Plato, Republic, ed. John Burnet, 5.478

Search the Perseus Catalog for:

← Previous Next →

[478]
καλῶς, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἕτερον ἐπιστήμης δόξα 478a ὁμολογεῖται ἡμῖν.
ἕτερον.
ἐφʼ ἑτέρῳ ἄρα ἕτερόν τι δυναμένη ἑκατέρα αὐτῶν πέφυκεν;
ἀνάγκη.
ἐπιστήμη μέν γέ που ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι, τὸ ὂν γνῶναι ὡς ἔχει;
ναί.
δόξα δέ, φαμέν, δοξάζειν;
ναί.
ἦ ταὐτὸν ὅπερ ἐπιστήμη γιγνώσκει; καὶ ἔσται γνωστόν τε καὶ δοξαστὸν τὸ αὐτό; ἢ ἀδύνατον;
ἀδύνατον, ἔφη, ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων· εἴπερ ἐπʼ ἄλλῳ ἄλλη δύναμις πέφυκεν, δυνάμεις δὲ ἀμφότεραί ἐστον, δόξα τε 478b καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ἄλλη δὲ ἑκατέρα, ὥς φαμεν, ἐκ τούτων δὴ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ γνωστὸν καὶ δοξαστὸν ταὐτὸν εἶναι.
οὐκοῦν εἰ τὸ ὂν γνωστόν, ἄλλο τι ἂν δοξαστὸν ἢ τὸ ὂν εἴη;
ἄλλο.
ἆρʼ οὖν τὸ μὴ ὂν δοξάζει; ἢ ἀδύνατον καὶ δοξάσαι τό γε μὴ ὄν; ἐννόει δέ. οὐχ ὁ δοξάζων ἐπὶ τὶ φέρει τὴν δόξαν; ἢ οἷόν τε αὖ δοξάζειν μέν, δοξάζειν δὲ μηδέν;
ἀδύνατον.
ἀλλʼ ἕν γέ τι δοξάζει ὁ δοξάζων;
ναί.
ἀλλὰ μὴν μὴ ὄν γε οὐχ ἕν τι ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ὀρθότατʼ ἂν 478c προσαγορεύοιτο;
πάνυ γε.
μὴ ὄντι μὴν ἄγνοιαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀπέδομεν, ὄντι δὲ γνῶσιν;
ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.
οὐκ ἄρα ὂν οὐδὲ μὴ ὂν δοξάζει;
οὐ γάρ.
οὔτε ἄρα ἄγνοια οὔτε γνῶσις δόξα ἂν εἴη;
οὐκ ἔοικεν.
ἄρʼ οὖν ἐκτὸς τούτων ἐστίν, ὑπερβαίνουσα ἢ γνῶσιν σαφηνείᾳ ἢ ἄγνοιαν ἀσαφείᾳ;
οὐδέτερα.
ἀλλʼ ἆρα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, γνώσεως μέν σοι φαίνεται δόξα σκοτωδέστερον, ἀγνοίας δὲ φανότερον;
καὶ πολύ γε, ἔφη. 478d
ἐντὸς δʼ ἀμφοῖν κεῖται;
ναί.
μεταξὺ ἄρα ἂν εἴη τούτοιν δόξα.
κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.
οὐκοῦν ἔφαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν, εἴ τι φανείη οἷον ἅμα ὄν τε καὶ μὴ ὄν, τὸ τοιοῦτον μεταξὺ κεῖσθαι τοῦ εἰλικρινῶς ὄντος τε καὶ τοῦ πάντως μὴ ὄντος, καὶ οὔτε ἐπιστήμην οὔτε ἄγνοιαν ἐπʼ αὐτῷ ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ μεταξὺ αὖ φανὲν ἀγνοίας καὶ ἐπιστήμης;
ὀρθῶς.
νῦν δέ γε πέφανται μεταξὺ τούτοιν ὃ δὴ καλοῦμεν δόξαν;
πέφανται. 478e
ἐκεῖνο δὴ λείποιτʼ ἂν ἡμῖν εὑρεῖν, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἀμφοτέρων μετέχον, τοῦ εἶναί τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ οὐδέτερον εἰλικρινὲς ὀρθῶς ἂν προσαγορευόμενον, ἵνα, ἐὰν φανῇ, δοξαστὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι ἐν δίκῃ προσαγορεύωμεν, τοῖς μὲν ἄκροις τὰ ἄκρα, τοῖς δὲ μεταξὺ τὰ μεταξὺ ἀποδιδόντες. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως;
οὕτω.

Republic. Plato. ed. John Burnet. Oxford. 1905.

Sponsored by Perseus Project, Tufts University.

Funding provided by The Annenberg CPB/Project.

Current edition Perseus

Πολιτεία (Greek) (Platonis Opera Tomus IV: Tetralogia VIII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905.)

