplate exclusively or even principally natural shadows of φυτευτά and σκευαστά (cf. VI 511 E note). Nor do the other comparisons exhaust the significance of the Cave as an allegory of ἀπαιδευσία. In order fully to apprehend its meaning, we must regard the lower section of the line as δοξαστόν in the sense of V 475 E ff. Plato himself does so: see VI 510 A note The shadows and originals within the cave will then symbolise δόξαι which are respectively twice and once removed from the truth which they seek to portray (see on 517 D), and the ascent from the Cave into the ὁρατόν will represent the soul's ascent from the δοξαστόν into the νοητόν—from the πολλά (in the widest sense) to the ἕν. Cf. 514 B and 532 B, C notes

ἐλπίδος : ‘surmise’: cf. II 383 B note The diffidence of tone recals VI 506 E: cf. infr. 523 A.

φαίνεται . For the construction cf. I 334 B note

τελευταία as well as μόγις should be taken predicatively with ὁρᾶσθαι. The sentiment is as in VI 505 A ( ὅτι—ἴσμεν), where see note.

τεκοῦσα κτλ. τεκοῦσα reminds us that the Sun is the ἔκγονος of the Good (VI 506 E). On ἀλήθειαν καὶ νοῦν see VI 508 D note ὅτι δεῖ depends on φαίνεται, not (as D. and V. translate) on συλλογιστέα. Cf. VI 505 A, 506 A notes Plato's guardians are not to rest satisfied with the εἰκών or ἔκγονος of the Good; they must see the Good itself, and infer (not by intuition, but) by means of reasoning ( συλλογιστέα) that it is the cause of all. See the notes on VI 511 B ( αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος and τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου).

ἀσχημονεῖ κτλ. Cf. Theaet. 174 B , C ὅταν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ἤ που ἄλλοθι ἀναγκασθῇ περὶ τῶν παρὰ πόδας—διαλέγεσθαι, γέλωτα παρέχει—ἡ ἀσχημοσύνη δεινὴ—γελοῖος φαίνεται. The whole of the description of the φιλόσοφος in the Theaetetus should be carefully compared with this passage.

ἔτι ἀμβλυώττων is logically subordinate to ἀναγκαζόμενος.

τῶν τοῦ δικαίου κτλ. treats the Cave as an allegory of δοξαστά (see on VI 510 A, VII 517 A). The expression ‘shadows of the just’ is vague (cf. σκιαμαχούντων in 520 C), and ἢ ἀγαλμάτων ὧν αἱ σκιαί introduces more precision. We may regard ἀγαλμάτων as symbolising the enacted laws of a city, and their shadows as the “representation or misrepresentation of the existing laws (themselves only ‘images’ of justice) by a rhetorician or pleader” (Nettleship Hell. p. 141 note 1). Compare (with Shorey Idea of Good etc. p. 287) Soph. 234 C and Pol. 303 C .

ὅπῃ ποτὲ ‐‐ ἰδόντων . For the real point at issue is not the law, but the judges' interpretation thereof. Plato is doubtless thinking of Socrates and his judges throughout the whole of this passage.

φανότερον (‘greater brightness,’ ‘more light’) and λαμπροτέρου are neuter. The omission of articles elevates the style. Richards would delete ὑπὸ λαμπροτέρου, but the words balance ὑπὸ ἀηθείας exactly as ἐσκότωται balances μαρμαρυγῆς ἐμπέπλησται (‘has been dazzled’). Any stronger antithesis than ὑπὸ ἀηθείας would give a false meaning, for the blindness is not caused by σκότος, but only by ἀήθεια: ξυνεθιζόμενοι γὰρ μυρίῳ βέλτιον ὄψεσθε τῶν ἐκεῖ κτλ. (520 C).

εἰ γελᾶν κτλ. Cf. Theaet. 175 B , D. There is more of pity than of malice in Plato's philosophic smile.

αὐτῶν : ‘the subject before us’: cf. VI 511 C, and αὐτό in I 339 E note

ἐπαγγελλόμενοι κτλ. ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι of sophistic ‘professions’ is almost technical: cf. e.g. Prot. 319 A , Gorg. 447 C and Isocr. Soph. 1. τινές from its position is emphatic, and makes us halfsuspect some allusion to a particular Sophist: cf. Aristotle's use of τινές (Bonitz Ind. Arist. p. 598). Similar sophistic ἐπαγγέλματα are ridiculed, though on different grounds, by Isocrates Soph. 2 ff.: see also Prot. 318 E ff. and Euthyd. 273 D ff. ( ἀρετήν, ἔφη sc. ὁ Εὐθύδημος,— οἰόμεθα οἵω τ’ εἶναι παραδοῦναι κάλλιστ’ ἀνθρώπων καὶ τάχιστα), and cf. Newman Politics of Aristotle I p. 387. It should be mentioned that the double εἶναι has been suspected by Richards, who would omit the first; but Plato himself is not averse to such repetitions: cf. μετέχειν— μετέχειν in VI 511 E and X 621 B note

ἐντιθέναι . Cf. Theognis 429—438 ( εἰ δ’ ἦν ποιητόν τε καὶ ἔνθετον ἀνδρὶ νοήμα 435). The grossly material and mechanical view of education which Plato here attacks has some affinity with what is sometimes called ‘cram.’ ἐντιθέναι was used of a nurse feeding children (I 345 B note); but such an allusion, though not in itself inappropriate, is scarcely intended here. Cf. also Symp. 175 D , E.

ὁ δέ γε νῦν λόγος κτλ. Sophists profess to put ἐπιστήμη into the soul; but Plato's argument indicates that the power or faculty of ἐπιστήμη ( ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν), and its organ νοῦς are already present in the soul of each individual, just as ὄψις and ὄμμα are already possessed by the prisoners in the cave. νοῦς is in fact the θεῖόν τι ἐν ἡμῖν, according to Plato, through whose indwelling man is most truly man by being like to God (VI 501 B, IX 589 D notes). The doctrine that μάθησις is ἀνάμνησις implies what is fundamentally the same view: see Meno 81 A ff. and Phaed. 72 E —76 D, especially 73 A ἐρωτώμενοι οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἐάν τις καλῶς ἐρωτᾷ, αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν πάντα ᾗ ἔχει· καίτοι εἰ μὴ ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῖς ἐπιστήμη ἐνοῦσα καὶ ὀρθὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἂν οἷοί τ’ ἦσαν τοῦτο ποιήσειν. We may even go further and say that Plato's conception of the divine element in man is the ultimate basis of all his proofs of Immortality. In its deeper bearings, therefore, the view of education here presented is incomparably grander and more profound than the usual connotation of the word either in ancient or in modern times. We educate our pupils not only for time, but for eternity, and therefore πείρας οὐδὲν ἀνήσομεν, ἕως ἂν ἢ πείσωμεν καὶ τοῦτον καὶ τοῦς ἄλλους, ἢ προὔργου τι ποιήσωμεν εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν βίον, ὅταν αὖθις γενόμενοι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐντύχωμεν λόγοις (VI 498 D). See also X 618 C ff. and Phaed. 107 D f. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἔχουσα εἰς Αἵδου ἡ ψυχὴ ἔρχεται πλὴν τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς κτλ. Michael Angelo used to say that every block of marble contained a statue, and that the sculptor brings it to light by cutting away the encumbrances by which the ‘human face divine’ is concealed. In like manner, according to Plato, it is the business of the teacher to prune the soul of his pupil of those unnatural excrescences and incrustations which hide its true nature (519 A, B note), until the human soul divine (VI 501 B note) stands out in all its pristine grace and purity. It should carefully be noted that in Plato's theory of education the entire soul is involved ( ξὺν ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ). The Platonic περιαγωγή, although, or rather, perhaps, because, it applies primarily and immediately to the intellect, effects a moral no less than an intellectual revolution. The moral discipline of Books II—IV, so far from being overthrown, is strengthened and consolidated by being intellectualised. Cf. also 519 A B note

ἑκάστου . ἑκάστῳ was read by Iamblichus ( Protrept. 16) for ἑκάστου: but cf. 527 D note

ξύν . See on IV 424 D. Here, as in Gorg. 513 A and Laws 678 C, it implies an intimate, almost organic, connexion (‘in conjunction with’). Lina ( de praepos. usu Plat. p. 33) is mistaken in holding that ξύν introduces a mere “Anhängsel” in this passage.

τούτου τοίνυν κτλ. “Construe: ( ἡ παιδεία) εἴη ἂν τέχνη τῆς περιαγωγῆς (i.q. τοῦ περιάγειν, quod praecedit) τούτου αὐτοῦ ( τοῦ ὀργάνου τῆς ψυχῆς, ᾧ καταμανθάνει ἕκαστος)— οὐ ( τέχνη ) τοῦ ἐμποιῆσαι αὐτῷ τὸ ὁρᾶν—ἀλλὰ ( τοῦ) μηχανήσασθαι τοῦτο ( ὥστε βλέπειν οἷ ἔδει)” Ast. This interpretation is, I believe, correct. Plato began by asserting that Education is not what certain Sophists declare it to be—the putting of sight, as it were, into blind eyes. For there is already in every man's soul an eye or ὄργανον, which sees or learns already; what is required is to turn this ὄργανον round. Hence he concludes ( τοίνυν) Education is not (as the Sophists say) an art of putting sight into the soul's eye ( τοῦ ἐμποιῆσαι αὐτῷ τὸ ὁρᾶν refers to τυφλοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ὄψιν ἐντιθέντες), but an art of turning round just this very eye or ὄργανον which is present in every soul from the first. The prevailing view since Schneider regards τούτου αὐτοῦ as anticipating and explained by, not as depending on, τῆς περιαγωγῆς. This yields a tolerable sense, but makes it difficult to supply the subject of μεταστραφήσεται, and αὐτῷ is also awkward. On Ast's view τίνα— μεταστραφήσεται explains τούτου αὐτοῦ τῆς περιαγωγῆς, and the subject of μεταστραφήσεται as well as the antecedent of αὐτῷ is at once seen to be τὸ ὄργανον ᾧ καταμανθάνει ἕκαστος, for it is identical with the antecedent of τούτου αὐτοῦ.

τοῦ ἐμποιῆσαι κτλ. The genitive has been wrongly taken as one of the rare examples in good Greek of an independent final infinitive (Weiske quoted in A. J. Ph. IV p. 418), a construction for which see Jannaris Historical Greek Grammar pp. 483, 578. It depends on τέχνη: see last note. For διαμηχανήσασθαι Ast (with some inferior MSS) reads δὴ μηχανήσασθαι: but cf. (with Schneider) Laws 746 C τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ διαμηχανᾶσθαι ὅπως ἂν γίγνηται.

αἱ μὲν τοίνυν κτλ. ἄλλαι is anticipative )( ἡ δὲ τοῦ φρονῆσαι below. καλούμεναι (as Bosanquet points out) should be taken with ψυχῆς (lit. ‘which are called soul's’ i.e. ‘which are commonly said to belong to the soul’). Plato does not mean to deny that they are virtues, but they do not belong to soul essentially and from the first. Krohn ( Pl. St. pp. 185 ff.), who, with the editors generally, takes καλούμεναι as ‘sogenannten,’ affirms that Plato here discards the virtues of Book IV; but he is merely contrasting these and other virtues or excellencies with νόησις.

ἐγγύς τι εἶναι . Campbell conjectures ἐγγύς τι τείνειν. I once thought of ἐγγύς τι τεῖναι, taking the aorist as an explicit reference to the ethical virtues already discussed; but the text is doubtless sound: cf. V 472 C and VIII 544 D ( μεταξύ τι τούτων πού εἰσιν).

ἔθεσι καὶ ἀσκήσεσιν . Aristotle Nic. Eth. II 1 is in effect a commentary on this text: note in particular ἡ δ’ ἠθικὴ ( ἀρετὴ) ἐξ ἔθους περιγίγνεται (1103^{a} 17)— οὐδεμία τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται (ibid. 19)— τὰς δ’ ἀρετὰς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον (1103^{a} 31).

ἡ δὲ τοῦ φρονῆσαι κτλ. The ἀρετή of φρονῆσαι (= νόησις or the exercise of νοῦς) is not merely καλουμένη ψυχῆς, but does in reality belong to (for τυγχάνει οὖσα cf. I 337 B note)—is an essential attribute of—something more divine (than that to which the other virtues belong), viz. νοῦς. The meaning of φρόνησις has changed since IV 433 B (see on IV 428 B) in conformity with the intellectualism of Books VI and VII.

παντὸς μᾶλλον has been suspected, and Madvig proposes ὑφάσματος or πλάσματος μᾶλλον, Richards ὀργάνου μᾶλλον: but the text is indubitably sound. The phrase, like πάντων μάλιστα, means ‘most assuredly,’ and has nothing to do with the comparative θειοτέρου, but emphasises the whole assertion exactly as in Crit. 49 B and Prot. 344 B .

τὴν μὲν δύναμιν κτλ. Plato means that νοῦς can never lose its power or function, which is νόησις. οὐδέποτε should not be limited to this life. The Peripatetic doctrine of “das unsterbliche Attribut der denkenden Function” is here foreshadowed, as Krohn observes ( Pl. St. p. 160). See also on 518 C.

ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς περιαγωγῆς is equivalent to ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς περιαγωγῆς τε καὶ μή (‘according as it is or is not turned round’). See on VI 498 A.

δριμὺ μὲν κτλ. δριμύ is ‘shrewdly.’ ‘astutely,’ like a quick-sighted lawyer: cf. (with J. and C.) Theaet. 175 D τὸν σμικρὸν ἐκεῖνον τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ δριμὺν καὶ δικανικόν. For ταῦτα Cobet needlessly proposes τά: cf. 519 B note Instead of ὥστε (which three MSS omit) Ast conjectured καί, and E. S. Thompson ( Camb. Phil. Soc. Proceed. XXI p. 13) ὥς τε: but the clause ὅσῳ—ἐργαζόμενον is a logical inference from οὐ φαύλην—ὑπηρετεῖν and should not therefore be introduced by καί, still less by ὥς τε. I formerly printed ἐργάζεται ( Ξ and the three MSS already referred to reading ἐργάσεται), but the finite verb is not likely to have been corrupted into a participle, and exactly the same ungrammatical assimilation appears with ὥστε in Andoc. 4. 20, Isaeus 9. 16 and Isocr. Paneg. 64, 65 (quoted by Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 1015 note 3). The instances cited by Schneider ( Addit. p. 52) viz. Tim. 56 B , [ Eryx.] 404 A and Thuc. I 25 are not strictly parallel to this.

τὰς τῆς γενέσεως κτλ. : ‘as it were the leaden weights, which are of the family of Becoming, and which, through indulgences in eating and through pleasures and gluttonous desires connected with such like indulgences, adhere to it’ (i.e. to such a nature, τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως) ‘and turn the soul's vision round below.’ The eye of the soul ought to be turned round ἐκ τοῦ γιγνομένου (518 C): and it is our duty to shake the soul clear of τὰς τῆς γενέσεως ξυγγενεῖς μολυβδίδας. For γενέσεως see on VI 485 B, and cf. μεταστροφῆς ἀπὸ γενέσεως ἐπ’ ἀλήθειάν τε καὶ οὐσίαν infra 525 C and 525 B, 526 E, 534 A al. With ξυγγενεῖς cf. VIII 554 D where τὰς τοῦ κηφῆνος ξυγγενεῖς ἐπιθυμίας = τὰς κηφηνώδεις ἐπιθυμίας. The μολυβδίδες are the accumulated products of sensual indulgence and desire: see X 611 C ff., especially ἃ νῦν αὐτῇ, ἅτε γῆν ἑστιωμένῃ, γεηρὰ καὶ πετρώδη πολλὰ καὶ ἄγρια περιπέφυκεν ὑπὸ τῶν εὐδαιμόνων λεγομένων ἑστιάσεων 611 E—612 A, and Phaed. 81 C together with Ep. VII 326 B. Cf. also Clement Strom. IV 4 p. 1228 C Migne ὥσπερ μολυβδίδας τὰς ἐπιθυμίας. These μολυβδίδες are akin to the world of γένεσις because they are σωματοειδῆ, γεώδη, γεηρά (Plato ll. cc.), of the earth earthy. They become incorporate with the soul ( προσφυεῖς γιγνόμεναι, cf. προσπεφυκέναι X 611 D), making it, as Plato does not hesitate to say, σωματοειδῆ, δοξάζουσαν ταῦτα ἀληθῆ εἶναι, ἅπερ ἃν καὶ τὸ σῶμα φῇ ( Phaed. 83 D , cf. ib. 82 E, 83 C). Milton is platonizing when he tells how the soul “grows clotted by con tagion, Imbodies and imbrutes, till she quite lose The divine property of her first being” ( Comus 464 ff.). Through the weight of these encumbrances the eye of the soul is turned down (cf. IX 586 A κάτω ἀεὶ βλέποντες καὶ κεκυφότες εἰς γῆν καὶ εἰς τραπέζας κτλ.), nor can the soul look upwards until they are knocked away ( περιεκόπη: cf. περικρουσθεῖσα in X 611 E). We may again compare the lines of Milton “Mammon, the least erected spirit that fell From Heaven; for e'en in Heaven his looks and thoughts Were always downward bent” ( Par. Lost I 679 ff.). For περικάτω cf. Photius περικάτω τραπήσεται· ἀντὶ τοῦ περιτραπήσεται κάτω. The περι‐ balances περι‐ in περιεστρέφετο just below. Instead of ἐδωδαῖς, Jackson suggests ἐδωδῆς, comparing III 389 E τῶν περὶ πότους καὶ ἀφροδίσια καὶ περὶ ἐδωδὰς ἡδονῶν. The proposal is attractive and may be right; but I think there is hardly sufficient reason for departing from the MSS. See also on περικάτω and the whole of this difficult and highly important sentence, App. V.

ὧν εἰ ἀπαλλαγὲν κτλ. For the anacoluthon cf. Laws 810 D, E (Engelhardt Anac. Pl. Spec. III p. 37). Cobet gratuitously adds τά before ἐφ’ ἅ. Cf. 519 A note With the sentiment cf. VI 491 C, D notes, 494 C ff. notes Plato may well be thinking of Alcibiades again. The present passage is a conspicuous proof of the almost boundless influence which Plato ascribed to education, when applied to gifted natures.

σκοπὸν ‐‐ ἕνα κτλ. The εἷς σκοπός of Plato's guardians is the Idea of Good, which is therefore clearly not only a metaphysical but also an ethical concept—the goal of conduct as well as the ultimate cause of knowledge and existence. Cf. 540 A and App. III.

ἑκόντες εἶναι . I 336 E note

τῶν οἰκιστῶν =‘the founders’ is in explanatory apposition with ἡμέτερον .

ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν . VI 505 A.

ἰδεῖν τε κτλ. depends on ἀναγκάσαι and explains ἀφικέσθαι—μέγιστον (J. and C.). τε balances καί before ἀναβῆναι. This explanation is better than to regard τε as ‘and’ (with Schneider and D. and V.).

ἔπειτα and ε<*>τα are used like our ‘what!’ in indignant or quasi-indignant questions. Cf. Gorg. 466 C , Ap. 28 B and elsewhere, with Blaydes on Ar. Av. 911 .

ἐπελάθου κτλ. πάλιν does not mean that Glauco has forgotten twice, but only that he remembered before. The emphasis falls on ἐπελάθου rather than on πάλιν. Plato is thinking of V 466 A, where Glauco says μέμνημαι when challenged on this point. To this explanation, which he gives as an alternative, Schneider inclines to prefer the view which sees in πάλιν a reference directly to IV 419 A ff. But the interlocutor there is Adimantus, not Glauco, and even Adimantus in IV could not strictly be said to forget what Socrates for the first time expressly asserts (IV 420 B οὐ μὴν πρὸς τοῦτο—ἡ πόλις) in reply to Adimantus' difficulties.

νόμῳ is the reading of all the best MSS, and was restored by Schneider for νομοθέτῃ. Law is personified throughout the whole sentence: cf. (with Schneider) Tim. 24 B . νομοθέτῃ gives a good sense, but is weaker than νόμῳ: Law, we feel, is free from selfishness and partiality, but a legislator need not be.

ἐπὶ τὸν ξύνδεσμον is not ‘so as to be the bond of the State’ (as J. and C. suggest), but ‘for binding the city together,’ with reference to ξυναρμόττων τοὺς πολίτας. Cf. Laws 921 C.

τοίνυν =‘further’ (I 339 D note). Socrates has not yet replied to Glauco's indignant ἀδικήσομεν αὐτούς; but proceeds to do so now.

οὐδ’ ἀδικήσομεν : (besides what I have just said) we shall not be wronging them either. οὐδέ is used in the same way in Euthyph. 12 A and Laws 673 C. δέ in οὐδέ cannot mean ‘in spite of what you say’ (as J. and C. imagine).

ὥσπερ ἐν σμήνεσιν κτλ. is probably a Socratic comparison: cf. Xen. Cyr. V 1. 24 (quoted by Ast) βασιλεὺς μὲν γὰρ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς σὺ πεφυκέναι οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ ὁ ἐν τῷ σμήνει φυόμενος τῶν μελιττῶν ἡγεμών. See also Pöhlmann Gesch. d. ant. Komm. p. 134 note

ἀμφοτέρων : “et publicorum negotiorum et philosophiae” Stallbaum. Cf. Gorg. 485 A ἀλλ), ο<*>μαι, τὸ ὀρθότατόν ἐστιν ἀμφοτέρων μετασχεῖν. Is the θεωρητικός or the πρακτικὸς βίος the better? It is clear that the subject was often debated in Plato's time: see the fragments of Euripides' Antiope in Pl. Gorg. 484 E ff. and Arist. Eth. Nic. I 3. 1095^{b} 17 ff., X 7. 1177^{a} 12 ff. If we contrast them with each other, Plato would reply, the θεωρητικός easily wins the prize, but under the existing conditions of human nature the best life is a combination of both. The practical statesman must derive his inspiration from θεωρία, and experience of affairs is an advantage as well as a duty to the thinker. Cf. VI 496 D—497 A notes

ξυνεθιζόμενοι κτλ. Cf. 518 A note

εἴδωλα . 517 D note The word is here used quite generally of all the idols of Plato's cave. “We have risen to a point of view from which the σκευαστά and the σκιαί are included under one notion as εἴδωλα” (J. and C.).

ὕπαρ κτλ. Cf. V 476 C. The Homeric line οὐκ ὄναρ, ἀλλ) ὕπαρ <*>σθλόν, ὅ τοι τετελεσμένον ἔσται ( Od. 19. 547) is in Plato's mind, though ὕπαρ and ὄναρ are here adverbial accusatives (cf. Cobet V. L.^{2} pp. 523 ff.).

σκιαμαχούντων : ‘fighting about shadows.’ See 517 D note and cf. IX 586 C note Dreamland is also shadowland.

ἐν πόλει ᾗ κτλ. On ᾗ for ἐν ᾗ see note on ἐν ἅπασιν οἶς ἔστι III 402 A. Van Cleef ( de attr. in enunt. rel. usu Plat. p. 46) explains the construction as equivalent to ἐν ᾗ πόλει, comparing Men. 96 C , which is however (like Tim. 45 D ) only an example of inverse attraction.

ταύτην : an anacoluthon, as in VI 510 E. For the sentiment see I 347 D note

σχοῦσαν =‘which gets’: a gnomic aorist participle. See Goodwin MT. p. 55. Richards conjectures ἔχουσαν, and ἴσχουσαν (which appears in the margin of A) has slight MS authority; but the inchoative sense (516 E note) is better suited to οἱ μέλλοντες ἄρξειν.

ἕκαστοι . The plural implies relays of governors relieving one another from time to time: cf. ἑκάστοις in 540 B.

μετ’ ἀλλήλων κτλ. “Far from the madding crowd's ignoble strife.” ἐν τῷ καθαρῷ means ‘in the undefiled.’ The phrase is half-mystical, as καθαρόν constantly is in Plato. It is natural to think of the myth of the Phaedo (109 B ff. αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν γῆν καθαρὰν ἐν καθαρῷ κεῖσθαι τῷ οὐρανῷ), but we should not translate “sub divo” (Ast), nor even “auf der reinen Höhe” (Schneider). Either version is too precise, and ἐν καθαρῷ does not mean sub divo even in Homer. The Ideas in Plato are τὸ καθαρόν: see Phaed. 79 D ἐκεῖσε οἴχεται εἰς τὸ καθαρόν τε καὶ ἀεὶ ὂν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον.

παντὸς μὴν κτλ. The πόλις ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν has now been found. That Plato intended to recal the prophecy of I 347 D is clear from the verbal echoes between the two passages. On the absence of the preposition before τὸ ἄρχειν see VIII 553 B note

οὐ χρυσίου κτλ. Cf. VIII 547 B φύσει ὄντε πλουσίω τὰς ψυχάς and Phaedr. ad fin. πλούσιον δὲ νομίζοιμι τὸν σοφόν.

πτωχοὶ κτλ. : ‘men who are poor and an-hungered for lack of goods of their own.’ So Schneider and Bosanquet rightly explain the passage. πεινᾶν is used almost in its original etymological sense ( πεῖνα from πέν‐ης, πέν‐ομαι): cf. Xen. Cyr. VII 5. 50 and VIII 3. 39 ὦ μακάριε σὺ τά τε ἄλλα καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὅτι ἐκ πένητος πλούσιος γεγένησαι· πολὺ γὰρ οἴομαί σε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἥδιον πλουτεῖν, ὅτι πεινήσας χρημάτων πεπλούτηκας. The contrast with πλούσιοι, and the presence of πτωχοί, make it easy to catch the meaning. The translation ‘hunger after private advantages’ (D. and V., Jowett) is in my opinion incorrect.

τἀγαθόν ‘their good’ (Bosanquet), hardly ‘the chief good’ (Jowett). Not possessing any ἴδια ἀγαθά in the shape of virtue, they are fain to make up for it at the expense of the State.

περιμάχητον κτλ. For the construction cf. (with J. and C.) Phaed. 69 B .

τοῦ ἄρχειν is personified and ἰέναι ἐπ’ αὐτό should be translated ‘woo her.’ Cf. VI 489 D note

οἳ κτλ. The copula is rarely omitted in a relative clause except in statements of proportion like Gorg. 465 C . An example occurs in II 370 E: see also Kühner-Blass Gr. Gr. II 1, p. 41. We ought not to revert to the old reading οἵπερ for οἳ περὶ (with q and E. S. Thompson, Camb. Phil. Soc. Proc. XXI p. 14, who also suggests οἵπερ περὶ), even if— which is far from clear— ὅσπερ can, as Thompson says, dispense with the copula more easily than ὅς .

λέγονται δή τινες κτλ. With εἰς θεοὺς ἀνελθεῖν cf. Plut. de ser. num. vind. 566 A ἔλεγε δὲ ταύτῃ τὸν Διόνυσον εἰς θεοὺς ἀνελθεῖν. If Plato's words are to be taken in their full significance, we can hardly (with J. and C.) suppose that the allusion is to Heracles, Pollux etc., for Heracles' descent to Hades was an incident which happened long before his ascent to Heaven; and Pollux's life among the gods was intermittent. Cf. Schneider in his translation p. 304 note 187. Schneider himself suggests that Plato is thinking of legends about e.g. Aesculapius' deliverance from Hades, after Zeus had smitten him (cf. III 408 C and Roscher's Lexicon d. Mythologie I p. 620), and others have thought of Briareos and the ἑκατόγχειροι: see Il. I 402—405 and cf. Hes. Theog. 617—721. Mr Walter Headlam has pointed out to me that Semele was also raised from Hades to Heaven, citing Paus. II 31. 2 and ib. 37. 5: cf. also Plut. l.c. Διόνυσον εἰς θεοὺς ἀνελθεῖν καὶ τὴν Σεμέλην ἀνάγειν ὕστερον. These examples are certainly more to the point. It is worthy of remark that Justin Martyr in a remarkable passage of his Apologia pro Christianis speaks of the ascent of Asclepius and others into Heaven as Pagan parallels to the Christian doctrine of the Ascension: Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν—σταυρωθέντα καὶ ἀποθανόντα καὶ ἀναστάντα ἀνεληλυθέναι εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν, οὐ παρὰ τοὺς παρ’ ὑμῖν λεγομένους υἱοὺς τῷ Διῒ καινόν τι φέρομεν. πόσους γὰρ υἱοὺς φάσκουσι τοῦ Διὸς οἱ παρ’ ὑμῖν τιμώμενοι συγγραφεῖς ἐπίστασθε, Ἑρμῆν μὲν λόγον τὸν ἑρμηνευτικὸν καὶ πάντων διδάσκαλον· Ἀσκληπιὸν δὲ καὶ θεραπευτὴν γενόμενον, κεραυνωθέντα, ἀνεληλυθέναι εἰς οὐρανόν· Διόνυσον δὲ διασπαραχθέντα κτλ. (l.c. I 21: cf. also Dialogus cum Tryphone 69). I was once half inclined to suspect that the clause ὥσπερ ἐξ Αἵδου —ἀνελθεῖν (although it appears in all MSS) might be an early satirical adscript by some Pagan scribe on the doctrine of our Lord's descent into Hell, and subsequent resurrection and ascent into Heaven. τινες might well be a specific allusion (518 B note), and there is more than a suspicion of satire in δή. But I have no longer any doubt that the text is sound.

ὀστράκου ‐‐ περιστροφή . On the different interpretations given by the ancients of this proverb see App. VI. The proverb is derived from the game of ὀστρακίνδα, the authorities for which are cited by Grasberger Erziehung u. Unterricht I pp. 57—60. The players were divided into two parties, separated by a line. A shell, black on one side, and white on the other, was thrown on the ground by one of the boys, who shouted νὺξ ἡμέρα or νὺξ ἢ ἡμέρα, ‘Heads or Tails,’ as he threw it. According as the white or black fell uppermost, one side ran away and the other gave chase. Plato means that education is not, like the ‘spinning of a coin,’ an affair of no consequence, to be settled off-hand, and by chance, but a slow and laborious scientific process, dealing with the gravest of all possible issues. See also App. VI.

ψυχῆς περιαγωγὴ κτλ. : ‘the turning round of a soul from a day which is as night into the true day, that is, the ascent into Being’ (not the tarrying in γιγνόμενον, which is the νυκτερινὴ ἡμέρα). In νυκτερινῆς τινος ἡμέρας (for which see 520 C notes) Plato, more suo, plays on the exclamation ‘ νὺξ ἡμέρα’: cf. IV 422 D, E notes (It may be noted that Plato's adaptation is from νὺξ ἡμέρα rather than from νὺξ ἢ ἡμέρα.) The words τοῦ ὄντος—ἐπάνοδον explain the figure, οὖσαν ‘that is’ being used as in φορὰν οὖσαν βάθους 528 D. The daylight in which the ἀπαίδευτος lives is darkness; the true day is the ascent of the soul out of the ὁρατόν and δοξαστόν into the νοητόν: cf. 517 B τὴν δὲ ἄνω ἀνάβασιν καὶ θέαν τῶν ἄνω τὴν εἰς τὸν νοητὸν τόπον τῆς ψυχῆς ἄνοδον τιθεὶς οὐχ ἁμαρτήσει τῆς γ’ ἐμῆς ἐλπἰδος. This and this alone is true philosophy. The phrase τὴν τοῦ ὄντος ἐπάνοδον is copied by Alcinous from Plato ( Isag. p. 7 ed. Hermann). Cf. also Clement Strom. V 14 p. 196 Migne ψυχῆς περιαγωγὴ ἐκ νυκτερινῆς τινος ἡμέρας εἰς ἀληθινὴν τοῦ ὄντος (vv. ll. ὄντος and ὄντως ὄντος) οὖσαν ἐπάνοδον κτλ. Other views on the text and interpretation of this passage are discussed in App. VI.

μέντοι . For μέντοι in questions see on I 339 B.

ἔφαμεν . Cf. III 403 E, 416 D and VIII 543 B.

δεῖ ἄρα κτλ. The subject of προσέχειν is τὸ μάθημα ὃ ζητοῦμεν: its object is τοῦτο. With προσέχειν ‘insuper habere’ (a rare use) cf. προσγενέσθαι II 375 E note

ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν . II 376 E ff.

τετεύτακεν . τευτάζων· πραγματευόμενος, ἐνδιατρίβων (Tim. Lex. S.V., where Ruhnken elaborately illustrates the word. See also Stephanus-Hase Thes. S.V.). τευτάζω is always, I believe, semi-contemptuous in Plato ( Phil. 56 E . Tim. 90 B ). Brugmann's connexion of the word with σεύω ( Vergl. Gr. I p. 362) may not be right, but the notion that τευτάζω is for ταὐτάζω (L. and S.) is certainly wrong.

ὅσην κτλ. There is (as J. and C. remind us) a sense in which φιλοσοφία itself is μουσική: cf. III 403 C note and VI 499 D.

ἀντίστροφος κτλ. is best explained by III 410 C—412 A, and κατά τε ἁρμονίαν—εὐρυθμίαν by III 400 D, E.

τοῖς λόγοις . II 377 ff., III 392 A ff.

ἔφη is repeated as in Phaed. 78 A : cf. I 348 D note and VIII 557 C, Euthyd. 296 D ( ἦν δ ἐγώ repeated). Here “iteratum ἔφη—ethicam, ut ita dicam, vim habet” (Schneider). I formerly omitted the word (with Flor. T), but now believe it genuine. ἔθη ( Π ^{2}, v and two other MSS, with Eusebius Praep. Ev. XIV 13. 3) is unsuitable in point of sense, and also because of ἄττα.

ἀληθινώτεροι : not=‘more true’ but ‘true on the other hand.’ The comparative only points the contrast with μυθώδεις: cf. Homer's well-known γυναικῶν θηλυτεράων.

πρὸς τοιοῦτόν τι κτλ. : ‘useful for any such purpose as you now require.’ ἀγαθόν goes with πρός: cf. with Schneider Xen. Mem. IV 6. 10 <*>ῤ οὖν τοὺς μὲν ἀγαθοὺς πρὸς τὰ δεινὰ καὶ ἐπικίνδυνα ὄντας ἀνδρείους ἡγεῖ εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ κακοὺς δειλούς; The words οἷον—ζητεῖς are equivalent to πρὸς οἷον—ζητεῖς sc. μάθημα ἀγαθὸν εἶναι: cf. ἐν πόλει ᾗ= ἐν πόλει ἐν ᾗ (520 D note), and (for ζητεῖς with infinitive) IV 443 B. The Oxford editors connect ἀγαθόν with τοιοῦτον and not with μάθημα, referring οἷον σὺ νῦν ζητεῖς ‘probably to μάθημα’—a highly unnatural interpretation, because it separates οἷον from τοιοῦτον, and leaves πρός out in the cold. ἄγον ( γρ Π and Eusebius l. c.) for ἀγαθόν is an obvious but wholly unnecessary ‘emendation.’ The present passage is Plato's authoritative statement of the relation between his two curricula of education. The aim of the first is morality, and its method habituation; in the second knowledge is attained by a scientific discipline. Cf. II 376 E, VI 502 E notes

αἵ τε κτλ. On τε used ἀνακολούθως see II 373 B note “Quid addere Socrates in animo habuerit, Glauconis intercipientis verba docent: καὶ μὴν τί ἔτ) <*>λλο λείπεται μάθημα” (Schneider).

ἔδοξαν . VI 495 D.

διάνοιαι scarcely means the mathematical sciences here, as J. and C. suggest, but simply ‘modes of thought’: cf. VI 511 D note Plato does not, I believe, use the plural of διάνοια in its peculiar technical sense, and in any case such a meaning is here unsuitable.

τὸ ἕν τε κτλ. Cf. Laws 818 C μήτε ἓν μήτε δύο μήτε τρία μήθ’ ὅλως ἄρτια καὶ περιττὰ δυνάμενος γιγνώσκειν, μηδὲ ἀριθμεῖν τὸ παράπαν εἰδώς and [ Epin.] 977 C.

ἀριθμόν τε καὶ λογισμόν . See on λογιστική τε καὶ ἀριθμητική 525 A.

ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις κτλ. Plato speaks as if he were bored to death by Palamedes' damnable iteration. Plays on the subject of Palamedes were written by all three dramatists (see the fragments of Aeschylus 180 ff., Sophocles 426 ff., Euripides 582 ff. Dindorf), and the invention of number or the like is ascribed to him by Aesch. l.c. Soph. Fr. 379 and Eur. l.c. Aeschylus also gives Prometheus the credit of the discovery ( P. V. 459 f.).

καίτοι κτλ. ‘Well, what d'ye think of Agamemnon for a general now?’ καίτοι (lit. ‘and yet’ sc. if this was true) is often thus used to introduce a question ‘cum quadam indignatione’ (real or, as here, feigned); for examples see Kugler de part. τοι ap. Pl. p. 18. ποῖόν τινα is derisive, as ποῖος constantly is: see on 1330 A. D. and V.'s translation “Yet what do you think of Agamemnon as a general?” misses the ἦθος of the original, which is correctly reproduced by Schneider and Jowett.

καὶ λογίζεσθαί τε κτλ. καί ‘also,’ because “et aliarum rerum et arithmetices peritum imperatorem esse decet” (Schneider). Cf. VI 506 A. The word is omitted by Π ^{1} q Ξ and some other MSS. καί may of course be spurious, but it was not likely to have been added by a scribe, and the balance of MS evidence is in its favour. The other variants ( ἤ and ἢ τό and μᾶλλον ἤ in place of καί) are corruptions due to the erroneous idea that ἄλλο τι is ‘any other’ and not ‘nonne.’

μᾶλλον δὲ κτλ. μᾶλλον δέ is ‘vel potius,’ as usual. ἄνθρωπος=‘human being,’ not ‘anything of a man’ (D. and V.), which suggests an entirely wrong idea. We may compare the Latin use of homo, for example in Cic. ad Quint. II 11. 5 “sed cum veneris, virum te putabo, si Sallusti Empedoclea legeris: hominem non putabo.” For the sense cf. Laws 819 D, where the Greek ignorance of arithmetic appears to Plato ούκ <*>νθρώπινον ἀλλὰ ὑηνῶν τινῶν εἶναι μᾶλλον θρεμμάτων. The knowledge of number is one of the characteristic differences between man and the lower animals: see Tim. 39 B and [ Epin.] 978 C.

φύσει belongs to ἀγόντων (Schneider) rather than to εἶναι (Stallbaum and others), as is clear from the antithesis χρῆσθαι δ’ οὐδεὶς αὐτῷ ὀρθῶς (explained in 525 C).

τό γ’ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦν . Cf. 517 B note Plato is careful to eschew the appearance of dogmatism, even where his convictions are most profound.

ὡς ἱκανῶς κτλ. is taken by Krohn ( Pl. Fr. p. 91) as excluding the possibility of Ideas of concrete things. Such an inference is unwarranted. ἱκανῶς, ‘adequately’ ‘satisfactorily’ (cf. E below), does not imply that sensation can apprehend everything there is to know about e.g. a finger, but merely that in the case of a finger etc., sensible perception is as a rule all that we demand: we are not impelled to summon νόησις to our aid. Even the perception of a finger may awaken the intelligence, and in such cases we shall be led to the Idea of finger (523 D note).

ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως κτλ. On αἰσθήσεως see 523 C note ποιούσης has been doubted by Ast, who conjectures νοούσης; “sed αἰσθήσεως non est νοεῖν” (Schneider). The Greek means ‘produces no sound result,’ “nichts zuverlässiges giebt” (Schneider): the product of sensation is, in such cases, ὕπουλον or νοσῶδες. For οὐδὲν ὑγιές metaphorically used cf. Phaed. 90 E and (with Schneider) Ar. Plut. 50 , 355 ( πρὸς ἀνδρὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιές ἐστ’ εἰργασμένου).

τὰ πόρρωθεν κτλ. readily suggest themselves to Glauco, for they were familiar examples of optical delusion in the Platonic school: cf. (for πόρρωθεν φαινόμενα ) Prot. 356 C , Theaet. 191 B , infra X 602 C ff., and (for ἐσκιαγραφημένα) II 365 C note

αἴσθησιν . Strictly speaking, of course, αἴσθησις by itself does not, and cannot, present us with a judgment of any kind. It merely furnishes a particular sensation, which is referred to our mental picture of the objects in question, and the resulting judgment is not αἴσθησις, but δόξα, which is, according to Plato, a combination of μνήμη and αἴσθησις (see Phil. 38 B ff. with Bury's notes). And in point of fact, the sort of contradictory judgments which are here ascribed to the initial step in the psychological process, viz. αἴσθησις (524 A), have already been attributed to δόξα in V 479 B—479 E. We have already seen that Plato throughout the whole of this part of the Republic is not careful to distinguish between αἰσθητόν (especially ὁρατόν) and δοξαστόν (VI 510 A note); and the same tendency shews itself again here. But in this part of the dialogue, Plato's argument is no way affected by his imperfect analysis of the psychological process involved in such a judgment as ‘This is a finger.’ The relevant consideration is that in such cases the intellect is not, as a rule, aroused, and this is equally true whether we regard the judgment as an act of αἴσθησις alone or as the joint product of αἴσθησις and μνήμη.

εἴτ’ ἐγγύθεν κτλ. (like ὡς ἐγγύθεν etc. below) is said to prevent misapprehension, in view of Glauco's τὰ πόρρωθεν etc. in B.

ὧδε δὲ κτλ. The best commentary on the following exposition is Phaed. 101 A ff., especially 102 B ff.: cf. also Theaet. 154 C . These passages should be carefully read in connexion with the view enunciated here. I have endeavoured to explain some of the wider bearings of Plato's principle in a pamphlet on Classical Education published by Deighton, Bell and Co. 1895: see also App. II and Nettleship Hellen. pp. 152 ff. We should bear in mind that the antithesis of ἕν and πολλά was the fons et origo of Greek philosophy, and runs throughout its entire history. In Plato's time the question had become acute in connexion particularly with the problem of predication, and it was in trying to solve this special form of the antinomy that Plato devised his theory of Ideas. Nothing could be more natural or just than that his philosopher-kings should receive their first scientific impulse from the problem which had proved so great an intellectual stimulus in the past, and which had also led Plato himself to the goal whither he would have his guardians arrive, the contemplation of the Idea.

ἐάν τε ἐν μέσῳ κτλ. : i.q. <*>άν τε ἐν μέσῳ ᾖ ὁ ὁρώμενος κτλ. This is said with reference to their size: cf. E below and Phaed. 102 B , C, where the difficulty is explained by the theory of Ideas. Thus b is both great and small, great relatively to a, small relatively to c. Similarly with the other antinomies. The Philebus dismisses such puzzles as τὰ δεδημευμένα τῶν θαυμαστῶν περὶ τὸ ἓν καὶ πολλά (14 D)—an indication perhaps of the priority in date of the Republic (cf. VI 505 C note and Jackson in J. Ph. X pp. 263 ff.).

ἀναγκάζεται is said of the ‘Drang nach Wahrheit’: cf. 524 C, E, 525 D and 518 E ff. It is not the ‘nature’ of Soul to acquiesce in falsehood: for man is an οὐράνιον φυτόν, οὐκ ἔγγειον (IV 443 B note).

τῶν πολλῶν . Some exceptional natures, who are endowed with an uncommon share of noble curiosity, may find intellectual stimulus even in perceptions such as these: cf. 523 B note Ast, who missed the point, wanted to excise the phrase. Herwerden seriously proposes <μὰ> τὸν Ἀπόλλω.

