Plato Republic 5.473

ed. John Burnet

Republic. Plato. ed. John Burnet. Oxford. 1905.

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Πολιτεία (Greek) (Platonis Opera Tomus IV: Tetralogia VIII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905.)

Translations (1)
Republic Perseus (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 5-6. Shorey, Paul, translator. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1935-37 (printing).) — 5.473 focus

Commentary

Commentary on Plato, Republic (Plato. The Republic, Vol 1-2. Adam, James, editor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902-1903.) focus

κἂν εἰ μή τῳ δοκεῖ shews that Plato is contradicting a common view: cf. IX 577 D. Most men would of course admit that a perfect scheme must usually be modified if it is to be put in force. But they would not allow that λέξις has more truth than πρᾶξις; for the truth of a theory—they would say —is best tested by experience. Not so Plato, according to whom the world of Mind is not only more perfect, but truer than the world of Matter: cf. ἡ παντελῶς ἀληθής VI 502 D and note ad loc. The pointed ἀλλὰ σύ invites the assent of Glauco as a Platonist: cf. infra 475 E.

δεῖν κτλ. δεῖν is tautological after ἀνάγκαζε, but the addition of τοῦτο μέν makes it easier. Π has δεῖ, perhaps a mistake for δή, which was read by Stobaeus Flor. 43. 109. For γιγνόμενα Bywater ( J. Ph. X p. 73) would write γιγνόμεν’ ἄν or ἂν γιγνόμενα. The categoric statement is however more in harmony with ἆρ’ οἷόν τέ τι—ἐφάπτεσθαι. ‘Do not compel me to shew that what we described in words is in all respects reproduced by experience.’ See also on ἐπιτάττεις below.

φάναι : infinitive for imperative as in VI 508 B, 509 B, all of them examples of φάναι, although Plato is not averse to φάθι (VI 508 E) and ξύμφαθι (VII 523 A). The imperatival infinitive is very common in Attic inscriptions (Meisterhans^{3} p. 244).

ἐπιτάττεις : sc. γίγνεσθαι. It is hardly possible to understand ἐξευρεῖν ὡς δυνατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι (with J. and C.). As in γιγνόμενα above, so also here Socrates represents Glauco as requiring that the city should be made into a reality: cf. ἣν σὺ πόλιν οἰκίζεις in 470 E.

πειρώμεθα : subjunctive, i.q. δεῖ πειρᾶσθαι: cf. λέγωμεν δή, ὡς ἔοικεν ( Theaet. 173 C , quoted by J. and C.).

ἐπ) αὐτὸ ‐‐ εἶμι : ‘well, said I, I will enter on the very topic which’ etc. Cf. Thuc. II 36. 4 εἶμι καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν τῶνδε ἔπαινον. I have returned to the most authoritative reading, though previously I read (with Richards) ἐπ’ αὐτῷ δὴ —εἰμί. In point of sense, εἶμι is only a sort of quasi-future, and should be compared with ἀλλ’ εἶμι in the mouth of characters just about to leave the stage (e.g. Soph. Trach. 86 ). Cf. also Phaed. 100 B ἔρχομαι —ἐπιχειρῶν—καὶ εἶμι πάλιν ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνα— καὶ ἄρχομαι κτλ. According to KühnerBlass ( Gr. Gr. I 2, p. 217) the present use of εἶμι is found only in poetry and late prose; but ἀνίασιν in VII 531 C is a certain case, and so also in my opinion are ἐπίασιν and ἀπίασι in Thuc. IV 61. 3, 8. It should also be remembered that Plato by no means abjures archaic and poetic forms and idioms: see I 330 B note Vind. F reads ἐπ’ αὐτῶ (i.q. αὐτῷ) δ’ εἰμι, and εἰμί was the reading of q ^{1}. ἐπ’ αὐτῷ δή εἰμι is highly idiomatic and may be supported (with Richards) by VI 490 D, Pol. 274 B ; but it is safer to follow the MSS, which are all but unanimous.

εἰ καὶ ‐‐ κατακλύσειν : ‘even al though it is likely—just like a wave with its cachinnations—to swamp me with laughter and disgrace.’ Hartman would insert < με> before μέλλει, but the object is easily supplied; and με before μέλλει is very cacophonous. For other views of this passage see App. VI.

