καὶ περὶ δικαίου κτλ.
This is the first appearance of the Theory of ‘Ideas’ properly so called in the
Republic. It should be carefully noted that Plato is not attempting to prove the theory: Glauco, in fact, admits it from the first. The Theory was approached from two directions, from the side of Mind or Thought (
οἱ λόγοι οἱ ἐκ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν Arist.
Met. 19. 990^{b} 12), and from the side of Existence (
τὸ ἓν ἐπὶ πολλῶν l.c. Cf. Zeller^{4} II 1, pp. 652 ff.). It is the first of these methods which is followed throughout the present investigation. The
εἴδη provide objects for Knowledge, as opposed to Opinion, and they are capable of being known: see 476 C, E ff., 478 A, 479 E. Throughout a large part of the following discussion, we are not much concerned with the Ideas as strictly transcendent entities or
χωριστά, existing apart not only from particulars but also from the knowing Mind, for it is only in so far as he knows the Ideas that the philosopher-king can make use of them (cf. VI 484 C, D): he cannot possibly frame political institutions on the model of Ideas which he does not know. We must admit that the philosopher's apprehension of the Ideas is the relevant consideration here (cf. VI 484 C
ἐναργὲς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔχοντες παράδειγμα), but it is none the less true, and the fact cannot be too strongly insisted on, that the Ideas themselves are not mere concepts of the mind, but have a separate and independent existence of their own. See the Appendix to Book VII ‘
On Plato's Dialectic.’ The translation ‘Class’ for
εἶδος (Jowett) is inappropriate on many grounds: ‘Form’ is better: but it will be most convenient to retain the usual expression ‘Idea,’ although it is not a translation, but a transliteration, whose unfortunate identity with the English word ‘idea’ is responsible in no small measure for many imperfect and erroneous interpretations of Plato's Ideal Theory. The German translators mostly render by ‘Begriff.’ The further specifications of the Ideal Theory in this passage are as follows. Each Idea is, in and by itself, one (476 A), changeless (479 A, 479 E), and perfect (VI 484 C, D), contrasting, in each of these respects, with the phenomena which ‘partake’ of or ‘imitate’ it (476 D note). Plato does not now touch on the question how it is that Mind has knowledge of a perfection above and beyond what can be derived from observation and experience. This faculty of Mind is elsewhere—in the
Meno and the
Phaedo—explained by the pre-existence of the Soul. See on 476 C.
αὐτὸ μὲν κτλ.
: ‘each is, in itself’ (i.e. viewed apart from its association with
πράξεις etc.), ‘one, but by reason of their partnership with actions and bodies and one another, they each of them make their appearance everywhere and appear many.’ The
εἷδος of Beautiful, for example,
is, in itself, one, but by
κοινωνία with e.g. an act of heroism, a sunset, a river, etc., it
appears many. Similarly the
εἷδος of Beautiful
appears many by
κοινωνία with other
εἴδη, as when we say ‘the Good is beautiful,’ the ‘Useful is beautiful’ etc. The expression
πανταχοῦ φανταζόμενα is better suited to describe Ideas allied with sensible particulars, than Ideas allied with Ideas; but statements involving the
κοινωνία of Ideas with Ideas ‘make their appearance everywhere’ as well as those which connect the objects of sense with Ideas. In all such cases the statements themselves are of course true or false according as the
κοινωνία is real or imaginary; but whether they are false or true, the appearance of
plurality which they give to the Idea is always fallacious. Cf. Zeller^{4} II 1, p. 738 note 3 and see on 479 D. The words
ἀλλήλων κοινωνία are further discussed in App. VII.
πρακτικούς
: ‘men of action.’ These were not mentioned in 475 D, but they clearly belong to the same category.
τὴν φύσιν
. Krohn (
Pl. St. p. 95) justly observes that the
φύσις τοῦ καλοῦ of III 401 C is “the true beauty, which
has an adequate external form, whereas that of Book V is the
essence of Beauty, which is never fully expressed in any outward form.” The contrast significantly marks the greater Idealism of Books V—VII. Cf. X 597 B note
καλὰ ‐‐ πράγματα
. πράγματα is a sufficiently general term to include all the
φαινόμενα πολλά which are specified in 476 A. The persons in question may be willing to assert that a
σῶμα, a
πρᾶξις, τὸ δίκαιον, τὸ ἀγαθόν etc. are
καλά. But they refuse to go beyond isolated observations of this sort and admit that Beauty
itself exists
αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ μεθ’ αὑτοῦ μονοειδὲς ἀεὶ ὄν (
Symp. 211 B
); and hence their notions of beauty are uncoordinated, inconsistent, unstable.
ἄν τις ἡγῆται κτλ.
Cf.
Symp. 210 A
.
ἐάν τε ἐν ὕπνῳ κτλ.
It is the pre-existence of the soul which qualifies her by nature to distinguish between the Idea or Original, and the phenomenon or copy. But as we lost at birth our ante-natal knowledge of the Idea, we cannot distinguish between Ideas and phenomena until we recover that knowledge. To effect this recovery is the aim of education. The uneducated wander in a sort of dreamland, taking shadows for realities, the copy for the Original. Cf.