οὐδαμοῦ : ‘at no stage’ viz. in the psychological process, not exactly ‘never’ (as Jowett, D. and V. etc.).

παραγγέλλει κτλ. : ‘intimates to the soul that the same thing is both hard and soft when it perceives it to be so.’ With παραγγέλλει (needlessly suspected by Stephanus) cf. Tim. 70 B τοῦ λόγου παραγγείλαντος ὥς τις ἄδικος περὶ αὐτὰ γίγνεται πρᾶξις. The English translators, together with Schneider, appear to take ὡς with αἰσθανομένη (“that it feels the same thing to be both hard and soft” D. and V.). But such a construction is difficult (cf. Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 652) and the meaning scarcely satisfactory. It should be remembered that touch does not always report that an object is both hard and soft, but only when it feels the object hard in relation to one thing and soft in relation to another, and similarly in other cases. This limitation is expressed by αἰσθανομένη (as well as by <*>ν τοῖς τοιούτοις), and explains its emphatic position. I have sometimes thought that < οὕτως> should be added after αἰσθανομένη, but the object can be supplied from ὡς—μαλακόν. Prantl understands the construction in somewhat the same way as I do.

ἀπορεῖν . The word is Socratic: see on 515 D. It is worthy of note that Plato, like Socrates, makes intellectual ἀπορία the beginning of Education. See App. II.

αὕτη ἡ αἵσθησις means ‘this present sensation,’ not the sense of touch in general, and similarly with ἡ τοῦ κούφου κτλ., which J. and C. erroneously understand as a special sense, apparently ‘the same which modern philosophers call the sense of resistance.’ But Plato nowhere recognises any such sense, and if he did, he would call it ἡ τοῦ κούφου καὶ βαρέος, and not ἡ τοῦ κούφου καὶ ἡ τοῦ βαρέος. The parallel in τί ποτε σημαίνει—λέγει shews that Plato means: ‘what do the sensation of light and the sensation of heavy mean by light and heavy, if they indicate, the one that the heavy is light and the other that the light is heavy?’ The last clause contains an elegant chiasmus. Schneider understands αὕτη ἡ αἴσθησις as ἡ αἴσθησις τοῦ σκληροῦ, but it is better taken as deictic: cf. 516 B, 523 C. Otherwise his view agrees with mine.

ἄτοποι . Herwerden's ἄποροι is an elegant conjecture, in view of ἀπορεῖν in A and 524 E; but the text is more forcible.

ἑρμηνεῖαι =‘communications,’ not ‘interpretations,’ as D. and V. translate. αἴσθησις is as it were the ἑρμηνεὺς καὶ ἄγγελος ( Crat. 407 E ) between the object of the perception and the soul: cf. παραγγέλλει in A.

λογισμόν . See on λογιστικῷ 525 B.

οὐκοῦν ἐὰν κτλ. Thus: Perception reports ‘This finger’ (let us say) ‘is big-and-little.’ Thereupon the soul is puzzled ( ἀπορεῖ), and calls in νόησις. If big-and-little appear (viz. to νόησις) not one but two, then each of them appears distinct from the other, and one: cf. V 476 A and Parm. 143 D . ‘Accordingly—if each appears one, and both together two— νόησις, conceiving as it does of two ( τά γε δύο), will conceive of them as separate; for otherwise it would have conceived, not of two, but of one.’ Plato's object is to make out that νόησις, in order to clear up the συγκεχυμένον τι of sensation ( διὰ τὴν τούτου σαφήνειαν) is compelled to view sensation's μέγα‐καὶσμικρόν (for example) separately, i.e. as τὸ μέγα and τὸ σμικρόν. These antinomies consequently force us to ask ‘What is the great?’ ‘What is the small?’ etc.; and just herein consists their periagogic or educative value, for to such questions the theory of Ideas alone furnishes an adequate and final answer ( Phaed. 99 B ff.). κεχωρισμένα νοήσει perhaps=‘are separate to νόησις,’ but the ordinary view, which understands νόησις as subject to νοήσει, is better. It may have been this passage of the Republic, or Phaed. 96 E ff., or both which inspired the line of Theopompus τὰ δὲ δύο μόλις (sic) ἕν ἐστιν, ὥς φησιν Πλάτων (D. L. III 26).

καὶ ὄψις : ‘sight also’ sc. as well as νόησις.

ἠναγκάσθη . See 523 D note

ποτέρων is intrinsically better than πότερον, which has considerable MS authority (including Α^{1}, Ξ and Μ), and is read by Hermann and Baiter. Cf. τῶν ἀγωγῶν ἂν εἴη κτλ. 525 A. For the error see Introd. § 5.

εἰ δ’ ἀεί τι κτλ. A visible ἕν is always seen both as ἕν and πολλά (one wood, many trees; one tree, many branches etc.).

ἐν αὐτῷ is not ἐν τῷ ἑνί, but ‘in the case in question,’ ‘in such a case,’ “dabei” (Schneider): cf. I 339 E note

αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν . See on αὐτῶν τῶν ἀριθμῶν 525 D.

ἡ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὄψις . I formerly read αὐτό instead of τὸ αὐτό with Ξ and a few inferior MSS. αὐτό, which Bekker, Schneider and Stallbaum adopt, is easier, but lacking in authority; and τὸ αὐτό is in reality more elegant. The marked antithesis between ἡ περὶ τὸ ἓν μάθησις (‘the intellectual apprehension of the one’) and ἡ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὄψις (‘the visual apprehension of the same’) makes it clear that τὸ αὐτό means ‘the same’ as that with which ἡ μάθησις was concerned (viz. τὸ ἕν), and not (as Hermann imagined) ‘one and the same object of vision’ (like ταὐτόν presently). Plato may have deliberately employed the two forms τὸ αὐτό and ταὐτόν in order to dissociate them from one another.

καὶ ξύμπας ἀριθμὸς κτλ. Because ἀριθμός is τὸ ἐκ μονάδων συγκείμενον πλῆθος (Euclid VII def. 2), or in other words a σύστημα μονάδων (Theo Smyrn. p. 18 ed. Hiller), and thus for example a visible three (i.e. three visible things) presents us with three separate cases of the contrast between ἕν and πολλά.

τοῦτο (see cr. n.) is preferable to τούτῳ, which appears in no MS except A, and would be superfluous after εἴπερ τὸ ἕν. Two MSS do in point of fact omit the word altogether.

λογιστική τε καὶ ἀριθμητική . Greek mathematicians distinguished between ἀριθμητική ‘the science of numbers’ and λογιστική ‘the art of calculation’ (Gow Greek Math. p. 22). It has been doubted whether Plato also held this distinction; but a comparison of Gorg. 451 B , 453 E, Theaet. 198 A (on ἀριθμητική) with Gorg. 451 C , Charm. 166 A , Pol. 259 E (on λογιστική) proves that he did (Rothlauf, l. c. pp. 19—21). Plato does not insist on the distinction here, but we may reasonably suppose that his pupils would begin with λογισμοί ( λογιστική) and rise from thence to ἀριθμητική: cf. C, D and Laws 817 E, 819 A ff. See also on λογιστικῷ in B.

ταῦτα : i.e. τὰ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ.

ἀλήθειαν : viz. the Ideas, and ultimately the Idea of Good (517 B).

γενέσεως . See on 519 A.

ἤ =‘alioquin’ (V 463 D note). Liebhold absurdly adds ἔστιν after γενέσθαι.

λογιστικῷ : ‘a reasoning proficient in the art of calculation,’ with a play on λογιστικός in its deeper sense, as Shorey points out ( Chicago Studies I p. 222 note 4), comparing the double meaning of παρανομία in IV 424 D. λογισμόν in 524 B prepared the way for this; and the same ambiguity partly explains why Plato puts λογιστική rather than ἀριθμητική in the forefront of this discussion (cf. λογιστικήν below and λογισμούς in C). We readily feel that λογιστική will arouse τὸ λογιστικόν. Cf. also X 602 E note

καὶ πείθειν . προσῆκον ἂν εἴη is carried on: cf. I 334 B note and infra 530 B. J. and C.'s explanation, that “ μάθημα (or αὐτό) is to be repeated in the accusative after νομοθετῆσαι and πείθειν ἐπὶ λογιστικὴν ἰέναι,” is untenable.

τῶν μεγίστων is idiomatically used of government: cf. 534 D and Apol. 22 D with my note ad loc.

θέαν ‐‐ αὐτῇ . The ‘nature of numbers’ cannot be fully seen except in their connexion with the Good and with all other νοητά (VI 511 B—D notes). Plato does not of course imply that ἀριθμητική by itself will achieve this result (although it may be doubted whether some of his successors did not exalt the science to something like this dignity: see e.g. the Epinomis): neither ἀριθμητική nor all the propaedeutic studies taken together will ever carry us so far. He only means that the student, having once set foot on the ladder, must not redescend until he reaches the Good. Then and then only will he understand the ‘nature of numbers’ i.e. the Ideas of 1, 2, etc., because only then will he know Numbers dialectically (VI 511 B). On the use of φύσις see X 597 B note

τῇ νοήσει αὐτῇ : ‘by thought alone.’ αὐτῇ is ‘by itself’ i.e. (in this case) unadulterated with αἴσθησις: cf. 525 D note and supra IV 437 E, 438 B, VI 510 B, D notes

ῥᾳστώνης . A few inferior MSS add καί after this word: A alone has ῥᾳστώνης τε. I agree with Schneider in holding that the conjunctions are interpolated to avoid the concurrence of genitives, in which there is, however, no difficulty at all: cf. V 449 A note

νῦν καὶ ἐννοῶ . Cf. (with J. and C.) II 370 A ἐννοῶ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς εἰπόντος σοῦ .

λογισμούς : see on λογιστικῷ in B.

αὐτῶν τῶν ἀριθμῶν : ‘numbers themselves,’ e.g. 1, 2, 3, 4 etc., in other words individual mathematical numbers and nothing more. αὐτῶν means ‘by themselves,’ ‘alone,’ i.e. with nothing αἰσθητόν about them, such as is present in the ὁρατὰ ἢ ἁπτὰ σώματα ἔχοντας ἀριθμούς (=Aristotle's αἰσθητικοὶ or σωματικοὶ ἀριθμοί: v. Bonitz Ind. Arist. s. v. ἀριθμός), e.g. one man, two men etc. These mathematical numbers are not Ideas, but (like τὰ μαθηματικά generally) a half-way house between sensibles and Ideas, and for this reason valuable as a προπαιδεία to Dialectic: cf. 526 A note and see on VI 510 D and App. I. For αὐτῶν in this sense cf. αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν in E, αὐτῇ τῇ νοήσει 526 B and ἀριθμῶν αὐτῶν ἀλλ’ οὐ σώματα ἐχόντων [ Epin.] 990 C.

δεινούς . The word δύο, which was originally written after δεινούς (see cr. n.) in Α and Π, is probably due to a marginal adscript on the words ἐάν τις αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν ἐπιχειρῇ—τέμνειν. Burnet neatly conjectures δεινοὺς αὖ, but αὖ is inappropriate here.

ἐάν τις κτλ. αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν means ‘the unit itself’ i.e. the mathematical number ‘one’ which is ex hypothesi and by definition ἀμέριστον καὶ ἀδιαίρετον (Theo Smyrn. 18). If any one maintains that the mathematical unit is divisible, the mathematicians καταγελῶσί τε καὶ οὐκ ἀποδέχονται. Quâ mathematicians, they never condescend to justify either this or any other mathematical definition ( οὐδένα λόγον οὔτε αὑτοῖς οὔτε ἄλλοις ἔτι ἀξιοῦσι—διδόναι VI 510 C), and think it ridiculous that any one should question the foundations of their science. The moment they begin to render an account of their ὑποθέσεις they cease to be mathematicians and become διαλεκτικοί. See also on VI 510 C and App. III.

ἐὰν σὺ κερματίζῃς κτλ. : ‘if you mince it, they multiply it.’ If you insist on dividing their unit, they insist on multiplying it (viz. by your divisor), and so defeat your purpose and keep the unit one and indivisible as before. ‘I cut that unit up!’ you exclaim. ‘I multiply it!’ is their reply; and you are checkmated. They have just as much right to multiply it as you to divide it; for the mathematical unit is only a ὑπόθεσις when all is said and done. Plato is humorously describing a passage-atarms between mathematicians and some obstinate fellow who will not admit the indivisibility of their unit. The words ‘back again’ in D. and V.'s translation “they multiply it back again” correspond to nothing in the Greek and suggest an erroneous idea; nor can the Greek mean “that division is regarded by them as a process of multiplication, for the fractions of one continue to be units” (as Jowett suggests). Each of these explanations misses the humour of the original. The word μόρια is doubtless genuine, though its rejection (proposed by Herwerden) would improve the antithesis. Cf. μόριόν τε ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ οὐδέν (526 A), for which μόρια here prepares the way.

περὶ ποίων κτλ. On the derisive ποῖος see 522 D n. Mathematical units are in every case ( ἕκαστον) equal each to each ( πᾶν παντί), and destitute of parts; whereas sensible units (e.g. one horse, one cow etc.) are not equal to each other, and are divisible. In πᾶν παντί Plato copies the formal language of mathematics: cf. ἑκατέραν ἑκατέρᾳ and the like in Euclid passim. For the sense see Phil. 56 C ff., where these two kinds of number are made the basis of a distinction between philosophical or scientific and popular or unscientific ἀριθμητική. It should be carefully noted that a plurality of mathematical units is expressly recognised both here ( ἴσον τε ἕκαστον πᾶν παντί κτλ.) and in Phil. l. c. ( μονάδα μονάδος ἑκάστης τῶν μυρίων μηδεμίαν ἄλλην ἄλλης διαφέρουσαν). This entirely confirms what Aristotle tells us, viz. that Plato placed μαφηματικά between αἰσθητά and εἴδη, τῷ τὰ μὲν πόλλ’ ἄττα ὅμοια εἶναι, τὸ δὲ εἶδος αὐτὸ ἓν ἕκαστον μόνον ( Met. A 6. 987^{b} 14 ff.). There are therefore three kinds of μονάδες in Plato's scheme—the Ideal μονάς, of which only one exists, the Mathematical and the Sensible, of each of which there are many. See on VI 510 D and App. I, where I have quoted further evidence on this subject, and endeavoured to explain the philosophical truth which is contained in the Platonic doctrine of mathematical numbers, magnitudes etc. as intermediates between the Ideas and sensibles.

ὧν κτλ. ὧν is for περὶ ὧν rather than <*> (as J. and C. hold): cf. VI 510 D οὐ περὶ τούτων διανοούμενοι, and (for the grammatical construction) III 402 A note διανοηθῆναι should be understood in the technical sense of VI 511 E.

τῷ ὄντι ἀναγκαῖον . Perhaps with a play on προσαναγκάζον (J. and C.): see on τῷ ὄντι VI 511 B.

ὀξεῖς κτλ. Plato was very emphatic on this point: see Laws 747 B and 819 C φύονται was restored by Schneider from the best MSS. Earlier editions read φαίνονται on inferior authority.

ἂν ‐‐ γυμνάσωνται κτλ. Even Isocrates admits this, although his self-styled ‘Philosophy’ was something very different from Plato's: see Antid. 265—266, especially γυμνασίαν μέντοι τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ παρασκευὴν φιλοσοφίας καλῶ τὴν διατριβὴν τὴν τοιαύτην (mathematical studies).

ἅ γε μείζω κτλ. is an important principle with Plato, who does not believe in any royal road to learning: cf. 530 C and VI 503 E. In antiquity, while algebra was still unknown, ἀριθμητική must have taxed the powers of thought far more than now, and been, from the Platonic point of view, all the more valuable on that account as an educative discipline. The treatment of numbers by Euclid Books VII—X will illustrate Plato's observation: see Gow Gk Math. pp. 74—85, with De Morgan's remarks there quoted.

ὡς τοῦτο . ὡς=‘quam’ instead of ἤ is found sporadically in Greek literature after comparatives: see my note on Ap. 30 B , 36 D. To say that in all such cases the comparative is equivalent to οὕτω with the positive is only to shelve the difficulty; and it is better to recognise the usage as exceptional than summarily to dismiss it as a barbarism (with Thompson on Gorg. 492 E ). J. and C. after οὐδὲ πολλά supply ἃ πόνον οὕτω μέγαν παρέχεται, but the ellipse is too difficult, especially as οὐδὲ πολλά is only a kind of afterthought to or elaboration of οὐ ῥᾳδίως.

τὸ ἐχόμενον τούτου . If γεωμετρία i.e. ἡ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου (plane surfaces) πραγματεία (528 D) concerns itself with δευτέρα αὔξη, and Stereometry with τρίτη αὔξη, we may infer that ἀριθμητική deals with the πρώτη αὔξη, i.e. presumably the line, which, according to the Pythagoreans, is a collection of points (cf. Laws 894 A and Rothlauf l.c. p. 51). And in point of fact the line represented number among the Pythagoreans exactly as the point is the geometrical symbol for the unit: cf. IX 587 D note Hence ἐχόμενον τούτου: we take the δευτέρα αὔξη after the first. See also App. II to this Book, and App. I to Book VIII Part I § 2.

ἢ γεωμετρίαν κτλ. The sequence —Geometry after ἀριθμητική—was probably a usual one with teachers, even in Plato's time: see Grasberger Erziehung u. Unterricht II p. 340 and cf. App. II.

ὅσον μὲν κτλ. is exactly the attitude of the historical Socrates, as Krohn ( Pl. St. p. 376) and others have pointed out, comparing Xen. Mem. IV 7. 2 ff. Practical necessities of this kind probably originated the science (Gow Gk Math. pp. 134 ff.) and gave it its name γεωμετρία. The name μαθήματα (or μαθηματικά) in the special sense of Mathematics owes its origin, no doubt, to the position occupied by mathematical studies in Plato's μαθήματα: but the usage itself is not found till Aristotle (Rothlauf l.c. p. 18), although it is clear from [ Epin.] 990 D, that some Platonists resented the γελοῖον ὄνομα γεωμετρίαν. Glauco represents the practical point of view throughout: cf. 527 D.

καὶ πορείαις . “Scriptum vellem καὶ ἐν πορείαις” (Stallbaum). The idiom is common enough: see KühnerBlass Gr. Gr. II 1, p. 548.

τὸ εὐδαιμονέστατον τοῦ ὄντος is cited by Stumpf (l.c. p. 95 note 3) in support of his identification of the Idea of Good with God: see on VI 505 A.

γένεσιν . 519 A note

αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη κτλ. : ‘the nature of this science is in precise contradiction to’ etc. πᾶν τοὐναντίον is adverbial, and ἔχει intransitive. In what follows Plato is not (as Stallbaum strangely supposes) censuring contemporary geometricians, “sed vitium quoddam ipsius scientiae” (Schneider, who refers to VI 510 B—511 A), for even those ὅσοι καὶ σμικρὰ γεωμετρίας ἔμπειροι agree with him. It is however probable on other grounds that Plato himself was afraid lest his pupils should depend too much on geometrical figures and instruments; and Plutarch tells us that he reproved Eudoxus and others for this very fault: ἀπόλλυσθαι γὰρ οὕτω καὶ διαφθείρεσθαι τὸ γεωμετρίας ἀγαθὸν αὖθις ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ παλινδρομούσης, καὶ μὴ φερομένης ἄνω μηδὲ ἀντιλαμβανομένης τῶν ἀϊδίων καὶ ἀσωμάτων εἰκόνων, πρὸς οἷσπερ ὢν ὁ θεὸς ἀεὶ θεός ἐστι ( Conv. Disp. VIII 2. 718 F: cf. also Vit. Marc. 14. 5—7. The anecdote refers in particular to stereometrical instruments, but its moral applies equally to the study of plane geometry). See Rothlauf l.c. pp. 66 ff. and Gow Gk Math. p. 181.

ἀναγκαίως ‘in beggarly fashion’ (“nothgedrungenen Weise” Prantl). They are ‘hard up’ for words to express their meaning, and must consequently use language which does not: cf. VI 510 D. J. and C.'s explanation “with merely practical needs in view” is quite wrong; nor does the word appear to me to contain “a facetious allusion to geometrical necessity” (in the sense of V 458 D), as they assert. Madvig's ἀκάκως for ἀναγκαίως is a singularly unhappy suggestion.

παρατείνειν = ‘to apply,’ e.g. a parallelogram to a given line: cf. Men. 87 A ( παρὰ τὴν δοθεῖσαν—γραμμὴν παρατείναντα κτλ.) with E. S. Thompson's note. Blass takes the same view ( de Pl. math. p. 19). Euclid's expression for this is παραβάλλειν (X 18 ff. and passim: cf. Cantor l.c. p. 145). The ordinary translation ‘produce’ (as e.g. a line) has no authority, and Euclid's word for ‘producing’ a line is ἐκβάλλειν or προσεκβάλλειν (I 5, 17 and passim. So also in Aristotle: see the Ind. Arist. s.v.).

προστιθέναι : ‘to add,’ sc. one μέγεθος to another in any geometrical construction: cf. Nicom. Introd. Ar. II 12. 2. Euclid uses συντιθέναι, σύγκειμαι (X 16 and passim) of such an operation.

φθεγγόμενοι is said “non sine eleganti quadam irrisione” (Stallbaum): cf. VI 505 C note

τὸ δέ : ‘whereas’: cf. I 340 D note

τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄντος . Plato held the objects of mathematical study to be ἀΐδια καὶ ἀκίνητα ‘eternal and unchangeable’ (Arist. Met. A 6. 987^{b} 16: cf. VI 510 C ff., VII 526 A note), but not Ideas. The Platonic meaning of τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄντος is certainly not exhausted by the observation that “the truths of every science are always true” (Bosanquet). ὄντος implies substantial existence, independently of our thoughts, and independently also of particulars. The existence of τὰ μαθηματικά as μιμήματα τῶν ὄντων or copies of the Ideas, ‘moving in and out of’ the material substance of the Universe, which they stamp with an infinite diversity of forms and shapes, is a cardinal doctrine of Plato's physics ( Tim. 50 C al.), and Bosanquet appears to me to rob the words of Plato of half their significance, in the fruitless attempt to find in his ontology nothing but what commends itself to certain schools of philosophy in the present day. See V 476 E and App. I.

τοῦ ποτέ κτλ. : ‘that which at some particular time is a particular instance of becoming and perishing.’ τι γιγνομένου= ὄντος (the copula) γιγνομένου τινός, but γιγνομένου itself involves the copula, the presence of which would here be intolerable. Cf. V 473 D note and Euthyph. 10 C εἴ τι γίγνεται ἤ τι πάσχει, οὐχ ὅτι γιγνόμενόν ἐστι, γίγνεται, ἀλλ’ ὅτι γίγνεται, γιγνόμενόν ἐστι. Here τι is indeclinable like τι in Lach. 200 B , Menex. 247 B ( οἰομένῳ τι εἶναι), Euthyd. 303 C ( δοκούντων τι εἶναι), οὐδέν, μηδέν etc. tolerably often in tragedy, and the adverbial use of ἀμφότερα and τἀναντία (e.g. Lach. 185 A ὑέων γὰρ που ἢ χρηστῶν ἢ τἀναντία γενομένων κτλ.): cf. also (with Schneider Addit. p. 57) Procl. in Tim. 136 E τοῦ—ἀδιαιρέτως πάντα ὄντος et al. The indeclinable form adds to the emphasis, and indeed τινὸς (if placed after ποτέ) could hardly stand at all. Schneider translates “des etwas werdenden und vergehenden,” apparently taking τι predicatively with γιγνομένου. But the expression ‘that which becomes something’ suggests a substratum underlying γιγνόμενον, whereas the only correct antithesis to ὄν ( τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄντος) is γιγνόμενον itself. Stallbaum wrongly explains τι as “aliqua ratione.” A few inferior MSS omit the word. I believe the text is sound, though possibly τι should be accented, as in the exactly similar Aristotelian usage of τις “ad significandam τὴν ἀτομότητα” (Bonitz Ind. Ar. p. 763) e.g. ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος. The use of ποτέ also reminds us of the ποτέ of the Categories.

γεωμετρική is an adjective (Schneider).

σχεῖν . The tense is inchoative or ingressive, as usual: see 516 E note

καλλιπόλει . Socrates rallies Glauco on his ‘braif toun.’ The word, as J. and C. point out, is full of tenderness and affection. Callipolis was the name of several cities in Greece (PapeBenseler Gr. Eigennam. s.v.), a fact which sufficiently refutes Herwerden's doubts as to the formation of the word: see also (with Schneider) Lobeck's Phrynichus pp. 600—607. Herwerden ought not to have revived the tasteless and prosaic conjectures καλῇ πόλει ( Π^{2}) and καλλίστῃ πόλει ( Ξ).

αὐτοῦ : viz. τοῦ μαθήματος.

καὶ δὴ καὶ κτλ. See on 526 B.

ἡμμένος τε . Herwerden excises τε, comparing 526 D; but the MSS are a safer guide.

ἐμοὶ γοῦν . Schneider and others write ἔμοιγ’ οὖν (see cr. n.), but οὖν is too strongly illative for this passage. Cf. I 335 E note

τὸ γὰρ περὶ κτλ. Cf. 526 C note and Xenophon there quoted, esp. § 4 ἐκέλευε δὲ καὶ ἀστρολογίας ἐμπείρους γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ταύτης μέντοι μέχρι τοῦ νυκτός τε ὥραν καὶ μηνὸς καὶ ἐνιαυτοῦ δύνασθαι γιγνώσκειν κτλ. and infra τὰς ὥρας τῶν εἰρημένων διαγιγνώσκοντες. The ana logy of this passage suggests that in Plato καὶ (‘both’) μηνῶν καὶ ἐνιαυτῶν depends on ὥρας, which is the accusative plural: cf. Laws 812 B εὐαισθήτους δεῖν γεγονέναι περί τε τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς κτλ. Practical astronomy will enable one to tell both the time of month and the time of year by looking at the moon and the sun. For ὥρας μηνῶν cf. also, besides the passage of Xenophon just quoted, Eur. Alc. 449 f. Σπάρτᾳ κυκλὰς ἁνίκα Καρνείου περινίσσεται ὥρα | μηνός κτλ. Schneider and the English translators take ὥρας as genitive and parallel with μηνῶν κτλ., but it is difficult to see what εὐαισθητοτέρως ἔχειν περὶ ἐνιαυτῶν can mean: for ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι ἐνιαυτοῦ καὶ ὡρῶν in VI 488 D is quite different. Schleiermacher translates the passage correctly.

εὐαισθητοτέρως . For this form of the comparative adverb see I 343 E note

ἡδὺς εἶ : ‘you amuse me.’ See I 337 D note

μὴ δοκῇς κτλ. The usefulness of ‘useless’ studies is a fundamental principle in Plato's theory; and (as Schneider points out) ὅτι ἐν τούτοις κτλ. is intended to shew that liberal studies are in the highest and truest sense useful.

τὸ δ’ ἔστιν . I 340 D note

χαλεπόν . Cobet's παγχάλεπον (after Nicom. Introd. Ar. III 7) is a wholly gratuitous change: see App. VII.

ἑκάστου . Every human being has an ὄργανον ψυχῆς viz. νοῦς: it is indeed the possession of νοῦς which makes him at once truly human and therewithal divine (VI 501 B note). The genitive is much more expressive than ἑκάστῳ, which Herwerden proposes: cf. 518 C note, and for the combination of genitives V 449 A note

ἐκκαθαίρεται κτλ. : ‘is purged and rekindled.’ In passages like this Plato hurls his metaphors about with Shakespearian vehemence and profusion. Cf. II 365 C note, and see the admirable remarks on metaphor by the author of the treatise περὶ ὕψους 32. 4 πλήθους καὶ τόλμης μεταφορῶν—τὰ εὔκαιρα καὶ σφοδρὰ πάθη καὶ τὸ γενναῖον ὕψος εἶναί φημι ἴδιά τινα ἀλεξιφάρμακα, ὅτι τῷ ῥοθίῳ τῆς φορᾶς ταυτὶ πέφυκεν ἅπαντα τἄλλα παρασύρειν καὶ προωθεῖν, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ὡς ἀναγκαῖα πάντως εἰσπράττεσθαι τὰ παράβολα, καὶ οὐκ ἐᾷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν σχολάζειν περὶ τὸν τοῦ πλήθους ἔλεγχον διὰ τὸ συνενθουσιᾶν τῷ λέγοντι. The eye of soul is purged of its blindness: its smouldering fires flame forth afresh. To translate “‘is polished’ like a soiled mirror” (J. and C.), besides being wrong, falls far below the level of Plato's ὕψος. The chiasmus in ἐκκαθαίρεται—τυφλούμενον adds to the literary effect. On other readings in this passage see App. VII.

οἷς μὲν οὖν κτλ. The logical sequence is somewhat difficult. Do not (says Socrates) be so anxious to persuade οἱ πολλοί of the usefulness of our curriculum. Its true utility is difficult to understand, and οἱ πολλοί will not easily be persuaded of it. Those who agree with us about its true utility will highly approve of your proposals; but οἱ πολλοί will not, for they can see no practical advantage (worthy of mention) accruing from them. δόξεις λέγειν attributes the proposals to Glauco as in D μὴ δοκῇς—προστάττειν, and ἄλλην is said with reference to τούτου. To the ὠφελία of intellectual salvation such persons are blind; and they cannot see any other, i.e. any practical ὠφελία worth mentioning in Plato's studies. ἄλλην cannot be understood as “beyond their practical applications” (D. and V.) unless we refer it to Glauco's remark τὸ γὰρ περὶ κτλ. in D, to the detriment both of grammar and of sense.

σκόπει οὖν κτλ. ‘Very well: make up your mind once for all with which of these parties you are discoursing: or are you not addressing your remarks to either, but’ etc.? Glauco's insistence on the practical uses of astronomy may be all very well with a popular audience, but are out of place in a philosophical discussion. For this peremptory αὐτόθεν cf. Symp. 213 A. οὐ πρὸς οὐδετέρους lit. ‘not to neither’: cf. the familiar μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ for μᾶλλον ἤ (Kühner Gr. Gr. II pp. 771—773). I understand ἢ—ὄνασθαι (with Ast) as an independent question: for it is difficult to supply ‘whether.’ Schneider's objections to this view are based on the idea that ἢ οὐ (if interrogative) must have an affirmative answer; but οὐ has nothing to do with ἤ, and only balances ἀλλά: cf. Ar. Plut. 372 μῶν οὐ κέκλοφας, ἀλλ’ ἥρπακας; Plato makes this clear by placing the two contrasting clauses in close juxtaposition. οὐ is omitted by Ξ and some inferior MSS. The text is, however, sound, and none of the proposed corrections— σὺ for οὐ (Schneider), εἰ πρὸς οὐδετέρους (Madvig), οὐδὲ πρὸς ἑτέρους (Cobet), εἰ οὐδὲ πρὸς ἑτέρους (Baiter), ἦ που πρὸς οὐδετέρους (Liebhold)—will bear examination, though Cobet's deserves the praise of elegance.

ἄναγε ‐‐ εἰς τοὐπίσω : ‘fall back then’: cf. Ar. Birds 383 ἄναγ’ ἐπὶ σκέλος, with Blaydes' note. The metaphor is not naval (as Ast and Stallbaum hold), but military, nor is ἀνάγειν ( ναῦν) even in naval language ‘inhibere,’ but ‘put out to sea,’ as in Hdt. VII 100, VIII 76 et al. and occasionally in Attic (for ἀνάγεσθαι). Cf. ἀνεχώρησας 528 D.

οὐκ ὀρθῶς : see on τὸ ἐχόμενον τούτου 526 C. The subjects ought to follow each other in the order of their complexity: see App. II. Plato's error was of course deliberately “contrived to emphasize the principle which it violated” (Bosanquet), and also, it may be added, to enable him to call especial attention to the study of Stereometry, on which he laid very great stress (527 D note).

ἤδη should be taken with ὄν (‘already in revolution’), not (as D. and V.) with λαβόντες.

δευτέραν αὔξην κτλ. It is better (with Schneider) to translate αὔξη by ‘increase’ than by ‘dimension’; for αὔξη always implies something increased, and in the phrases δευτέρα αὔξη etc. this ‘something’ is the point. Among the Pythagoreans, who probably originated these expressions, the line was regarded as an αὔξη of the point, the plane of the line, the solid of the plane. See App. II.

κύβων αὔξην : ‘cubic increase,’ i.e. the increase which belongs to, or results in, cubes, with perhaps also a play on a different sense of κύβων αὔξην, ‘how to increase cubes,’ as in the famous ‘Delian problem’ of the διπλασιασμὸς κύβου (so also Tannery l. c. X p. 525). See on 527 D. But as cubes are not the only solid bodies, Plato adds τὸ βάθους μετέχον. By Aristotle's time the name στερεομετρία had been invented to designate the science as a whole ( An. Post. II 13. 78^{b} 38).

ταῦτά γε ‐‐ ηὑρῆσθαι . Plato does not of course mean to say that the study of Stereometry had not yet been invented, for the subject had already in one form or another engaged the attention of the Py thagoreans, Anaxagoras and Democritus (Blass l.c. p. 21, Tannery l.c. X p. 524), not to speak of Hippocrates of Chios, who had concerned himself in the fifth century B.C. with the question of the duplication of the cube (Allman Gk Geometry etc. pp. 84 ff.). He only means that its problems had not yet been ‘discovered’ ( ηὑρῆσθαι as in Pythagoras' ηὕρηκα) or solved. When and by whom the ‘Delian problem’ in particular was definitively solved to the satisfaction of the Academy, is not quite clear. The tradition which ascribes a solution of it to Plato himself is beset with grave difficulties, as Blass (l.c. pp. 21—30) and others have pointed out (see especially Cantor l.c. pp. 194—202 and Sturm Das Delische Problem pp. 49 ff.). It is however universally allowed that the principle involved —the finding of “two mean proportionals between one straight line and another twice as long” (Gow Gk Math. p. 169) —was first stated by Hippocrates of Chios and well known to Plato, at all events when he wrote the Timaeus (32 A ff.: see also Häbler Ueber zwei Stellen in Platons Timaeus etc. pp. 1—17). We may perhaps infer from οὔπω ηὑρῆσθαι that Plato did not think a final solution of this as of other stereometrical problems had yet been reached: there is at all events nothing in the Republic to justify the curious statement of Diogenes Laertius that ( Ἀρχύτας) πρῶτος κύβου διπλασιας μὸν εὗρεν, ὥς φησι Πλάτων ἐν πολιτείᾳ (VIII 83), although it is probably true that Archytas was the first to offer a solution of the famous difficulty (see Sturm l.c. pp. 22—32). In D. L. l.c. Cobet reads πρῶτος κύβον εὗρεν κτλ., whether on his own responsibility, or on MS authority, he does not tell us. See also on 527 D, 528 C.

ὅτι τε κτλ. In Laws 819 E ff. Plato reproaches the Greeks for their ignorance of and indifference to stereometrical questions.

ἐντίμως ἔχει : ‘holds in honour,’ as in VIII 548 A. The expression usually means ‘is honoured’ ( Xen. An. II 1. 7 ): hence ἄγει for ἔχει is proposed by Herwerden, who compares 528 C, 538 E. But the error is not an easy one in such a MS as A, and it is safer to keep ἔχει and take the phrase as= ἐν τιμῇ ἔχει (cf. ἐν ἀτιμίῃ ἔχει Hdt. III 3, ἐν εὐνοίᾳ ἔχειν [Dem.] 284. 11, and Jebb on Soph. Ant. 639 ) as ἄγειν ἐντίμως= ἄγειν ἐν τιμῇ (538 E).

ὡς νῦν ἔχει belongs no doubt to the following clauses (IV 419 A note): but see also on 528 C.

μεγαλοφρονούμενοι is condemned as un-Attic by Cobet ( V. L.^{2} pp. 232, 531); but μεγαλόφρων, μεγαλοφροσύνη are Attic, and Xenophon uses μεγαλοφρονεῖν. μεγαλαυχούμενοι (Cobet's emendation) would mean ‘vaunting’: cf. III 395 D.

εἰ δὲ πόλις κτλ. is perhaps the earliest demand in literature for the State-encouragement—we might almost say the State-endowment—of pure science (cf. Krohn Pl. St. p. 169). Plato implies that in his city this claim will be fully satisfied; and the Platonic Utopia is in fact “la revendication du pouvoir pour la science” (Tannery l.c. p. 521).

ξυνεπιστατοῖ κτλ. : ‘should cooperate with the superintendent’ etc. not (as Jowett) ‘become the director of these studies’: for a special ἐπιστάτης—Plato has just said—is needed in any case. Plato's picture of the odium stereometricum, if the phrase may be allowed, is evidently drawn from life. He seems to speak as if he had himself an ἐπιστάτης ready, and wished to secure for him public support in order that students might be willing to work under him. Now although ὡς νῦν ἔχει belongs, strictly speaking, to the following clause, the words may, so far as the Greek is concerned, be connected with ἔπειτα καὶ γενομένου, and will then be equivalent to ὡς νῦν ἐγένετο ἐπιστάτης. I think it not impossible that Plato intended his readers to suspect him of this further meaning. If there is anything in this conjecture, to whom does Plato allude? Not, surely, to himself, although some have suspected the philosopher of blowing his own trumpet in a somewhat similar passage of the Phaedo (78 A): see Lutoslawski's Plato's Logic pp. 263 f. We are told by Plutarch de genio Socratis 7. 579 C that Plato referred the Delian deputation to Eudoxus, telling them that the problem was οὔ τοι φαῦλον οὐδ’ ἀμβλὺ διανοίας ὁρώσης, ἄκρως δὲ τὰς γραμμὰς ἠσκημένης ἔργον εἶναι· τοῦτο μὲν οὖν Εὔδοξον αὐτοῖς τὸν Κνίδιον ἢ τὸν Κυζικηνὸν Ἑλικῶνα συντελέσειν κτλ. Now we know that Eudoxus not only himself achieved a solution of the Delian problem (Sturm l.c. pp. 32—37), but was also, in the fullest sense of the term, ‘the founder of scientific Stereometry’ (Günther in Müller's Handbuch V 1, p. 30), and did more for the subject than any of Plato's disciples (Cantor l.c. pp. 208—210). For these reasons I think it not unlikely that Plato has Eudoxus in his mind. Eudoxus and his pupils seem to have been living and working in the Academy along with the followers of Plato sometime between Plato's second and third visits to Sicily (368 B.C. and 361 B.C.: see Allman Gk Geometry etc. p. 178), and it is a pleasing and I hope pardonable conjecture—I do not claim that it is more—to suppose that Plato avails himself of this opportunity to pay a graceful compliment to his fellow-workers. See also on line 19 below and Introd. § 4.

ἐντίμως ἄγουσα . The phrase is illustrated by Lobeck Phryn. p. 419.

ὑπὸ δὲ κτλ. ὑπὸ depends on ἀτιμαζόμενα καὶ κολουόμενα. There is a sense in which the students also ἀτιμάζουσι καὶ κολούουσι a subject, which they ἀσθενῶς ζητοῦσιν (B above). κολουόμενα is in harmony with αὐξάνεται—though cut short, the study still grows or advances. For other views on this sentence see App. VIII.

λόγον κτλ. The ζητοῦντες are the ζητητικοί of B—not, I think, Plato's pupils, but men who cannot explain the true utility of stereometry (as described in 527 D, E), and are unwilling to throw their whole hearts into a ‘useless’ study.

βίᾳ ‐‐ αὐξάνεται . Blass (l.c. p. 22) observes that in these words “sine dubio mathematici ex schola Platonis profecti intelligendi sunt.” It is just conceivable —though of course no stress should be laid on the conjecture—that ὑπὸ χάριτος conceals some complimentary allusion to a particular person. If so, Eudoxus may be intended (see above on 528 C). There is, it is true, a tradition that Plato and Eudoxus had not always been on the best of terms (Allman Gk Geom. pp. 128 f.), but during the visit of Eudoxus to Athens between 368 and 361 B.C., they appear to have worked harmoniously and even cordially together (ib. pp. 133, 178). See also 530 A note But we have no evidence to shew that Eudoxus bore the sobriquet of χάρις, though his character and personality (see Arist. Eth. Nic. X 2. 1172^{b} 15 ff.), and even perhaps his name, deserved such a compliment. I think Plato means merely ‘through elegance,’ i.e. through the inherent elegance of the subject: cf. τό γε ἐπίχαρι καὶ διαφερόντως ἔχει. The use of ὑπό is as in ὑπὸ δέους φωνὴν ἔρρηξε and the like: see KühnerGerth Gr. Gr. II 1, p. 523. Badham's ἐπιχάριτα for ὑπὸ χάριτος is an unlucky venture. Dr Jackson suggests that ὑπὸ χάριτος may perhaps mean ‘by grace, favour,’ ‘on sufferance’: but Glauco's reply appears to me against this view.

οὐδὲν ‐‐ φανῆναι : ‘be brought to light,’ ‘discovered,’ ‘solved’: cf. X 602 D and ηὑρῆσθαι and ἐκφανῆ above. Unless Badham, Madvig, and Baiter had entirely mistaken the meaning of φανῆναι, they could scarcely have conjectured or approved of τοιαῦτα in place of αὐτά. Plato's language seems to point to some exceptional activity in connexion with the study of stereometrical problems, such as may have been occasioned by the application from Delos (527 D note), and to encourage his pupils to hope for success at no distant date.

ἀλλά μοι κτλ. The recapitulation is intended to emphasize once more the principle regulating Plato's sequence of subjects (528 A note and App. II).

σπεύδων ‐‐ βραδύνω : a proverbial saying, like our ‘more haste, less speed’: cf. (with Stallbaum) Pol. 264 B . If we σπεύδομεν ταχέως, we are apt σπεύδοντες βραδύνειν; hence the proverb σπεῦδε βραδέως ‘Eile mit Weile.’ See Jebb on Soph. Ant. 231 .

ὅτι τῇ ζητήσει κτλ. : not “quia ita est comparata, ut de ea quaerere ridiculum sit” (Stallbaum), but ‘quia ridicule tractatur’: cf. (with Schneider) 529 E.

ᾗ σὺ μετέρχει : lit. ‘in respect of that, in respect of which you pursue it,’ i.e. ‘in the way in which you pursue it,’ no longer for its practical uses, as I did before (527 D), but because it leads the soul ‘on high,’ and from things here yonder (“from the things of this world to the next,” say D. and V., quite wrongly). The object of ἐπαινῶ is not ᾗ σὺ μετέρχει, but astronomy. Glauco has assimilated the phraseology of Socrates without its meaning. ‘On high’ and ‘yonder’ mean to Glauco the material heavens, not the νοητὸς τόπος: and he thinks the soul looks upwards if the bodily eye is turned aloft! The essence of Glauco's error consists in materializing the spiritual; and Plato here warns us against a danger which is responsible for countless errors, not only in Platonic criticism, but in every department of human thought and dogma. See also on 529 B, C.

