Plato Republic 4.430

ἐκπλύναι . Not ἐκπλύνοι (with Herwerden); for the action of ἐκπλύναι is more rapid than that of γίγνοιτο.

χαλεστραίου κτλ. χαλεστραῖον λίτρον (or νίτρον, but λίτρον is the Attic form) came from Χαλέστρα, a lake and city in Macedonia. λίτρον is supposed to be ‘native carbonate of soda’: see Blaydes on Ar. Frogs 712 . The spelling χαλεστραῖον is established (as against χαλαστραῖον in Tim. Lex. s. v. and the Scholiast) by Hdt. VII 123 ( χαλέστρα) and other authorities quoted by Schneider. κονία as appears from ψευδολίτρου κονίας in Ar. l. c. was a preparation of λίτρον, whence Plato couples them here. See on the subject generally Dict. Ant. I p. 881.

παντὸς ἄλλου ῥύμματος is cancelled by Badham and others. It is difficult however not to feel that something is wanted to balance χαλεστραίου and κονίας, especially as these are two specific detergents of the same class. Further, without παντὸς ἄλλου ῥύμματος Plato would probably have written καὶ λύπη κτλ. The sentence as it stands rings Platonic; nor was παντὸς ἄλλου ῥύμματος at all likely to be added by a scribe. The words were also in the text used by Stobaeus and Theo Smyrnaeus: see Flor. 43. 97 and de utilit. math. p. 14. I suggest the following interpretation. The action of pleasure differs from that of pain, fear, and desire, in being more gentle, and less violent ( βίαιος). Pleasure in short relaxes ( χαλᾷ) while pain (of which fear and desire as such are both varieties) contracts: cf. III 411 A on the effect of γλυκεῖαι ἁρμονίαι, Tim. 66 C and Stallbaum on Phil. 46 D . Now χαλεστραίου suggests χαλᾶν, and it is probably for this reason that Plato compares pleasure to it. Such a play on words is quite in Plato's manner: cf. Prot. 361 D . If we suppose that other ῥύμματα were harder, and less agreeable in their action, the point of comparing pain etc. with ‘every other detergent’ will appear.

τὴν ὀρθὴν δόξαν has been questioned, on the ground that beasts cannot have ὀρθὴ δόξα. It was no doubt a feeling of this kind which gave birth to the reading αὐτήν for ὀρθήν in some inferior MSS. Herwerden employs his favourite remedy of excision; and other equally unsatisfactory remedies will be found in Hartman. The text is quite sound. True opinion is in Plato the basis of action done in ignorance of what is right but in obedience to an authority which knows. A dog and a slave act from true opinion as often as they obey a master who orders them to do what is right. So also (among others) Rettig ( Proleg. p. 109) and Krohn ( Pl. St. p. 42) rightly understand the passage. Cf. note on πολιτικήν in C below.

οὔτε ‐‐ τε =‘not only not—but also’ lays stress on the second clause: cf. 427 C, VIII 566 D, E, IX 587 A al.

μόνιμον . See cr. n. The reading of some of Stobaeus' MSS ( Flor. 43. 97) (which Dobree and others approved) appears to me almost certainly right, although it has been adopted by no recent editor. νόμιμον, as Rettig shews ( Proleg. p. 110), must be used in precisely the same sense as in δόξης ὀρθῆς τε καὶ νομίμου just before. If so, Plato flatly (except for the οὔτε πάνυ) contradicts himself. For the only reason why a δόξα is ὀρθή is that it is νόμιμος ‘in accordance with the law’: nor is it possible for even a dog to possess an ὀρθὴ δόξα which is not νόμιμος. In obeying a just command, the δόξα of a dog is therefore not οὐ πάνυ νόμιμος, but wholly νόμιμος. On the other hand μόνιμον is not only appropriate but necessary in what is practically a résumé of Socrates' whole account of courage ( δοκεῖς γάρ μοι —καλεῖν). The only difference between the ὀρθὴ δόξα of a guardian and a dog lies in this, that the former has received παιδεία, while the latter has not. And it is precisely this difference which makes the guardian's δόξα lasting, as the whole of the simile from dyeing was intended to shew ( ἵνα δευσοποιὸς κτλ. 430 A). Finally, the soldier's ὀρθὴ δόξα has just been defined (in 430 B) as σωτηρίαν διὰ παντός κτλ. To διὰ παντός the words οὐ πάνυ μόνιμον are the necessary contrast: the δόξα is in both cases ὀρθή τε καὶ νόμιμος, only you can depend on the guardian always, ἔν τε λύπαις καὶ ἐν ἡδοναῖς καὶ ἐν ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ἐν φόβοις (429 D), but not always on your dog and slave. Cf. Men. 97 E f.

ἄλλο τε ‐‐ ἀνδρείαν . With the sentiment cf. Lach. 197 A ff., where however it is because they are destitute of knowledge that courage is denied to the lower animals. Isocrates Antid. 211 speaks of dogs etc. as brave.

