Plato Republic 3.386

Πλάτωνος Πολιτεία . On the name, characters, and date of action of the dialogue, see Introd. §§ 1, 2, 3.

κατέβην κτλ. Dionys. Hal. de comp. verb. p. 208 (Reiske) ὁ δὲ Πλάτων, τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ διαλόγους κτενίζων καὶ βοστρυχίζων, καὶ πάντα τρόπον ἀναπλέκων, οὐ διέλιπεν ὀγδοήκοντα γεγονὼς ἔτη. πᾶσι γὰρ δή που τοῖς φιλολόγοις γνώριμα τὰ περὶ τῆς φιλοπονίας τἀνδρὸς ἱστορούμενα, τά τ’ ἄλλα, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν δέλτον ἣν τελευτήσαντος αὐτοῦ λέγουσιν εὑρεθῆναι ποικίλως μετακειμένην τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς πολιτείας ἔχουσαν τήνδε “κατέβην χθὲς εἰς Πειραιᾶ μετὰ Γλαύκωνος τοῦ Ἀρίστωνος.” See also Quint. VIII 6. 64, and Diog. Laert. III 37. The latter gives as his authorities Euphorion and Panaetius. As Cicero was tolerably familiar with the writings of Panaetius, it is possible that he too has the same story in view in de Sen. V 13, where he says of Plato

The anecdote may well be true, but does not of course justify any inference as to the date of composition of the Republic. See Introd. § 4.

τῇ θεῷ . What goddess? Bendis or Athena? The festival is the Bendideia (354 A) and it is perhaps safest to acquiesce in the usual view that Bendis is here meant. “Alii Minervam intelligunt, quae vulgo ἡ θεὸς appellabatur; neque mihi videtur Socrates in ista Panathenaeorum propinquitate de Minerva veneranda cogitare non potuisse: sed quod simpliciter τὴν ἑορτὴν dicit, numina diversa statuere non sinit” (Schneider). We hear of a temple of Bendis in the Piraeus in 403 B.C. ( τὴν ὁδὸν ἡ φέρει πρός τε τὸ ἱερὸν τῆς Μουνυχίας Ἀρτεμίδος καὶ τὸ Βενδίδειον Xen. Hell. II 4. 11 ). See also Introd. § 3 and App. I.

νῦν πρῶτον . Perhaps 410 B.C. Introd. § 3.

οἱ Θρᾷκες . Probably resident aliens (as opposed to the ἐπιχώριοι or natives), living for commercial purposes in the Piraeus, which at all times contained a large admixture of foreign population. It was part of Athenian policy to encourage commercial settlers by allowing them to exercise their own cults (Foucart des assoc. relig. chez les Grecs p. 131). Foucart holds that the worship of the Thracian goddess Bendis was brought to the Piraeus by Thracian merchants (p. 84). Others have supposed that οἱ Θρᾷκες refers to envoys from Thrace, or Thracian mercenaries, the survivors of those who came to Athens in 414 B.C. (Thuc. VII 27); but the other view is more probable.

τὸ ἄστυ or

ἄστυ 327 C is regular for Athens itself as opposed to the Piraeus. Hartman would omit the article (cf. Lys. 13. 88

): but it occurs infra 328 C, Phaedr. 230 C , Arist. Pol. Ath. 38. 1 and elsewhere.

αὐτός : ‘ ipse’ ‘ erus’ ‘ the master’ as often: cf. e.g. Prot. 314 D οὐ σχολὴ αὐτῷ and the Pythagorean αὐτὸς ἔφα. With the deictic

οὗτος cf. Symp. 175 A Σωκράτης οὗτος—ἕστηκεν, ‘there goes Socrates—standing.’

ἓν λείπεται . See cr. n. ἐλλείπεται (which Hermann and others retain) is less pointed, in view of the two alternatives ἢ—κρείττους γένεσθε ἢ μένετ’ αὐτοῦ. For λείπεται said of the μεταξύ τι ( Symp. 202 A ) or third alternative, cf. Theaet. 188 A ἄλλο γ’ οὐδὲν λείπεται περὶ ἕκαστον πλὴν εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι.

ὡς ‐‐ διανοεῖσθε : ‘well, you may make up your mind that we shall refuse to listen.’ Cf. (with Stallbaum) Crat. 439 C διανοηθέντες—ὡς ἰόντων ἁπάντων ἀεὶ καὶ ῥεόντων.

μὴ is owing to the imperative: cf. Soph. O. C. 1154 and Jebb's note.

λαμπὰς κτλ . λαμπάς was the official name for a torch-race: see Mommsen Heortologie pp. 170 note, 282.

τῇ θεῷ : see on 327 A and App. I.

λαμπάδια : Harpocratio remarks ἣν νῦν ἡμεῖς λαμπάδα καλοῦμεν, οὕτως ὠνόμαζον. But λαμπάς was used for ‘torch’ even in classical Greek. Plato chooses λαμπάδιον because he has just used λαμπάς in a different sense.

διαδωσουσιν κτλ. shews that—except for the novel substitution of mounted competitors for runners—the torch-race in question was of the kind alluded to in Hdt. VIII 98 and elsewhere as held in honour of Hephaestus. The competition was not between one individual and another, but between different lines of competitors, the torch being passed on from man to man. Victory fell to the chain whose torch, still burning, first reached the goal. The well-known figure in Laws 776 B καθάπερ λαμπάδα τὸν βίον παραδιδόντας ἄλλοις ἐξ ἄλλων refers to the same form of race. Plato nowhere mentions the simpler form described by Pausanias (1 30. 2), in which individuals contended against each other: see Baumeister Denkmäler d. kl. Altert. p. 522.

ἄξιον θεάσασθαι . Songs and dances were the leading features in a παννυχίς. See Soph. Ant. 1146 —1152 and Eur. Heracl. 781 —783 ἀνεμόεντι δὲ γᾶς ἐπ’ ὄχθῳ | (the Acropolis) ὀλολύγματα παννυχίοις ὑπὸ παρθένων ἰακχεῖ ποδῶν κρότοισιν (in honour of Athena at the Panathenaea).

ἐξαναστήσομεθα κτλ. The promise is nowhere fulfilled.

μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖτε . Schanz ( Novae Comm. Plat. p. 25) shews that this phrase, which is tolerably frequent in Plato, always occurs in combination with a positive command (here μένετε) except in II 369 B.

εἰς τοῦ Πολεμάρχου . Polemarchus was older than Lysias (infra 331 D), and we are to infer that at this time Cephalus lived with him. There is no reason why we should (with Blass Att. Ber. p. 338) reject Plato's statement that Polemarchus had a house in the Piraeus: the words of Lysias (12. 16), which Blass relies upon as shewing that Polemarchus lived not in the Piraeus, but in Athens, refer to 404 B.C. and do not prove it even for that year. Lysias probably lived at this time in a house of his own in the Piraeus, as in 404 B.C. ( Lys. 12. 8 ): it is to be noted that he is mentioned along with the visitors, in contrast with Cephalus ( ἦν δ’ ἔνδον κτλ. —τεθυκὼς γὰρ ἐτύγχανεν ἐν τῇ αὐλῇ infra C). Cf. Boeckh Kl. Schr. IV p. 475 note 1 and Shuckburgh Lys. Orat. ed. 2 p. xii.

διὰ χρόνου ‐‐ αὐτόν . καί ‘indeed’ goes with the whole clause: cf. Soph. Ant. 1253 ἀλλ’ εἰσόμεσθα μή τι καὶ κατάσχετον | κρυφῇ καλύπτει καρδίᾳ θυμουμένη with Jebb's note. Tucker translates ‘for it was some time since I had so much as seen him’—throwing, I think, too much emphasis on καί.

προσκεφαλαίου τε καὶ δίφρου : virtually a hendiadys, as Hartman remarks, comparing Homer Il. IX 200 εἷσεν δ’ ἐν κλισμοῖσι τάπησί τε πορφυρέοισιν. It is somewhat fanciful to suppose (with Hartman) that Plato throughout this picture was thinking of the aged Nestor seated among his sons ( Od. III 32 ff.). τινος adds a touch of vagueness: ‘a sort of combination of cushion and chair’ (Tucker).

τεθυκὼς γάρ explains ἐστεφανωμένος: “coronati sacrificabant, ut satis constat” Stallbaum. The God to whom Cephalus had been sacrificing was doubtless Ζεὺς ἑρκεῖος, whose altar stood in the αὐλή.

οὐδὲ ‐‐ Πειραιᾶ . A negative must be supplied, “ut amice expostulabundus cum Socrate senex hoc dicere videatur: tu neque alia facis, quae debebas, neque nostram domum frequentas. Simili ellipsi nostrates: Du kommst auch nicht oft zu uns” (Schneider). οὐδέ is ‘also not’: for exx. see Riddell Digest of Platonic Idioms § 141 and Jebb on Soph. O. C. 590 f. οὐδέ in οὐδὲ πάνυ ῥᾴδιον IX 587 C is another instance, in which, as here, the idiom has a kind of colloquial effect. Stallbaum takes οὐδέ with θαμίζεις “ne ventitas quidem ad nos, h. e. raro sane domum nostram frequentas”; but his equation hardly holds good, and is not justified by Xen. Symp. 4. 23. where οὐδέ coheres closely with the emphatic σοῦ. Others have suspected corruption, proposing οὔ τι (Ast, cf. Od. V 88 πάρος γε μὲν οὔ τι θαμίζεις), οὐ δέ (Nitzsch), or οὐ δή (Hartman). οὔ τι is very unlikely; for θαμίζω is not exclusively a poetic word (cf. Laws 843 B), and we need not suppose that Plato is thinking of Homer. I agree with Hartman that οὐ δέ is improbable: δέ is not sufficiently explained by saying that it is “adversative to the idea contained in ἠσπάζετο” (J. and C., with Schneider Additamenta p. 2). None of the cases quoted by Sauppe Ep. Crit. ad G. Hermannum p. 77 ( Ar. Knights 1302 , Hdt. IX 108, Theogn. 659, 887, 1070 and Callinus I 2) seem to me to justify the change of οὐδέ to οὐ δέ. Hartman's correction is better: but I believe the text is sound.

μὴ οὖν κτλ. To this sentence Lach. 181 B C furnishes a near parallel. νεανίαις refers to Socrates' companions who had come from Athens, as opposed to Cephalus, Polemarchus and the others; the emphasis, as often, being on the καί clause: ‘associate with these young men, but come and visit us also.’ So also Boeckh Kl. Schr. IV p. 475. There is no sufficient reason for reading νεανίσκοις (with II and other MSS): see Introd. § 3.

καὶ μὴν κτλ. : ‘Indeed, Cephalus,’ etc. γε need not be added (with II and other MSS) after χαίρω: cf. Phaed. 84 D καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τἀληθῆ σοι ἐρῶ, Euthyd. 275 E 304 C al., with Jebb on Soph. O. T. 749 , 1005.

τραχεῖα καὶ χαλεπή κτλ. The language (as Ast observes) is perhaps suggested by Hesiod OD. 290 ff. μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρθιος οἶμος ἐς αὐτὴν | καὶ τρηχὺς τὸ πρῶτον· ἐπὴν δ’ εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηται, | ῥηιδίη δὴ ἔπειτα πέλει, χαλεπή περ ἐοῦσα. Cf. II 364 D note

ἐπὶ γήραος οὐδῷ . The phrase occurs first in the Iliad (XXII 60, XXIV 487) to denote the natural limit of the life of man. Cephalus is μάλα πρεσβύτης 328 B. The same meaning suits also in Od. XV 246 ( οὐδ’ ἵκετο γήραος οὐδόν) 348 and XXIII 212, Hymn. Aphr. 106, Hes. OD. 331, Hdt. III 14 and elsewhere. Leaf can hardly (I think) be right in explaining οὐδῷ as= ὁδῷ in Il. XXII 60. γήραος is a descriptive genitive (like τέλος γήραος ἀργαλέου Mimn. Fr. 2. 6, τοῦ λογου in δόλιχον—not δολιχὸν—τοῦ λόγου Prot. 329 A ), old age being itself the threshold by which we leave the House of Life. We enter as it were by one door and pass out by another. The idea underlying the phrase may be compared with Democritus' ὁ κόσμος σκηνή, ὁ βίος πάροδος· ἠλθες, εἶδες, ἀπῆλθες (Mullach Fr. Phil. Gr. I p. 356).

χαλεπὸν κτλ . χαλεπόν is neuter on account of τοῦτο in ὅ τί σοι φαίνεται τοῦτο, and τοῦ βίου is a simple partitive genitive: cf. Xen. Mem. I 6. 4 ἐπισκεψώμεθα τί χαλεπὸν ᾔσθησαι τοὐμοῦ βίου. I cannot agree with Tucker in rendering ‘disagreeable in respect of the sort of life.’ Ast takes χαλεπόν as masc. (comparing cases like III 416 B τὴν μεγίστην τῆς εὐλαβείας), but αὐτό shews that he is wrong. Translate simply ‘whether it is a painful period of life.’ It is needless to insert (with Hartman) τι after χαλεπόν: still worse is Liebhold's addition of τέλος.

ἐξαγγέλλεις : like the ἐξάγγελος in tragedy, Cephalus is the bearer of news from behind the scenes.

παροιμίαν . ἥλιξ ἥλικα τέρπει ( Phaedr. 240 C ).

ξυνιόντες : i.q. ὅταν ξυνίωσιν ‘whenever they come together.’ Such a use of the participle is admissible when the main verb is in the present of habitual action. ξυνόντες is a needless conjecture.

οὐδὲ ζῶντες . Soph. Ant. 1165 —1167 τὰς γὰρ ἡδονὰς | ὅταν προδῶσιν ἄνδρες, οὐ τίθημ’ ἐγὼ | ζῆν τοῦτον, ἀλλ’ ἔμψυχον ἡγοῦμαι νεκρόν. Cf. also Mimn. Fr. I. 1 ff.: Sim. Fr. 71 τίς γὰρ ἁδονᾶς ἄτερ<*> θνατῶν βίος ποθεινός: Eur. Fr. 1065 . Similar sentiments are very common throughout Greek literature, especially in poetry.

ἔτι ‐‐ συγγίγνεσθαι . These words are rejected by Hirschig, Cobet, and Hartman, but their genuineness is supported by the singular αὐτό in αὐτὸ ἀπέφυγον and by Plut. περὶ φιλοπλουτίας 5. 525 A ὁ Σοφοκλῆς ἐρωτηθεὶς εἰ δύναται γυναικὶ πλησιάζειν, Εὐφήμει, ἄνθρωπε, εἶπεν κτλ. In such matters Greek realism called a spade a spade. In spite of the anecdote here told, few writers have painted sadder pictures of old age than Sophocles: see for example O. C. 1235— 1238 and Fr. 684. More in keeping with the present passage is Fr. 688 οὐκ ἔστι γῆρας τῶν σοφῶν, ἐν οἷς ὁ νοῦς | θείᾳ ξύνεστιν ἡμέρᾳ τεθραμμένος.

ἀπέφυγον ‐‐ ἀποφυγών . The repetition adds a certain impressiveness to the sentence. Herwerden is in error when he ejects ἀποφυγών, which seems to have been read also by Plutarch (referred to in last note).

κατατείνουσαι is intransitive. If the meaning were (as Ast holds) transitive —man being conceived as the puppet of the desires cf. Laws 644 E—we should expect ἐπι‐ or συν‐ rather than κατατείνουσαι: see Phaed. 94 C and 98 D.

παντάπασιν κτλ. The impressive iteration is in keeping with the age and earnestness of the speaker: cf. 331 A, B.

ἐστι . Stallbaum and others eject this word, but it is not easy to see why a scribe should have inserted it, particularly in such an idiomatic position. The asyndeton before δεσποτων is regular in explanatory clauses. I read ἐστι (with A) in preference to ἔστι: the meaning ‘is possible’ does not suit, and would require ἀπαλλαγῆναι rather than ἀπηλλάχθαι. Translate ‘it is the deliverance once and for all from tyrants full many and furious.’ The grammatical subject, as in English, remains vague; it is involved in ἐπειδὰν —χαλάσωσιν. For the use of ἐστι cf. Euthyphr. 2 D φαίνεταί μοι—ἄρχεσθαι ὀρθῶς· ὀρθῶς γάρ ἐστι τῶν νέων πρότερον ἐπιμεληθῆναι. The sentence-accent falls on πολλῶν and μαινομένων and not on ἐστι. The view of old age presented here recalls the μελέτη θανάτου of the Phaedo.

εὔκολοι . Like Sophocles himself: ὁ δ’ εὔκολος μὲν ἐνθάδ’ , εὔκολος δ’ ἐκεῖ ( Ar. Frogs 82 ).

ἐκίνουν . κινεῖν ‘rouse’ is technical in the Socratic dialect for the stimulating of the intellect by interrogation: cf. (with Stallbaum) Lys. 223 A , Xen. Mem. IV 2. 2. See also Ar. Clouds 745 .

οὐ μέντοι γε . The collocation μέντοι γε, which rarely occurs in good Greek, is condemned by Porson (on Eur. Med. 675 ) and others. In Plato it is found only here and in Crat. 424 C , [ Sisyph.] 388 A. Here some inferior MSS omit γε. It would be easy (with Hoefer de particulis Plat. p. 38, Cobet, and Blaydes) to write οὐ μέντοι ὅσον γε, but “notanda talia potius quam mutanda.” The idiom, though exceptional, is (in my judgment) sufficiently supported (see the instances cited by Blaydes on Ar. Thesm. 709 ). It should also perhaps be remembered that the speaker, Cephalus, was not a native Athenian. Cf. 331 B E notes

τὸ τοῦ Θεμιστοκλέους . The story as told by Herodotus VIII 125 is probably more true, if less pointed: ὡς δὲ ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος ἀπίκετο (sc. Θεμιστοκλῆς) ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας, ἐνθαῦτα Τιμόδημος Ἀφι<*>ναῖος—φθόνῳ καταμαργέων ἐνείκεε τὸν Θεμιστοκλέα—ὡς διὰ τὰς Ἀθήνας ἔχοι τὰ γέρεα τὰ παρὰ Λακεδαιμονίων, ἀλλ) οὐ δἰ ἑωυτόν. ὁ δὲ—εἶπε· οὕτω ἔχει τοι· οὔτ) ἂν ἐγὼ ἐὼν Βελβινίτης (Belbina was a small island about 2 miles south of Sunium) ἐτιμήθην οὕτω πρὸς Σπαρτιητέων, οὔτ’ ἂν σὺ ὤνθρωπε ἐὼν Ἀθηναῖος. The changes are not due to Plato: for τῷ in τῷ Σεριφίῳ—for which Heindorf on Charm. 155 D wrongly suggests τῳ, like Cicero's Seriphio cuidam ( Cato Mai. 8)—shews that Plato's form of the story was also familiar. The Platonic version, in which Belbina has become Seriphus, and Themistocles' detractor a Seriphian, afterwards held the field.

καὶ τοῖς δή . καί is ‘also’ and δή illative.

εὔκολος ‐‐ ἑαυτῷ . The dative is used as with εὐμενής: cf. Ar. Frogs 359 μηδ’ εὔκολός ἐστι πολίταις (v.l. πολίτης). To suit the application precisely to the story we should require (1) neither would the ἐπιεικής easily endure old age with poverty, (2) nor the μὴ ἐπιεικής easily endure old age with riches. For (2) Plato substitutes ‘nor would the bad man ever attain to peace with himself by becoming rich’; thereby conveying the further idea that the bad man is not εὔκολος ἑαυτῷ under any circumstances or at any time. Richards' suggestion ἐν αὐτῷ (i.e. γήρᾳ) for ἑαυτῷ is neat, but loses sight of this additional point. The allusion to old age in the second clause, so far as it is necessary to allude to it, is contained in ποτε.

ποἶ ἐπεκτησάμην κτλ. : ‘do you want to know what I acquired, Socrates?’ ποῖα is simply ‘what’ as in Men. 87 E σκεψώμεθα δὴ καθ’ ἕκαστον ἀναλαμβάνοντες, π οῖά ἐστιν ἃ ἡμᾶς ὠφελεῖ. ὑγίειά φαμεν καὶ ἰσχὺς καὶ κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος δή· ταῦτα λέγομεν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὠφέλιμα, and in the usual τὰ ποῖα ταῦτα; There is no derision implied, as in ποῖος Κτήσιππος ( Euthyd. 291 A ) and the like: had Cephalus desired to pour scorn on the suggestion, he would have said πόθεν ἐπεκτησάμην; (cf. Crat. 398 E ): and it would be absurd to deride a charge to which you at once plead guilty ( γέγονα χρηματιστής κτλ.). If Socrates' question had been not πότερον—τὰ πλείω παρέλαβες ἢ ἐπεκτήσω, but ποῖα ἐπεκτήσω, Cephalus would have said ὁποῖα ἐπεκτησάμην: but this idiom is inadmissible, except where the same interrogative occurs in its direct form in the original question. In view of the answer ( μέσος τις κτλ.) which Cephalus gives, πόσα for ποῖα would be too precise. Of the various emendations which have been suggested, the only plausible one (in point of sense) is Richards' πότερον for ποἶ or ποῖ: this would assimilate the original and the repeated question, but is less well adapted to Cephalus' reply. Cephalus in point of fact uses an old man's privilege and accommodates his interrogator's question to his own reply. See also V 465 E note

Λυσανίας δέ . Groen van Prinsterer's suggestion ( Platon. Prosopogr. p. 111) Λυσίας for Λυσανίας is at first sight plausible, since it is in harmony with the well-known Greek custom of calling grandsons after their grandfathers: but the fashion was by no means invariable: see Blümner, Gr. Privatalterth. p. 284. [Plut.] vit. Lys. 835 C also calls Cephalus son of Lysanias.

τούτοισιν . Bekker and others read τουτοισί, but there is no reason for deserting the MSS. The archaic dative in ‐οισι is tolerably often used by Plato. In the Republic alone it recurs in 345 E, 388 D, 389 B, 468 D (Homer), 560 E, 564 C, 607 B ( ‐αισι) (poetic): see also Schneider on III 389 B, and for the usage of inscriptions Meisterhans^{3} p. 126. In this particular passage the archaic ending suits the age of the speaker; but it should be remembered that Plato's style (at least in his more mature dialogues) is not a mere reproduction of the vernacular Attic, but also in no small measure a literary language or ‘Kunstsprache,’ in which Ionisms and poetic and archaic forms are occasionally employed: see especially Hirzel Der Dialog I pp. 246—250 notes Hirzel (ib. p. 34 note 1) gives reasons for holding that a sort of κοινὴ διάλεκτος, resembling the dialect of Herodotus, was actually spoken in certain cultivated circles at Athens in the Periclean age, e.g. by Anaxagoras and his group, by the Ionian sophists and their followers etc., and some of Plato's Ionisms may be inherited from this source. Cf. VII 533 B note

οὗ τοι ἕνεκα ‐‐ ὅτι . The reading τούτου for οὗ, though supported by Stobaeus ( Flor. 94. 22), is a correction made by some one unacquainted with the idiom, which is common enough in conversational style: cf. infra 491 B ὃ μὲν πάντων θαυμαστότατον ἀκοῦσαι, ὅτι κτλ. and Ar. Frogs 108 . Hartman's τοῦ τοι (interrogative) is ingenious, but unnecessary.

διπλῇ ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι . The meaning is simply ‘twice as much as the others’: cf. e.g. Laws 868 A διπλῇ τὸ βλάβος ἐκτεισάτω and 928 B ζημιούτω— διπλῇ. The ἤ is like ἤ after διπλάσιος, πολλαπλάσιος etc. If διπλῇ meant simply ‘on two grounds,’ it could not be followed by ἤ, and we should have to regard ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι as an interpolation. Cephalus expresses himself somewhat loosely, as if loving a thing on two grounds, or in two ways, were equivalent to loving it twice as much. ταύτῃ below is defined by the ὥσπερ clause, and is preferred to ὥσπερ, partly in order to correspond to διπλῇ but stiil more to suit κατὰ τὴν χρείαν. The present passage is through Aristotle ( Eth. Nic. IV 2. 1120^{b} 14, cf. ib. IX 7. 1168^{a} 1—3) the source of the proverb about ‘parents and poets.’

ξυγγενέσθαι : ‘to meet’ in social intercourse, as in Ap. 41 A . ξυγγίγνεσθαι (suggested by Richards) would express habitual intercourse, which is not what Plato means to say. With the sentiment cf. Symp. 173 C ὅταν μέν τινας περὶ φιλοσοφίας λόγους ἢ αὐτὸς ποιῶμαι ἢ ἄλλων ἀκούω—ὑπερφυῶς ὡς χαίρω· ὅταν δὲ ἀλλους τινάς, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοὺς ὑμετέρους τοὺς τῶν πλουσίων καὶ χρηματιστικῶν, αὐτός τε ἄχθομαι ὑμᾶς τε τοὺς ἑταίρους ἐλεῶ, ὅτι οἴεσθε τὶ ποιεῖν οὐδὲν ποιοῦντες.

ἐπειδὰν ‐‐ τελευτήσειν : ‘when a man faces the thought that he must die,’ not (with Jowett) ‘when a man thinks himself to be near death,’ which would be ἐπειδάν τις ἐγγὺς εἶναι οἴηται τοῦ τελευτῆσαι, as Herwerden proposes to read (cf. Laws 922 C ὅταν ἤδη μέλλειν ἡγώμεθα τελευτᾶν). “Senum, non iuvenum τὸ οἴεσθαι τελευτήσειν est” (Hartman): the weakness of old age convinces us at last that we too must die. Cf. Simon. 85. 7—10 θνητῶν δ’ ὄφρα τις ἄνθος ἔχῃ πολυήρατον ἥβης | κοῦφον ἔχων θυμόν, πόλλ’ ἀτέλεστα νοεῖ· | οὔτε γὰρ ἐλπίδ’ ἔχει γηρασέμεν οὔτε θανεῖσθαι, | οὐδ’ ὑγιὴς ὅταν ᾖ, φροντίδ’ ἔχει καμάτου .

ἀδικήσαντα ‐‐ διδόναι δίκην . Plato is fond of this verbal play: cf Euthyph. 8 B and 8 E τῷ γε ἀδικοῦντι δοτέον δίκην. He who does not render justice in deeds must render justice in punishment: for the tale of justice must be made up. Note that we have here in ἀδικία and δίκη the first casual allusion to the subject of the Republic.

αὐτὸς κτλ . αὐτός= ipse s. ultro as opposed to οἱ λεγόμενοι μῦθοι. The verb is to be supplied by a kind of zeugma from μᾶλλόν τι καθορᾷ αὐτά (i.e. τὰ ἐκεῖ; or rather the predicate is accommodated to the second alternative. Cf. 344 B infra and VIII 553 C. To regard the bodily weakness of old age as in itself the cause of clearer vision of the world beyond may be in harmony with the doctrine of the Phaedo, but Cephalus is not represented as a Platonist. Tucker needlessly doubts the text.

καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὕπνων κτλ . καί is ‘both,’ not ‘and,’ and balances καὶ ζῇ: ‘many a time, like children, awakes out of sleep in terror and lives in the expectation of ill.’ For ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες compare Phaed. 77 D , E, and for the general sentiment Arist. Eth. Nic. I 13. 1102^{b} 8—11 ἀργία γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ὕπνος τῆς φυχῆς ᾗ λέγεται σπουδαία καὶ φαύλη, πλὴν ε<*> πῃ κατὰ μικρὸν διικνοῦνταί τινες τῶν κινήσεων, καὶ ταύτῃ βελτίω γίνεται τὰ φαντάσματα τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἢ τῶν τυχόντων.

ἡδεῖα ‐‐ γηροτρόφος . ἡδεῖα is suggested by Pindar's γλυκεῖα, and καὶ ἀγαθή, as presently appears, is not part of the quotation, but goes with ἐλπίς and is added by Plato in contrast to μετὰ κακῆς ἐλπίδος.

γηροτρόφος κτλ. : ‘to nurse him in old age, as Pindar also says.’ γηροτρόφος is best taken by itself and not with ἀγαθή .

ἀτάλλοισα κτλ . ἀτάλλω is used of rearing children, and helps out the idea of γηροτρόφος: δὶς παῖδες οἱ γέροντες. It is not clear how the fragment is to be arranged, nor to what class of Pindar's poems it belongs. See Bergk Poet. Lyr. Gr.^{4} I p. 452.

εὖ οὖν ‐‐ σφόδρα . The emphasis is quite in keeping with Cephalus' age and character; and Hartman is certainly wrong in condemning the clause: cf. 329 C, 331 B.

ὀφείλοντα ‐‐ θεῷ θυσίας τινάς . Phaed. 118 A εἶπεν, ὃ δὴ τελευταῖον ἐφθέγξατο, ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὀφείλομεν ἀλεκτρυόνα· ἀλλὰ ἀπόδοτε καὶ μὴ ἀμελήσητε. Wealth is in Cephalus' view the indispensable χορηγία ἀρετῆς.

ἀλλά γε ἓν ἀνθ) ἑνός . ἀλλά γε is extremely rare in Attic prose: in the Platonic corpus it occurs—according to the best manuscript authority—here and in Rep. VIII 543 C, Phaed. 86 E , Hipp. Maior 287 B, Phaedr. 262 A ( ἀλλά γε δή), Phaed. 116 D (id.). In some of these passages ἀλλ’ ἄγε has been conjectured — wrongly, as I think (with Schneider), at all events in the passage from the Republic:—but ἀλλ’ ἄγε cannot be read in the Phaedrus and Hippias Maior. There is no a priori objection to the collocation, which is also implied in ἀλλὰ γάρ ( γ’ ἄρα); and in later Greek ἀλλά γε aroused no objection. The meaning is ‘but still,’ originally ‘yes, but’: as Schneider says, “ γε in his dictionibus concedit aliquatenus praecedentia, sed magis urget sequentia.” There is perhaps also a dramatic motive for putting ἀλλά γε into the mouth of Cephalus: see on οὐ μέντοι γε in 329 E. Against the reading of Stobaeus ( Flor. 94. 22) ἀλλὰ ἕν γε ἀνθ’ ἑνός, we may urge the further objection that the idiomatic phrase ἓν ἀνθ’ ἑνός (‘setting one thing against another,’ as Jowett correctly translates it) seems to depend for its peculiar force (like μόνος μόνῳ and the like) on the juxtaposition of its two parts: cf. Phil. 63 B ( ἓν ἀνθ’ ἑνός) and Laws 705 B ( ἀνθ’ ἑνὸς ἕν). The passage quoted by Stallbaum from Euripides Orest. 651 ἓν μὲν τόδ’ ἡμῖν ἀνθ’ ἑνὸς δοῦναί σε χρή is quite different and does not mean ‘hoc praecipue,’ but ‘one thing in return for one thing,’ as is clear from lines 646 f.

οὐκ ἐλάχιστον is not adverbial (as Hartman and others suppose), but belongs to τοῦτο: ‘setting one thing against another, I should regard this as not the least important object for which wealth is most useful to a man of sense.’ The emphasis is characteristic: cf. 329 C, 331 A.

τὴν ἀλήθειαν κτλ. This theory of justice or righteousness is deduced from the words of Cephalus: τὸ γὰρ μηδὲ ἄκοντά τινα ἐξαπατῆσαι ἢ ψεύσασθαι being generalised into ἀλήθειαν (truthfulness, cf. τἀληθῆ λέγειν below), and μηδ’ αὖ ὀφείλοντα ἢ θεῷ θυσίας τινὰς ἢ ἀνθρώπῳ χρήματα into ἀποδιδόναι ἄν τίς τι παρά του λάβῃ. Cf. (with Wohlrab) Mimn. Fr. 8 ἀληθείη δὲ παρέστω | σοὶ καὶ ἐμοί, πάντων χρῆμα δικαιότατον. It is simply Truth and Honesty, the two chief ingredients in the popular conception of morality.

ἁπλῶς οὕτως : ‘quite without qualification.’ For this idiomatic οὕτως cf. ῥᾳδιως οὕτω II 377 B note

οἷον τοιόνδε λέγω . Similar points of casuistry are raised in Socrates' conversation with Euthydemus ap. Xen. Mem. IV 2 12 ff.

οὐδ’ αὖ κτλ. I have removed the comma before οὐδέ, because the ὁ in ὁ ἀποδιδούς covers both participles, the person in both cases being the same.

ἔφη . There is not sufficient reason for changing the best supported reading ἔφη, ἐγω to ἔφην ἐγώ. Polemarchus is throughout the introduction represented as a vivacious person: e.g. in ὁρᾷς οὖν ἡμᾶς—ὅσοι ἐσμέν (327 C), and in the lively emphasis with which he breaks in just above: πάνυ μὲν οὖν—εἴπερ γέ τι χρὴ Σιμωνίδῃ πείθεσθαι. True to his name, he is first to mingle in the fray. It is this φιλολογία on the part of his son which draws a smile from Cephalus: over-much προθυμία always struck the Greeks as laughable: cf. e.g. Eur. Ion 1172 ff. The words in which Socrates addresses Polemarchus σὺ ὁ τοῦ λόγου κληρονόμος are also somewhat more appropriate if the title was self-chosen. Cephalus leaves the argument to be carried on by the assembled company (for ὑμῖν does not mean Polemarchus and Socrates alone): whereupon Polemarchus, seizing hold on the word παραδίδωμι in its sense of ‘transmit,’ ‘bequeath,’ playfully claims the right to inherit his λόγος as Cephalus' eldest son and heir. It may be added that ἔφη ἐγώ was much more likely to be changed to ἔφην ἐγώ than vice versa. With the Greek compare Phaed. 89 C ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐμέ, ἔφη, τὸν Ἰόλεων παρακάλει.