οἱ εἰς φιλοσοφίαν ἀνάγοντες : ‘those who would lead us upwards to philosophy (“welche zur Wissenschaftsliebe hinaufführen wollen,” Schneider). Plato is thinking of teachers who recognise (with Isocr. Antid. 261) that Astronomy and kindred subjects are the παρασκευὴ φιλοσοφίας, but nevertheless teach Astronomy on methods directly calculated to turn the soul's eye down. His description fits some of the Sophists, particularly Hippias (see Prot. 318 E and cf. Isocr. Pan. 26—28). In οἱ—ἀνάγοντες Plato takes them at their own valuation. For the Greek cf. 521 C ψυχῆς περιαγωγὴ ἐκ νυκτερινῆς τινος ἡμέρας εἰς ἀληθινήν, τοῦ ὄντος οὖσαν ἐπάνοδον, ἣν δὴ φιλοσοφίαν ἀληθῆ φήσομεν εἶναι, where ἀληθῆ points the contrast with the false philosophy to which some would lead the soul. ἀνάγοντες preserves the idea of education as an ascent, in harmony with the prevailing metaphor throughout this book. The translation “those who embark on philosophy” (D. and V.) is untenable: so also are the two other versions in J. and C. (‘raise astronomy to the rank of a science,’ ‘refer astronomy to philosophy’), as Shorey—whose view is more nearly correct—has pointed out ( A. J. Ph. XVI p. 237).

οὐκ ἀγεννῶς : ‘with a fine audacity,’ “non sine generosa fiducia” (Schneider), as in Gorg. 492 D οὐκ ἀγεννῶς γε—ἐπεξέρχει τῷ λόγῳ παρρησιαζόμενος, and elsewhere.

κινδυνεύεις γὰρ κτλ. Glauco conceives of astronomy in exactly the same way as the Aristophanic Socrates; and this indignant repudiation by the Platonic Socrates is the more intelligible, if (with Nettleship Lect. and Rem. II p. 274 note) we suppose that Plato is thinking of the Clouds. Our astronomy (says Plato in effect), our vision upward, is not what Aristophanes made it appear to be, but something very different. See below on ἄνω κεχηνώς in B and ἐξ ὑπτίας νέων in C.

ἄλλο τι νομίσαι κτλ. : ‘think any other study one that makes,’ etc. “Aliud esse puto νομίσαι τι ποιεῖν, aliud ποιοῦν idque huic loco magis aptum, scilicet non solum facere sive faciendo in praesentia occupatum esse, sed vim et consuetudinem faciendi habere aliquid existimare” (Schneider). ποιοῦν is half adjectival, like συμφέρον in Xen. Rep. Lac. I 6 (quoted by Ast) τοῦτο συμφέρον τῇ εὐγονίᾳ νομίζων. Heindorf's conjecture ποιεῖν was approved by Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 631; but ποιοῦν is in all the MSS, and should be retained.

ἐάν τέ τις κτλ. : ‘and if any one attempts to learn aught which is perceivable I care not whether his open mouth yawn upwards or his closed mouth look below—he will never, as I hold, learn’ etc. For ἐάν τε, Hermann and Stallbaum read ἐὰν δέ on slight MS authority; but οὐ δύναμαι and οὔ ( τε)— φημι are properly joined by τε (Schneider). The English translators understand συμμεμυκώς of closed eyes; but the eyes must of course be open in any case, and the balance with ἄνω κεχηνώς is conclusive against this view. συμμύω, as the Lexica shew, is used of closing any bodily aperture. The state of the mouth is ludicrously irrelevant, but κεχηνώς, which betokens rapt stupidity, inevitably suggests συμμεμυκώς, and the whole expression is a finely indignant outburst of exuberant and extravagant satire on a gross misapprehension of Socratico-Platonic views.

ἄνω κεχηνώς refers perhaps specifically to Clouds 171—173 ζητοῦντος αὐτοῦ τῆς σελήνης τὰς ὁδοὺς | καὶ τὰς περιφορὰς εἶτ’ ἄνω κεχηνότος | ἀπὸ τῆς ὀροφῆς νύκτωρ γαλεώτης κατέχεσεν. It will be admitted that Plato had some ground for his anger. I don't in the least care, he says in effect to Aristophanes, whether your Socrates looks up or down: so long as he studies αἰσθητά, he is not my Socrates, and I disown your caricature. For the general sense cf. (with J. and C.) Tim. 91 D .

ἐπιστήμην ‐‐ ἔχειν : ‘admits of knowledge.’

τὴν ψυχήν : though his bodily eye looks upwards.

κἂν ἐξ ὑπτίας κτλ. : ‘aye, even though the learner float face upwards on land or in the sea.’ I understand ἐξ ὑπτίας νεῖν ἐν γῇ as an allusion to Socrates in the κρεμάθρα: cf. Ap. 19 C ταῦτα γὰρ ἑωρᾶτε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοφάνους κωμῳδίᾳ, Σωκράτη τινὰ ἐκεῖ περιφερόμενον, φάσκοντά τε ἀεροβατεῖν κτλ. and see Ar. Clouds 218 —226. If we suppose that Socrates lay supine in his swinging κρεμάθρα, as presumably he did, since he was looking at the moon, then any one who had seen the Clouds would at once catch the allusion, especially after ἄνω κεχηνώς and the other references just above. For νεῖν of floating in the air, cf. ἀερονηχής Ar. Clouds 337 , with Blaydes ad loc. and on Peace 831.

ἢ ἐν θαλάττῃ is thrown in by Plato with the same extravagant mockery as κάτω συμμεμυκώς. Float him on land, float him, if you like, in the sea; but though his body's eye looks upward, his soul looks down. On the text and other views of this passage see App. IX.

ταῦτα μὲν κτλ. ‘Yonder embellishments in the heavens, forasmuch as they are wrought in that which is seen with the bodily eye, we should indeed consider more beautiful and perfect than anything visible, but far inferior to those which are genuine and true—far inferior to the movements wherewith essential speed and essential slowness, in true and genuine number and in all true forms, are moved in relation to each other and therewithal make that which is essentially in them to move: the true adornments, which are apprehended by reasoning and the mathematical intelligence, but not by sight.’ The clause κάλλιστα μὲν —ἔχειν is concessive, and ἐπείπερ ἐν ὁρατῷ πεποίκιλται gives the reason why τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ ποικίλματα πολὺ ἐνδεῖ τῶν ἀληθινῶν (sc. ποικιλμάτων), for the ἀληθινὰ ποικίλματα are wrought, not ἐν ὁρατῷ, but ἐν νοητῷ, i.e. in the lower νοητόν, with which and which alone the true astronomer as such is conversant. See App. I. The clause ἃς τὸ ὀ=ν τάχος—φορὰς κτλ. explains τῶν ἀληθινῶν ( ποικιλμάτων), being equivalent, as Schneider points out, to τοῦτ’ ἔστι, τῶν φορῶν, ἂς κτλ., ‘that is, the movements which’ etc. So much for the relation between the different members of the sentence. In order to grasp the meaning of Plato, we should read the sentence aloud, letting the full stress of the voice fall on the words ἀληθινῶν, ὄν, οὖσα, ἀληθινῷ, ἀληθέσι and ‐όντα in τὰ ἐνόντα φέρει. Each of these words is emphatic, and expresses that degree of Truth or Being which belongs to the mathematical realities of true astronomy, as opposed to the sensibles or αἰσθητά which form the subject-matter of the astronomy which Plato has just condemned. Popular astronomy observes with the bodily eye the movements of visible and material planets, e.g. Mercury and Mars. These two planets φορὰς πρὸς ἄλληλα φέρει in γιγνόμενος or κινητὸς ἀριθμός, i.e. in time (cf. Tim. 37 C ff.), Mercury, as astronomers tell us, completing his orbit in about three, and Mars in about twenty-three, months. In the second place, these planets travel in γιγνόμενα (not ἀληθῆ) σχήματα, i.e. in forms or orbits which belong to the world of γιγνόμενα, and as they travel they carry with them the γιγνόμενα which they contain, Mars for example his snow-caps and canals. The Platonic astronomer, on the other hand, looks with the eye of διάνοια at the ἀληθινὰ ποικίλματα, i.e. at the motions of true or mathematical stars. These mathematical stars φορὰς πρὸς ἄλληλα φέρεται ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ ἀριθμῷ, i.e. in mathematical number, e.g. in 3 and 23 (not three months, etc.), and also ἐν ἀληθέσι σχήμασιν, i.e. in mathematical orbits, viz. the perfect ellipses which are imperfectly reproduced in the orbits of the visible material planets. Furthermore, although here perhaps our imagination may refuse to follow Plato in his flight, just as the visible Mars in his journey carries with him the γιγνόμενα which he contains, so Plato represents the true stars of mathematical astronomy as carrying round with them τὰ ἐνόντα, i.e. the mathematical realities which are in them. The mathematical counterpart of Mars, for example, will take with it in its revolution those perfect mathematical forms which are imperfectly reproduced in the canals and snow-caps of the visible Mars. Plato in short conceives of a mathematical οὐρανός of which the visible heavens are but a blurred and imperfect expression in time and space, just as every visible and material triangle is only an approximation to a true or perfect, i.e. a mathematical, triangle. The following remark of Aristotle's is intended as an objection to Plato's theory, but, according to the doctrine of this part of the Republic, Plato would have accepted the criticism as containing a just and true account of the astronomy which he prescribes: ἔτι δὲ εἴ τις παρὰ τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ τὰ μεταξὺ θήσεται, πολλὰς ἀπορίας ἕξει. δῆλον γὰρ ὡς ὁμοίως γραμμαί τε παρ’ αὐτὰς καὶ τὰς αἰσθητὰς ἔσονται καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἄλλων γενῶν. ὥστ’ ἐπείπερ ἀστρολογία μία τούτων ἐστίν, ἔσται τις καὶ οὐρανὸς παρὰ τὸν αἰσθητὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ ἥλιός τε καὶ σελήνη καὶ τἄλλα ὁμοίως τὰ κατὰ τὸν οὐρανόν ( Met. B 2. 997^{b} 12 ff.). It remains to speak of two particular difficulties. What does Plato mean by ταῦτα τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ποικίλματα, and by τὸ ὂν τάχος καὶ ἡ οὖσα βραδυτής? The ποικίλματα seem to be generally identified with the stars and nothing more. But inasmuch as astronomy deals with φορὰ βάθους, and the ordinary astronomer, according to Plato, studies τὰς τῶν ἄστρων φοράς (cf. 533 A) rather than ἄστρα themselves, it may be presumed that the ποικίλματα ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ in reality denote the stars regarded as moving bodies, i.e., strictly speaking, the movements of the heavenly bodies revolving in their orbits (cf. Tim. 39 D and 40 C); and the presumption becomes a certainty when we reach the words τῶν ἀληθινῶν, ἃς—φέρει, for since the true ποικίλματα which true astronomy studies are identified with the movements of true stars, we are bound in like manner to suppose that the γιγνόμενα ποικίλματα which observational astronomy studies are the movements of γιγνόμενα ἄστρα. Some may be disposed to think that τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ ποικίλματα refers to the intricate and complex patterns which the orbits of the celestial bodies weave upon the Heavens: cf. Tim. 39 D τὰς τούτων πλάνας, πλήθει μὲν ἀμηχάνῳ χρωμένας, πεποικιλμένας δὲ θαυμαστῶς. But in view of expressions like Aesch. P. V. 24 ἡ ποικιλείμων νύξ and Eur. Hel. 1102 ἀστέρων ποικίλματα, it is better to hold that Plato adopts the word which was usually applied to the ‘spangles’ in the heavens, the “patines of bright gold,” with which “the floor of heaven is thick inlaid” ( Merchant of Venice V 1), and uses it of the movements of the stars, especially as throughout this chapter he consistently represents the visible stars which popular astronomy investigates as nothing but visible or material φοραί. I understand τὸ ὂν τάχος and ἡ οὖσα βραδυτής as the mathematical counterparts of visible stars. This interpretation is, I think, the only one which gives a proper sense to φοράς τε πρὸς ἄλληλα φέρεται καὶ τὰ ἐνόντα φέρει, and no other solution preserves in its full and unimpaired significance the necessary contrast between the astronomy of observation and Plato's form of the science. The place which in popular astronomy is occupied by a γιγνόμενον τάχος, e.g. the planet Mercury, and a γιγνομένη βραδυτής, e.g. the planet Mars, is in true astronomy filled by ὂν τάχος and οὖσα βραδυτής. Plato's conception of a true science of Astronomy is a remarkable product of his peculiar half-poetical, half-philosophical imaginative faculty, and differs fundamentally from the theory and practice of the science both in antiquity and now. But it must in fairness be allowed that if a science of astronomy could be constructed on Platonic principles, admitting no element of sense-perception, and dealing exclusively with incorporeal mathematical abstractions, it would prove a better prelude to the study of the ἀχρώματός τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος καὶ ἀναφὴς οὐσία ( Phaedr. 247 C ) than could ever be provided by the astronomy which depends on observation of the heavenly bodies. See further App. II, and for other views of this passage App. X.

παραδείγμασι κτλ. The visible heavens may be used as a moving orrery, but nothing more. ὁμοίως κτλ. is a singularly apt illustration, because the special feature of Daedalus' statues was that they moved ( Euthyph. 11 B ff., Men. 97 D ff., Eur. Frag. 373 ).

τῷ ὄντι δὴ κτλ. It has been conjectured by Brandt ( z. Entw. d. plat. Lehr. v. d. Seelenteilen p. 8) that Plato is thinking of Eudoxus; but there is nothing to suggest a specific reference here, as there was in 528 B, C, and as Eudoxus, “the father of scientific astronomical observation in Greece” was preeminently “a practical observer” (Allman Gk. Geometry etc. p. 142), he would hardly be described by Plato in this passage as τῷ ὄντι ἀστρονομικός. See also Hirmer Entst. u. Komp. d. plat. Pol. p. 667.

τὰ τοιαῦτα : i.e. ὁρατά, σωματοειδῆ.

τῷ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ δημιουργῷ : the Demiurgus of the Timaeus.

τὴν δὲ νυκτὸς κτλ. : with which astronomical observation is concerned. Plato's tone is very different in the Timaeus (47 A ff.) as Grote points out ( Plato III p. 235 note, where also an amusing parallel is quoted from Malebranche); but it should be remembered that it is with the educational value of astronomy as a preparation for Dialectic that we are here concerned (note εἰ μέλλομεν—ποιήσειν in B, and see App. II).

τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων : ‘the other stars’ (Schneider), as ταῦτα shews, not ‘the stars besides’ (as Stallbaum).

ταῦτα : viz. the Sun and Moon, which make day, night, year, and month.

παραλλάττειν ‐‐ ὁρώμενα is a cardinal principle with Plato: see Tim. 28 A , B, 37 D and especially Pol. 269 D , E. παράλλαξις is used half-technically of any change or deviation in the courses of the heavenly bodies, as for example in the legend of Atreus ( Pol. 269 A ): cf. Tim. 22 C .

ζητεῖν depends on ἄτοπον ἡγήσεται, ἄτοπον being now taken as neuter. A reference to 525 B note will shew that Madvig's ζητήσει (or ζητεῖν δεῖν), and Richards' ζητοῦντα, with other conjectures, are wholly beside the mark. J. and C. (following Stallbaum) say ζητεῖν “depends on νομίζοντα with the common ellipse of δεῖν”: but δεῖν is not commonly omitted. In ζητεῖν—λαβεῖν there is a slight suggestion of something like the historical Socrates' distrust of astronomy ( Xen. Mem. IV 7. 6 ).

προβλήμασιν κτλ. Some have cited in illustration “Leverrier and Adams calculating an unknown planet into existence by enormous heaps of algebra” (De Morgan, quoted by Bosanquet p. 293: cf. Lutoslawski Plato's Logic p. 300). The example is striking but inapposite; for, according to this passage, the visible perturbations of Uranus, which occasioned the search for Neptune, would not have seemed to Plato anything very extraordinary. Unless he is greatly exaggerating here, and I do not deny that throughout this passage there is a touch of γενναῖον πάθος, ὥσπερ ὑπὸ μανίας τινὸς καὶ πνεύματος ἐνθουσιαστικῶς ἐκπνέον καὶ οἱονεὶ φοιβάζον τοὺς λόγους (Longinus περὶ ὕψους 8. 4), Plato's views on law in the heavens must have undergone considerable modification before he wrote the Laws: see the striking passage 821 B ff., and Tim. 47 A ff.

τὰ δ’ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ἐάσομεν : ‘we will dispense with the starry heavens.’ There is a touch of fine audacity, not to say impiety, in Plato's phrase. Greater than the starry heavens is the mind of man. Nettleship ( Lect. and Rem. II pp. 271— 277) and Bosanquet ( Companion pp. 290—293) are, as it seems to me, unduly anxious throughout the whole of this episode to minimise and explain away Plato's depreciation of the senses and their objects, although by so doing they can make his theories harmonize more nearly with the views of certain modern philosophers, and possibly also with the truth. Krohn ( Pl. St. pp. 170—174) inclines to the opposite error, although, except perhaps on verbal grounds, Plato would not quarrel with his definition of Platonic astronomy as “die Wissenschaft von den Bewegungen intelligiblen Körper.” Plato's Astronomy is in fact a kind of idealised Kinematics, with occasional illustrations from the visible movements of the heavenly bodies ( τῇ περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ποικιλίᾳ παραδείγμασι χρηστέον κτλ. 529 D).

οἶμαι δέ γε κτλ. 526 C note

ἀλλὰ γὰρ κτλ. Socrates means: If you criticise my curriculum (as in ἦ πολλαπλάσιον—προστάττεις), you are doubtless ready with suggestions of your own: hence I appeal to you: ‘what suitable study can you suggest?’ ‘I cannot,’ says Glauco, ‘make any suggestion straight off.’ ἀλλὰ γάρ (‘however’ as in Theaet. 144 B , Symp. 220 E ) goes closely with the previous sentence; if it were otherwise, Plato would have added ἦν δ’ ἐγώ or the like. The reading ἀλλὰ γάρ τι ( q Vind. F, Hermann etc.) can hardly stand; nor is Steinhart's ἄλλο γάρ τι κτλ., or Richards' ἀλλὰ γὰρ <ἄλλο> τι (or ἀλλὰ γὰρ <ἔτι> τι) pleasing or probable. I formerly suggested ἀλλὰ γάρ τι ἔχεις <σὺ> ὑπομνῆσαι κτλ., the other subjects having all been suggested by Socrates and not Glauco, with the partial exception of geometry 526 C; but now believe (with Schneider) that the text is sound.

πλείω κτλ . φορά is (according to both Plato and Aristotle) a specific variety of κίνησις, being in fact, ἡ κατὰ τόπον κίνησις. Of the genus κίνησις Plato enumerates ten varieties in Laws 893 B ff.; of φορά in particular some specific εἴδη are mentioned by Arist. Eth. Nic. X 3 1174^{a} 30 ff.

πρὸς τούτῳ : “praeter astronomicum φορᾶς s. motus genus” (Stallbaum).

ὡς πρὸς ἀστρονομίαν κτλ . ἀστρονομία is φορὰ βάθους (528 E note), and appeals to the eye in the same way as ἐναρμόνιος φορά, or movement in accordance with the laws of ἁρμονία (III 397 B, 398 D, E notes), appeals to the ear. In ἐναρμόνιος φορά the air moves more or less quickly etc., and this accounts for the different pitch etc. of notes: see Tim. 67 B , 80 A ff. and Theo Smyrn. p. 50 Hiller, where this—Pythagorean as well as Platonic—theory of sound is very clearly explained. Cf. also von Jan Musici Scriptores Graeci pp. 130 ff.

ἀδελφαί τινες . Cf. [Archytas] in Mullach Frag. Phil. Graec. I p. 564 περί τε δὴ τᾶς τῶν ἄστρων ταχυτᾶτος καὶ ἐπιτολᾶν καὶ δυσίων παρέδωκαν ἁμῖν διάγνωσιν καὶ περὶ γαμετρίας καὶ ἀριθμῶν καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα περὶ μωσικῆς· ταῦτα γὰρ τὰ μαθήματα δοκοῦντι εἶμεν ἀδελφά, ib. p. 565 and (with J. and C.) Tim. 47 B , C. The sisterhood of Music and Astronomy is best seen in the ‘harmony of the Spheres’: see X 617 B note and RP^{7}. 68 B notes

ἐκείνων πευσόμεθα κτλ. Plato does not claim to be a specialist in musical matters: cf. III 400 A. The words καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο πρὸς τούτοις look like a general acknowledgment of obligation throughout this part of the Republic to the Pythagoreans. See App. II.

ἐξῆκον κτλ. The MS reading ἀεί, οἷ gives a weightier and better meaning than οἷ ἀεί, which Richards proposes. For ἀφήκειν Eusebius ( Praep. Ev. XIV 13. 5) has ἀνήκειν, also a rare word: Stephanus conjectured ἐφήκειν. ἀφήκειν is better, though rarer, than either: cf. (with Schneider) ἀφίκηται in 531 D. The reference in ἄρτι is to 529 A ff.

τὰς γὰρ ἀκουομένας κτλ. The intervals reckoned as consonant ( σύμφωνα) were such as the octave, double octave, fifth and fourth: see on IV 430 E. These the Pythagoreans ‘measure by’ (or ‘against’) ‘one another,’ by comparing the lengths of vibrating strings of the same material, thickness and tension. It is thus found that the octave is 2 : 1, the double octave 4 : 1, the fifth 3 : 2, and the fourth 4 : 3. See Dict. of Ant. II p. 193 with Theo Smyrn. pp. 48—51, 56—61 Hiller, and Aristox. Harm. 20 ff. Marquard. Richards proposes <ἐν> ἀλλήλοις, but the dative is strictly accurate: cf. Tim. 39 D τῷ τοῦ ταὐτοῦ καὶ ὁμοίως ἰόντος ἀναμετ ρηθέντα κύκλῳ.

ὥσπερ οἱ ἀστρονόμοι . The parallel is exact: as the astronomers studied visible, so the Pythagoreans investigated audible φοραί (Theo l.c.). To Plato, on the other hand, ἁρμονίη ἀφανὴς φανερῆς κρείσσων (Heracl. Fr. 47 B ywater). ‘Heard harmonies are sweet, but those unheard are sweeter.’ See above on 530 C.

νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς κτλ. There were two rival schools of musical theory in Greece, viz. “(1) the Pythagorean or mathematical, who identified each interval with a ratio, (2) the ‘musical’ ( μουσικοί), who measured all intervals as multiples or fractions of the Tone” (Monro in Dict. Ant. II p. 193). Cf. Modes of Anc. Gk. Mus. p. 124. Plato's criticism was intended to apply to the first school; but Glauco erroneously understands it of the second.

πυκνώματα κτλ . ἄττα ( nescio quae) and ὀνομάζοντες shew that πυκνώματα is a technical term. The word πύκνωμα does not appear to occur elsewhere in this sense, but πυκνόν was a favourite word with writers of the ‘musical’ school, as may be seen from its constant employment by Aristoxenus. πυκνόν is thus defined: τὸ ἐκ δύο διαστημάτων συνεστηκὸς ἃ συντεθέντα ἔλαττον διάστημα περιέξει τοῦ λειπομένου διαστήματος ἐν τῷ διὰ τεσσάρων (Aristox. Harm. 24. 10 ff. Marquard) i.e. any combination of two intervals which are together less than the interval remaining in the Fourth when the πυκνόν is subtracted from the Fourth, e.g. two quarter tone intervals, or even two semitone intervals (but not more): see Aristox. l.c. 50. 15 ff. The definition in Bacchius Isag. 20 von Jan τὸ ἐκ δύο διαστημάτων ἐλαχίστων συγκείμενον ἐν ἑκάστῳ γένει is less exact, but not, so far as it goes, inconsistent with that of Aristoxenus. Plato's πυκνώματα must be “haec ipsa πυκνά vel alia parva et tamen composita intervalla,” so called “propter sonorum in angusto spatio quasi confertorum frequentiam” (Schneider). Cf. πυκνότης in Laws 812 D, καταπυκνοῦσθαι, καταπύκνωσις etc. in Theo 91 and often in Aristoxenus, and see generally Westphal and Rossbach Gr. Harm. etc. pp. 105 ff. It is possible that the musical application of these terms was originally a metaphor borrowed from the art of weaving: for “vestes spatha textae, ob densitatem, quam inde consequebantur, πυκνώματα dictae ap. Aesch. Suppl. 235 πέπλοισι βαρβάροισι, καὶ πυκνώμασι” (Stephanus-Hase s.v. πύκνωμα, where reference is made also to Hesych. s.v. σπάθημα and a Scholiast on Ar. Ach. 180 ). I agree with Schneider in doubting whether Gellius' “frequentamenta” (I 11. 12, V 1. 1) are the same as Plato's πυκνώματα.

οἷον ἐκ γειτόνων κτλ. : ‘as if they were trying to catch a sound in the neighbourhood.’ Cf. Heliod. I 17 πίνει δὲ ἐνταῦθα ἐκ γειτόνων and Blaydes on Ar. Plut. 435 or Stephanus-Hase Thes. s.v. γείτων, where numerous examples of this highly idiomatic phrase are quoted. J. and C.'s translation “from a neighbour's house” is incorrect and pointless: still worse is Westphal's “als ob sie die Intervallgrösse dem Nachbarton ablauschen wollen.” The idiom was understood by Ficinus, who translates it by “viciniore loco.”

οἱ μέν φασιν κτλ. Some will have it that they overhear a note between (let us say) B and C, and that this is the smallest interval, and should be the unit of measurement: others say ‘No! it is not different from B.’ Plato (who is all for simplicity in music Laws 812 C) here satirises the μουσικοί, who made the quartertone or δίεσις their unit: see Theo 55 δίεσιν δὲ καλοῦσιν ἐλαχίστην οἱ περὶ Ἀριστόξενον τὸ τεταρτημόριον τοῦ τόνου, ἥμισυ δὲ ἡμιτονίου, ὡς ἐλάχιστον μελῳδητὸν διάστημα, and on the ἐναρμόνιον γένος generally, which Plato strongly disliked (Theo 56; cf. also Procl. in Tim. 191 E), and in which the δίεσις played a large part, Dict. of Ant. l.c. and Westphal and Rossbach l.c.

ἀμφισβητοῦντες . We should expect ἀμφισβητοῦσιν (so Theo 6) or else φάσκοντες instead of φασιν above. Cobet would emend, but the anacoluthon is not difficult in a writer like Plato: see on VI 488 C, D and supra 519 A note

φθεγγομένων : sc. τῶν χορδῶν, omitted as in ἡ διὰ πασῶν.

ὦτα κτλ. This bitter epigram was applied by Adrastus to Aristoxenus (Procl. in Tim. 192 B). The cap fits admirably; for Aristoxenus was afterwards the leader of the μουσικοί whose principle is here ridiculed. With the expression itself cf. Pliny Epp. VII 27, 8 sed offirmare animum auribusque praetendere.

σὺ μὲν κτλ. Socrates now corrects Glauco's error: see on νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς κτλ. 531 A. τοὺς χρηστούς is of course contemptuous. Plato has no sympathy with the ‘ μουσικοί.’

τοὺς ταῖς χορδαῖς κτλ. : ‘who persecute and torture the strings, racking them upon the pegs. But lest my figure become somewhat tedious if I dwell upon the blows delivered with the plectrum, and the accusations brought against the strings, as well as their denials and braggadocio behaviour’ etc. The figure ( εἰκών) is from torturing and beating slaves, as βασανίζοντας, στρεβλοῦντας and πληγῶν shew: even πράγματα παρέχοντας suggests a court of law (cf. Crit. 44 E ). The strings are the victims, while the pegs are the pulleys by which they were racked upon the τροχός (see Dict. Ant. s. v. eculeus). For ἐπί Herwerden proposes ὑπό: but the strings are racked by the musicians upon the pegs.

πλήκτρῳ τε πληγῶν κτλ. The etymological meaning of πλῆκτρον adds point to this part of the comparison.

πέρι from its position divides πληγῶν and κατηγορίας, which refer to the behaviour of the musicians, from ἐξαρνήσεως καὶ ἀλαζονείας, in which the behaviour of the strings is described. For the anastrophe of πέρι see Lina de praeposit. usu Plat. pp. 26—30. The angry musician is like the prosecutor, and blames the strings, which in their turn repudiate the charge and swagger away like a stubborn slave however savagely the screw is turned. For a further discussion of this passage see App. XI.

ἐκείνους : i.e. the Pythagoreans, and not the μουσικοί, as Glauco supposed.

τοὺς γὰρ κτλ. It is strange that in spite of οὓς ἔφαμεν νῦν δὴ κτλ. this should have been so frequently understood as referring to the school satirised by Glauco: see for example Susemihl Gen. Entw. II p. 210. Plato is of course, as Schneider pointed out, speaking about the Pythagoreans who investigated the numbers or ratios of audible consonances: see 531 A note and RP.^{7} § 56 C.

ἀλλ’ οὐκ κτλ. Cf. 530 B. ἀνίασιν is undoubtedly present, and not future, here: see on V 473 C.

τίνες ξύμφωνοι κτλ. As the true astronomer should study intelligible stars with the mathematical intelligence, using the visible stars only as imperfect παραδείγματα (529 C, D note), so the true ἁρμονικός must investigate intelligible, and not audible, consonances. In the words of a modern writer, he must “look, not into the tone-world here, but into the world of harmony beyond.” Plato holds that certain mathematical numbers are in themselves ξύμφωνοι, and others not: see Theo 72—75, where examples of both varieties are given. The numbers or ratios of audible consonances are only particular and imperfect embodiments or expressions of these numbers: they may serve as παραδείγματα, but nothing more. In the Timaeus Plato represents the World-soul as the grandest expression of certain ξύμφωνοι ἀριθμοί, so that it is natural enough for him to crown his προπαιδεία with the study of mathematical ξυμφωνία, and say that it is ‘useful in seeking out the beautiful and good.’ It must nevertheless be admitted that Plato's conception of Harmonics as well as of Astronomy is fundamentally different from that of modern science, in spite of the attempts which Bosanquet and others have made to prove their essential harmony. See on 530 C and App. II.

ᾗ ‐‐ οἰκεῖα κτλ. Cf. [ Epin.] 991 E ff. πᾶν διάγραμμα ἀριθμοῦ τε σύστημα καὶ ἁρμονίας σύστασιν ἅπασαν τῆς τε τῶν ἄστρων περιφορᾶς τὴν ὁμολογίαν οὖσαν μίαν ἁπάντων ἀναφανῆναι δεῖ τῷ κατὰ τρόπον μανθάνοντι, ἀναφανήσεται δὲ ἂν— ὀρθῶς τις εἰς ἒν βλέπων μανθάνῃ· δεσμὸς γὰρ πεφυκὼς πάντων τούτων εἷς ἀναφανήσεται διανοουμένοις· εἰ δ’ ἄλλως πως ταῦτα μεταχειριεῖταί τις, τύχην δεῖ καλεῖν. The apprehension of the ‘one in the many’ in these preliminary studies prepares us for the dialectical conception of the universe of Thought as an organic and correlated whole (VI 511 B—D notes); but the mere specialist in mathematics for example, or astronomy, can never become a dialectician. Cf. 537 C and Euthyd. 290 B ff.

νόμου : ‘song’ or ‘strain.’ There is no pun on νόμος ‘law,’ as Bosanquet supposes. Dialectic is not a ‘law’ in the Greek sense of the word.

οὐ γάρ που κτλ. Theodorus in the Theaetetus (146 B) is a good example, and everyone who knows men who are distinguished mathematicians and nothing more will heartily echo Glauco's emphatic οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία. Taught on the Platonic method, not as an end, but as a means, by teachers who have themselves penetrated into regions beyond and above the sphere of pure mathematics, and who are constantly on the alert to direct their pupils thither, the study of mathematics may prove one of the most valuable of all instruments of education. See App. II.

ὧν . For the attraction see VI 510 B note

ἀλλ’ ἤδη κτλ. ‘Well, did it ever seem to you that persons who are unable’ etc. The subject is μὴ δυνατοί τινες ὄντες— λόγον, and after ἤδη “supplendum est ἔδοξαν, quod ipsum Glauconis verbis magis accommodatum est quam δοκοῦσι” (Schneider). The form of Socrates' question is in fact affected by Glauco's reference to the past in ὧν ἐγὼ ἐντετύχηκα. I formerly, with v and three other MSS, including Vind. F, read ἀλλὰ δή, understanding δοκοῦσι: but ἀλλὰ δή is scarcely appropriate here (see on II 365 C), and Schneider's explanation gives a satisfactory meaning to ἤδη. J. and C. take ἤδη with μὴ δυνατοί τινες ὄντες (‘persons who are as yet unable’ etc.); but the hyperbaton is too difficult, and the meaning (which Plato would rather have expressed by μήπω δυνατοὶ κτλ.) unsuitable. Few will approve of Badham's ἀλλ’ οἱ δὴ κτλ. or even of Burnet's ἀλλὰ δή, εἶπον, μὴ δυνατοὶ οἵτινες δοῦναί τε κτλ. For the sentiment, which is a commonplace of the Socratic school, cf. Xen. Mem. IV 6. 1 , Prot. 336 C , Phaed. 76 B , Crat. 390 C ff. al.

οὐδ’ αὖ κτλ. ‘My answer to this question is also no.’

περαίνει =‘performs’: cf. Plut. Crass. 33. 3 ἀναβακχεύσας ἐπέραινεν ἐκεῖνα τὰ μέλη κτλ., Tim. 29 D τὸ μὲν οὖν προοίμιον θαυμασίως ἀπεδεξάμεθά σου, τὸν δὲ δὴ νόμον ἡμῖν ἐφεξῆς πέραινε, and Laws 723 E. The metaphor is still from music, though D. and V. erroneously translate “of which dialectical reasoning is the consummation.”

ἣν ἐλέγομεν κτλ. It follows that the progress of the prisoner after he has begun to look on real objects outside the Cave represents Dialectic: cf. 516 A note and 532 B.

αὐτὰ ἄστρα . I formerly read αὐτὰ <τὰ> ἄστρα with Baiter; but there is no MS authority for the article, and its presence is unnecessary even between αὐτὰ τὰ ζῷα and αὐτὸν τὸν ἥλιον.

οὕτω καὶ κτλ. : ‘so also whenever by means of dialectic one attempts through discourse of reason’ etc. On τοῦ λόγου and ἄνευ πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων see VI 511 B note and App. III. Ast's conjecture ὁρμᾶν (see cr. n.) is supported by Clement Strom. V 112 B Migne (quoted by Schneider) ἐὰν ἐπιχειρῇ τις ἄνευ πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων διὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐπ’ αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον ὁρμᾶν κτλ., and closely corresponds with ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποβλέπειν in the last sentence. There is no occasion for Stallbaum's professional ridicule of Schneider's view: ‘quasi vero recte dici potuerit: τῷ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖν διὰ τοῦ λόγου ὁρμᾶν ἐπί τι!’ for οὗ αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος ἅπτεται τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμει in VI 511 B is an exact parallel. On other views see App. XII.

ἕκαστον is omitted in A (see cr. n.) and some other MSS. It is however necessary both in itself, and in order to provide a proper contrast with αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν. For the process here described see App. III.

τότε . 516 B.

ἡ δέ γε κτλ. Having described διαλεκτική in terms of the cave-simile, Plato now proceeds to describe his προπαιδεία in the same way: cf. 515 C, 516 A notes Bosanquet finds a difficulty in ἡ λύσις—ἐπάνοδος, and thinks it just conceivable that these words describe the training in music and gymnastic and not the προπαιδεία (so also Susemihl Gen. Entw. II p. 201). But Plato's language is perfectly definite; and τῶν τεχνῶν ἂς διήλθομεν (532 C) cannot mean anything beyond or except the five studies just described. Nor is this the only passage where the ‘turning round’ of the prisoners while still in the cave and their gradual ascent are identified with the προπαιδεία, or with part of it: see 521 C. Plato means that the emancipation of the soul is a gradual process, and that we are not to expect our mathematical studies to deliver us from δόξα all at once. ἡ λύσις —εἴδωλα suggests that their first effect will be to loosen our intellectual bonds, and turn us as it were from reflected to original δόξαι—from εἰκασία to πίστις (VI 511 E, VII 517 A notes). The higher we mount, the less of δόξα we retain, and in the higher stages of the προπαιδεία (symbolized by ἐκεῖ—ἀποσκιαζομένας) we escape from δόξα altogether. See App. I.

καὶ ἐκεῖ κτλ. ‘and when there, their inability still to look upon animals and plants and the light of the sun, but upon divine reflections in water and shadows of things real, not, as before, shadows of images thrown by a light which is itself but an image compared with the sun.’ Cf. 516 A, B. ἔτι ἀδυναμία is due to Iamblichus: see cr. n. and cf. Bywater in J. Ph. X p. 78. Nägelsbach also conjectured ἔτ’ ἀδυναμία. The difference between ἔτι and ἐπ in an uncial MS is practically nil. With πρὸς δὲ τὰ κτλ. the positive counterpart of ἀδυναμία ( βλέπειν) is to be supplied: cf. Ap. 36 B (where Schanz's insertion of οὔ after οἱ πολλοί is inelegant and unnecessary) and Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 1072. For ἔτι with a verbal noun cf. IV 434 C note ‘Divine’ φαντάσματα is a half-technical Platonic phrase for reflections of natural objects produced by natural lights: they are θεῖα because θείας ἔργα ποιήσεως ( Soph. 266 C , where the whole matter is very clearly explained). Even without the aid of the Sophist, we might deduce the meaning from the antithetical clause ἀλλ’ οὐκ —ἀποσκιαζομένας, if we remember that the sun is a θεός (VI 508 A). The adjective is regularly placed after the substantive when two coordinate qualifications have to be expressed (here ἐν τοῖς ὕδασιν and θεῖα): cf. III 397 D τὸν τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς μιμητὴν ἄκρατον, IX 573 A τῶν ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις συνουσίαις ἡδονῶν ἀνειμένων. Other examples are given by Jebb on Soph. O. T. 1245 and Sandys on Arist. Ath. Pol. 51. 3: cf. also Stallbaum on Phil. 20 B . The present passage explains why Plato was so careful to make the originals in the Cave σκευαστά and εἴδωλα, and not φυτευτά: see on 514 B. Other views of this sentence are discussed in App. XIII.

πᾶσα κτλ. The anacoluthon is illustrated by Engelhardt Anac. Pl. Spec. III p. 45.

ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν : viz. λύσιν ἀπὸ τῶν δεσμῶν κτλ.

οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νῦν κτλ. We ought not to interpret this as a promise of future dialogues (with Siebeck Unters. z. Phil. d. Griechen p. 118); it is only a way of indicating, before we pass on, that the subject is not exhausted. See on IV 430 C.

οὐκέτι κτλ. With the general tenour and form of the sentence cf. (with Jackson) Symp. 210 A. I can see no reason for suspecting the text (with Madvig, who proposes εἴ γ’ ἔτι, or εἰ σύ γ’ ἔτι, and Badham, who would insert εἰ before οἷός τ’ ἔσει). Glauco has not without difficulty (517 C) followed Socrates thus far: nor is there anything rude in telling him frankly that he has reached his limit, and even if there were, Socrates does not spare Glauco's feelings (cf. 527 D, 529 A). That his audience would not be able to follow a description of the Good, has already been implied in VI 506 E ff. βουλοίμην ἄν, εἶπον, ἐμέ τε δύνασθαι αὐτὴν (the account of the Good itself) ἀποδοῦναι καὶ ὑμᾶς κομίσασθαι. Here Socrates appears to be a trifle more confident of his own expository powers, though he is careful, as before, to avoid the appearance of dogmatism and therefore introduces the expression ὅ γε δή μοι φαίνεται etc. (cf. τοῦ γε δοκοῦντος ἐμοί l.c.) and προθυμίας (cf. προθυμούμενος δὲ κτλ. VI 506 D). Krohn (Pl. St. pp. 179 ff.) bitterly complains of Socrates for drawing back; and Whewell (Phil. of Discovery p. 436) observes “We may venture to say that it does not appear that he had any answer ready.” The dialectical method recommended by Plato in the Republic is doubtless, in its full significance, an unrealised ideal (cf. nn. on ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον VI 510 B and τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου 511 B), just as the ultimate object of Dialectic, the Idea of Good, will still recede as we approach it. The description which follows merely recapitulates the account already given in Book VI, with a few additional characteristics already familiar in the Socratic school: but the majority of the Platonic dialogues furnish practical illustrations of many essential features in Plato's dialectical method: so that it is possible to form a tolerably clear idea of the kind of answer which the Platonic Socrates might have made in reply to Glauco's invitation. See on the whole subject App. III.

οὐδ’ εἰκόνα ἂν ἔτι κτλ. : such as we saw before in VI 506 E ff. Glauco's question refers to the method, Socrates' reply to the object, of Dialectic: it is of course impossible to separate the two. On διισχυρίζεσθαι followed by ἰσχυριστέον see I 336 E note

ὅτι μὲν δεῖ κτλ. Cf. VI 505 E ff., supra 517 C ( δεῖ ταύτην ἰδεῖν κτλ.), 519 C, 526 E ( ὃ δεῖ αὐτὴν παντὶ τρόπῳ ἰδεῖν). These passages are strongly in favour of δεῖ as against δή (see cr. n.), which Schneider, Hermann, and Stallbaum retain. ἰδεῖν is unpleasing if we read δή, and μὲν δή is not free from difficulty here. For μέν without δέ following see V 475 E note

τόδε γοῦν κτλ. Socrates proceeds to establish what he has just asserted, viz. that only dialectic can reveal the Good to those who are versed in the propaedeutic ‘arts’ or sciences. In this at least (he says) every one will agree with us, viz. ‘that it is some other μέθοδος’ (different from the five propaedeutic ‘arts’) ‘which endeavours in every case to apprehend by scientific procedure concerning each several self’ (e.g. αὐτοῦ καλοῦ, αὐτοῦ δικαίου, etc.) ‘that which they severally are’ (the οὐσία of each) e.g. ὃ ἔστιν καλόν, etc. Cf. 531 D οὐ γάρ που δοκοῦσί γε σοι οἱ ταῦτα (the five propaedeutic ‘arts’) δεινοὶ διαλεκτικοὶ εἶναι. Socrates continues: while all the other arts (except τὰ μαθηματικά) address themselves πρὸς δόξας ἀνθρώπων, etc., even the mathematical ‘arts’ give no λόγος of their ὑποθέσεις (and so do not apprehend the ὃ ἔστιν of their subject). Dialectic and Dialectic alone does this (533 C), so that Dialectic is the ἄλλη τις μέθοδος and alone satisfies our needs. τόδε is the object of λέγουσιν, on which, and not on ἀμφισβητήσει, ὡς depends. ἄλλη means other than ὧν νῦν δὴ διήλθομεν. ἀλλά is opposed to the negative notion contained in ἄλλη (another μέθοδος, not that of the five ‘arts,’ but etc.). Badham arbitrarily proposes to read ὅρῳ περιλαμβάνειν for ὁδῷ περὶ παντὸς λαμβάνειν. The expression περὶ παντός ‘about everything’ is of course different from αὐτοῦ ἑκάστου πέρι, and μέθοδος ὁδῷ is the kind of collocation in which Plato delights. For other views on this sentence see App. XIV.

αἱ μὲν ἄλλαι κτλ. Cf. Phil. 55 E — 58 E. Plato is thinking of a threefold classification of arts under κολακική, ποιητική, and ἐπιμελητική or the like (J. and C., comparing Gorg. 463 ff., 501, 502, Soph. 222 E , 265 ff., Pol. 261 ff.).

τετράφαται is one of Plato's archaisms: see on I 330 B. Such forms are not found in inscriptions after 410 B.C. (Meisterhans^{3} p. 166).

γεωμετρίας ‐‐ ταύτῃ . For the syntax cf. VI 511 B note

ὀνειρώττουσι κτλ. Krohn ( Pl. St. pp. 179—181) accuses Plato of a sudden volte face in regard to mathematical studies. It is true that the same language is used of δόξα in V 476 C (cf. VII 520 C), but there are dreams and dreams, and we may fairly say that if the προπαιδεία is only a dream in comparison with Dialectic, at least it is one of those dreams which come through the gates of horn.