πολιτικήν γε ‐‐ δίιμεν . In this passage πολιτικὴν ἀνδρείαν means, I think, primarily the virtue of a πόλις as opposed to that of an ἰδιώτης: cf. 442 D πόλεώς τε καὶ ἰδιώτου. Our πόλις is brave because her soldiers are brave (429 B); so that in describing the courage of the soldiers we have really and truly been describing that of our city. But the ἀνδρεία with which we are now concerned is πολιτική in another, and more important sense, being based on ‘correct opinion’ (cf. Phaed. 82 A , B), i.e. in this instance on opinion which is in conformity with the law of the πόλις (cf. Aristotle's πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία Eth. Nic. III 11. 1116^{a} 16 ff.), and not on ‘knowledge,’ like the scientific or philosophic virtue to which we are introduced in Books VI and VII. In this Platonic connotation of the term, δημοτική or πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία is inferior both to the courage which rests upon knowledge in the Socratic sense ( Lach. 195 A , 196 E ff., Prot. 349 D ff.) and to that which rests on knowledge of the Idea of the Good (cf. VI 506 A), although it is nevertheless on a much higher plane than the so-called courage of slaves and brute beasts, because it is μετὰ παιδείας γεγονυῖα. In αὖθις—δίιμεν Siebeck ( Zur Chron. d. Pl. Dial. pp. 126 ff.) finds a promise of the Laches. To this view it seems to me a serious objection that the Laches has nothing to say of the characteristically Platonic distinction between ἐπιστήμη and ὀρθὴ δόξα: for that very reason it is probably earlier than this passage. Courage in the Laches is little more than Socratic courage (cf. Mem. IV 6. 10 ff.), for the knowledge of the good into which it is finally resolved is not knowledge of the Idea. Others have found in αὖθις a reference to the account of Courage in the individual (442 B), or to V 467 A ff., or to VI 486 B. None of these references are in point; and it is simplest to take Plato at his word. He drops the subject because further discussion of it would be irrelevant; he will resume it on another occasion if Adimantus wishes, but Adimantus is content. Cf. VII 532 D note and see also on 1 347 E. The whole of this section of the dialogue is important because it emphatically reaffirms the principle that courage as well as the other virtues enumerated here rests on ὀρθὴ δόξα and not on ἐπιστήμη. We have already seen that Plato's earlier scheme of education aims at implanting only ὀρθὴ δόξα. Cf. II 376 E note

νῦν γὰρ ‐‐ ἐζητοῦμεν . νῦν=‘as it is’: so that Cobet's ζητοῦμεν (found also in one or two MSS) is unnecessary.

πρότερον is omitted by Richards as illogical. So slight a flaw is easy to forgive; and ἔτι in μηκέτι suggests that πρότερον is genuine. Nor could Adimantus well have said that in any event he did not wish Justice— οὗ δὴ ἕνεκα πάντα ζητοῦμεν—to be discovered.

εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ . Cf. X 608 D, 612 D, Charm. 156 A , Menex. 236 B . The translation “as I am an honest man” (D. and V.) is inaccurate; but Schneider's “ich thäte ja sonst nichts recht” hits the mark. In English we require an independent clause, ‘I have no right to refuse.’

ὥς γε ἐντεῦθεν ἰδεῖν : ‘seen from where we stand,’ i.e. on a first view: cf. ὡς ἐνθένδε ἰδεῖν Pol. 289 D , infra 432 B, X 595 B, and see Grünenwald in Schanz's Beiträge etc. II 3 pp. 1—37.

ξυμφωνίᾳ ‐‐ ἁρμονίᾳ . On ἁρμονία see III 398 E note In its musical application συμφωνία is used both of consonance as in the octave or double octave and also of other musical intervals: cf. VII 531 A and von Jan's Mus. Script. Gr. p. 102 and passim. The ξυμφωνία in which σωφροσύνη consists is apparently of the former kind: cf. 432 A note

ἡδονῶν ‐‐ ἐγκράτεια . It is chiefly this which is insisted on in the popular view of σωφροσύνη taken in III 389 D ff. Cf. Xen. Cyr. VIII 1. 32 , Isocr. 3. 44, and other passages cited by Nägelsbach Nachhom. Theol. II p. 233. Here the essential mark of σωφροσύνη is ξυμφωνία as to who shall be rulers, and who subjects; a point which is not mentioned in III. In other fundamental respects, also, the two descriptions differ; and Hirzel rightly insists that the σωφροσύνη of Book IV must be examined independently and by itself (l.c. p. 409).

κρείττω ‐‐ αὑτοῦ : a common formula in the popular acceptation of σωφροσύνη: see Nägelsbach l.c.

λέγοντες . See cr. n. λέγοντες is found also in Flor. A, in some MSS of Stobaeus ( Flor. 43, 97) and in Cesenas M. λέγοντες should (with Stallbaum) be taken as agreeing with the nominative of φασι, ‘as men say, calling one lord of oneself in some mysterious way.’ δή, ‘forsooth,’ helps out οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅντινα τρόπον. For other views on this passage see App. II.

κρείττω αὑτοῦ . Stallbaum reads κρείττων αὑτοῦ, and wishes to do so also in 431 A below. The accusative is more natural in both places, partly because it suggests τὸ κρείττω αὑτοῦ εἶναι (cf. ὁ γὰρ ἑαυτοῦ κρείττων καὶ ἥττων—ἂν αὑτοῦ εἴη), partly because of κρείττω αὑτοῦ just before.