ἅμα ᾔει πρὸς τὰ ἱερά . Soph. Fr. 206 γήρᾳ πρεπόντως σῷζε την εὐφημίαν. The editors quote Cicero Epp. ad Att. IV 16. 3 “credo Platonem vix putasse satis consonum fore, si hominem id aetatis in tam longo sermone diutius retinuisset.” Cf. the words of Theodorus in Theaet. 162 B οἶμαι ὑμᾶς πείσειν ἐμὲ μὲν <*>ᾶν θεᾶσθαι καὶ μὴ ἕλκειν πρὸς τὸ γυμνάσιον, σκληρὸν ἤδη ὄντα, τῷ δὲ δὴ νεωτέρῳ τε<*>καὶ ὑγροτέρῳ ὄντι προσπαλαίειν. It is worthy of note that the entrance and exit of Cephalus are alike associated with the services of religion: see 328 C and Introd. § 2.

ὁ τοῦ λόγου κληρονόμος . See on παῖδες ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός II 368 A.

τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ‐‐ ἐστι . Probably some current saying attributed to Simonides: there is nothing like it in his fragments. The words do not profess to be a definition of justice: if they did, τό would appear before δίκαιον. It is not likely that Simonides himself explained this particular saying as Polemarchus does, although he would not have disapproved of the explanation. In Xen. Hier. II 2 he is represented as saying that tyrants are ἱκανώτατοι—κακῶσαι μὲν ἐχθρούς, ὀνῆσαι δὲ φίλους. The words of Socrates σὺ μέν, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, ἴσως γιγνώσκεις, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγνοῶ tend to fix the responsibility of the explanation on Polemarchus alone. Probably Simonides (if the saying is his) meant no more than that we should ‘render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's.’ Plato virtually confesses in 332 B that his interpretation is forced.

ἔμοιγε : said with confidence, as Σιμωνίδῃ γε with emphasis and some mockery: with you one might disagree, but not with Simonides.

σοφὸς ‐‐ θεῖος . Cf. Prot. 315 E . σοφός and θεῖος were fashionable words of praise: in the mouth of Socrates they are generally ironical. Plato's own connotation of the word θεῖος is given in Men. 99 C οὐκοῦν, ὦ Μένων, ἄξιον τούτους θείους καλεῖν τοὺς ἄνδρας, οἵτινες νοῦν μὴ ἔχοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα κατορθοῦσιν ὧν πράττουσι καὶ λέγουσιν; Ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοῖμεν θείους τε, οὓς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν χρησμῳδοὺς καὶ μάντεις καὶ τοὺς ποιητικοὺς ἅπαντας· καὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς οὐχ ἥκιστα τούτων φαῖμεν ἂν θείους τε εἶναι καὶ ἐνθουσιάζειν, ἐπίπνους ὄντας καὶ κατεχομένους ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅταν κατορθῶσι λέγοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πράγματα, μηδὲν εἰδότες ὦν λέγουσι.

ἀνήρ . I formerly read ἁνήρ, but ἀνὴρ (in the predicate) is satisfactory enough: cf. Men. 99 D θεῖος ἀνήρ, φασίν, οὗτος.

παρακαταθεμένου κτλ. Xen. Cyr. I 6. 31 ff. καὶ ἔτι προβὰς (sc. ἐπὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων προγόνων γενόμενός ποτε ἀνὴρ διδάσκαλος τῶν παίδων ) ταῦτα ἐδίδασκεν ὡς καὶ τοὺς φίλους δίκαιον εἴη ἐξαπατᾶν, ἐπί γε ἀγαθῷ, καὶ κλέπτειν τὰ τῶν φίλων, ἐπί γε ἀγαθῷ: Mem. IV 2. 17 ff.

ὁτῳοῦν is to be taken with παρακαταθεμένου and not with ἀπαιτοῦντι.

καίτοι γε ὀφειλόμενον . There is the same dispute about καίτοι γε as about μέντοι γε and ἀλλά γε (see on 329 E, 331 B). καίτοι γε has the best MS authority in its favour here and in IV 440D: elsewhere in Plato it is not well-attested except in the νοθευόμενοι, where it occurs Min. 318 E , Axioch. 364 B , 368 E. καίτοι γε is also found occasionally in Aristophanes, Xenophon, Aristotle, and the orators: see Blaydes on Ar. Ach. 611 , and the Lex. Arist. Many distinguished critics would emend the idiom everywhere; but the instances are far too numerous for such a drastic policy. The difference between καίτοι ὀφειλόμενόν γε που (which Hoefer de part. Plat. p. 38 would read) and καίτοι γε ὀφειλόμενον would seem to be that in the former more stress is thrown on the word ὀφειλόμενον, in the latter on τοι. καίτοι γε is ‘and surely’ rather than ‘quamquam’ (as Kugler holds de part. τοι eiusque comp. ap. Pl. usu p. 20), cf. IV 440 D note The periphrasis ὀφειλόμενον—ἐστι is used of course to correspond to τὰ ὀφειλόμενα in E above: such periphrases (the principle of which is explained in Euthyph. 9 E ff.) are extremely common in Plato. See W. J. Alexander in A. J. Ph. IV pp. 299 ff.

ἀποδοτέον ‐‐ ἀπαιτοῖ : ‘well, but we were not on any account to make restoration at the time when the claimant is’—according to the Greek idiom ‘was’ —‘mad.’ Socrates, as in ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, is appealing to the admissions made by the πατὴρ τοῦ λόγου (in 331 C), as he is justified in doing when addressing his heir. ὁπότε is not—as τότε shews —the particle of ‘indefinite frequency,’ but stands for ὅτε of the direct: the whole clause τότε ὁπότε τις μὴ σωφρόνως ἀπαιτοῖ is thus in the oratio obliqua of self-quotation and exactly corresponds to εἰ μανεὶς ἀπαιτοῖ in 331 C. Madvig's ἀπαιτεῖ for ἀπαιτοῖ is therefore unnecessary. Goodwin MT. p. 213 explains the optative otherwise, but not (I think) rightly.

ἀγαθὸν μέν τι δρᾶν sc. αὐτούς, for τοῖς φίλοις depends on ὀφείλειν, to which τοὺς φίλους is the subject.

μανθάνω ‐‐ ὅτι . ὅτι is ‘because,’ not ‘that,’ as always (I believe) in Plato's use of this phrase: cf. Euthyph. 3 B , 9 B and infra III 402 E, VIII 568 E. For the sentiment cf. (with J. and C.) Xen. Mem. IV 2 17 ff.

ὀφείλεται δέ . See cr. n. In explanatory clauses of this kind δέ and not δέ γε is the correct usage: cf. infra 337 D, 344 A. I therefore follow Bekker in reading δέ.

προσήκει . ὀφειλόμενον has thus been equated with προσῆκον by means of the special cases τὸ τοῖς φίλοις ὀφειλόμενον and τὸ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ὀφειλόμενον. τὸ προσῆκον is a more general term and is the regular word in classical Greek for ‘proper conduct’ or ‘duty’ (as the Greeks conceived it), the Stoic καθῆκον being very rarely used in this sense by good authors.

ᾐνίξατο ‐‐ ποιητικῶς . Theaet. 194 C τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κέαρ, ὃ ἔφη Ὅμηρος αἰνιττόμενος τὴν τοῦ κηροῦ ὁμοιότητα. The present passage is no more serious than that in the Theaetetus: Plato knew that Simonides merely meant to say ‘it is just to render what you owe.’

ἀλλὰ τί ὄει ; is a rhetorical question, which needs and receives no answer, like τί μήν; and τί μὴν δοκεῖς; ( Theaet. 162 B ). It is equivalent to ‘of course.’ For the use of τί Stallbaum compares Gorg. 480 B τί γὰρ δὴ φῶμεν; to which there is also no reply. This explanation is preferable to that of Madvig, who gives ἀλλὰ τί οἴει to Socrates, and takes ἔφη as equivalent to συνέφη— a harsh usage in a narrated dialogue, and not likely to have been intended by Plato, because sure to be misunderstood. Liebhold's ἄλλο τι οἴει; <οὐκ> ἔφη has everything against it.

ὦ πρὸς Διὸς κτλ. ‘In the name of heaven, said I, if any one then had asked him’ etc. ‘what reply do you think he would have made to us?’ ὦ before πρὸς Διός is (as Schanz holds) an interjection, and does not require a vocative to follow it: cf. Euthyd. 287 A , 290 E. It is tempting (with Tucker) to take ὦ πρὸς Διός as part of the address to Simonides (cf. Euthyd. 294 B ὦ πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε—αὐτὼ τῷ ὄντι πάντα ἐπίστασθον). But on this view the presence of εἰ οὖν—ἤρετο forms a difficulty, and ὦ πρὸς Διός may very well go with τί ἂν οἴει— ἀποκρίνασθαι.

ὀφειλόμενον καὶ προσῆκον . It is characteristic of Plato to combine the thing explained and the explanation itself in this way: see my note on Prot. 314 A . Here ὀφειλόμενον is necessary to enable Simonides to recognise his own saying.

ἰατρικὴ ‐‐ μαγειρική . In Gorg. 463 A ff. Plato refuses the name of ‘art’ to ὀψοποιική: it is but an ἐμπειρία or τριβή, a sort of bastard adjunct to ἰατρική, as κομμωτική is to γυμναστική. Here, where less precision is required, both are regarded as τέχναι.

εἶεν according to Timaeus ( Lexicon s. v.) expresses συγκατάθεσις μὲν τῶν εἰρημένων, συναφὴ δὲ πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα. It rarely expresses συγκατάθεσις (‘assent’) and no more: see on IV 436 C. The word was pronounced εἶἑν with intervocalic aspiration (Uhlig in Fl. Jahrb. 1880 pp. 790 ff.) and may possibly be a compound of εἷα and ἕν (used as in ἓν μὲν τόδ’ ἤδη τῶν τριῶν παλαισμάτων Aesch. Eum. 589 ). εἶἑν is the usual orthography in Paris A, and has left some traces also in the Bodleian MS e.g. Gorg. 466 C .

τέχνη δικαιοσύνη . The Socratic view that Justice is an art—a view that dominates the whole of the conversation w<*> Polemarchus—is thus introduced quite incidentally.

τὸ ‐‐ λέγει . Cf. Xen. Hiero II 2 (cited above on 331 E).

τί δέ; ὁ δίκαιος κτλ. This punctuation throws more emphasis on ὁ δίκαιος than τί δὲ ὁ δίκαιος; which appears in some editions. It is therefore to be preferred in introducing the application of the two illustrations. So also below in 333 A τί δὲ δή; τὴν δικαιοσύνην κτλ.

προσπολεμεῖν explains ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν as ξυμμαχεῖν explains φίλους ὠφελεῖν. Ast's προπολεμεῖν (a conjecture of Stephanus) would leave ἐχθ<*>οὺς βλάπτειν unrepresented. Stephanus' conjecture was natural enough with the wrong reading καὶ ξυμμαχεῖν, which Ast also followed. For

ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ Hartman demands ἔμοιγε δοκεῖν; but cf. 333 B, Crito 43 D, Phaed. 108 D , Menex. 236 B . These cases shew that δοκεῖ can be used without ὡς: and ἐμοὶ ( ἔμοιγε) δοκεῖν does not occur in the Republic (Grünenwald in Schanz's Beitr. <*>ur hist. Synt. d. gr. Spr. II 3 p. 12).

ξυμβολαια are contracts where money is involved. Polemarchus (as in εἰς ἀργυρίου in B below), in harmony with the natural meaning of Simonides' saying, thinks first of pecuniary dealings as the sphere in which δικαιοσύνη acts. Socrates substitutes for ξυμβόλαια the more general term κοινωνήματα, in order once more to introduce the analogy of the arts.

εἰς τίνα δὴ κοινωνίαν is idiomatic for εἰς τίνος δὴ κοινωνίαν. Compare VIII 556 C ἢ ἐν ὁδῶν πορείαις ἢ ἐν ἄλλαις τισὶ κοινωνίαις and τὴν τιμὴν ταύτην (where the English idiom would expect τὴν τιμὴν ταύτης) in II 371 E. In spite of εἰς κρουμάτων and εἰς ἀργυρίου, it is not necessary to read (with Richards) τίνος.

παρακαταθέσθαι καὶ σῶν εἶναι . The double expression is necessary to explain κοινῇ χρῆσθαι: the κοινωνία arises because one deposits the money and by the other it is kept safe.

ἄχρηστον ‐‐ χρήσιμος . ἄχρηστος fluctuates between ‘unused’ and ‘useless’: the latter sense is predominant here and gives an epigrammatic tone to the sentence (cf. ἐν μὲν χρήσει ἄχρηστος, ἐν δὲ ἀχρηστίᾳ χρήσιμος in D). It is noticeable that Plato does not take into account the possibility of money being deposited at interest: in this case the money could not be said to be useless.

καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ : not ‘to the individual and to the state,’ but ‘both in dealings with others, and in personal concerns.’ The words καὶ ἰδίᾳ are, strictly speaking, irrelevant, for it is with κοινωνήματα (in the widest sense) that we are concerned. They are to be regarded merely as a rhetorical amplification for the sake of emphasis: cf. infra 350 A, 351 A notes

οὐκ ἂν οὖν κτλ. See cr. n. Some may think that we should read οὐκοῦν (with the majority of MSS) and cancel εἴη after σπουδαῖον (so also Vind. D), understanding ἐστι. The accidental omission of ἄν is however not uncommon in Plato's MSS: see on IV 437 B.

οὗτος καὶ φυλάξασθαι . Because knowledge of anything implies knowledge also of its opposite, according to the usual Socratic view. See Phaed. 97 D οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπεῖν προσήκειν ἄνθρωπον—ἀλλ’ ἢ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον· ἀναγκαῖον δὲ εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον εἰδέναι, Charm. 166 E , Hipp. Min. 367 A ff. See also Stewart's Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics Vol. I p. 378.

φυλάξασθαι κτλ. See cr. n. With the emendation in the text, the argument is as follows: (1) he who can πατάξαι, can φυλάξασθαι: (2) he who can φυλάξασθαι ( νόσον), can λαθεῖν ἐμποιήσας ( νόσον): (3) he who can κλέψαι ( τὰ τῶν πολεμίων), is a good φύλαξ of an army. Thus the predicate of each step in the argument corresponds to the subject of the step next following: for λαθεῖν ἐμποιήσας ( νόσον) is to be taken as parallel to κλέψαι ( τὰ τῶν πολεμίων). The argument is unsound, and not intended to be serious: it is enough that it suffices to bewilder Polemarchus. For a further discussion on this passage see App. II.

στρατοπέδου γε κτλ. The στρατηγός must be both φυλακτικος τε καὶ κλέπτης according to Socrates in Xen. Mem. III 1. 6.

κλέπτειν and

κλέμμα were used (especially by Spartans) with reference to military operations involving surprise and stealth (Classen on Thuc. v 9. 5).

κλέπτης ‐‐ ἀναπέφανται . Cf. Hipp. Min. 365 C ff., where this view is worked out at length, ib. 369 B ἀναπέφανται ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν ψευδής τε καὶ ἀληθής and Xen. Mem. IV 2. 20 ff. ἀναπέφανται, as J. and C. remark, expresses an unexpected result—here a paradox. Like ὁ ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνων ἀμείνων, the conclusion is a logical inference from the Socratic identification of virtue and knowledge, made without regard to experience.

ἀγαπᾷ , ‘esteems,’ is said with reference to ἐσθλόν in Hom. Od. XIX 395 f. μητρὸς ἑῆς πατέρ’ ἐσθλόν, ὃς ἀνθρώπους ἐκέκαστο | κλεπτοσύνῃ θ’ ὅρκῳ τε. The suggested ἄγαται for ἀγαπᾷ τε would be too strong: see Symp. 180 B μᾶλλον— θαυμάζουσιν καὶ ἄγανται—ὅταν ὁ ἑρώμενος τὸν ἐραστὴν ἀγαπᾷ, where the meaning of ἀγαπᾷ is shewn by οὕτω περὶ πολλοῦ ἐποιεῖτο in 180 A.

τοῦτο ‐‐ ἔτι . So Euthyphro (15 B) harks back to his first definition of piety (6 E) after he has been refuted by Socrates. Cf. also VII 515 E note

δοκεῖ does double duty, first with τοῦτο and then with δικαιοσύνη: cf. VI 493 A, VII 517 B, 525 B, 530 B and (with Stallbaum) Ap. 25 B . Hartman needlessly doubts the text.

φίλους δὲ λέγεις κτλ. The same mode of argument recurs in 339 B ff. Cf. also Hipp. Maior 284 D.

φίλοι κτλ. Schneider rightly observes that κατὰ δὴ τὸν σὸν λόγον below tends to shew that ἀλλ’ ὅμως —βλάπτειν is interrogative. The argument is in the form of a dilemma: either a it is just to injure those who do us no injustice (and benefit those who do), or b it is just to injure friends and benefit foes. The first alternative is immoral ( πονηρός), and the second directly opposed to Simonides' view. Socrates suppresses the words which I have put in brackets, because they lessen rather than increase the immorality of the conclusion: the second alternative is expressed in full as the αὐτὸ τοὐναντίον ἢ τὸν Σιμωνίδην ἔφαμεν λέγειν .

ὅσοι κτλ. : not ‘those of mankind who are in error’ (J. and C.) but ‘those who have mistaken their men’: cf. Phaedr. 257 D τοῦ ἑταίρου συχνὸν διαμαρτάνεις. So also Schneider, and Davies and Vaughan.

πονηροὶ γὰρ κτλ. Stallbaum (followed by D. and V.) wrongly takes αὐτοῖς as ‘in their eyes.’ The reasoning is difficult only from its brevity. If it is δίκαιον βλάπτειν ἀδίκους, and men sometimes suppose that a man is good when he is bad ( πονηροὶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσὶν ‘for they have bad friends’), then since friend has been defined as one whom we suppose to be good (334 C), it is sometimes δίκαιον βλάπτειν φίλους. Stallbaum's view is quite inconsistent with the definition of friends in 334 C as οὓς ἄν τις ἡγῆται χρηστούς.

τὸν φίλον καὶ ἐχθρόν . Hartman (with some inferior MSS) wishes to insert τόν before ἐχθρόν; but cf. infra III 400 D and many other examples cited by himself. To pronounce them all corrupt is to destroy the basis on which our knowledge of Platonic idiom rests.

τὸν δοκοῦντά τε ‐‐ καὶ τὸν ὄντα . The meaning required—‘he who both seems and is good’—would be more correctly expressed by τὸν δοκοῦντά τε—καὶ ὄντα (so Ast and others), but “aliquid tribuendum interpositis ἧ δ’ ὅς, quae negligentiam repetendi, si est negligentia, saltem excusant” (Schneider, who compares also infra 341 B ποτέρως λεγεις τὸν ἄρχοντά τε καὶ τὸν κρείττονα). In τὸν δὲ δοκοῦντα μέν, ὄντα δὲ μή Polemarchus expresses himself more accurately.

ὁ ἀγαθός ‐‐ ὁ πονηρός . Socrates unfairly neglects the δοκῶν, although according to Polemarchus' amended definition the ἀγαθός who seemed πονηρός would not be a friend, nor the πονηρός who seemed ἀγαθός an enemy. Polemarchus' theory indeed points to a division of men into three classes: friends, enemies, and those who are neither (viz. those who seem good and are bad, and those who seem bad and are good). The somewhat ideal view that the ἀγαθός is φίλος and the πονηρὸς ἐχθρός is genuinely Socratic (cf. Mem. II 6. 14 ff.): it is part of the wider view that all men desire the good ( Symp. 206 A , Gorg. 467 C ff.).

προσθεῖναι ‐‐ βλάπτειν . ἤ after τῷ δικαίῳ must mean ‘or in other words’: cf. infra 349 E πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ ἀξιοῦν πλέον ἔχειν and Phaed. 85 D ἐπὶ βεβαιοτέρου ὀχήματος, ἢ λόγου θείου τινός (so the Bodleian, but ἤ is cancelled by many editors). The late expression Φαίδων ἢ περὶ ψυχῆς involves essentially the same use of ἤ. .The clause ὡς—κακῶς is summed up in τούτῳ, and the whole sentence means: ‘do you wish us to make an addition to our account of justice, or in other words to say now—in addition to our original definition where we said it was just to do good to friends and harm to enemies—that it is just to do good to friends if they are good etc.’ This explanation is (I think) the least vulnerable one, if the text is to be retained. With προσθεῖναι used absolutely cf. 339 B. For other views see App. III.

ἔστιν ἄρα κτλ. Cf. Crito 49 A ff., Corg. 469 B , [ περὶ ἀρετῆς] 376 E. This chapter contains the only element of permanent ethical interest and value in the discussion with Polemarchus—the only element, moreover, which reappears in a later book of the Republic (11 379 B). The underlying principle—that κακῶς ποιεῖν = κακὸν ποιεῖν—is in accordance with the traditional Greek view of life. For illustrations we may cite Od. XVIII 136 f. τοῖος γὰρ νόος ἐστὶν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων | οἷον ἐπ’ ἦμαρ ἄγῃσι πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε, Arch. Fr. 70 (Bergk), and Simon. Fr. 5. 10—14 ἄνδρα δ’ οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι | ὃν ἀμάχανος συμφορὰ καθέλοι· | πράξας μὲν εὖ πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, | κακὸς δ’ εἰ κακῶς <τις>, | κἀπὶ πλεῖστον ἄριστοι, τούς κε θεοὶ φιλῶσιν. The same point of view is manifest in the transition of meaning in μοχθηρός and πονηρός from ‘laborious,’ ‘afflicted’ (e.g. Hesiod Fr. 95. 1 Göttling) to ‘depraved.’ Conversely, prosperity makes one morally better, as in Solon 13. 69 f. τῷ δὲ κακῶς ἔρδοντι θεὸς περὶ πάντα τίθησιν | συντυχίην ἀγαθήν, ἔκλυσιν ἀφροσύνης, and in the frequent identification of εὐπραγία or εὐδαιμονία with εὖ πράττειν e.g. Charm. 172 A , 173 D, Alc. I 116 B, Arist. Eth. Nic. I 8. 1098^{b} 20. It is by the analogy of the arts that Socrates in this chapter seeks to prove, first the identification κακῶς ποιεῖν = κακὸν ποιεῖν, and second that the good man cannot harm others: the Socratic conception of right conduct as an art is still predominant. It is important to observe that it was by means of this Socratic weapon that Plato achieved this noble anticipation of Christian ethical theory (St Matth. 5. 44 al.). Cf. also Gorg. 472 D ff.

ἀνθρώπους δὲ κτλ. Cf. 352 E— 353 E.

οὐκ ἦν σοφὸς ‐‐ εἰπών . Teichmüller ( Lit. Fehd. I p. 22 note) finds in this an allusion to Xenophon, who puts into the mouth of Socrates (addressing Critobulus in Mem. II 6. 35) the words ἔγνωκας ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν εἶναι, νικᾶν τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιοῦντα, τοὺς δὲ ἐχθροὺς κακῶς: but the reference is only to 331 E σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θεῖος ἀνήρ. The presents φησίν and νοεῖ are used in a general way, because such a theory and such an interpretation of it might be held by any one at any time: in οὐκ ἦν σοφὸς ὁ ταῦτα εἰπών the time is changed to the past to suggest οὐκ ἦν Σιμωνίδης ὁ ταῦτα εἰπών (Simonides being σοφός 331 E). But for ὁ ταῦτα εἰπών, ἦν would be ἐστι. It is a mistake to take ἦν as ‘is after all’: ἦν is hardly so used in Plato without ἄρα, nor is Phaedr. 230 A (cited by Goodwin MT. p. 13) an example of that idiom.

ἐάν τις αὐτὸ φῇ ‐‐ Σιμωνίδην : as Xenophon virtually does in Hier. II 2: see 331 E note

τῶν σοφῶν τε καὶ μακαρίων ἀνδρῶν . μακάριος is somewhat stronger than θεῖος, which it suggests, μάκαρες being a usual epithet of gods. The whole phrase is intended to carry us back to 331 E σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θεῖος ἀνήρ. Ast's view that μακαρίων means “qui ante nostram aetatem floruerunt,” as if ‘sainted,’ misses the allusion to 331 E, and is a little far-fetched: it is enough that μακάριος conveys the same ironical commendation as θεῖος: cf. (with Stallbaum) Men. 71 A .

ἐγὼ γοῦν . See cr. n. With Hartman, I adopt Bekker's restoration: cf. VII 527 D. For γοῦν A everywhere writes γοὖν .

Περιάνδρου κτλ. Periander, Xerxes and Perdiccas are taken as types of tyrants, and no tyrant is σοφός ( Rep. IX 587 D). It is noticeable that Periander does not appear in the list of the seven wise men in Prot. 343 A . The expedition of Xerxes against Greece is cited by Callicles in Gorg. 483 D in connexion with the doctrine that might is right. In Περδίκκου the allusion is to Perdiccas II, father of Archelaus ( Gorg. 471 B ): he died late in 414 or early in 413, three years before the probable date of action of the Republic ( Introd. § 3), after proving himself a fickle friend and foe to the Athenians during the Peloponnesian war. Ismenias is mentioned again in Men. 90 A as having become rich δόντος τινός—<*> νῦν νεωστὶ εἰληφὼς τὰ Πολυκράτους χρήματα. There can be no doubt that he is to be identified with the Ismenias who (see Xen. Hell. III 5. 1 ) in 395 took money from Timocrates the Rhodian, envoy of the Persian King, in order to stir up war against Sparta, and who in 382, when the Spartans had seized the Cadmea, was condemned on this charge among others ( Xen. Hell. V 2. 35 ; Plut. Pelop. 5. 2). Plato implies that Ismenias kept enough Persian gold to enrich himself. he was no true Greek if he did not. But what is meant by saying that he had received the money of Polycrates? This question has been much discussed. Possibly ‘the money of Polycrates’ (with allusion, of course, to the riches of the Samian tyrant) was a sarcastic expression current in Athens for ‘the money of Timocrates’: this is perhaps the more likely as we are informed that the Athenians got no share of it themselves ( Hell. III 5. 2). Plato would naturally avail himself of such a political gibe to express his dislike of a man who took gold from the natural enemy of Greece ( Rep. V 470 C) to stir up not war, but sedition (ib. 470 B), and withdraw Agesilaus from fighting with the barbarian: for his political ideal in foreign policy was that of Cimon. See also on V 471 B. It is not however likely, I think, that the present passage was written after Ismenias' death, for Plato is not given to reviling his contemporaries after their death. That the other three persons cited by Plato were already dead would only make his reproof of the living more marked and scathing. The present passage—so far as it goes—is on the whole in favour of Teichmüller's view ( Lit. Fehd. I p. 25) that the first book of the Republic was written soon after 395, when the disgraceful affair was still fresh in men's minds. See Introd. § 4.

οἰομένου is to be pressed (as in III 395 D, 409 C: cf. IV 431 C): their power is fancied, not real: they cannot even do the thing they want: cf. Gorg. 467 A ff. πῶς ἂν οὖν οἱ ῥήτορες μέγα δύναιντο ἢ οἱ τύραννοι ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐὰν μὴ Σωκράτης ἐξελεγχθῇ—ὅτι ποιοῦσιν ἃ βούλονται;— οὔ φημι ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς ἃ βούλονται. He alone (says Plato) is truly powerful who wills what is good and has the power to obtain it.

ὡς δὲ διεπαυσάμεθα . Cobet's suggestion ὡς δὲ δὴ ἐπαυσάμεθα misses the point. No doubt διαπαύομαι is (as he says) “intermitto orationem post aliquam moram denuo dicturus” (cf. Tim. 78 E , Symp. 191 C ), but this is precisely the sense required, for the question with which Socrates concludes ( τί ἂν ἄλλο κτλ.) shews that he desires to resume the discussion.

ταῦτ’ εἶπον refers to εἶεν—φαίη εἶναι.

συστρέψας ‐‐ διαρπασόμενος : ‘gathering himself up he sprang at us like a wild beast as though he would seize and carry us off.’ Thrasymachus comes down like a wolf on the fold. ἧκεν is not from <*>κω, but from ἵημι: this is also Ast's view (in his Lex. Plat.). The expression ἥκειν ἐφ’ ἡμᾶς would be too weak after συστρέψας ἑαυτὸν ὥσπερ θηρίον. The object to ἧκεν is ἑαυτόν, easily supplied from συστρέψας ἑαυτόν: lit. ‘he let himself go at us.’ Cf. Ar. Frogs 133 . It should be noted also that compounds of ἵημι occasionally drop ἑαυτόν altogether and become intransitive (e.g. VIII 563 A, Prot. 336 A ). Hartman's ᾖττεν for ἧκεν is not likely to find favour. For διαρπασόμενος Cobet would read διασπασόμενος. Plato however does not use διασπᾶν of harrying by wild beasts, but in the sense of disiungere, seiungere (VI 503 B, Laws 669 D): and even Cobet does not propose to change Pol. 274 B διηρπάζοντο ὑπ’ αὐτῶν (i.e. θηρίων). J. and C.'s citation of Il. XVI 355 αἶψα διαρπάζουσιν (i.e. οἱ λύκοι τὰς ἄρνας) seems to me (in spite of Hartman's wonder) strictly relevant, if only we take διαρπάζειν as ‘harry,’ and not (with J. and C.) as ‘tear in pieces.’

τίεὐηθίζεσθε κτλ. εὐηθίζεσθε refers to the readiness of the interlocutors to assent to one another's questions: cf. Charm. 175 C οὕτως ἡμῶν εὐηθικῶν τυχοῦσα ἡ σκέψις καὶ οὐ σκληρῶν.

ὑποκατακλινόμενοι : a metaphor, not from the wrestling schools, but from taking a lower or inferior seat at table or the like: cf. Symp. 222 E ἐὰν οὖν ὑπὸ σοὶ κατακλινῇ Ἀγαθών and Plut. quomodo adul. ab amico internoscatur 58 D τὰς τοιαύτας ὑποκατακλίσεις (alluding to men who take the front seats at theatres etc., in order to flatter the rich by giving up their seats to them). Thrasymachus' brutal frankness is not intended by Plato to be altogether wide of the mark: see App. II and 335 A note

μὴ ‐‐ φιλοτιμοῦ ἐλέγχων . A common reproach against Socrates: cf. Theae<*>. 150 C.

ὅπως μοι κτλ. This idiom is colloquial and abrupt, almost rude: cf. 337 B and the examples cited in Goodwin MT. p. 94. Thrasymachus will not tolerate the stale and barren platitudes— note ὕθλους below—of ordinary disputation: cf. [ Clitoph.] 409 C οὗτος μὲν—τὸ συμφέρον ἀπεκρίνατο, ἄλλος δὲ τὸ δέον, ἕτερος δὲ τὸ ὠφέλιμον, ὁ δὲ τὸ λυσιτελοῦν and Stewart's Nicomachean Ethics Vol. I p. 16, with the references there quoted.

εἰ μὴ πρότερος ‐‐ γενέσθαι . The θηρίον of 336 B has become a wolf. This is the earliest allusion in Greek literature to the belief that if a wolf sees you first you become dumb. Like Virgil Ecl. IX 53 the present passage favours Schaefer's emendation Αύκος εἶδέ ς); for Αύκον εἶδες in Theocr. XIV 22.

μὴ χαλεπὸς ἡμῖν ἴσθι : ἀεὶ θρασύμαχος εἶ, said Herodicus on one occasion to the sophist (Arist. Rhet. II 23. 1400^{b} 20).

ἐξαμαρτάνομεν ‐‐ ἁμαρτάνομεν : the preposition is often dropped in repeating a compound verb: cf. V 452 A, VII 533 A, X 608 A and my note on Prot. 311 A . I can see no sufficient reason for inserting τι before ἐξαμαρτάνομεν (with Π and some other MSS), although Stallbaum and others approve of the addition.

μὴ γὰρ δὴ οἴου κτλ. Cf. Laws 931 C, where there is a similar a fortiori sentence couched in the imperatival form.

ἑκόντας εἶναι . This phrase is used sixteen times by Plato, always in negative clauses, and generally in the nominative or accusative (Grünenwald in Schanz's Beiträge zur hist. Synt. d. gr. Spr. II 3. 1 ff.).

οἴου γε σύ, ὦ φίλε : i.e. ἡμᾶς σπουδάζειν ὅ τι μάλιστα φανῆναι αὐτό. For the justification of this view see App. IV.

εἰκός ἐστιν . There is no reason for omitting ἐστίν (with Hartman and apparently also Usener Unser Platotext p. 40).

χαλεπαίνεσθαι . This strained use of the passive of χαλεπαίνω in order to make the antithesis to ἐλεεῖσθαι formal as well as real is not found elsewhere in Plato. For parallels see Cope's Rhetoric of Aristotle Vol. 1 p. 299.

