Plato Republic 6.503

τὸ δόγμα τοῦτο . The patriot's creed: see III 412 E, 413 C.

ἤ =‘alioquin.’ Cf. V 463 D note

καὶ ἆθλα is ejected by Cobet. The precise words do not occur in III 414 A, but they are unobjectionable, and end the sentence well. Cf. V 460 B καὶ γέρα δοτέον καὶ ἆθλα, and see also on V 465 D.

παρακαλυπτομένου : ‘putting on her veil.’ The λόγος is personified, as often.

κινεῖν τὸ νῦν παρόν . There is perhaps a hint of the proverb εὖ κείμενον κακὸν μὴ κίνει. No one who reads III 412 B —414 B without reference to the present passage would detect that the λόγος ‘leaves the high road’ in 414 B because she is afraid to raise the question of the Philosopher-king. The words ὡς ἐν τύπῳ, μὴ δἰ ἀκριβείας, εἰρῆσθαι would not suggest to him anything of the kind; and the impression which the earlier account of the Rulers leaves on us is that it was intended by Plato himself to be complete in outline, though not in detail. From the standpoint of Book VI it is certainly even in outline incomplete. Cf. Krohn Pl. St. p. 126, where the case is somewhat overstated; and see on 497 C, 502 D. But there is nothing in all this to justify any chorizontic inference, if only we have regard to the laws of the Dialogue as a form of literary art. See Introd. § 4.

ὄκνος κτλ. Examples of the omission of ἦν will be found in Schanz Nov. Comm. Pl. p. 33. q^{2} has ὤκνουν: but cf. V 450 D.

ὅτι ‐‐ καθιστάναι : lit. ‘that we must appoint philosophers in the persons of our most perfect guardians,’ i.e. that the rulers we appoint must be philosophers. The ἀκριβέστατοι φύλακες are the same as the τέλεοι φύλακες of IV 428 D: and the whole expression is equivalent to ὅτι φιλοσόφους δεῖ εἶναι τοὺς ἀκριβεστάτους φύλακας οὓς καθίσταμεν. To read καθεστάναι for καθιστάναι (with v) is much less elegant; still less should we follow D. and V. in transposing φύλακας and φιλοσόφους. For the sense of ἀκριβεστάτους cf. (with Jackson) I 341 B, 342 D.

διεσπασμένη . Cobet proposes διεσπασμένα, which he wrongly asserts to be the reading of A. But the parts of the philosophic φύσις are not torn asunder; it is the φύσις itself which is in partes disiuncta. Bywater's διεσπαρμένα avoids this difficulty; but διεσπασμένη is much better, because it suggests that the disjunction is ‘unnatural’ (in the Platonic sense of παρὰ φύσιν): see on IV 443 B. The philosophic nature ought to be born whole.

εὐμαθεῖς κτλ. ‘The faculty of learning easily, memory, sagacity, quickness, and so on, together with spirit and high-mindedness, are, as you know, not often naturally combined with the disposition to live soberly in quiet and stedfast ways’ etc. Plato means that natural intelligence and vivacity, with their accompaniments of spirit and highmindedness, rarely go with moral stedfastness. A good illustration is afforded by the contrast between “the Athenian and the Spartan, the former ‘neither resting themselves nor letting anyone else rest, the latter so slow that aggression can hardly rouse them to repel it’” (Bosanquet). Cf. Thucyd. I 70. For other views on the text and interpretation of this difficult passage see App. VI.

ὑπὸ ὀξύτητος κτλ. Theaet. 144 A οἵ τε ὀξεῖς—καὶ ἀγχίνοι καὶ μνήμονες—ᾄττοντες φέρονται ὥσπερ τὰ ἀνερμάτιστα πλοῖα.

τὰ βέβαια κτλ. Theaet. 144 B οἵ τε αὖ ἐμβριθέστεροι νωθροί πως ἀπαντῶσι πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις καὶ λήθης γέμοντες.

ἔφαμεν . 484 D—487 A.

ἀμφοτέρων is explained in 503 C note

αὐτῷ is probably masculine (Schneider), in spite of αὐτό (the philosophic ἦθος) immediately following. We can hardly speak of assigning concrete τιμή or ἀρχή to an ἦθος. The pronoun refers to the philosophic guardian that is to be. See on δυνατὴ ἔσται 503 E.