ᾧ γὰρ ἀρχὴ κτλ. See VI 510 C, D notes ὁμολογίαν means ‘agreement’ ‘harmony’ (“Übereinstimmung” Schneider), viz. of ἀρχή, τελευτή and τὰ μεταξύ, not ‘admissions’ (as D. and V. translate): cf. ὁμολογουμένως l.c.

οὐκοῦν κτλ. ‘Well then,’ said I, ‘the method of dialectic alone proceeds by the destruction of hypotheses to the actual first principle, in order to make its results secure.’ Dialectic examines and cancels ( ἀναιρεῖ) one ὑπόθεσις after another, till in the end it reaches the Idea of Good. Suppose for example that ὁσιότης is the subject of discussion. Various ὑποθέσεις are proposed, tested, and overthrown. Out of the ruins of the former ὑποθέσεις we built a new and better one, which must in its turn be thoroughly tested, tried, and perhaps overthrown, before it can serve as a stepping-stone to one which is higher, truer and better: cf. 534 B, C. Now this process of testing, revising, discarding, is not, ideally speaking, complete until we examine the relations of our ὑπόθεσις of ὁσιότης with all νοητά, and in such an examination we apply the same ‘hypothetical method’ throughout the whole noetic sphere, testing and correcting all our ὑποθέσεις by one another. In the final stage, which is of course only an ideal, all our ὑποθέσεις become exact counterparts of the Ideas, and we have reached the ἀρχή or Good. Thereafter the results of Dialectic are βέβαια: see VI 511 B. The earlier steps in this dialectical ascent may be illustrated from many, if not most, of the Platonic dialogues. For ἀναιροῦσα cf. Arist. Topic. Γ 6. 120^{a} 6—31, and especially Eth. Eud. II 6. 1222^{b} 27 f. κινουμένης τῆς ἀρχῆς πάντα μάλιστ’ ἂν τὰ δεικνύμενα μεταβάλλοι, αὐτὰ δ’ αὑτὰ οὐ μεταβάλλει ἀναιρουμένου θατέρου ὑπὸ θατέρου, ἂν μὴ τῷ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἀνελεῖν καὶ δἰ ἐκείνης δεῖξαι. The word is often used in connexion with the Eleatic dialectic, of which Plato's ἡ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀνάλυσις (Alcin. Isag. 7), here described, is a development: see RP^{7}. §§ 95 note a, 105 A—106, 110—115. For other views on this passage see App. XV: and for a farther discussion of the method itself and its permanent value in the history of investigation consult App. III.

βορβόρῳ . The image is taken from Orphic theology: cf. II 363 D note

ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν . VI 511 D, E.

ἔστι δ’ , ὡς κτλ. Cf. Laws 864 A. Plato constantly reminds us that he has no fixed terminology (see Hirmer Entst. u. Komp. d. pl. Pol. p. 647 and Hirzel Der Dialog pp. 246 ff.), and the ancients were well aware of this fact, though modern interpreters of Plato too often forget it; see the references collected by Hermann Gesch. u. Syst., p. 573 note 106 and D. L. III 63 (quoted by Hirmer).

οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη . See cr. n. The interpolation which follows these words in all MSS except Ξ is discussed in App. XVI.

ἀρέσκει οὖν . See cr. n. Though γοῦν is in A and Ξ, a majority of MSS read οὖν, which is alone suitable. The same error occurs in one or more MSS in V 455 E and VI 506 C (Schneider).

ὅ τι νόησις ‐‐ εἰκασίαν . That is to say, in the Simile of the Line (see Fig. i on p. 65), (1) CB : AC :: EB : DC and (2) CB : AC :: CE : AD. We have already seen that CE : EB :: AD : DC (VI 509 D note); therefore componendo

τὴν δ’ ἐφ’ οἷς κτλ. Liebhold (who also conjectured καὶ ἔτι νόησις for καὶ ὅ τι νόησις) makes the extraordinary suggestion τὴν δ’ ἐφ’ οἶς ταῦτ’ ἂν διέχῃ ἀναλογίαν καὶ διαίρεσιν ἑκατέρου ( Philol. 1876 p. 372). The text is of course quite sound and= τὴν δὲ <τούτων> ἐφ’ οἷς ταῦτά <ἐστιν> ἀναλογίαν κτλ.: cf. VI 511 E. I cannot agree with Shorey when he says ( Idea of Good etc. p. 235) that Plato “avoids drawing out the proportion εἴδη: objects of διάνοια= σκευαστά etc.: εἰκόνες, because he is aware that the second member is a blank and the fourth is largely fantastic.” Both of these assertions are in my opinion quite wrong, and if they were true, Plato would have refrained from drawing out the proportions between the faculties themselves for exactly the same reasons. See App. I. As it is, we should take Plato at his word. He may well decline to enter on the tedious and unprofitable task of expounding and illustrating in detail the proportions which may be conjectured to obtain between the different objects of our intellectual powers. It would for example lead to no useful result if we tried to establish a proportion between a particular ε<*>δος, one of the five μαθήματα, a particular object of πίστις, and a particular object of εἰκασία. Such attempts would certainly involve us in an endless amount of talk, and would hardly result in anything but a series of barren and pedantic formulae and subdivisions.

ἢ ὅσων . See cr. n. ὅσων is read by a large majority of MSS, and the confusion of ο and ω is common: see Introd. § 5. The construction (as Schneider points out) is ἢ ὅσων λόγων οἱ παρεληλυθότες λόγοι ἡμᾶς ἐνέπλησαν: cf. (with Schneider) παρὰ δόξαν τοῖς νῦν δοκουμένοις VI 490 A. Madvig's ὅσοι has little probability, although it avoids a certain awkwardness.

ἦ καὶ διαλεκτικὸν κτλ. Cf. 531 E note As far as words go, this definition of Dialectic might almost have come from the historical Socrates, although of course λόγον λαμβάνειν, οὐσία and λόγον διδόναι meant less to him than to Plato.

οὐ φήσεις =‘negabis.’ οὐ is not here ‘nonne.’ The interrogation is carried on from the last clause.

διορίσασθαι ‐‐ ἀφελών perhaps suggests the διαίρεσις, which was an essential part of Plato's dialectical method: see App. III. It is noteworthy however that the Republic lays far more stress on συναγωγή than on διαίρεσις: cf. 537 C, Zeller^{4} II 1. p. 617 note and App. III.

ὥσπερ ἐν μάχῃ κτλ. : ‘as it were in a battle, exhausting every elenchus, striving to test his view not by that which seems, but by that which is’ etc. For διὰ πάντων—διεξιών cf. Thuc. III 45. 3 διεξεληλύθασί γε διὰ πασῶν τῶν ζημιῶν and Parm. 136 E διὰ πάντων διεξόδου. We apply the ἔλεγχοι ourselves: cf. ἐξελέγξωμεν in X 610 A. The ordinary interpretation supposes that the ἔλεγχοι are applied by others (‘running the gauntlet of all questionings’ J. and C.); but in that case we must take ἐλέγχειν as= ἐλέγχειν τοὺς τῶν ἄλλων ἐλέγχους, which is difficult, because ἐλέγχειν is most naturally interpreted by ἐλέγχων just before, and ἐλέγχων certainly means tests or elenchi which are applied to the theory which the dialectician is himself maintaining. Plato means that the dialectician tests his view of good not by ‘seeming’ i.e. by what ‘seems’ (good, bad etc.) to the many, but by the Truth i.e. by that which ‘is’ in the Platonic sense of οὐσία, viz. the Ideas, such as (let us say) the Ideas of κάλλος, δίκαιον and so forth. The Idea of Good has connexions and relations with all the other Ideas (cf. VI 510 B, 511 B notes); and our knowledge of these may therefore be used to test the accuracy of our conception of Good. Zeller^{4} II 1. p. 620 note rightly compares the present passage with Parm. 135 C —136 E: see App. III. It is perhaps unnecessary to notice Liebhold's foolish conjecture νόησιν for οὐσίαν.

ὀνειροπολοῦντα κτλ. 533 C note

οὐκ ἂν ἐάσαις κτλ. : ‘you will not suffer to be mere irrational quantities, if they are to rule in the city and control the higher issues.’ ἄλογοι γραμμαί are irrational magnitudes (cf. Arist. περὶ ἀτόμων γραμμῶν 968^{b} 18), which Greek mathematicians treated “geometrically through a symbolism of irrational lines,” as in Euclid Bk. X (Gow Gk Math. p. 78). They are ἄλογοι or ἄρρητοι because “nicht aussprechbar” (Cantor Gesch. d. Math. p. 154 note), whereas rational lines are ῥηταί, ‘expressible’ (cf. Blass de Pl. Math. p. 18). In its application to Glauco's ‘children,’ ἄλογοι is active, and means of course μὴ λόγον ἔχοντες διδόναι (534 B). Has γραμμάς also any special application? Probably it has: otherwise the witticism seems unnecessarily far-fetched and frigid, even if we make every allowance for Plato's love of a mathematical jest (cf. Pol. 266 B ), as well as for the interest which the subject of irrationals seems to have excited among the mathematicians of his day (see Theaet. 147 D ff. and Cantor l.c. pp. 182, 191, 203). Lucilius (II 20) has the line “vix vivo homini ac monogrammo” (“a dead-alive sketch of an anatomy” Tyrrell Lat. Poetry p. 175), and Cicero mocks at Epicurus' gods as “monogrammos” ( N. D. II 59: cf. I 123 homunculi similem deum—liniamentis dumtaxat extremis, non habitu solido— praeditum etc., and other passages in Usener Epicurea p. 234). Perhaps Plato means to suggest that his “airy burgomasters,” as Milton calls them, would in such a case be only as it were mere silhouettes (“Schattenrisse” Bertram Bilderspr. Pl. p. 46) of rulers moving blindly to and fro in a sort of dreamland (cf. ὀνειροπολοῦντα 534 C and 533 C note). For other views see App. XVII.

τῶν μεγίστων . 525 B note

ἐρωτᾶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι κτλ. Plato concludes by emphasizing the most conspicuous and characteristic feature of the Socratic method: cf. Crat. 390 C .

διανομὴ κτλ. Herwerden needlessly and wantonly inserts σκεπτέα after τὸ λοιπόν.

τὴν προτέραν ἐκλογήν . III 412 B ff.

ἐκείνας τὰς φύσεις κτλ. ‘I would have you suppose that it must be those natures which are to be selected,’ lit. ‘ those natures must be to-be-selected.’ Kopetsch ( de verbalibus Plat. p. 29) confesses himself unable to quote any parallels for the ‘pleonasm.’ We might compare the use of δεῖν in μνημονικὴν αὐτὴν ζητῶμεν δεῖν εἶναι VI 486 D, where see note; but the fact is that δεῖν is not altogether pleonastic in the present passage. Without δεῖν we should translate ‘that it is those natures’ etc. and not ‘that it must be those natures’ etc.; and there is a slight but appreciable difference between the two. Richards would expunge δεῖν or read ἀεί, but ἀεί is quite unsuitable here. ἐκλεκτάς (which I once proposed, taking the words as=‘ought to have been selected’) is equally unsatisfactory, nor does θεῖναι, which might be suggested in place of εἶναι, carry conviction. The text is in my judgment sound.

βεβαιοτάτους ‐‐ ἀνδρειοτάτους . The contrast is between stedfastness and spirit: cf. II 375 A ff. and VI 503 C with Appendix VI to Book VI. εὐειδεστάτους has not hitherto been mentioned as a qualification of Plato's rulers: for VI 494 C cannot be interpreted in such a sense. The word is however certainly genuine: cf. ἀρτιμελεῖς in 536 B.

γενναίους ‐‐ τὰ ἤθη : ‘of noble and masculine characters.’ Cf. Theaet. 149 A μαίας μάλα γενναίας τε καὶ βλοσυρᾶς, Nicostrat. Frag. 35 ed. Kock νὴ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην, ὦ ξένη, βλοσυράν γε τὴν φυχὴν ἔχεις, and Aelian Var. Hist. 12. 21 δεμνὸν ἅμα καὶ βλοσυρὸν ὁρῶσαι (of Spartan women). In Cl. Rev. XIII p. 10 I have tried to shew that the original meaning of this vigorous and expressive word is ‘hairy,’ ‘shaggy,’ ‘bristling’ (horridus), from which to ‘virile’ the transition is natural enough. Mr L. D. Barnett has since supplied me with an interesting confirmation from Pollux IV 136 (on tragic masks) ὁ δὲ οὖλος, ξανθός, ὑπέρογκος. αἱ τρίχες τῷ ὄγκῳ προσπεπήγασιν, ὀφρύες ἀνατέτανται, βλοσυρὸς τὸ εἶδος.

ἃ ‐‐ πρόσφορα : ‘the natural characteristics suitable for our scheme of education.’ τῆς φύσεως depends on ἅ, not (as Stallbaum supposes) on τῇδε τῇ παιδείᾳ. The following list of qualifications should be compared with that in VI 485 A ff. The difference is slight, but φιλοπονία as a special attribute is new, and on the other hand some of the secondary moral qualities are not insisted upon here.

ἀποδειλιῶσι κτλ. Cf. VI 504 A.

ἄρρατον . The word ἄρρατος, which occurs again in Crat. 407 D , is apparently, like βλοσυρός, an expressive vulgarism de foro arreptum. There is considerable variety here in the inferior MSS, but the evidence of the Scholiast places the reading beyond doubt. ἄρρατος is explained by Timaeus (s. v.) as ἰσχυρός, στερεός, and with this explanation the Scholiast and Lexicographers agree. Some of the ancients derived the word from an obsolete verb ῥάω = ῥαίω. Schneider remarks that the α must be long “si verum est quod scholiastes Victorianus ad Il. XIIII 56 tradit, pro ἄῤῥηκτον alios legisse ἄῤῥατον.” See Stephanus-Hase Thes. s. v.

οὐδένα : ‘I think no one will.’ Van Prinsterer's οὐδενί, as Stallbaum observes, is unnecessary. In written dialogue, as in actual conversation, the answer does not always accommodate itself to the exact form of the question: cf. V 465 E note

πρότερον κτλ. The reference in πρότερον is to VI 495 C—496 A. In οὐ κατ’ ἀξίαν αὐτῆς ἅπτονται Dümmler sees an allusion to Antisthenes ( Antisth. p. 34), but see on 535 D, E.

ἄπονον : not μισόπονον, although μισοπονῇ appears below. Plato loves variety as well as uniformity, and Herwerden should not have proposed to write μισόπονον.

φιλόθηρος . Dümmler thinks Plato perhaps means Xenophon, who loved the chase; but it is unlikely that any personal reference is intended either here or in 535 C. See also on 535 E.

ὁ ‐‐ φιλοπονίαν : ‘whose love of work has taken the opposite direction.’

αὐτή τε καὶ κτλ. See on αὐτός τε καὶ—παρακάλει IV 427 D.

τὸ δ’ ἀκούσιον . See II 382 A—C.

θηρίον ὕειον . Dümmler again recognises the unhappy Antisthenes, remembering, no doubt, the ‘city of pigs.’ See however on II 372 D.

μεγαλοπρέπειαν : ‘highmindedness,’ not (as Jowett) ‘magnificence.’ See VI 486 A note

τὰ τοιαῦτα (“das dazu gehörige” Schneider) is quite general, and means how so-and-so is in respect of the virtues just enumerated: cf. VIII 549 D. The Oxford editors wrongly understand τὰ τοιαῦτα as τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μέρη.

λανθάνουσι κτλ. : ‘they unconsciously use cripples and bastards for any of these services that happen, as friends in the one case, and in the other rulers.’ Schneider explains τούτων as “horum negotiorum, hoc est, aliquam ex his, quae dictae sunt, virtutibus requirentium.” This is perhaps safer than to understand it merely of the services rendered by friends and rulers. In either case cf. for τούτων VIII 543 C note J. and C. have rightly noted that “the subject of τύχωσι is the same with that of λανθάνουσι”: but they are mistaken in referring τούτων to τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μέρη, and in connecting πρός with χωλοῖς τε καὶ νόθοις. It is certain that χρώμενοι is understood with τύχωσι, and, if so, πρός can belong only to χρώμενοι. D. and V. are consistently wrong in the translation of this somewhat perplexing little clause.

ἀρτιμελεῖς κτλ. For ἀρτιμελεῖς cf. 535 A. ἄσκησιν is of course the physical discipline: note the chiasmus.

ἥ τε δίκη κτλ. Cf. VI 487 A where οὐδ’ ἂν ὁ Μῶμος, ἔφη, τό γε τοιοῦτον μέμφαιτο similarly concludes the earlier enumeration of qualities necessary to the philosophic ruler.

καὶ πράξομεν . καί (which some inferior MSS omit) is “paullo insolentius positum, sed ita ut τἀναντία πάντα partim ad civitatis conditionem—partim ad opinionem hominum atque existimationem philosophiae, quam sequi errorem istum oporteat, spectare et utramque contra, quam dictum optandumque sit, casuram esse significet” (Schneider).

γελοῖον takes up γέλωτα just before, hence καί. My extreme προθυμία, says Socrates in effect, was fitted to provoke a smile (cf. VI 506 D).

ἐν τῷ παρόντι . The reference is to 535 C and VI 495 C—496 A. After παρόντι Burnet adds < τι>, needlessly: see on III 388 D.

ἐπαίζομεν . Literature is not life, but ‘noble play’— παγκάλην— παιδιὰν—τοῦ ἐν λόγοις δυναμένου παίζειν ( Phaedr. 276 E . Cf. also X 599 A note). See Hirzel der Dialog I p. 180, where this thoroughly Platonic view is admirably expounded. There is a touch of pathos in Plato's application of it to his own dialogues, recalling to my mind, I know not exactly why, the saying of Isaac Newton about gathering pebbles by the shore, as well as Heraclitus' αἰὼν παῖς ἐστι παίζων πεσσεύων ( Fr. 79 B ywater).

μᾶλλον ἐντεινάμενος . Plato's apology is by no means intended to appease the ‘bald little tinker’ (VI 495 E) and his crew; for he still holds them responsible for the insults levelled at philosophy ( τοῖς αἰτίοις). He is merely apologising, not without a characteristic touch of irony, for an offence against the canons of literary taste. One ought not to turn ‘play’ into earnest, and, as Longinus remarks, κἀν βακχεύμασι νήφειν ἀναγκαῖον ( περὶ ὕφους 16. 4).

πρεσβύτας ἐξελέγομεν . III 412 C. It is quite clear that the προτέρα ἐκλογή is not supplemented but superseded by the provisions now laid down. Cf. VIII 543 D note

γηράσκων κτλ. γηράσκω δ) αἰεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος Solon Fr. 18 B ergk. The line is quoted in [ Erast.] 133 C and alluded to again in Lach. 188 B , 189 A.

ἧττον . ἔτι ἧττον, which Herwerden proposes, is no improvement, but rather the reverse. Plato may be alluding to some proverbial saying, as D. and V. appear to believe, translating thus: “an old man can sooner run than learn.”

νέων δὲ κτλ. Cf. Eur. I. T. 122 μόχθος γὰρ οὐδεὶς τοῖς νέοις σκῆψιν φέρει and Theaet. 146 B , Symp. 175 E .

παισὶν οὖσι κτλ. This preliminary survey is clearly meant to take place in the years during which ‘Music’ and Gymnastic are chiefly cultivated. See Nettleship Lect. and Rem. II p. 290.

οὐχ ὡς ἐπάναγκες κτλ. We must bear in mind throughout the whole of this subject that Plato is legislating for a select class who naturally love labour and truth. They alone are nature's freemen and must be treated as such in their education, but the compulsory method may be necessary, Plato would say, in order to educate others, so far as others can be educated at all. With the general sense cf. Phaedr. 240 C and Theogn. 472 πᾶν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον χρῆμ’ ἀνιηρὸν ἔφυ.

παίζοντας : with a play on παῖδας: cf. infra VIII 545 E and ἀτεχνῶς παισὶν—μετὰ παιδιᾶς—μανθάνειν in Laws 819 B, a passage in which the general idea is that play should be study, whereas here it is that study should be play.

ἔφαμεν . V 467 C—E.

ἐντρεχέστατος : ‘most agile in’ (“der rührigste” Schneider). The word is rare, and apparently not elsewhere found in writers of the best period. It occurs in Longinus περὶ ὕψους 44. I δριμεῖαί τε καὶ ἐντρεχεῖς ( φύσεις) and Marc. Aur. VI 14: cf. id. VII 66 ( ἐντρεχέστερον) and I 8 ( ἐντρέχειος). For a kindred use of the verb ἐντρέχειν see Hom. Il. 19. 385 εἰ οἷ ἐφαρμόσσειε (sc. ἔντεα) καὶ ἐντρέχοι ἀγλαὰ γυῖα.

οὗτος ‐‐ ὁ χρόνος κτλ. The compulsory military or militia service of Athenian youth during their eighteenth and nineteenth years is probably in Plato's mind: see Gilbert Gk. Const. Ant. E. T. pp. 311—313.

προκριθέντες . See on 537 D.

ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ . It is difficult to decide whether Plato in this instance wrote παιδιᾷ, παιδίᾳ or παιδείᾳ. παιδιὰ| is supported by three inferior MSS as well as by A^{2} and the oldest MS of Theo (see Hiller's edition p. 3), and παίζοντας τρέφε in 536 E seems at first sight to favour it. But ἐν τῇ παιδιᾷ is different from ἐν παιδιᾶς μέρει, and ought to mean ‘in their play’; whereas 536 E does not distinguish between ‘study’ and ‘play’ (see note ad loc.). παιδίᾳ ‘boyhood’ has also some MS support, and the existence of the word in Greek is fully proved by Schneider in his elaborate note. But ἐν τῇ παιδίᾳ would be superfluous after παισίν, and on the whole I now prefer the traditional reading παιδείᾳ, which appears to be in a majority of MSS.

τούτοις συνακτέον κτλ. τούτοις (sc. τοῖς προκριθεῖσι) goes with συνακτέον. The propaedeutic studies now begin to be pursued no longer χύδην, but systematically and comparatively, so as to reveal the ‘kinship of the studies with one another and with the nature of Being’: cf. 531 D note, and (for the meaning of οἰκειότης) 526 C note Platt would omit τῶν μαθημάτων as a gloss on ἀλλήλων, but without these words the Greek might mean ‘their mutual kinship and the kinship of true being’ (with itself). τῶν μαθημάτων is also in Theo (l. c.). For the genitives ἀλλήλων and τῆς—φύσεως, (which D. and V. wrongly connect with σύνοψιν), cf. VI 501 D τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν οἰκείαν εἶναι τοῦ ἀρίστου .

ὁ μὲν γὰρ συνοπτικὸς κτλ. Cf. 531 D note: also Phaedr. 265 D ff. εἰς μίαν —ἰδέαν συνορῶντα ἄγειν τὰ πολλαχῇ διεσπαρμένα, Laws XII 965 B ( συνορῶντα), Phaedr. 273 E , Soph. 253 D ff. and other passages cited by Zeller^{4} II 1. p. 616 note 3. See also App. III.

ἐν αὐτοῖς . αὐτοῖς is masculine (Schneider), not neuter (as D. and V. translate).

ἐκ τῶν προκρίτων . πρόκριτοι was a familiar term in the organisation of Greek polities: see Arist. Ath. Pol. 8. 1 with Sandys ad loc., and cf. also Pl. Laws 753 C f.

ὀμμάτων ‐‐ μεθιέμενος . See VI 511 B note

παρανομίας κτλ. Like Phidippides in Ar. Clouds 1399 ff. ὡς ἡδὺ καινοῖς πράγμασιν καὶ δεξιοῖς ὁμιλεῖν | καὶ τῶν καθεστώτων νόμων ὑπερφρονεῖν δύνασθαι κτλ. Schneider retains ἐμπίπλαται (see cr. n.), making the subject τὸ διαλέγεσθαι, but the present tense (‘they become filled with lawlessness’) favours the plural. Or does Plato mean that the dialectic of his day was degenerating? I think not; for that is scarcely a reason for exercising special care in connexion with his own ( ἐνταῦθα δὴ πολλῆς φυλακῆς ἔργον). αὐτούς is not decisive, though it points to the plural, which is also supported by 539 A παράνομος δὴ— δόξει γεγονέναι ἐκ νομίμου.

τῶν φασκόντων γονέων : ‘his self-styled parents.’ For the omission of εἶναι see Schanz Nov. Comm. Pl. p. 34. γονέων <εἶναι>, which Herwerden proposes, is weaker and less emphatic.

ὑποβαλομένους is the reading of A and Cesenas M; whereas all, or nearly all, the other MSS have ὑποβαλλομένους. “Ac nescio an qui suppositum sibi aliquando filium pro suo habere et venditare pergunt, ὑποβαλλόμενοι dici potuerint” (Schneider, comparing καθιστάντες in III 410 B). This is true, and the present may be right, especially as in V 469 E, A has βαλόντος (wrongly, as I think) for the βάλλοντος of all the other MSS. But M may here perhaps be allowed to turn the scale.

ἤδει . εἰδείη (suggested by Richards) would be more regular (as in B below), but cf. δύναται 515 E note

εἰς αὐτούς . εἰς (which Herwerden brackets) is used as in ὑβρίζειν εἰς.

αἰσθόμενος . αἰσθόμενον, which is read by Hermann and others, has no MS authority except a variant, perhaps an early variant, in A, and apparently also M. The anacoluthon will of course be scouted by many scholars; but although it is ungrammatical, no doubt, it is scarcely harsher than many anacolutha in Plato; see Schneider on IV 430 E and Engelhardt Anac. Pl. Spec. III p. 40, where numerous examples of the nominativus pendens are given. Plato begins as if he were going to write δοκεῖ μοι instead of μαντεύομαι: compare Ap. 21 C διασκοπῶν οὖν τοῦτον—καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, ἔδοξέ μοι κτλ., where ἔδοξέ μοι is substituted for ἔγνων or the like. Here the nominative seems to me to emphasize the contrast with ἐν ᾦ χρόνῳ—εἰδείη better than the accusative could have done; but in any case it is safer to retain than to expunge such echoes of conversational style in Plato wherever the weight of MS evidence is in their favour. For this reason I now, with Schneider and others, revert to αἰσθόμενος.

πατρὸς δὲ ἐκείνου κτλ. : ‘his former father’ etc. i.e. the reputed father of his earlier days. ποιουμένων ‘reputed’ (J. and C.), lit. ‘made out to be,’ is scarcely different from δοκούντων ( τοὺς ἄλλους οἰκείους δοκοῦντας in B). Cobet conjectures προσποιουμένων, but the text is sound: cf. VI 498 A note

ἔστι που κτλ. Plato, as Bosanquet points out ( Companion p. 305), seems to think it possible enough that the higher education will lead his rulers to criticise the δόγματα of the earlier ‘musical’ training. “But if this criticism is only the negative side of the deepening grasp with which a mature and stedfast mind lays hold on reality, no harm, he urges, will be done” (Bosanquet l.c.). We may even go farther and say that Dialectic and its ancillary studies are expressly intended to place the Guardians in the same position as the original legislator (VI 497 D) and enable them within limits to modify and reconstruct the authoritative δόγματα of the city (VI 500 E ff.).

ἐλθὸν ἐρώτημα . See IV 434 D note

ἀποκριναμένου . The genitive is defended by Schneider from IX 590 D. ἀποκρινάμενον ( Ξ and two other MSS) is obviously a ‘correction.’

καὶ πολλάκις κτλ. The whole of this passage should be compared with the account of the genesis of μισολογία in Phaed. 90 B ff.

μήτε ‐‐ τε . See on IV 430 B.

τὸν κολακεύοντα is explained by the Oxford editors as ‘the life that is flattering him,’ with reference to 538 D. It is rather, I think, ‘the flattering life’ i.e. the life of the κόλαξ (cf. ὁ ἀπολαυστικὸς βίος and the like in Arist. Eth. Nic. I 2. 1095^{b} 17 ff.). In other words the epithet which properly belongs to the person who lives the life is transferred to the life which he lives. Aristotle reminds us that ὁ δημαγωγὸς καὶ ὁ κόλαξ οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἀνάλογον ( Pol. Δ 4. 1292^{a} 20), and the demagogic life may be taken as one among many illustrations of Plato's meaning, especially as in παράνομος κτλ. he seems to be thinking of Alcibiades: cf. Thuc. VI 15. 4 and 28. 2. See VI 494 C ff. notes and Bosanquet Companion p. 306.

δόξει . The appearance does not exclude the reality: cf. (with J. and C.) Soph. O. T. 402 and Thuc. III 10. 1.

εὐλαβουμένῳ refers not to the pupils, but to Glauco as legislator, who ‘meddles with Dialectic’ by introducing the Guardians to it. This appears clearly both from εὐλάβεια and from ἐνταῦθα δὴ πολλῆς φυλακῆς ἔργον in 537 D. εὐλαβουμένους (Madvig) and εὐλαβουμένοις (Baiter) are therefore wrong.

μὴ νέους κτλ. Cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. I 1. 1095^{a} 2 τῆς πολιτικῆς οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκεῖος ἀκροατὴς ὁ νέος. It is clear from the present passage that Dialectic is largely concerned with moral and religious questions, as Bosanquet ( Companion p. 302) and Nettleship ( Lect. and Rem. II p. 291) remark. See App. III. Grote (III pp. 237—239) has some interesting observations on Plato's exclusion of the young from dialectical debate; but it is scarcely right to say that the Parmenides (135 C—136 E) contradicts Plato's precept in the Republic, for the disputations in the Parmenides are a preliminary exercise ( γυμνασία 135 D) to be undertaken before we attempt to define καλόν τε τί καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν (135 C).

οἶμαι γάρ σε κτλ. The same phenomenon is similarly described in Phil. 15 D —16 A: cf. also Ap. 23 C and Isocr. Panath. 26.

ἀντιλογίαν . See on V 454 A.

τούτου : this provision, viz. that they shall not begin Dialectic in youth (539 B). The genitive depends on προειρημένα (which refers to passages like VI 485 ff., 490, 503 C, VII 535 A ff.), and not, as J. and C. suggest, on εὐλαβείᾳ .

ὡς ‐‐ ἔρχεται . On the construction see III 410 B note

ἔτη ‐‐ τότε . 537 B.

πέντε θές . Krohn thinks five years very short, compared with the time allotted to the προπαιδεία, and suspects that we have here ‘a silent confession that there is not so very much to say about the Ideas after all.’ ( Pl. St. p. 187). Five years devoted ἐνδελεχῶς καὶ ξυντόνως to Dialectic exclusively is a good deal; and we may be sure that Plato does not intend his Guardians to neglect the subject between 35 and 50, although practical duties occupy most of their time. Moreover at 50, Dialectic is resumed, and it is not till then that the Idea of Good is fully apprehended, so that the five years from 30 to 35 were certainly not thought by Plato to exhaust the subject. We must also beware of supposing that there is any break of continuity in the education of the Guardians. The study of each propaedeutic ‘art’ by itself prepares us for seeing all the ‘arts’ in their mutual relations and interdependence, and the comparative survey of the ‘arts’ in turn prepares us for Dialectic (537 C), nor need the subjects of the προπαιδεία be finally abandoned after we enter on Dialectic. See Appendices II and III.

πεντηκοντουτῶν . We are told that in Chalcis the magistrates had to be at least 50 years of age: νόμος δὲ ἦν Χαλκιδεῦσι μὴ ἄρξαι μηδὲ πρεσβεῦσαι νεώτερον ἐτῶν πεντήκοντα (Heraclides Fr. Hist. Gr. II p. 222), but advanced age was rarely a condition of holding office in Greek states. See Whibley Gk. Olig. pp. 148 f.

τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς αὐγήν : ‘the radiant light of the soul.’ αὐγή is highly poetic in this sense: cf. Soph. Ajax 70 . There is more than a touch of mysticism in this and similar passages throughout Books VI and VII (cf. especially VI 490 A, B), but it is exaggerated by Krohn ( Pl. St. p. 187), who boldly declares that “the only person who correctly understood the later phase of the Republic was Plotinus,” and that “the so-called Platonic Dialectic is a Missverständniss.”

παραδείγματι κτλ. See VI 484 C, 501 A—C notes

ἑκάστους . See 520 D note

οὐχ ὡς καλόν τι κτλ. 520 E note

ἐὰν καὶ ἡ Πυθία κτλ. See on IV 427 B, C.

ξυναναιρῇ . See cr. n. The error in Α, Π, and several MSS besides, is a pretty example of lipography: contrast προσαναιρῇ in V 461 E, where the temptation is absent and the MSS right. Burnet says that A^{2} has ξυναναιρῇ, I know not on what authority: I found no trace in the MS of anything except ξυναιρῇ.

εὐδαίμοσι . If not δαίμοσιν, then εὐ‐δαίμοσιν.

ὥσπερ ἀνδριαντοποιός . Jowett seems to find an allusion to the fact that Socrates had been a sculptor; but the same words might have been used if he had not: cf. (with J. and C.) II 361 D.

ὡς διήλθομεν . V 451 C ff.

εὐχάς . V 450 D note

χαλεπὰ κτλ. See VI 502 C note

ἢ πλείους ἢ εἷς . See on IV 445 D.

ἀναγκαιότατον . They will admit no compulsion save that of Right; Non civium ardor prava iubentium Non vultus instantis tyranni Mente quatit solida. Contrast VI 492 B—493 D.

ὅσοι μὲν ἂν κτλ. Newman ( Aristotle's Politics I p. 413 note) thinks this proposal is “a softened version of the sentence which Heraclitus passed on the Ephesians for expelling Hermodorus” (Bywater's Heracl. Fr. 114), but the parallel is not very close. Plato's καθαρμός is sufficiently explained by the precepts which he himself lays down in VI 501 A: see also Pol. 293 D and especially Laws 735 B—736 C, where he gives an interesting survey of the various καθαρμοί applicable to commonwealths, and 752 B ff. Whether the καθαρμός of the Republic is itself either possible or adequate is another matter: Grote pronounces it an εὐχή ( Plato III p. 218 note). An age which had witnessed the διοικισμός of Mantinea ( Xen. Hell. V 2. 7 ) might well have regarded it as feasible. ‘Possible, but difficult’ is perhaps the safest verdict. The purgation, even if successfully applied, might not be sufficient to start the city well, but it would be a useful auxiliary to that “express initiative force, exceptional and belonging to some peculiar crisis,” which (according to Grote l. c.) would float the enterprise. Bosanquet raises the question how far the καθαρμός is seriously meant. To me it appears to be neither more nor less serious than Plato's treatment of the general question as to the possibility of his ideal city: see on VI 502 C and Hirmer Entstehung u. Komp. d. pl. Pol. p. 638.

ἐκπέμψωσιν ‐‐ θρέψωνται . Stephanus (with some inferior MS authority) reads the future, which Liebhold also would restore; but ὅταν is carried on. Cf. II 359 B note

θρέψωνται κτλ. J. and C. accuse Plato of barely considering “how the provision, which he here abruptly introduces, is to be reconciled with what precedes. For how are the children to be taught music and gymnastic when all their elders have been sent away? From what other State are the new teachers to be brought?” Plato is perfectly consistent. The new teachers are οἱ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι δυνάσται ἐν πόλει γενόμενοι (540 D: cf. VI 499 B, 502 A ff.), and they rusticate the parents etc. just because their presence makes it impossible to bring up children on the new lines. If ‘their elders’ could teach the young children, it would be unnecessary and wrong to send them into the country. Jowett seems to forget for the moment that Plato is not here speaking of his own city, but of an actual city which he wishes to transform into his καλλίπολις.

καὶ οὕτω κτλ. The infinitives still depend on ξυγχωρεῖτε.

ἐλέγομεν . Liebhold's λέγομεν is harmless, but unnecessary: cf. διεληλύθαμεν τότε above.

εἴπερ ποτὲ γίγνοιτο . Cf. VI 502 C note

ὅπερ ἐρωτᾷς refers to Socrates' question οὐκοῦν—ἀνδρός; Cf. X 595 C ἀλλ’ ὃ λέγω, ῥητέον. “The present inquiry is, I believe, concluded” (D. and V.) is an erroneous translation.

τῇ μελλούσῃ ἄκρως κτλ. Cf. Laws 739 C, D. The adverb ἄκρως is said by Herwerden ( Mn. XIX p. 335) to be a ἅπαξ εἰρημένον in classical Greek. On the word βασιλέας Pfleiderer ( Zur Lösung etc. p. 73) bases a chorizontic argument; but see on IV 445 D. Plato's rulers may well be called ‘Kings,’ for Plato holds that there is no difference of principle between Kingship and Aristocracy: cf. VII 520 B with V 473 C, IX 587 B, and Henkel Stud. zur Gesch. d. Gr. Lehre vom Staat p. 57.

αὐτῶν . The genitive is partitive: ‘and that those of their number are to be Kings who have shewn themselves best’ etc. Jowett wrongly translates ‘their kings.’

ξυνεχωρήσαμεν . III 415 D ff.

οἷαι . The reference is to III 416 D ff. Liebhold's conjecture ὅτι κοιναί is an undeserved reflection on Glauco's powers of memory.

οἱ ἄλλοι . οἱ ἄνθρωποι, which I once suggested ( Cl. Rev. IV p. 357), would be more exact, and ΑΛΛΟΙ and ΑΝ—ΟΙ are pretty easily confused in uncial MSS (Cobet V.L.^{2} p. 432: cf. Heindorf on Prot. 354 B ). Owing to νῦν, οἱ ἄλλοι can only mean ‘the rest of mankind,’ and the Guardians are therefore virtually spoken of as a section of living men. This kind of looseness is not uncommon, though here it has no stylistic effect. An alternative view might be to understand οἱ ἄλλοι of the rest of the citizens ( τῶν ἄλλων below) and νῦν as ‘in point of fact’ or ‘in our present discussion’; but this explanation is much less satisfactory. ὡς, which some inferior MSS write for ὧν, does not remove the inaccuracy in οἱ ἄλλοι: nor is οἷον ἄλλοι in IV 419 A precisely parallel, though it supports the view that οἱ ἄλλοι means ‘the rest of mankind.’

ἀθλητάς ‐‐ πολέμου . VII 521 D note

εἰς ἐνιαυτόν . Nothing is to remain over at the end of the year (III 416 E).

εἰς ταῦτα : viz. εἰς τὰ τῆς φυλακῆς etc. For the use of the pronoun cf. VII 536 A and infra 558 E notes Madvig's εἰς τακτά is unnecessary, and ταξαμένους in III 416 D means something quite different.

ἀλλά γ’ ἐπειδὴ κτλ. : ‘yes, but after we finished that subject, let us recall where we digressed to come here, that we may resume the old path.’ “ γε ad sequentia ε<*>πειδὴ τοῦτ) ἀπετελέσαμεν pertinet et priora recte quidem dicta a Glaucone, sed unum idque non leve reliquum esse significat, quod item sit in memoriam revocandum, ut relictam viam denuo capessere possint” (Schneider). The MSS fluctuate between ἀλλά γ) (the reading of A), ἀλλ’ ἄγ) and ἀλλ’ ἄγε ( Π), the last of which readings is adopted by all editors except Schneider. α<*>λλά γε, though rare, is, I believe, firmly established in Plato: see on I 331 B. It fits the situation in this passage exactly, whereas ἀλλ’ ἄγε does not, if we translate ἐπειδὴ τοῦτ’ ἀπετελέσαμεν correctly, and not (with D. and V., Jowett etc.) by ‘now that we have concluded the subject.’ τοῦτο is not Books V—VII, but the arrangements of the earlier city of II—IV, as described in 543 B, C: and ἀπετελέσαμεν is aorist, not perfect. ἀναμνησθῶμεν (as Schneider observes) is necessitated by ἵνα —ἴωμεν, otherwise Socrates might simply have said ἀλλά γ’ ἐπειδὴ τοῦτ’ ἀπετελέσαμεν, πόθεν δεῦρο ἐξετραπόμεθα; There is moreover no need for so vigorous an exhortation to exercise the memory as would be conveyed by ἀλλ’ ἄγε ἀναμνησθῶμεν, especially as Glauco's recollection had left nothing to be desired in B and C above.

καθάπερ νῦν . νῦν refers to 541 B.

ὡς διεληλυθὼς ‐‐ πόλεως : “quasi disputatione de civitate absoluta” (Stallbaum): cf. V 450 A. The MSS vary between this reading, and ὡς διελήλυθας or διελήλυθας alone: but A (with which Π^{2} and several other MSS agree) is certainly right.

λέγων κτλ. V 449 A.

καὶ ταῦτα κτλ. : ‘and that, too, though, as it seems, you could have told us of a still more beautiful city and man’ viz. the city of the philosopherking and the philosopher-king himself, afterwards described by Socrates in V 472 B—VII. The city of V—VII is spoken of as a different city from that of II— IV: see on ἐν μὲν τῇ προτέρᾳ ἐκλογῇ VII 536 C, II 372 D note, and Hirzel Der Dialog pp. 235 ff. Jowett's translation “although, as now appears, you had more excellent things to relate both of State and man” is a defensible construction, but unnatural, and certainly not what Plato meant. The passage has been curiously misunderstood by some critics, through inattention to the force of the imperfect participle ε<*>χων. Herwerden, for example, actually proposes to insert <οὐ> before καλλίω. Schneider and Stallbaum translate the sentence correctly.

ἔφησθα κτλ. IV 445 C. On the pronouns ὧν—αὐτῶν see II 357 B note Plato is very careful to make it clear that he does not profess, like Aristotle, to give a complete account of faulty States. From his watch-tower he can descry infinite varieties, but only four on which he need expatiate. We may take it that these are, in Plato's view, the four most conspicuous landmarks in the history of political degeneration, as well as the most important and clearly-outlined varieties of existing States. Cf. IV 445 C and infra 544 D ἥτις καὶ ἐν εἴδει διαφανεῖ τινι κεῖται.

ἵνα πάντας κτλ. reminds us of the thread which is the clue to the labyrinthine reasoning of the Republic: cf. 545 A, 548 D and II 368 E note

ἔχοι . The optative, for which Ast and Stallbaum needlessly read ἔχει with Ξ q and some other inferior MSS, is due to the oratio obliqua: cf. VII 515 D note

ἐρομένου . V 449 A.

ὥσπερ παλαιστής . The Scholiast remarks ἔθος γὰρ τούτοις, ὅταν πέσωσιν ὁμοῦ—πάλιν ἐγερθέντας ἐφ’ ὁμοίῳ συμπλακῆναι σχήματι, ὅπερ τὴν αὐτὴν εἶπε λάβην. Plato, as Stallbaum points out, uses the same figure in Phaedr. 236 B : cf. Phil. 13 D , Laws 682 E and ἀντιλαμβανόμενος VI 505 A note

ἐπιθυμῶ ‐‐ ἀκοῦσαι : ‘I am desirous also on my own account to hear’ sc. apart from the half-polemical motive suggested by the figure. Herwerden remarks “locus vix sanus,” but it is sound enough, although the English translators (“I shall particularly wish” etc. Jowett) miss the meaning.

ἥ τε ‐‐ ἐπαινουμένη . The Spartan constitution in its palmy days was widely praised for εὐνομία and discipline (pseudo-Archytas in Mullach Frag. Philos. Gr. I p. 560, Xen. Mem. III 5. 15 f., IV 4. 15, Plato Hipp. Mai. 283 E, 285 B, Laws 692 C and elsewhere), and became on this ground a sort of political ideal in the eyes of many Greeks: see for example Isocr. Panath. 108 ff. 200 ff. 216 ff. and the fragments of Critias' Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτεία in Müller Frag. Hist. Gr. II pp. 68 f. Cf. Nohle Statslehre Plat. pp. 108 ff. and Whibley Gk Olig. pp. 57 ff.