σαρδάνιον . Plato uses this expression as Homer does, of a sinister smile which bodes pain to others: Od. XX 301 f. μείδησε δὲ θυμῷ | σαρδάνιον μάλα τοῖον (of Odysseus among the suitors). Among later authors it more frequently denotes the forced smile which disguises the sufferer's own pain; and so apparently Simonides used the phrase ( Fr. 202 A Bergk). The explanations volunteered by the ancients apply only to the non-Homeric usage: the Scholiast, however, at the end of his note on this passage correctly remarks, μήποτε οὖν τὸ Ὁμηρικόν, ὅθεν καὶ ἡ παροιμία ἴσως ἐρρύη, “ μείδησε δὲ κτλ.,” τὸν ἀπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν χειλῶν γέλωτα καὶ μέχρι τοῦ σεσηρέναι γιγνόμενον σημαίνει. The spelling σαρδόνιον came into vogue through the popular etymology from the bitter Sardinian herb, ἧς οἱ γευσάμενοι δοκοῦσι μὲν γελῶντες, σπασμῷ δὲ ἀποθνῄσκουσιν (Schol.). The Scholiast's suggested derivation from σαίρειν ( ringi, as of an angry dog) suits the meaning which the phrase bears in Homer and Plato, and is probably right. Photius' σαρδάζων· μετὰ πικρίας γελῶν preserves the δ .

ποιήσοις is rejected by Cobet and Herwerden. “Post οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἤ, τί ἄλλο ἤ, πάντα μᾶλλον ἤ verbum omittunt” (says Cobet, quoting Theophr. Char. c. 25). ποιήσοις is not however otiose, but suggests the phrase πάντα ποιεῖν, ‘leave nothing undone,’ as in Euthyph. 8 C πάντα ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσι φεύγοντες τὴν δίκην: cf. Ap. 39 A .

ἐρωτᾷ . I formerly read ἐρωτῷ (with Goodwin MT. p. 277). A few inferior MSS have ἔροιτο. The optative is certainly the regular periodic construction in clauses of this kind: but the indicative may perhaps be allowed in loose conversational style.

τυγχάνει ὄν . Stallbaum explains ὄν as ‘being true,’ and τι as the subject to τυγχάνει. This view is perhaps less natural than to make ὄν the copula and τι the predicate: for the pronoun ‘it’ i.e. τὸ ἐρωτώμενον (Schneider) can be quite easily understood. For the use of τυγχάνει ὄν (‘really is’) cf. II 379 A, VII 518 E, Euthyph. 4 E with my note ad loc.

ὡς δή . The force of ὡς in this common ironical expression ( quasi vero, cf. Gorg. 468 E , 499 B) is referred by Jebb ( Soph. O. C. 809 ) to an ellipse: ‘(do you mean) forsooth that.’ An objection to this theory is that it will not explain ὡς δή τοι in cases like II 366 C, Phaedr. 242 C , Tim. 26 B . It seems better to explain these usages on the same principle. The view that ὡς is exclamatory will not account for II 366 C, and is not specially appropriate in the other places. Neither is it easy to make ὡς= ἐπεί (‘your illustration is excellent, seeing that the cases are so very similar!’ Tucker). Schneider (on II 366 C) regards ὡς as nearly equivalent to ὥστε (cf. note on II 365 D). Probably ὡς is in reality consequential (like the English ‘so’), the relative retaining its original demonstrative sense. This explanation will, I believe, suit all the passages in question.

περὶ δικαιοσύνης κτλ. περὶ δικαιοσύνης and τούτων are rejected by Herwerden, but the fulness of expression suits the arrogant tone of Thrasymachus.

τί ἀξιοῖς παθεῖν ; Here and in what follows there is a play on the judicial formula παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτεῖσαι, where παθεῖν refers to δεσμός φυγή θάνατος ἀτιμία, and ἀποτεῖσαι to fines. In a δίκη τιμητός, the defendant if found guilty would be asked in the words τί ἀξιοῖς παθεῖν καὶ ἀποτεῖσαι to propose an alternative penalty to that demanded by the accuser; after which it was the duty of the judges finally to assess ( τιμᾶν) the penalty: cf. Ap. 36 B and Laws 933 D. It is partly the paronomasia in the words παθεῖν μαθεῖν (cf. the ancient text πάθος μάθος Aesch. Ag. 176 ) which draws from Thrasymachus the mock compliment ἡδὺς γὰρ εἶ (‘you are vastly entertaining’) although (cf. ἆ <*>διστε 348 C) Thrasymachus is also jeering at the simplicity of Socrates.

πρὸς τῷ μαθεῖν καὶ ἀπότεισον . Hertz and Herwerden conjecture παθεῖν for μαθεῖν: but this would make Thrasymachus ignore Socrates' identification of παθεῖν with μαθεῖν. In ἀπότεισον ἀργύριον Plato no doubt satirizes (somewhat crudely, it must be allowed) the avarice of Thrasymachus and his class, in contrast with whom Socrates has no money, because his conversations are gratis.

εἰσοίσομεν . The metaphor is from a banquet to which each contributes his share: cf. Symp. 177 C ἐγὼ οὖν ἐπιθυμῶ ἅμα μὲν τούτῳ ἔρανὀν εἰσενεγκεῖν κτλ.

ἀπειρημένον αὐτῷ . See cr. n. The retention of εἴη after αὐτ ῷ can only be defended by regarding μὴ εἰδὼς μηδὲ φάσκων as equivalent to εἰ μὴ εἰδείη μηδὲ φάσκοι and carrying on the εἰ; but this is excessively harsh and no parallel has yet been adduced. Of the two alternatives, to insert an εἰ before ἀπειρημένον or εἴη, and to drop εἴη (with Bremius), I prefer the latter as simpler in itself and accounting more easily for the corruption. The accusative absolute may have been misunderstood and εἴη inserted by a negligent reader owing to εἰ in the previous line. Richter (in Fl. Jahrb. 1867 p. 137) inserts δ) before αὐτῷ and retains εἴη, regarding εἴ τι καὶ οἴεται and ἀπειρημένον δ’ αὐτῷ εἴη as coordinate clauses under the rule of the same εἰ; but to this there are many objections. Tucker's suggestion εἰ, ὅ τι καὶ οἴεται περὶ τούτων, ἀπειρημένον αὐτῷ εἴη κτλ. (‘if, in regard to whatever he thinks about them, it were forbidden’ etc.) strikes me as heavy and cumbrous.

μὴ οὖν ἄλλως ποίει : 328 B note

ἄκουε δή calls for attention, ostentatiously, like a herald: cf. X 595 C, Ap. 20 D , Prot. 353 C .

Πουλυδάμας ‐‐ ὁ παγκρατιαστής . οὗτος ὁ Πουλυδάμας ἀπὸ Σκοτούσσης ἦν, πόλεως θεσσαλίας, διασημότατος παγκρατιαστής, ὑπερμεγέθης, says the Scholiast. He was victor in the ninety-third Olympian games 408 B.C. Stallbaum refers to Pausanias (VI 5) and others for the wonderful stories of his prowess. His statue at Olympia by Lysippus was very famous. Cf. Boeckh Kl. Schr. IV p. 446.

τοῦτο τὸ σιτίον κτλ. Teichmüller ( Lit. Fehd. II p. 196) finds in this a confirmation of his belief that Plato was a vegetarian: but it is implied merely that a beef diet was not considered wholesome for persons out of training. Aristotle may have had this passage in view in Eth. Nic. II 5. 1106^{a} 36 ff., though his illustration is there taken from quantity, and not from quality, of food. Cf. also Gorg. 490 C .

ξυμφέρον ἅμα καὶ δίκαιον . The sophistry is undisguised. If βόεια κρέα is Polydamas' συμφέρον and δίκαιον, and δίκαιον is assumed to be everywhere identical with itself, it follows that βόεια κρέα is our δίκαιον, but not our ξυμφέρον, otherwise we are also κρείττονες. To avoid this, Wohlrab ingeniously takes ἐκείνου not with ἥττοσιν but with ξυμφέρον ἅμα καὶ δίκαιον, as if the meaning were ‘Polydamas' συμφέρον καὶ δίκαιον is also δίκαιον for us.’ This explanation is however linguistically harsh and comparatively pointless. On βδελυρὸς γὰρ εἶ Tucker aptly reminds us that the prevailing feature in Theophrastus' description of the βδελυρός ( Char. c. 11) is παιδιὰ ἐπιφανὴς καὶ ἐπονείδιστος (‘obtrusive and objectionable pleasantry’ Jebb).

κακουργήσαις . Cope observes that the word is used “of the knavish tricks and fallacies which may be employed in rhetorical and dialectical reasoning” ( Aristotle's Rhetoric Vol. 1 p. 17). Cf. Gorg. 483 A (cited by Tucker).

εἶτ’ οὐκ οἶσθα κτλ. ‘Do you mean to say you don't know’ etc. The division of constitutions into Monarchy, Oligarchy (for which Aristocracy is here substituted) and Democracy was familiar to everybody: see Aeschin. Ctes. 6, Tim. 4 ὁμολογοῦνται γὰρ τρεῖς εἶναι πολιτεῖαι παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, τυραννὶς καὶ ὀλιγαρχία καὶ δημοκρατία. Cf. Whibley Greek Oligarchies pp. 17, 24. Thrasymachus proceeds to define κρείττων as ὁ κρατῶν (not ὁ ἰσχυρότερος, as Socrates had insinuated): ‐κρατοῦνται in δημοκρατοῦνται and ἀριστοκ ρατοῦνται well brings out his meaning. Cf. Laws 714 B νόμων εἴδη τινές φασιν εἶναι τοσαῦτα ὅσαπερ πολιτειῶν, and C οὔτε γὰρ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον οὔτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὅλην βλέπειν δεῖν φασι τοὺς νόμους, ἀλλ) ἥτις ἂν καθεστηκυῖα ᾖ πολιτεία, ταύτῃ δεῖν τὸ ξυμφέρον ὅπως ἄρξει τε ἀεὶ καὶ μὴ καταλυθήσεται, καὶ τὸν φύσει ὅρον τοῦ δικαίου λέγεσθαι κάλλισθ) οὕτως. Πῶς; Ὅτι τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον ἐστί .

τίθεται δέ γε : Laws l. c. τίθεται δήπου, φασί, τοὺς νόμους ἐν τῇ πόλει ἑκάστοτε τὸ κρατοῦν. ἦ γάρ; Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. Ἆῤ οὖν οἴει, φασί, ποτὲ δῆμον νικήσαντα ἤ τινα πολιτείαν ἄλλην ἢ καὶ τύραννον θήσεσθαι ἑκόντα πρὸς ἄλλο τι πρῶτον νόμους <*> τὸ συμφέρον ἑαυτῷ τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ μένειν; Πῶς γὰρ ἄν; Aristotle makes it the distinguishing mark of his three perverted forms ( παρεκβάσεις) of constitution ( τυραννίς, ὀλιγαρχία, δημοκρατία) that they seek their own and not τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον: Pol. Γ 7. 1279^{b} 4 ff.

τὸν τούτου ἐκβαίνοντα κτλ. Laws 714 D οὐκοῦν καὶ ὄς ἂν ταῦτα τὰ τεθέντα παραβαίνῃ, κολάσει ὁ θέμενος ὡς ἀδικοῦντα, δίκαια ταῦτ) εἶναι ἐπονομάζων; Ἔοικε γοῦν. Ταῦτ) ἄῤ ἀεὶ καὶ οὕτω καὶ ταύτῃ τὸ δίκαιον ἂν ἔχοι. Φησὶ γοῦν οὗτος ὁ λόγος. νόμος and δίκαιον are identified by this theory.

ταὐτὸν εἶναι δίκαιον . Herwerden would expunge ταὐτόν, but ταὐτὸν is not more otiose here than τὸ αὐτὸ below.

ξυμφέρον γέ τι . There is here a hint of the main purpose of the Republic, which is to prove that δίκαιον is ξυμφέρον in the truest sense for the individual and the state.

οὐ ‐‐ μέντοι . “In interrogationibus haec particula” ( μέντοι) “ita cum οὐ negatione coniungitur, ut gravissima sententiae vox intercedat, quo modo aliquis eis quae ex altero quaerit summam veritatis ingerit speciem” (Hoefer de part. Plat. p. 34). μέντοι is simply ‘of course,’ ‘surely’: ‘surely you regard it as just to obey the rulers, do you not?’ The idiom is frequent in Plato. The other examples of it (cited by Stallbaum) in the Republic are infra 346 A, VII 521 D, IX 581 A, 584 A, X 596 E.

πότερον δὲ ἀναμάρτητοι κτλ. The reasoning echoes that of 334 C above.

τιθέναι ‐‐ τίθεσθαι : we should expect τιθέναι in both cases, as the ἄρχοντες according to the theory we are discussing are κρείττονες and supreme as legislators: but the middle of personal interest is naturally used in combination with τὰ ξυμφέροντα ἑαυτοῖς: cf. infra 341 A.

τί λέγεις σύ ; a favourite eristic formula: see Ar. Clouds 1174 τοῦτο τοὐπιχώριον | ἀτεχνῶς ἐπανθεῖ, τὸ τί λέγεις σύ;

τοίνυν : not ‘therefore,’ but ‘also,’ a frequent use in Plato. In the Republic it occurs 29 times, according to Kugler de particulae τοι eiusque comp. ap. Pl. usu p. 34.

ὅταν οἱ μὲν ‐‐ τοῖς δέ (i.e. τοῖς ἀρχομένοις). These two clauses depend, not on ὡμολογῆσθαι, but on ποιεῖν: it is just to do τὰ ἀξύμφορα τοῖς ἄρχουσιν as often as the rulers unwillingly prescribe what is evil for themselves and so long as Thrasymachus says it is just for subjects to do what the rulers have prescribed. Desire for brevity and balance leads Plato to put both clauses under the government of ὅταν, although ‘since’ rather than ‘whenever’ is the more appropriate conjunction for introducing the second: for Thrasymachus does not sometimes but always assert that it is just to obey the rulers. The suggested reading φῄς for φῇς would require us to take τοῖς δέ κτλ. as an independent sentence, and leave μὲν in οἱ μέν without a corresponding δέ.

αὐτό is ‘the matter,’ ‘the case before us’: cf. IV 428 A ( αὐτῷ), VII 518 B ( αὐτῶν), 524 E ( αὐτῷ ), Theaet. 172 E al. The text has been needlessly suspected by Madvig and other critics.

οὑτωσί : not ‘in that case’ (Campbell), but (with Jowett) simply ‘thus,’ as explained in δίκαιον—λέγεις: cf. Ap. 26 E οὑτωσί σοι δοκῶ; οὐδένα νομίζω θεὸν εἶναι;

ναὶ μὰ Δία κτλ. The interlude is intended to mark that the first stage has been reached in the refutation of Thrasymachus.

ἐὰν σύ γε is of course ironical. The disciples of the rival disputants now enter the fray.

τὸ γὰρ τὰ κελευόμενα κτλ. If this, and no more, had been Thrasymachus' definition, it would remain unrefuted; commands would be commands, whether expedient for the rulers or not.

δ ἡγοῖτο ‐‐ ξυμφέρειν . This explanation is involved in Clitophon's earlier statement τὸ τὰ κελευόμενα ποιεῖν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων: that which the rulers κελεύουσι is what they believe to be in their interests. Clitophon's defence finds no justification in the terms of Thrasymachus' definition; but it was the most obvious way of attempting to reconcile that definition with the admission that rulers are capable of erring.

τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον κτλ. Bonitz ( Zeitschr. f. öst. Gymn. 1865 p. 648), followed by Wohlrab, proposes to add the words τὸ ξυμφέρον after ξυμφέρον, “parum venuste,” as Hartman thinks. Neither is it well (with Hartman) to omit τοῦ κρείττονος. The apparent harshness of the construction (‘that which seems to be the stronger's interest to the stronger’) is justified by its brevity and precision, and by the desire to introduce the exact words of the original definition into its amended form.

συκοφάντης . Cf. (with Tucker) Arist. Soph. El. 15. 174^{b} 9 σοφιστικὸν συκοφάντημα τῶν ἐρωτώντων and Rhet. II 24. 1402^{a} 14 ἐπὶ τῶν ἐριστικῶν τὸ κατὰ τί καὶ πρὸς τί καὶ πῇ οὐ προστιθέμενα ποιεῖ τὴν συκοφαντίαν.

λέγομεν τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως . Bekker (with whom Shilleto on Dem. F. L. § 91 agrees) would insert μέν after λέγομεν: but (as Schneider remarks) the emphasis on τῷ ῥήματι does duty instead of the particle, and even otherwise, μέν is not essential: cf. III 398 A (where Shilleto would also add μέν), infra 343 C, II 363 E, X 605 C al.

τὸ δέ =‘whereas in point of fact’ is a favourite Platonic idiom: cf. IV 443 C, VII 527 A, 527 D al.

ἐπιλιπούσης . See cr. n. The present, which Stallbaum and others adopt, may be right, but the older reading is at least as good. The failure in knowledge must precede the actual error. For the mistake see Introd. § 5.

ἀποκρίνεσθαι . The imperfect infinitive, as Schneider remarks ( Addit. p. 6).

συκοφαντεῖν is explained in ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς—κακουργοῦντά σε, where κακουργοῦντα (as Schneider observes) is not used as in 338 D of putting an evil or sophistical interpretation on a theory, but of damaging a man's personal reputation and credit: “scilicet existimationis et pecuniae detrimentum facturus sibi videbatur sophista ideoque Socratem se, quamquam frustra, impugnare in sequentibus quoque criminatur.”

μὴ λαθών : “si non latueris” (Schneider). Stephanus conjectured μήν and Ast με for μή: but either change would destroy the antithesis between λανθάνειν and βιάζεσθαι—secret guile and open fraud: cf. II 365 D ἀλλὰ δὴ θεοὺς οὔτε λανθάνειν, οὔτε βιάσασθαι δυνατόν. Hirschig's excision of μὴ λαθών greatly impairs the emphasis.

τὸν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν . The only exact parallel to this use of ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν in Plato is Laws 656 E σκοπῶν δ’ εὑρήσεις αὐτόθι τὰ μυριοστὸν ἔτος γεγραμμένα ἢ τετυπωμένα οὐχ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν μυριοστὸν ἀλλ’ ὄντως. This idiomatic phrase is rare before Plato, who uses it 77 times with the meaning ‘to put the matter in a word,’ implying that other and possibly more exact means of describing the thing in question might be found. In 52 of these cases the phrase is combined with πᾶς or οὐδείς and their family of words, in the sense of fere, propemodum: its use in other connexions is in part a return to old poetic usage; cf. Aesch. Pers. 714 , Eur. Hipp. 1162 , Heracl. 167. See Grünenwald in Schanz's Beiträge zur hist. Synt. d. gr. Spr. II 3, pp. 21 ff. The other examples in the Republic are V 464 D, VIII 551 B, IX 577 C.

ὃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες : viz. in 340 E κατὰ τὸν ἀκριβῆ λόγον. The antecedent is the phrase ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ. The conjecture of Benedictus, ὅν for ὅ, though adopted by several editors, would (as Schneider remarks) leave it uncertain whether λόγῳ or τόν was referred to by the relative. There is no MS authority for ὅν.

ξυρεῖν ‐‐ λέοντα . παροιμία ἐπὶ τῶν καθ) ἑαυτῶν τι ἢ ἀδύνατα ποιεῖν ἐπιχειρούντων λεγομένη (Schol.). The proverb is very rare, and does not seem to occur elsewhere in classical Greek.

οὐδὲν ὢν καὶ ταῦτα : ‘though you were a nonentity at that too’: i.e. at bluffing me, as well as in other respects. So (I think) Schneider, rightly (“aber auch darin ist's nichts mit dir”). Others (e.g. Shorey in A. J. Ph. XVI p. 234) explain ‘and that too though you are a thing of naught.’ But in that case καὶ ταῦτα would surely precede οὐδὲν ὤν. Tucker can hardly be right in making καὶ ταῦτα simply ‘moreover’ ‘too,’ ‘and proved a failure, too.’ Nor (in spite of J. B. Mayor in Cl. Rev. X p. 110) is it quite enough to translate (with Campbell) ‘though here again you are nobody,’ i.e. ‘with as little effect as ever.’

καὶ λέγε ‐‐ ὄντα is expunged by Herwerden, but the emphatic reiteration is in keeping with the whole tone of the passage. For the sense we may recall the words of the so-called oath of Hippocrates εἰς οἰκίας δὲ ὁκόσας ἂν ἐσίω, ἐσελεύσομαι ἐπ’ ὠφελείῃ τῶν καμνόντων (Vol. 1. p. 2 ed. Kühn).

ἑκάστῳ τούτων : viz. τοῖς κάμνουσι, τοῖς ναύταις, and in general the sub jects upon whom the art is exercised. The expression is a little vague (cf. VIII 543 C note) but it is rash and unnecessary to insert εἴδει or write ἑκάστῳ <τῶν εἰδῶν> τούτων, as Tucker recommends.

ἆῤ οὖν ‐‐ τελέαν εἶναι . I have retained this reading, in deference to the MSS, but it is open to grave objection. As the sentence stands, the meaning is that every art (as well as every object of an art—this is implied by καί) has one συμφέρον, viz. to be as perfect as it can, but no other. In the sequel this is interpreted to mean that no art needs any additional ἀρετή; since it is ( qua art) perfect already: οὔτε γὰρ πονηρία οὔτε ἁμαρτία οὐδεμία οὐδεμιᾷ τέχνῃ πάρεστιν κτλ. (342 B). But the words of the sentence ἆρ’ οὖν—τελέαν εἶναι have to be taken very loosely in order to admit of this interpretation. We must suppose them equivalent to ‘No art has a συμφέρον of its own, unless you are to call the fact that it is perfect its συμφέρον.’ If Plato had written the passage as it stands in q and in the margin of Flor. U (both MSS probably of the fifteenth century), it would be open to no objection: ἆρ’ οὖν καὶ ἑκάστῃ τῶν τεχνῶν ἔστι τι ξυμφέρον ἄλλο <οὗ προσδεῖται>, ἢ <ἐξαρκεῖ ἑκάστη αὐτὴ αὑτῇ, ὥστε> ὅ τι μάλιστα τελέαν εἶναι; This reading was adopted by Bekker, and by Stallbaum in his first edition; and a careful study of the whole passage confirms the judgment of Schneider, “Platonem non solum potuisse, sed etiam debuisse vel haec ipsa vel consimilia scribere.” The same sense, expressed more briefly, may be obtained by the insertion of δεῖ before εἶναι: ‘has every art also a ξυμφέρον besides (i.e. besides the ξυμφέρον of its object), or must it be as perfect as possible?’ <*>κάστην does not require to be repeated any more than in 346 A below. The alteration is very slight; for δεῖ εἶναι, δεῖναι may have been written by mistake and δ afterwards ejected.

νῦν κτλ. : ‘has now been invented.’ The art of medicine is not coeval with body. I can see no reason for thinking (with Campbell) that νῦν is corrupt for ἡμῖν.

σῶμά ἐστι πονηρὸν κτλ. Lys. 217 B ἀναγκάζεται δέ γε σῶμα διὰ νόσον ἰατρικὴν ἀσπάζεσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν.

ὅπως ἐκπορίζῃ . This is said by Weber (Schanz's Beiträge II 2, p. 67) to be the only example in Plato of ὅπως with the subjunctive after a preterite tense.

ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς . Hartman proposes ἔτ’ αὐτοῖς. αὐτοῖς (sc. ὀφθαλμοῖς, ὠσίν) may be emphatic (ipsis), and ἐπί, ‘over and above,’ ‘besides’: ‘we require in addition to the organs themselves, an art’ etc. But it is perhaps simpler to make ἐπί=‘ to preside over’: cf. ἐφ’ οἷς ἔστιν VI 511 E note

εἰς ταῦτα means εἰς ὄψιν καὶ ἀκοήν. The art in question considers what is advantageous with respect to ( εἰς) seeing and hearing.

ἐκποριούσης . See cr. n. ἐκποριούσης appears in three Florentine MSS. The present is difficult, if not impossible, in so close a union with the future: cf. X 604 A and VI 494 D. See Introd. § 5.

ἢ αὐτὴ ‐‐ σκέψεται ; This question (which is of course to be answered in the negative) shews the awkwardness of the reading of A in ἆρ’ οὖν—τελέαν εἶναι (341 D), which might almost be construed to mean that each art does seek its own συμφέρον, viz. the perfection of itself.

ἕωσπερ κτλ. : ‘that is, so long as an art, taken in its strict sense’ (“streng genommen” Schneider) ‘preserves its essence entire and unimpaired.’ The predicate is ὅλη ἥπερ ἐστί, and ἀκριβής = ἀκριβὴς οὖσα in the sense which ἀκριβής bears throughout this passage (341 B al.). Hartman's insertion of ἡ before ἀκριβής is unsatisfactory; his alternative proposal to change ἀκριβής to ἀκριβῶς spoils the emphasis, and gives a wrong sense.

ἐπιστήμη is here a synonym for τέχνη. All arts rule: and ruling is itself an art or science, not a happy inspiration (cf. Mem. III 6). Like other arts, ruling seeks only the good of that which it rules.

ὡμολόγηται γὰρ ‐‐ χρηματιστής . Ast compares Arist. Pol. A 9. 1258^{a} 10 ff. ἀνδρίας γὰρ οὐ χρήματα ποιεῖν ἐστιν ἀλλὰ θάρσος, οὐδὲ στρατηγικἧς καὶ ἰατρικῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν νίκην, τῆς δ’ ὑγίειαν.

ᾧ ἂν ‐‐ βλέπων . ᾧ is of course ( τῷ) ὃ, and τῷ ἀρχομένῳ is also neuter (not masculine), like ἀρχομένου in D. Bremius took τῷ ἀρχομένῳ as masculine, and consequently changed (with inferior MS authority) πρὸς ἐκεῖνο into πρὸς ἐκεῖνον: he has been followed by Stallbaum and others. But as ᾧ must be neuter, it would be intolerable to make ἀρχομένῳ masculine, since both words (as denoting the same object) are covered by the same article, viz. τῷ before ἀρχομένῳ. ἐκείνῳ is of course neuter also.

εἰς τοὐναντίον . Justice has now become τὸ τοῦ ἥττονος (rather than κρείττονος) συμφέρον.

κορυζῶντα : ‘snivelling,’ μωραίνοντα, μυξάζοντα· κόρυζα γὰρ ἡ μύξα, ἣν οἱ Ἀττικοὶ κατάρρουν φασίν (Schol.). Ruhnken on Timaeus Lex. s.v. quotes among other passages Lucian Alex. § 20 ἦν δὲ τὸ μηχάνημα τοῦτο ἀνδρὶ μὲν οἵῳ σοι, εἰ δὲ μὴ φορτικὸν εἰπεῖν, καὶ οἵῳ ἐμοί. πρόδηλον καὶ γνῶναι ῥᾴδιον, τοῖς δὲ ἰδιώταις καὶ κορύζης μεστοῖς τὴν ῥῖνα τεράστιον καὶ πάνυ ἀπίστῳ ὅμοιον, and Horace Sat. I 4. 8 (of Lucilius) emunctae naris.

ὅς γε αὐτῇ κτλ. “Apte αὐτῇ interpositum; nam ipsi nutrici Socratis insipientiam opprobrio esse, Thrasymachus vult significare” Ast. Richter ( Fl. Jahrb. for 1867 p. 140) ought not to have suggested ὅς γε αὐτός. The sense is ‘for she cannot teach you to recognise even sheep or shepherd,’ not ‘you do not know either sheep or shepherd’ (J. and C.), which would require οὔτε— οὔτε. The phrase is clearly a half-proverbial expression borrowed from the nursery.

ὅτι οἴει τοὺς ποιμένας κτλ. Thrasymachus gives a new turn to the nursery saying. The illustration from the shepherd and his sheep (which is now for the first time introduced) was used by the historical Socrates to justify the opposite conclusion ( Xen. Mem. III 2. 1 ) ἐντυχὼν δέ ποτε στρατηγεῖν ᾑρημένῳ τῳ, Τοῦ ἕνεκεν, ἔφη, Ὅμηρον οἴει τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα προσαγορεῦσαι ποιμένα λαῶν; ἆρά γε ὅτι, ὥσπερ τὸν ποιμένα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖ, ὅπως σῶαί τε ἔσονται αἱ ὄϊες, καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἕξουσιν, οὕτω καὶ τὸν στρατηγὸν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖ, ὅπως σῶοί τε οἱ στρατιῶται ἔσονται, καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἕξουσι, καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα στρατεύονται τοῦτο ἔσται; So also Arist. Eth. Nic. VIII 13. 1161^{a} 12 ff. εὖ γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς βασιλευομένους, εἴπερ ἀγαθὸς ὢν ἐπιμελεῖται αὐτῶν, ἵν’ εὖ πράττωσιν, ὥσπερ νομεὺς προβάτων· ὅθεν καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα ποιμένα λαῶν εἶπεν. In Plato Pol. 271 D ff. the deities of the golden age are compared to shepherds, and the comparison of a good ruler to a shepherd is very frequent in Plato: see Ast's Lex. Plat. s. v. νομεύς. In Socrates' view ‘the shepherd careth for his sheep.’ With Thrasymachus' attitude should be compared the picture of the tyrant in Theaet. 174 D as a συβώτην ἢ ποιμένα ἤ τινα βουκόλον—πολὺ βδάλλοντα (he squeezes as much milk as he can out of his flock): also Solon ap. Arist. Rep. Ath. ch. 12 εἰ γάρ τις ἄλλος ταύτης τῆς τιμῆς ἔτυχεν, οὐκ ἂν κατέσχε δῆμον οὐδ’ ἐπαύσατο, | πρὶν ἀνταράξας πῖαρ ἐξεῖλεν γάλα. In the word ἀμοργοί or ἀμολγοί used by Cratinus in the sense of πόλεως ὄλεθροι (Meineke Fr. Com. Graec. II 1, p. 140) the image is the same. Compare the eloquent words of Ruskin in Sesame and Lilies § 43 and Milton's Lycidas 113—129.

ἡγεῖ διανοεῖσθαι . The conjecture διακεῖσθαι for διανοεῖσθαι is tempting in view of διατεθείη which follows, but διανοεῖσθαι is better suited to σκοπεῖν and βλέποντας just above. For the somewhat rare construction Schneider compares Laws 626 D αὐτῷ δὲ πρὸς αὑτὸν πότερον ὡς πολεμίῳ πρὸς πολέμιον διανοητέον, ἢ πῶς ἔτι λέγομεν; and 628 D.

πόρρω εἶ περί . πόρρω can hardly (I think) mean ‘far from’ (sc. knowing): this would require πόρρω εἶ <τοῦ τι εἰδέναι> περί, as Herwerden suggests: cf. Lys. 212 A οὕτω πόρρω εἰμὶ τοῦ κτήματος ὥστε κτλ. The meaning is (I believe) ‘so far on’; ‘so profoundly versed are you in justice’ etc.: cf. πόρρω ἤδη ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου Ap. 38 C and phrases like πόρρω σοφίας ἐλαύνειν: see also Blaydes on Ar. Wasps 192 . Such biting sarcasm is appropriate in the mouth of Thrasymachus.

ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν . Arist. Eth. Nic. V 3. 1130^{a} 3 f. διὰ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ δικαιοσύνη μόνη τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὅτι πρὸς ἕτερόν ἐστιν· ἄλλῳ γὰρ τὰ συμφέροντα πράττει, ἢ ἄρχοντι ἢ κοινωνῷ (with Stewart's note) and ib. 10. 1134^{b} 5.

τῷ ὄντι is not τῷ ὄντι δικαιῳ, but revera (as Stallbaum observes).

ὡς ἀληθῶς as well as ἀληθῶς, τῷ ὄντι, and the like, is used to indicate that a word is to be taken in its strict and full etymological sense ( εὐ‐ηθικῶν): cf. Phaed. 80 D εἰς Ἅιδου ὡς ἀληθῶς, and infra II 376 B, V 474 A, VI 511 B, VIII 551 E notes

τά γε οἰκεῖα ‐‐ μοχθηροτέρως . Wells aptly cites the refusal of Deioces in Herod. I 97 to continue as an arbiter: οὐ γάρ οἱ λυσιτελέειν τῶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐξημεληκότα τοῖσι πέλας δἰ ἡμέρης δικάζειν. Cf. also Ap. 23 B , 31 B. In like manner Aristotle mentions it as one of the safeguards of a democracy engaged in agriculture that the necessity of looking after their private interests will prevent the citizens from often attending the assembly ( Pol. Z 4. 1318^{b} 11). Plato is fond of the comparative ending in ‐ως (affected, says Cobet, by those “qui nitidissime scribunt”): see Kühner-Blass Gr. Gramm. I p. 577.

ἀπεχθέσθαι . ἀπέχθομαι as a present is not well attested in Plato's time; and the aorist ‘to incur the enmity of’ is at least as suitable in point of meaning here.

λέγω γὰρ ὅνπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον . Ast points out that nothing in what has been already said corresponds to the words τὸν μεγάλα δυνάμενον πλεονεκτεῖν, and reads ὅπερ on slight MS authority. But no special reference is intended: the words mean simply ‘I mean the man I meant just now.’ Thrasymachus asserts that he has all along been referring to τὸν μεγάλα κτλ.