ἐλέγομεν . III 413 A ff.

δυνατὴ ἔσται : sc. ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν. φύσις was last employed in 503 B, since when it has been represented both by the individual and by the ἦθος ( αὐτῷ and αὐτό in 503 D). We must bear in mind that the Greek inflexions of gender made it easier for them than it is for us to tolerate such irregularities. No Greek could possibly misunderstand the reference, as soon as he heard the ‐η of δυνατή. A tolerably close parallel will be found in Phaedr. 254 B (not D, as Stallbaum prints). See also 508 D and X 605 C notes Bywater conjectures δυνήσεται, but δυνήσεται is unlikely to have been corrupted into δυνατὴ ἔσται.

ἄθλοις . See cr. n. Orelli's emendation has met with considerable favour; but Schneider, Stallbaum, and J. and C. still retain ἄλλοις. With the MS reading we must, I think, translate ‘in the other cases’ i.e. in the πόνοι etc. spoken of just before. (If Plato merely meant ‘in other kinds of effort’ it was not worth his while to insert the clause at all.) But ὥσπερ certainly suggests something more than a mere comparison between flinching at moral, and flinching at intellectual tests; and nothing could be more appropriate, or more in Plato's way, than an allusion to the games: see on V 465 D. That <*>θλοι in this sense is half-poetic, “occurring only in the Timaeus and the Laws” (J. and C.), is scarcely an objection in Plato. ἄθλοις also suits well with γυμνάζειν. In [ Axioch.] 365 A occur the words ὡς γὰρ ἀγωνιστὴς δειλός, ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις γενναῖος φαινόμενος, ἀπολέλοιπας ἐν τοῖς ἄθλοις. The author of the Axiochus may have been thinking of the present passage, and if so, he certainly read ἄθλοις. See also the fine anecdote in Plut. Them. 11. 3.

διαστησάμενοι . IV 436 A ff.

ξυνεβιβάζομεν : ‘we drew conclusions,’ viz. in IV 441 C ff. The use of συμβιβάζειν as a synonym for συμπεραίνεσθαι, συλλογίζεσθαι, is common in Aristotle: for examples see Bonitz Ind. Ar. s. v.

ἐλέγομεν . See IV 435 D note

ἦν : “ut ἐχρῆν et similia dictum” (Schneider). There is no reason to eject the word (with Madvig) or to write εἴη: why should not the mood of the oratio recta be retained? εἴη would be unpleasing with εἴη following so soon. Liebhold's ὡς μὲν δυνατὰ ᾖ is unclassical: see on I 349 C. Richards conjectures ὡς μὲν <ὡς or ὅσον or εἰς τὸ> δυνατὸν κάλλιστα κτλ., taking ὡς with κατιδεῖν. But we ought not to multiply instances of ὡς for ὥστε in Plato (II 365 D note). The infinitive means simply ‘for descrying,’ ‘in order to descry them in the best possible way’: see Goodwin MT. p. 308 and Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 586.

αὐτά is of course the four cardinal virtues, like ταῦτα in 504 D. The ‘longer circuit’ is the educational training necessary in order to enable the guardians to obtain scientific knowledge of the virtues by discerning their relation with the Idea of Good: cf. 506 A. In Book IV Justice, Temperance etc. were regarded as psychological qualities or relations; but the philosophic Guardians must learn their metaphysical import. Throughout the rest of VI and VII Plato, in short, discards Psychology for Metaphysics. Thus much is clear; but many difficult and interesting questions arise in connexion with this passage, as Krohn and others have pointed out. The μακροτέρα περίοδος mentioned in IV 435 D appears to be a longer way of determining, not the essential nature of the virtues, but whether Soul has ‘parts’ or not. (A solution of this difficulty is suggested on 435 D). Socrates' shorter road, again, is not a way by which the Guardians are to go, but a method employed by himself in studying primarily the Soul, and secondarily the virtues. Finally, what is the relation between the psychological conception of Virtue and the metaphysical? And does the metaphysical conception involve a revised psychology or not? The last question is touched on in the notes to X 611 B, where Plato himself appears to raise it. For the last but one see on 504 D.