Translations (1)

Republic Perseus (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 5-6. Shorey, Paul, translator. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1935-37 (printing).) — 5.478 focus

[478] Excellent, said I, and we are plainly agreed 478a that opinion is a different¹ thing from scientific knowledge. Yes, different. Each of them, then, since it has a different power, is related to a different object. Of necessity. Science, I presume, to that which is, to know the condition of that which is. But opinion, we say, opines. Yes. Does it opine the same thing that science knows, and will the knowable and the opinable be identical, or is that impossible? Impossible by our admissions,² he said. If different faculties are naturally related to different objects 478b and both opinion and science are faculties, but each different from the other, as we say—these admissions do not leave place for the identity of the knowable and the opinable. Then, if that which is is knowable, something other than that which is would be the opinable.³ Something else. Does it opine that which is not,⁴ or is it impossible even to opine that which is not? Reflect: Does not he who opines bring his opinion to bear upon something or shall we reverse ourselves and say that it is possible to opine, yet opine nothing? That is impossible. Then he who opines opines some one thing. Yes. But surely that which is not could not be designated as some one thing, but 478c most rightly as nothing at all. To that which is not we of necessity assigned nescience, and to that which is, knowledge. Rightly, he said. Then neither that which is nor that which is not is the object of opinion. It seems not. Then opinion would be neither nescience nor knowledge. So it seems. Is it then a faculty outside of these, exceeding either knowledge in lucidity or ignorance in obscurity? It is neither. But do you deem opinion something darker than knowledge but brighter than ignorance? Much so, he said. And does it lie within the boundaries 478d of the two? Yes. Then opinion would be between the two. Most assuredly. Were we not saying a little while ago⁵ that if anything should turn up⁶ such that it both is and is not, that sort of thing would lie between that which purely and absolutely is and that which wholly is not, and that the faculty correlated with it would be neither science or nescience, but that which should appear to hold a place correspondingly between nescience and science. Right. And now there has turned up between these two the thing that we call opinion. There has. 478e
It would remain, then, as it seems, for us to discover that which partakes of both, of to be and not to be, and that could not be rightly designated either in its exclusive purity; so that, if it shall be discovered, we may justly pronounce it to be the opinable, thus assigning extremes to extremes and the intermediate to the intermediate. Is not that so? It is.

Commentary

Commentary on Plato, Republic (Plato. The Republic, Vol 1-2. Adam, James, editor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902-1903.) focus

δοξάζει . See cr. n. The same conjecture had occurred to Jackson. δοξάζειν is in itself defensible and seems at first sight required by the balance of clauses ἐπιστήμη μέν γέ που—δόξα δέ. But the introduction of φαμέν breaks the balance, and suggests a new departure. The real reason for writing δοξάζει is the occurrence of ἆρ’ οὖν τὸ μὴ ὂν δοξάζει (SC. δόξα); in 478 B. Unless δοξάζει is read here, it is very difficult to supply the subject of δοξάζει there. Reading δοξάζει, again, we supply after ἦ ταὐτόν not δοξάζειν (as must be done if the infinitive is read), but δοξάζει. This too is an improvement, because it provides an exact balance to γιγνώσκει. If Plato had meant ἢ ταὐτὸν δοξάζειν, we should expect him to have written not γιγνώσκει, but γιγνώσκειν. On the corruption see Introd. § 5.

ἀμφότεραί ἐστον . The union of a plural subject with a dual verb is tolerably frequent in Plato: cf. Euthyd. 278 E , 303 C. These and other examples are quoted in Roeper de dualis usu Plat. p. 30.

ἆῤ οὖν ‐‐ δοξάζει ; J. and C. understand ὁ δοξάζων: but δόξα is more appropriate in itself, and much more easily supplied, especially if δοξάζει is read in 478 A: see note ad loc.

ἢ ἀδύνατον κτλ. Cf. Theaet. 189 B οὐκ ἄρα οἷόν τε τὸ μὴ ὂν δοξάζειν, οὔτε περὶ τῶν ὄντων οὔτε αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτό. μὴ ὄν is here the bare negative—absolute not-being. Cf. Bosanquet Companion p. 212.

μὴ ὄν γε : i.q. τὸ μὴ ὄν γε (cf. μὴ ὄντι just below), not εἰ μὴ εἴη γε (as Stallbaum and Campbell suppose). Schneider and Jowett take the right view.

δοξάζει . The subject is δόξα rather than ὁ δοξάζων, in spite of ὁ δοξάζων above. δόξα was the subject of the verb where the two stages of the argument began (478 A ἦ ταὐτόν sc. δόξα δοξάζει and 478 B ἆρ’ οὖν τὸ μὴ ὂν δοξάζει), and ought to be so in the conclusion also.

σαφηνείᾳ ‐‐ ἀσαφείᾳ . The full significance of these words does not appear till VI 508 D ff., where the relation between Light and Truth is explained. See note ad loc. and VI 511 C note

ἐντὸς δ’ ἀμφοῖν . Hartman (with Ast) prefers ἐντὸς δὴ ἀμφοῖν. It is much better to regard the expression as a step in the argument, leading to the conclusion μεταξὺ ἄρα κτλ.

οἷον ‐‐ ὄν . οἷον is adverbial; if it were an adjective the infinitive would follow. The qualification suggests that in the ultimate analysis it is inaccurate to say that phenomena ‘both are and are not’: the truth is that they lie somewhere between being and not being. Hence also οὕτως ἔχει ὡς εἶναί τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι in 477 A. See also on καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα κτλ. in 479 C. It should be noted that Plato now adds ἅμα: in 477 A it was absent. See on 479 A τούτων γὰρ δὴ κτλ.

Plato Republic 5.478

ed. John Burnet

Search the Perseus Catalog for:

Current edition Perseus

Commentary

Stable identifiers