ἢ τὸ δίκαιον : i.e. ἢ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι τῷ δικαίῳ. The reading αὑτῷ (found in A, but no dependence can be put on this MS in such matters) would require the omission of the article before δίκαιον (so Stallbaum and others). Tucker inclines to render ‘how much more he is personally benefited by being unjust than by justice,’ but the ordinary view is preferable.

ἣ οὐ κτλ. This laboured sentence is perhaps intended as a parody of some sophistic style: cf. Gorg. 448 C .

ὧν depends on

μέρει .

ἀνδραποδισταί : ‘kidnappers.’ The word is defined by Pollux III 78 as ὁ τὸν ἐλεύθερον καταδουλωσάμενος ἢ τὸν ἀλλότριον οἰκέτην ἀπαγόμενος. Thessaly had an evil name for this kind of crime (Blaydes on Ar. Plut. 521 ); but the frequent references to it in Attic literature shew that Greece itself was not exempt. See on IX 575 B and the article in Stephanus-Hase Thes. s.v.

τῶν τοιούτων κακουργημάτων is usually explained as depending on κατὰ μέρη, but as κατὰ μέρη is adverbial, this is somewhat awkward. It is perhaps better to regard the genitive as partitive, τι being omitted as in κινήσειεν ἂν τῶν ἀξίων λόγου νόμων IV 445 E, where see note.

πρὸς τοῖς ‐‐ χρήμασιν is virtually equivalent to πρὸς τῷ τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀφελέσθαι, and combined by zeugma with δουλώσηται. Cf. I 330 E note

εὐδαίμονες ‐‐ κέκληνται . The generic singular τις has become a plural, as in Phaed. 109 D , infra VII 536 A. Envy of tyranny and tyrants was common in the Athens of Plato's younger days: compare Gorg. 484 A , 470 D (where it is maintained by Polus that Archelaus of Macedon is εὐδαίμων, and Socrates says ὀλίγου σοι πάντες συμφήσουσι ταῦτα Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ξένοι 472 A) and Alc. II 141 A ff. The plays of Euripides in particular (see VIII 568 A) often eulogised the tyrant: e.g. Troad. 1169 ff., Fr. 252, Phoen. 524 ff. In earlier days Solon's friends had blamed him for not making himself tyrant of Athens: see the dramatic fragment (33 ed. Bergk), where the prevalent passion for tyranny is forcibly expressed in the lines ἤθελον γάρ κεν κρατήσας, πλοῦτον ἄφθονον λαβὼν | καὶ τυραννεύσας Ἀθηνῶν μοῦνον ἡμέραν μίαν, | ἀσκὸς ὕστερον δεδάρθαι κἀπιτετρῖφθαι γένος (4—6). See also Newman's Politics of Aristotle I pp. 388—392.

οὐ γὰρ ‐‐ τὴν ἀδικίαν . Cf. Gorg. 483 A φύσει μὲν γὰρ πᾶν αἴσχιόν ἐστιν, ὅπερ καὶ κάκιον, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, νόμῳ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν.

ἱκανῶς γιγνομένη : ‘realised on an adequate scale’ (D. and V.). For the construction of γίγνεσθαι with an adverb cf. (with Ast) Soph. 230 C and infra VI 504 C. After τὸ δ’ ἄδικον below, Herwerden would insert τό to go with ἑαυτῷ λυσιτελοῦν τε καὶ ξυμφέρον, but only τυγχάνει (and not τυγχάνει ὄν) is to be understood after ἄδικον; nor is the last clause intended as a strict and formal definition of injustice.

καταντλήσας . For the metaphor cf. infra VII 536 B, Lys. 204 D , Lucian Dem. Enc. 16 (imitated from this passage) and other examples in Blaydes on Ar. Wasps 483 .

ἐμβαλών : cf. Theaet. 165 D , Prot. 342 E . The whole expression recalls the Latin proverb scrupulum abeunti (Cic. de Fin. IV 80).

διαγόμενος . The use of this verb in Soph. El. 782 χρόνος διῆγέ με, Dem. 18. 89 πόλεμος—διῆγεν ὑμᾶς, Xen. Rep. Lac. I 3 and elsewhere is in favour of regarding διαγόμενος (‘living’) as grammatically passive and not middle both here and in Laws 758 A. Cf. Stephanus-Hase Thes. s.v. διάγω.

ἐγὼ γὰρ κτλ. I agree with Stallbaum and others in taking this sentence as interrogative: ‘do you mean that I think otherwise about this matter?’ i.e. think that it is not a question of βίου διαγωγή. J. and C. complain that this interpretation is “wanting in point.” It is surely much to the point to make Thrasymachus repudiate the imputation of trifling. His doctrine appears all the more dangerous when he confesses that it is no sophistic paradox, but a rule of life. I can see nothing to justify Apelt's conjecture ἔγωγ’ ἄῤ for ἐγὼ γὰρ ( Observ. Crit. p. 11).

ἤτοι ἡμῶν γε . ἤτοι or ἤτοι—γε= ‘or else’ (not ‘or rather’ as J. and C.). The regular construction is ἤτοι—ἤ, and ἤ—ἤτοι was condemned by the grammarians as a solecism, though it occurs in Pind. Nem. 6. 5. With the use of ἤτοι in this passage cf. III 400 C, IV 433 A τοῦτό ἐστιν—ἤτοι τούτου τι εἶδος ἡ δικαιοσύνη. Emendations have been suggested on all these passages of Plato: here ἤ τοι (van Prinsterer, Hartman) and in the other two passages ἤ: but we are not justified in altering the text. Cf. Kugler de partic. τοι eiusque comp. ap. Pl. usu p. 14.

ἔστω μὲν ἄδικος κτλ. The subject is ὁ ἄδικος, supplied from ἀδικίαν. To πείθει also ὁ ἄδικος is the subject; but ἡ ἀδικία or τὸ ἀδικεῖν is the subject of ἔστι. The effect is exactly as in the English ‘let him be unjust’ etc., ‘nevertheless he cannot convince me that it is really more profitable than justice.’ J. and C. understand τις before ἔστω, needlessly, as I think, and suppose that the “supposed impunity of injustice” is the subject to πείθει, but πείθει is much better with a personal subject. Although the sentence is a trifle loose, it is clear enough, and there is no occasion for reading πείθεις (with Vind. D and Ficinus).

ἐνθῶ . ἐντιθέναι (as Wohlrab points out) was used of nurses feeding children: cf. Ar. Knights 716 f., supra 343 A, and (for the general idea) Theognis 435 and Pl. Symp. 175 D . In μὰ Δία, μὴ σύ γε Socrates shudders at the prospect of having Thrasymachus for his intellectual nurse.

ποιμαίνειν . See cr. n. Cobet ( Mnem. IX p. 355) calls for πιαίνειν, but the “addita verba καθ’ ὅσον ποιμήν ἐστιν circa universum pastoris negotium errantem a Socrate Thrasymachum notari docent” (Schneider). How Thrasymachus errs is explained in οὐ πρὸς τὸ κτλ. πιαίνειν might perhaps be read, if the ἀλλά clause is taken closely with what precedes: you did not think it necessary (says Socrates) to adhere rigidly to the genuine shepherd, but think he fattens his sheep qua shepherd. In that case, however, we should expect ἀλλ’ οὐ—βλέπειν in place of οὐ—βλέποντα, to form the antithesis to πιαίνειν .

οὕτω δὲ ᾤμην . Some inferior MSS (with Eusebius Praep. Ev. XII 44. 2) read δή for δέ, and so Ast and Stallbaum. The connecting particle is better than the illative here, where Socrates is merely recalling his former train of reasoning: ‘and it was thus that I came to think’ etc.

οὐδεὶς ‐‐ μισθόν . Cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. V 10. 1134^{b} 5 ff. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀλλότριον εἶναί φασιν α<*>γαθὸν τὴν δικαιοσύνην—μισθὸς ἄρα τις δοτέος.

αὐτοῖσιν : see 330 B note

οὐχὶ ‐‐ μέντοι : 339 B note

παρὰ δόξαν is simply ‘contrary to your opinion’ (“gegen deine Ueberzeugung” Schneider) as in Prot. 337 B , cf. 349 A ἕως ἄν σε ὑπολαμβάνω λέγειν ἅπερ διανοεῖ and 350 E. The words could hardly mean an ‘unexpected or paradoxical’ reply (as Tucker construes). Socrates is appealing—note ὦ μακάριε— to Thrasymachus not to obstruct the discovery of the truth by want of candour and sincerity.

ἀλλὰ ‐‐ ἑτέρα sc. ἐστίν. The reading ἑτέραν is in itself equally good, but has inferior MS authority. Herwerden needlessly recommends the omission of ἑτέρα, or (as alternatives) ἀλλὰ τούτῳ, ἔφη, τῷ ἑτέραν, or ἀλλὰ τούτῳ, ἔφη, ἑτέραν, τῷ ἑτέραν .

οὐκοῦν κτλ. Aristotle agrees with this analysis: see Pol. A 3. 1258^{a} 10 ff. It should be noted that the antecedent to αὕτη is not μισθόν, but τὸ παρέχεσθαι μισθόν.

διὰ τὸ ξυμφέρειν . See cr. n. To ξυμφέρον there are two objections: first that διά with the participle used like διά with the infinitive is rare and dubious; second that ξυμφέρον is more naturally to be taken as a virtual adjective than as a participle. The last objection might be surmounted by reading ξυμφέρον<ὄν>, but the more serious flaw would still remain, and ξυμφέρειν is in itself so much superior, that (like most editors) I feel bound to adopt it.

οὐδέ γ’ οἶμαι τὴν μισθωτικήν sc. καλεῖς ἰατρικήν. The reasoning is somewhat subtle. ἰατρική, κυβερνητική, μισθωτική ( μισθαρνητική), says Socrates, are three distinct arts. κυβερνητική is not to be called ἰατρική, even if ἰατρική should accompany its operation, nor is μισθωτική to be called ἰατρική in a similar case. Nor is ἰατρική to be called μισθωτική, even if ἰατρική should be accompanied by μισθωτική.

κοινῇ ‐‐ προσχρώμενοι : ‘from the common use of some additional element which is the same in all.’

τὸ μισθὸν ἀρνυμένους . δέ γε as usual introduces the minor premise. The semi-poetic word ἀρνυμένους is used to suggest μισθαρνεῖν and μισθαρνητική, the word μισθόν at the same time bringing the product of the art well into view. As τὸ—δημιουργούς is the subject to γίγνεσθαι, the masculine τόν—so most MSS—for τό is impossible.

ἔλεγον μηδένα ἐθέλειν . μή with the infinitive after verbs of saying, thinking and the like “carries with it the emphasis of the witness on oath, so to speak the emphasis of desire” (Gildersleeve in A. J. Ph. 1 50). Cf. Theaet. 155 A , Euthyph. 6 B , Phaed. 94 C al., and infr. III 407 E, IV 419 A.

ὡς ἔοικε belongs to

ὧν ἕνεκα , and δεῖν is in indirect narration after ἔλεγον above. There would be no object in qualifying the force of δεῖν; it is not disputed that rulers must have their reward. Hence Stallbaum is wrong in regarding δεῖν as under the influence of ἔοικε, an illogical idiom which is common in Herodotus (Stein on 1 65), and found occasionally in Tragedy (Jebb on Trach. 1238) and in Plato ( Phil. 20 D , Soph. 263 D , Euthyd. 280 D ). That ὡς ἔοικε has no influence on δεῖν in this passage may also be seen from the fact that δεῖν (not δεῖ) would still be used if ὡς ἔοικε were removed. δεῖν is not for δέον; the late participial form δεῖν is not found in Plato: see my note on Euthyph. 4 D .

ἄρχῃ . The transition from plural to singular and conversely is common: see for examples III 408 B, 411 C, 413 D, E, IV 426 A, C, V 463 D, VI 496 C, 500 C, VIII 554 A, C, 558 A, IX 591 A, X 601 D, E, 604 D, and cf. Heindorf on Gorg. 478 C , Prot. 319 D .

ὡς ἐν μισθοῦ μέρει . ὡς is not (with Wohlrab) to be taken with <*>ν μισθοῦ μέρει, but stands for the indirect interrogative ὅπως.

αὐτοί = ‘by themselves,’ ‘ultro,’ should be construed with λαμβάνοντες. The conjecture αὐτόν for αὐτοί is very tame.

ὅθεν κινδυνεύει ‐‐ νενομίσθαι . These words are intended to indicate parenthetically that Socrates' thesis finds support in the common judgment of men. Good men, he says, require to be compelled to rule. This may be why ( ὅθεν) it is accounted a disgrace to enter on office willingly: that is to say, if you do so, you may be inferred to be, not ἀγαθός, but φιλότιμος or φιλάργυρος, which ὄνειδος λέγεταί τε καὶ ἔστιν 347 B. There is no good reason for rejecting the clause, as some have proposed to do.

πόλις ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν is the first express allusion to an Ideal City in the Republic. The principle here laid down—the reluctance of the best men to undertake the task of government—is fully recognised in Plato's commonwealth, where the ἄρχοντες are represented as unwilling to desert the life of contemplation for the cares of office. ‘Nolo episcopari’ is in fact one of the leading guarantees which Plato gives against the abuse of political power (Nohle Die Staatslehre Plato's in ihr. gesch. Entwick. p. 119). See VI 520 E, 521 A, where this topic is resumed. Cf. also Sesame and Lilies § 43 “The true kings—rule quietly, if at all, and hate ruling; too many of them make ‘il gran rifiuto.’”

τῷ ὄντι κτλ . τῷ ὄντι belongs to οὐ πέφυκε, not to ἀληθινός (as Ast supposes). Richter suggests ἁληθινός for ἀληθινός, but what is said of a single ruler applies to all: cf. (with Schneider) Laws 733 E λέγωμεν δὴ σώφρονα βίον ἕνα εἶναι καὶ φρόνιμον ἕνα καὶ ἕνα τὸν ἀνδρεῖον.

πᾶς ἂν κτλ. The articular infinitive with αἱρεῖσθαι is hard to parallel, and on this ground Richards would cancel τό. I once thought that τὸ ὠφελεῖσθαι might be taken as the object after γιγνώσκων (‘he who knows what being benefited is,’ i.e. virtually ‘who knows his own interests’); but this is harsh, and I now acquiesce in the usual interpretation. With γιγνώσκων ( intellegens) used absolutely cf. (with Schneider) Laws 733 E σώφρονα μὲν οὖν βίον ὁ γιγνώσκων θήσει πρᾶον ἐπὶ πάντα. For the sentiment cf. Soph. O. T. 584 —598, Eur. Ion 621 —632, Hipp. 1016—1020.

εἰσαῦθις σκεψόμεθα . The reference has been much discussed. Pfleiderer's idea ( Zur Lösung d. Pl. Fr. p. 72) that the words were introduced by Plato “bei der Gesammtredaktion des Werkes” to prepare us for the second half of Book X is most unlikely, because (among other reasons) Book X does not expressly revert to this topic at all. Siebeck ( Zur Chron. d. Pl. Dialoge pp. 121 ff.) holds that phrases of this sort always refer either to some future dialogue contemplated by Plato, or to a later part of the same dialogue. It is difficult to establish either alternative in the present case; nor has Siebeck, I think, succeeded in proving his point even elsewhere. It is simplest to suppose that such formulae (like εἰσαῦθις ἐπισκεπτέον in Arist. Eth. Nic. I 5. 1097^{b} 14) are in general only a convenient way of dropping the subject, although there may occasionally be a specific reference. Here there is none. So also Hirmer Entst. u. Komp. d. Pl. Polit. in Fl. Jahrb. Supplementband XXIII p. 607 note 2.

τὸν τοῦ ἀδίκου βίον ‐‐ δικαίου . In these words Socrates sums up the remarks of Thrasymachus from 343 B ( καὶ οὕτω πόρρω κτλ.) to 344 C ( λυσιτελοῦν τε καὶ ξυμφέρον).

ποτέρως ‐‐ λέγεσθαι . Ast's suggestion πότερον, ἦν δ) ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, αἱρεῖ; καὶ ποτέρως ἀληθεστέρως δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι; is now generally adopted, but (apart from its considerable divergence from the MS reading) the juxtaposition of ποτέρως and ἀληθεστέρως is unpleasing. The ποτέρως αἱρεῖ of A is quite unobjectionable: cf. VII 528 A οὕτως—αἱροῦμαι; and it is (I think) an objection to πότερον αἱρεῖ that it would represent Socrates as asking Glauco not which view he elected to take, but which life—the just or the unjust—he chose for himself. Schneider (after Bekker) retains the reading of the best MSS in πότερον ὡς ἀληθεστέρως, and explains the last two words as equivalent to ὥσπερ ὃ ἀληθεστέρως λέγεται: but ὡς ἀληθεστέρως could not (if written by Plato) be anything but the comparative of ὡς ἀληθῶς, and that is quite different in sense from ἀληθεστέρως. I have omitted ὡς (with Bremius and a few MSS of inferior authority), “ut ortum ex varia lectione πότερον et ποτέρως in ποτερόνως conflata” (Schneider). I am glad to find that Tucker adopts the same solution.

διῆλθε : i.q. διῆλθεν ὄντα or διελθὼν ἔλεξεν εἶναι (Schneider). Cf. II 363 A ἄφθονα ἔχουσι λέγειν ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ὁσίοις with note ad loc. In view of ἐν ἑκατέρῳ λέγομεν in B below, it is easy to suggest διῆλθεν <ἐν>; but the text is probably sound.

ἂν μὲν τοίνυν κτλ. The alternatives are between continuous speech and dialectic. By λόγον in παρὰ λόγον Thrasymachus' speech in 343 A ff. is meant: to this Socrates would reply, after which Thrasymachus would speak again, and finally Socrates. Thus each party would have delivered two speeches. In Athenian lawsuits there were often two speeches delivered by the accuser and two by the defendant (Meier und Schömann Attische Process p. 924), so that Plato's imagery is borrowed from the law-court, whence δικαστῶν τινῶν τῶν διακρινούντων just below. This point escaped Ast, who reads καὶ αὖθις οὗτος ἄλλον ἡμῖν (after Ficinus and Stephanus).

ἀντικατατείναντες is intransitive: cf. II 358 D κατατείνας ἐρῶ τὸν ἄδικον βίον ἐπαινῶν and 367 B: the notion (as in ξυντείνω, ξυντεταμένως and the like) is of nervous tension. The word cannot mean ‘replying to one another in set speeches’ (J. and C.). “Setting out alternative lists of advantages” (remarks Bosanquet) “was the well-known method of fable or poetry. See Book II” 361 D—362 C and 362 E— 365 A: “and compare Prodicus' Choice of Heracles (Xen. Mem. II 1) and the discussion between the Just and Unjust arguments in the Clouds of Aristophanes.”

ὁποτέρως is virtually indirect: translate ‘whichever you please, then.’ Hermann reads ποτέρως, but the text ought not to be changed either here or in Euthyd. 271 A τίς ἦν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ᾧ χθὲς ἐν Λυκείῳ διελέγου;—τίς ἦν; Ὁπότερον καὶ <*>ρωτᾷς, ὦ Κρίτων· οὐ γὰρ εἶς, ἀλλὰ δὔ ἤστην, i.e. (it depends on) which of these you are asking about etc. Cf. also <*>τις—αὐτῶν ἡ ἀρετή 353 C. In Rep. IX 578 E ἐν ποίῳ ἄν τινι καὶ ὁπόσῳ φόβῳ οἴει γενέσθαι αὐτόν and Gorg. 522 A , the ὁπόσῳ is perhaps due to the proximity of οἴει, which gives the question a certain semblance of indirectness; ὁποίῳ in Alc. I 110 C and ὁποίου infra 400 A may be similarly explained; while in Meno 74 D ἀλλὰ μή μοι οὕτως—ἀλλ’ ὅ τι ἐστὶν τοῦτο, it is casy to supply a verb of saying. Possibly (as Heindorf thinks) ὅτι (B ὃ τί) in Euthyd. 287 B is corrupt for τί, as <*>πως for πῶς in Charm. 170 C . In Lys. 212 C ὁπότερος οὖν αὐτῶν ποτέρου φίλου ἐστιν; ὁ φιλῶν τοῦ φιλουμένου—ἢ ὁ φιλούμενος τοῦ φιλοῦντος; we ought no doubt to read ὁ πότερος (with Hermann).

εἰκός γε ‐‐ τοὐναντίον . Thrasymachus' view of δικαιοσύνη is like Callicles' theory of ἀρετή in Gorg. 491 E ff. esp. 492 B τρυφὴ καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ ἐλευθερία, ἐὰν ἐπικουρίαν ἔχῃ, τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἀρετή τε καὶ εὐδαιμονία. The irony is clearly marked by ὦ ἥδιστε, and Hartman should not have revived Hirschig's proposal to read <οὔκουν> εἰκός γε .

ἀλλὰ τί μήν ; ‘Well, what else?’ Cf. (with J. and C.) Symp. 206 E .

πάνυ γενναίαν εὐήθειαν : ‘sublime simplicity.’ Such contempt for εὐήθεια recalls Thucydides' description of contemporary morals: cf. especially III 83. 1 καὶ τὸ εὔηθες, οὖ τὸ γενναῖον πλεῖστον μετέχει, καταγελασθὲν ἠφανίσθη.

εὐβουλία was preeminently a political virtue: cf. Alc. I 125 E πολιτείας κοινωνούντων τίνα καλεῖς ἐπιστήμην; Εὐβουλίαν ἔγωγε, Prot. 318 E , and infra IV 428 B. It is therefore fitly used by Thrasymachus to describe his theory, which is a theory of political rather than of private morality: cf. πόλεις τε—ποιεῖσθαι below.

ὑφ) ἑαυτοὺς ποιεῖσθαι . ἑαυτοῖς is found in some inferior MSS, but the accusative is also admissible. Cf. Thuc. IV 60 (cited by Schneider) εἰκὸς—αὐτοὺς τάδε πάντα πειράσασθαι ὑπὸ σφᾶς ποιεῖσθαι. In τελέως Thrasymachus recalls the τελέαν ἀδικίαν of 348 B.

σὺ δὲ οἴει ‐‐ λέγειν . Baiter (with Paris A) assigns these words to Socrates; but they come much more naturally from Thrasymachus: cf. 344 B. βαλλάντια and not βαλάντια is the spelling of A here and in VIII 552 D ( βαλλαντιοτόμοι): in IX 575 B ( βαλλαντιοτομοῦσι) the second λ is due to an early corrector. The double ‐λλ‐ has also the best MS authority in Gorg. 508 E , Symp. 190 E . See also Blaydes on Ar. Frogs 772 . For

ἦ δ’ ὅς below after ἔφη cf. Phaed. 78 A and VII 522 A.

ἤδη στερεώτερον : ‘still more stubborn.’ στερέος is like σκληρός in Theaet. 155 E σκληροὺς—καὶ ἀντιτύπους ἀνθρώπους, but stronger, suggesting castiron hardness and inflexibility.

ῥᾴδιον . See cr. n. Schneider refers to Laws 757 B τὴν δὲ ἀληθεστάτην καὶ ἀρίστην ἰσότητα οὐκέτι ῥᾴδιον παντὶ ἰδεῖν. ῥᾷον is not (I think) possible here: and a scribe might easily omit ΙΔ in ΡΑΙΔΙΟΝ. Cf. Introd. § 5.

εἰ γὰρ κτλ. Gorg. 483 C νόμῳ μὲν τοῦτο ἄδικον καὶ αἰσχρὸν λέγεται, τὸ πλέον ζητεῖν ἔχειν τῶν πολλῶν, καὶ ἀδικεῖν αὐτὸ καλοῦσιν. Dümmler ( Zur Comp. d. Pl. St. p. 13) goes so far as to assert that ὥσπερ ἄλλοι τινές is an express reference to Polus in the Gorgias; but nothing is gained by so hazardous a conjecture.

προσετίθεμεν : ‘used to attribute to,’ sc. before you announced your view—with ironical deference, like ἐλέγομεν in Prot. 353 C τί οὖν φατε τοῦτο εἶναι, ὃ ἡμεῖς <*>ττω ε<*>ναι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐλέγομεν; Stallbaum takes the imperfect as referring to 345 C, but neither there nor in 348 C (cited by Schneider) is there anything to justify a particular reference.

ἐμοὶ γὰρ ‐‐ λέγειν . A similar remark is made after Callicles has expounded kindred views in Gorg. 492 D σαφῶς γὰρ σὺ νῦν λέγεις ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι διανοοῦνται μέν, λέγειν δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσι.

τὰ δοκοῦντα κτλ. can only mean ‘what you think about the truth,’ not ‘what you think to be the truth’ (D. and V.) or ‘your real mind’ (Schneider and Jowett). We should expect ἀδικίας for ἀληθείας, as H. Wolf proposed to read, for it is Injustice, not Truth, which is the subject of dispute. But as ἀδικίας has not a vestige of support from the MSS, I have not ventured to make the change. The truth in question must be understood as the truth about justice and injustice. Herwerden's ἐπὶ τῆς ἀληθείας (for which he compares Dem. de Cor. 17, 226, and 294) will hardly command assent.

τί δέ ‐‐ ἐλέγχεις ; Cf. Charm. 161 C πάντως γὰρ οὐ τοῦτο σκεπτέον ὅστις αὐτὸ εἶπεν, ἀλλὰ πότερον ἀληθὲς λέγεται ἢ οὔ.

πλέον ἔχειν . The literal and derived significations of this phrase are treated as identical throughout the curious reasoning which follows. Primarily, πλέον ἔχειν refers to quantitative superiority; in its derived sense, it is used (together with πλεονεκτεῖν) more generally of ‘overreaching.’

τῆς δικαίας πράξεως . ‘To have more than the just action’ means ‘to do more than is just’ (cf. πλείω—αἱρεῖσθαι— πράττειν 350 A), outdo, overreach what is just in action. The notion of virtue as a μεσότης is implied.

οὐδὲ τῆς κτλ. See cr. n. I do not think that οὐδὲ τῆς δικαίας can be right. The whole emphasis (as οὐδὲ shews) must be on πράξεως, and the emphatic word should be expressed. οὐδὲ τῆς πράξεως τῆς δικαίας (sc. any more than the ἀνδρὸς δικαίου) gives exactly the emphasis required. In the cases quoted by Schneider ( Laws 754 B, 916 B, infra VII 516 B) the omitted word is unemphatic and easily supplied. For the error cf. Crito 50 B where the first hand of the Bodleian MS reads τὰς δικασθείσας by mistake for τὰς <δίκας τὰς> δικασθείσας. See also Introd. § 5.

οὐκοῦν καὶ ‐‐ λάβῃ . The ἄδικος πρᾶξις which the unjust man overreaches is to be regarded as ἄδικος because it has itself overreached (not fallen short of) the mean. ὡς with the subjunctive after verbs of striving does not seem to occur elsewhere in Plato: like its use in a pure final clause (of which there is only one example in Plato, viz. Tim. 92 A ) it is almost exclusively confined (among Attic writers) to Xenophon and the tragedians. See Weber's tables in Goodwin MT. p. 398, and cf. Gildersleeve in A. J. Ph. IV p. 419.

τοῦ μὲν ὁμοίου ‐‐ τοῦ δὲ ἀνομοίου . This generalisation of ‘like’ and ‘unlike’ into abstract notions, without regard to their relativity, is suggestive of (but does not of course presuppose) the Ideas of τὰ πρός τι which we meet with in Phaed. 74 A .

οὐκοῦν κτλ. A proviso which is made use of in 350 C ( ἀλλὰ μὴν —ἑκάτερον εἷναι ).

ὁ δὲ μὴ ἐοικέναι . ὁ δέ is simply ‘the other’ (as is marked in A by a pause after δέ), i.e. ὁ μὴ τοιοῦτος: cf. 339 E ( τοῖς δέ for τοῖς δὲ ἀρχομένοις), 343 D ὁ μὲν δίκαιος ἀπὸ τῶν ἴσων πλέον εἰσφέρει, ὁ δ’ ἔλαττον and IX 587 B. J. and C., with most of the editors, adopt the reading of Stephanus ( ὁ δὲ μὴ μὴ ἐοικέναι), which has the support of some inferior MSS; but the idiom is sufficiently well authenticated, and the collocation of the two negatives would be unpleasing. I am glad to see that Tucker takes the same view.

οἷσπερ ἔοικεν . Madvig's οἵοισπερ ἔοικεν is refuted by 350 C ὡμολογοῦμεν ᾧ γε (i.e. οἷος ᾧ γε) ὅμοιος ἑκάτερος εἴη, τοιοῦτον καὶ ἑκάτερον εἶναι. Cf. also Arist. Pol. H 13. 1332^{a} 22. The construction was supported by Schneider from Phaed. 92 B , but ὅ and not ᾧ is now read there on the authority of the best MS.

ἀλλὰ τί μέλλει (sc. εἶναι); A rare formula, occurring also in Hipp. Min. 377 D: cf. τί δ’ οὐ μέλλει; VIII 566 D, X 605 C. With the force of τί (‘what else’) cf. ἀλλὰ τί οἴει supra 332 C.

μουσικὸν δέ τινα κτλ. Here begin the usual Socratic illustrations from the arts, with the concomitant identification of virtue and knowledge ( ὁ δὲ σοφὸς ἀγαθός; Φημί 350 B).

δοκεῖ ἂν οὖν ‐‐ ἀξιοῦν πλέον ἔχειν . Socrates ignores the proverb καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ ἀοιδὸς ἀοιδῷ. Strictly speaking, however, it is not qua κεραμεύς, but qua moneymaker (or the like) that the κεραμεὺς κοτέει. J. and C. cite an admirable parallel from Shakespeare ( King John IV 2) “When workmen strive to do better than well, They do confound their skill in covetousness.” The words ἢ ἀξιοῦν πλέον ἔχειν have a suspicious look, and are rejected by Heller ( Fl. Jahrb. 1875 p. 171) and others, but such duplicate expressions are common in Plato, and as the illustration from the harp introduces a new and important stage in the argument, Plato may have wished to remind us that after all πλεονεκτεῖν is only the πλέον ἔχειν with which we started (349 B). It should be noted, too, that ἀξιοῦν is a little more than ἐθέλειν.

ἐν τῇ ἐδωδῇ ἢ πόσει refers of course to the patient's diet. Plato carefully writes πλεονεκτεῖν here in preference to πλέον ἔχειν. The ‘overreaching’ in such a case might well consist in giving the patient less.

ἢ πράττειν ἢ λέγειν . The idea of πλεονεκτεῖν in speaking has not been introduced before, nor is it made use of in the sequel. We must regard the addition of ἢ λέγειν as merely a rhetorical device to increase the emphasis: see on 333 D and 351 A.

τί δὲ ὁ ἀνεπιστήμων; κτλ. Proclus' commentary on these words is interesting, though he probably reads more into them than Plato intended here: καὶ ὅλως τῷ μὲν ἀγαθῷ τὸ κακὸν ἠναντίωται μόνον, τῷ δὲ κακῷ καὶ τὸ καλὸν (leg. κακὸν) καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν· ἀναιρετικὸν οὖν ἐστι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸ ἐναντίου κακοῦ ( in Alc. I p. 323 ed. Creuzer). The identifications in ὁ δὲ ἐπιστήμων σοφός and ὁ δὲ σοφὸς ἀγαθός below have been allowed before in the special cases of the μουσικός and the ἰατρικός (349 E).

ἀναπέφανται . Stallbaum naïvely reminds us that ἀναπέφανται is often used of a conclusion which “praeter exspectationem emergit et elucet.” The pervading fallacy in the discussion is akin to the a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter. Thus ‘like’ and ‘unlike’ are used absolutely, and each of them is equated with itself. The wise man is held to be good, because one is good in that in which one is wise (this might however be justified on the “stricter mode of reasoning”). Finally, the just man is inferred to be wise and good, on the principle that one is what one resembles: but whether the resemblance be in essence or in accident, we are not told. The argument should be regarded as a dialectical tour de force,— φιλόνικον μᾶλλον ἢ φιλάληθες. The reasoning in the next section of the argument strikes a deeper note.

ὁ δὲ Θρασύμαχος κτλ. ‘Now Thrasymachus’ etc. δέ is not “flat” (Tucker), but at least as good as δή, and much better supported by the MSS.

οὐχ ὡς ἐγὼ νῦν ῥᾳδίως λέγω . “Expectabam certe: οὐχ ὡς ἐγὼ νῦν λέγω ῥᾳδίως,” says Herwerden; but the antecedent in Greek is idiomatically attracted into the relative clause (Kühner Gr. Gramm. II p. 922). Translate ‘not in the easy way in which I now repeat them.’

ἅτε καὶ θέρους ὄντος . The action is probably laid in Hecatombaeon (roughly our July): see Introd. § 3. Bekker (following the punctuation of A) takes τότε with ὄντος, but πρότερον δὲ οὔπω shews that it belongs to καὶ εἶδον.

τότε καὶ is simply ‘then too’; I cannot see anything “mock-heroic” in the expression, as J. and C. do.

εἰ οὖν λέγοιμι κτλ. εἰ δ) οὖν is read by Ast: “sed sufficit externum, ut ita dicam. vinculum οὖν (Schneider).” δημηγορεῖν and εἰπεῖν ὅσα βούλομαι are the opposites of διαλέγεσθαι and βραχυλογία ( Prot. 336 B , 335 A).