αὕτη : ista ‘that of yours,’ ‘your Cretan and Lacedaemonian constitution.’ On their connexion see Arist. Pol. B 10. 1271^{b} 22 ff. with Susemihl and Hicks's notes. It is, I think, fanciful to see in αὕτη an allusion to Glauco's sympathies for Sparta, in spite of 548 D below.

καὶ δευτέρως . Hermann prints his own conjecture ἡ δευτέρως, but the common confusion of καί and ἡ (Bast Comm. Pal. p. 815) is, I believe, later than the date of Paris A, and the text is free from objection: ‘and second in order as in esteem, a constitution fraught with many evils, bearing the name of oligarchy.’ δευτέρα agrees with πολιτεία, not with ὀλιγαρχία.

διάφορος : not of course ‘different’ (as Jowett), but ‘antagonistic,’ adversaria (Stallbaum). διάφορος ‘different’ gives a poor sense, and would take the genitive, which Ast erroneously proposed to read. Greek history furnished only too many proofs of the natural feud between democracy and oligarchy: see Greenidge Gk Const. Hist. pp. 208 ff. and Gilbert Gr. Staatsalt. II p. 285 note 2.

ἐφεξῆς γιγνομένη . From this and other indications it would appear on a first perusal that the sequence of commonwealths in VIII and IX is intended by Plato to be not merely logical, but historical also; but there is no question that the political evolution of Greek constitutions was far more complex than would appear from Plato's description. See on 543 A. We must above all things remember that it is in order to furnish a picture of the worst city and the worst man that the whole of this enquiry is undertaken, and Plato is at liberty to adopt whatever mode of presentation is best adapted for the object which he has in view. The form which he does in point of fact select is that of a historical narrative (see on 543 A, 548 D), but the real order of the development which he describes is a ‘logical order,’ and is primarily determined by psychological, and not by historical considerations. Although there are many points of contact between the development of Greek constitutional history and Plato's arrangement, Plato here employs narration primarily and chiefly as a vehicle or instrument for expressing the results of psychological analysis, and not because he believes that political development always and inevitably follows the same lines. See also on 543 A and infra 544 D.

διαφέρουσα κτλ. The reading of Ξ—see cr. n.—is confirmed by v and two other MSS, as well as by Stobaeus ( Flor. 43. 115) and Ficinus ( ab his omnibus differens). All other MSS appear to have διαφεύγουσα. “Errori—occasionem pronuntiatio non absimilis dedisse videtur” (Schneider). The word does not mean ‘differs’ (as Jowett) but ‘excels’ (ironically, of course, like ἡ γενναία δή). Father Rickaby has suggested to me that we should read καὶ ἡ πασῶν τούτων διαφέρουσα, ἡ γενναία δὴ τυραννίς, τέταρτον κτλ. The conjecture is an attractive one, both on other grounds and also because it enables us to retain the article which appears before πασῶν (see cr. n.) in A: but it is perhaps safer to follow Ξ.

νόσημα . Greek political theory regards tyrants as νοσήματα τῶν πόλεων (Isocr. Hel. 34: cf. Henkel l. c. p. 156).

ἢ τίνα . Ast and others write ἤ τινα (with slight MS support), but τίνα is perfectly good: cf. IX 573 A.

ἐν εἴδει διαφανεῖ τινι . See on 544 A.

δυναστεῖαι . δυναστεία is that form of polity in which the son succeeds the father καὶ ἄρχῃ μὴ ὁ νόμος ἀλλ’ οἱ ἄρχοντες (Arist. Pol. Δ 5. 1292^{b} 5 ff.: cf. Laws 680 A, B). Such a πολιτεία might be good, but was of course generally bad: see Susemihl and Hicks on Arist. Pol. B 10. 1272^{b} 3. Examples are pro vided by Thessaly (Thuc. IV 78. 3) and (about 480 B.C.) Thebes (Thuc. III 62. 3: cf. Gilbert Griech. Staatsalt. II pp. 10, 46). See Whibley Gk Olig. pp. 124— 126.

ὠνηταὶ βασιλεῖαι : like Carthage (Arist. l.c. 11. 1273^{a} 36 with Susemihl and Hicks p. 349). Herwerden sins through ignorance when he proposes αἱρεταί for ὠνηταί.

τοιαῦταί τινες : such as, for example, αἰσυμνητεία, and the other specific varieties (as Aristotle reckons them) of Plato's typical πολιτεῖαι: see Pol. Γ, Δ Ζ passim.

εὕροι δ’ ἂν κτλ. : whereas Plato confines himself to Greek history throughout VIII and IX.

καὶ ἀνθρώπων κτλ. Cf. IV 445 C, and on the principle here laid down see IV 435 E note The present passage is a clear and emphatic statement of the psychological basis on which Plato's philosophy of History rests. Political ἀδικία, like political δικαιοσύνη (IV 443 B note), is after all no more than εἴδωλόν τι: injustice in the truest sense is στάσις within the individual soul (IV 444 B), and social and political wrong-doing is but its outward manifestation. The double genitive, which is easy enough (cf. E below and V 449 A note), has led to the corruption τρόπον τινά in several MSS. Liebhold also suggests καὶ τρόπων instead of τρόπων. The expression εἴδη τρόπων (‘specific characters’) is treated as a single word, and should be repeated with πολιτειῶν: cf. IV 445 C ὅσοι πολιτειῶν τρόποι εἰσὶν εἴδη ἔχοντες, τοσοῦτοι κινδυνεύουσι καὶ ψυχῆς τρόποι εἶναι (a passage which proves, I think, that Schneider and Stallbaum are wrong in supplying only εἴδη with ὅσαπερ κτλ.)

ἐκ δρυὸς κτλ. Hom. Od. XIX 162 f. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὥς μοι εἰπὲ τεὸν γένος, ὁππόθεν ἐσσί· | οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ δρυός ἐσσι παλαιφάτου οὐδ’ ἀπὸ πέτρης, i.e. you have a γένος (cf. Ap. 34 D ) and are not miraculously sprung ἀγενεαλογήτως out of tree or stone, like the fabled men of old (see Preller-Robert Gr. Myth. p. 79 note 4). In Plato the saying is used much like the German ‘es ist doch nicht aus der Luft gefallen’ (Schück de scholiis p. 32, where the proverb is illustrated).

ἃ ἂν κτλ. οἶ ἄν was read till Schneider on the authority of Ξ; but ἃ ἄν ( ΑΠ and a large majority of MSS) is quite satisfactory. “Reipublicae formae eos dicuntur sequi mores, qui in quavis civitate veluti pondere praegravantes ad se suamque regionem attraxerint reliqua” (Schneider, comparing for ῥέψαντα Hdt. VII 139). The word ῥεύσαντα ( Ξ and some other MSS) is unattic (Lobeck Phryn. p. 738): Plato's form is ῥυέντα e.g. VI 495 B.

ὀρθῶς is more naturally taken with φαμέν (Jowett etc.) than with the adjectives (as Schneider). We rightly call him ‘good’ etc., because he is ὅμοιος ἀριστο‐κρατίᾳ.

ἵνα κτλ. See 544 A note

ἠρξάμεθα . II 368 E note

ὄνομα γὰρ κτλ. : ‘for I have no other name in our language for it: we must call it either “timarchy” or “timocracy”’ (“Ehrenherrschaft oder Ehrenobmacht” Schneider). Plato called the constitution in question φιλότιμος πολιτεία, which may be cumbrous, but is certainly Greek. If we want a single name, we must, he says, invent: and either τιμαρχία or τιμοκρατία will do. The Oxford editors erroneously suggest that ἢ—κλητέον is interrogative: nor is there any reason to suspect the text, as W. H. Thompson did. Both of Plato's coinages survived, but they never became popular, and were used in another sense from Plato's— τιμοκρατία with the meaning of the vox nihili τιμηματοκρατία or ἡ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων ἀρχή (Arist. Eth. Nic. VIII 12. 1160^{a} 36) and τιμαρχία for the Roman censorship (Stephanus-Hase Thes. s.v.).

πρὸς ‐‐ ταύτην =‘ad hanc’: cf. IX 577 B and Tim. 24 A τοὺς μὲν οὖν νόμους σκόπει πρὸς τοὺς τῇδε (Schneider).

ἁπλοῦν . See on I 351 A. For the statement itself cf. Laws 683 E ff. Aristotle, whose standpoint is historical rather than psychological, enumerates many and diverse causes of revolutionary change ( Pol. E passim).

κινηθῆναι : an ominous word, used here, as constantly throughout Greek literature, of constitutional changes for the worse.

ὅπως δὴ κτλ. An imitation of Hom. Il. XVI 112 f. ἔσπετε νῦν μοι, μοῦσαι —ὅππως δὴ πρῶτον πῦρ ἔμπεσε νηυσὶν Ἀχαιῶν. Homer appeals to the Muses at the turning-point of his narrative (see Leaf ad loc.); and Plato, like Milton (“Of man's first disobedience and the fruit Of that forbidden tree, sing heavenly Muse”), fitly invokes them at the commencement of his Epic of the Fall of Man. Cf. Tim. 27 C .

καὶ φῶμεν κτλ. : ‘and shall we say that they speak in the lofty tragic vein, as if it were all earnest, whereas it is only the banter of the Muses playing with us as if we were little children?’ Instead of φῶμεν, I once suggested θῶμεν (cf. Laws 654 A and 677 C), but φῶμεν, which is in all MSS, though less picturesque, may stand. Herwerden's excision of παιζούσας καί obliterates a tender touch; for there is of course a play on παῖδας (cf. VII 536 E note). The remarks of Proclus in Tim. 300 C ff. on the style of this and similar passages deserve to be quoted: ὁ δὲ χαρακτὴρ τῶν λόγων ἐστὶν ἐνθουσιαστικός, διαλάμπων ταῖς νοεραῖς ἐπιβολαῖς, καθαρός τε καὶ σεμνός—ἐξηλλαγμένος τε καὶ ὑπερέχων τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἐννοιῶν, ἁβρός τε ὁμοῦ καὶ καταπληκτικὸς καὶ χαρίτων ἀνάμεστος κάλλους τε πλήρης καὶ σύντομος ἅμα καὶ ἀπηκριβωμένος. ‘The Muses playing’ warns us that there is an element of the mythical and fantastic in what follows, but by no means implies that it is fooling and nothing more. See on 545 C and App. I, Pt ii ad fin.

γενομένῳ κτλ. This is a universally recognised principle of ancient philosophy, alluded to again by Plato in Tim. 41 A . Cf. Arist. de cael. I 12. 282^{b} 8 τὸ γὰρ γενητὸν καὶ τὸ φθαοτὸν ἀκολουθοῦσιν ἀλλήλοις and ib. 10. 279^{b} 20 ἅπαντα γὰρ τὰ γινόμενα καὶ φθειρόμενα φαίνεται. That τὸ ἀγένητον is ἄφθαρτον and τὸ ἄφθαρτον ἀγένητον was also held (cf. Phaedr. 245 D , Arist. l. c. 282^{a} 30 ff., al.): hence Plato always regards the preexistence and immortality of the soul as involving one another. γένεσις is here, as usual, σύγκρισις, and φθορά διάκρισις. The point of ἐπεὶ—ἐστιν is that the cause of decay is not contained in the ideal city itself—the city would be less than ideal if it were—but springs from a universal law of Nature, to which the city, like everything else, is necessarily subject: see on 545 C and App. I, Pt iii.

λύσις δὲ ἥδε κτλ. Here begins Plato's description of the mode of dissolution. οὐ μόνον—ἐναντίας, literally trans lated, is ‘Not only to plants within the ground, but also among animals above the ground, there cometh production or non-production of souls and bodies, as often as turnings-round join for each species’ (of animals, plants etc.) ‘circumferences of circles faring a short way for the short-lived, and the reverse for the reverse.’ See Fig. 1. Suppose the revolution starts at the fixed point A. The circumference is joined as soon as the revolving wheel reaches A again, and at that point there is φορὰ ψυχῆς τε καὶ σώματος, if the seed was sown at A and has come safely to maturity. If the seed was not sown, or, though sown, did not take root or miscarried on the way, there is ἀφορία. The phrase is only a fantastic way of saying ὅταν περίοδοι ἑκάστοις ἀποτελεσθῶσιν. The περιφορά of a short-lived species is βραχύπορος and conversely, because short-lived creatures have short periods of gestation, and long-lived creatures long (Arist. de gen. an. IV 10. 777^{a} 31 ff., al. See App. I, Pt ii § 2). Soul, viewed merely as the vital principle, is one and the same in every organic creature: hence the singular ψυχή (App. l. c.). This explanation, so far as I know, is new, the περίοδος being generally supposed to be ‘Umlaufszeit.’ Cf. App. l. c.

γένους δὲ κτλ. The literal translation is: ‘Now of your kind’ (i.e. mankind: it is the Muses who are speaking), ‘clever though the leaders of the city be whom you educated’ (the middle of personal interest IV 421 E note), ‘none the more will they by calculation together with perception obtain’ (lit. hit the obtaining of) ‘good offspring and no offspring, but it will escape them, and the time will come when they will beget children wrongly or inopportunely’ (cf. παρὰ καιρόν 546 D). In arranging matters connected with marriages and the treatment of children etc., the rulers of our city employ both λογισμός and αἴσθησις. αἴσθησις helps them to decide what couples should be joined, what children should be reared etc.: by λογισμός they calculate what number of marriages they should permit ἵνα ὡς μάλιστα διασῴζωσι τὸν αὐτὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ἀνδρῶν (V 460 A) etc.: see App. I, Pt ii § 2. But however well they use these instruments, the time will come when children are begotten οὐ δέον. The fault lies not with the rulers, but with the inevitable law of Change, which is beginning to affect our city together with the rest of the Universe. ἀφορίας is said, because the rulers must if possible make illicit unions unproductive (V 461 C). Possibly the εὐ of εὐγονίας may affect ἀφορίας also: cf. 555 A note See also App. l. c.

ἔστι δὲ ‐‐ τέλειος . ‘For a divine creature, there is a period comprehended by a number which is final.’ The ‘divine creature’ is the World: it is θεῖον, because it is a God, γεννητόν, because it is created (i.e. has been brought out of chaos into order). Cf. Tim. 30 A and Proclus in Tim. 89 D. With περιλαμβάνει cf. Theaet. 148 A . The ἀριθμὸς τέλειος is the period expressing the gestation of the Universe, i.e. the time which its creation occupies. For the metaphor cf. the Orphic verses cited by Proclus in Tim. 94 B and 95 E. The number is a final or consummating number because it τελειοῖ τὴν γένεσιν: cf. Theol. Ar. p. 58 ed. Ast. Plato wisely leaves this number shrouded in silence and obscurity. See App. I, Pt ii § 3 for a full discussion of the sentence.

ἀνθρωπείῳ δὲ ‐‐ ἀπέφηναν gives us the περίοδος or period of gestation for the human creature: ‘and for a human creature the number is the first in which root-and-square increases, comprehending three distances and four limits, of elements that make like and unlike and wax and wane, render all things conversable and rational with one another.’ The construction is ἀνθρωπείῳ δὲ <γεννητῷ. ἔστιν ἀριθμὸς> ἐν ᾦ κτλ., and that is itself short for ἀνθρωπείῳ δὲ <γεννητῷ ἔστι περίοδος ἣν ἀριθμὸς περιλαμβάνει> ἐν ᾧ κτλ. The ‘first’ number is of course the first number after unity. αὐξήσεις ‘increases’ may in itself mean either ‘additions’ or ‘multiplications.’ δυνάμεναι refers to ‘roots’ (cf. Eucl. X def. 11), δυναστευόμεναι to ‘squares’ (Procl. in remp. comm. ed. Kroll II p. 36. 9—12 et al.), and ‘root-and-square increases’ means either ‘additions of roots to squares’ or ‘multiplications of roots by squares.’ τρεῖς ἀποστάσεις etc. shew that multiplications and not additions are meant. The three distances are μῆκος, πλάτος and βάθος, and the four ὅροι their attendant limits. Thus in Fig. 2 AB, BC, CD are the three ἀποστάσεις, AB μῆκος, BC πλάτος, CD βάθος, and A, B, C, D the four ὅροι. Cf. Nic. Introd. Ar. p. 116 Ast εἴ τι γὰρ στερεόν ἐστιν, τὰς τρεῖς διαστάσεις—they are called ἀποστάσεις in Theol. Ar. p. 23— πάντως ἔχει, μῆκος, πλάτος καὶ βάθος· καὶ ἔμπαλιν εἴ τι ἔχει τὰς τρεῖς διαστάσεις, ἐκεῖνο πάντως στερεόν ἐστιν, ἄλλο δ’ οὐδέν: also Iambl. in Nic. Introd. Ar. p. 93 Pistelli στερεὸς δέ ἐστιν ἀριθμὸς ὁ τρίτον διάστημα παρὰ τὰ ἐν ἐπιπέδοις δύο προσειληφώς, δηλονότι τετάρτου ὅρου προσγενομένου· ἐν γὰρ τέσσαρσιν ὅροις τὸ τριχῇ διαστατόν, Arist. Top. Z 5. 142^{b} 24 f. and many other passages quoted in App. I, Pt i § 1. Consequently the arithmetical meaning of αὐξήσεις—λαβοῦσαι is merely ‘root-and-square multiplications’ i.e. ‘multiplications of root by square,’ in other words cubings (thus w x w^{2}= w^{3}, x x x^{2}= x^{3}, y x y^{2}= y^{3}), or κυβικαὶ αὐξήσεις, a phrase which itself might well have been employed by Plato, except that he has an object in drawing attention to the different stages in the process of augmentation (see App. I, Pt ii § 4); and partly also he wants the Muses to preserve their character as ὑψηλολογούμεναι. The period of human gestation is therefore the first number, in which ‘cubings make everything ῥητὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα’—but cubings of what? The answer is ‘of elements which make like and unlike and wax and wane.’ These elements are the numbers 3, 4 and 5, which measure the three sides of the Pythagorean ζῳογονικὸν τρίγωνον (Procl. in remp. II p. 43. 10), the triangle which, as we are informed by many authorities— Aristotle, Plutarch, Aristides Quintilianus, Proclus and others—Plato made use of in his Number. The antecedent of ὧν in ὧν ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγείς is ὁμοιούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων καὶ αὐξόντων καὶ φθινόντων, and as ὧν ἐπίτριτος πυθμήν means ‘of which 4, 3,’ Plato himself tells us two of the numbers, and the third is also readily suggested by πεμπάδι. 3, 4 and 5 are said to ‘make like,’ because, as we shall see, in the latter part of the Number, where the triangle fulfils its office as a κοσμικὸν τρίγωνον (Proclus l.c. II p. 45. 23), they produce the ‘harmony’ 3600^{2}, and square numbers are ὅμοιοι (Iambl. l.c. p. 82): they ‘make unlike’ because they produce the ‘harmony’ 4800 x 2700, and oblong numbers are ἀνόμοιοι (ib.): they are said to wax and wane in a figurative sense—to wax in the first harmony, which represents in a certain sense the waxing of the Universe, and to wane in the second, which represents its wane. As the elements out of which the Universe is formed, they may be said to grow with its growth, and decline with its decline. The words have also a further meaning as a description of 3, 4, 5 regarded as the ἀρχαί of everything which exists: see App. I, Pt ii § 5. Now the first number in which cubings of 3, 4 and 5 are present is 3^{3} + 4^{3} + 5^{3}=216, and Aristides Quintilianus, in the passage where he refers to Plato's number, speaking of the Pythagorean triangle, remarks ἀλλ’ εἰ καὶ τῶν πλευρῶν ἑκάστην κατὰ βάθος αὐξήσαιμεν ( βάθος γὰρ ἡ σώματος φύσις) ποιήσαιμεν ἂν τὸν διακόσια δεκαέξ, ἰσάριθμον σύνεγγυς τῷ τῶν ἑπταμήνων (p. 151 Meibom). Aristotle also in Pol. E 12. 1316^{a} 5—8, according to Schneider's interpretation of his words, which I believe to be right, informs us that the whole number of this section is 216: see App. I, Pt iii. On πάντα— ἄλληλα see next note. In App. I, Pt ii § 4 I have fully treated of the meaning of all these calculations. The different mathematical terms are discussed in detail ib. Pt i § 1. My explanation of this passage is, as far as I can discover, new, except as regards αὐξήσεις—δυναστευόμεναι. Some other views are mentioned in App. I, Pt i § 1 ad fin. notes

πάντα προσήγορα κτλ. Cf. Philol. Fr. 13 Mullach πάντα γνωστὰ καὶ ποτάγορα ἀλλήλοις—ἀπεργάζεται. The Pythagoreans asserted that the embryo develops according to the proportions of the ἁρμονία or musical scale. The first stage is complete in 6 days, the second in 8, and 8 : 6 is ‘the fourth’ ( διὰ τεσσάρων). The third stage (making flesh) takes 9 days, and 9 : 6 is ‘the fifth’ ( διὰ πέντε). In the next 12 days the body is formed: and 12 : 6 is the octave ( διὰ πασῶν). Total 6 + 8 + 9 + 12=35, and 35 is a ἁρμονία (Plut. de anim. gen. in Tim. 1017 F). Now 216=(6 x 35) + 6, so that 216 contains 6 ἁρμονίαι together with 6 times ἡ πάντων ἀρχή i.e. the unit ( Excerpt. ex Nicom. in v. Jan's Mus. Script. Gr. p. 279), or if you like together with the marriage number 6. For the evidence and further details see App. I, Pt ii § 4.

ὧν ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν κτλ. In ἀνθρωπείῳ δὲ—ἀπέφηναν the Pythagorean triangle was employed to construct the period of gestation for the microcosm or man: here it is used to construct two periods in the lifetime of the macrocosm or Universe, for that is what Plato means by the two ‘harmonies.’ The translation is: ‘of which, 4, 3 married with 5, yields two harmonies when thrice increased, the one equal an equal number of times, so many times 100, the other of equal length one way, but oblong:—on the one side, of 100 squares of rational diameters of five diminished by one each, or if of irrational diameters, by two: on the other of one hundred cubes of three.’ The antecedent of ὧν is ὁμοιούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων καὶ αὐξόντων καὶ φθινόντων, which I have already interpreted as the numbers 3, 4, 5. Of these numbers ( ὧν) the ἐπίτριτος πυθμήν i.e. 3, 4 (cf. Theo Smyrn. p. 80 ed. Hiller, Proclus l. c. II p. 37 ὁ ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν γ/ καὶ δ/), is ‘married’ or ‘coupled’ with 5. That is to say, 3, 4, and 5 are multiplied together: whence we get 3 x 4 x 5=60. ‘Thrice increased’ is ‘three times multiplied by itself’; and 60 thrice increased is therefore 60 x 60 x 60 x 60. This sum, which is 12,960,000, yields two harmonies. One of the two harmonies is ‘equal an equal number of times, viz. so many times 100,’ in other words, it is a square (cf. Theaet. 147 E ) each of whose sides is a certain number of times 100 (for τοσαυτάκις cf. τοσοῦτον in Alc. I 108 E), viz. of course 36 times 100, for 60 x 60 x 60 x 60=3600^{2}. See Fig. 4. The other harmony which 60 x 60 x 60 x 60 yields is a rectangle (with προμήκη cf. Theaet. 148 A ), one of whose sides is one hundred cubes of 3, i.e. 2700, and the other the number which Plato describes in ἑκατὸν μὲν—δυοῖν. What is that number? ἀριθμοὶ ἀπό means (numerical) ‘squares of’ (cf. Procl. l. c. II p. 38. 9 et al.): the side in question is therefore ‘100 squares of’—what? Of the rational diameter of 5 etc. Now the ‘rational diameter of 5’ is the nearest rational number to the real diameter of a square whose side is 5 (Theo l. c. pp. 43 ff. and other authorities). The real diameter of a square whose side is 5 is √50. See Fig. 5. AC^{2}=5^{2} + 5^{2}=50 (by Pythagoras' famous εὕρημα Eucl. I 47): therefore AC=√50. And the nearest rational number to √50 is 7: for √49=7. Consequently 7 is ‘the rational diameter’ of 5. And 100 squares of 7=100 x 49=4900. But we are told to diminish the 100 squares by 1 each. Do so: 4900 - (1 x 100)=4800. This side is therefore 4800. The words ἀρρήτων δὲ δυοῖν give us an alternative way of reaching the number 4800. The construction is <ἀπὸ> ἀρρήτων δὲ <διαμέτρων δεομένων> δυοῖν <ἑκάστων> = (or of 100) ‘squares of irrational diameters of 5, wanting 2 each.’ Now the irrational diameter of 5 is √50. Square this and it becomes 50. 100 squares of 50= 5000. Subtract 2 from each square and you have 5000 - (2 x 100)=4800. The two sides of the oblong are therefore 4800 and 2700 (‘one hundred cubes of three’). The area is 4800 x 2700= 12,960,000 which is 60 x 60 x 60 x 60. See Fig. 6. Thus the arithmetical meaning of this part of Plato's Number may be expressed by us as follows:

συζυγείς . The metaphor is from marriage, and marriage, among the Pythagoreans, was usually expressed by multiplication. Thus 6, which is the product of the first male number 3 and the first female number 2, was called by them marriage. συζυγεῖσα also means ‘multiplied with’ in Proclus l. c. II p. 544 (App. I, Pt i § 2).

δύο ἁρμονίας . The square and oblong may be regarded as ἁρμονίαι because in them, as in the number 216 above, all things are προσήγορα καὶ ῥητὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα. Thus 12,960,000=(35 + 1) x 360,000, so that, as 35 is a ἁρμονία, 12,960,000 contains the portentous number of 360,000 ἁρμονίαι plus (1 x 360,000=) 360,000, each ἁρμονία thus having added to it, as before, the unit which is ἡ πάντων ἀρχή. The analogy between the Microcosm and the Macrocosm is thus preserved : see on πἁντα—ῥητά 546 B above. So much for the arithmetical meaning of the term ἁρμονίας. In App. I, Pt ii § 5 I have given my reasons for connecting the two ἁρμονίαι with the myth of the Politicus. In that myth we are told how two cycles of equal and vast duration invariably succeed one another in the life of the Universe, a progressive and a retrogressive cycle. These two cycles are two Great Years, in the first of which ὁμοιότης prevails and the Universe is fresh and strong, while in the second, in which we are living now, ἀνομοιότης begins to assert itself and the Universe flags and wanes. Cf. 547 A note Here the first ἁρμονία, which is a square and therefore ὅμοιον, represents the progressive cycle, the cycle of όμοιότης, and the second ἁρμονία, which is an oblong, and therefore ἀνόμοιον (see above on 546 B line 12), stands for the retrogressive cycle, the cycle of ἀνομοιότης. If this identification is, as I believe, correct, each ἁρμονία represents a Great Year. The area or number of each harmony, according to Plato, is 12,960,000, and as Plato elsewhere says that the Great Year is measured τῷ τοῦ ταὐτοῦ καὶ ὁμοίως ἰόντος κύκλῳ ( Tim. 39 D ), i.e. by the diurnal revolutions of the heavens, we may take this number as denoting days. Converted into years, on the astronomical calculation of 360 days to the year, followed by Plato here and elsewhere, the number becomes 36,000 years, which was known in Ptolemaic astronomy as the magnus Platonicus annus. For the evidence on all these points, see App. I, Pt ii §§ 5, 6.

ξύμπας δὲ οὗτος κτλ. ‘This whole number, a number measuring the earth, is lord of better and worse births.’ On its arithmetical side, γεωμετρικός means only that the number is reached by means of γεωμετρία and expressed in geometrical figures: but I have no doubt that Plato meant the word to bear another and profounder meaning, suitable to the real import of the two harmonies whereof this is the number. The number is τῷ ὄντι γεωμετρικός, for it measures an aeon of the Universe, of which the Earth is part (cf. 555 A note and VI 511 B note): and indeed it is artistically right that the meaning of the two harmonies should be summed up at the climax of the whole in a single pregnant word. How do good and bad births depend upon this number? Because in the early days of our era, when God had but lately left the world, and ἀνομοιότης and ἀνωμαλία were young, Nature produced better children than οἶοι νῦν βροτοί εἰσιν. Plato in fact invites us to think of his city as having existed soon after the change to the aeon in which we now live, just as throughout Book VIII and part of IX the Ideal City is figured in the past. For more on this subject see App. I, Pt ii §§ 5—7. I know not what others will think, but to me it seems that the extraordinary range and elevation of its central ideas make the Platonic number worthy even of a writer who is full of ‘thoughts that wander through eternity.’ The connexion between the Human Child and the Divine, the Microcosm and the Macrocosm, has played no small part in the history of human thought, and the story of a Great Year, with the hope which it affords of the ἀποκατάστασις of all things ( Acts 3. 21), has been and is, in its religious setting, the solace and support of many a ‘human child.’

παρὰ καιρόν : ‘inopportunely,’ ‘improperly’: cf. Pol. 277 A and οὐ δέον 546 B. The phrase does not, as I once thought, imply that Nature has appointed certain periodic times or seasons in the life of men and women when their union will produce good offspring, but refers to unions of wrong couples, superabundance of marriages, and the like: cf. V 459 E ff. The notion that the number of the Great Year is to be used by the rulers as a means of determining at what time unions should take place, derives no support from the Greek, and ought not to be entertained. In point of fact, the number is not a nuptial but a secular number, being γεωμετρικὸς ὡς ἀληθῶς. The expression ‘nuptial number’ is not applied to it either by Plato or by Aristotle, and it is only in later writers that we meet with ὁ τοῦ λεγομένου γάμου τόπος (Nicom. Introd. Ar. p. 144 Ast), γαμήλιον διάγραμμα (Plut. de Is. et Os. 373 F) and γαμικὸς ἀριθμός (Iambl. in Nic. Ar. p. 82. 21 Pistelli).

καταστήσονται . The active καταστήσουσι, found in v and two other MSS of little moment, is read by Hermann. Some may prefer it because καταστήσονται is passive just below: but Plato is careless about matters of this kind, and it is better to follow the best MSS.

ἡμῶν κτλ. : ‘us they will first begin to neglect when they are Guardians’ (i. e. after they have come εἰς τὰς τῶν πατέρων δυνάμεις), ‘setting too little store by music first, and second by gymnastic.’ Political decay is constantly associated by Plato with neglect of ‘Music’: see on IV 424 C. In place of δεύτερον δὲ τὰ γυμναστικῆς, which is in all MSS, Baiter adopts Madvig's conjecture δεύτερά τε γυμναστικῆς. At first sight ὅθεν ἀμουσότεροι—νέοι would seem to favour such an alteration, as well as the fact that in the city which comes next in order Gymnastic is more esteemed than Music (548 C). But πρῶτον after ἡμῶν supports the MS tradition, and the decline of the ideal city, which, as we have seen, arises from inevitable organic deterioration, shews itself in a general lowering of vital energy, rather than in the exaltation of any one pursuit at the expense of another. In the Spartan city Gymnastic ranks higher than Music, because Music has fallen from the high position which she formerly occupied, and not because Gymnastic stands higher than before.

ὅθεν ‐‐ νέοι : ‘and so our children will forget us.’ The Muses are speaking, and the children of Plato's Muse may well be called the Muses' children. This is the force of ἡμῖν, which is the reading of A, Ξ and some other MSS: Π and others have ὑμῖν. Schneider says ‘ Μούσαις—ἄμουσον γίγνεσθαι nullo modo tolerabile est.’ That is true, only ἡμῖν does not go with ἀμουσότεροι, but is an ethic dative, and seems to me at least to be full of a strange beauty and pathos. As true Gymnastic educates the soul and not the body (III 410 C ff.), the neglect of Gymnastic in the ideal city itself contributes to ἀμουσία.

τὰ παρ’ ὑμῖν γένη . See III 415 A ff.

ἀνομοιότης καὶ ἀνωμαλία ἀνάρμοστος . We have already seen that as the second scroll of the World's life unfolds itself, ἀνομοιότης, ἀνωμαλία, and ἀναρμοστία, with their attendant retinue of sedition, strife and war, make their appearance and wax more and more aggressive, until at last, in the words of the Politicus, careful lest the world χειμασθεὶς ὑπὸ ταραχῆς διαλυθεὶς εἰς τὸν τῆς ἀνομοιότητος ἄπειρον ὄντα τόπον δύῃ, God takes the helm again and κοσμεῖ τε καὶ ἐπανορθῶν ἀθάνατον αὐτὸν καὶ ἀγήρων ἀπεργάζεται ( Pol. 273 D f.). See on 546 C and App. I, Pt ii § 5. The same insidious enemies, not from any fault of the rulers, but because the part must neces sarily suffer with the whole, fasten both on the perfect individual and on the perfect State, and the fall of men and cities, which Plato describes in VIII and IX, is one long record of the triumphal progress of ἀνομο<*>ότης, until at last she sits enthroned in the soul and city of the tyrant. The Platonic number is thus the setting in which Plato's ‘Philosophy of History’ is framed.

ταύτης τοι γενεᾶς . From Homer Il. VI 211 al. ταύτης τοι γενεῆς τε καὶ αἵματος εὔχομαι εἶναι. Plato means of course ‘Such, as we must say, is the pedigree of Sedition, wheresoever she arises.’ D. and V. are wholly wrong when they translate: “so that we may positively assert that the rise of such a generation will invariably be marked by divisions.”

εἱλκέτην κτλ. The logical object of εἱλκέτην and ἠγέτην (in line 13) is τὴν πολιτείαν. For the omission of the object with ἕλκω and ἄγω cf. 560 B, X 604 A, 604 D et al. It is only another way of expressing oneself to say that the verbs are practically intransitive. The sedition which arises is not between rulers and ruled, but between the rulers among themselves, as is clear from 545 D and elsewhere: hence τὸ μὲν σιδηροῦν καὶ χαλκοῦν does not refer to the farmers and artisans, who probably possessed οἰκίαι from the first (III 417 A note), but to the section of the rulers who have become σιδηροῦν and χαλκοῦν by the intermixture of different breeds. Cf. the oracle foretelling the destruction of the city ὅταν αὐτὴν ὁ σίδηρος ἢ ὁ χαλκὸς φυλάξῃ (III 415 C). γῆς κτῆσιν κτλ. means ‘the possession of land and a private dwelling-place as well as of gold and silver,’ all of which were forbidden to Plato's rulers. ἔγκτησις γῆς καὶ οἰκίας was a familiar expression to the Greeks, and one of the well-recognised privileges of μέτοικοι at Athens (Gilbert Gr. Staatsalt. II p. 295). On the reading χρυσοῦ see cr. n. It is usual to read χρυσίου, but ἀργύρου immediately following favours χρυσοῦ, whose authority is not much inferior to that of χρυσίου. Cf. χρυσόν τε καὶ ἄργυρον 548 A. Herwerden, retaining χρυσίου, would write ἀργυρίου instead of ἀργύρου with some MSS of little value: but the reading printed above has much more MS support. His further proposal ἐπὶ χρηματισμὸν χρυσίου τε καὶ ἀργυρίου καὶ γῆς κτῆσιν καὶ οἰκίας will not find favour among scholars.

φύσει ‐‐ ψυχάς . They are not rich in worldly possessions, but they have the true riches—the riches of the soul. Cf. the prayer of Socrates in Phaedr. 279 C πλούσιον δὲ νομίζοιμι τὸν σοφόν, and see also on III 416 E. The usual view, which makes τὰς ψυχάς depend on ἠγέτην (Schneider, J. and C., D. and V., etc.) is surely wrong. Jowett from his translation appears to have caught the meaning.

εἰς μέσον ὡμολόγησαν κτλ. The change is effected, as in the case of the corresponding man (550 B), by a peaceful compromise. In the later stages of political decay, when ἀνομοιότης has gathered strength, revolution is attended by civil war (557 A), and the tyrant wades through bloodshed to his throne (565 E ff.).

περιοίκους τε καὶ οἰκέτας . We meet with περίοικοι not only in Sparta, of which city Plato is chiefly thinking, but also in Crete, Thessaly and Argos: see Gilbert Gr. Staatsalt. II pp. 16, 74, 220. In each of these States there was also an inferior grade, in Sparta the Helots, in Crete the vοικέες of the Gortynian inscription, sometimes also spoken of as οἰκέται, in Thessaly the πενέσται, and in Argos the γυμνῆτες or γυμνήσιοι (Gilbert l.c.). It is clear, I think, that in οἰκέτας Plato is thinking of this lowest order. The Spartan Helots had to perform the duties of domestic servants, as appears from Plut. Lyc. et Num. comp. 2. 4 ἦν ἡ περὶ τὰ χρήματα κατασκευὴ δεδομένη δούλοις καὶ Εἵλωσιν, ὥσπερ ἡ περὶ τὸ δεῖπνον καὶ ὄψον διακονία.

φυλακῆς αὐτῶν : the duty of watching and guarding— sensu inimico— the περίοικοι and οἰκέται. The institutions and history of Sparta are a sufficient commentary on the phrase.

οὐκοῦν ‐‐ πολιτεία . Cf. 547 C note

γεωργιῶν ‐‐ χρηματισμοῦ : as in Sparta: see Xen. Rep. Lac. 7. 1—2 and other authorities in HermannThumser l.c. p. 182 notes

ξυσσίτια . Cf. Hermann-Thumser l.c. pp. 185—191. In Crete, the ξυσσίτια were maintained at the expense of the State; in Sparta, by the contributions of the ξύσσιτοι. The former arrangement of course prevailed in the ideal city (III 416 E), and as timarchy copies the ideal city in regard to ξυσσίτια ( τὴν προτέραν μιμήσεται below), we may suppose that in the timarchical polity, as conceived by Plato, the Cretan method was observed. Cf. Arist. Pol. Β 9. 1271^{a} 28 ff. and see also on 551 A, B.

τῷ δέ γε φοβεῖσθαι κτλ. The Spartans were notorious for their dislike and distrust of knowledge and intellectual cultivation: see Hipp. Mai. 285 B ff. and Arist. Pol. Β 9. 1271^{b} 1 ff., with Susemihl and Hicks' notes. For the anacoluthon τῷ δέ γε—τὰ πολλά—ἕξει (548 A) cf. (with Schneider) Laws 931 C, 949 A.

κεκτημένη . See cr. n. Bekker's silence is often untrustworthy, and as he omitted Α and Ξ as well as v in the list of MSS which read κεκτημένην, it is doubtful if even v has the nominative here. κεκτημένην is however very awkward from its position between τὴν προτέραν μιμήσεται and πολεμοῦσα, and the error is so easy and common that I agree with Bekker and others in rejecting the accusative. See Introd. § 5. In illustration of what Plato says we may contrast Pausanias for example and Lysander with Brasidas and Callicratidas. The former were σοφοί but far from ἁπλοῖ: the latter θυμοειδεῖς and ἁπλούστεροι.

τοὺς τοιούτους : i.q. τοὺς σοφούς. With μεικτούς cf. 547 A.

ἁπλουστέρους = ‘more singleminded.’ Since they distrust σοφοί because their σοφοί are not ἁπλοῖ, it is natural enough that they should seek ἁπλούστεροι, and find them in θυμοειδεῖς, whose single all-engrossing idea is war (548 A) and φιλονικίαι (548 C). The text would hardly have been suspected if critics had grasped the meaning of ἁπλοῦς (see on I 351 A, II 370 B and IV 434 C). As it is, there is a host of superfluous conjectures: ἀλλοκωτέρους, αὐστηρούς, αὐθαδεστέρους, ποικιλωτέρους (Ast), πολλαπλουστέρους (Stallbaum), ἀγχινουστέρους (Müller), ὑποαμουσοτέρους (Herwerden), ἀμουσοτέρους (Herwerden, Apelt, Richards). It should be remembered that the Spartans prided themselves upon τὸ ἁπλοῦν in the ordinary sense of the term.

ἐντίμως ἔχειν . See VII 528 B note For the statement itself cf. for example Laws 630 D, 666 E στρατοπέδου—πολιτείαν ἔχετε and elsewhere, with Isocr. Archid. 81 and Arist. Pol. Η 14. 1333^{b} 12 ff.

καὶ πολεμοῦσα κτλ. Isocrates says much the same of Sparta in Paneg. 128 and Philipp. 51: cf. also Laws 686 B. The description up to this point recalls to some extent the city of Books II—IV, minus the ἄρχοντες proper and some parts of the ‘musical’ education, and Plato may well have looked on the constitution of Lycurgus, from which he borrowed several features, as in some respects a kind of imperfect edition of his earlier καλλίπολις. See on this subject K. F. Hermann Die historischen Elemente d. plat. Staatsideals, in his Gesammelte Abhandlungen, pp. 132—159. Cf. also Laws 692 C, where the Lacedaemonian polity is called a παράδειγμα γεγονός. In what follows the strictly oligarchical features of the Spartan polity are described.

ἐπιθυμηταὶ δέ γε κτλ. Spartan avarice was the theme of universal com ment: see the references collected by Susemihl and Hicks on Arist. Pol. Β 9. 1271^{b} 16 with Eur. Andr. 451 , Ar. Peace 622 ff. and Isocr. Bus. 20.

τιμῶντες ἀγρίως : ‘passionately adoring.’ The adverb was unnecessarily suspected by Herwerden.

ταμιεῖα κτλ. In spite of the formal prohibition of gold and silver (Xen. Rep. Lac. 7. 6, Plut. Lyc. 9. 2, Lys. 17. 6), an immense amount of gold and silver money was accumulated in private hands throughout Laconia: cf. Alcib. I 122 E χρυσίον δὲ καὶ ἀργύριον οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν πᾶσιν Ἕλλησιν ὅσον ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ἰδίᾳ· πολλὰς γὰρ ἤδη γενεὰς εἰσέρχεται μὲν αὐτόσε ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶν βαρβάρων, ἐξέρχεται δὲ οὐδαμόσε κτλ. and other authorities quoted in Hermann-Thumser p. 252 notes or Gilbert Gk Const. Ant. E. T. pp. 12, 13.

οἰκείους ‐‐ κρύψειαν refers specifically to the hoarding of specie as practised by Spartan citizens. It may be doubted whether the Thucydidean Pericles was justified even at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war in telling the Athenians that the Spartans possessed οὔτε ἰδίᾳ οὔτε ἐν κοινῷ χρήματα (I 141. 3), in spite of Xenophon Rep. Lac. 7. 6.

περιβόλους οἰκήσεων κτλ. : not ‘walled houses’ (D. and V.) but ‘dwellings to encompass them withal, veritable private nests’: cf. Theaet. 174 E σηκὸν ἐν ὄρει τὸ τεῖχος περιβεβλημένον and Crat. 400 C . The phrase has a poetical sound and may be taken from the drama, but is more likely to be one of Plato's own poetical flourishes. A Spartan husband could occasionally escape from the rigid discipline of camp-life and take shelter— this is the force of περιβόλους—in his domestic nest: see Plut. Lyc. 15. 4—7. Plato seems to imply that this arrangement encouraged habits of extravagance and luxuriousness in the wives as well as in the husbands: cf. Arist. Pol. Β 9. 1269^{b} 22 ζῶσι γὰρ (the Spartan wives) ἀκολάστως πρὸς ἅπασαν ἀκολασίαν καὶ τρυφερῶς. Aristotle's remark is amply borne out by other evidence: see Hermann-Thumser l. c. p. 180 note 5 and Newman on Arist. l.c.