ἐὰν μὴ κτλ. Cf. Laws 709 E ff. Plato's famous and often quoted paradox is not in its essence so paradoxical as it appears. The abiding truth of Plato's suggestion is “that somehow or other the best and deepest ideas about life and the world must be brought to bear on the conduct of social and political administration if any real progress is to take place in society” (Bosanquet). But it was a paradox in the Athenian democracy, or so at least Plato, like Socrates, thought: hence πολὺ παρὰ δόξαν ῥηθήσεται 473 E. See for example Prot. 319 A —323 A and Gorg. 514 A —519 D: and cf. Krohn Pl. St. p. 93. Political evil is in Plato's view the result of a divorce between political power and knowledge of the good; it can only be cured by effecting their reconciliation. In the Politicus Plato's remedy is to make the philosopher (who is the true king) act through the statesman (305 C ff.: cf. Nohle Die Statslehre Platos pp. 82, 88, whose interpretation is—wrongly, as I think—questioned by Zeller^{4} II 1, p. 901 note 5): but in the Republic the union between Thought and Action is complete, and the philosopher is himself a statesman. Whether even then he would be strong enough to found the perfect city of the Republic, depends upon the amount of resistance which he would be likely to encounter: see on VI 499 B and IX 577 A.

λεγόμενοι . Though called kings and potentates, they are so in nothing but the name: cf. I 336 A note True kingship belongs only to the scientific ruler: Euthyd. 291 B ff. It is probable that Plato was already thinking throughout this passage of the hopes which he seems to have formed of the Syracusan dynasty: see Epp. VII and XIII with note on VI 499 B.

τοῦτο κτλ. : ‘unless this coalition of political power and philosophy come to pass,’ lit. ‘unless this coalesce,’ i.e. unless there be this coalescence, viz. ‘political power and philosophy.’ For a somewhat similar idiom see VII 527 B note δύναμις—φιλοσοφία is in explanatory apposition to the whole phrase τοῦτο—ξυμπέσῃ, rather than to τοῦτο alone. Otherwise we must suppose that τοῦτο is virtually for ταῦτα, the singular number emphasizing by anticipation the union of political power and philosophy (so J. and C.). But on this explanation the singular τοῦτο goes ill with εἰς ταὐτὸν ξυμπέσῃ, and with ἑκάτερον; nor are we justified in writing ταῦτα (with Richards). The dual τούτω might easily have been corrupted into τοῦτο, but τούτω ξυμπέσῃ is hardly defensible, in spite of εἰ ἔστι τούτω διττὼ τὼ βίω ( Gorg. 500 D ): cf. Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 57.

τῶν δὲ νῦν κτλ. : ‘while the numerous natures who at present pursue either to the exclusion of the other are forcibly debarred,’ sc. from exclusively pursuing either. The genitive τῶν— πορευομένων is not partitive (Schneider, Stallbaum, and others), but rather possessive, and depends on φύσεις. Had Plato meant to say ‘most of those who pursue’ he would have written οἱ πολλοί instead of α<*> πολλαὶ φύσεις, as Hartman points out. There is moreover no reason to suppose that Plato wishes to allow any exceptions whatever to his rule. Nor is πολλαί ‘volgares’ (Baiter), or ‘commoner’ (Jowett), but simply ‘numerous,’ ‘plentiful’: cf. the usage of ό πολύς in II 376 E τῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ χρόνου ηὑρημένης ( παιδείας) and τὸν πολὺν λεών 458 D. Exclusive devotion either to politics or φιλοσοφία was common, but by no means universal, as the examples of Pythagoras, Solon, and many others sufficiently attest: see Arist. Rhet. II 23. 1398^{b} 16—19. Various emendations have been proposed for πολλαί, such as χωλαί (Madvig), πονηραί (Liebhold), and πολιτικαί (Apelt), but the above explanation removes the difficulty. As regards the sentiment, it should be noted that Plato refuses to sanction the exclusive pursuit of knowledge as well as of politics. He holds “that a specialised study of merely abstract questions unfits a man for the true grasp of life and character which is the centre of real philosophy” (Bosanquet), and on this ground he would probably have condemned the one-sided enthusiasm which many persons now profess for what is usually called by them ‘research.’ Cf. VI 497 A note and 499 B.

εἰς τὸ δυνατόν . See 472 E note

πολὺ παρὰ δόξαν . 473 C note

ἐκβέβληκας =‘have let fall’ is more appropriate here than ἐμβέβληκας, which Hartman (with Flor. T) prefers, on the strength of I 344 D and other passages. ἐκβάλλειν in this sense is half-poetic, and suits well with Glauco's excited mood.

πάνυ πολλούς τε κτλ. Chiappelli (l.c. p. 202) supposes that the allusion is to Aristophanes and the comic stage. Comedy would doubtless join in the outcry; but the loudest clamour would be raised by the ‘practical politician’ to whom philosophy is foolishness, and worse: see Gorg. 484 C —486 C and cf. Theaet. 172 D —175 B. The attitude of Isocrates and his adherents would also be hostile and contemptuous (Dümmler Chron. Beiträge pp. 43—45). Glauco clearly anticipates a combined assault from different quarters.

νῦν οὕτως : “jetzt ohne weiteres” (Schneider). οὕτως is used as in ἐξαίφνης οὕτως and the like: cf. II 377 B note

ῥίψαντας τὰ ἱμάτια is illustrated by Blaydes on Ar. Wasps 408 .