ὥσπερ ταῖς γραυσί . Cf. Gorg. 527 A τάχα δ’ οὖν ταῦτα μῦθός σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι, ὥσπερ γραός, καὶ καταφρονεῖς αὐτῶν: Pol. 268 E ἀλλὰ δὴ τῷ μύθῳ μου πάνυ πρόσεχε τὸν νοῦν, καθάπερ οἱ παῖδες. παῖς for ταῖς was read before Ast on the authority of one MS; but ταῖς is quite satisfactory.

ὅπερ ἄρτι . The words ἔφαμεν δὲ δὴ καὶ ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι τὴν ἀδικίαν· ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι; (350 D), which are referred to in ἄρτι, involve the general question of the relation between justice and injustice; whence we have ὁποῖόν τι τυγχάνει ὂν δικαιοσύνη πρὸς ἀδικίαν. ὁποῖον depends on ἐρωτῶ, not on λόγον.

ἐλέχθη γάρ που : 344 C, 348 E. It has nowhere been expressly said that Injustice is δυνατώτερον than Justice, but καὶ δυνατώτερον is added for emphasis (see on ἢ λέγειν in 350 A); and indeed according to the theory of Thrasymachus δύναμις (power in a general sense) rests solely on ἰσχύς (physical strength). δύναμις and ἰσχύς are clearly distinguished in Prot. 351 A .

ἁπλῶς . The Platonic use of ἁπλοῦν has been investigated by Bonitz in Hermes II (1867) pp. 307 ff. Its antitheses are διπλοῦν, διάφορον, σύνθετον, πεπλεγμένον, ποικίλον, and the like, and it denotes that which is uniform, or single and simple, or true without any difference or qualifications. ἁπλῶς οὕτως means merely ‘in this simple or general way’ (“im Allgemeinen” Schneider): a more elaborate and profounder proof (thinks Socrates) is necessary.

καὶ καταδεδουλῶσθαι is rejected by Cobet, but successfully defended by Heller ( Fl. Jahrb. 1875 p. 172). There is in reality no pleonasm: we have first an attempt ( ἐπιχειρεῖν), then a successful attempt ( καταδεδουλῶσθαι), then the results of success ( πολλὰς δὲ καὶ ὑφ’ ἑαυτῇ ἔχειν δουλωσαμένην). A powerful city like Athens might, and often did, display her energy in all three directions simultaneously. For the collocation of δουλοῦσθαι and καταδουλοῦσθαι (middle) Heller compares infra IX 589 D, E and Menex. 240 A .

ἡ ἀρίστη . Thrasymachus refuses to withdraw from the position that ἀδικία is ἀρετή, in spite of Socrates' refutation. This is why Socrates says μανθάνω κτλ. ‘I understand: (you say so) because this was your theory.’ ὅτι is not ‘that’: see above on 332 A. Richter suggested κρατίστη for ἀρίστη on account of κρείττων just below; but κρείττων is said not by Thrasymachus, but by Socrates.

εἰ ‐‐ ἔχει . After ἔχει, εἰ is inserted by Stallbaum, following a suggestion of Baiter's. Cf. also J. B. Mayor in Cl. Rev. X p. 111. It so happens that ἡ is written in A over an erasure large enough to have contained εἰ ἡ, but there is no trace of εἰ, and mere erasures in A are seldom useful in determining the text. For ἡ Richter suggests ᾖ, which would however give a wrong meaning. Tucker also offers a variety of conjectures, but the text is perfectly sound: cf. II 359 B μάλιστ’ ἂν αἰσθοίμεθα, εἰ τοιόνδε ποιήσαιμεν τῇ διανοίᾳ· δόντες (i.e. εἰ δόντες ) ἐξουσίαν —εἶτ’ ἐπακολουθήσαιμεν κτλ. and IX 589 D εἴπερ τοιόνδε τι γίγνεται, λαμβάνων (i.e. εἰ λαμβάνων )— καταδουλοῦται.

ἢ λῃστὰς κτλ. Cf. (with Ast) Isocrates Panath. 226 οὐδεὶς ἂν αὐτοὺς ( τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας) διά γε τὴν ὁμόνοιαν δικαίως ἐπαινέσειεν, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς καταποντιστὰς καὶ λῃστὰς καὶ τοὺς περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀδικίας ὄντας· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ὁμονοοῦντες τοὺς ἄλλους ἀπολλύουσιν. There must be some honour even among thieves.

ὁμόνοιαν καὶ φιλίαν . The conception of δικαιοσύνη which meets us in Book IV 433 A—434 E is dimly outlined here.

ἐν ἐλευθέροις κτλ. : ‘whether it makes its appearance among freemen or among slaves.’ Plato wishes to emphasize the universality of the rule, and that is why he specifies the two classes into which society is divided. Cf. Gorg. 514 D , 515 A. It is less natural and easy to construe (with Tucker) ‘in a society where there are both freemen and slaves.’

ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις . So in 349 C above it is said that the unjust try to overreach both one another and the just.

ἐν ἑνὶ κτλ. The results of Book IV are foreshadowed more clearly in what follows. The notion that justice present in the individual keeps the individual at peace with himself is more fully developed in 441 D, and implicitly assumes a psychological theory like that in Book IV, where soul is shewn to have ‘parts’ (435 C ff.). Further, in Book IV, Plato first describes justice in the State, and afterwards justice in the individual, using the larger aggregate to assist him to find it in the smaller. The same method is observed here in the description of injustice, and afterwards in Books VIII and IX, where the varieties of ἀδικία in states and individuals are described. The present passage (351 A —352 A), in fact, contains the undeveloped germ of the whole method and doctrine of the Republic (with the exception of Books V—VII). Cf. Hirmer Entst. u. Kompos. d. Pl. Pol. p. 608.

μῶν μὴ (a strengthened num) occurs only twice in the Republic, here and in VI 505 C. In the later dialogues μῶν is especially frequent (Frederking in Fl. Jahrb. 1882 p. 539). A classified list of examples is given by Kugler de part. τοι eiusque comp. ap. Pl. usu p. 40.

οἵαν ‐‐ ποιεῖν . See cr. n. ποιεῖ would involve (as even Schneider admits) “durissimum et haud scio an vitiosum anacoluthon.” Cf. οἷοι μὴ ἀδικεῖν in 334 D. Tucker proposes to eject οἵαν and retain ποιεῖ, but the reading of II is preferable in every way. For the error see Introd. § 5.

παντὶ : i.e. whether just or unjust: cf. 351 E ἐχθροὶ ἔσονται (viz. οἱ ἄδικοι) ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις.

ἔστων . On the form see Introd. § 5.

τὰ λοιπά κτλ. : viz. the discussion which begins in D below.

ὅτι μὲν γὰρ κτλ. The whole sentence is summed up in ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει (352 D) and placed in this recapitulated form under the government of μανθᾴνω. The introduction of the antithesis ( ἀλλὰ δὴ κτλ.) to οἱ δὲ ἄδικοι οὐδὲν πράττειν μετ’ ἀλλήλων οἶοί τε, and of the explanations required by that antithesis, complicates the sentence, without, however, rendering it obscure. For similar anacolutha with ὅτι see V 465 A, VI 493 D notes and cf. Engelhardt Anac. Plat. Spec. III pp. 38, 40. The whole sentence forms a kind of transition to “the rest of the feast” by summing up what has been so far proved; viz. that Justice is wisdom and virtue ( καὶ σοφώτεροι καὶ ἀμείνους), and more capable of action than Injustice ( δυνατώτεροι πράττειν); even the difficulty raised in ἀλλὰ δὴ—ἀδύνατοι is not new, having been briefly explained in 351 C. Liebhold's ἔτι for ὅτι is an unhappy suggestion; nor should ὅτι be rendered ‘quoniam,’ as Hartman proposes.

μήτοι ‐‐ γε : a strong negative somewhat rarely used by Plato: cf. Phil. 67 A and infra III 388 B, C. See Kugler de part. τοι eiusque comp. ap. Pl. usu p. 11.

ὅντινα τρόπον χρὴ ζῆν . A reminiscence of the πῶς βιωτέον of Socrates: cf. 344 E.

ὃ ἂν ‐‐ ἄριστα . The political applications of this principle are developed from II 369 E onwards: cf. IV 433 A ff.

ἀκούσαις κτλ. The rapid succession of questions makes it possible to dispense with ἄν in the second: cf. II 382 E.

φαῖμεν . See cr. n. If φαμέν is retained, ἄν will belong to εἶναι (cf. VI 493 C), but it is inappropriate here to make εἶναι future or hypothetical. Schneider, while retaining φαμέν, refers ἄν to δικαίως, “ut sensus sit: οὐκοῦν, εἰ ταῦτα τούτων φαμὲν ἔργα εἶναι, δικαίως ἂν φαῖμεν”—a harsh and unnatural view. We may either drop ἄν and keep φαμέν, as (with one of Stobaeus' MSS Flor. 9. 63) I formerly did: or change φαμέν to φαῖμεν. The latter solution is easier and better. Similarly in φαῖμεν below (353 D) the ι is due to A^{2}. See also Introd. § 5.

ἀποτέμοις —see cr. n.—can hardly, I think, dispense with the particle ἄν. It should be noted that the illustrations are of two kinds—the first to illustrate ἢ μόνῳ ἐκείνῳ, the second to illustrate ἄριστα; after each division the conclusion is stated, in the second case more diffidently ( ἆρ’ οὖν οὐ—θήσομεν), perhaps because it is less obvious.

μόνον τι . Cornarius unhappily suggested τις for τι and Stephanus μόνῳ τις for μόνον τι (cf. 352 E). μόνον τι is of course the subject to ἀπεργάζηται .

οὐκοῦν ‐‐ προστέτακται . Cf. Men. 72 A οὐκ ἀπορία εἰπεῖν ἀρετῆς πέρι ὅ τι ἔστιν. καθ’ ἑκάστην γὰρ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῶν ἡλικιῶν πρὸς ἕκαστον ἔργον ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἡ ἀρετή ἐστιν. ὡσαύτως δὲ—καὶ ἡ κακία: also infra X 608 E with Arist. Eth. Nic. II 5. 1106^{a} 15 ff.

ἦν : ‘is, as we saw,’ viz. at 352 E: cf. infra IV 441 D, VI 490 A, VII 522 A.

ἀπεργάσαιντο . Heindorf (on Crat. 424 E ) would read ἀπεργάσαιτο, and Baiter adopts his suggestion; but (as Stallbaum observes) the use of ὀφθαλμοί just above may affect the construction. In the same way, perhaps, the occurrence of γυναῖκες καὶ τἄλλα θηρία immediately before causes Plato to write δεήσοιντο (the reading of A) rather than δεήσοιτο in Tim. 76 E . Of the other alleged cases of a plural verb after a neuter plural in Plato, some (e.g. Laws 634 E, 683 B) are not supported by the best MSS; one— ἐξ ὧν τά τε ὀνόματα καὶ τὰ ῥήματα συντίθενται (so AT) Crat. 424 E —is distributive; some refer to living objects, e.g. Laws 658 C (with which contrast κρίνοι just before) and Lach. 180 E ; at least one ( Phil. 24 E ) is perhaps corrupt. See also on Rep. II 365 B.

τυφλότητα κτλ. τυφλότης is also said to be the disease or vice of the eyes in Alc. I 126 B, a passage probably imitated from this. In the stricter discussion of X 608 E it is not τυφλότης but ὀφθαλμία which is the vice to which the eyes are subject.

οὐ γάρ πω ‐‐ ἐρωτῶ is ‘I do not, at this stage, enquire’; but the words do not, I think, contain an express promise that the subject will be afterwards resumed. Although the peculiar vice of the eyes is specified in Book X (l.c.), their virtue is not; and τοῦτο refers to ἥτις αὐτῶν ἡ ἀρετή. Cf. 347 E note

ψυχῆς ἔστιν τι ἔργον : cf. III 407 A and Arist. Eth. Nic. I 6. 1097^{b} 22—1098^{a} 17, where this discussion is closely imitated. That it is the ἔργον of soul (and in particular of νοῦς) to rule ( ἄρχειν, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, and the like), is continually asserted in Plato: see for example Phaedr. 246 B πᾶσα ἡ ψυχὴ παντὸς ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ ἀψύχου, Crat. 400 A , Phil. 30C, Laws 896 A. The same doctrine is made the ground of the subjection of body to soul which is inculcated in the Phaedo (80 A, 94 B), and in Alc. I 130 A. Cf. also Isocrates περὶ ἀντιδόσεως 180 ὁμολογεῖται μὲν γὰρ τὴν φύσιν ἡμῶν ἔκ τε τοῦ σώματος συγκεῖσθαι καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς· αὐτοῖν δὲ τούτοιν οὐδεὶς ἔστιν ὅστις οὐκ ἂν φήσειεν ἡγεμονικωτέραν πεφυκέναι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ πλείονος ἀξίαν· τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἔργον εἶναι βουλεύσασθαι καὶ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων καὶ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν, τοῦ δὲ σώματος ὑπηρετῆσαι τοῖς ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς γνωσθεἶσιν.

ἐκείνου . The reading ἐκείνης—see cr. n.—can only be defended by supposing that Plato was guilty of a strange confusion, unless we make a pause at ἄλλῳ, and take ἤ as ‘or,’ not ‘than’; but ἤ after ἄλλῳ would certainly here be understood as ‘than,’ and an alternative question should be less ambiguously expressed. After ψυχῇ the corruption to ἐκείνης was natural enough. Madvig would eject the word.

τὸζῆν is κατ’ ἐξοχήν the ἔργον of ψυχή in Plato: cf. Crat. 399 D , E τοῦτο ἄρα (sc. ψυχή), ὅταν παρῇ τῷ σώματι, αἴτιόν ἐστι τοῦ ζῆν αὐτῷ, τὴν τοῦ ἀναπνεῖν δύναμιν παρέχον καὶ ἀναψῦχον, ἅμα δὲ ἐκλείποντος τοῦ ἀναψύχοντος τὸ σῶμα ἀπόλλυταί τε καὶ τελευτᾷ· ὅθεν δή μοι δοκοῦσιν αὐτὸ ψυχὴν καλέσαι, and Phaed. 105 D . The influence of this idea makes itself felt in all the proofs of immortality in Plato, and not least in X 608 E ff. See notes ad loc.

συνεχωρήσαμεν κτλ. The reference is to 350 C, D: cf. also 348 C. In these passages Justice has been identified with Virtue, but not expressly with virtue of soul. For this reason Hartman would eject ψυχῆς. But as Plato has just been using ἀρετή ‘excellence’ in connexion with things other than soul (ears and eyes), it is important that he should now make it clear that in identifying δικαιοσύνη and ἀρετή, he meant soul's ἀρετή. Otherwise a soul may possess its ἀρετή without being just; in which case the conclusion which he is aiming at will not follow.

ὅ γε εὖ ζῶν κτλ. The ambiguity (as it appears to us) of εὖ ζῆν and εὖ πράττειν is frequently used by Plato to suggest that the virtuous life is the happy one, e.g. Charm. 172 A , 173 D: see note on 335 B. Aristotle says that Plato was the first to establish this identification: see the third fragment of his elegies vv. 4—6 ed. Bergk ὃς μόνος ἢ πρῶτος θνητῶν κατέδειξεν ἐναργῶς | οἰκείῳ τε βίῳ καὶ μεθόδοισι λόγων | ὡς ἀγαθός τε καὶ εὐδαίμων ἅμα γίνεται ἀνήρ.

εἱστιάσθω . The metaphor occurs again in 352 B, V 458 A, IX 571 D. It is one of the formal links connecting the Timaeus with the Republic: see Tim. 17 A . Cf. Shakespeare Macbeth Act I Scene 4 “In his commendations I am fed: It is a banquet to me.”

Βενδιδείοις . See Introd. § 3.

ὑπὸ σοῦ γε κτλ. Plato seems to be making the amende honorable to Thrasymachus: cf. VI 498 C, D μὴ διάβαλλε— ἐμὲ καὶ Θρασύμαχον ἄρτι φίλους γεγονότας, οὐδὲ πρὸ τοῦ ἐχθροὺς γεγονότας.

παραφερομένου . Casaubon's conjecture περιφερομένου is neat, but inappropriate, the reference being to the successive courses at a feast, which were not usually carried round among the Greeks. In Athen. IV 33 the carrying round of viands is mentioned as an Egyptian custom: τρίτη δ’ ἐστὶν ἰδέα δείπνων αἰγυπτιακή, τραπεζῶν μὲν οὐ παρατιθεμένων, πινάκων δὲ περιφερομένων .

ἐγώ μοι δοκῶ κτλ. Lys. 222 E δέομαι οὖν ὥσπερ οἱ σοφοὶ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις, τὰ εἰρημένα ἅπαντα ἀναπεμπάσασθαι.

ἐγὼ κτλ. λόγου is abstract = τοῦ λέγειν, not ‘the discussion’ (Jowett), which would be τοῦ λόγου. For τὸ δέ see on I 340 D.

ἦν ἄρα : ‘was after all,’ as in IV 443 C τὸ δέ γε ἦν ἄρα—εἴδωλόν τι τῆς δικαιοσύνης and Soph. Tr. 1172 τὸ δ’ ἦν ἄρ’ οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν θανεῖν ἐμέ. With προοίμιον cf. infra VII 531 D, Aesch. P. V. 740 f. ο<*>ς γὰρ νῦν ἀκήκοας λόγους | εἶναι δοκεῖ σοι μηδέπω )ν προοιμίοις, and Shakespeare Macbeth I 3 “As happy prologues to the swelling act Of the imperial theme.” For the sense see the last note on Book I. There is no good ground for supposing (with von Sybel De Platonis Proemiis Academicis) that either Book I of the Republic or the rest of Plato's dialogues were intended merely as προοίμια or ‘Programs’ to attract pupils to his lectures.

βούλει κτλ. The antithesis is between δοκεῖν πεπεικέναι and πεῖσαι, and βούλει is used in its natural sense, not (as Ast thinks) with the force of μᾶλλον βούλει.

λέγε γάρ μοι . Other classifications of ‘goods’ in Plato will be found in Laws 631 B ff. and 697 B ff. (with which compare Arist. Eth. Nic. I 8. 1098^{b} 12 ff.). See also Euthyd. 279 A ff., Gorg. 467 E , Phil. 66 A ff. The nearest parallels to the present classification are furnished by Stoicism, in which goods were classified as a τελικά, b ποιητικά, c both τελικά and ποιητικά, and the προηγμένα as a δἰ αὑτά, b δἰ ἕτερα, c καὶ δἰ αὑτὰ καὶ δἰ ἕτερα see D. L. VII 96, 107.

χαίρειν ‐‐ ἀβλαβεῖς . These ‘innocent pleasures’ are defined in Laws 667 E as those which bring no consequences in their train, good, bad, or otherwise (cf. καὶ μηδὲν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον διὰ ταύτας γίγνεται ἄλλο ἢ χαίρειν ἔχοντα). They are not quite identical with the ‘pure pleasures’ of Phil. 51 B , which are not necessarily devoid of all results, but only of pain. The same conception recurs in Aristotle, who regards the ἀβλαβεῖς ἡδοναί both as conducive to the ethical end and as useful for purposes of recreation ( Pol. Θ 5. 1339^{b} 25).

καὶ μηδὲν κτλ. The relative passes into a demonstrative ( ταύτας) in the second half of the sentence, as in III 412 D, VI 505 D, E, VII 521 B, and elsewhere. The idiom is regular in Greek, but the second pronoun is more usually some case of αὐτός than of οὗτος, e.g. III 395 D, VI 511 C, Gorg. 452 D , Theaet. 192 A . Cobet however ( Mnem. XI p. 167) goes too far in maintaining that αὐτός is alone permissible in this idiom. Cf. Engelhardt Anac. Plat. Spec. III pp. 41—43. μηδέν is used in preference to οὐδέν: for “cogitatione circumscriptum genus significatur” (Schneider). With the sentiment Muretus compared Arist. Eth. Nic. X 2. 1172^{b} 22 οὐδένα γὰρ ἐπερωτᾶν τίνος ἕνεκα ἥδεται, ὡς καθ’ αὑτὴν οὖσαν αἱρετὴν τὴν ἡδονήν.

ἔχοντα : sc. αὐτάς (so also Schneider), not the idiomatic ‘to continue rejoicing’ (as Campbell suggests). The essential mark of these pleasures, viz. that they give pleasure only while they last, is brought out by ἔχοντα, which recalls δεξαίμεθ’ ἂν ἔχειν just above, and is used without an expressed object as in 366 E.

τὸ φρονεῖν ‐‐ ὑγιαίνειν . ἀκούειν is added in 367 C. Cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. I 4. 1096^{b} 16 καθ) αὑτὰ δὲ ποῖα θείη τις ἄν; ἢ ὅσα καὶ μονούμενα διώκεται, οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἡδοναί τινες καὶ τιμαί; ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ καὶ δἰ ἄλλο τι διώκομεν, ὅμως τῶν καθ) αὑτὰ ἀγαθῶν θείη τις ἄν: also Met. A 1. 980^{a} 2 ff. Aristotle himself does not suggest that a special class should be made of things desirable both in themselves and for their results; but integri sensus and bona valetudo are included in the Stoic category of προηγμένα καὶ δἰ αὑτὰ καὶ δἰ ἕτερα (Cic. De Fin. III 56: cf. D. L. VII 107).

γυμνάζεσθαι κτλ. Cf. Prot. 354 A and Gorg. 467 C , D (where χρηματισμός is again said to belong to this class). ἰάτρευσις as an example of χρηματισμός (in spite of the ἀκριβὴς λόγος of I 342 B ff.) is suggested by ἰατρεύεσθαι. ὁ ἄλλος is ‘the rest of,’ and should not be taken (with Stallbaum) as praeterea: cf. Gorg. l.c. οἱ πλέοντές τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον χρηματισμὸν χρηματιζόμενοι and Crito 53 E.

μισθῶν θ’ ἕνεκα κτλ. Herwerden would read μισθῶν τε μὲν ἕνεκα, but for δέ without μέν preceding see I 340 D note The words διὰ δόξαν, which are condemned by the same critic, may no doubt be a gloss on εὐδοκιμήσεων ἕνεκα. I incline however to think them genuine. Plato is not averse to duplicate expressions of this kind (see Schanz Nov. Comm. Plat. pp. 12—15), and the emphatic addition of διὰ δόξαν helps in the absence of μέν to prepare us for the antithesis αὐτὸ δὲ δἰ αὑτὸ κτλ. Cf. 363 A below.

ψέγεται . See cr. n. The words ἀδικία δ’ ἐπαινεῖται are probably genuine: for the mention of ἀδικία seems to be necessary to justify the pronoun ἑκατέρου just below: cf. also in D βούλομαι καὶ σοῦ ἀκούειν ἀδικίαν μὲν ψέγοντος, δικαιοσύνην δὲ ἐπαινοῦντος. For the omission see Introd. § 5.

ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡς ἀγαθόν . Cf. infra 360 C and VI 493 C τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν ὅσον διαφέρει τῷ ὄντι κτλ.

ἀμείνων ἄρα . ἄρα disclaims responsibility for the theory: cf. 362 A, 364 B, E al.

Θρασυμάχου ‐‐ ἄλλων . See on I 337 A ff.

κατατείνας κτλ. : ‘I will speak vehemently in praise of the unjust life.’ The explanation of Photius and Suidas ( κατατείνας ἐρῶ· ἀντὶ τοῦ μακρὸν λόγον διεξελεύσομαι) does not suit II 367 B ὡς δύναμαι μάλιστα κατατείνας λέγω. For this intransitive use of κατατείνω cf. I 348 A and Boeckh's emendation of Eur. Iph. Aul. 336 οὔτε κατατενῶ ( καταινῶ MSS) λίαν ἐγώ.

εἴ σοι βουλομένῳ . In Crat. 384 A ἐστί is again omitted in this phrase. A still bolder example is cited by Stallbaum from Antipho 6. 8 ἐὰν ὑμῖν ἡδομένοις. See Schanz Novae Comm. Plat. pp. 31— 35.

οἷόν τέ τι . The reading of A τί ὄν τε καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε involves the separation of ὅθεν from γέγονε, and is otherwise much too harsh to be right. There is something to be said in favour of Schneider's περὶ τούτου ἅκουε τί οἴονται, καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε δικαιοσύνη (see cr. n.), especially as the confusion between οἷόν τε and οἴονται occurs rather frequently in Platonic MSS (see Schneider on 1 329 E), but the specific reference in ὃ ἔφην πρῶτον ἐρεῖν to 358 C πρῶτον μὲν ἐρῶ δικαιοσύνην οἷον εἶναί φασι καὶ ὅθεν γεγονέναι points to the presence of οἷον here. The reading οἷόν τε, adopted by Stallbaum, as well as by Jowett and Campbell, on the authority of three MSS (Vind. F, Flor. RT), is unexceptionable in point of sense, but fails to account for the presence of τί in the best MSS. I have ventured to read οἷόν τέ τι (SC. ἐστί), supposing that the confusion arose from the accidental omission of τι, which was afterwards (as τί) wrongly inserted before οἶόν (where it remained in Π), οἷον itself being afterwards changed to ὄν in order to provide a kind of construction (‘being what, and whence, it arises,’ J. and C.). This ὄν was itself fortified by τυγχάνει in Flor. B and the Aldine edition. Campbell's suggestion that “ τί ὄν τε may be a corruption of τί ἐστί” is improbable: still less can Herwerden and Hartman induce us to reject the whole clause. Few will approve of Tucker's conjecture τί τῷ ὄντι καὶ ὅθεν κτλ. Dr Jackson suggests ἄκουέ τι, οἷόν τε καὶ κτλ., and a reviewer of my Text of the Republic in Lit. Centralblatt 1898 p. 296 οἷόν τ’ ἐστί κτλ.

πεφυκέναι γὰρ ‐‐ κακόν . Cf. Gorg. 483 A φύσει μὲν γὰρ πᾶν αἴσχιόν ἐστιν ὅπερ καὶ κάκιον, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, νόμῳ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν. That the natural relation between man and man is one of war is a view expressed in Laws 626 A ἢν γὰρ καλοῦσιν οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰρήνην, τοῦτ’ εἶναι μόνον ὄνομα, τῷ δ’ ἔργῳ πάσαις πρὸς πάσας τὰς πόλεις ἀεὶ πόλεμον ἀκήρυκτον κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι. A similar theory is contained in the myth of Protagoras ( Prot. 322 B ff.).

τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις κτλ. : i.e. (according to the theory of Callicles) τοῖς ἀσθενέσι ἀνθρώποις καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ( Gorg. 483 B ). In place of δοκεῖ in 359 A I have adopted Ast's conjecture δοκεῖν. Throughout this paragraph Glauco consistently presents his view at second hand. For the collocation of infinitives cf. ἀδικεῖν, ἀδικεῖν 360 D, and for the error itself Introd. § 5.

ξυνθήκας αὑτῶν : ‘covenants between one another,’ ‘mutual covenants.’ Reading αὐτῶν, Tucker suggests that the meaning is, ‘they established laws and covenants concerning them,’ i.e. concerning matters connected with ἀδικεῖν and ἀδικεῖσθαι—a very improbable view.

νόμιμόν τε καὶ δίκαιον · φημὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ τὸ νόμιμον δίκαιον εἶναι, said Socrates ( Mem. IV 4. 12).

τοῦ μὲν ἀρίστου κτλ. Cf. the reasoning of Philus (whose position in Cicero's work corresponds to that of Glauco here) in Cic. de Rep. III 23 “nam cum de tribus unum esset optandum, aut facere iniuriam nec accipere, aut et facere et accipere, aut neutrum, optimum est facere, impune si possis, secundum nec facere nec pati, miserrimum digladiari semper tum faciendis tum accipiendis iniuriis.” Cicero is following Carneades ( ibid. 8), who may have been thinking of the present passage. ἀγαπᾶσθαι below (as J. and C. observe) “implies acquiescence rather than decided preference.”

ἐπεὶ τὸν δυνάμενον κτλ. is further elaborated with much vigour in Gorg. 484 A . With ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα should be compared the emphatic ἀνήρ in that passage ( ἐὰν δέ γε, οἶμαι, φύσιν ἱκανὴν γένηται ἔχων ἀνήρ), and Eur. Phoen. 509 ἀνανδρία γάρ, τὸ πλέον ὅστις ἀπολέσας | τοὔλασσον ἔλαβε.

εἰ τοιόνδε ‐‐ δόντες . δόντες κτλ. explains τοιόνδε. εἰ need not be twice expressed: cf. I 351 C note

νόμῳ ‐‐ παράγεται . The language is perhaps suggested by the lines of Pindar cited in Gorg. 484 B νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων— ἄγει δικαιῶν τὸ βιαιότατον ὑπερτάτᾳ χειρί κτλ. (cf. Prot. 337 D ). but the preposition in παράγεται adds the further notion that equality is not Nature's highway. For βίᾳ i.q. βιαἴως in conjunction with another dative Schneider cites VIII 552 E οὓς ἐπιμελείᾳ βίᾳ κατέχουσιν αἱ ἀρχαί. In the next line it is better to regard τοιάδε as explained by εἰ—γενέσθαι, than as balancing οἴαν, in which case εἰ αὐτοῖς γένοιτο would be superfluous. The opportunity ( ἐξουσία) of working their will comes from the possession ( εἰ αὐτοῖς γένοιτο) of a certain active faculty ( δύναμις) like that of Gyges.

τῷ Γύγου κτλ. Cf. X 612 B τὸν Γύγου δακτύλιον. In Appendix I I have given reasons for believing that the Gyges of the proverbial ‘Gyges' ring’ was not “Gyges the Lydian”—the hero of Herodotus' story (I 7), but a homonymous ancestor of his. If so, we must (on the hypothesis that the text is sound) suppose that Plato here omits the name of the original Gyges either because he wishes tacitly to contradict a prevalent misconception, or (more probably) because his readers might be presumed to know or to be capable of inferring that the ancestor of Gyges the Lydian was also called Gyges. The MS reading is supported by Proclus ( τῷ κατὰ τὸν Γύγου πρόγονον διηγήματι in Schöll Procli Comm. in Remp. Pl. part. ined. p. 60. 30). For other views of this passage see App. I.

ὡς φαίνεσθαι : with νεκρόν, as Schneider saw: “utrum vere mortuus fuerit, an specie, fabula incertum reliquit.” Stallbaum wrongly interprets ‘nimirum videbatur Gyges cernere’ etc.: this would be expressed by δοκεῖν. Ast connects the phrase with μείζω ἢ κατ’ ἄνθρωπον: but this is very weak in point of sense. The words are omitted by Cicero ( De Off. III 38).

ἔχειν . See cr. n. and (for the omission in A) Introd. § 5. ἔχειν in the sense of ‘have on’ ‘wear,’ i.q. φορεῖν, is tolerably frequent in Homer, though rarer in Attic: see Stephanus-Hase Thes. s.v. For the change of subject in ἔχειν—ἐκβῆναι cf. III 414 D note Other views on the text and interpretation of this passage are discussed in App. II.

χειρί . Herwerden's δακτύλῳ is unnecessary, and even unpleasant with δακτύλιον so near. Cf. χρυσόχειρες in Luc. Tim. 20. “Etiamnunc homines ita loquuntur” (Hartman).

ἵν’ ἐξαγγέλλοιεν κτλ. : ‘to report, as was done every month.’ The present expresses the habit (J. and C.).

σφενδόνην : the ‘collet’ or ‘bezel’ (Lat. funda or pala annuli)— which is as it were the sling in which the stone is set.

ὡς δόξειεν . “Optativus eandem vim habet, quam solet in oratione obliqua habere, efficitque, ut verba οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο οὕτως etc. ex aliorum ore missa videantur" (Schneider). This explanation appears to me better than any other, although I can discover no exact parallel in Greek. Glauco is most careful throughout the whole of this section to disclaim responsibility for the views he advocates: cf. ὡς ὁ λόγος 359 B, ἐπεὶ— ἀδικεῖν in C, ὡς φήσει κτλ. in D below: also 361 E al. Tucker would translate ‘as it might seem,’ defending the optative by Ar. Birds 180 ὥσπερ εἴποι τις and Eur. Andr. 929 ὡς εἴποι τις. Others erroneously hold that ἄν may be supplied from ἂν γένοιτο, while Ast is desirous of inserting the particle on conjecture. I do not think that the optative can be explained as an instance of irregular assimilation or attraction.

ἂν μείνειεν . For ἄν cf. Symp. 179 A and other examples in Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 934.

ἰσόθεον ὄντα . The halfconscious irony of ἰσόθεος foreshadows Plato's attack on the popular theology.

οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν δίκαιος here and in 366 D sums up the Thrasymachean theory in a phrase which suggests the Socratic and Platonic antithesis οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν πονηρός .

περὶ ‐‐ λέγων . περί can hardly be for ὑπέρ, nor dare we write ὑπέρ for περί (as Badham suggests). The words mean simply ‘qui de hoc argumento verba facit,’ ‘the exponent of such a theory.’ Cf. 362 D ἱκανῶς εἰρῆσθαι περὶτοῦλόγου. Muretus seems to have desiderated πατήρ for περί: cf. expressions like Phaedr. 275 E ( λόγος) τοῦ πατρὸς ἀεὶ δεῖται βοηθοῦ. On the strength of this Herwerden would read ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου, rejecting λέγων (“posteaquam ex πήρ factum est περί, corrector addidit λέγων”). The ‘father of the theory’ would mean Thrasymachus: see on ὦ παῖδες in 368 A. It is just possible that πατήρ was read by Ficinus (“ut sermonis huius perhibent auctores”), and if so, the variant may have some ancient authority now lost; but Herwerden's proposal is too drastic, and the text is probably sound.