οἷς ἐθέλοιεν ἄλλοις : masculine, not (as D. and V. translate), neuter. The reference is probably intended to include παιδικά as well as others. The Spartan's domestic nest was doubtless occasionally a nest of vice.

τὸν νόμον ἀποδιδράσκοντες . The expression is borrowed by Aristotle Pol. Β 9. 1270^{b} 34, where see Newman's note.

τῆς ἀληθινῆς ‐‐ φιλοσοφίας . Cf. the famous saying φιλοσοφία μεγίστη μουσική in Phaed. 61 A .

μεμιγμένην and μέμικται sound half-technical, and it is clear from Laws 712 D ff., 691 E, 693 D, Isocr. Nicocles 24 (with Areop. 61) and Arist. Pol. Δ 9. 1294^{b} 18 ff. that Greek political theorists were in the habit of viewing the Spartan constitution as a ‘mixed polity,’ although they did not always analyse the μῖξις in the same way: cf. Henkel Studien zur Gesch. d. Gr. Lehre v. Staat p. 62 notes 35, 36, and Whibley Gk Olig. pp. 14, 19. The analysis which is attributed to Archytas may serve as a specimen: δεῖ δὴ τὸν νόμον τὸν κάρρονα καὶ τὰν πόλιν ἐκ πασᾶν σύνθετον ἦμεν τᾶν ἄλλαν πολιτειᾶν, καὶ ἔχεν τι δαμοκρατίας, ἔχεν τι ὀλιγαρχίας, ἔχεν τι βασιλῄας καὶ ἀριστοκρατίας, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τᾷ Λακεδαίμονι. τοὶ μὲν γὰρ βασιλέες τᾶς μοναρχίας, τοὶ δὲ γέροντες τᾶς ἀριστοκρατίας, τοὶ δὲ ἔφοροι τᾶς ὀλιγαρχίας, ἱππαγρέται δὲ καὶ κόροι τᾶς δαμοκρατίας (Stobaeus Flor. 43. 134). On mixed polities in ancient political science see Henkel l.c. pp. 85 ff., 102, 106 ff., 112, 115 and Greenidge Gr. Const. Hist. pp. 74—121.

ἕν τι μόνον . For τι μόνον Apelt conjectures τιμώμενον: but Plato expresses himself emphatically in case the oligarchical features of the Spartan polity should make us forget that after all it is and must be essentially θυμο‐κρατία—the expression of θυμοειδές and not φιλοχρήματον (547 C note).

φιλονικίαι κτλ. Cf. Plut. Ages. 5. 4. Plato is not thinking of ‘divisions in Sparta between the partisans of the ephors and kings’ (as J. and C. suppose), but of the passion ὑπείροχον ἐμμέναι ἄλλων: for this and not ‘quarrelsomeness’ is the distinctive feature of timarchy. We are in danger of misconceiving the whole position of ‘timarchy’ and the ‘timarchical’ man if φιλόνικος (or φιλόνεικος) is connected with νεῖκος instead of with νίκη. On the spelling and derivation of the word see IX 581 B note

διὰ τὸ ἐξαρκεῖν κτλ. See 544 A note With ἀμήχανον δὲ κτλ. cf. IV 443 D, E note

πῶς τε γενόμενος : ‘how did he arise?’ Richards proposes γιγνόμενος: but the past tense is in harmony with ἔμπεσε 545 D, with είλκέτην, ἠγέτην, ὡμολόγησαν 547 B, and indeed with the whole of Plato's exposition, which is deliberately arrayed in the vesture of a historical narrative or epic poem: see on 543 A, 544 C. It appears to be the custom to translate most of the aorists of this kind in Books VIII and IX by the present, but in some cases the effect is much more realistic and picturesque if we make them past, and I think that Plato intended some of these aorists to be understood in that way. The instances in point are 550 B ἦλθε, παρέδωκε, ἐγένετο, 550 E ἀπειργάσαντο, 551 B κατεστήσαντο, 555 D ἠνάγκασαν, 560 A—C ὑπεχώρησε, διεφθάρησαν, ἐξέπεσον, κατεκοσμήθη, ἐγένοντο, εἵλκυσαν, ἐνέτεκον, κατέλαβον, κατέσχον, 565 B ἔσχον, 566 E ἠλευθέρωσε, διένειμε. Except in 550 E, 551 B, 555 D, 565 B, and 566 E, in which the aorists are no doubt the so-called gnomic aorists “used in animated language to express general truths” (Goodwin MT. p. 53), each of these tenses is in my opinion correctly translated by a past in English. Plato of course repeatedly employs the present also, not only where he is painting a scene (e.g. 549 B ff., 553 A ff., 555 C ff.), but also when he is describing the actual genesis of a particular sort of commonwealth or individual (e.g. 550 D, 551 A, B al. and many instances of γίγνεται), and in such cases the appearance of historical narration is not preserved, for it would be pedantic to view all these presents as merely examples of the praesens historicum. See also on 549 C.

φιλονικίας : ‘desire to excel.’ The translations ‘party-spirit’ (D. and V.), ‘spirit of contention’ (Jowett) are misleading: see 548 C note On Glauco's φιλονικία see Introd. § 2.

ὑποαμουσότερον . It is unnecessary (with Herwerden) to add < μέν>, although ὑποαμουσότερον is contrasted with φιλόμουσον: see on I 340 D.

φιλόμουσον . The ‘timocratical’ man has neglected τῆς ἀληθινῆς Μούσης τῆς μετὰ λόγων τε καὶ φιλοσοφίας (548 B), but he is nevertheless φιλόμουσος, though somewhat less so than Glauco, whom Socrates calls μουσικός in III 398 E. On the Spartan love of music cf. Plut. Lyc. 21 and other evidence in Hermann-Thumser l.c. p. 178 notes 5, 6.

φιλήκοον κτλ. This characteristic of the Spartans is well illustrated by J. and C. from Hipp. Mai. 285 D ff.: Ἀλλὰ τί μήν ἐστιν ἃ ἡδέως σου ἀκροῶνται καὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν (sc. οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι);— Περὶ τῶν γενῶν—τῶν τε ἡρώων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τῶν κατοικίσεων, ὡς τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐκτίσθησαν αἱ πόλεις, καὶ συλλήβδην πάσης τῆς ἀρχαιολογίας ἥδιστα ἀκροῶνται. Schneider is mistaken in taking οὐδαμῶς with all three adjectives: it belongs only to ῥητορικόν. The carefully qualified expression ὑποαμουσότερον would be inconsistent with calling the Spartan οὐδαμῶς φιλόμουσον: and φιλήκοον is not used as in VII 535 D, but rather as the antithesis to ῥητορικόν .

ἄγριος κτλ. : like the Spartans towards slaves and Helots: cf. Laws 777 A ff. and Gilbert Gk Const. Ant. E. T. pp. 32 ff.

οὐ καταφρονῶν κτλ. is a subtle psychological touch. Those who have no moral or intellectual right to ‘despise’ inferiors are apt to treat them harshly, in the vain effort to convince themselves of their own superiority. ὁ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευμένος uses those below him “as creatures of another place” ( All's well that ends well I 2. 41). Cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. IV 8. 1124^{b} 5. 20 and (for καταφρονῶν) Thuc. II 62. 4 αὔχημα μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀμαθίας εὐτυχοῦς καὶ δειλῷ τινι ἐγγίγνεται, καταφρόνησις δὲ ὃς ἂν καὶ γνώμῃ πιστεύῃ τῶν ἐναντίων προέχειν.

οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ λέγειν κτλ. Cf. Prot. 342 E ff. The Spartans were men of deeds, not words.

φιλογυμναστής ‐‐ φιλόθηρος . as in Sparta: see Hermann-Thumser l.c. p. 182 notes 1, 2.

ὅσῳ δὲ πρεσβύτερος κτλ. The life of the timocratical man is an epitome of that of the State, in which, as actually happened at Sparta, the oligarchical element grows more and more powerful as time goes on (547 C note).

λόγου ‐‐ κεχραμένου recalls the ἀληθινὴ Μοῦσα of 548 B.

σωτὴρ ἀρετῆς . Virtue is never secure unless it rests on knowledge, and can render a λόγος of itself: cf. VI 497 C and VII 531 E notes

ἐνίοτε κτλ. Krohn finds a difficulty in οὐκ εὖ πολιτευομένῃ, for timarchy is a degeneration of the perfect city ( Pl. St. pp. 208 ff., insufficiently refuted by Grimmelt de reip. Pl. comp. et unit. p. 71). But Plato is here speaking of the origin of the ‘timarchical’ man, not of the ‘timarchical’ State, and the ἀριστοκρατικός whose son becomes τιμοκρατικός may be found in any one of the degenerate commonwealths, although he will not rule except ‘in his own city,’ i.e. aristocracy. We must beware of supposing that there is no remnant of good men in depraved States (cf. VI 492 E ff., 496 C ff., IX 591 E ff.). If Plato had here preserved the fiction of a historical narrative and made the τιμοκρατικὸς νεανίας the son of an ἀριστοκρατικός in his own ideal city, he could only have attributed his fall to the same law of natural degeneration which subverted the καλλίπολις (546 A ff.). As it is, the description is drawn from facts of daily experience and observation, and Plato, as is suggested by the Oxford editors, may well be thinking of some ‘Laconizing youth of Athens,’ perhaps of some member of the Socratic circle. We have already seen that Plato frequently deserts the epic or narrative form of exposition which he has chosen to express his views: see above on 548 D. I formerly printed a comma after πως and a full stop after ἔχειν, but now revert to Stallbaum's punctuation, because (1) the contrast with καὶ ἔστι μέν γε κτλ. seems to require a fuller pause after πως, (2) ἐνίοτε —ἔχειν does not explain the γένεσις of the τιμοκρατικός, as it ought to do, if γίγνεται—ἔχειν is all one sentence, (3) Adimantus' interruption πῇ δὴ—γίγνεται, which calls attention in a lively manner to the point which Plato wishes to emphasise, is most easily accounted for on the supposition that ἐνίοτε κτλ. begins a separate sentence: cf. 567 E note and Soph. O. C. 644 f., with Jebb's note. νέος ὑός is resumed in νέος (550 A), and has no other predicate except ἦλθε etc. in 550 B.

φεύγοντος κτλ. Cf. VI 496 C ff. and Theaet. 173 C ff. φυγαρχία (if the word may be allowed) on the part of the best men was a growing evil in Athenian politics: see Hermann-Thumser l.c. p. 749 note 4. In a bad State, according to Aristotle ( Pol. Γ 4), the good man is apt to be a bad citizen.

ὅταν κτλ. : ‘whenever, I continued, he listens in the first instance to his mother, who is annoyed because her husband has no place in the government and is on that account belittled among the other wives, and who also sees’ etc. πρῶτον μέν has nothing to do with ἔπειτα, but prepares us for καὶ οἱ οἰκέται κτλ. in 549 E. See also on 549 D. Krohn ( Pl. St. p. 198) thinks the present sentence inconsistent with the position assigned to women in V; but actual wives ἐν πόλει οὐκ εὖ πολιτευομένῃ may be allowed to differ from the perfect products of an ideal city. Plato's description is as realistic as anything could well be: he speaks as though ξυνῳκηκὼς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ παραγεγονὼς ἐν ταῖς κατ’ οἰκίαν πράξεσιν (IX 577 A). Socrates and his relations with Xanthippe possibly furnished some details of the picture (so also Müller on p. 749 of his Translation).

λοιδορούμενον is certainly middle, not passive, as Ast imagined: cf. VI 500 B.

ἐν δικαστηρίοις . The opposition between ἴδιαι and δημόσιαι δίκαι (cf. Laws 957 A) is not to the point here, as Vermehren remarks ( Plat. Stud. p. 107), but we should not, with that critic, expunge ἐν δικαστηρίοις. The expression ἰδίᾳ ἐν δικαστηρίοις refers to ἴδιαι δίκαι: and δημοσίᾳ to other public gatherings, as e.g. the assembly: cf. Theaet. 174 C ὅταν ἐν δικαστηρίοις ἤ που ἄλλοθι ἀναγκασθῇ κτλ.

ῥᾳθύμως κτλ. : ‘indifferent to everything of the sort’: cf. Xen. Mem. II 9. 1 , Theaet. 173 C , D and (for the vague use of τὰ τοιαῦτα) VII 536 A.

αἰσθάνηται is usually explained as by anacoluthon for αἰσθανομένης: but no parallels have been cited, nor are the anacolutha by which Engelhardt ( Anac. Pl. Spec. III p. 42) illustrates the sentence in any degree comparable. The sense compels us to regard the subject of αἰσθάνηται as the mother, but grammatically it can only, as with ἀκούῃ, be the son. I formerly placed αἰσθάνηται after ἀχθομένης τε: Richards excises it altogether. Neither solution is perfectly satisfactory; and it is possible that the sentence by some accident or other was imperfectly revised by Plato. The grammatical structure of this chapter from ἐνίοτε πατρός down to ἐπαινουμένους (550 A) is considerably freer than is usual even with Plato, and there are other passages in Book VIII which seem to stand in need of revision: cf. 558 A note Nothing is easier than to ‘emend’ them all in accordance with our grammatical rules, but such emendations involve so great a departure from the MSS that they lack every element of probability, and as it is possible that the fault is Plato's, it is safer for us to adhere to the MSS. Nearly all the greatest writers occasionally offend against the rules by which we seek to bind them. See the excellent remarks of Longinus on the subject of correctness versus fire in composition ( περὶ ὕψους 33—36).

ἄνανδρος ‐‐ καὶ λίαν ἀνειμένος rings poetical. The rhythm may be intentional, to suit ὑμνεῖν: or Plato may have taken the words from a tragedian. Such a line as ἄνανδρός ἐστι καὶ λίαν ἀνειμένος might well have been applied by Zethus to Amphion in Euripides' Antiope, which was in effect a comparison between the πρακτικός and the θεωρητικὸς βίος: see Gorg. 485 E ff. and Eur. Frag. 187 Dind. Cf. also VI 494 D note

ἀκούει . See cr. n. If we retain ἀκούῃ, ὅταν must be carried on from 549 C, in spite of the intervening sentences in 549 E. In that case we should regard Socrates' description (549 C —550 B) as virtually a single sentence ἐνίοτε—ἔχειν, ὅταν—ὑμνεῖν, καὶ ἐξιὼν— ἐπαινουμένους, τότε δὴ—ἀνήρ, and ignore Adimantus' replies, as well as οἶσθα οὖν —πατρός (549 E). But although ὅταν sometimes extends its influence in this way (VII 540 D—541 A), the interposition of 549 E makes it very difficult to retain the subjunctive here, and I therefore agree with other editors in holding the sentence to be independent. Cf. 553 B note

παρὰ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων . Others know his father πόρρωθεν: the son sees him near at hand, comparing his ways of life with those of other men—and consequently understands and appreciates his father more. J. and C. wrongly translate “having a nearer view of his father's ways than of the ways of others.”

ἑλκόμενος κτλ. describes the στάσις in the soul. Cf. 545 C, D.

ἄρδοντος . The metaphor is common: cf. X 606 D and Euthyph. 2 D with my note ad loc. So also in Cor. I 3. 6 ἐγὼ ἐφύτευσα, Ἀπόλλως ἐπότισεν.

διὰ τὸ κτλ. : ‘because he is not naturally a bad man,’ lit. ‘his nature is not that of a bad man’: not ‘because he is by birth the son of no bad man.’

εἰς τὸ μέσον ‐‐ ἦλθε κτλ. A compromise is effected, reminding us of the compromise which converted the aristocratical State into τιμαρχία: cf. 547 B εἰς μέσον ὡμολόγησαν κτλ. The aorists ἦλθε, παρέδωκε etc. are past, and should be so translated: see on 548 D.

ἔχομεν ἄρα κτλ. Richards thinks this sentence interrogative; but ἄρα rather points the other way.

οὐκοῦν μετὰ τοῦτο κτλ. As θυμοειδές in Timarchy superseded λογιστικόν, so in Oligarchy φιλοχρήματον supersedes θυμοειδές. The lower ‘parts’ of soul assert the mastery in turn, as the scale of commonwealth descends (cf. 553 D and 547 C note); and the continuity is unbroken, for the element of φιλοχρήματον already displayed an ominous activity in the Spartan State, although it had not yet attained the sovereign place. Plato's description of Greek oligarchies, if we judge it by the facts of history, probably lays rather too much emphasis on τὸ φιλοχρήματον: but it is certainly true that the pursuit of riches was the characteristic feature of ancient oligarchy. See on the whole subject Whibley Greek Oligarchies, and Newman The Politics of Aristotle IV pp. xxi— xxxvi, and compare the account which Aristotle gives of the causes producing revolution in what he calls ‘aristocracies’ ( Pol. Ε 7).

τὸ τοῦ Αἰσχύλου . The line is a playful adaptation from Sept. 451 λέγ’ ἄλλον ἄλλαις ἐν πύλαις εἰληχότα and 570 Ὁμολωίσιν δὲ πρὸς πύλαις τεταγμένος. There is no good reason for holding (with Herwerden) that Plato is quoting from one of Aeschylus' lost plays.

τὴν ὑπόθεσιν . See 545 B ff.

τὴν ἀπὸ τιμημάτων . By Herodotus (III 81) ὀλιγαρχίη is used in its strictly etymological sense; and Socrates' own name for that which Plato calls ‘oligarchy’ was πλουτοκρατία ( Mem. IV 6. 12). The establishment of a property qualification for full citizenship was the central feature in the programme of the Athenian oligarchical party from 412 B.C. onwards: see (for 411) Thuc. VIII 65. 3, 97. 1 and (for 404) Xen. Hell. II 3. 48 , with Hermann-Thumser l.c. pp. 724—734. It is therefore natural enough that Plato should define oligarchy as he does, especially as in his younger days, both personally and through his friends, he was himself connected with the Athenian oligarchical faction (Grote VIII p. 30). The term ‘oligarchy’ retained its Platonic sense after Plato (cf. e.g. Arist. Pol. Γ 8. 1280^{a} 1 f. ἀναγκαῖον μέν, ὅπου ἂν ἄρχωσι διὰ πλοῦτον ἄν τ’ ἐλάττους ἄν τε πλείους, εἶναι ταύτην ὀλιγαρχίαν κτλ.), though Aristotle recognises also the wider meaning, e.g. in Pol. Ζ 2. 1317^{b} 39 ὀλιγαρχία καὶ γένει καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ παιδείᾳ ὁρίζεται. See especially Whibley Gk Olig. pp. 15—22.

ὡς μεταβαίνει . The leading features in Plato's narrative are probably taken from the history of Sparta, which had degenerated during his lifetime from a ‘timarchy’ to what was virtually an oligarchical polity: cf. Nohle die Statslehre Pl. p. 106 and Hermann-Thumser l.c. p. 258. Others have referred to the Solonian constitution and the oligarchical revolutions at Athens in 411 and 404. In neither of these instances was the previous government timarchical, for the rule of the Eupatrids had become an oppressive oligarchy by the time of Solon (Holm Gk Hist. E. T. I p. 389); but it is likely enough that Plato was thinking of these among other oligarchies and oligarchical movements in some parts of his descriptions: see 551 B note

τὸ ταμιεῖον ‐‐ ἐκεῖνο . 548 A notes The oracle spoke truly ἁ φιλοχρηματία Σπάρταν ὀλεῖ, ἄλλο δὲ οὐδέν (Tyrtaeus 3. 1).

γυναῖκες . See on 548 A.

ἀπειργάσαντο . On the tense see 548 D note A few MSS read ἀπειργάσατο: but ἄλλος ἄλλον is in partitive apposition to the plural subject, according to the regular idiom: cf. II 369 B, C, IX 581 C note

ἢ οὐχ κτλ. Cf. 555 C and especially Laws 743 A ff. ἀγαθὸν δὲ ὄντα διαφερόντως καὶ πλούσιον εἶναι διαφερόντως ἀδύνατον (‘how hardly shall a rich man’ etc.). Other parallels are quoted by Spiess Logos Spermatikos p. 74. Cf. also III 416 E note

ὥσπερ κτλ. : ‘as it were inclining always in opposite directions when each is placed in the scale of a balance.’ As the scale containing virtue rises, that containing riches falls, and vice versa. Cf. Hom. Il. XXII 209 ff. Madvig's κείμενον ἑκάτερον, though adopted even by J. and C., is questionable Greek, and certainly no improvement. ὥσπερ should be taken with ῥέποντε “quasi non πλούτου ἀρετὴ διέστηκεν, sed πλοῦτος καὶ ἀρετὴ διεστήκατον praecessisset” (Schneider). There is a kindred figure in 544 E above: ἃ ἂν ὥσπερ ῥέψαντα τἄλλα ἐφελκύσηται. Ξ and some other inferior MSS have the obvious ‘correction’ ῥέποντος. Other conjectures are ῥέπουσα (Liebhold) and ἂν ῥέπουσα (Price), but neither could ever have been changed to ῥέποντε.

φιλοχρηματισταὶ κτλ. Although Aristotle ( Pol. Ε 12. 1316^{a} 39 ff.) pronounces it ἄτοπον to think that oligarchy arises ὅτι φιλοχρήματοι καὶ χρηματισταὶ οἱ ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς, there is no doubt that the special oligarchy which Plato probably has in view, viz. Sparta in the fourth century B.C., became to all intents and purposes an oligarchy chiefly from this cause, as in fact Aristotle himself recognises ib. 7. 1307^{a} 34 ff.: cf. also Β 9. 1270^{a} 14 ff. It should also be remembered that Plato's selection of the αἰτία τῆς φθορᾶς is primarily determined by his psychological standpoint: see on 543 A.

ἐγένοντο . See 548 D note

νόμον τίθενται κτλ. In Sparta, apparently, matters never went so far as this, although those who were unable to make the statutory contribution to the public mess forfeited their citizenship, according to the laws of Lycurgus, and later abuses swelled the ranks of the ὑπομείονες from this cause: see Arist. Pol. Β 9. 1271^{a} 34 and Hermann-Thumser l.c. pp. 258— 260 notes ‘The minimum amount of property qualifying for privilege in an oligarchy’ was of course different in different oligarchical States: cf. Whibley Gk Olig. p. 22.

οὗ μὲν μᾶλλον κτλ. See again Whibley l.c. pp. 126—132. As an example of a moderate oligarchy (in the Platonic sense) we may take the Solonian constitution, which was, broadly speaking, the ideal of the moderate oligarchs at Athens towards the end of the fifth century (Beloch Att. Pol. p. 74: cf. Thuc. VIII 97. 2), and is commended by Plato in Laws 698 B ff.

ἢ βίᾳ κτλ. “To an Athenian, as to ourselves, this would naturally suggest a revolution against a democratic system such as took place at the establishment of the Four Hundred in 411 B.C., or of the Thirty in 404 B.C., and constantly throughout Greece during the Peloponnesian war” (Bosanquet). The remark applies with equal force to πρὸ τούτου φοβήσαντες (cf. Thuc. VIII 66. 2), and it can scarcely be doubted that the familiar struggles of oligarchy against democracy in his own as well as other times supplied Plato with this detail of the picture. But the employment of force would be equally necessary in order to transform a timarchy into an oligarchy, owing to the opposition to be apprehended from the impoverished and relatively poorer sections of the timarchs, who would under an oligarchy be formally and for ever excluded from office. The conspiracy of Cinadon partly illustrates Plato's point; for it was supported by ὑπομείονες, and suppressed by force ( Xen. Hell. III 3. 4 —11 with Grote IX pp. 70 ff.). Krohn ( Pl. St. p. 211) asserts that Plato has already forgotten 545 C, D, where constitutional change was said to originate from στάσις in the ruling class. But the struggle between those timarchs who have, and those who have not, the proposed τίμημα, is in reality στάσις between the rulers, for until timarchy is abrogated by law, the poor, if otherwise qualified, are de iure rulers as well as the rich. In Sparta it would be otherwise, because those who failed to pay their contributions to the ξυσσίτια ceased ipso facto to be rulers; only Plato's timarchy is not in this particular a copy of Sparta, but rather resembles Crete (547 D, 551 A notes). See also on 545 C.

κατεστήσαντο κτλ. For the aorist cf. 548 D note ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν is illustrated on I 341 B. ἔφαμεν refers to 544 C.

πρῶτον μέν : sc. ἁμάρτημά ( ἐστιν ).

ὅρος ‐‐ ἐστιν : ‘terminus eius qualis sit.’ ὅρος is the limit or defining mark which separates it from all the other πολιτεῖαι: cf. I 331 D. Few will approve of Badham's conjecture τοῦτο αὐτὸ ὁρᾷς αὐτῆς οἷόν ἐστιν, especially as ὅρος echoes ὅρον in 551 A. οἷός ἐστιν, ἄθρει· εἰ γὰρ νεῶν κτλ. (Liebhold) is scarcely less unhappy. The text is above suspicion.

εἰ νεῶν κτλ. The illustration is a favourite one both with Socrates and Plato: cf. Xen. Mem. III 9. 11 and supra VI 488 A ff. notes There is probably no aposiopesis after ἐπιτρέποι: we should translate ‘Just consider if one were to choose pilots on the census principle and refuse to let a poor man steer though better qualified!’

πονηρὰν κτλ. “Adimantus quasi non videre, sed quid videat renuntiare iussus, πονηράν, inquit, τὴν ναυτιλίαν αὐτοὺς ναυτίλλεσθαι sc. ὁρῶ” (Schneider). Cf. VII 535 C note This explanation is, I think, easier than that of Stallbaum, who prints ἄθρει γάρ· εἰ νεῶν κτλ., understand ing (after ἐπιτρέποι) τί λέγοις ἂν περὶ τούτου; or the like, and λέγοιμι ἄν to govern the accusative with infinitive. J. and C.'s solution is in principle the same as Stallbaum's. The text may be corrupt, but no convincing emendation has hitherto been offered. The different proposals are εἰκός (Ast, Richards) and ἂν εἴη δέος (Liebhold) for ἦ δ’ ὅς: < φαίην ἂν> added after ἦ δ’ ὅς (Stephanus): πονηρὰ εἴη ἂν ναυτιλία αὐτοῖς ναυτίλλεσθαι (Ast): πονηρὰν <ἀνάγκη> κτλ. Richards—but it would surely be better to add the word after ναυτιλίαν. I have sometimes fancied that Plato wrote πονηράν, ἦ δ’ ὅς, τὴν ναυτιλίαν αὐτοῖς ναυτίλλεσθαι, taking the accusative as in apposition to the previous sentence (cf. in some respects Hipp. Mai. 291 E and infra 567 C); but, for a reason to be mentioned presently on 551 D, perhaps ναυτιλίαν <ἀνάγκη> is right.

περὶ ἄλλου κτλ. See cr. n. ἤ τινος is retained by Schneider, who takes it as neuter, and ὁτουοῦν as masculine. The words can hardly be anything except a gloss or variant on ὁτουοῦν: the corrections ἥστινος or ἡστινοσοῦν (Ast) are much less easy and probable. περὶ governs ἀρχῆς, on which ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν, which is neuter, depends. Cobet's περὶ ἄλλης οὕτως ὁτουοῦν ἀρχῆς (‘about any other ἀρχή whatsoever’) does not suit with πλὴν πόλεως (i.e. ἄλλου—not ἄλλης —ὁτουοῦν πλὴν πόλεως).

μὴ μίαν κτλ. Aristotle ( Pol. Ε 12. 1316^{b} 6 ff.) urges that this is equally true of all States where inequality of property prevails: but Plato would not allow that it is true of his ideal city, or even of timarchy except in so far as timarchy is itself oligarchical (548 A).

ἀνάγκῃ . See cr. n. The word could be dispensed with here, and, as all those MSS which are in the habit of writing the iota subscript at all regularly appear to have the nominative and not the dative, it is possible, and even perhaps probable, that this is the ἀνάγκη which Richards desiderated in 551 C: see note ad loc.

τὸ ἀδυνάτους κτλ. The sense of course is ‘to be—probably—unable’ i.e. ‘that they are in all probability unable.’ Richard says ἴσως is ‘feeble’: to me it seems exactly the right word in the right place. The conjectures σῶς (Badham) and ἰσχυρῶς (Richards) are each of them for different reasons very unpleasing, and even if the passage were corrupt ἰσχυρῶς is far too violent a change to deserve consideration.

χρωμένους κτλ. In illustration the Oxford editors cite Thuc. III 27. The Spartans in particular had regularly to arm and employ the πλῆθος, both Perioeci and Helots, in their wars (see e.g. Thuc. VII 19. 3), and were consequently sometimes exposed to grave dangers (Thuc. IV 80).

ὡς ἀληθῶς ὀλιγαρχικούς : ‘literally olig-archical or masters of few’ ( Herren von wenigen, Schneider). Cf. ὀλιγαρχικῶς 555 A note and (for ὡς ἀληθῶς) VI 511 B note Jowett's translation “few to fight as they are few to rule” does not bring out the peculiar force of ὀλιγαρχικούς here.

φιλοχρημάτους : with emphasis on φιλο‐ (Schneider, who compares 568 B for ἅτε without the copula). The sentiment is illustrated by Bosanquet from Arist. Pol. B 9. 1271^{b} 13 εἰσφέρουσί τε κακῶς (of the Spartans): cf. also infra 554 E f. and Theophr. Char. 26, where the ὀλιγαρχικός cries πότε παυσόμεθα ὑπὸ λειτουργιῶν καὶ τριηραρχιῶν ἀπολλύμενοι; and more in Hermann-Thumser l. c. p. 685 note 1.

πάλαι . IV 434 A ff.

τὸ ἐξεῖναι κτλ. According to some ancient authorities (cited in Hermann-Thumser l. c. pp. 186 f.), the constitution of Lycurgus absolutely forbade the alienation of a certain minimum of the original κλῆρος, called the ἀρχαία μοῖρα. The evidence of Plato does not go far, but so far as it does go, it supports this view; for he says that oligarchy is the first polity which permits a citizen πάντα τὰ αὑτοῦ ἀποδίδοσθαι: cf. also Laws 744 D. Aristotle says nothing of the ἀρχαία μοῖρα, and states that a Spartan might legally part with his estate by gift or bequest, although to sell it was οὐ καλόν ( Pol. B 9. 1270^{a} 19 ff.). The conflict of evidence is discussed by Newman and Susemihl on Arist. l.c.: see also on the other side Hermann-Thumser l. c. pp. 259 f. In many Greek States besides Sparta it was either illegal, or at least dishonourable, to dispose of the ‘ancient lot’: see Whibley Gk Olig. pp. 113—115.

οὔκουν κτλ. Schneider was the first to give this sentence to Adimantus, and ὀρθῶς to Socrates, “qui quum paucorum gubernationem primam illud vitium recipere persuasum haberet eamque sententiam verbis ὅρα δή etc. aperte demonstrasset, suffragante Adimanto rursus in dubium sine causa rem vocare non debebat.” Cf. 554 B. Baiter and others ought not to have reverted to the old arrangement. For οὔκουν—γε see Neil's edition of the Knights of Aristophanes p. 195.

εἰς ἅ : i.e. for χρηματισμός, δημιουργία and the other purposes specified in 552 A.

ἐδόκει : sc. ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀναλωτής (Schneider). This explanation, which is, I think, neater and more pointed than to supply τῶν ἀρχόντων, makes ἦν—ἀναλωτής indispensable. Herwerden was wrong in any case when he bracketed these words.

ἐν κηρίῳ : not ‘in the hive’ (as D. and V.), but ‘in a cell.’ The drone-cell in which the drone is produced stands to the whole hive as the οἰκία to the πόλις. For κηρίον in this sense, see Bonitz Ind. Arist. s.v.

τὸν τοιοῦτον ‐‐ κηφῆνα . The comparison is frequent in Greek literature from Hesiod onwards ( O D. 304 ff.): see Ruhnken on Tim. Lex. s.v. κηφήνεσσι κοθούροισι and Blaydes on Ar. Wasps 1114 . “We would purge the land of the drones, that rob the bee of her honey” ( Pericles Prince of Tyre II 1. 50).

τελευτῶσιν : i.q. τελευτῶντές εἰσιν. ‘To the stingless belong those who die paupers in their old age.’ πρὸς τὸ γῆρας is adverbial as in VI 498 A. Stallbaum and others understand τελευτῶσιν as only ‘tandem fiunt’; but the other view— Schneider's—is better and more natural: cf. II 372 D γηραιοὶ τελευτῶντες and Symp. 179 E .

πάντες : sc. εἰσίν (understood from τελευτῶσιν) rather than γίγνονται (as J. and C. explain).

ἐν πόλει κτλ. Compare the melancholy picture of Athens in Isocrates Areop. 83 τότε μὲν οὐδεὶς ἦν τῶν πολιτῶν ἐνδεὴς τῶν ἀναγκαίων, οὐδὲ προσαιτῶν τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας τὴν πόλιν κατῄσχυνε, νῦν δὲ πλείους εἰσὶν οἱ σπανίζοντες τῶν ἐχόντων· οἷς ἄξιόν ἐστι πολλὴν συγγνώμην ἔχειν, εἰ μηδὲν τῶν κοινῶν φροντίζουσιν ἀλλὰ τοῦτο σκοποῦσιν, ὁπόθεν τὴν ἀεὶ παροῦσαν ἡμέραν διάξουσιν. The Areopagiticus was published about 354 B.C.

ὀλίγου γε ‐‐ ἀρχόντων . Plato's description may be illustrated from the state of Athens just before Solon's legislation: see Solon Fr. 36 ed. Bergk = Arist. Ath. Pol. 12. 4. The words χρησμὸν λέγοντας (in line 9 of the fragment) are certainly not, as some have thought, a corruption of χρείους φυγόντας (as in Aristotle's text), but point to a different recension. χρῃσμὸν λέγοντας ‘gathering alms’ has been suggested (cf. χρῄζω, χρησμοσύνη), and may I think be the original from which the first of the two variants comes.

μὴ οὖν οἰώμεθα : ‘are we, then, not to suppose?’ μή is not ‘num,’ but the negative and goes with οἰώμεθα: cf. I 337 B μὴ ἀποκρίνωμαι ὧν προεῖπες μηδέν; and infra 554 B with other examples cited by Stallbaum: see also Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 187. The positive counterpart of this idiom is οἰώμεθα or βούλει οἰώμεθα: and the negative is due to the jussive idea on which the subjunctive logically depends. οἰόμεθα (see cr. n.) is retained by Schneider and others, μή being construed as ‘num.’ But ‘we do not, then, suppose, do we,’ overdoes the irony, and Stallbaum's explanation is better in every way. On the interchange of ο and ω in Paris A see Introd. § 5.

ἐπιμελείᾳ = ‘deliberately,’ ‘consulto,’ is a rare but well-established adverb: see Xen. Cyr. V 3. 47 , Mag. Eq. 7. 9 and cf. κατ’ ἐπιμέλειαν in Hell. IV 4. 8. The magistrates resign themselves to the presence of these κακοῦργοι, and instead of removing the cause— ἀπαιδευσία καὶ κακὴ τροφὴ καὶ κατάστασις τῆς πολιτείας—as they should do, they ‘deliberately hold them down by force.’ Plato emphatically believed that ‘force is no remedy.’ Cf. the corresponding account of the oligarchical man in 554 C, D κατέχει ἄλλας κακὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνούσας, οὐ πείθων ὅτι οὐκ ἄμεινον, οὐδ’ ἡμερῶν λόγῳ, ἀλλ’ ἀνάγκῃ καὶ φόβῳ κτλ. Schneider's translation ‘carefully’ (sorgfältig) is inaccurate; but he was right in holding that ἐπιμελείᾳ and not βίᾳ (as J. and C. suppose) is the adverb. We certainly cannot understand ἐπιμελείᾳ as = ὑπὸ τῆς ἄλλης ἐπιμελείας in spite of 554 C. The suggestions καὶ βίᾳ (Stephanus) and [ ἐπιμελεία ] βίᾳ (J. J. Hartman) are superfluous.

ἀπαιδευσίαν . ἀπαιδευσία is a feature of the oligarchical State and man: cf. 554 B, 559 D.

ὅταν κτλ. Plato (as suggested by Hermann Gesch. Abhandl. pp. 155 ff.) may have in view some of the generation of Athenian oligarchs who succeeded to the political party of Cimon; for Cimon was τιμοκρατικός rather than ὀλιγαρχικός (cf. V 470 C note). The description of the progress of individual degeneration from the aristocrat down to the tyrant constantly reflects Plato's own experience of Athenian society and domestic life: cf. 549 C, D notes Abundant materials for the picture were doubtless ready at hand in the παντοδαποὶ ἄνθρωποι (557 C) of the ‘bazaar of polities’ (557 D). For the construction of this sentence cf. 549 C—550 A note We ought not to understand μεταβάλλει before ὅταν, for the μεταβολή does not take place until 553 C, and ἆρ’ οὐκ—παραζωννύντα is the only apodosis which Plato thinks it necessary to provide.

πταίσαντα κτλ. For the figure cf. Aesch. Ag. 1006 and Eum. 554—565.

ὥσπερ πρὸς ἕρματι κτλ. In some other examples of this idiom (III 414 E, VII 520 E, supra 545 E, IX 573 E et al.) only the first preposition is expressed; but in Euthyph. 2 C , Phaedr. 255 D and Phaed. 67 D (according to Ven. T) we find as here both prepositions. Cobet is not justified in excising the second preposition either here or elsewhere ( V. L.^{2} pp. 54, 164 ff., 532); for while ὥσπερ πρὸς ἕρματι πρὸς τῇ πόλει (for example) is only a similitude, in ὥσπερ πρὸς ἕρματι τῇ πόλει the connexion is much closer, amounting almost to identification: see my note on Euthyph. l. c. and cf. Braun de Hyperb. Plat. II p. 9.

ἢ στρατηγήσαντα κτλ. The words ἢ στρατηγήσαντα—ἀποβαλόντα interpret the figure in ἐξαίφνης πταίσαντα—ἑαυτόν: ‘having either been a Strategus or held some other high office, and then, when brought to trial, been either put to death, or banished, or disfranchised and deprived of all his property, by the damaging evidence of lying informers.’ βλαπτόμενον ὑπὸ συκοφαντῶν might be taken as subordinate to ἐμπεσόντα, but πρὸς πόλει πταίσαντα seems rather to imply that the prosecution is not wholly vexatious, although the evidence turns out to be so. Some misfortune, such as happened for example at the battle of Arginusae (Xen. Hell. 16. 33 ff., 7. 4 ff., with Grote VII pp. 411 ff.), arouses a great wave of popular feeling, in consequence of which the general is put upon his trial, and συκοφάνται manage to secure his condemnation (cf. Xen. l.c. I 7. 11). Badham and Cobet ignominiously expel βλαπτόμενον, apparently for no better reason than that ἐμπεσόντα can be followed by ὑπό of the agent (Cobet N. L. p. 752, V. L.^{2} p. 54). If the passage is taken as I take it, βλαπτόμενον cannot be cancelled without grave inconvenience; and even if βλαπτόμενον ὑπὸ συκοφαντῶν be construed with ἐμπεσόντα, its excision is unnecessary. On the mischief wrought by συκοφάνται in Athens see Hermann-Thumser Gr. Staatsalt. p. 686 notes 2—4.

ξυλλέγεται . See cr. n. and 550 A, 553 A notes ξυλλέγηται is impossible after ὠθεῖ, and ὠθῇ would be very awkward.

τιάρας κτλ. : symbols of Oriental sovereignty—note μέγαν βασιλέα—and distinction: see Dict. Ant. s.vv. and Schück de Scholiis p. 32.

χαμαὶ ‐‐ παρακαθίσας . Plato makes them squat like servile Oriental courtiers. The picture expresses with admirable clearness the psychological basis of Plato's sequence of polities: see on 547 C and 550 C, and compare the lines of Milton Paradise Lost IX 1127 ff. “Understanding ruled not, and the will Heard not her lore; both in subjection now To sensual appetite, who from beneath Usurping, over sovran reason claimed Superior sway.” The poet Gray's note, though not, I think, correct, is worthy of quotation: “An allusion to those statues or bas-reliefs where some king, or conqueror, is represented with captive nations in chains sitting at his feet; as in that erected to the honour of Justinian, in the Hippodrome at Constantinople.”

καὶ καταδουλωσάμενος is excised by J. J. Hartmann: but see V 451 B note

μηδέν is written rather than οὐδέν owing to the infinitives θαυμάζειν καὶ τιμᾶν.

ἄλλη : i.e. other than you have just described. Jowett's translation “Of all changes, he said, there is none so speedy or so sure as the conversion of the ambitious youth into the avaricious one” is quite wrong.

εἴη . Stallbaum and some others place a mark of interrogation after εἴη: “quod ego non penitus ineptum, sed inter proxime praecedentem et proxime sequentem interrogationem minus aptum existimo” (Schneider). Cf. 550 C.

ἐργάτης : not simply ‘hardworking’ (D. and V.), but with reference to illiberalis labor.

ἀναγκαίους . This form of the feminine recurs in IV 425 D, supra 558 D, 559 A, 561 A (ter) and IX 572 C; but in 558 D we have ἀναγκαῖαι, and ἀναγκαία in 559 B, C. See Schneider on IV 425 D. There is no justification for making ἀναγκαῖος consistently an adjective of either two or three terminations (as suggested by Richards). The full meaning of ἀναγκαῖοι ἐπιθυμίαι is explained in 558 D ff.

τὰ ἄλλα ἀναλώματα “sunt pecuniae in cetera impendendae, quas hic negatur παρέχεσθαι, de suis praebere” (Schneider). With ἄλλα cf. ἄλλης 554 C, and with παρεχόμενος IV 421 D note The translation ‘not affording or allowing himself’ (J. and C.) is inaccurate. παραδεχόμενος, which was read, with slight MS authority, before Bekker, has been rightly discarded by later editors.

οὓς δή . For the plural cf. (with Stallbaum) Laws 908 D and Eur. Hel. 440 <*>λλην πεφυκώς, οἷσιν οὐκ ἐπιστροφαί. See also on I 347 A.

τυφλὸν κτλ. τὸν Πλοῦτον, οἷμαι, φησίν says a Scholiast in the margin of A. See Blaydes on Ar. Plut. 90 . Hirmer ( Entst. u. Komp. d. Pl. Pol. p. 658 note) doubts whether the god of Wealth is represented as blind earlier than Aristophanes; but a σκόλιον of Timocreon began ὤφελέν σ’ ὦ τυφλὲ Πλοῦτε (Schol. on Ar. Ach. 532 ). With the figure in τοῦ χοροῦ cf. VI 490 C and infra 560 E.

ἐτίμα μάλιστα . See cr. n. Schneider's admirable emendation is now universally accepted: cf. μάλιστα ἔντιμα above and τιμᾶν μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ πλοῦτον 553 D. On the corruption see Introd. § 5.

κηφηνώδεις κτλ. As oligarchy has ‘drones’ (552 C), so the oligarchical man has ‘drone desires.’ The parallel is worked out with unusual completeness, even for Plato: see on 555 A.

μὴ φῶμεν . 552 D note

κατεχομένας κτλ. Cf. 552 E. ἄλλης= περὶ τὰ ἄλλα: cf. ἄλλα in 554 A. The translation ‘his general habit of carefulness’ (J. and C.) is scarcely right: cf. περὶ τῆς ἄλλης οὐσίας τρέμων in D below.

αὐτῶν : not κηφηνωδῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, but the plural masculine, in spite of αὐτῷ above (I 347 A note).

ὥστε πολλῆς κτλ. See II 359 B ff. Socrates would say that the picture which Glauco there draws is only too true of the oligarchical man.