Phaed. 74 A
—76 D,
Men. 81 A
ff.,
Symp. 209 E
—212 A.
μετέχοντα
. Cf.
Phaed. 100 D
. The words by which Plato describes the relation of Ideas and particulars are of necessity figurative.
κοινωνία is the vaguest, and least metaphorical; side by side with it comes
παρουσία (of the Idea) and
μέθεξις (of the particular). A somewhat different figure is involved when the Idea is regarded as the Original (Urbild), and the particular as its likeness. Plato does not scruple to use both figures side by side: here, for example, the Idea was a
παράδειγμα just above (
αὐτὸ—ᾧ ἔοικεν 476 C: cf. VI 500 E ff., X 596 B).
οὗτος
. Dümmler (
Antisthenica p. 42) supposes that Plato means Antisthenes. There was undoubtedly no love lost between the two philosophers: see the authorities cited in Urban
Ueber die Erwähnungen der Phil. d. Antisthenes in d. Pl. Schr. (Königsberg 1882), and Zeller^{4} II 1, p. 296 note 2. Antisthenes was in particular a bitter opponent of the Theory of Ideas. The passage of arms between Plato and him is well known:
ὦ Πλάτων, ἵππον μὲν ὁρῶ, ἱππότητα δὲ οὐχ ὁρῶ, καὶ ὃς εἶπεν ἔχεις μὲν ᾧ ἵππος ὁρᾶται, τόδε τὸ ὄμμα, ᾧ δε ἱππότης θεωρεῖται, οὐδέπω κέκτησαι (Simplicius in
Schol. Arist. 66^{b} 44 ed. Brandis, and other authorities quoted by Urban l.c. p. 3). It is no doubt true, as Stein observes in his
Geschichte des Platonismus, that Plato's “Kunst verallgemeinert nicht bloss das Historische, sondern individualisiert auch das Allgemeine”; but Antisthenes himself could scarcely deny that the cap fits. The deictic
οὗτος is in favour of Dümmler's view, which certainly adds point to the whole passage; note in particular
χαλεπαίνῃ, παραμυθεῖσθαι, πείθειν ἠρέμα (allusions perhaps to the ferocity of his opponent: Antisthenes had nicknamed Plato
Σάθων! cf. Ath. V 220 D),
οὐχ
ὑγιαίνει (‘is barely sane’),
οὐδεὶς αὐτῷ φθόνος, and the delightful innuendo
ἄσμενοι ἂν ἴδοιμεν εἰδότα τι. Antisthenes himself wrote a work
περὶ δόξης καὶ ἐπιστήμης (D. L. VI 17), and Plato may well be thinking of it here: see next note. But we must be careful to note that Plato, even if we allow that Antisthenes is in his mind, does not refer to Antisthenes alone; he merely individualizes the type in him.
πῶς γὰρ ‐‐ γνωσθείη
; ‘for how can something which is not, be known?’ Cf.
Parm. 132 B
, C
ἓν ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν νοημάτων, vόημα δὲ οὐδενός; Ἀλλ’ ἀδύνατον, εἰπεῖν. Ἀλλὰ τινός; Ναί. Ὄντος ἢ οὐκ ὄντος; Ὄντος. Οὐχ ἑνός τινος, ὃ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν τὸ νόημα ἐπὸν νοεῖ, μίαν τινὰ οὖσαν ἰδέαν; Ναί. “Quod Parmenides simpliciter dicit
ταὐτὸν δ’ ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ οὕνεκέν ἐστι νόημα, id sibi prorsus probari Plato plus semel significat” Bonitz
Disput. Plato. duae p. 11. That everything which is known exists in a certain sense, is of course a truism. But when Plato says that the objects of knowledge ‘are,’ the kind of
οὐσία which he means is substantial, selfexistent
οὐσία. If it is really Antisthenes for whom Glauco is answering (
ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου ἀποκρίνου), the words
πῶς—γνωσθείη are exceedingly well chosen; for Antisthenes (perhaps in his
περὶ δόξης ἢ ἐπιστήμης, perhaps in
Σάθων, ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν) had argued in almost exactly the same way to prove the impossibility of contradiction. See Proclus
in Crat. 37 (Zeller^{4} II 1 p. 302 note 1)
Ἀντισθένης ἔλεγεν μὴ δεῖν ἀντιλέγειν· πᾶς γάρ, φησί, λόγος ἀληθεύει· ὁ γὰρ λέγων τὶ λέγει· ὁ δὲ τὶ λέγων τὸ ὂν λέγει· ὁ δὲ τὸ ὂν λέγων ἀληθεύει and cf. Plat.
Crat. 429 D
. It is by no means improbable that Plato has this or some similar argument of Antisthenes in view, and feathers his arrows from his victim's wing. Antisthenes and his friends would not of course admit the connotation which Plato gives to
ὄν, but Plato is not attempting to prove the Ideal theory. The object of the whole investigation is to shew that his opponents possess only
δόξα, on the assumption that the theory of Ideas is true: cf. 476 A note