ἀθλιώτατος . Apelt conjectures ἠλιθιώτατος, but cf. (with Hartman) I 344 A τοὺς δὲ—ἀδικῆσαι οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοντας ἀθλιωτάτους.

τὴν δὲ κρίσιν κτλ. αὐτήν opposes the third division of Glauco's speech to the other two (see 358 C), and marks it as the most important. A kindred use of αὐτός recurs at 370 E ἀλλὰ μήν,—κατοικίσαι γε αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν —ἀδύνατον. I formerly read αὖ τὴν for αὐτήν, but the MS reading is quite de fensible. It should be noticed that κρίσιν is at first a kind of pendent accusative, afterwards “resumed as a cognate accusative with κρῖναι” (J. and C.). Tucker strangely makes κρίσιν=‘choice.’ The word means of course (our) ‘judgment’ concerning etc. Cf. 361 D ἵν’ ἀμφότεροι —κρίνωνται and εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἐκκαθαίρεις.

εἰς goes with τέλεον: cf. δόξαν εἰς 361 A.

οὕτω ‐‐ λανθανέτω . ἐπιχειρῶν ὀρθῶς means of course attempting possible, and abstaining from impossible, ἀδικήματα. But as an ἀδίκημα is possible only if the ἀδικῶν is able to conceal it (the alternative of open violence is recognised later 361 B), it is necessary that the unjust man should escape detection. Hence λανθανέτω, although λανθάνειν was not attributed (because not essential) to the pilot and doctor (360 E).

φαῦλον means a ‘bungler’ (D. and V.). With the sentiment cf. Prot. 317 A τὸ οὖν ἀποδιδράσκοντα μὴ δύνασθαι ἀπξδρᾶναι, ἀλλὰ καταφανῆ εἶναι, πολλὴ μωρία καὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρήματος: also Laws 845 B, and the Spartan practice of punishing boys not for stealing, but for being caught (Xen. Rep. Lac. 2. 8). With ἐσχάτη γὰρ ἀδικία κτλ. the editors compare Cicero de Off. I 41 “totius autem iniustitiae nulla capitalior est, quam eorum, qui, cum maxime fallunt, id agunt, ut viri boni esse videantur.”

κατ) Αἰσχύλον ‐‐ ἀγαθόν . Sept. 592—594 (of Amphiaraus) οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἄριστος, ἀλλ’ εἶναι θέλει | βαθεῖαν ἄλοκα διὰ φρενὸς καρπούμενος, | ἐξ ἧς τὰ κεδνὰ βλαστάνει βουλεύματα. Herwerden would expunge ἀγαθόν (“mente repetatur ἁπλοῦν καὶ γενναῖον”), on the ground that if Plato had added any adjective, it would have been δίκαιον. (The Scholiast substitutes δίκαιος for ἄριστος in Aeschylus.) ἀγαθόν gives excellent sense, and is nearer to the poet's words.

εἴη is explained by Stallbaum as an optative of wish (though in a subordinate clause): ‘it is not clear therefore whether he is fain to be just,’ etc. This gives a fair sense, but the idiom is obscure, and unsupported by other examples. J. and C. remark that “the optative accords with the conditional nature of the case in an imagined future,” taking ἄδηλον as for ἄδηλον ἂν εἴη. But an omitted ἂν εἴη cannot be responsible for the mood of τοιοῦτος εἴη, nor could ἂν εἴη easily be omitted (see Schanz Nov. Comm. Pl. p. 33). Still less should we accept Hartman's ἄδηλον <ἂν> οὖν, sc. εἴη. Madvig ejects εἴη altogether, understanding ἐστι after τοιοῦτος. This may be right, but its intrusion is not easy to explain. I think the word is genuine, and means ‘was’: ‘it is not clear then, say they, whether he was just,’ etc. Glauco again disclaims responsibility: cf. 360 B note εἴη would in direct speech be ἦν: and the idiom is like that in III 406 E, where see note. For the sequence of moods and tenses cf. VI 490 A note Failing this interpretation, the word must (I think) be spurious. Herwerden's proposal— τοιούτῳ εἶναι, ἄδηλον ὄν (retaining εἴη)—does not surmount the difficulty and is also wrong in point of sense.

ἀπ’ αὐτῆς . See cr. n. The sense required is not ‘what is produced by’ ( ὑπό) ‘it,’ but ‘what results from it’: cf. γίγνεσθαι ἀπό (in a similar connexion) 357 C and 358 B. The scribe no doubt assimilated the preposition to the preceding ὑπό.

ἔστω . See cr. n. I formerly read ἴτω with A^{1} and the majority of editors, but I now agree with Schneider that ἔστω is right. ἴτω cannot be used by itself as a synonym for ‘live,’ or as a copula: we should require ἴτω διὰ βίου, instead of ἴτω μέχρι θανάτου (to transpose the two phrases would of course be too violent a change). The sole authority for ἴτω is the first hand in A: and this is certainly insufficient to outweigh the inherent superiority of ἔστω. Most MSS have ἤτω, a late form for ἔστω.

ἐκκαθαίρεις : not ‘polish up’ (J. and C.) but rather ‘scour clean’ (D. and V.), ‘purge’ from all extraneous matter: see 361 C γυμνωτέος δὴ πάντων πλὴν δικαιοσύνης.

ἀγροικοτέρως is said with reference to the exaggeration and coarseness of the description: cf. Ap. 32 D , Gorg. 509 A .

δεδήσεται : ‘will be kept in chains.’ δεθήσεται (so v and some other MSS) is required by Herwerden, and may be right. But in Xen. Cyr. IV 3. 18 δεδήσομαι is similarly combined with several first futures.

ἐκκαυθήσεται κτλ. Schneider refers to Hdt. VII 18 θερμοῖσι σιδηρίοισι ἐκκαίειν—τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς, and Gorg. 473 C ἐὰν—στρεβλῶται καὶ ἐκτέμνηται καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐκκάηται. That ἐκκαυθήσεται (and not ἐκκοπήσεται, the reading of some inferior MSS, and of the ancient authorities who cite this passage) is right here, is probable also from X 613 E ἃ ἄγροικα ἔφησθα σὺ εἶναι ἀληθῆ λέγων, εἶτα στρεβλώσονται καὶ ἐκκαυθήσονται, whether the last clause is genuine or not. It is not clear that Cicero ( de Rep. III 27) did not find ἐκκαυθήσεται in his text; for though he has effodiantur oculi, he adds afterwards vinciatur, uratur. Herwerden recasts the words of Plato to suit Cicero's translation, but Cicero is a much less trustworthy witness than Paris A.

ἄρα : see on 358 C. τῷ ὄντι in the same line belongs not to φήσουσι, but to τὸν ἄδικον—ἐθέλειν.

βαθεῖαν κτλ. : “reaping in his thoughts the fruit of the deep furrow, from which good counsel grows” (Verrall). Plato takes τὰ κεδνὰ βουλεύματα more concretely, and places in apposition thereto ἄρχειν and the other infinitives down to ὠφελεῖσθαι, δοκοῦντι being the dative of interest after βλαστάνει. For the change from the dative δοκοῦντι to the accusative κερδαίνοντα cf. Euthyph. 5 A and infra IV 422 B, C.

κοινωνεῖν . Cobet deletes this word, as well as καὶ κοινωνήματα in Laws 738 A πρὸς ἅπαντα τὰ ξυμβόλαια καὶ κοινωνήματα. In view of the same passage Platt ( Cl. Rev. III p. 72) would read καὶ κοινωνεῖν. No change is necessary, for κοινωνεῖν is a term of wider connotation than ξυμβάλλειν (see I 333 A note), and the asyndeton has a rhetorical effect: cf. III 407 B, V 465 C, VI 488 C, IX 590 A notes

πλεονεκτεῖν recalls I 343 D, E, 349 B ff., as τούς τε φίλους εὐ ποιεῖν κτλ. recalls the theory attributed to Simonides in I 334 B. Here however it is not Justice, but Injustice masquerading as Justice, which is said to benefit friends and injure enemies.

μᾶλλον προσήκειν . The comparative is attached to the verb as well as to the adjective, so as to combine the force of two expressions, viz. (1) ὥστε καὶ θεοφιλῆ αὐτὸν εἶναι μᾶλλον προσήκειν and (2) ὥστε καὶ θεοφιλέστερον αὐτὸν εἶναι προσήκειν. In cases like λαθραιότερον μᾶλλον Laws 781 A, μᾶλλον is quite redundant: in Hipp. Mai. 285 A ἔστι δέ γε—ὠφελιμώτερον—παιδεύεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ κτλ. it is resumptive. See on the whole subject Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 25.

παρεσκευάσθαι ‐‐ ἄμεινον . For ἄμεινον Richards would read ἀμείνον) or ἀμείνονα: cf. 358 C πολὺ γὰρ ἀμείνων ἄρα ὁ τοῦ ἀδίκου ἢ ὁ τοῦ δικαίου βίος. The change is tempting at first sight; but Plato generally uses ἀμείνω and not ἀμείνονα, and the adverb expresses what is virtually the same meaning, since a βίος ἄμεινον παρεσκευασμένος (cf. πόλιν εὖ παρεσκευασμένην Laws 751 B) is (according to the views here described) a βίος ἀμείνων. Hermann's χείρον) for χεῖρον in Phaed. 85 B , though adopted by Schanz, is also unnecessary, for ἔχειν may be intransitive.

ἔφη . See cr. n. ἔφη is present in the majority of MSS, and cannot be dispensed with, where the interlocutor is specified, as here. See Introd. § 5.

ἀδελφὸς ἀνδρὶ παρείη : frater adsit fratri. Ast proposed to insert ἂν before ἀνδρί, making the sentence interrogative. The rhythm would thus approximate to the usual paroemiac rhythm of proverbs: but the brevity and force of the proverb would suffer. If change were needed it would be better to adopt Shilleto's elegant suggestion ἀδελφεὸς ἀνδρὶ παρείη (note on Dem. F. L. § 262), but even if this was the original expression, it would be quite in Plato's manner to substitute the modern for the archaic word, in defiance of rhythm. The source of the proverb (with which compare συγγνώμη ἀδελφῷ βοηθεῖν F. L. § 264) is found by the Scholiast in Od. XVI 97 f. ἤ τι κασιγνήτοις ἐπιμέμφεαι, οἷσί περ ἀνὴρ | μαρναμένοισι πέποιθε, καὶ εἰ μέγα νεῖκος ὄρηται. Cf. also Il. XXI 308 f. and Xen. Mem. II 3. 19.

ἐναντίους . Adimantus' λόγοι are ἐναντίοι, because they praise Justice, and censure Injustice: whereas Glauco had done the reverse: κατατείνας ε<*>ρῶ τὸν ἄδικον βίον ἐπαινῶν (358 D).

αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην . Not αὐτοδικαιοσύνην (with the second hand in A), which would be the (chiefly postPlatonic) expression for the Idea of Justice (cf. αὐτοάνθ ρωπος and the like). αὐτό is ipsum, ‘by itself,’ as in αὐτοὶ γάρ ἐσμεν: cf. Theaet. 146 E γνῶναι ἐπιστήμην αὐτὸ ὄ τι ποτ’ ἐστιν, and infra V 472 C, X 612 B (cited by J. and C.). αὐτό may be thus used even when the feminine of the article is present, e.g. Prot. 361 A αὐτὸ ἡ ἀρετή: cf. also Crat. 411 D .

γίγνηται . The nominatives are treated as equivalent to a neuter plural, whence the singular verb. Cf. Symp. 188 B , Laws 925 E, Andocides I 145. γίγνεσθαι is the verb in each of these examples. See also infra V 462 E.

τῷ δικαίῳ . Schneider is right in refusing to change the δικαίῳ of A, II and most MSS to ἀδίκῳ, which has the authority of a few inferior MSS. The reference in διῆλθεν ἄρτι is no doubt to 362 B, where the benefits accrue to the man who seems to be just, although in reality he is unjust. But ὄντα etc. should be taken, not with διῆλθεν, but as part of the parents' exhortation. This yields a better rhythm, and much better sense. The parents exhort their children to be just, in order that ( ἵνα depends on χρὴ δίκαιον εἶναι) they may obtain the rewards ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν ὄντα τῷ δικαίῳ. They very properly assume that the surest way to seem to be just (and so to obtain the rewards of justice) is to be just: cf. Xen. Mem. II 6. 39 συντομωτάτη τε καὶ ἀσφαλεστάτη καὶ καλλίστη ὁδὸς—ὅ τι ἂν βούλῃ δοκεῖν ἀγαθὸς εἶναι, τοῦτο καὶ γενέσθαι ἀγαθὸν πειρᾶσθαι and ib. I 7. 1 with Heracl. Fr. 137 ed. Bywater συντομωτάτην ὁδὸν—εἰς εὐδοξίαν τὸ γενέσθαι ἀγαθόν. Glauco's picture of the just man as one who seems to be unjust is untrue to the facts of experience, as Socrates points out in X 612 D: nor did even Glauco go so far as to say that the unjust man, qua unjust, ηὐδοκίμει, but only ὁ δοκῶν δίκαιος εἶναι (who may, of course, be unjust). The divorce between appearance and reality is purely argumentative, and out of place in parental exhortations. Further, in order to make ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν ὄντα etc. represent what Glauco said, we should have to read τῷ ἀδίκῳ μὲν δοκοῦντι δὲ δικαίῳ: otherwise the words δοξαζομένων δὲ ἀδίκων in the corresponding phrase (363 E) might just as well be omitted. If ὄντα is construed with διῆλθεν, the words τῷ δικαίῳ must (with Ast) be expunged: but that the clause represents what the parents say is further proved by the exact correspondence of ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν ὄντα τῷ δικαίῳ with τὰς ἀπ’ αὐτῆς (sc. δικαιοσύνης ) εὐδοκιμήσεις, which is what the parents praise. I have dwelt on this point at some length because recent English editors (except Tucker) have wrongly deserted Paris A.

τοῖς ὁσίοις depends on ἀγαθά (‘good things for the pious’): cf. ἀγαθὰ διῆλθε τῷ τοῦ ἀδίκου I 348 A note This is much simpler than to punctuate ἀγαθά, τοῖς ο<*>σίοις ἅ as the other editors do. Such a postponement of the relative is rare, and here, I think, unduly harsh, in spite of the analogy of III 390 B and IV 425 C. Cobet felt the difficulty when in an unhappy moment he suggested ἀγαθά, ἃ τοῖς ὁσίοις κτλ.

Ἡσίοδός τε κτλ. Hesiod and Homer are appealed to as recognised theological authorities: see Hdt. II 53.

ἄκρας ‐‐ καταβεβρίθασι . OD. 232 f. τοῖσι (i.e. ἰθυδίκῃσιν ἀνδράσι) φέρει μὲν γαῖα πολὺν β<*>ον, οὔρεσι δὲ δρῦς | ἄκρη μέν τε φέρει βαλάνους, μέσση δὲ μελίσσας· | εἰροπόκοι δ’ ὄϊες μαλλοῖς καταβεβρίθασι. Further rewards of justice ( ἄλλα δὴ πολλὰ ἀγαθά) are enumerated in vv. 227—231, and 235—237. Many other illustrations in support of Plato's attack on Greek religion throughout this passage will be found in Nägelsbach's Hom. Theol. and Nachhom. Theol. passim.

ὥστε τευ ‐‐ ἰχθῦς . Od. XIX 109 ff. The ἤ before βασιλῆος is difficult: apparently the author intended to give two comparisons, but dropped the second. We are hardly justified, I think, in abolishing the anacoluthon by reading (with Platt) ὥστέ τεο βασιλῆος or (with Ameis) ὥστε τευ ἦ.

Μουσαῖος κτλ. By Musaeus' son Plato probably means Eumolpus (cf. Suidas s. vv. Εὔμολπος and Μουσαῖος). In this section of the argument Plato directs his attack against certain forms of the Orphic conception of a future life: see Lobeck Aglaophamus p. 807 with Rohde Psyche^{2} II pp. 127, 129 notes, and Dieterich Nekyia pp. 72 ff. 77 ff. notes Lobeck refers to Plut. Comp. Cim. et Lucull. 2 Πλάτων ἐπισκώπτει τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ὀρφέα τοῖς εὖ βεβιωκόσι φάσκοντας ἀποκεῖσθαι γέρας ἐν ᾅδου μέθην αἰώνιον and id. Ne suav. quidem vivi posse sec. Epic. 1105 B, where the allusion to Plato is less clear: also D. L. VI 4.

συμπόσιον τῶν ὁσίων . ὅσιοι was the regular appellation of the μύσται ( ὁσίους μύστας hymn. Orph. 84. 3 ed. Abel). For the συμπόσιον cf. [ Axioch.] 371 D συμπόσιά τε εὐμελῆ καὶ εἰλαπίναι αὐτοχορήγητοι καὶ ἀκήρατος ἀλυπία καὶ ἡδεῖα δίαιτα. The stock example in antiquity of earthly virtue rewarded by the delights of a sensuous paradise is Heracles: see e.g. Pind. Nem. I 71, Theocr. XVII 28 f. and Horace Od. III 3. 9 f., IV 8. 29 f. A somewhat higher note is struck in Pind. Ol. II 61 ff. and Fr. 129 f. Several of these passages shew traces of Orphic influence, but the special instance of Heracles is traceable to Homer ( Od. XI 602 f.).

μέθην αἰώνιον may be illustrated from the fragment of Pherecrates ap. Athen. VI 268 E ff.

ἀποτίνουσιν . See cr. n. The reading of A is defended by Stallbaum as an abbreviation for μακροτέρους λόγους ἀποτείνουσι περὶ μισθῶν παρὰ θεῶν; but no other example of this harsh condensation has been adduced, and the sense is far from satisfactory. A better meaning is conveyed by Schneider's translation, “Andere aber lassen die Belohnungen der Götter noch weiter reichen als diese”: for it is clear from the next clause that μακροτέρους (‘more extensive,’ not, of course, ‘greater,’ which would be μείζους) refers to the extension of the rewards of virtue beyond the personality of the individual concerned. But μακροτέρους ἀποτείνουσιν μισθούς is (to say the least) an obscure and difficult expression; and ἀποτίνουσιν (i.q. λέγουσιν ἀποτίνεσθαι) receives strong support from the parallel use of διδόασιν in C above, and κατορύττουσιν, ἀναγκάζουσι, and ἄγοντες below. The collocation of μακροτέρους with ἀποτίνουσι may easily have led to the corruption ἀποτείνουσι, owing to the frequency of such expressions as μακροὺς λόγους ἀποτείνειν. For the error see Introd. § 5.

παῖδας ‐‐ κατόπισθεν . The Scholiast remarks ἐξ Ἡροδότου (VI 86) ἀπὸ τοῦ δοθέντος χρησμοῦ Γλαύκῳ τῷ Λάκωνι ὡς Ἀνδρὸς δ’ εὐόρκου γενεὴ μετόπισθεν ἀμείνων. The story of Glaucus admirably illustrates the view herein expressed; but Plato is more probably thinking of Hesiod OD. 285 (a line which is identical with that quoted from the oracle), and also perhaps of some such lines as those of Tyrtaeus 12. 29 f. καὶ τύμβος καὶ παῖδες ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀρίσημοι | καὶ παίδων παῖδες καὶ γένος ἐξοπίσω.

εἰς πηλόν τινα κατορύττουσιν . τινα is contemptuous: ‘something which they call mud’: cf. 372 B infra and Symp. 210 D ( ἀνθρώπου τινός). The ‘mud’ is Orphic: see Abel Orphic. p. 247 and cf. Phaed. 69 C , Rep. VII 533 D, and the σκῶρ ἀείνων of Ar. Frogs 146 , with Blaydes' note. See also Rohde Psyche^{2} I p. 313 note and Dieterich Nekyia pp. 82 f. The employment of the Danaid legend in Orphic teaching is illustrated by Gorg. 493 B : cf. also Dieterich Nekyia pp. 69 f., 75.

δοξαζομένων δέ . For δέ without μέν see I 340 D note

ἄλλα δὲ οὐκ ἔχουσιν : sc. λέγειν τιμωρήματα. Adimantus means that they dissuade men from injustice merely on account of its results, ignoring τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ ἐνὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ (358 B). J. and C. aptly cite Theaet. 176 D , E ἀγνοοῦσι γὰρ ζημίαν ἀδικίας, ὃ δεῖ ἥκιστα ἀγνοεῖν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἣν δοκοῦσιν, πληγαί τε καὶ θάνατοι, ὧν ἐνίοτε πάσχουσιν οὐδὲν ἀδικοῦντες, ἀλλ’ ἣν ἀδύνατον ἐκφυγεῖν, viz. “that by their wicked acts they become like the pattern of evil.”

ἰδίᾳ has been understood of writing in prose, but the reference is only to the representations of private persons, e.g. parents, etc.)(to poets, who were in a sense the professional teachers of Hellas: cf. X 606 C, Laws 890 A ἰδιωτῶν τε καὶ ποιητῶν, and 366 E below.

καλὸν μὲν ‐‐ ἐπίπονον . See cr. n. For the omission of τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη see Introd. § 5. The sentiment may be illustrated by Hesiod OD. 289—292 and Simon. ap. Pl. Prot. 339 B ff. ἄνδρ’ ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπόν κτλ.; cf. also Simonides' imitation of Hesiod ( Fr. 58 ed. Bergk).

ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος : i.q. ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. So also Phaedr. 275 B . The sentiment recurs in Isocr. de Pace § 31.

πονηρούς is the substantive, and ἄλλας δυνάμεις ἔχοντας balances πλουσίους. πλούτους, parallel to ἄλλας δυνάμεις, and also dependent on ἔχοντας, might appear neater. But there is no reason for deserting the MSS, although Plato is fond of the plural of πλοῦτος (cf. e.g. VI 495 A, X 618 B, 619 A). The sentiment is best illustrated from Polus's description of the happiness of Archelaus in Gorg. 471 A ff.

ὡς ἄρα ‐‐ μοῖραν . ἄρα hints dissent: cf. 358 C note The gnomic poets often express themselves in this vein: e.g. Solon 15. 1 πολλοὶ γὰρ πλουτεῦσι κακοί, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ πένονται, Theogn. 373— 380. A kindred sentiment occurs in Sophocles Phil. 447—452. For the most part however it is held that Justice asserts herself in the end: see for example Solon 4. 15 f., 13. 7—32. Euripides expresses the general teaching of Greek tragedy on this subject when he writes ( Ion 1621 f.) ἐς τέλος γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἐσθλοὶ τυγχάνουσιν ἀξίων, | οἱ κακοὶ δ’ , ὥσπερ πεφύκασ’ , οὔποτ’ εὖ πράξειαν ἄν. There is no occasion to write (with Richards) πολλάκις τοῖς for πολλοῖς.

ἐπὶ πλουσίων θύρας ἰόντες . This semi-proverbial expression (cf. VI 489 B, C) stigmatises the avarice of seers and mendicant priests ( ἀγύρται from ἀγείρω, cf. infra 381 D). Plato's contempt for μαντική in general is expressed in the Euthyphro and sporadically in various dialogues (see e.g. Tim. 71 E , with Archer-Hind's note); but his attack is here particularly directed (cf. infra 364 E) against such Ὀρφεοτελεσταί or Orphic friars as Theophrastus speaks of in his description of the δεισι‐ δαίμων ( Charact. 16) καὶ τελεσθησόμενος πρὸς τοὺς Ὀρφεοτελεστὰς κατὰ μῆνα πορεύεσθαι μετὰ τῆς γυναικός, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ σχολάζῃ ἡ γυνή, μετὰ τῆς τίτθης καὶ τῶν παιδίων. The kind of ceremonies which they practised may be seen from Dem. de Cor. §§ 258 ff. Plato agreed with the more enlightened section of his countrymen in condemning such degrading cults and superstitions on the ground of their immoral tendency: see especially Foucart des Assoc. religieuses chez les Grecs pp. 153 —157, where the opinions of ancient writers on this subject are collected. On ἀγύρται in general reference may be made to J. H. Wright in Harvard Studies in Cl. Philol. VI p. 66 note

ἐάν τε ‐‐ βλάψειν is in oratio obliqua: ‘et si quis inimicum laedere velit, nocituros se parvo sumptu iusto pariter et iniusto’ (Schneider Addit. p. 11). This explanation (which Tucker also proposes without knowing that Schneider had forestalled him) is by far the best and simplest. For other views see App. III.

ἐπαγωγαῖς ‐‐ καταδέσμοις . ἐπαγωγαί are ἀγωγαὶ δαίμονος φαύλου ἐπί τινα γενόμεναι (Timaeus Lex. s.v.). The datives are usually construed with πείθοντες, and καταδέσμοις understood as the binding formulae “by which the seer compels the invisible powers to work his will” (Rohde Psyche^{2} II p. 88 note). But in the κατάδεσμοι which have been discovered it is the victim and not the god who is bound down; see e.g. CIG 538 (an Athenian inscription of about 380 B.C.)— καταδῶ Κτησίαν—καὶ Κλεοφράδην καταδῶ—καὶ τοὺς μετὰ Κτησίου ἅπαντας καταδῶ. This and other instances from leaden tablets found in graves are given by Wachsmuth Rhein. Mus. XVIII (1863) pp. 560 ff.: cf. also Marquardt Röm. Staatsverwaltung III p. 109 note 6. On this account I think it better to connect ἐπαγωγαῖς τισὶν καὶ καταδέσμοις with βλάψειν, exactly as in Laws 933 D ἐὰν δὲ καταδέσεσιν ἢ ἐπαγωγαῖς ἤ τισιν ἐπῳδαῖς ἢ τῶν τοιούτων φαρυακειῶν ὡντινωνοῦν δόξῃ ὅμοιος εἶναι βλάπτοντι—τεθνάτω. Plato is still alluding to the debasing forms of oriental superstition which had gained a footing in Greece in his day: see Foucart l. c. p. 172.

θεοὺς ‐‐ σφισιν ὑπηρετεῖν : whereas true religion consists in man's ὑπηρεσία τοῖς θεοῖς Euthyph. 13 D ff.

οἱ μὲν κτλ. : ‘some declaiming about the easiness of vice, how that’ etc. οἱ μὲν—ᾄδοντες recalls 364 A, while οἱ δέ refers to the ἀγύρται καὶ μάντεις of 364 B. The reference in the first case is as precise as possible: πάντες γὰρ ἐξ ἑνὸς στόματος ὑμνοῦσιν ὡς καλὸν μὲν ἡ σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη, χαλεπὸν μέντοι καὶ ἐπίπονον· ἀκολασία δὲ καὶ ἀδικία ἡδὺ μὲν καὶ εὐπετὲς κτήσασθαι, δόξῃ δὲ μόνον καὶ νόμῳ αἰσχρόν (364 A). Those who ὑμνοῦσιν ὡς—ἀκολασία—καὶ ἀδικία—εὐπετὲς κτήσασθαι can be accurately described as κακίας περὶ εὐπετείας ᾄδοντες, but scarcely by οἱ κακίας πέρι εὐπετείας διδόντες, because ‘to offer facilities for vice’ is not the same thing as to say that vice is easy. Stallbaum attempts to evade this difficulty by taking διδόντες as equivalent to διδόσθαι λέγοντες, but neither is ‘saying that facilities are offered for vice’ quite the same as ‘saying that vice is easy.’ It is also difficult to find another instance of the plural of εὐπέτεια. The verbal echoes seem to me very strongly in favour of περὶ—ᾄδοντες. For ᾄδοντες=‘harping on’ (like the ὑμνοῦσιν to which it refers) cf. Lys. 205 C ἃ δὲ ἡ πόλις ὅλη ᾄδει and 205 D ἅπερ αἱ γραῖαι ᾄδουσι (with reference to the proverbial γραῶν ὕθλος): the use of ᾄδειν in Laws 854 C is different, but akin. For the corruption of ᾄδοντες to διδόντες see Introd. § 5. The conjectures of Liebhold ( Fl. Jahrb. 1888 p. 107) and Zeller ( Arch. f. Gesch. d. Phil. II p. 694) κακίας πέρι εὐπετείας διελθόντες and κακίας πέρι εὐπέτειαν διδόντας have little in their favour.

ὡς τὴν ‐‐ ἔθηκαν . Hesiod OD. 287—289. ὡς is due to Plato: Hesiod has τὴν μέν τοι κτλ. For λείη the MSS of Hesiod read ὀλίγη: λείη (also in Laws 718 E, Xen. Mem. II 1. 20 and elsewhere) proves the existence of a different recension. Cf. G. E. Howes Harvard Studies in Cl. Philol. VI p. 165. The verses are partially quoted or referred to again in Laws 718 E, Prot. 340 D ; their influence is also seen in Phaedr. 272 C .

καί τινα ὁδὸν κτλ. : Hesiod OD. 290 μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρθιος οἶμος ἐς αὐτὴν | καὶ τρηχὺς κτλ. The last two words account for the marginal addition καὶ τραχεῖαν in A.

λιστοὶ ‐‐ ἁμάρτῃ . See cr. n. The words are spoken by Phoenix to Achilles in Il. IX 497—501. Plato edits the lines to suit his own purposes. For λιστοί our text of Homer has στρεπτοί. The word λιστοί (though implied in ἄλλιστος, τρίλλιστος) does not occur elsewhere, a fact which is strongly in favour of its genuineness here. We must suppose that the recension which Plato used had λιστοί. The theology contained in these lines meets us continually in ancient literature: cf. also the words of the king in Hamlet III 3 “And what's in prayer but this twofold force To be forestalled ere we come to fall Or pardoned being down?” Plato expresses his dissent in Laws 716 E ff., 905 D: in Alc. II 149 E we read οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι τοιοῦτόν ἐστι, τὸ τῶν θεῶν ὥστε ὑπὸ δώρων παράγεσθαι οἶον κακὸν τοκιστήν.

βίβλων ‐‐ ἐγγόνων . The allusion is to Orphic liturgies. Musaeus was the son of Selene, according to Philochorus quoted by the Scholiast on Ar. Frogs 1033 : cf. φαεσφόρου ἔκγονε Μήνης | Μουσαῖε in Abel Orphic. Fr. 4. Orpheus' mother was the Muse Calliope (Suidas s.v. Ὀρφεύς). There is no solid basis for the old view that ἔκγονος means ‘son,’ and ἔγγονος ‘grandson.’ The etymological form is ἔκγονος, but ἐκ‐ was often assimilated to ἐγ‐ before γ during the 4th century B.C., particularly in this word: cf. also ἐγγειτόνων etc. on Inscriptions. See Meisterhans^{3} p. 107. Elsewhere in the Republic ἔκγονος is the regular spelling.

καθ’ ἃς θυηπολοῦσιν : sacrificial liturgies. A θυηπολικόν is mentioned by Suidas (s.v. Ὀρφεύς) as one of the ‘works’ of Orpheus: see also Lobeck Aglaoph. p. 371 and Rohde Psyche^{2} II pp. 112, 113 notes

πόλεις : as for instance when Epimenides the Cretan purified Athens (see Grote III 85—89). Plato may be thinking of this event, which in defiance of chronology he placed ten years before the Persian wars ( Laws 642 D, E). Cf. also infra 366 A and Laws 909 B.

λύσεις ‐‐ καθαρμοί . λύσεις means ‘modes of absolution’ (Lobeck Aglaoph. p. 810): cf. 366 A οἱ λύσιοι θεοί and Arist. Pol. B 4 1262^{a} 32 τὰς νομιζομένας λύσεις. The Scholium on Ar. Frogs 1033 contains the remark: οὗτος (i.e. Musaeus) δὲ παραλύσεις καὶ τελετὰς καὶ καθαρμοὺς συντέθεικεν. For παραλύσεις Blaydes proposes λύσεις, while Rutherford reads περὶ λύσεις (apparently with the Ravenna Codex), inserting also on his own conjecture ποιήματα after συντέθεικεν. I have no doubt that the Scholiast wrote παρὰ λύσεις: ‘besides Absolutions, he has composed also τελεταί and καθαρμοί.’ καθαρμοί formed a distinct class of religious literature, and were written by Epimenides, Empedocles, and others: see Grote I p. 27 note 3.

παιδιᾶς ἡδονῶν : ‘pleasures of play.’ παιδιᾶς depends on ἡδονῶν, and is here used abstractly: cf. Thuc. III 38. 7 ἀκοῆς ἡδονῇ and (with Schneider) Paus. I 21. 7 θέας ἡδονήν. Madvig would eject ἡδονῶν, but without ἡδονῶν Plato would probably have written παιδιῶν (cf. Laws 829 B): other suggestions, such as καὶ παιδιᾶς καὶ ἡδονῶν, or καὶ παιδιᾶς διὰ ἡδονῶν, or καὶ παιδιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν are open to graver objection. For παίζειν and the like in connexion with religious celebrations Stallbaum cites Hdt. IX 11 Ὑακίνθιά τε ἄγετε καὶ παίζετε and VIII 99 ἐν θυσίῃσί τε καὶ εὐπαθείῃσι: add Phaedr. 276 B , Laws 666 B. Plato's point is that atonement if it is made a pleasure and not a penance sets a premium on sin.