τούτῳ δῆλον : ‘clear by this,’ ‘clear from this,’ as in Eur. Hipp. 627 τού τῳ δὲ δῆλον and Ar. Plut. 587 ( τούτῳ δηλοῖ). Stallbaum reads τοῦτο with Ξ and a majority of the inferior MSS; but there is no reason for deserting A and II. The antecedent to τούτῳ is contained in οἶσθ’ οὖν—ἀδικεῖν. From the fact that such a person κακουργεῖ when he gets the chance, it is clear (says Socrates) that when he εὐδοκιμεῖ δοκῶν δίκαιος εἶναι, he achieves this result only by doing violence to himself.

ἐπιεικεῖ κτλ. : ‘by a sort of virtuous self-constraint’ not (as Campbell) ‘by some virtuous element in himself he forcibly restrains.’ βίᾳ is a verbal noun as in βίᾳ τῶν ἐχθρῶν (566 A) and the like. τινι qualifies ἐπιεικής: there is no real ἐπιείκεια in this sort of thing: cf. Phaed. 69 A ff.

εὑρήσεις : see cr. n. The addition of ἐν above the line by A^{2} is hardly sufficient to justify ἐνευρήσεις, especially as εὑρήσεις has much more support from the other MSS. ἐνευρίσκω has not yet been proved classical (see Jebb on Soph. Aj. 1144 ), and Schneider afterwards ( Addit. p. 65) retracted his defence of it here. The distance of τοῖς πολλοῖς from ἐνούσας ἐπιθυμίας is no real difficulty, especially after ἐπιθυμίας ἐνούσας just above.

τὰς τοῦ κηφῆνος ξυγγενεῖς κτλ. Cf. VII 519 B, C note For ἀστασίαστος see on 545 C. διπλοῦς: like the oligarchical State, which is ‘not one, but two’ (551 D).

ἡρμοσμένης τῆς ψυχῆς . Richards would omit τῆς, but the article (which is in all MSS), implies, I think, that such a soul exists and has already been described, as it has in ἕνα γενόμενον ἐκ πολλῶν, σώφρονα καὶ ἡρμοσμένον IV 443 D, E.

ἀνταγωνιστής γε κτλ. See on 551 E. Susemihl Gen. Entw. II p. 232 reminds us of the disinclination on the part of rich Athenians to undertake λειτουργίαι: see Hermann-Thumser l.c. pp. 687 ff.

τῶν καλῶν : sc. φιλοτιμιῶν. In χρήματά τε the τε connects its own with the preceding clause, and does not here mean ‘both.’ τοιούτων: i.e. εὐδόξων. This interpretation is more idiomatic and forcible than to refer τοιούτων to φιλοτιμίας κτλ.

φιλονικίαν κτλ. The ὀλιγαρχικός, when competing for νίκη, is a φαῦλος ἀνταγωνιστής, because he is afraid to summon his ἀναλωτικαὶ ἐπιθυμίαι ‘to fight and strive for victory along with him,’ precisely as the oligarchical city was afraid to arm the πλῆθος (551 D note). And just as the oligarchs found themselves ὡς ἀληθῶς ὀλιγ‐αργικοὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ μάχεσθαι (551 E), so the ὀλιγαρχικὸς ἀνήρ, ‘true to his name of olig-arch’ ( ὀλιγαρχικῶς), ‘employs but few of his forces in the war, and is usually beaten and keeps his money’ (‘loses the prize and saves his money’ Jowett). The force of ξυμ‐ in ξυμμαχίαν may perhaps extend to φιλονικίαν (cf. 546 A note), which must not be translated ‘rivalry’ (with D. and V.): see on IX 581 B. ἡττᾶται καὶ πλουτεῖ has an epigrammatic effect somewhat like Juvenal's “probitas laudatur et alget.”

ὁμοιότητι = ‘in virtue of similarity’: cf. IX 576 C. Baiter and others would expunge the word in both places as an ‘inutile glossema,’ and it is true that the meaning could be apprehended without ὁμοιότητι, as in 561 E—562 A. There are, however, many principles (e.g. ἀνομοιότης etc.) on which things can be τεταγμένα κατ’ ἄλληλα ‘ranged over against one another,’ and it is right that in summing up, Plato should emphasise the principle which has determined the form of his exposition from σκοπῶμεν δὴ εἰ ὅμοιος ἂν εἴη (554 A) onwards: see 554 B, D, E notes For the dative cf. IX 575 C note

δημοκρατίαν δὴ κτλ. We have seen that the dominant feature in the oligarchical State is τὸ φιλοχρήματον, and the present chapter describes how in process of time the polity itself is inevitably overthrown by that very principle. The incidents which prove the immediate cause of revolution are such as may frequently have happened in Greek history: see 556 C, D, E and 557 A notes It is instructive to compare with this chapter Aristotle's a posteriori analysis of the causes of revolution in oligarchical cities ( Pol. E 6). On the psychological basis of democracy see 557 A note

παραστησώμεθα κτλ. For the use of παραστήσασθαι Schneider refers to II 360 E, 361 B and Lucian Icarom. 17, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις παραστησάμενος πολλοὺς χορευτὰς—ἔπειτα προστάξειε κτλ.

ὁμοίως κτλ. See 543 A note μεταβάλλει = ‘it changes,’ viz. the πολιτεία. The verb is scarcely impersonal, as the English translators appear to suppose.

προκειμένου κτλ. προκειμένου is not ‘publicly acknowledged’ (D. and V.), but ‘propositus,’ as in τὸ τέλος τὸ προκείμενον. δεῖν (wrongly rejected by J. J. Hartman) ‘resumes the notion of προκειμένου’ (J. and C.). Similar pleonasms occur in Crit. 44 C , Gorg. 500 C and elsewhere: cf. also ἐξεῖναι in C below and VII 535 A note

ἅτε ‐‐ ἄρχοντες κτλ. As in timarchy (550 D ff.), so in oligarchy, it is the love of money which sows the seeds of party strife and political degeneration. Cf. generally 552 A note and Aristotle Pol. E 6. 1305^{b} 39 ff., with his criticism of Plato ibid. 12. 1316^{b} 15 ff.

εἰσδανείζοντες : i.e. ‘lending money on-the-security-of’ ( εἰς). The τὰ τῶν τοιούτων should be taken with the εἰς of εἰσδανείζοντες as well as with ὠνούμενοι: cf. Arist. Pol. Z 4. 1319^{a} 13 δανείζειν εἴς τι μέρος τῆς ὑπαρχούσης ἑκάστῳ γῆς and Dem. in Aphob. I 28. The word εἰσδανείζω is a ἅπαξ εἰρημένον, but we certainly ought not to substitute ἐκδανείζοντες (suggested by Stephanus) or προσδανείζοντες (with Richards).

δῆλον ἤδη τοῦτο κτλ. See 550 E note

οὐκ ἀγεννεῖς κτλ. =‘of no common stamp’ etc. ( von nicht gemeiner Art, Schneider), not simply ‘of noble birth’ (as D. and V.). Catiline would have seemed to Plato a case in point (cf. Sallust Cat. 5 ), and the Catilinarian conspiracy illustrates not inaptly the description which follows (555 D, E). The aorist ἠνάγκασαν is gnomic, as appears from the plural ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις.

κεκεντρωμένοι κτλ. See 552 C, D notes ἐξωπλισμένοι does little more than explain the metaphor, more Platonico: see on V 451 B and cf. καὶ πτωχόν (wrongly discarded by J. J. Hartman) in 556 A below.

ἐγκύψαντες . τοιαῦτα γὰρ τὰ τῶν ἄγαν φροντιζόντων καὶ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐχόντων σχήματα (Schol. on Ar. Clouds 191 ). A comparison with IX 586 A κάτω ἀεὶ βλέποντες καὶ κεκυφότες εἰς γῆν suggests that the stoop of the χρηματιστής in reality betrays the inherent earthliness of his soul: see on VII 519 A, B and cf. Dante Purg. 19. 70—72.

τοῦ πατρὸς κτλ. Cf. VI 507 A note τόκους is bracketed by Herwerden, but τὸν τόκον τε καὶ ἔκγονον (l.c.) supports it.

οὔτε γε κτλ. καί appears before οὔτε in ΠΞ q and a majority of MSS, but the reading of A is, I now think, right. We should translate ‘At all events, said I, they are unwilling to extinguish this kind of mischief when it is beginning to break into a flame, either by preventing’ etc. If they quenched it in its earlier stages, then the πτωχοί would not be πολλοί: and πολύν bears the emphasis in both the previous sentences. For this use of γε see 559 B note, and cf. IX 581 C and (with Schneider) Isocr. Paneg. 153. With ἐκκαόμενον cf. Ar. Peace 1132 . D. and V. understand the word of ‘cauterizing,’ wrongly, as ἀποσβεννύναι shews.

ὅπῃ . I formerly, with two inferior MSS, Bekker and Ast, read ὅποι, which is certainly more exact: see the examples cited by Blaydes on Ar. Clouds 858 τὰς δ’ ἐμβάδας ποῖ τέτροφας; The verb βούλεται is however treated as more than a mere auxiliary, and the relative accommodated to it by a species of attraction, even at the cost of sacrificing something of the peculiar force of τρέπειν. Translate ‘to dispose of one's property as one likes.’

ἕτερον νόμον . Plato's language here and in ὃς μετ’ ἐκεῖνόν ἐστι δεύτερος seems to imply that such a law would not be altogether a novelty in Greece. According to Theophrastus ( Frag. 97. 5 Wimmer=Stob. Flor. 44. 22), it found a place among the laws of Charondas: ἐὰν δέ τις πιστεύσῃ, μὴ εἶναι δίκην· αὐτὸν γὰρ αἴτιον εἶναι τῆς ἀδικίας. Plato makes a similar provision in Laws 742 C, 849 E, 915 E.

τοὺς μὲν δὴ κτλ. μέν balances δέ after σφᾶς, and should not be taken with δή in the ordinary sense of the collocation μὲν δή: so that there is no reason to omit δή (with Ξ and two other MSS) on the ground that μὲν δή comes too late in the sentence. δή “priori membro dilatando inservit et vinculi per μέν iniecti nexum relaxans alterum membrum ut nova interrogatione instructum minus miremur efficit” (Schneider, comparing Laws 751 E).

ἆρ’ οὐ τρυφῶντας κτλ. Note the usual Platonic chiasmus.

παραβάλλωσιν : ‘come alongside,’ originally perhaps a nautical expression (J. and C.), as in Arist. de gen. anim. III 11. 763^{a} 31. The usage occurs again in Lys. 203 B , and tolerably often in Aristotle.

ἢ καὶ κτλ. ὅταν extends its influence to καταφρονῶνται and ἴδῃ. On θεώμενοι κτλ. Schneider remarks “post verba ἀλλήλους θεώμενοι exspectabatur μηδαμῇ ὡς πρότερον περὶ ἀλλήλων διανοῶνται, vel tale quid, quod ad utrosque se invicem conspicientes pertineret; cuius loco statim divisione facta quid iam de pauperibus divites, de divitibus pauperes sentiant, infertur. Cuius non inconsequentiae, sed breviloquentiae significandae causa supra post θεώμενοι comma—sustuli.” The effect is analogous to that produced by so-called partitive apposition (IV 431 A note), of which idiom a somewhat similar extension occurs in V 465 C, where see note. Richards suspects corruption, proposing to read either (1) θεωμένων and perhaps also ἢ κἄν or ἢ καὶ <ἐάν> instead of ἢ καί, or (2) simply to insert καί before μηδαμῇ. The second proposal is neat and scholarly; but καί was unlikely to disappear, and Plato's rapidity of thought and style renders him particularly liable to grammatical and other irregularities in his more spirited and dramatic passages: cf. VI 488 C, D, VII 531 A, and infra 558 A. See also on 549 D above.

ταύτῃ is emphatic, implying that it is otherwise when danger does not threaten.

πολλὰς κτλ. : ‘with quantities of alien fat about him’ ( viel fremdes Fleisch an sich habend, Schneider), ‘cumbered with much fat.’ παχεῖς ‘bloated’ was, it may be remembered, a nickname for oligarchs: see Gilbert Gr. Staatsalt. II p. 275 note 2 and Neil's edition of Ar. Knights App. II p. 209. ἀλλοτρίας is ‘not his own,’ i.e. no real part of him, and hence useless, superfluous. As Graser points out ( Spec. advers. in serm. Pl. p. 91), it is Homer's γναθμοῖσιν ἀλλοτρίοισι ( Od. XX 347) which is the source of this and other kindred uses of ἀλλότριος, e.g. Thuc. I 70. 6 and Isocr. Faneg. 86. Hermann thinks the meaning is that he has grown fat at the expense of others, like the drone. This explanation is less pointed, and the drone represents not the rich oligarch, but the πτωχός (555 E). With the feeling of this passage cf. Plut. Apoph. Reg. et Imp. 192 D τοῖς πολυσάρκοις ἐπολέμει ( Ἐπαμεινώνδας) καί τινα τοιοῦτον ἀπήλασε τῆς στρατιᾶς, εἰπὼν ὅτι μόλις αὐτοῦ σκέπουσι τὴν γαστέρα ἀσπίδες τρεῖς ἢ τέσσαρες.

ἄνδρες ‐‐ οὐδέν . ‘We have them at our mercy: for they're good for nothing.’ ἄνδρες ἡμέτεροι is virtually an exhortation to rise in revolt: hence παραγγέλλειν. The omission of the article heightens the dramatic effect: cf. X 617 D. ἡμέτεροι has a colloquial ring (‘they are ours’). A kindred meaning, but without any colloquial touch, appears in Xen. Cyr. II 3. 2 (quoted by Schneider Addit. p. 65) ἢν μὲν ἡμεῖς νικῶμεν—δῆλον ὅτι οἵ τε πολέμιοι ἡμέτεροι καὶ τὰ τῶν πολεμίων ἀγαθὰ πάντα: cf. also VII 5. 73. This interpretation, which Schneider finally suggested, has the support of A, II and other MSS. Baiter's ἄνδρες ἡμέτεροι εἰσὶ παρ’ οὐδέν has found considerable favour, and gives a fair sense, but παρ’ οὐδέν (for which see Jebb on Soph. Ant. 466 ) appears to me unpleasantly weak. ἄνδρες ἡμέτεροι εἰσὶν οὐδέν ( q and others) is intrinsically better (cf. 562 D), and may be right, but the intrusion of γάρ in the best MSS remains a difficulty, and παραγγέλλειν (as in Baiter's reading) is shorn perhaps of its full force. It is on the whole easier, I think, to understand ἡμέτεροι as I do than to explain the insertion of γάρ in our two oldest and best MSS.

οὐκοῦν ὥσπερ κτλ. Cf. Soph. O. T. 961 σμικρὰ παλαιὰ σώματ’ εὐνάζει ῥοπή. The Platonic simile is imitated by Arist. Pol. Z 6. 1320^{b} 33 ff. and may also, as Stallbaum thinks, have been in Demosthenes' mind when he wrote Ol. II 21.

ἔξωθεν ἐπαγομένων κτλ. A familiar feature in the history of Greek revolutions: cf. Whibley Gk Olig. p. 52 and (for examples) Gilbert Gr. Staatsalt. II passim.

καὶ ὡς τὸ πολὺ κτλ. : ‘and the magistracies in the city are for the most part given by lot.’ These words, which depend, of course, on ὅταν, explain ἐξ ἴσου—ἀρχῶν, and should be taken in close connexion with that clause, as Ast long ago pointed out. The difference in tense ( μεταδῶσι but γίγνωνται), no less than the meaning, clearly indicates that the two clauses do not express two separate and distinct acts. It is by means of the lot that ἰσότης is secured; and hence democracy is not established until offices are assigned thereby: cf. Hdt. III 80 πάλῳ μὲν ἀρχὰς ἄρχει and Arist. Rhet. I 8. 1365^{b} 32 δημοκρατία μὲν πολιτεία ἐν ᾗ κλήρῳ διανέμονται τὰς ἀρχάς, with Whibley Gk Olig. p. 35 and Greenidge Gk Const. Hist. pp. 139 ff. The clause was, strangely enough, condemned by Hermann. Plato was not likely to omit all mention of the most characteristic and necessary factor in the establishment of a democracy, especially as he introduces the same feature in describing the democratical man (561 B ὥσπερ λαχούσῃ). J. and C., with Schneider and others, read γίγνονται, for which there is very little MS support, remarking that ‘the subjunctive is inexact, because any words dependent on ὅταν should describe a characteristic of the origin of democracy, not merely a characteristic of democracy.’ The fact is that the words do explain the origin of democracy by explaining ἐξ ἴσου μεταδῶσι κτλ., where the aorist is rightly used of the act by which democracy is established; whereas if we read γίγνονται the clause must be taken by itself, and then it can only express a characteristic of democracy after that constitution is in force, so that its proper place would be in the next chapter. It should be observed that in no ancient democracy that we know of was the lot employed in electing to all magistracies: see Gilbert l.c. II p. 318. For this reason Plato writes ὡς τὸ πολύ .

τίνα δὴ οὖν κτλ. The psychological principle of Democracy, as well as of Oligarchy, is τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν. But whereas in Oligarchy everything was subjected to the dominion of one particular desire, viz. the desire of wealth (550 C note), Democracy, on the other hand, is the political embodiment of absolute freedom and equality among all desires, unnecessary as well as necessary: see on 558 C ff. The materials for Plato's picture of democracy are of course taken from Athens more than any other single city. It is an extraordinarily vivid sketch; and indeed Plato's whole account of democracy and the democratical man (557 A—565 C), in spite of manifest exaggerations, brings Athens nearer to us than almost any monument of ancient literature, Aristophanes alone excepted. We can see that Plato was fully alive to the wonderful variety and colour of Athenian life; but even on this ground democracy did not appear to him worthy of praise. Multiplicity and variety are the offspring of that fatal ἀνομοιότης which works ruin alike in the city and the soul (547 A note). In other respects, Plato represents democracy as a land of Hedonism, peopled by Anarchy and Waywardness, and darkened by the shadow of the Tyranny to which it must at last succumb. Nearly all the greatest writers of Greek antiquity were on the whole unfavourable to democracy, except of course the Orators: and least of all in Plato could democracy expect a champion. For the other side of the picture, we should of course take Pericles' speech in Thuc. II 35 ff. See Neil's Knights of Aristophanes pp. vii ff.

δῆλον γὰρ κτλ. It is the ἀνήρ rather than the πολιτεία which is the ultimate object of our search; but as the ἀνήρ in a democracy will be δημοκρατικός τις, we cannot understand him until we understand δημοκρατία. Hence the question ποία τις—πολιτεία. Cf. 545 B, C.

ἐλευθερίας . ἐλευθερία was the fundamental ὑπόθεσις of ancient democracy: ὑπόθεσις μὲν οὖν τῆς δημοκρατικῆς πολιτείας ἐλευθερία, says Aristotle Pol. Z 2. 1317^{a} 40. Cf. 562 B. It involves, according to Aristotle l.c., two ideas, viz. (1) τὸ ἐν μέρει ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν, (2) τὸ ζῆν ὡς βούλεταί τις (ib. 1317^{b} II). Throughout this chapter Plato illustrates the second of these characteristics. Cf. Whibley Gk Olig. pp. 33—35.

παρρησία and

ἐξουσία are democratical watchwords; see e.g. Gorg. 461 E , Eur. Hipp. 422 , Ion 671 ff., and Thuc. VII 69 ( τῆς—ἀνεπιτάκτου πᾶσιν ἐς τὴν δίαιταν ἐξουσίας) with II 37. 2 and infra 557 D, 563 E, Arist. Pol. Z 4. 1318^{b} 39 al.

ὥσπερ ἱμάτιον κτλ. For the asyndeton cf. VI 497 B note ποικίλον=‘many-coloured’ is cancelled by Herwerden and J. J. Hartman. The word is in every MS and thoroughly harmonises with Plato's characteristic fulness of style: ‘like a many-coloured garment, diversified with every shade of colour.’ In itself it is the antithesis of ἁπλοῦς, and symbolical of kaleidoscopic diversity and changefulness, just as in recent years we have heard the expression ‘Joseph's coat of many colours’ applied to a versatile and distinguished statesman. See also on 561 E. ἄνθεσι is not ‘flowers’ (as seems to be generally supposed), but ‘dyes,’ ‘colours’ (IV 429 D note): nor need πεποικιλμένη be understood of embroidery: for ποικίλλειν means no more than ‘to diversify with colours’ and implies nothing whatever as to the process: cf. II 378 C. On the verbal play in ἄνθεσι—ἤθεσι see III 406 B note For ἦν δ’ ἐγώ repeated cf. VII 522 A note

πάντα γένη κτλ. Cf. Laws 681 D πολιτείας σχῆμα—ἐν ᾦ δὴ πάντα εἴδη καὶ παθήματα πολιτειῶν καὶ ἅμα πόλεων ξυμπίπτει γίγνεσθαι. On ἐξουσίαν see 557 B note

τοῦτον ἐκλέξασθαι κτλ. Pericles (Thuc. II 37. 1) regarded the Athenian constitution as a παράδειγμα: Plato humorously describes it as a motley aggregate of παραδείγματα. Democracy is πόλεις παμπολλαί, ἀλλ’ οὐ πόλις, the different varieties of individuals living in it representing so many different constitutions. In view of 561 C we may even go farther, and say that every democratical individual is himself a kaleidoscopic succession of polities— χαμαιλέων τις καὶ σαθρῶς ἰδρυμένος (ap. Arist. Eth. Nic. I 11. 1100^{b} 6). Hence, as Plato would hold, the waywardness and instability of democratic policy, constantly reversing to-morrow what it decrees today. See Thuc. I 44, II 65, III 36 ff., IV 28 and VIII 1. Democracy in fact, from Plato's point of view, is the political expression of monochronous Hedonism: cf. 558 A and 561 C notes

ἀνάγκην . The Athenians gloried in their ἀνειμένη δίαιτα. See Thuc. II 39. 1 and Laws 642 C μόνοι γὰρ ἄνευ ἀνάγκης, αὐτοφυῶς, θείᾳ μοίρᾳ, ἀληθῶς καὶ οὔ τι πλαστῶς εἰσιν ἀγαθοί .

θεσπεσία καὶ ήδεῖα is almost a hendiadys: cf. IV 429 E note Democracy is political hedonism: see on 561 C. Hermann's θεσπεσία ὡς ἡδεῖα is inelegant and even questionable Greek: nor does θεσπεσία καὶ θεία (Stallbaum) merit praise.

τί δέ; ἡ πραότης κτλ. : ‘And is not the perfect good temper of some who have been tried exquisite? or have you never seen in such a State, when people have been condemned to death or exile, how none the less they remain and roam about in public, and the culprit saunters round as though unheeded and unseen like some spirit from another world?’ They bear the State no malice, and shew their good temper by stopping where they are—for the sentence remains unexecuted. See also App. II.

δικασθέντων has been thought to be neuter (Weil Rev. d. Phil. VIII pp. 171 ff.); but although the usage of the word in other passages of Plato ( Critias 120 C, Laws 867 E, infra X 614 D, Crit. 50 B , Gorg. 523 C and elsewhere) favours this view, it yields no satisfactory sense, and πραότης is an attribute of persons rather than of things. The perfect passive—it is not the middle—of δικάζω is similarly used of persons in Lysias 21. 18 αἰσχρὰς δίκας δεδίκασμαι. The circumstances of Socrates' own imprisonment after his condemnation illustrate, though only imperfectly, what is said here, for the Athenians were not careful to prevent him from escaping: see Crit. passim and my Introduction to that dialogue pp. ix f.

ἀνθρώπων κτλ. The construction is extremely irregular. Perhaps the simplest and least unsatisfactory solution is to make καταψηφισθέντων a genitive absolute and regard μενόντων etc. as attracted by ἀνθρώπων καταψηφισθέντων (so also J. and C.). See App. II.

θανάτου ἢ φυγῆς κτλ. For the genitive Kühner ( Gr. Gr. II p. 332) compares θανάτου κρίνεσθαι, ὑπάγεσθαι and the like, in which δίκην is probably understood. The genitive of the penalty seems not to occur elsewhere with καταψηφί‐ ζεσθαι, and we should perhaps, read θάνατον ἢ φυγήν. The pronoun αὐτῶν is half pleonastic: cf. IV 428 A note

καὶ ὡς κτλ. The change from plural to singular (cf. 1 347 A note) “rem magis insignem et imaginem evidentiorem reddit” (Schneider). The same effect is produced by making the clause independent—a common transition, for examples of which see Engelhardt Anac. Pl. Spec. III pp. 41—43.

περινοστεῖ κτλ. : i.e. ἀπὸ τόπου εἰς τόπον μεταβαίνει κτλ. (Schol. on Ar. Plut. 121 ). The word has a contemptuous ring—a rolling stone gathers no moss— and suggests a vagrant or loafer. Cf. Ar. l.c. and ib. 494 ἢν γὰρ ὁ Πλοῦτος νυνὶ βλέψῃ καὶ μὴ τυφλὸς ὢν περινοστῇ, with Lucian Tim. 24 ἄνω καὶ κάτω πλανῶμαι περινοστῶν. The comparison ὥσπερ ἥρως is suggested by ὁρῶντος οὐδενός. They excite no more notice and remark than an invisible ἥρως or circumambient spirit of one who has joined the happy or unhappy dead: see Rohde Psyche^{2} I pp. 146 ff. and especially p. 182 notes, or Roscher Lex. d. Myth. s.v. Heros. Weil ( Rev. d. Phil. VIII pp. 171 ff.) seems to think there is a specific reference to such an invisible hero as sometimes rendered service in battle (cf. Paus. III 19. 12 with Frazer's note, and Hdt. VIII 64); but Plato's language is quite general. The meaning cannot be ‘parades like a hero’ (as Jowett translates), for ἥρως is not thus used in Greek, and a parading hero always excites popular attention. J. and C. think ‘there is an implied allusion to the νόστοι. “He is welcomed wherever he goes like one of the heroes returning from the siege of Troy”.’ But what of οὔτε φροντίζοντος οὔτε ὁρῶντος οὐδενός? It may be noted that the superstition of which Plato here avails himself was widely prevalent in Greece as elsewhere. Hence some of the Pythagoreans asserted ψυχὴν ε<*>ναι τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ξύσματα (Arist. de An. I 2. 404^{a} 18), and commanded τὰ πίπτοντα ἀπὸ τῆς τραπέζης μὴ ἀναιρεῖσθαι (Mullach Fr. Phil. Gr. I p. 507)—a precept on which Diogenes Laertius remarks Ἀριστοφάνης δὲ τῶν ἡρώων φησὶν εἶναι τὰ πίπτοντα (VIII 34). The famous passage in Cor. I 11. 10 looks like a relic of some similar idea. Cf. also Phaed. 81 C , Zeller^{5} I p. 452 notes, Rohde Psyche^{2} II pp. 320 note 1, 346 ff. notes, 361 notes, and Dieterich Nekyia pp. 88 f. notes For other views on the whole of this difficult sentence see App. II.

καὶ πολλούς γε . The reply differs somewhat in form from the question: cf. V 465 E note It is difficult not to believe that Plato is exaggerating, although the frequency of the δίκη <*>ξούλης in Athens shews that in civil cases at all events it was often far from easy to enforce the verdict.

συγγνώμη : ‘considerateness,’ viz. in making allowance for want of education in their demagogues, as the rest of the sentence shews. The irony is of the truly Platonic kind. Jowett's “forgiving spirit” misses the point.

σμικρολογία κτλ. : ‘haggling about trifles’ etc., like education, forsooth ! ἐλέγομεν refers to IV 424 E ff. and VI 492 E.

καταπατήσασα κτλ. Cf. Gorg. 484 A . The reading αὐτά for ταῦτα—see cr. n.—is intrinsically weak, and has no MS support except A. On ἐξ ὁποίων κτλ. see VI 488 B note

γενναία . γενναῖα—see cr. n.—is much less elegant, in spite of the exclamatory anacoluthon ὡς μεγαλοπρεπῶς κτλ. See on V 465 E. Apelt strangely suggests ἔφη. Γενναῖα ταῦτά τε κτλ. ( Fleck. Jb. for 1893, p. 556).

ἄλλα ἀδελφά . It is remarkable that Plato says nothing of ψηφίσματα, which were regarded as an essential feature of advanced democracy: see Arist. Pol. Δ 4. 1292^{a} 19 and Gilbert Beitr. zur innern Gesch. Ath. etc. pp. 79 ff.

ἡδεῖα κτλ. True political equality, according to Plato, is γεωμετρικὴ ἰσότης, which τῷ μὲν—μείζονι πλείω, τῷ δ’ ἐλάττονι σμικρότερα νέμει ( Laws 757 C and Gorg. 508 A ): ἀριθμητικὴ ἰσότης, which is the democratic principle, is a spurious kind of equality, not κατὰ φύσιν: τοῖς γὰρ ἀνίσοις τὰ ἴσα ἄνισα γίγνοιτ’ ἄν, εἰ μὴ τυγχάνοι τοῦ μέτρου ( Laws 757 A). Cf. Isocr. Nicocles 14 and Arist. Pol. Γ 9. 1280^{a} 11 ff., with other passages cited by Henkel Gr. Lehre vom Staat p. 154 note 63.

βίᾳ δὴ κτλ. The description is interrupted by the digression on Desire: hence the anacoluthon.

οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι . See 554 A note

ἵνα μὴ σκοτεινῶς κτλ. It becomes important at this stage to investigate the subject of the Desires, because τὸ <*>πιθυμητικόν in the widest sense is the psychological basis of the democratical as well as of the oligarchical character. Plato's complete classification distinguishes between (1) necessary desires, (2) not-necessary, (3) not-necessary and παράνομοι (IX 571 B). The ὀλιγαρχικός is the embodiment of (1): the δημοκρατικός of (1) and (2) equally (561 A ff.): the τυραννικός of (3). Cf. IX 571 A note If we translate παράνομοι by ‘unnatural’ (as in view of IX 571 C ff. we are justified in doing: cf. IX 571 B note), Plato's account becomes almost identical with that of Epicurus, who classified Desires as (1) natural and necessary, (2) natural and not-necessary, (3) neither natural nor necessary. For the authorities see Usener Epicurea pp. 78, 294. Cf. also Athen. XII 511 E.

ἄν . See cr. n., and for the loss of ἄν before ἀναγκαῖαι IV 437 B note

ὅσαι ‐‐ ἡμᾶς . As Aristotle would say, those also are ἀναγκαῖαι <*>ν ἄνευ τὸ ἀγαθὸν μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἢ εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι ( Met. Δ 5. 1015^{a} 22).

τούτων ‐‐ ἀνάγκη justifies the appellation ἀναγκαῖαι. The pronoun τούτων is used somewhat vaguely, and denotes not the desires themselves, but their objects. Cf. 543 C note

τῆ φύσει . It follows that no desires which are necessary can be unnatural: see Epicurus referred to on 558 D.

καὶ πρός : ‘and which moreover’ (“idem est quod καὶ προσέτι, ac praeterea, atque insuper” Stallbaum). Two kinds of necessary desires were distinguished viz. (1) ἃς—ἀποτρέψαι, (2) ὅσαι—ἡμᾶς. Corresponding to this, which is not of course a mutually exclusive, division, Plato emphasises two distinct features of unnecessary desires: so that καὶ πρός (‘and which moreover,’ or according to the Greek idiom, ‘and these moreover’: see on II 357 B) is altogether appropriate. Cf. (with Stallbaum) Euthyd. 298 D and Blaydes on Ar. Knights 578 . Schneider takes πρὸς οὐδέν together (“nullius rei habita ratione”), but οὐδὲν cannot easily be separated from ἀγαθόν, unless we read <οὐδὲν> πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀγαθόν, as I formerly suggested. I have no longer any doubt that Stallbaum's view is right. Ast's conjecture πρὸς οὐδέν) is refuted by Schneider.

αὐτοῦ σίτου : ‘merely of food,’ as opposed to e.g. pleasant food, sweet food ( τῶν τοιῶνδε σιτίων in Epicurus: Usener Epic. p. 295). See in particular IV 437 D —439 A notes

ἡ μέν γε κτλ. On γε see 556 A note and Neil's Appendix on γε in his edition of Ar. Knights p. 192. The words ᾗ τε—δυνατή should be explained as follows. Hunger, which is the desire of σῖτος, ‘is capable of putting an end to life’: i.e. it must be gratified ( οὐκ ἂν οἷοί τ’ εἶμεν ἀποτρέψαι 558 D), or else we die. On this ground, and also because it is ὠφέλιμος (i.e. ἀποτελουμένη ὠφελεῖ ἡμᾶς 558 E), we pronounce it an ἀναγκαία ἐπιθυμία. The Greek is terse but not obscure. With παῦσαι ζῶντα cf. Gorg. 523 C , D and Menex. 241 B . Jowett thinks the expression ‘very strange’ for ἀποκτιννύναι. It is strictly accurate: the sword kills, but hunger παύει ζῶντα: we merely ‘cease to live.’ Other views on this passage are discussed in App. III.

ἀλλοίων ‐‐ ἢ τοιούτων : “alius generis—quam quales modo diximus” (Stallbaum).

χρηματιστικὰς ‐‐ χρησίμους : ‘money-making or productive, because useful in production.’ Plato more suo σοφίζεται περὶ τὸ ὄνομα (VI 509 D note).

οὕτω δή : they also are ἀναλωτικαί. Epicurus l.c. describes ἡ τῶν ἀφροδισίων ἐπιθυμία as φυσικὴ μέν, οὐκ ἀναγκαία δέ.

νῦν δή . 552 C ff., 555 E ff.

πάλιν τοίνυν κτλ. Plato's description of the genesis of the democratical man is one of the most royal and magnificent pieces of writing in the whole range of literature, whether ancient or modern. Throughout most of this chapter, in the words of Longinus, the style πλουσιώτατα καθάπερ τι πέλαγος εἰς ἀναπεπταμένον κέχυται—μέγεθος ( περὶ ὕψους 12. 2), and no better example will ever be discovered of that full tide of lofty thoughts and images and words—a tide ‘too full for sound and foam’—in which the author of the treatise On the Sublime places the essence of <*>ψος. We owe to Longinus what is by far the best appreciation of Plato's hierophantic vein: see especially cc. 33—36, where we can hear more than a mere echo of that sublimity which is itself, according to Longinus, the ‘echo of high-mindedness’ ( ὕψος μεγαλοφροσύνης ἀπήχημα ib. 9. 2). For a very different estimate the student may be referred to Dionysius of Halicarnassus ( ad Cn. Pomp. Gem. 753—765 Reiske), whose pedantic criticisms make it tolerably plain that a study of the Attic orators does not qualify a man to sit in judgment upon Plato. The present episode is hardly less remarkable for psychological insight than for elevation of style, and the description of the democratic man as the chameleon of human society paints him for all time (561 C ff.). As a representation of actual fact, the picture is doubtless somewhat exaggerated, as usual; but it is extraordinarily vivid and powerful, and shews that the Platonic analogy between the individual and the State may prove in the hands of a master an admirable clue whereby to unravel the workings of the human soul in the individual as well as in the State.

νῦν δὴ κτλ. See 558 C, D. With ἀπαιδεύτως cf. 552 E note

κηφήνων κτλ. It is clear from the summary of this passage in IX 572 C συγγενόμενος δὲ κομψοτέροις ἀνδράσι καὶ μεστοῖς ὧν ἄρτι διήλθομεν ἐπιθυμιῶν that κηφήνων and αἴθωσι θηρσὶ καὶ δεινοῖς refer to human drones, and not to the κηφηνώδεις ἐπιθυμίαι in the young man's heart. αἴθωσι ‘furious,’ ‘wild’ (Jebb on Soph. Ajax 221 ) shews that the drones are of the ‘stinging’ order (552 C ff., 555 D ff.).

ὀλιγαρχίας ‐‐ δημοκρατίαν . See cr. n. Schneider defends the MSS by explaining μεταβολὴ ὀλιγαρχική as “ea quae ad ὀλιγαρχίαν pertinet eamque efficit,” and referring τῆς ἐν ἑαυτῷ “ad ipsam ὀλιγαρχίαν in adjectivo latentem.” δημοκρατικήν he thinks is written for δημοκρατίαν by a sort of attraction. This explanation is much too difficult and obscure. Nor can ὀλιγαρχικῆς by itself stand for ὀλιγαρχικῆς πολιτείας, at all events in this connexion. The MS reading can only mean ‘of the oligarchical change within himself into a democratical,’ an expression which bears no sense. I formerly wrote ὀλιγαρχικοῦ τοῦ—δημοκρατικόν, comparing 559 E, 560 A; but it may fairly be objected that the ‘oligarchical element’ within the man does not change into a democratical: it is the government that changes. For this reason I now prefer my old suggestion ( Cl. Rev. IV p. 357), although the corruption of ὀλιγαρχικοῦ — δημοκρατικόν is perhaps somewhat easier to explain. For the combination of genitives cf. V 449 A note An alternative solution would be to insert πολιτείας after ἑαυτῷ. This gives excellent sense, but it is difficult to assign a plausible reason for the loss of πολιτείας in all our MSS. I am unable to resist the conclusion that the text is corrupt, otherwise I should not venture to make any alteration. If Plato did not write the passage as it is printed above, there can be little doubt that πολιτείας has accidentally disappeared.

μετέβαλλε κτλ. See 556 E. τῷ ἑτέρῳ τῶν means of course τῷ ἑτέρῳ εἴδει τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν.

τῷ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὀλιγαρχικῷ : ‘the oligarchical element within one.’ ἑαυτῷ is ‘oneself’: cf. III 407 C μελέτας πρὸς ἑαυτόν. ἐν αὐτῷ, which Ast adopted (after Stephanus), would be easier; but I think Plato means to suggest that the oligarchical element present in this νεανίας is a universal feature of the human race. J. and C. think ἐκείνῳ and ἑαυτῷ may have changed places—a conjecture which is surely too bold. Schneider, taking ἑαυτῷ as ‘himself’ and not ‘oneself,’ compares ἐν αὐτῷ πρὸς αὑτόν below and αὐτῷ—ἐν ἑαυτῷ in 559 D, E; but here there is nothing corresponding to the αὐτῷ in each of these passages, and ἑαυτῷ cannot therefore be translated in Schneider's way.

στάσις κτλ. Cf. 556 E, 557 A. On the tense of ὑπεχώρησε and the other aorists throughout this passage see 548 D note

τινες ‐‐ αἱ μὲν κτλ. Cf. IV 431 A note The words διεφθάρησαν—ἐξέπεσον correspond to ἀποκτείνωσι—ἐκβάλωσι in 557 A. Madvig's διετράπησαν is an unlucky venture.

ἀνεπιστημοσύνην ‐‐ πατρός : the father is himself ἀπαίδευτος (552 E note), and the ἀπαίδευτος cannot παιδεύειν. On the genitives see V 449 A note

τὰς αὐτὰς ὁμιλίας κτλ. The reference in τὰς αὐτάς is to ξυγγένηται—δεινοῖς 559 D. Ast's conjecture τὰς αὑταῖς ὁμιλίας is wrong in point of sense. λάθρᾳ ξυγγιγνόμεναι: viz. with the desires of the ‘drones’: see 559 D.

ἐν ἀνδρῶν κτλ. The stately cadence is worthy of the theme: cf. τὴν— τέλεσι 560 E, and see the remarks of Longinus on rhythm and the arrangement of words as an element of ὕψος ( περὶ ὔψους 39 ff.).

ἀναδραμόντες κατέσχον : ‘ran up and seized.’ ἀναδραμόντες preserves the metaphor in ἀκρόπολιν (560 B).

εἰς ‐‐ Λωτοφάγους : ‘to those Lotos-eaters' land.’ ἐκείνους refers to κηφήνων 559 D. The figure is strikingly appropriate, for the lotos-flower of sensual indulgence makes man, who is an οὐράνιον φυτόν (Clem. Alex. Cohort. ad Gent. 96 A ed. Migne, following Plato Tim. 90 A ), forget ‘the imperial palace whence he came.’ Cf. VII 519 A, B notes, and (for Λωτοφάγοι) Luc. Salt. 2-4, Anth. Pal. XV 12. 8 μισῶ Λωτοφάγων γλυκερὴν λιπόπατριν ἐδωδήν (with reference to Epicureanism).

φανερῶς κατοικεῖ : no longer λάθρᾳ (560 B). He glories in his shame. Herwerden's κατοικεῖ <ἐκεῖ> in place of κατοικεῖ is wholly unnecessary and spoils the rhythm.

τοῦ βασιλικοῦ τείχους : i.e. the wall enclosing the ἀκρόπολις (560 B), where the soul's king or ruling power inhabits.

οὔτε πρέσβεις κτλ. : ‘nor admit an embassy of wise words spoken by private persons of maturer years.’ The contrast is between the ξυμμαχία itself, consisting of the λόγοι of οἰκεῖοι, and ‘ambassador-words’ of ἰδιῶται, i.e. men who take no part in public or official life. Their representations would serve as ambassadors to those of the οἰκεῖοι, whether the οἰκεῖοι inspire them or not. It has often been pointed out that Plato is thinking of Alcibiades in various parts of this description (see e.g. Steinhart Einleitung pp. 239, 698 note 238), Susemihl Gen. Entw. II p. 233 and Herwerden Mnem. XIX p. 337); and here, I believe, he has in mind the efforts of Socrates to reclaim him. Cf. VI 494 D note and especially Symp. 215 D ff. <*>πρεσβύτερος with reference to Socrates see ἀγαθοῖς καὶ πρεσβυτέροις III 409 C note; and for ἰδιώτης as applied to him, Apol. 32 E — 33 B. The order and rhythm, as in ἐν ἀνδρῶν θεοφιλῶν εἰσι διανοίαις above, is in keeping with the stately and sonorous eloquence of the whole passage: cf. IX 573 D. On Badham's conjecture δἰ ὤτων for ἰδιωτῶν see App. IV.

μαχόμενοι : viz. with τὸ φειδωλόν (560 C).

αἰδῶ . See 560 A. With what follows cf. Thuc. III 82. 4 ff. and Isocr. Areop. 20, Panath. 131 (Dümmler's Chron. Beiträge pp. 15 ff.).

σωφροσύνην κτλ. Thuc. l.c. τὸ δὲ σῶφρον τοῦ ἀνάνδρου πρόσχημα. Cf. Eur. Phoen. 509 ἀνανδρία γὰρ τὸ πλέον ὅστις ἀπολέσας | τοὔλασσον ἔλαβε. It is probable that Plato had Thucydides in his mind: see Susemihl Gen. Entw. II p. 234.

μετά : ‘with the aid of’ ( in Vereinigung mit, Schneider).

καθήραντες κτλ. The imagery is borrowed from the Eleusinian rites. On the first day of the Greater Mysteries, which was called ἅλαδε μύσται, took place the cleansing of the μύσται in the sea: cf. Mommsen Feste d. Stadt Ath. p. 207 note 2. κατεχομένου is used as in Men. 99 D κατεχομένους ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ.

μεγάλοισι τέλεσι κτλ. The archaic termination in μεγάλοισι adds solemnity: see on I 330 B. λαμπράς = ‘in a blaze of light.’ Plato's language would suggest to an Athenian the brilliant scene on the evening of the Iacchus-day, when the ‘procession following the figure of Iacchus transformed itself into a λαμπαδηφορίἀ (Mommsen l.c. p. 229): cf. Ar. Frogs 340 ff. ἔγειρε φλογέας λαμπάδας ἐν χερσὶ τινάσσων Ἴακχ’ , ὦ Ἴακχε. The exiled ὕβρις etc. are conducted home like Iacchus to Eleusis. In χοροῦ there is an allusion to the χορὸς μυστῶν .

