καὶ ὡς τὸ πολὺ κτλ.
: ‘and the magistracies in the city are for the most part given by lot.’ These words, which depend, of course, on
ὅταν, explain
ἐξ ἴσου—ἀρχῶν, and should be taken in close connexion with that clause, as Ast long ago pointed out. The difference in tense (
μεταδῶσι but
γίγνωνται), no less than the meaning, clearly indicates that the two clauses do not express two separate and distinct acts. It is by means of the lot that
ἰσότης is secured; and hence democracy is not established until offices are assigned thereby: cf. Hdt. III 80
πάλῳ μὲν ἀρχὰς ἄρχει and Arist.
Rhet. I 8. 1365^{b} 32
δημοκρατία μὲν πολιτεία ἐν ᾗ κλήρῳ διανέμονται τὰς ἀρχάς, with Whibley
Gk Olig. p. 35 and Greenidge
Gk Const. Hist. pp. 139 ff. The clause was, strangely enough, condemned by Hermann. Plato was not likely to omit all mention of the most characteristic and necessary factor in the establishment of a democracy, especially as he introduces the same feature in describing the democratical man (561 B
ὥσπερ λαχούσῃ). J. and C., with Schneider and others, read
γίγνονται, for which there is very little MS support, remarking that ‘the subjunctive is inexact, because any words dependent on
ὅταν should describe a characteristic of the origin of democracy, not merely a characteristic of democracy.’ The fact is that the words do explain the origin of democracy by explaining
ἐξ ἴσου μεταδῶσι κτλ., where the aorist is rightly used of the act by which democracy is established; whereas if we read
γίγνονται the clause must be taken by itself, and then it can only express a characteristic of democracy after that constitution is in force, so that its proper place would be in the next chapter. It should be observed that in no ancient democracy that we know of was the lot employed in electing to
all magistracies: see Gilbert l.c. II p. 318. For this reason Plato writes
ὡς τὸ πολύ .
τίνα δὴ οὖν κτλ.
The psychological principle of Democracy, as well as of Oligarchy, is
τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν. But whereas in Oligarchy everything was subjected to the dominion of one particular desire, viz. the desire of wealth (550 C note), Democracy, on the other hand, is the political embodiment of absolute freedom and equality among all desires, unnecessary as well as necessary: see on 558 C ff. The materials for Plato's picture of democracy are of course taken from Athens more than any other single city. It is an extraordinarily vivid sketch; and indeed Plato's whole account of democracy and the democratical man (557 A—565 C), in spite of manifest exaggerations, brings Athens nearer to us than almost any monument of ancient literature, Aristophanes alone excepted. We can see that Plato was fully alive to the wonderful variety and colour of Athenian life; but even on this ground democracy did not appear to him worthy of praise. Multiplicity and variety are the offspring of that fatal
ἀνομοιότης which works ruin alike in the city and the soul (547 A note). In other respects, Plato represents democracy as a land of Hedonism, peopled by Anarchy and Waywardness, and darkened by the shadow of the Tyranny to which it must at last succumb. Nearly all the greatest writers of Greek antiquity were on the whole unfavourable to democracy, except of course the Orators: and least of all in Plato could democracy expect a champion. For the other side of the picture, we should of course take Pericles' speech in Thuc. II 35 ff. See Neil's
Knights of Aristophanes pp. vii ff.
δῆλον γὰρ κτλ.
It is the
ἀνήρ rather than the
πολιτεία which is the ultimate object of our search; but as the
ἀνήρ in a democracy will be
δημοκρατικός τις, we cannot understand him until we understand
δημοκρατία. Hence the question
ποία τις—πολιτεία. Cf. 545 B, C.
ἐλευθερίας
. ἐλευθερία was the fundamental
ὑπόθεσις of ancient democracy:
ὑπόθεσις μὲν οὖν τῆς δημοκρατικῆς πολιτείας ἐλευθερία, says Aristotle
Pol. Z 2. 1317^{a} 40. Cf. 562 B. It involves, according to Aristotle l.c., two ideas, viz. (1)
τὸ ἐν
μέρει ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν, (2)
τὸ ζῆν ὡς βούλεταί τις (ib. 1317^{b} II). Throughout this chapter Plato illustrates the second of these characteristics. Cf. Whibley
Gk Olig. pp. 33—35.
παρρησία
and
ἐξουσία
are democratical watchwords; see e.g.
Gorg. 461 E
,
Eur.
Hipp. 422
,
Ion 671 ff., and Thuc. VII 69 (
τῆς—ἀνεπιτάκτου πᾶσιν ἐς τὴν δίαιταν ἐξουσίας) with II 37. 2 and infra 557 D, 563 E, Arist.
Pol. Z 4. 1318^{b} 39 al.
ὥσπερ ἱμάτιον κτλ.
For the asyndeton cf. VI 497 B note
ποικίλον=‘many-coloured’ is cancelled by Herwerden and J. J. Hartman. The word is in every MS and thoroughly harmonises with Plato's characteristic fulness of style: ‘like a many-coloured garment, diversified with every shade of colour.’ In itself it is the antithesis of
ἁπλοῦς, and symbolical of kaleidoscopic diversity and changefulness, just as in recent years we have heard the expression ‘Joseph's coat of many colours’ applied to a versatile and distinguished statesman. See also on 561 E.
ἄνθεσι is not ‘flowers’ (as seems to be generally supposed), but ‘dyes,’ ‘colours’ (IV 429 D note): nor need
πεποικιλμένη be understood of embroidery: for
ποικίλλειν means no more than ‘to diversify with colours’ and implies nothing whatever as to the process: cf. II 378 C. On the verbal play in
ἄνθεσι—ἤθεσι see III 406 B note For
ἦν δ’ ἐγώ repeated cf. VII 522 A note
πάντα γένη κτλ.
Cf.
Laws 681 D
πολιτείας σχῆμα—ἐν ᾦ δὴ πάντα εἴδη καὶ παθήματα πολιτειῶν καὶ ἅμα πόλεων ξυμπίπτει γίγνεσθαι. On
ἐξουσίαν see 557 B note
τοῦτον ἐκλέξασθαι κτλ.
Pericles (Thuc. II 37. 1) regarded the Athenian constitution as a
παράδειγμα: Plato humorously describes it as a motley aggregate of
παραδείγματα. Democracy is
πόλεις παμπολλαί, ἀλλ’ οὐ πόλις, the different varieties of individuals living in it representing so many different constitutions. In view of 561 C we may even go farther, and say that every democratical individual is himself a kaleidoscopic succession of polities—
χαμαιλέων τις καὶ σαθρῶς ἰδρυμένος (ap. Arist.
Eth. Nic. I 11. 1100^{b} 6). Hence, as Plato would hold, the waywardness and instability of democratic policy, constantly reversing to-morrow what it decrees today. See Thuc. I 44, II 65, III 36 ff., IV 28 and VIII 1. Democracy in fact, from Plato's point of view, is the political expression of monochronous Hedonism: cf. 558 A and 561 C notes
ἀνάγκην
. The Athenians gloried in their
ἀνειμένη δίαιτα. See Thuc. II 39. 1 and
Laws 642 C
μόνοι γὰρ ἄνευ ἀνάγκης, αὐτοφυῶς, θείᾳ μοίρᾳ, ἀληθῶς καὶ οὔ τι πλαστῶς εἰσιν ἀγαθοί .