τελευτήσασιν ‐‐ τελετάς . The Orpheotelestae connected τελεταί with τελευτᾶν, sometimes on the ground assigned by Plato here, sometimes because they alleged that the sensations of dying resembled those of initiation into the great mysteries (Plut. Frag. de An. 725). This and other ancient derivations are given by Lobeck Aglaoph. pp. 124, 126, 172. For περιμένει Cobet needlessly conjectures περιμένειν.

τιμῆς i. q. τοῦ τιμᾶν. Cf. (with J. and C.) 359 C above.

τί ‐‐ ποιεῖν . The subject to ποιεῖν is ταῦτα πάντα—λεγόμενα: ψυχάς is its secondary object. Cf. infra 367 B τί ποιοῦσα ἑκατέρα τὸν ἔχοντα κτλ. and 367 E. This view, which Schneider also holds, is better than to make ψυχάς subject to ποιεῖν and ταῦτα πάντα κτλ. dependent on ἀκουούσας.

ἐπιπτόμενοι . The image, as Jowett remarks, suggests a bee gathering honey: cf. Ion 534 B λέγουσι γὰρ—οἱ ποιηταὶ ὅτι ἀπὸ κρηνῶν μελιρρύτων ἐκ Μουσῶν κήπων τινῶν καὶ ναπῶν δρεπόμενοι τὰ μέλη ἡμῖν φέρουσιν ὥσπερ αἱ μέλιτται, Simon. Fr. 47 ὁμιλεῖ δ’ ἄνθεσιν (viz. the poet) ὧτε μέλισσα ξανθὸν μέλι κηδομένα and Pind. Pyth. X 53 f.

πότερον δίκᾳ ‐‐ ἀναβάς . The fragment (which appears tolerably often in ancient citations) is restored as follows by Bergk ( Fr. 213) Πότερον δίκᾳ τεῖχος ὕψιον | ἢ σκολίαις ἀπάταις ἀναβαίνῃ | ἐπιχθονίων γένος ἀνδρῶν | δίχα μοι νόος ἀτρέκειαν εἰπεῖν. It is, I think, unlikely that θεσπέσιος βίος and κύριον εὐδαιμονίας below “si non a Pindaro, certe ex poetis petita sunt” (Bergk).

ἐὰν καὶ μὴ δοκῶ has been commonly altered to ἐὰν μὴ καὶ δοκῶ on the suggestion of Dobree and Boeckh (with a few inferior MSS): but the text is sound. We are dealing with ταῦτα πάντα— λεγόμενα κτλ.; and it has not been said that it is useless to be just, unless one is also believed to be just ( ἐὰν μὴ καὶ δοκῶ). This would imply that it is useful to be just, if one is also considered just; but what has been urged is that Justice is in itself never advantageous, although its εὐδοκιμήσεις (363 A) are: see 358 C, E, 360 C ( οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν δίκαιος, ἀλλ’ ἀναγκαζόμενος, ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδιᾳ ὄντος), 362 A ( οὐκ εἶναι δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖν δεῖ ἐθέλειν). The words ἐὰν καὶ μὴ δοκῶ mean ‘if I also seem unjust,’ for οὐ δοκῶ δίκαιος εἶναι, not δοκῶ οὐ δίκαιος εἶναι, is the Greek idiom. This meaning suits exactly. What has to be established is that δοκεῖν prevails over εἶναι in human life ( οὐκοῦν—βιᾶται). The proof is as follows. To be just and seem unjust is misery (see 361 E): to be unjust, and seem just is bliss (see 362 A, C): therefore δοκεῖν is everything, and ἐπὶ τοῦτο τρεπτέον ὅλως.

φασιν . Is τὰ λεγόμενα the subject? or is the sentence an anacoluthon? (“nam quo modo res ipsa comparata sit, nescio: quae quidem vulgo dicuntur, talia sunt, ut iusto mihi commodi quicquam fore negetur” Schneider). The latter view is the more likely. Similar anacolutha are cited by Engelhardt Anac. Pl. Spec. III p. 40.

οἱ σοφοί . Simonides ( σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θεῖος ἀνήρ I 331 E) Fr. 76 B ergk. Plato himself sets no small store by a good name (coupled with virtue) in Laws 950 C.

πρόθυρα ‐‐ σχῆμα : ‘as my porch and trappings.’ The mixture of metaphors is thoroughly Platonic: cf. VII 527 D note With σχῆμα (any kind of external or adventitious means of impressing others or hiding one's own deficiencies) cf. Gorg. 511 E περιπατεῖ ἐν μετρίῳ σχήματι.

σκιαγραφίαν (‘perspective drawing’ VII 523 B, X 602 D) with its cognate words is continually used by Plato of things unreal, counterfeit, illusory: cf. infra IX 583 B note, 586 B al., and Wohlrab on Theaet. 208 E .

τοῦ σοφωτάτου κτλ. Archilochus seems to have canonized the fox as the embodiment of cunning in Greek literature: fragments are preserved of at least two fables of his in which the fox appears (86—88 and 89 ed. Bergk). In the second (89. 5, 6) occur the lines τῷ δ) (sc. πιθήκῳ) ἆρ’ ἀλώπηξ κερδαλέη συνήντετο | πυκνὸν ἔχουσα νόον. The κερδαλέαν καὶ ποικίλην of Plato corresponds in meaning to κερδαλέη—πυκνὸν ἔχουσα νόον, and may have ended one of the iambics in this or another Archilochean fable: it is at all events clear that they are from Archilochus. ‘The crafty and subtle fox of Archilochus’ means simply ‘the crafty and subtle fox of which Archilochus speaks’: the rest of the imagery is due to Plato. With the general sentiment cf. St Matth. vii 15 ἔρχονται πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐν ἐνδύμασι προβάτων (this is the σκιαγραφία ἀρετῆς), ἔσωθεν δέ εἰσιν λύκοι ἅρπαγες: with ἑλκτέον ἐξόπισθεν (opposed to πρόθυρα μὲν καὶσχῆμα) Milton Samson Agonistes 358— 360 “Why are his gifts desirable, to tempt Our earnest prayers, then, given with solemn hand As graces, draw a scorpion's tail behind?” Unnecessary difficulty has been caused by an erroneous gloss of Timaeus ( τὴν ἀλωπεκῆν· τὴν πανουργίαν), which seems to imply that he read ἀλωπεκῆν ‘fox's skin’ for ἀλώπεκα in this passage. Ruhnken (followed by Ast and Stallbaum) while retaining ἀλώπεκα explained it of the fox's skin; but it would be pointless to ‘drag behind a fox's skin.’ With ἀλώπεκα—‘fox’ for ‘foxiness’—cf. infra 382 D ποιητὴς—ψευδὴς ἐν θεῷ οὐκ ἔνι , Phaed. 77 E , and the well-known “astutam vapido servas sub pectore vulpem” Persius V 117.

ἀλλὰ γάρ ‘at enim,’ like ἀλλὰ δή (infra D, X 600 A al.), introduces an objection: cf. infra 366 A al.

οὐδὲ γὰρ ‐‐ μεγάλων : an audacious application of the proverb χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά .

ὡς ‐‐ φέρει . For ὡς we might expect ᾗ (Ficinus has quâ). ταύτῃ must be taken as referring to what precedes, though further explained by ὡς—φέρει. ἴχνη and φέρει shew that the metaphor is still the ὁδὸς βίου. The words ἴχνη φέρει may be from Archilochus. For the sentiment cf. III 394 D.

ξυνωμοσίας ‐‐ ἑταιρίας . An allusion to the political life of Athens: cf. Ap. 36 B , Theaet. 173 D , Thuc. VIII 54 ξυνωμοσίας, αἵπερ ἐτύγχανον πρότερον ἐν τῇ πόλει οὖσαι ἐπὶ δίκαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς. In the Laws, Plato would suppress all such secret clubs and cabals with a strong hand: see 856 B ff. The πειθοῦς διδάσκαλοι mentioned presently are the Sophists.

ὡς for ὥστε (except in idiomatic phrases like ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ὥς γε ἐντεῦθεν ἰδεῖν) is a curious archaism, tolerably frequent in Xenophon (e.g. Cyrop. I 2. 8, V 2. 5, VI 4. 16, VIII 5. 1 and 7. 27), but almost unexampled in Plato. The Protagoras (330 E) furnishes an instance with οὕτως preceding (cf. Xen. Cyr. IV 2. 13 ). ὡς in Phaed. 108 E is perhaps to be explained in the same way: cf. also Alc. II 141 B and Symp. 213 B παραχωρῆσαι γὰρ τὸν Σωκράτη ὡς ἐκεῖνον καθίζειν. See also on ὡς δή in I 337 C. As βιάζομαι can be followed by the simple infinitive, it might seem preferable to connect ὡς πλεονεκτοῦντες as a participial explanatory clause either with βιασόμεθα or with δίκην μὴ διδόναι (‘not to be punished for aggrandisement’); but the first alternative gives a wrong sense to πλεονεκτοῦντες, and the second involves too harsh an inversion.

οὐκοῦν κτλ. Cf. Laws 885 B θεοὺς ἡγούμενος εἰναι κατὰ νόμους οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὔτε ἔργον ἀσεβὲς εἰργάσατο ἑκὼν οὔτε λόγον ἀφῆκεν ἄνομον, ἀλλὰ ἓν δή τι τῶν τριῶν πάσχων, ἢ τοῦτο ὅπερ εἶπον οὐχ ἡγούμενος, ἢ τὸ δεύτερον ὄντας οὐ φροντίζειν ἀνθρώπων, ἢ τρίτον εὐπαραμυθήτους εἶναι θυσίαις τε καὶ εὐχαῖς παραγομένους. These three classes of heretics are severally refuted in 886 A—899 D, 899 D— 905 D, 905 D—907 B. It is clear both from this passage and from the Laws that the air was full of such heresies in Plato's day. The first was doubtless fostered by the sceptical attitude of Protagoras— περὶ μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἰδέναι οὔθ’ ὡς εἰσὶν οὔθ’ ὡς οὐκ εἰσίν (ap. D. L. IX 51): for the second cf. Aesch. Ag. 369 —372 οὐκ ἔφα τις | θεοὺς βροτῶν ἀξιοῦσθαι μέλειν | ὅσοις ἀθίκτων χάρις | πατοῖθ’ · ὁ δ’ οὐκ εὐσεβής: the third—the most pernicious of all, according to Plato Laws 948 C—furnished the raison d'être of a degenerate priesthood.

τί καὶ ἡμῖν κτλ. ‘If the gods do not care for us, why should we in our turn ( καί) care’ etc. For the text see cr. n. and App. III.

ἀκηκόαμεν ‐‐ ποιητῶν . The first ἤ is ‘or’ and the second ‘than.’ In λόγων Plato may be thinking inter alia of the works of early λογογράφοι like Pherecydes, who wrote genealogies of gods and heroes in prose; but there is no occasion to change λόγων into λογίων with Muretus. γενεαλογησάντων ποιητῶν refers to Homer and the Hesiodic and Orphic theogonies.

θυσίαις ‐‐ ἀγανῇσιν : see 364 D.

ἀπό : ‘from the proceeds of.’ Cf. Laws 906 C, D τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον ἀναγκαῖον λέγειν τὸν λέγοντα ὡς εἰσὶ συγγνώμονες ἀεὶ θεοὶ τοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀδίκοις καὶ ἀδικοῦσιν, ἂν αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀδικημάτων τις ἀπονέμῃ, καθάπερ κυσὶ λύκοι τῶν ἁρπασμάτων σμικρὰ ἀπονέμοιεν, οἱ δὲ ἡμερούμενοι τοῖς δώροις συγχωροῖεν τὰ ποίμνια διαρπάζειν.

ὑπερβαίνοντες καὶ ἁμαρτάνοντες are subordinate to λισσόμενοι: “by praying when we transgress and sin, we shall persuade them,” etc. There is again a reference to λισσόμενοι ὅτε κέν τις ὑπερβήῃ καὶ ἁμάρτῃ quoted in 364 E. The position of the participles is justified by the allusion to this line.

ἢ ‐‐ ἤ . It was a common Greek belief that the sins of the fathers are visited upon the children: see the passages cited by Nägelsbach Nachhom. Theol. pp. 34 ff. If we take Plato at his word, Adimantus represents this vicarious punishment as extending even to the other world.

ἢ παῖδες παίδων . Baiter conjectures <ἢ παῖδες> ἢ παῖδες παίδων, and so I formerly printed. But παῖδες παίδων means little more than ‘descendants’ (cf. Laws 927 B), and the text may stand. Similarly in Ruskin Modern Painters Ch. 1 “all those labours which men have given their lives and their sons' sons' lives to complete.”

ὦ φίλε ‐‐ λογιζόμενος . ὦ φίλε is the objector who urges ἀλλὰ γὰρ—παίδων. In φήσει Plato recurs to the singular of 365 B λέγοι γὰρ ἂν κτλ. λογιζόμενος is not ‘reasoning,’ but ‘making his calculation,’ ‘calculos subducens’: such a man's morality is nothing but a balancing of profit and loss. Hermann's devotion to Paris A led him to conjecture ἀλλ’ ὠφελήσουσιν ἁγνιζομένους αἰ τελεταί rather than admit a simple case of omission arising from homoioteleuton: see cr. n. Vermehren proposes ἀλλ’ ὠφελήσουσιν αἱ νομιζόμεναι τελεταί ( Plat. Stud. p. 90), but we should certainly follow Π here. See also Introd. § 5.

λύσιοι : ‘givers of absolution’: cf. 364 E. Certain Chthonian deities of the Orphic theology are meant, such as Hecate, Demeter, Dionysus λύσιος or λυσεύς, and above all Ζεὺς μειλίχιος. See Lobeck Aglaoph. p. 303.

θεῶν παῖδες : e.g. Musaeus and Orpheus ( Σελήνης τε καὶ Μουσῶν ἔγγονοι 364 E). Madvig's rejection of οἵ (so also Ficinus) before ταῦτα in the last clause seriously impairs the rhythm of the sentence.

ἄκρων . ἄκρος was a fashionable expression to apply to the élite of any profession or art: cf. Theaet. 152 E τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκατέρας, Pol. 292 E , supra 360 E, infra III 405 A, V 459 B.

ὡς δή τοι : see on I 337 C.

θείᾳ φύσει ‐‐ ἐπιστήμην . θείᾳ φύσει means a disposition which is good by divine grace or nature, not as the result of knowledge or compulsion. The virtue of such men is θείᾳ μοίρᾳ παραγιγνομένη ἄνευ νοῦ ( Men. 99 E ): they are ἄνευ ἀνάγκης, αὐτοφυῶς, θείᾳ μοίρᾳ ἀγαθοί ( Laws 642 C), resembling Wordsworth's “Glad Hearts! without reproach or blot, Who do thy work and know it not.” Cf. VI 493 A note ἐπιστήμην is scientific knowledge of the good in the Socratic, not yet in the Platonic, sense.

οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν δίκαιος gives the lie to the Socratic οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἄδικος: cf. 360 C. For ἀνανδρίας below see on 359 B.

ἡρώων . J. and C. think “Plato is referring to well-known tales and maxims, which the poets and logographers had put into the mouths of ancient heroes.” It is simpler to understand the expression of Orpheus, Musaeus, and other θεῶν παῖδες, ποιηταὶ καὶ προφῆται τῶν θεῶν γενόμενοι: see 366 B note So also Dreinhöfer Plato's Schrift üb. d. Staat nach Disposition u. Inhalt p. 2 note 16.

ἄλλως ἤ . Praise of the δόξαι of Justice is somewhat inaccurately spoken of as praise of justice itself: but it is unnecessary to insert διά (with Richards) before δόξας. Cf. 367 D τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀποδεχοίμην ἂν οὕτως ἐπαινούντων δικαιοσύνην καὶ ψεγόντων ἀδικίαν, δόξας τε περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ μισθοὺς ἐγκωμιαζόντων καὶ λοιδορούντων.

ἰδίοις : see on 363 E.

ἀλλ) αὐτὸς ‐‐ ξύνοικος ᾖ . This thesis is developed and elaborated in Gorg. 472 D —481 B.

ὑπέρ is here little if anything more than περί, cf. Laws 777 A ὑπὲρ τοῦ Διὸς ἀγορεύων. This usage, which appears on Inscriptions after 300 B.C. (Meisterhans^{3} p. 222), is very rare in Plato. It occurs occasionally in the Attic orators, especially with λέγειν, and is tolerably common in Polybius and later Greek: see Stephanus-Hase Thes. s. v. ὑπέρ and Jannaris Hist. Gr. Gr. § 1685. I do not think we are justified in translating (with Tucker) ‘on behalf of their view of the relations of justice and injustice.’

κατατείνας : 358 D note

ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν : I 343 C note

ὡμολόγησας : 358 A.

πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον . The sequence of δέ after τε is frequent in Plato with δὲ καί, εἰ δὲ βούλει, τί δέ, ἔτι δέ, μέγιστον δέ, τὸ δὲ κεφάλαιον and the like. For a classified list of examples see Hoefer de part. Plat. pp. 15—17.

ἀκούειν is added to Glauco's list (357 C) by Adimantus, who is also responsible for the exaggeration πολὺ μᾶλλον.

καὶ ‐‐ δή with ὑγιαίνειν marks it as different in kind from the other examples: cf. (with J. and C.) Men. 87 E καὶ πλοῦτος δή and infra 373 A.

γόνιμα : i.q. γνήσια, but more forcible: cf. Theaet. 151 E , Ar. Frogs 96 .

καὶ ἀδικία βλάπτει . The sense is: καὶ ψέγε τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ ἀδικίας ὃ αὐτὴ δἰ αὑτὴν τὸν ἔχοντα βλάπτει. Hartman would cancel the words, needlessly, although the zeugma is bolder than usual. For the stylistic effect cf. ἀδικία δ’ ἐπαινεῖται 358 A above.

ἀποδεχοίμην and ἀνασχοίμην are equally good Greek (cf. Prot. 339 D , Phaed. 92 A , E al.), but as ἀπο‐ is supported by both Α and Π, it is more probable that the error lies in ‐σχοίμην than in ἀπο‐, especially as ἀποδεχοίμην is found also in the margin of A. The ἀπο‐ is at least as old as the Scholium, which mentions the two readings ἀποσχοίμην and ἀνασχοίμην. The latter is an obvious correction of ἀποσχοίμην, and has survived in Ξ and a few inferior MSS besides.

ὦ παῖδες ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός . This curious phrase occurs once again in Plato viz. Phil. 36 D , where Protarchus is addressed in the words ὦ παῖ ἐκείνου τἀνδρός. Philebus has withdrawn from the discussion, his part in which he has bequeathed to Protarchus, who is therefore playfully called his son. That this is the meaning appears from Phil. 11 A , B, 11 C δέχει δὴ τοῦτον τὸν νῦν διδόμενον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, λόγον; Ἀνάγκη δέχεσθαι· Φίληβος γὰρ ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς ἀπείρηκεν, 12 A, 16 B, 19 A: cf. also 15 C and 28 B. In precisely the same way Glauco and Adimantus are the ‘children of Thrasymachus.’ They are διάδοχοι τοῦ λόγου as appears from 357 A, 358 B ( ἐπανανεώσομαι τὸν Θρασυμάχου λόγον), 367 A and 367 C, as well as from the substance of their arguments. This image is in fact one of the links by means of which Plato binds the dialogue together: as Polemarchus is heir to Cephalus (331 E), so Glauco and Adimantus are heirs to Thrasymachus. In explaining ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός of Thrasymachus, Stallbaum is therefore not “ridiculous” (as J. and C. assert) but right. See my article in Cl. Rev. X p. 237.

ὁ Γλαύκωνος ἐραστής may be Critias, as Schleiermacher supposed; but there is no evidence in support of the conjecture: see Bergk Poet. Lyr. Gr.^{4} II p. 283.

τὴν Μεγαροῖ μάχην : perhaps in 409 B.C.: see Diod. Sic. XIII 65. If so, Plato is guilty of a slight anachronism, supposing that the scene of the dialogue is laid in 410. See Introd. § 3.

παῖδες ‐‐ ἀνδρός . By Ἀρίστωνος, the author of the line of course meant Aristo, father of Glauco and Adimantus; but Ἀρίστων suggests ἄριστος (cf. IX 580 B) and the pun conveys a friendly, if halfironical, compliment to ‘his excellency’ Thrasymachus, whose παῖδες (so far as the argument is concerned) Glauco and his brother are: see on ὦ παῖδες above. In Symp. 174 B , when inviting Aristodemus to come as an uninvited guest to sup with Agathon, Socrates indulges in a similarly playful pun: ἕπου τοίνυν, ἔφη, ἵνα καὶ τὴν παροιμίαν διαφθείρωμεν μεταβάλλοντες, ὡς ἄρα καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐπὶ δαῖτας ἴασιν αὐτόματοι ἀγαθοί. (The διαφθορά consists in the substitution of ἀγαθῶν for δειλῶν, the form of the proverb which Plato had in view being αὐτόματοι δ’ ἀγαθοὶ δειλῶν ἐπὶ δαῖτας ἴασιν, as the Scholiast remarks. Arnold Hug is ill-advised in adopting Lachmann's suggestion to read Ἀγάθων) i.e. Ἀγάθωνι for ἀγαθῶν: see Cl. Rev. X p. 238.) Other plays on proper names in Plato are collected by Riddell Digest pp. 250 f. In κλεινοῦ Stallbaum finds a ‘lusus facetus’ on ἐκείνου; but this particular lusus (if it exists) is accidental and unmeaning.

θεῖον . The addition of τι (proposed by Herwerden) is unnecessary: cf. III 388 D note θεῖος is here used, like ἔνθεος, of inspiration: if the speaker does not understand or believe what he says, he is, like a rhapsodist or poet, nothing but the mouthpiece of the inspiring deity: cf. Phaedr. 245 A , Ion 533 E, 535 E— 536 D.

τί τέ ἐστιν ‐‐ ἔχει recalls the conclusion of Book I (354 B, C).

οἵανπερ ἂν sc. ἐποιησάμεθα, the verb being omitted as it frequently is with ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ.

ἕρμαιον ‐‐ τυγχάνει . I have followed Schneider in printing a colon before ἕρμαιον: for the sentence ἕρμαιον— τυγχάνει is not the grammatical apodosis to the εἰ clause, but a further result. The asyndeton with ἕρμαιον is the usual asyndeton of ampliative clauses. For the principle underlying the method of inquiry here enunciated, see Soph. 218 C ὅσα δ’ αὖ τῶν μεγάλων δεῖ διαπονεῖσθαι καλῶς, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων δέδοκται πᾶσι καὶ πάλαι τὸ πρότερον ἐν σμικροῖς καὶ ῥᾴοσιν αὐτὰ δεῖν μελετᾶν, πρὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς μεγίστοις and Pol. 286 A . (Contrast Phil. 48 B , where the opposite course is recommended.) In the special case of the State versus the Individual, the words ἐν σμικροῖς, ἐν ἐλάττοσιν are not applicable, but ἐν ῥᾴοσιν πρότερον δεῖ μελετᾶν is the essential part of the principle, and Justice in the State is ῥᾴων καταμαθεῖν (368 E) than in the Individual. Cf. also infra 377 C ἐν τοῖς μείζοσιν—μύθοις ὀψόμεθα καὶ τοὺς ἐλάττους. Illustrations from letters are tolerably frequent in Plato: cf. e.g. IV 402 A f., Theaet. 205 D —206 A, Pol. 277 E ff.

πρῶτον ‐‐ ἐπισκοποῦντες lays down the method to be pursued in the rest of the treatise, except in books V—VII, which are professedly a ‘digression,’ and X, which is of the nature of an epilogue. At each suc cessive stage in the exposition of his subject, Plato reminds us more or less explicitly of the method which he here proposes to follow:—at the end of the first sketch of a State 371 E; in connexion with the φλεγμαίνουσα πόλις 372 E; before entering on the theory of education 376 C, D and again in III 392 C, when he has finished the treatment of λόγοι; at Adimantus' objection IV 420 B, C; at the end of the picture of the just state IV 427 D ff.; in passing to Justice in the Individual IV 434 D ff.; at V 472 B ff., where the question is raised ‘Is this State possible?’; on beginning the account of the degenerate commonwealths and men in VIII 545 B; and finally when the whole argument draws to a head at IX 577 C.

τὴν τοῦ μείζονος ὁμοιότητα . Justice in the State is in fact to be used as a means of explaining Justice in the Individual, which is after all the real Justice: cf. IV 443 B ff. notes The relation between the two is that of a παράδειγμα and that which the παράδειγμα is intended to explain: see Pol. 278 C οὐκοῦν τοῦτο μὲν ἱκανῶς συνειλήφαμεν, ὅτι παραδείγματός γ) ἐστὶ τότε γένεσις, ὁπόταν ὂν ταὐτὸν ἐν ἑτέρῳ διεσπασμένῳ, δοξαζόμενον ὀρθῶς καὶ συναχθὲν περὶ ἑκάτερον ὡς συνάμφω μίαν ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἀποτελῇ; Φαίνεται. Plato has been severely blamed (as e.g. by Grote Plato III pp. 123 ff.) for representing the Commonwealth as the Individual “writ large.” Plato, however, laid stress upon this view, as tending to cement the union between the citizen and the State, which was rapidly dissolving in his day. This is well brought out by Krohn Plat. Frag. p. 5. Cf. also Pöhlmann Gesch. d. antik. Kommunismus etc. pp. 146 ff.

εἰ γιγνομένην ‐‐ ἀδικίαν . This would lead us to expect that we are to discover Justice and Injustice in the same State. In the sequel we find Justice only in the Ideal City: it is the degenerate Cities of VIII and IX that furnish the picture of Injustice. Plato does not expressly announce his change of plan till IV 420 B, C: ᾠήθημεν γὰρ ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ μάλιστα ἂν εὑρεῖν δικαιοσύνην καὶ αὖ ἐν τῇ κάκιστα οἰκουμένῃ ἀδικίαν—νῦν μὲν οὖν—τὴν εὐδαίμονα πλάττομεν—αὐτίκα δὲ τὴν ἐναντίαν σκεψόμεθα. The discrepancy must, I think, be admitted (see Krohn Pl. St. p. 32, and Kunert die doppelte Recens. d. Pl. St. pp. 10 ff.), but such corrections and developments of plan are characteristic of the dialogue as a form of literature, and do not establish the theory of a double recension of the Republic. Cf. Grimmelt de reip. Pl. comp. et unit. p. 19, and Westerwick de Rep. Pl. pp. 43—45.

γίγνεται ‐‐ πόλις κτλ. The present episode is ostensibly an historical account of the genesis of society, and from this point of view should be compared with Laws III 676 A ff. Some of the features are derived from an analysis of the industrial basis of society as it exists in civilised times: others (see 372 B—D), are semi-mythical and idyllic, recalling pictures of the golden age such as we find in Pol. 269 C ff., and in the caricatures of the comedians (e.g. ap. Athen. VI 267 E ff.). But the prevailing atmosphere is not historical or legendary, but idealistic (note δεῖ in 369 E and elsewhere), and Plato's πρώτη πόλις (Arist. Pol. Δ 4. 1291^{a} 17) should primarily be regarded as—in its essential features—a preliminary and provisional description of the industrial foundation on which the higher parts of his own ideal city are to rest. Cf. also on 372 B, D, Rettig Proleg. in Plat. remp. p. 42 and Steinhart Einleitung p. 156.

τυγχάνει as a mere copula is very rare in Attic prose, and it would be easy here to insert ὤν after πολλῶν: see Porson on Eur. Hec. 782 . In the Platonic dialogues this usage recurs in Phaedr. 263 C , Gorg. 502 B , Alc. I 129 A, 133 A, Hipp. Mai. 300 A, Laws 918 C, Tim. 61 C , nor is it possible in the last three examples to account for its omission by lipography. The idiom occurs in Sophocles and Euripides, once in Aristophanes ( Eccl. 1141), and (though condemned by Phrynichus) must also be admitted (though rarely) in prose: see the instances cited by Blaydes on Ar. (l.c.) and cf. Rutherford's New Phrynichus p. 342.

πολλῶν ἐνδεής . In the account of the genesis of society given in the Laws (676 A—680 E), more stress is laid on the social instinct of man: in Prot. 322 B ff the operating cause is man's defencelessness against wild beasts. Grote ( Plato III p. 139 note) censures Plato for not mentioning the “reciprocal liability of injury” among the generative causes of civic life; but this (as well as assistance against external aggression) is hinted at in βοηθούς.

ἄλλος ‐‐ χρείᾳ . The words are short for ἄλλος ἄλλον, τὸν μὲν ἐπ’ ἄλλου, τὸν δ’ ἐπ’ ἄλλου χρείᾳ (for the omission of τὸν μέν cf. Prot. 330 A , Theaet. 181 D al.): ‘one taking to himself one man, another another—the one man for one, the other for another purpose.’ Essentially the same meaning would no doubt be conveyed without τὸν δ’ ἐπ’ ἄλλου, which Herwerden following two inferior MSS would omit; but the fuller form of expression is chosen in order, I think, to prepare us for the principle of ‘One man, one work’ to be presently enunciated.

ταύτῃ τῇ ξυνοικίᾳ . Stallbaum rightly regards the sentence as an anaco luthon, the antecedent to ταύτῃ being the words from παραλαμβάνων to βοηθούς. If the subject to ἐθέμεθα (a gnomic aorist) were ἄλλος—δεόμενοι—ἀγείραντες, we should probably have had παραλαμβάνοντες for παραλαμβάνων: and besides, Plato is not yet describing the particular city which we are ποιεῖν λόγῳ (infra line 19), but laying down the law as to the γένεσις of cities in general. For the anacoluthon see Engelhardt Anac. Pl. Spec. III p. 40.

τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα : neuter, not masculine; otherwise Plato would have written θεραπευτῶν (as in q and some other MSS).

ἀναγκαιοτάτη πόλις . Referring to this passage, Aristotle ( Pol. Δ 4. 1291^{a} 10—19) attacks Plato for making the end of his city not τὸ καλόν, but τὰ ἀναγκαῖα. No doubt, the end of this ‘first city’— so Aristotle calls it—is primarily τὰ ἀναγκαῖα; but Plato would reply that the cities of the farmers, the auxiliaries, and the rulers, are in reality one city, γινομένη μὲν τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν, οὐσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν (Arist. Pol. A 2. 1252^{b} 29. Cf. Laws 828 D δεῖ δὲ αὐτὴν καθάπερ ἕνα ἄνθρωπον ζῆν εὖ).

ἕνα ἕκαστον κτλ. Cf. Charm. 161 E δοκεῖ ἄν σοι πόλις εὖ οἰκεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ· νόμου τοῦ κελεύοντος τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἱμάτιον ἕκαστον ὑφαίνειν καὶ πλύνειν, καὶ ὑποδήματα σκυτοτομεῖν, καὶ λήκυθον καὶ στλεγγίδα καὶ τἄλλα πάντα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον κτλ.;

οὕτω ῥᾷον ἢ )κείνως . οὕτω refers to the alternative which is more familiar, although mentioned first: cf. (with Ast) Xen. Mem. I 3. 13 τοῦτο τὸ θηρίον—τοσούτῳ δεινότερόν ἐστι τῶν φαλαγγίων ὅσῳ ἐκεῖνα μὲν ἁψάμενα, τοῦτο δὲ οὐδ’ ἁπτόμενον—ἐνίησί τι. On the corruption ῥᾴδιον for /ῥᾷον (also in Men. 94 E ) see Introd. § 5.

φύεται strikes the keynote of the City of Books II—IV. The first critic to lay sufficient stress on this point was Krohn: see Pl. St. pp. 59—62, where he collects the references to φύσις throughout Books I—IV. The City of II—IV is a κατὰ φύσιν οἰκισθεῖσα πόλις. What is meant by φύσις? Not inorganic Nature, but the ‘nature’ of a πόλις or aggregate of πολῖται, i.e. (as the unit in a city is the man) human nature, in other words, the nature of the human soul, which, according to Plato and Socrates, constitutes a man's true and proper individuality. It is not however human nature as it is, but as it ought to be, which is the foundation on which the Platonic State is built; so that, although the doctrine of transcendent Ideas is excluded from the first four books (see on III 402 C), Idealism at all events is present. See also Krohn Plat. Frage pp. 8—11, and (for the connotation of φύσις) Benn's article on ‘The Idea of Nature in Plato’ in Archiv f. Gesch. d. Phil. IX pp. 24 —49 and Pöhlmann l.c. pp. 110 ff.

ὅταν ‐‐ εἷς μίαν . This principle—the cardinal principle of the Republic, reiterated also with great emphasis in Laws 846 D—847 B—is deduced by Plato from φύσις, whose rule is specialization: cf. 370 C ὅταν εἷς ἓν κατὰ φύσιν—πράττῃ. Plato (as usual in the Republic) is thinking of Man's nature, one man being naturally fitted for one pursuit, another for another: cf. III 395 B, IV 433 A, 434 A, B. The principle of specialization had already been enunciated by Socrates: see e.g. Xen. Mem. III 9. 3 , 15, Cyrop. VIII 2. 5, 6. Aristotle widens it into a general law of Nature: οὐθὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ τοιοῦτον οἷον οἱ χαλκοτύποι τὴν Δελφικὴν μάχαιραν πενιχρῶς, ἀλλ’ ἓν πρὸς ἕν ( Pol. A 2. 1252^{b} 1 ff.). In its application to politics, the principle becomes in Plato's hands a weapon for attacking the foundations of Athenian democracy (see Gorg. 455 A —C), to which, in this respect, his own Ideal City was a kind of counterblast.