μεγαλοπρέπειαν . See on VI 486 A.

τοῦ ‐‐ τρεφομένου . Masculine, not neuter.

τὴν ‐‐ ἄνεσιν . I formerly read εἰς τὴν (with ΠΞ and many other MSS) instead of τήν, but now believe that A is right. “Non est idem, εἰς δημοκρατικὸν μεταβάλλειν, et τὴν—ἐλευθέρωσιν μεταβάλλειν. Hoc prius, illud posterius, haec via, ille finis est” (Schneider). If Plato had written εἰς, it should have been followed by an accusative masculine, contrasting with ἐκ τοῦ—τρεφομένου, as in 553 A εἰς ὀλιγαρχικὸν ἐκ τοῦ τιμοκρατικοῦ ἐκείνου μεταβάλλει. For the use of μεταβάλλει cf. (with Schneider) IV 424 C et al. With the force of ἄνεσιν cf. IX 575 A ( ἀνεθέντα) and 590 A.

εὐτυχὴς ᾖ =‘if he is fortunate’ is much better than εὐτυχήσῃ (Cobet), which would mean ‘if he becomes fortunate.’ Cf. IX 578 C note

ἀλλά τι κτλ. : ‘but, owing also in some measure to the influence of years, when the tumult of the soul has mostly passed’ etc. Cf. I 329 C. Plato means that good fortune does something, and growing age the rest.

εἰς ἴσον κτλ. Pleasures are regarded by the δημοκρατικὸς ἀνήρ as individual men are regarded by the δημοκρατικὴ πολιτεία (557 A, 558 C notes): they are all equal. For ὥσπερ λαχούσῃ see on 557 A. ἕως ἂν πληρωθῇ means ‘till he’ (not ‘it,’ as D. and V. etc.) ‘is filled.’ Sensual pleasures πληροῦσι because they are πληρώσεις: cf. Phil. 35 D ff. This is the χαραδριοῦ βίος so powerfully described in Gorg. 493 A —494 D.

τὸ φρούριον κτλ. The φρούριον is the ἀκρόπολις of 560 B. With ἐάν τις λέγῃ κτλ. cf. Gorg. 495 A ff.

διαζῇ κτλ. The δημοκρατικός, like the State of which he is the counterpart, is a living example of the Cyrenaic cult of μονόχρονος ἡδονή: see 557 A, D, notes and RP.^{7} 207 B, 211. Steinhart ( Einleitung p. 698 note 239) with much probability thinks that the portrait is drawn from Alcibiades, whose ἦθος (says Plut. Alc. 2. 1) πολλὰς—ἀνομοιότητας καὶ πρὸς αὑτὸ μεταβολὰς ἐπεδείξατο. Cf. Eur. Hipp. 1115 —1117 ῥᾴδια δ’ ἤθεα τὸν αὔριον | μεταβαλλομένα χρόνον ἀεὶ | βίον ξυνευτυχοίην, and (with Nettleship Lect. and Rem. II p. 311 note) the striking parallel in Dryden's Absalom and Achitophel 545 ff. On ἀνομοιότης as marking decay in men and cities see 547 A, 557 A notes

οὔτε τις τάξις κτλ. “The absence of principle, he, like the democratic state, makes into a principle” (Nettleship l.c. II p. 310). On οὔτε ἀνάγκη see 557 E note, and on ήδύν 561 C note

ἰσονομικοῦ : ‘to whom all laws are equal.’ ‘Equal laws’ ( ἰσονομία) was the proud claim of democracy (Hdt. III 80, Bergk Poet. Lyr. Gr.^{4} III Scol. 12). The δημοκρατικός practises what he preaches ὡς ἀληθῶς—by impartially ignor ing every law ! For the etymological figure cf. II 376 B note

παντοδαπόν τε καὶ ‐‐ μεστόν . Richards proposes to write the genitive, remarking “surely the words are parallel to ἰσονομικοῦ.” Logically they are, but grammatically they need not be, for the life of an ἰσονομικὸς ἀνήρ is of course ἰσονομικός. With πλείστων ἠθῶν cf. πᾶσιν ἤθεσι πεποικιλμένη 557 C.

καὶ τὸν καλόν τε κτλ. lit.: ‘and that this man is the beautiful and manycoloured man, as the city described above’ (was the beautiful and manycoloured city). “Sunt diversa hominum et civitatum genera, unum simplex ac rectum, alterum duplex, aliud multiplex et varium. Qui primo accensendus est, ὁ ἁπλοῦς, qui alteri, ὁ διπλοῦς, hic vero ὁ καλός τε καὶ ποικίλος audit” (Schneider). Thus understood the article is strictly to the point, and there is no reason for writing τῶν καλῶν τε καὶ ποικίλων with Vind. B and W. H. Thompson. On ποικίλον see 557 C note It is worthy of remark that Clement interprets Joseph's ‘coat of many colours’ in the Old Testament as symbolical of desire: εἴη δ’ ἂν ἐπιθυμία ποικίλον ἔνδυμα ( Strom. V 8. 84 C ed. Migne).

ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν . See 557 C, with which and 557 D the words ὂν πολλοί κτλ. are also in close correspondence.

ἡ καλλίστη κτλ. As Oligarchy fell a victim to the excessive pursuit of its ideal, viz. Wealth, so also the extravagant devotion to liberty and equality subverts in course of time the democratic State. In 562 A—565 D Plato puts before us the different stages in the fall of democracy: cf. Arist. Pol. Δ 4 1291^{b} 30—1292^{a} 38, where the various εἴδ<*>ς δημοκρατίας are distinguished, and Newman The Politics of Aristotle IV pp. xxxvi—lxi. Plato's description, as usual, can be illustrated in many places from Greek and especially Athenian political and social life: see 562 D, E, 563 B, C, D al. notes

γίγνεται =‘prodit,’ ‘quaerentibus se offert’ (Schneider). Cf. III 412 C οἱ δὲ γεωργῶν ἄριστοι ἆρ’ οὐ γεωργικώτατοι γίγνονται, Euthyd. 298 E ὥστε σὸς πατὴρ γίγνεται ὁ κύων καὶ σὺ κυναρίων ἀδελφός, infra 566 A, IX 576 B and Prot. 325 B with my note ad loc. ‘What,’ asks Socrates, ‘do we find to be the character of tyranny? As for its origin, it is pretty obvious that tyranny comes from democracy.’ For the order of questions cf. 558 C. The words ὅτι μὲν γὰρ κτλ., when taken in connexion with the preceding question, seem at first sight to suggest that the μεταβολή will not be described: but cf. V 466 D, where μὲν γὰρ is used in exactly the same way, and followed by a full account of the topic to which its clause refers. See also App. V.

ἆρ’ οὖν κτλ. begins a long description of the τρόπος τῆς γενέσεως: the τρόπος τῆς πολιτείας is not described till 566 D ff. Here again the situation in V 466 D is nearly, though not quite, analogous: see note ad loc. For other views on this passage consult App. V.

προὔθεντο : sc. the citizens of the oligarchical State. Stallbaum reads προὔθετο, on inferior MS authority; but the plural is easy enough: cf. 550 D.

καὶ δἰ ὃ κτλ. explains and amplifies ὃ—ἀγαθόν. Wealth is the cause of oligarchy, that ‘on account of’ which it was established: cf. 550 D ff., 551 C, 555 B ( τοῦ προκειμένου ἀγαθοῦ). The reading δἰ οὗ (see cr. n.) would make wealth the means or instrument in producing the result, and this it was not, except in the loose sense in which the προκείμενον ἀγαθόν is also a means. I formerly conjectured δἰ ὃ αὖ ( Cl. Rev. IV p. 357), but αὖ is unsuitable. For the corruption in the MSS see note on διὰ τοῦτο X 610 D. Jowett wrongly translates καθίστατο by ‘was maintained.’

πλοῦτος . See cr. n. The majority of editors reject ὑπέρπλουτος: rightly, for the word is not used except as an adjective. A host of emendations has been suggested, ὁ πέρα πλοῦτος (Richter Fleck. Jb. 1867 p. 146), ὑπέρπλουτος <πλοῦτος> (Stallbaum), ὑπὲρ πλούτου (Madvig—but the use of ὑπέρ is not above suspicion), που πλοῦτος (Campbell), ὑπερπλουτεῖν (apud J. and C.), εἴπερ τι, πλοῦτος (Apelt Berl. Phil. Woch. 1895 p. 968). Stephanus' conjecture γίγνεσθαι ὑπέρπλουτον was adopted by Ast. The expression ὑπέρπλουτος πλοῦτος occurs in Joan. Damasc. III 733 A ed. Migne, but in a highly rhetorical passage and without any reference to Plato. It is probably best to read πλοῦτος, with Schneider and Hermann. ὑπέρπλουτος may have originally been a marginal note intended to recall ὑπέρπλουτοι in 552 B.

ἀπώλλυ . 555 C—557 A.

ἐλευθερίαν . See 557 B note

ἀκούσαις ‐‐ ἐλεύθερος rings like an echo from some of the panegyrists of Athens: cf. Eur. Ion 669 —675 with Menex. 239 A ff. and Thuc. II 37. 2.

ἔχει ‐‐ κάλλιστον (sc. ἡ δημοκρατουμένη πόλις)=‘is its fairest possession,’ not ‘it has this in the highest perfection’ (as suggested in J. and C.).

προστατούντων . See on 565 C.

ἂν μὴ ‐‐ ὀλιγαρχικούς . For a striking example see the account of the proceedings after Arginusae in Xen. Hell. I 7. 12 —15.

μέχρι τῶν θηρίων . See on 563 C, D.

πατέρα μὲν κτλ. Cf. Laws 701 B, [Xen.] Rep. Ath. I 8—12 and Mem. III 5. 15, 16 (Hermann Gesch. u. System d. Pl. Phil. p. 91).

ξυγκαθιέντες . V 467 B note

τὸ δέ γε κτλ. ‘But the extremest amount of freedom which appears in such a city is when’ etc.: lit. ‘the extreme of the amount of freedom’ etc. τὸ—ἔσχατον is the subject to something like ἐστιν or γίγνεται understood: cf. such idioms as οὗ τοι ἕνεκα ἠρόμην—ὅτι κτλ. I 330 B, where see note. The sentence is not exclamatory, as some have supposed. With πλήθους ἐλευθερίας cf. πολλὴν—τὴν ἐλευθερίαν 562 D, and (for πλῆθος) IX 591 E ( πλῆθος οὐσίας), Laws XI 913 D, Theaet. 158 D ( πλῆθος χρόνου) and Dem. Phil. IV 2. This explanation is that of Schneider, and indubitably right. The English editors and translators make τοῦ πλήθους depend on ἐλευθερίας: but “servi servaeque non sunt pars τοῦ πλήθους,” and ὅσον—πόλει is not easily either separated from πλήθους or connected with ἔσχατον.

ὅταν ‐‐ πριαμένων . Cf. [Xen.] Rep. Ath. I. 10 ff. τῶν δούλων δ’ αὖ καὶ τῶν μετοίκων πλείστη ἐστὶν Ἀθήνῃσιν ἀκολασία, καὶ οὔτε πατάξαι ἔξεστιν αὐτόθι, οὔτε ὑπεκστήσεταί σοι ὁ δοῦλος κτλ. In Arist. Pol. E 11. 1313^{b} 35 δούλων ἄνεσις is said to be a symptom of extreme democracy.

ἐν γυναιξὶ κτλ. Arist. l.c. goes farther and speaks of a γυναικοκρατία περὶ τὰς οἰκίας. A German critic characteristically sees an ‘admirable’ illustration of Plato's remarks in the social life “jenes transatlantischen Staatvereins” (Steinhart Einleitung p. 243). Some have accused Plato of already forgetting the liberalism of Book V (Krohn Pl. St. p. 214): but an ideal city is one thing, and a lawless democracy another; and corruptio optimi, in the relations between the sexes, as in other cases, may well be pessima.

ὅ τι νῦν ‐‐ στόμα : “‘what rose to our lips just now, whatever it be,’ as Aeschylus observes.” See Aesch. Frag. 337 Dindorf=334 Nauck. The reference in νῦν, which here as in some other places (III 414 B note) has the meaning of ‘just now,’ is to 562 E καὶ τελευτᾶν μέχρι τῶν θηρίων τὴν ἀναρχίαν ἐμφυομένην. Nauck restores the fragment of Aeschylus in the form ὅτι νυν ἦλθ’ ἐπὶ στόμα: but the enclitic is unpleasing, and as ὅτι is absent from the other two places where the quotation occurs (Plat. Amat. 763 B , Them. Or. IV 52 B) Aeschylus probably wrote νῦν γὰρ ἦλθ’ ἐπὶ στόμα (‘just come to my lips’) or something of the sort. With the general sense cf. III 394 D. Similar expressions in Greek literature are collected by Schaefer on Dion. Hal. de comp. verb. pp. 12, 13. Jackson ingeniously proposes to connect the present passage with Arist. Eth. Nic. III 2. 1111^{a} 9 ff., where he conjectures οἷον λέγοντές φασιν ἐκπεσεῖν αὑτοὺς ἃ (for ἢ) οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι ἀπόρρητα ἦν, ὥσπερ Αἰσχύλος τὰ μυστικά ( Proceedings of the Camb. Phil. Soc. XIII 8 and Journal of Philology XXVII p. 159 f.). “Is it possible” he asks “that the phrase ἦλθ’ ἐπὶ στόμα is a proverbial survival of the plea urged by Aeschylus in plain prose on the occasion referred to in the Ethics?” I think an Athenian speaking in plain prose would have said ἦλθεν ἐπὶ στόμα or ἐπὶ τὸ στόμα, not ἦλθ’ ἐπὶ στόμα. The elision is tragic.

οὕτω : i.e. in the spirit of the Aeschylean phrase: the idea occurred to me, and it shall out, though never so extravagant and absurd!

ἐλευθερώτερα . For the concord cf. Phil. 45 E and Laws 657 D (Ast).

τὴν παροιμίαν . The proverb was οἵαπερ ἡ δέσποινα, τοία χἀ κύων (Schol.), and meant <*>τι ὁποία δέσποινα, τοιαύτη καὶ ἡ θεραπαινίς ‘like mistress, like maid.’ Plato takes κύων literally: hence ἀτεχνῶς. See Leutsch und Schneidewin Paroem. Gr. II p. 44. The traveller in modern Greece will remember the ‘democratic dogs’ of Peloponnesian villages.

γίγνονταί τε δὴ κτλ. : ‘aye, and there arise both horses and asses’ etc. This explanation—Jowett's—catches the mock-heroic humour of the passage and is at the same time easier grammatically than to supply, with Schneider, οἷοίπερ οἱ δεσπόται or, with Campbell, ἐλεύθεροι or the like. There is no ground for suspecting the text as some have done. Plato's humorous description brings vividly before us the anarchical condition of the Athenian streets. Foot-passengers have a poor time of it where the very beasts of burden forsooth are tainted with the spirit of democracy! “The regulation of traffic,” remarks Bosanquet, perhaps a little sententiously, “is in some degree a real test of social order.” No doubt this is what Plato means.

ἐμβάλλοντες κτλ. See the amusing and characteristic anecdote about Alcibiades' childhood in Plut. Alc. 2. 4 μικρὸς ὢν ἔπαιζεν ἀστραγάλοις ἐν τῷ στενωπῷ, τῆς δὲ βολῆς καθηκούσης εἰς αὐτὸν ἅμαξα φορτίων ἐπῄει. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἐκέλευε περιμεῖναι τὸν ἄγοντα τὸ ζεῦγος· ὑπέπιπτε γὰρ ἡ βολὴ τῇ παρόδῳ τῆς ἁμάξης· μὴ πειθομένου δὲ δἰ ἀγροικίαν, ἀλλ’ ἐπάγοντος, οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι παῖδες διέσχον, ὁ δ’ Ἀλκιβιάδης καταβαλὼν ἐπὶ στόμα πρὸ τοῦ ζεύγους καὶ παρατείνας ἑαυτὸν ἐκέλευεν οὕτως, εἰ βούλεται, διεξελθεῖν, ὥστε τὸν μὲν ἄνθρωπον ἀνακροῦσαι τὸ ζεῦγος ὀπίσω δείσαντα, τοὺς δ’ ἰδόντας ἐκπλαγῆναι καὶ μετὰ βοῆς συνδραμεῖν πρὸς αὐτον .

τὸ ἐμόν γ) ‐‐ ὄναρ is manifestly proverbial (Schneider). For ὄναρ cf. Charm. 173 A ἄκουε δὴ—τὸ ἐμὸν ὄναρ and Theaet. 201 E .

αὐτὸς γὰρ κτλ. ‘I frequently experience what you describe when I am on my way to the country,’ sc. through the congested streets of Athens. Jowett's ‘when I take a country walk’ is hardly accurate. The present πορευόμενος should be taken in its full force.

κἂν ὁτιοῦν κτλ. If the middle is to be pressed, we must translate: ‘if any man applies to himself the very least degree of slavery’ etc. That is to say, they are so sensitive that they cannot bear to see any one making himself even a willing slave. In the sacred name of Freedom, Democracy, which is now on the verge of Tyranny, puts freedom down. The sentiment is perhaps a little exaggerated, but otherwise suitable enough; only we should rather have expected Plato to express this meaning by αὐτὸς α<*>τῷ προσφέρῃ. If there were any well-authenticated examples of the middle of προσφέρειν used for the active, it would be better to construe προσφέρηται as if it were προσφέρῃ, and suppose that the slavery is applied to others: but the instances of προσφέρεσθαι= προσφέρειν in Stephanus-Hase s. v. are either dubious or from late authors. The syllable ‐ται at the end of a line is sometimes abbreviated in uncial MSS (see Bond and Thompson Public. of the Pal. Soc. I Plate 106), and this fact lends additional plausibility to W. H. Thompson's conjecture, that we should write προσφέρῃ for προσφέρηται. I once proposed τισί, and the proposal is approved by a critic in Hermathena XXIV p. 252. The citizens become so sensitive that the least degree of pressure applied to any section of them rouses them all. Meantime, as neither of these conjectures is quite convincing, I have retained the MS reading pro tempore, although I think Thompson's conjecture represents what Plato meant to say.

τελευτῶντες γὰρ κτλ. There is steady deterioration; and the last stage of democracy is the worst. Aristotle holds the same opinion: see Pol. Δ 6. 1293^{a} 1 ἡ τελευταία τοῖς χρόνοις ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι γεγενημένη along with 1291^{b} 30 —1292^{a} 37.

οὐδὲ τῶν νόμων κτλ. Cf. Laws. 701 B and Xen. Hell. I 7. 12 ff. Such a democracy works by means of ψηφίσματα rather than laws, and is ἀνάλογον τῶν μοναρχιῶν τῇ τυραννίδι (Arist. l.c. Cf. also Gilbert Beiträge zur inn. Gesch. Athens pp. 79 ff.).

αὕτη μὲν τοίνυν κτλ. In his account of the genesis of tyranny, as in his description of the tyrant himself, Plato has borrowed several features from the career of the most conspicuous tyrant of his own age, Dionysius I of Syracuse. See on 564 A, and for other historical references 566 B al.

καλὴ καὶ νεανική : ‘fair and proud.’ For νεανική cf. IV 425 C.

νόσημα : viz. the drones, as explained in 564 B ( ἐκεῖνο τοίνυν κτλ.).

ἐξουσίας κτλ. See on 557 B. For τῷ ὄντι cf. VI 497 D note

καὶ δὴ καὶ κτλ. See cr. n. The omission of καὶ δή was a natural slip, and a majority of MSS agree with II. For καὶ δὴ καί with οὐχ ἥκιστα following cf. (with Schneider) Soph. 216 B . The present passage brings out very clearly Plato's conception of the State as a living organism and no mere ‘dead machine.’ See on this subject Bluntschli Theory of the State E. T. pp. 18—24 and cf. 543 A note

ἄγαν δουλείαν . For the omission of the article cf. IV 434 C note We certainly should not read, with Schaefer, τὴν ἄγαν, or delete ἄγαν with Cobet.

οὐκ ἐξ ἄλλης κτλ. In early times, according to Aristotle ( Pol. E 5. 1305^{a} 7 ff.) democracies used to give rise to tyrannies. The tyranny of Dionysius I of Syracuse is a notorious illustration from later history (see Grote c. 81). But tyranny had other origins as well: it constantly appeared for example during the transition from Aristocracy to an oligarchical form of government (Whibley Gk Olig. pp. 72—83). Plato deliberately selects that particular origin which accords with his psychological standpoint. In the decline of an individual soul, ‘lawless’ or unnatural ( παράνομοι) desires succeed the ἰσονομία in which all desires are treated as equal. Hence tyranny, which is only the political expression of unnatural desire, succeeds democracy in the fall of a State. Granted that Plato thought Athens was still degenerating, he must certainly have expected her, unless the process of decay should be arrested, to end in a tyranny. See also on IX 576 B. With the position of οἶμαι cf. 568 C and other examples in Braun de hyperb. Plat. II p. 12.

ἀκροτάτης . Herwerden (with Flor. T) conjectures ἀκρατοτάτης: but ἄκρατος does not easily admit the superlative, and the word is less suitable here than in the elaborate similitude about the wine of freedom 562 D. For the superlative of ἄκρος cf. V 459 E al.

ἠρώτας : ‘you were asking about’ ( doch wohl nicht danach fragtest du, Schneider), viz. when you said τί τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο; (563 E). Cf. Crat. 407 C τὸν Ἄρη ἐρώτα (‘ask about Ares’). καὶ τῷ ὄντι—ἀγριωτάτη (563 E—564 A) is a digression, and Adimantus' question is not answered until Socrates specifies what particular νόσημα was meant by the allusion in 563 E. J. and C. erroneously refer ἠρώτας to πῶς—τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγομεν; (562 E).

ἐκεῖνο κτλ. ‘Well then,’ said I, ‘I was referring to yon class’ etc. ἐκεῖνο=‘already-mentioned’ (in 552 C and later). On τὸ μὲν—ἑπόμενον see 564 D note

ἀφωμοιοῦμεν . See cr. n. The present is less suitable, especially with δή (= ut scis, Schneider). For the error see Introd. § 5.

ταράττετον κτλ. ταράττετον is used absolutely as in Hipp. Min. 373 B Σωκράτης—ἀεὶ ταράττει ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. On φλέγμα τε καὶ χολή the Oxford editors refer to Arist. Probl. I 29. 862^{b} 27 τῶν κατὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἡ χολὴ μέν ἐστι θερμόν, τὸ δὲ φλέγμα ψυχρόν, and rightly hold that ‘the hot humour answers to the stinging, the cold to the stingless drones.’ Cf. Tim. 85 D ff.

μελιττουργόν is the reading of Ξ q Μ as well as Π (see cr. n.), and is elsewhere better attested than μελιτουργόν, which “api magis quam homini convenit” (Schneider).

ξύν has been suspected by W. H. Thompson and Herwerden; but the preposition is occasionally found with this idiom both in poetry and prose (Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 356 and Lina de praep. usu Plat. p. 33). The half-poetic ξύν (see on IV 424 E and VII 518 C) suits well with the archaic form αὐτοῖσι (I 330 B note).

τριχῇ διαστησώμεθα . With what follows cf. Eur. Suppl. 238 —245 τρεῖς γὰρ πολιτῶν μερίδες· οἱ μὲν ὄλβιοι | ἀνωφελεῖς τε πλειόνων τ’ ἐρῶσ’ ἀεί· | οἱ δ’ οὐκ ἔχοντες καὶ σπανίζοντες βίου | δεινοί, νέμοντες τῷ φθόνῳ πλέον μέρος, | ἐς τοὺς ἔχοντας κέντρ’ ἀφιᾶσιν κακά, | γλώσσαις πονηρῶν προστατῶν φηλούμενοι· τριῶν δὲ μοιρῶν ἡ )ν μέσῳ σῴζει πόλεις κόσμον φυλάσσουσ’ ὅντιν’ ἂν τάξῃ πόλις. Plato is thinking primarily of course of Athens. See also Arist. Pol. Δ 11. 1295^{b} 1 ff. and (on the whole subject) Whibley Pol. Parties in Athens pp. 35 ff. and Beloch Att. Pol. pp. 1—19.

τὸ τοιοῦτον γένος : viz. the drones.

ἐξουσίαν . See on 557 B.

προεστός refers not only to the εἷς προστάτης τοῦ δήμου (565 C note), but to δημαγωγοί in general and all who lead the people whether as orators or as officers ( λέγει τε καὶ πράττει).

ἐκτὸς ὀλίγων . The leaders in a democracy, says Plato, belong to the class of drones—with a few exceptions. Pericles, for example, was an illustrious exception (Thuc. II 65. 8, 9 and Xen. Symp. 8. 39); and so, according even to Plato himself, was Aristides ( Gorg. 526 B ). Plato's general attitude towards Athenian demagogues has often been censured; but nearly all the greatest writers of antiquity, except the orators, pronounce the same verdict.

τὸ μὲν δριμύτατον ‐‐ βομβεῖ . Cf. Dem. Ol. II 29 πολιτεύεσθε κατὰ συμμορίας. ῥήτωρ ἡγέμων ἑκατέρων, καὶ στρατηγὸς ὑπὸ τούτῳ, καὶ οἱ βοησόμενοι τριακόσιοι. οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι προσνενέμησθε οἱ μὲν ὡς τούτους, οἱ δὲ ὡς ἐκείνους. προσίζον (used of a bee alighting in Arist. Hist. An. VIII 11. 596^{b} 15) and βομβεῖ keep up the figure.

τοῦ ἄλλα λέγοντος . Vermehren proposes του, comparing V 479 A οὐδαμῇ ἀνεχόμενος ἄν τις—φῇ and IX 579 A. If Plato had wished to say ‘any one,’ he would, I think, have written οὐδενός· του is too weak. The article is generic.

τοῦ τοιούτου : the class of drones in general, not simply τὸ δριμύτατον αὐτοῦ. Cf. τὸ τοιοῦτον γένος in C above.

χωρίς τινων ὀλίγων is neuter and should be taken with πάντα. The different liturgies etc. would scarcely be performed by the drones; and some departments of civic administration might be in the hands of the few exceptions noted above ( ἐκτὸς ὀλίγων D).

τοίνυν is ‘also’: see I 339 E note

χρηματιζομένων κτλ. : ‘if all are engaged in making money’ etc. παντων is the whole of which οἱ κοσμιώτατοι form a part; not ‘all the citizens of a democracy,’ for the aim of democracy is not πλοῦτος but ἐλευθερία, and the drones at least are not engaged in money-making.

πλεῖστον δὴ κτλ. : ‘thus, I imagine, there is plenty of honey for the drones, and it is most easy to squeeze honey from this source.’ My correction βλίττειν for βλίττει (see cr. n.) is regarded as certain by a reviewer of my Text of the Republic in Hermathena XXIV p. 252. βλίττει is retained by J. and C.; but there is no authority for the intransitive use of the verb, and βλίσειεν in the very next sentence is active. Schneider reads βλύττει, which would be a ἅπαξ εἰρημένον. Ruhnken's βλίττεται is unexceptionable in point of sense, and has found much favour. The author of this emendation claims (in his note on Tim. Lex. s.v. βλίττειν) that it is confirmed “cum Scholiastae, tum Codicis Parisini auctoritate.” But the Paris MSS have all either βλίττει or βλύττει; and Bekker's collation of the Scholium is βλίττει· ἀφαιρεῖ ( not ἀφαιρεῖται ) τὸ μέλι ἀπὸ τῶν κηρίων. Moreover, although the syllable ται was sometimes abbreviated in uncial MSS (see on 563 D), it is easier to suppose that the horizontal stroke for final ν was here accidentally omitted, as constantly in the Republic: see Introd. § 5. For the sense cf. I 343 A note and on the word βλίττειν (i.e. * μ ( β) λίττειν from μέλι) Blaydes on Ar. Knights 794 .

πλούσιοι ‐‐ καλοῦνται . The oligarchs were frequently called πλούσιοι, κτηματικοί and the like: see Whibley Pol. Part. in Ath. p. 48 and Beloch Att. Pol. p. 2.

κηφήνων βοτάνη has a proverbial ring: cf. the proverb κηφῆνες μόχθους ἄλλων κατέδονται (Leutsch u. Schneidewin Paroem. Gr. II p. 179). The same expression, as Schneider points out Addit. p. 69, is used by Plut. Mor. 42 A with a different meaning.

κυριώτατον . In a democracy the sovereignty lies with the δῆμος in its assemblies.

οὐ θαμὰ κτλ. Under the earliest and best form of democratical government, according to Aristotle, the δῆμος consists chiefly of farmers, and ἐκκλησίαι are infrequent, for διὰ τὸ ἐσπάρθαι κατὰ τὴν χώραν οὔτ’ ἀπαντῶσιν οὔθ’ ὁμοίως δέονται τῆς συνόδου ταύτης ( Pol. Ζ 4. 1319^{a} 30 ff., 3. 1318^{b} 11, and Δ 5. 1292^{b} 27). It is a later and degenerate phase when assemblies are multiplied by the payment of ἐκκλησιαστικὸς μισθός and other forms of ‘honey’ (ib. Δ 6. 1293^{a} 1 ff.). Plato in this passage contributes some hints towards a historical analysis of the evolution of Greek democracy such as we find in Aristotle.

ἐὰν μὴ ‐‐ μεταλαμβάνῃ . Cf. Ar. Peace 632 —643. There is little doubt that the compulsory migration of Athenian farmers into Athens at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war had a decisive effect on the course of Athenian democracy: cf. Thuc. II 14 and 16 and Gilbert Beiträge etc. pp. 98 ff.

τοὺς ἔχοντας κτλ. On the oppression of the rich in Athens see Hermann-Thumser Gr. Staatsalt. pp. 688 ff., 747.

διανέμοντες κτλ. : ‘while dividing it among the people to retain the lion's share themselves.’ The epigram is spoiled if (with Cobet) we read <ὀλίγα> διανέμοντες. For the sentiment cf. Dem. Ol. III 31, Ar. Peace l.c., Knights 46 ff., 792 ff., 1218 ff. and (with J. and C.) Wasps 655—679.

οὕτως : emphatic, ‘with that proviso’ (D. and V.).

πράττοντες is quite satisfactory: cf. λέγει τε καὶ πράττει 564 D. Richter should not have proposed ταράττοντες .

ὅπῃ δύνανται κτλ. : ‘in any way they can.’ Their opportunities of public action in self-defence are limited; hence they form e.g. secret associations and the like. On the tense of ἔσχον see 548 D note, and for the statement itself ( αἰτίαν—ὀλιγαρχικοί) many passages in Aristophanes, e.g. Wasps 488 ff. and others quoted by Whibley Pol. Part. in Athens p. 65 note 3.

τότ) ἤδη ‐‐ οὐχ ἑκόντες . Isocrates makes a similar complaint ( Antid. 318): οὐ τοὺς μὲν ἐνδοξοτάτους τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ μάλιστα δυναμένους ποιῆσαί τι τὴν πόλιν ἀγαθόν, ὀλιγαρχίαν ὀνειδίζοντες καὶ λακωνισμόν, οὐ πρότερον ἐπαύσαντο (sc. οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν ) πρὶν ἠνάγκασαν ὁμοίους γενέσθαι ταῖς αἰτίαις ταῖς λεγομέναις περὶ αὐτῶν; Cf. also Arist. Pol. E 5. 1304^{b} 21 ff. Observe how Plato now begins to insist on the inevitable necessity which dogs the footsteps of political decay: see on 566 A and 567 C.

εἰσαγγελίαι : ‘impeachments,’ as e.g. for κατάλυσις τοῦ δήμου. On eisangelia in Attic legal procedure see Hager Dict. Ant. s.v. and Meier u. Schömann Att. Proc. I pp. 312—335.

ἀγῶνες περὶ ἀλλήλων : ‘trials of one another’ (Jowett): lit. ‘trials about one another,’ i.e. trials in which the individuals chiefly concerned, viz. the defendants, belong to one or other of the two parties in the State. ἀλλήλων by itself would be better suited to the words εἰσαγγελίαι καὶ κρίσεις, but ἀγῶνες ἀλλήλων is too harsh an expression, and that, I think, is why Plato writes ἀγῶνες περὶ ἀλλήλων. This explanation is in my opinion better than to translate “Processe um Leben und Tod” (Schneider: cf. ἀγῶνας—περὶ σφέων αὐτῶν Hdt. VIII 102). Some may think that ἀλλήλους should replace ἀλλήλων: but περί with the accusative would not express a close enough connexion in this passage.

οὐκοῦν κτλ. So in Ar. Knights 1127 Demos says βούλομαι τρέφειν ἕνα προστάτην. The προστάτης τοῦ δήμου in Athens was simply, “the leading demagogue, who acted as guardian and representative of the demos, as the ordinary προστάτης did of the metoecs” (Whibley Pol. Part. in Ath. p. 51). He was not a magistrate, although his position was recognised and much sought after. Pericles was certainly προστάτης, and, among his successors, apparently Cleon and others. For the authorities see Whibley l.c. and Gilbert Beiträge etc. pp. 78 ff. For ἕνα τινά Cobet substitutes ἕνα γέ τινα, without sufficient reason: cf. VI 494 D note To my mind the emphasis on ἕνα is much stronger without γε: and Plato clearly intends to emphasise that word, for it is by the rise of a single champion that tyranny is caused.

ἐκ προστατικῆς ῥίζης κτλ. Arist. Pol. E 10. 1310^{b} 14 ff. σχεδὸν γὰρ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν τυράννων γεγόνασιν ἐκ δημαγωγῶν ὡς εἰπεῖν, πιστευθέντες ἐκ τοῦ διαβάλλειν τοὺς γνωρίμους. This was especially true of earlier times, when the orator also held military command (ib. 5. 1305^{a} 7 ff.). See Gilbert Gr. Staatsalt. II pp. 280 ff.

καὶ οὐκ ἄλλοθεν . If we treat this sentence as a statement of historical fact, Plato expresses himself too strongly; for tyranny sometimes arose in other ways. See however on 564 A and 543 A, 544 C notes

τῷ μύθῳ . See [Hecat.] Frag. 375 in Müller Frag. Hist. Gr. I p. 31 and Paus. VIII 2. 6. In his note on the latter passage, Frazer collects the ancient legends about werewolves. For the later history of the superstition consult M^{c}Lennan's article Lycanthropy in Enc. Brit. ed. 9, and for parallels in non-classical mythologies Tylor Prim. Culture^{2} I pp. 308— 315.

ἑνός is bracketed by Herwerden; but τοῦ in τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σπλάγχνου proves it genuine. But for ἑνός Plato must have written τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σπλάγχνου <τοῦ> ἐν ἄλλοις κτλ. The werewolf superstition was similarly associated with cannibalism in some of its later European forms (M^{c}Lennan l.c.).

ἀνάγκη δὴ κτλ. The anacoluthon is illustrated by Engelhardt Spec. Anac. Pl. III p. 40.

ἐμφυλίου αἵματος . Cf. Pind. Pyth. II 32 ἐμφύλιον αἷμα πρώτιστος οὐκ ἄτερ τέχνας ἐπέμιξε θνατοῖς. The style rises into poetry as usual in passages of solemn import and sustained emotion; cf. 560 B, D notes

ἀνδρός is poetic for ἀνθρώπου: cf. Aesch. Ag. 1020 f. ἀνδρὸς μέλαν αἷμα τίς ἂν πάλιν | ἀγκαλέσαιτ’ ἐπαείδων; and often in Pindar ( Ol. I 35, 66 etc.).

γλώττῃ τε καὶ ‐‐ ξυγγενοῦς . The blood of fellow-citizens is kindred blood: for all are sons of the same fatherland. ‘The unholy tongue and lips’ is an eloquent amplification of γευόμενος, in harmony with the story to which Plato has referred in D above. J. and C. seem to me to mar the effect of Plato's eloquence by remarking that “the tongue and lips which make the slanderous accusation are vividly imagined as actually tasting blood.”

ἀνδρηλατῇ κτλ. Cf. Gorg. 466 C τί δέ; οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι ἀποκτιννύασί τε (sc. οἱ ῥήτορες) ὃν ἂν βούλωνται, καὶ ἀφαιροῦνται χρήματα καὶ ἐκβάλλουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς; Νὴ τὸν κύνα. The unscrupulous mob-orator is a budding tyrant.

ὑποσημαίνῃ : ‘hints at.’

χρεῶν ‐‐ ἀναδασμόν : phrases ominous of revolution to a Greek ear: see Laws 684 E, [Dem.] 24. 149 ψηφιοῦμαι—οὐδὲ τῶν χρεῶν τῶν ἰδίων ἀποκοπὰς οὐδὲ γῆς ἀναδασμὸν τῆς Ἀθηναίων οὐδ’ οἰκιῶν (in the Heliastic oath), Isocr. Panath. 259, Arist. Pol. E 5. 1305^{a} 5 al. and Sandys on Ath. Pol. 6. 1. Cf. also Gilbert Gr. Staatsalt. II p. 279.

ἀνάγκη ‐‐ καὶ εἵρμαρται κτλ. Once more Necessity rings her knell (565 C note): the instinct of self-preservation makes the final stage inevitable. For the same reason Xenophon remarks ( Hier. 7. 12, 13) that a tyrant never dare lay down his power: cf. also Periander in D. L. I 97 and the pathetic saying καλὸν μὲν εἶναι τὴν τυραννίδα χωρίον, οὐκ ἔχειν δὲ ἀπόβασιν (Plut. Sol. 14. 10). See also on 545 C and 547 A.

οὗτος κτλ. ‘This then,’ said I, ‘is the man who is guilty of sedition against the holders of property.’ γίγνεται is not ‘becomes’ (“the leader of the faction against the rich becomes that person” J. and C.), but ‘turns out to be,’ ‘is’ sc. in our argument or picture: cf. 562 A note οὗτος γίγνεται is similarly used at the end of the picture of the tyrannical man in IX 576 B. Schneider seems to suppose that στασιάζων refers to civil war (“vim et arma civilia”) such as is described in what follows, but the incidents just enumerated would certainly be called στάσις by a Greek, and οὗτος δὴ—γίγνεται points backward rather than forward, as is clear both from δή and from Adimantus' reply.

ἐκπεσὼν κτλ. He is transformed into a full and finished tyrant in one of two ways: either by being expelled (in course of the στάσις) and returning βίᾳ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, or else in the way described in ἐὰν δὲ—ἀποτετελεσμένος (D). Pisistratus is not a perfect example to illustrate ἐκπεσών etc., for he had made himself a tyrant before he was expelled (Arist. Ath. Pol. 14. 3).

διαβάλλοντες τῇ πόλει : ‘by setting the citizens against him’ (J. and C.) rather than ‘by accusing him to the State’ (D. and V.). Cf. VI 498 C and Phaed. 67 E .

βιαίῳ ‐‐ λάθρᾳ . Cf. Thuc. VIII 65. 2.

αἵτημα τὸ πολυθρύλητον : as in the case of Theagenes of Megara, Pisistratus, and Dionysius of Syracuse: see Arist. Rhet. I 2. 1357^{b} 30—33 with Cope ad loc., and (for Dionysius) Grote X pp. 202 ff. and Freeman's Sicily III p. 558. Gilbert ( Gr. Staatsalt. II p. 281 note 1) remarks that the body-guard plays a part in the genesis of nearly every Tyrannis.

θαρρήσαντες ‐‐ ἑαυτῶν . Cf. Solon Frag. 11. 5—8 Bergk.

τὸν Κροίσῳ κτλ. See Hdt. I 55.

αἰδεσθείη κτλ. Liebhold's conjecture οἰκισθείη is of course absurd. The expression θανάτῳ διδόναι is paullo exquisitius dictum, resembling our phrase ‘is done to death’: cf. (with Stallbaum) IX 571 E, 574 C and Phaedr. 254 E ( ὀδύναις ἔδωκεν, imitated from Homer Od. XVII 567).

μέγας μεγαλωστί . Il. XVI 776.

ἐν τῷ δίφρῳ κτλ. The figure—a common one—is of course suggested by the Homeric allusion. Cebriones ἀρνευτῆρι ἐοικὼς | κάππεσ’ ἀπ’ εὐεργέος δίφρου (ib. 743). Not so the προστάτης: he fells others, but himself ( αὐτὸς) ἕστηκεν ἐν τῷ δίφρῳ τῆς πόλεως.

διέλθωμεν δὴ κτλ. Throughout the whole of this picture, it is tolerably clear that Plato has Dionysius the first of Syracuse in his mind: see on 566 E, 567 B, E, 568 A, D. The reader should compare Aristotle's brief account of the three kinds of Tyranny in Pol. Δ 10. 1295^{a} 1—24. That which Plato describes is of course the worst variety ἥτις ἀνυπεύθυνος ἄρχει τῶν ὁμοίων καὶ βελτιόνων πάντων πρὸς τὸ σφέτερον αὐτῆς συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων (ib. 20— 22).

βροτός : ‘creature’ (Jowett). The tyrant is something less than human.

πάντας ὣ| ἂν κτλ. For the grammatical concord cf. IV 426 C note The sense is well illustrated by Stallbaum from Eur. I. A. 337 —342, where Menelaus says to Agamemnon: οἲσθ’ ὅτ’ ἐσπούδαζες ἄρχειν Δαναίδαις πρὸς Ἴλιον | — ὡς ταπεινὸς ἦσθα, πάσης δεξιᾶς προσθιγγάνων, | καὶ θύρας ἔχων ἀκλῄστους τῷ θέλοντι δημοτῶν, | καὶ διδοὺς πρόσρησιν ἑξῆς πᾶσι, κεἰ μήτις θέλοι, | τοῖς τρόποις ζητῶν πρίασθαι τὸ φιλότιμον ἐκ μέσου; On οὔτε followed by τε (neque—et) where the stress falls on the affirmative clause (non modo non— sed etiam) see IV 430 B note

ἠλευθέρωσε ‐‐ διένειμεν : fulfilling the hopes held out by him as προστάτης (566 A note). A redistribution of landed property was one of Dionysius' earliest measures after he had established himself in the tyranny (Grote X pp. 221 ff.). As Mr Giles points out, such a step would tend to keep up the enthusiasm of the πλῆθος, especially when the tyrant succeeded to an oligarchy which had added field to field by lending on mortgage to the small farmers and selling them up after a bad year. It would be easy enough to carry out, because the tyrant's opponents would have fled the country: cf. 566 C. For the aorists see 548 D note

πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω ἐχθροὺς κτλ. : ‘in his relations to foreign enemies’ etc. With the construction of τοῖς μὲν κτλ. cf. IX 591 E—592 A ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τιμάς γε— τῶν μὲν μεθέξει καὶ γεύσεται ἑκών, ἃς ἂν ἡγῆται ἀμείνω αὑτὸν ποιήσειν, ἃς δ’ ἂν λύσειν τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἕξιν, φεύξεται ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ. In both cases the idiom resembles so-called partitive apposition, for which see IV 431 A note

πολέμους τινὰς κτλ. Cf. Arist. Pol. E 11. 1313^{b} 28 ff. ἔστι δὲ καὶ πολεμοποιὸς ὁ τύραννος, ὅπως δὴ ἄσχολοί τε ὦσι καὶ ἡγεμόνος ἐν χρείᾳ διατελῶσιν ὄντες. The history of Dionysius the elder is again in point: see Grote X pp. 224—331.