ἑπομένας : ‘corresponding with’ ‘on a level with’ (Jowett) viz. in point of ἀκριβεία: cf. IV 435 D τῶν γε προειρημένων τε καὶ προεσκεμμένων ἀξίως, where see note. For the genitive with ἑπόμενος cf. (with Stallbaum) Pol. 271 E and Laws 899 C ( ὁπόσα τούτων ξυνεπόμενα, according to the best MS). Bywater would read ἐχομένας here and ἐχόμενα in the Politicus, but it is safer to make no change, although the reverse corruption of ἐχόμενα for ἑπόμενα apparently occurs in Gorg. 494 E , if Bekker's restoration is correct.

ἀλλ’ ὦ φίλε κτλ. Socrates σοφίζεται περὶ τὸ ὄνομα (509 D)—plays on the etymological sense of μετρίως. In effect he says “Don't say ‘ μετρίως’: short measure in such cases is no measure at all: for—if ‘Measure’ be rightly understood—there can be no imperfect measure of anything.” Etymologically, for example, ἀτελὲς μέτρον ὕδατος is a misnomer, for the measure must be exactly commensurate with the water. Hence the μέτρον τῶν ἀκριβεστάτων must itself be ἀκριβέστατον (cf. 504 E). The essential perfection of μέτρον, τὸ μέτριον and the like is expounded in Pol. 284 A ff., Phil. 64 D ff. and 66 A: cf. also Laws 716 C ff., where we read that God, not Man, is the Measure of all things. The translation ‘Nothing imperfect is the measure of anything’ (Jowett and others) suggests, I think, a wrong idea, and is not so well adapted to μέτρον—γίγνεται.

τισιν : with reference, perhaps, to Adimantus and the others (J. and C., comparing II 372 E. Cf. also V 465 E). Adimantus betrays no consciousness of the allusion in his reply.

ἤ =alioquin. Cf. V 463 D note

νῦν δή . The reference (somewhat loose, as usual) is to 503 E.

καὶ μεῖζον κτλ. κοὶ—καί=‘not only—but also.’ αὐτῶν τούτων is ‘harum ipsarum virtutum.’

οὐχ ὑπογραφὴν ‐‐ ὥσπερ νῦν is as clear a proof as we could wish that Justice and the other virtues, as described in Book IV, are not the transcendental αὐτὰ καθ’ αὑτὰ εἴδη: see on III 402 C. They are only a ὑπογραφή or ‘adumbratio’ of the Ideas, being, we may suppose, simply the psychological relations which result from the παρουσία of the Ideas in certain particulars, viz. in human souls, during their union with human bodies. ὥσπερ νῦν admits moreover that the Rulers of III and IV (apart from a few suggestions to the opposite effect: see on 497 C) had only ‘correct opinion’ and not ‘knowledge’ (in the strict Platonic sense): it was their duty to accept and carry out the precepts of Plato, the founder of the city (IV 429 C note).

παριέναι . The present is better than παρεῖναι, which Herwerden conjectures.

καὶ μάλα . See cr. n. The words ἄξιον τὸ διανόημα are not strictly suitable to ἢ οὐ γελοῖον, and although διανόημα is of course a Platonic word, it is questionable whether Plato could have used it in this way. Perhaps we owe the comment to a gratified monk, who may have applied the observation to systematic theology. The comment is at all events a just one. Cf. 496 A note Plato's remark is best illustrated by the case of the exact sciences; and in a certain sense it may be said that he wished to make Politics into an exact science.

ὃ μέντοι κτλ. : lit. ‘but that which you call the greatest study, and that which you call its subject whatever it be—do you suppose any one would let you off without asking what they are?’ Richards finds a difficulty, but there is none, if only we take ὅ τι not as interrogative, but as the indefinite relative. For εἶναι omitted see Schanz Nov. Comm. Pl. p. 33. The μέγιστον μάθημα is Dialectic; and its subject the Idea of Good, though of course the latter can itself be called the μέγιστον μάθημα, as in 505 A. For ἐρωτᾷ Richards neatly conjectures ἐρωτᾷς, but the text (‘You may ask it yourself if you like’) is better. See next note.