Plato Republic 6.501

ὃ οὐ πάνυ ῥᾴδιον . Cf. 499 C note Plato's κάθαρσις is sufficiently drastic. He would rusticate the entire population above ten years of age, and bring up the remainder in the principles of his καλλίπολις (VII 540 E ff. note).

διενέγκοιεν . See cr. n. Schneider retains διενεγκεῖν, comparing other passages in which ὅτι is followed by an infinitive. Instances of this irregularity occasionally occur (Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 877), but it is unusually awkward here, and the majority of editors are probably right in following q. With the sentiment cf. Laws 735 B—736 C, where the necessity of an initial κάθαρσις is equally insisted on, and various forms of legislative purgation are described.

μήτε ἰδιώτου κτλ. The individual is cleansed by the Socratic elenchus, which purges him of his false persuasion of knowledge: cf. Soph. 230 B —E, where this kind of κάθαρσις is expounded in detail. Gildersleeve ( A. J. Ph. III p. 201) points out that the ‘articular infinitive’ with ἄν is rare in Plato.

γράφειν νόμους : ‘to paint or draft laws.’ Richards is inclined to cancel μηδὲ—νόμους as involving “a most awkward and inartistic confusion of the figure (painting) with the thing figured (legislation).” Nothing is more usual in Plato than such a ‘confusion,’ if the phrase employed bears, like γράφειν νόμους, or is capable of bearing, like ἀνδρείκελον below, a meaning of its own as well as an application in the simile, and it is a narrow conception of art which pronounces the idiom inartistic. Cf. 507 A note and Euthyph. 3 A with my note ad loc., and see also on V 451 B. Cobet's ἐγγράφειν νόμους, which Baiter adopts, is another unsuccessful attempt to obliterate this characteristic feature of Plato's stvle.

παραλαβεῖν καθαράν . Plato would cite as examples a tutor who is entrusted with the sole authority over a child, and legislators who (as in the Laws 702 B ff.) receive autocratic power in order to found a colony. Cf. 499 B note

τὸ φύσει δίκαιον is assuredly the Idea of Justice, as opposed to τὸ νόμῳ δίκαιον ‘conventional justice’: cf. 500 C and (for φύσει) V 476 B. See also on X 598 A. Bosanquet ignores the most essential and characteristic feature of Plato's teaching when he remarks that “the ‘natural’ principles of justice and other moral qualities are no doubt those which Plato believes himself to have found present, in various degrees, throughout inorganic and organic nature and the animal world, and culminating in the life of man.” It is better to let Plato soar where we cannot follow him than thus to clip his wings. See the Appendix to Book VII On Plato's Dialectic.

καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο κτλ. The legislative painter looks now at his model (the φύσει δίκαιον etc.), now at his picture (the δίκαιον etc. which he is implanting among men), rubbing out one part and painting another in again ( τὸ μὲν—ἐγγράφοιεν), till he is satisfied with the result. He combines and mixes various ἐπιτηδεύματα or institutions, till he produces the true ἀνδρείκελον or ‘colour and likeness of true Manhood’; just as the painter mixes various colours to produce his ἀνδρείκελον or flesh-tint. ἀνδρείκελον in painting was a sort of flesh-colour, made by mixing various colours together: see Crat. 424 E , Xen. Oec. 10. 5, Arist. de gen. an. I 18. 725^{a} 26 and Ruhnken on Timaeus Lex. s.v. To this Plato of course alludes, but he intends us also to take the word in its etymological signification, as is clear from θεοείκελον below. The stress in ἀνδρείκελον, as in θεοειδές and θεοείκελον, is on the first part of the compound: it is not the mere ἀνθρωποειδές, but the Man-like, at which the legislator aims: cf. the force of ἄνδρα in 498 E. ἀνδρείκελον might be translated by ‘the human form divine,’ except that ‘form’ suggests a wrong notion. For other views on this passage see App. V.

θεοείκελον . Il. I 131 et al. It is pleasing to meet with so cordial and spontaneous an acknowledgment of Homer as a kindred spirit in a passage so full of Plato's characteristic idealism. There is more than a grain of truth in Longinus' observation: μόνος Ἡρόδοτος Ὁμηρικώτατος ἐγένετο; Στησίχορος ἔτι πρότερον ὅ τε Ἀρχίλοχος, πάντων δὲ τούτων μάλιστα ὁ Πλάτων ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὁμηρικοῦ κείνου νάματος εἰς αὑτὸν μυρίας ὅσας παρατροπὰς ἀποχετευσάμενος ( περὶ ὕψους 13. 3). By the words τὸ ἀνδρείκελον—θεοείκελον Plato means to suggest that Man is then most manlike when he most resembles God: and (as Tennyson says) “then most godlike being most a man.” Cf. IX 589 D note This sure and abiding conviction of the presence of a divine element within us, rendering our nature essentially and truly human, makes itself felt in nearly all the dialogues of Plato. It is the ultimate source of all his idealism, religious and metaphysical, no less than moral and political, and may well be considered the most precious and enduring inheritance which he has bequeathed to posterity.

ὅ τι μάλιστα should be taken with ποιήσειαν, and εἰς ὅσον ἐνδέχεται with θεοφιλῆ: ‘until, as far as possible, they have made mere human characters as dear to God as human characters can be.’ For the σχῆμα ἐκ παραλλήλου see Schanz, Nov. Comm. Pl. pp. 12—15. Schneider can hardly be right in connecting ὅ τι μάλιστα with ἀνθρώπεια. For θεοφιλῆ Badham conjectured θεοειδῆ—a most arbitrary change, though approved by Cobet and Baiter. How could θεοειδῆ have degenerated into θεοφιλῆ, which is in all the MSS? The opposite corruption was far more likely. Plato means us to understand that God loves those most who most resemble Him: cf. X 612 E and Laws 716 C.

ἔφησθα . V 474 A.

αὐτό : viz. the statement ὡς τοιοῦτος —αὐτούς with its interpretation in the preceding exposition.

φήσει . We should expect φήσουσι, but the transition from plural to singular is common (see on 1 347 A), and Plato is probably thinking of the objector in 487 C ( φαίη ἄν τις κτλ.): cf. 489 D and 490 D. οὐκ ἀγαθήν just above (instead of μὴ ἀγαθήν as in μὴ τὴν φύσιν) prepares the way for φήσει, by shewing that the infinitives are beginning to escape from the sway of ἀμφισβητῆσαι. φήσει in φήσει λογιζόμενος II 366 A furnishes an exact parallel to φήσει here. The best MSS—see cr. n.—read φήσειν, which is retained by Schneider and others. If φήσειν is right, we must either (1) refer it to ἕξουσι, and suppose that the future is “ob ἔσεσθαι pro φάναι receptum” (Schneider, Stallbaum), or (2) supply an οἴει (J. and C.). Neither explanation is in my judgment possible. φήσεις, the reading of q and editors before Bekker, may be defended from 489 B and 489 D, where Adimantus is identified with the antagonist of 487 C, but the corruption is not a very likely one. Madvig, more suo, expels the word. Cf. Introd. § 5.

μὴ ἧττον . Herwerden would insert χαλεπούς or πικρούς, Richards ἀγρίους or ἀγριαίνειν. If ἧττον is pronounced with emphasis, its meaning is easily caught, after ἧττον in Adimantus' reply. It is virtually a quotation: “wollen wir nicht statt dieses weniger” etc. (Schneider).