κάλλιον . Did Plato write καλλίω? κάλλιον γίγνεται may no doubt mean ‘are better made,’ which is fairly satisfactory in point of sense, but καλλίω forms a better balance to πλείω τε, and is more suited to καλόν just below. With ῥᾷον immediately following, the corruption would be easy. On the other hand the collocation καλλίω καὶ ῥᾷον is unpleasing, and it is probably safer to adhere to the MSS.

ἐπὶ τὸ ἀροῦν . See on 372 B.

αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν : ipsam urbem: the city as opposed to the inhabitants ( τέκτονες, χαλκῆς etc.). Cf. 360 D note It is not necessary to adopt Hermann's conjecture αὖ for αὐτήν, or (with Hartman) to eject τὴν πόλιν.

σχεδόν τι ἀδύνατον . Plato nevertheless endeavours to secure this advantage in the Laws: see 704 A—705 B. Cf. Arist. Pol. H 5. 1326^{b} 26 ff.

ὧν ἐκεῖνοι δέονται . All exchange with foreign cities is to be in kind: money is used only for transactions within the city: see infra 371 C ff. Here again Plato is constructing his city κατὰ φύσιν: cf. Arist. Pol. A 9. 1257^{a} 28 ἡ μὲν οὐν τοιαύτη μεταβλητικὴ οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν οὔτε χρηματιστικῆς ἐστὶν εἷδος οὐδέν.

ὧν ἂν αὐτοῖς χρεία . αὐτοῖς is of course emphatic ( ipsis). For the rare omission of ᾗ cf. III 416 D and Schanz Nov. Comm. Pl. p. 33 with Cope's Rhetoric of Aristotle Vol. II p. 328.

ὧν ἂν δέωνται . ὧν is masculine in spite of ὧν ἐκεῖνοι δέονται just above. The reading of q ἐκείνοις ἄξουσιν, οἳ μεταδώσουσιν ὧν ἂν δέωνται is a free correction (after 371 B) intended to make ὧν neuter.

τῆς ‐‐ ἐργασίας is not the work of a seaman (as Jowett seems to suppose), but a special department of ἐμπορία, viz. ναυκληρία: see Arist. Pol. A 11. 1258^{b} 21 ff. The ναύκληρος owned a ship and conveyed passengers and cargo for payment (cf. Gorg. 511 D , E): he is frequently mentioned along with the ἔμπορος, e.g. Pol. 290 A ἐμπόρους καὶ ναυκλήρους καὶ καπήλους, Laws 831 E, Xen. Vect. 3. 4, 5. 3.

ὧν δὴ ἕνεκα . ὧν can hardly (as J. and C. suppose) refer to μεταδώσουσιν: it must denote the same objects as the previous ὧν. The meaning is ‘for the sake of which things we established the principle of community and founded a city.’ Cf. 369 C κοινωνοὺς—μεταδίδωσι δὴ ἄλλος ἄλλῳ κτλ.

νόμισμα ‐‐ ἕνεκα . Cf. Laws 742 A νόμισμα δ’ ἕνεκα ἀλλαγῆς τῆς καθ’ ἡμέραν. See also 370 E note Plato regards coined money as a necessary evil— the offspring, not of φύσις, but of νόμος (cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. V 8. 1133^{a} 30 ff. διὰ τοῦτο τοὔνομα ἔχει νόμισμα, ὅτι οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ ἐστί and Pol. A 9. 1257^{b} 10 ff.), a mere conventional symbol, the private possession of which is denied to the highest classes of the State (III 416 D ff.).

οἱ ἀσθενέστατοι κτλ. Cf. Laws 918 A—920 C, where καπηλεία is confined by Plato to those ὧν διαφθειρομένων οὐκ ἂν γίγνοιτο μεγάλη λύμη τῇ πόλει (919 C).

καπήλους ‐‐ ἐμπόρους . Soph. 223 D τῆς μεταβλητικῆς οὐχ ἡ μὲν κατὰ πόλιν ἀλλαγή, σχεδὸν αὐτῆς ἥμισυ μέρος ὄν, καπηλικὴ προσαγορεύεται; Ναί. Τὸ δέ γε ἐξ ἄλλης εἰς ἄλλην πόλιν διαλλαττόμενον ὠνῇ καὶ πράσει ἐμπορική; Τί δ) οὕ;

ἀξιοκοινώνητοι : worthy of being admitted into the κοινωνία of our city. This explanation (Schneider's) is better than ‘worthy of one's society’ (L. and S.).

τὴν τιμὴν ταύτην . ταύτην is idiomatic for ταύτης: see I 333 B note

μισθωτοί . Plato does not admit slave labour in his city, unless perhaps in the persons of barbarians. The exclusion of slaves is also a touch of ‘Nature’: cf. Arist. Pol. A 3. 1253^{b} 20 τοῖς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν (sc. δοκεῖ) τὸ δεσπόζειν with Suse mihl and Hicks ad loc. If barbarians may be enslaved, it is because they are φύσει δοῦλοι: cf. V 469 B ff., with 470 C and Arist. Pol. A 2. 1252^{b} 9 ταὐτὸ φύσει βάρβαρον καὶ δοῦλον.

ἐν αὐτῶν ‐‐ ἀλλήλους . The reply is to the first question, not to the second: see on V 465 E. In so far as δικαιοσύνη can be said to exist in so elementary a state, Plato would have identified it with the performance by each class (farmers, artisans, etc.) of their own work and no more. This is the first view of δικαιοσύνη in the Republic: for the second see IV 432 ff., 441 D ff., and for the third or metaphysical VI 504 B note

ὑποδήματα . I have placed the mark of interrogation after ὑποδήματα, as it is only the present participles which belong to διαιτήσονται. ‘And when they have built themselves houses’ marks a fresh start, no longer interrogative, for which reason I have also departed from the usual punctuation after ἱκανῶς (in B) and πόλεμον (in C).

θρέψονται κτλ. The picture which Plato proceeds to draw represents the working of well-regulated ἐπιθυμία or appetite—the psychological groundwork of the third or lowest order in Plato's city. τὰ μέν is the wheaten meal ( ἄλευρα), τὰ δέ the barley-meal ( ἀλφιτα). Only the wheaten meal was (as a rule) baked ( πέσσειν or ὀπτᾶν) into loaves ( ἄρτοι): the barley-meal was “kneaded into a simple dough ( μάσσειν, whence μᾶζα), dried in a mould, and afterwards moistened with water and eaten” (Blümner, Gr. Privatalt. p. 218). μᾶζαι made of barley meal was the staple food of the common Greek: the wheaten loaf was a luxury. The double chiasmus ἄλφιτα, μάξαντες, μάζας )( ἄλευρα, πέψαντες, ἄρτους is noticeable: cf. Crito 47 C.

τὰ μὲν πέψαντες κτλ. The asyndeton (as usual) is ampliative. The punctuation in the text avoids the difficulty of the two verbs θρέψονται and εὐωχήσονται. Schneider places the colon before μάζας, but this is much less natural. For μάζας γενναίας, ‘noble bannocks’ (J. and C.), cf. (with Stallbaum) Laws 844 E τὰ γενναῖα σῦκα ἐπονομαζόμενα. κάλαμον is not ‘a mat of reeds’ (Jowett, with L. and S.), which would be much too artistic, but ‘reeds,’ κάλαμον being collective as in Arist. Hist. An. IX 36. 620^{a} 35; and τινα is contemptuous (cf. II 363 D note).

παραβαλλόμενοι is also contemptuous for the παρατιθέμενοι of civilised society: it suggests throwing food before animals (cf. 372 D).

στιβάδων : not ‘mattresses’ (L. and S.): why should they ‘strew’ mattresses? The whole point of the passage is that instead of reclining on manufactured couches they lie on natural ones of bryony and myrtle boughs: contrast 372 D. στρωννύναι στιβάδας is simply ‘to make couches of leaves’: cf. στορέσαι λέχος. The word μῖλαξ means bryony (as Schneider saw): cf. Sandys on Eur. Bacch. 107 χλοήρει μίλακι καλλικάρπῳ. The ‘yew’ of the English translators would make a sombre and lugubrious couch.

ἐπιπίνοντες . ἐπί means ‘after’: cf. Xen. Cyr. VI 2 28 μετὰ δὲ τὸν σῖτον εἰ οἶνον ἐπιπίνοιμεν. In Greek banquets there was little or no drinking during dinner. The conjecture ὑποπίνοντες (Stephanus-Hase Thes. s. v. ἐπιπίνω) is unnecessary.

ἢ πόλεμον . The origin of war is over-population (373 D).

ἄνευ ὄψου κτλ. ὄψον is meant by Glauco in its narrower sense of animal food (whether fish or flesh); Socrates on the other hand uses the word in its wider sense of anything eaten in addition to, or along with, bread, e.g. vegetables (see Blümner Gr. Privatalt. p. 223). A spirited and athletic Athenian like Glauco cannot tolerate a vegetarian diet: cf. 372 D.

ἑστιωμένους : sarcastic, with reference to εὐωχήσονται: ‘you call it feasting when they have nothing but dry bread!’ (J. and C.).

ἅλας ‐‐ ἑψήσονται . ‘Of course they will make salt and olives and cheese and vegetables whether wild’ ( βολβούς) ‘or cultivated’ ( λάχανα) ‘into such boiled dishes as can be prepared in the country.’ ἕψημα is not ‘something for boiling,’ but something boiled; and ἑψήσονται is used with two accusatives, one external ( ἅλας, &c.) and the other internal ( ἑψήματα). Plato hints that cookery in the country ( ἐν ἀγροῖς, cf. κατ’ ἀγρούς III 399 D) is inferior to that in the town. For the kind of dishes in question cf. Ath. II 64 E περὶ δὲ τῆς τῶν βολβῶν σκευασίας Φιλήμων φησὶ τὸν βολβόν, εἰ βούλει, σκόπει | ὅσα δαπανήσας εὐδοκιμεῖ, τυρὸν μέλι | σήσαμον ἔλαιον κρόμμυον ὄξος σίλφιον· | αὐτὸς δ’ ἐφ’ αὑτοῦ )στὶν πονηρὸς καὶ πικρός .

φηγούς : ‘acorns,’ not ‘beech-nuts’ (D. and V.): see Blaydes on Ar. Peace 1137 .

ὑποπίνοντες . Wine was sipped during dessert. ὑπο‐ in ὑποπίνοντες emphasizes the moderation already expressed in μετρίως: cf. Lys. 223 B ὑποπεπωκότες ἐν τοῖς Ἑρμαίοις. Dr Jackson connects πρὸς τὸ πῦρ with ὑπο πίνοντες, comparing IV 420 E, Ar. Ach. 751 al. This may be right, but the ordinary view seems to me somewhat more natural.

ὑῶν . The city of Pigs is supposed by Zeller^{4} II 1 pp. 325, 893, and Dümmler Antisthenica pp. 5 ff., Proleg. zur Pl. Staat p. 61, to be a contemptuous allusion to Antisthenes' ideal commonwealth (on which see Susemihl in Fl. Jahrb. 1887 pp. 207—214). This conjecture requires us to interpret Plato's first sketch of a State as wholly ironical and intended ‘to warn us against the false ideal of a Nature-City’ (Zeller l. c.). I agree with Henkel ( Stud. zur Gesch. d. Gr. Lehre vom Staat pp. 8 f.) in thinking that there is no solid ground for Zeller's theory. The πρώτη πόλις is not of course Plato's ideal republic, and his description of it is plentifully bestrewn with irony, but it is nevertheless the foundation on which his city is built, and, in point of fact, although some of its features are implicitly corrected or superseded in the sequel, it still remains on the whole, and as far as it goes, a not unpleasing picture of the life of the lowest stratum in Plato's city, and it is nowhere expressly cancelled or abolished. See also on 369 B and 372 E. The εὐχερὴς βίος ( Pol. 266 C ) of the πρώτη πόλις is fitly compared to that of pigs, the εὐχερέστατον γένος τῶν ὄντων (ib.); and it is appropriate that Glauco, who is nothing if not θυμοειδής ( Introd. § 2), should thus express his contempt for a life which hardly if at all rises above the level of ἐπιθυμία.

καὶ οἱ νῦν ἔχουσι : e.g. fish, flesh, fowl: see on 372 C. The words ἅπερ—ἔχουσι are to be taken with τραγήματα as well as with ὄψα. Glauco is thinking of delicacies like the preserved sorb-apples ( ὄα τεταριχευμένα) alluded to in Symp. 190 D . See Blümner Gr. Privatalt. p. 222 note 2.

τρυφῶσαν πόλιν . Krohn ( Pl. St. pp. 34, 72) thinks that Plato originally meant to look for ἀδικία in this τρυφῶσα πόλις: but see on 369 A.

ἀληθινὴ ‐‐ φλεγμαίνουσαν . There is a vein of irony in ἀληθινή: for the πρώτη τόλις is not the final form of Plato's city. The epithets τρυφῶσαν, φλεγμαίνουσαν are not however ironical (as Dümmler seems to hold Proleg. p. 62): see III 399 E.

εἰδ)αὖ ‐‐ ἀποκωλύει . I have adopted Richards' suggestion, and printed a comma after βούλεσθε, a colon before οὐδέν. The meaning is: ‘but if you wish it, let us contemplate also’ etc. The scribe in Paris A must have understood καὶ θεωρήσωμεν in the same way, for he assigns the words οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει to Glauco. We are hardly justified in making θεωρήσωμεν the subjunctive after βούλεσθε, in the absence of other examples in which the subjunctive follows a dependent βούλει ( βούλεσθε). A possible view would be to take θεωρήσωμεν as= δεῖ θεωρῆσαι and construe ‘but if you wish it and we are to contemplate’ etc., cf. Crat. 425 D εἰ μὴ ἄρα δἠ (MSS δεῖ)— καὶ ἡμεῖς— ἀπαλλαγῶμεν (‘unless we too are to get quit’), and Postgate in Transactions of the Camb. Philol. Soc. III Pt. I pp. 50—55. But Richards' proposal is a better one.

ταῦτα ‐‐ τισιν . γάρ is introductory and means not ‘for’ but ‘well.’ τισιν contains a sly allusion to Glauco: cf. V 465 E, VI 504 C.

καὶ ὄψα δή . For δή see 367 C note

ἑταῖραι . G. W. Nitzsch ( Rhein. Mus. 1857, pp. 471 f.), Richter ( Fl. Jahrb. 1867, p. 141), Madvig, and Stallbaum take offence at the juxtaposition of ἑταῖραι and πέμματα and suggest respectively ἀθῆραι (apparently an error for ἀθάραι, cf. Ar. Plut. 673 ), ἐραῖα (= ἑψήματα in Schol. on 445 C), ἐσχαρῖται ‘panes delicati,’ and ἕτερα (with the following καί deleted),—conjectures which are altogether needless and refute one another. The text is successfully defended by Hug ( Hermes 1876, p. 254), who cites an exact parallel in Ar. Ach. 1090 —1092 κλῖναι, τράπεζαι, προσκεφάλαια, στρώματα, | στέφανοι, μύρον, τραγήμαθ’ , αἱ πόρναι πάρα, | ἄμυλοι πλακοῦντες, σησαμοῦντες, ἴτρια | (varieties of πέμματα). Cf. also Amphis ap. Ath. XIV 642 A οἶνος ἡδύς, ᾠά, σησαμαῖ, | μύρον, στέφανος, αὐλητρίς and infra III 404 D, IX 573 D note From these passages it may fairly be doubted whether Plato's mention of ἑταῖραι is in any way even παρὰ προσδοκίαν (as the Oxford editors suggest): for αὐλητρίδες were almost as common a feature at dessert as the cakes ( πέμματα) etc. which accompany them here: see e.g. Xen. Mem. I 5. 4 , Symp. 2. 1, Pl. Symp. 176 E , Prot. 347 D . Vahlen ( Index Lect. per sem. hib. 1875—6 Berol.) quotes also Catullus'

(13. 1 ff.).

καὶ τὴν ποικιλίαν . ποικιλία means variety of colour as e.g. in embroidery: cf. 378 C, III 401 A, Euthyph. 6 C . On the omission in A see Introd. § 5.

χρυσὸν καὶ ἐλέφαντα : with reference to chryselephantine statuary. Note that (according to Plato) the demand for decorative arts does not arise till the physical necessities of man are satisfied. Cf. Nettleship Lectures and Remains, II p. 73.

μείζονά τε αὖ τήν . τέ is ἀνακόλουθον (Hoefer de part. Pl. p. 14): for other instances in the Republic see V 463 D, VII 522 B, IX 575 A. In this passage Richter would change τε αὖ τήν into τοιαύτην, comparing 372 E; but the text is sound, and τοιαύτην would be quite wrong. αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν (cf. 370 E), conjectured by Heller instead of αὖ τὴν πόλιν, is neat but needless.

πλήθους ἅ : i.e. πλήθους τούτων ἅ, as Ficinus understood the words. Stallbaum's alternative suggestion (that ἅ refers directly to ὄγκου and πλήθους) gives a poor sense. Cf. infra 373 E note

θηρευταὶ πάντες . The addition of πάντες shews that θηρευταί is used in a wide sense, including every variety of fishing as well as hunting: Laws 823 B θήρα γὰρ πάμπολύ τι πρᾶγμά ἐστί, περιειλημμένον ὀνόματι νῦν σχεδὸν ἑνί. πολλὴ μὲν γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἐνύδρων, πολλὴ δὲ ἡ τῶν πτηνῶν, πάμπολυ δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰ πεζὰ θηρεύματα. In Euthyd. 290 B —D, Soph. 219 E ff., and Laws (l.c.), Plato makes θηρευτική include ‘fishing for men’ e.g. in war, or by Sophists etc. This wider meaning clearly rests upon a Platonic—or rather Socratic (see Xen. Mem. II 6. 29 , quoted by J. and C.)—metaphor, and is not intended here. Cf. Benseler in Fl. Jahrb. 1881, pp. 236 ff. Aristotle on the other hand regards hunting as characteristic of the most primitive society ( Pol. A 8. 1256^{a} 35 ff.), and so too Plato himself in Laws 679 A.

ῥαψῳδοί ‐‐ ἐργολάβοι are the poet's servants. In Athens and elsewhere they formed regular guilds or σύνοδοι τῶν περὶ τὸν Διόνυσον τεχνιτῶν: cf. Arist. Probl. XXX 10. 956^{b} 11 οἱ Διονυσιακοὶ τεχνῖται. The ἐργολάβος contracted with the poet for the performance of his play, acting as a kind of financial agent or middleman between him and the σύνοδος to which he belonged. See Müller Bühnenalterthümer, pp. 392—414.

παιδαγωγῶν ‐‐ κουρέων . We infer that in the ‘healthy’ State fathers were παιδαγωγοί, mothers suckled ( τιτθῶν) and nursed ( τροφῶν) their own children, and the professional hair-dresser was unknown.

συβωτῶν . See on 372 B.

χρείαις . Cobet's χρείᾳ is not, I think, necessary. The plural (for which cf. 369 D al.) refers to the different occasions when we may require the help of doctors.

λέγομεν . λέγωμεν may be right, but the first hand of A was apt to err in these subjunctive forms ( Introd. § 5), and the Indicative is somewhat more natural here: cf. (with Schneider) 377 E ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγομεν καὶ ποῖα;

πολεμήσομεν . Stallbaum adds δή after πολεμήσομεν with some inferior MSS. The effect of its omission is to lay special stress on the first mention of πόλεμος in πολεμήσομεν, which should be pronounced with emphasis. Cf. IV 432 C, IX 583 C.

πολέμου ‐‐ γένεσιν . War then arises from the acquisition of territory and wealth: cf. Phaed. 66 C διὰ γὰρ τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτῆσιν πάντες οἱ πόλεμοι ἡμῖν γίγνονται, where war is farther traced to the body and its desires, to satisfy which we seek to multiply our possessions. Cf. Arist. Pol. A 8. 1256^{b} 23 ἡ πολεμικὴ φύσει κτητική πως ἔσται.

ἐξ ὧν ‐‐ γίγνηται defines γένεσιν. War comes ἐξ ὧν i.e. ἐκ τούτων ὧν κτλ. ( ὧν for ἐξ ὧν, according to the usual Greek idiom, cf. Euthyph. 10 C , and III 402 A ἐν ἅπασιν οἷς ἔστι al.), from that which involves both cities and individuals in calamities, viz. from the desire of money. Cf. 373 B note and (for the sentiment Laws 870 A ff. ἡ τῶν χρημάτων τῆς ἀπλήστου καὶ ἀπείρου κτήσεως ἔρωτας μυρίους ἐντίκτουσα δύναμις διὰ φύσιν τε καὶ ἀπαιδευσίαν τὴν κακὴν κτλ. The love of money —so Plato held—is the root of all evil. This explanation is due to Schleiermacher; others (Schneider, Stallbaum, J. and C. as an alternative) refer ἐξ ὧν to war and the like=‘ex cuiusmodi rebus’ (Stallbaum). It is an objection to such a view that it makes Plato say that evils come from War (and the like), directly after he has declined to say anything of the sort ( μηδέν γέ πω — ἐργάζεται). Further, if ὧν referred to war, the sentiment would in itself be a platitude and almost deserve to be expunged from the text, as it is by Herwerden. On the other hand ἐξ ὧν—γίγνηται is on Schleiermacher's view quite consistent with μηδέν γέ πω— <*>ργάζεται, for although war arises from that which harms a State, in itself it may (and does) actually do good. Good in other words may come out of evil; which is exactly the principle on which Plato evolves his ideal city out of the τρυφῶσα πόλις. ὅταν γίγνηται (sc. κακά) is equivalent (as J. and C. remark) to ἑκάστοτε: cf. Phaed. 68 D φόβῳ μειζόνων κακῶν ὑπομένουσιν αὐτῶν οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι τὸν θάνατον <*>ταν ὑπομένωσιν.

ὅλῳ . Herwerden's conjecture μεγάλῳ seems to shew that he connected σμικρῷ with στρατοπέδῳ, but the meaning is ‘not by a small amount, but by a whole army.’ For the datives cf. IX 579 C note

αὐτοὶ οὐχ ἱκανοί ; Glauco speaks as an Athenian citizen-soldier. In making war a profession, and citizens synonymous with soldiers, Plato is laconizing. The language which Isocrates ( Archid. 81) applies to Sparta might in point of fact be used of Plato's State: τῶν Ἑλλήνων διενηνόχαμεν οὐ τῷ μεγέθε<*> τῆς πόλεως, οὐδὲ τῷ πλήθει τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλ) ὅτι τὴν πολιτείαν ὁμοίαν κατεστησάμεθα στρατοπέδῳ καλῶς διοικουμένῳ καὶ πειθαρχεῖν <*>θέλοντι τοῖς ἄρχουσιν. Cf. Grote Plato III pp. 176, 209.

ὡμολογοῦμεν : without εἶναι as in X 610 C ἀθανάτους τὰς ψυχὰς ὁμολογεῖν, and Soph. 246 E . The analogy of these cases shews that ἀδύνατον here is not neuter but masculine, agreeing with ἕνα. The reference is to 370 B.

ἀλλ’ ἄρα . As διεκωλύομεν is certainly interrogative, Ast conjectured ἆρα for ἄρα, but ἄρα ( nimirum) is regularly present in a fortiori arguments of this kind, either in the δέ clause ( Ap. 34 C , 37 C, D, Crito 46 D) or in both ( Crito 50 E, Prot. 325 B , C). In place of the second ἄρα is here written δὴ ( τὰ δὲ δὴ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον κτλ.). For the combination ἀλλ’ ἄρα cf. Soph. 243 E ἀλλ) ἄρα τὰ ἄμφω βούλεσθε καλεῖν ὄν; Ἴσως.

ἀλλὰ σκυτοτόμον . See cr. n. and Introd. § 5. The homoioteleuton as well as the presence of the clause ἵνα—γίγνοιτο is in favour of the genuineness of these words: and the construction itself, which requires ἐκελεύομεν or the like to be supplied out of διεκωλύομεν (see Heindorf on Gorg. 457 C and Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 1072), is too idiomatic to have been readily invented by a scribe.

ἐφ’ ᾧ : with σχολὴν ἄγων (Schneider): cf. Ap. 36 D . The phraseology here recalls 370 B and C.

ἢ οὕτω ῥᾴδιον : singular in spite of the plural τὰ περί. Cf. (with Schneider) Hipp. Maior 299 A, Laws 708 D.

τε καὶ ὀργάνων is ejected by Herwerden, who is also inclined to denounce τὰ ὄργανα below. But it is just these words which “point the analogy: the weapons of the warrior are his tools.” (J. and C.) On similarly inadequate grounds τῶν νέων has been condemned in Euthyph. 3 A τοὺς τῶν νέων τὰς βλάστας διαφθείροντας: see my note ad loc. τινος ἄλλης μάχης below refers for example to ψιλοί or πελτασταί; the ἀσπίς (it should be remembered) was worn by the ὁπλίτης (whence ἀσπίδα μὲν λαβὼν—ὁπλιτικῆς). The necessity of special knowledge and training for success in war is insisted on by the historical Socrates in Xen. Mem. III 1.

φυλάκων . This is the first occurrence of φύλακες in the technical sense which it bears throughout the Republic. It is important to remember that the name includes not only the soldiers, but also—after they have been introduced— the rulers; when it becomes necessary to distinguish between the two classes, the former are called ἐπίκουροι (first named in III 414 B), the latter φύλακες παντελεῖς (III 414 B), τέλεοι φύλακες (IV 428 D) or the like, or more commonly ἄρχοντες (first alluded to in III 389 B, but not expressly separated off until 412 B ff., and finally and fully described only in Books VI and VII).

ὅσον γ’ ἂν δύναμις παρείκῃ . The phrase is not found elsewhere in Plato, although παρείκει is found with a personal subject ( ὁ θεός, θεοί) again in Theaet. 150 D , Laws 934 C. Herwerden would eject δύναμις (cf. Symp. 187 E καθ’ ὅσον παρείκει), but such a word is very unlikely to have been interpolated. δύναμις is simply ‘our powers’: the article is omitted as in the idiomatic κατὰ δύναμιν, εἰς δύναμιν.

σκύλακος . A play on σκύλαξ and φύλαξ is intended. Analogies from the animal kingdom were freely employed by the historical Socrates: for the dog in particular cf. Xen. Mem. IV 1. 3 καὶ τῶν κυνῶν τῶν εὐφυεστάτων, φιλοπόνων τε οὐσῶν καὶ ἐπιθετικῶν τοῖς θηρίοις, τὰς μὲν καλῶς ἀχθείσας ἀρίστας γίγνεσθαι—, ἀναγώγους δὲ γιγνομένας μᾳταίους τε καὶ μανιώδεις καὶ δυσπειθεστάτας. Cf. note on φύεται 370 A.

αἰσθανόμενον : ‘the moment he perceives.’ The present (where one might expect the aorist) emphasizes the rapidity with which pursuit follows upon sight.

ἀνδρεῖος . For ἀνδρεῖος applied to beasts cf. Isocr. 15. 211 εἰ περὶ τοὺς ἵππους καὶ τοὺς κύνας καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ζῴων ὁρῶντες τέχνας ἔχοντάς τινας, αἷς τὰ μὲν ἀνδρειότερα, τὰ δὲ πραότερα, τὰ δὲ φρονιμώτερα ποιοῦσι, περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσιν μηδεμίαν οἴονται τοιαύτην ηὑρῆσθαι παιδείαν κτλ. See also Lach. 196 D — 197 B and Arist. Eth. Nic. III 11. 1116^{b} 33 ff.

θυμοειδής . The technical term θυμοειδής is here for the first time used in the Republic. Plato probably inherited the word from Socrates (see Xen. Mem. IV 1. 3 τῶν τε ἵππων τοὺς εὐφυεστάτους, θυμοειδεῖς τε καὶ σφοδροὺς ὄντας κτλ.): in practice he employs it as the adjective corresponding to θυμός (see e.g. III 411 A, B), as ἐπιθυμητικός corresponds to ἐπιθυμία. The usual translation ‘spirited’ probably expresses the meaning as nearly as can be done by a single word. For a full discussion of the word reference may be made to P. Meyer ὁ θυμὸς ap. Arist. Platonemque (1876), whose conclusion (p. 65) is “ τὸν θυμὸν esse eam naturalem vim, qua ductus suam quisque propriam naturam explere studeat, quaque incitatus, quaecunque hanc naturam ipsi propriam tollere vel laedere conentur, fugiat, quae contra perfectiorem reddere possint, adpetat.” See also on IV 439 E.

ἄμαχόν ‐‐ ἀνίκητον . Ast may be right in supposing that Plato has in view the words of Heraclitus, often referred to in antiquity, θυμῷ μάχεσθαι χαλεπόν· ὅ τι γὰρ ἂν χρηίζῃ γίνεσθαι, ψυχῆς ὠνέεται ( Fr. 105 B ywater).

οὗ παρόντος ‐‐ ἀήττητος . Cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. III 11. 1116^{b} 26 ἰτητικὠτατον γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους.

ἐναντία γὰρ ‐‐ φύσις . Plato regarded this opposition as the fundamental antithesis of human character, and thought it a statesman's foremost duty to blend the θυμοειδές and πρᾶον harmoniously together: see Pol. 306 C — 311 C, infra III 410 B ff., VI 503 C, Theaet. 144 A , B.

ταῦτα ‐‐ ἔοικεν . Van Heusde ( Initia Phil. Plat. p. 471 note 1) somewhat hastily declares these words to be corrupt, and supplies ἀμφότερα ἔχειν after ταῦτα δέ. ταῦτα refers like τούτων simply to the two qualities πρᾶον and μεγαλόθυμον: ‘these’—meaning the combination of these as opposed to one of them—‘are apparently unattainable’: cf. VI 499 D οὐ γὰρ ἀδύνατος γενέσθαι, οὐδ’ ἡμεῖς ἀδύνατα λέγομεν.

ἐνοήσαμεν ‐‐ φύσεις . ἐνενοήσαμεν (with q) is read by most of the editors, quite unnecessarily, as Schneider shews. νοεῖν is not ‘putare,’ nor— I think—‘perpendere,’ but simply ‘animadvertere,’ ‘notice,’ as often. Such a meaning is peculiarly appropriate with ἴδοι following. Presently ἄρα is not ‘then’ (J. and C.), but ‘after all.’

τῷ φύλακι : not τῷ σκύλακι, as Groen van Prinsterer conjectured ( Plat. Prosop. p. 209). τῷ φύλακι of course depends on παρεβάλλομεν, and ἐν ᾧ is for ἐν τούτῳ ὃ.

αὐτῶν τὸ ἦθος . With αὐτῶν (unnecessary, but welcome, after τῶν γενναίων κυνῶν) cf. IV 428 A note

πρὸς μὲν ‐‐ τοὐναντίον . In Od. XVI 4—10 the dogs of Eumaeus do not bark at Telemachus, and Odysseus remarks (8, 9) Εὔμαἰ, ἦ μάλα τίς τοι ἐλεύσεται ἐνθάδ’ ἑταῖρος | ἢ καὶ γνώριμος ἄλλος, ἐπεὶ κύνες οὐχ ὑλάουσιν | ἀλλὰ περισσαίνουσι. See also Od. XIV 30, where they bark at the stranger Odysseus, and cf. Heracl. 115 (Bywater) κύνες καὶ βαύζουσι ὃν ἂν μὴ γινώσκωσι. In Aristotle similar characteristics are attributed to the lion: see Physiogn. 5. 809^{b} 34—36 μεγαλόψυχον καὶ φιλόνικον, καὶ πραΰ καὶ δίκαιον καὶ φιλόστοργον πρὸς ἃ ἂν ὁμιλήσῃ, and Hist. An. IX 44. 629^{b} 10—12.

πρὸς τῷ θυμοειδεῖ κτλ. There seems to be no other example in good Greek of προσγενέσθαι meaning ‘to become in addition’: but we may compare προσέσονται II 373 A, προσέχειν VII 521 D, προσείπωμεν X 607 B, and similar instances with other verbs. I formerly wrote φιλόσοφον for φιλόσοφος (‘that to the element of spirit nature should have added’— προσγενέσθαι, i.q. accessisse, cf. I 346 D —‘a philosophical temperament’). The accusative with infinitive has however a harsh effect. Herwerden cuts the knot by deleting the προς‐ of προσγενέσθαι.

ὅτι ‐‐ προπεπονθώς . Schneider justly observes that ὅτι is not likely to be an interpolation, and might easily have disappeared before ὅν, as it has in A (see cr. n.). In itself the presence of ὅτι is an improvement. For οὐδὲν δή v (supported also by Stobaeus Flor. 43. 149) reads οὐδέν, which may be right. Cobet's οὐδὲ ἕν is too emphatic.

οὐ πάνυ ‐‐ τὸν νοῦν : ‘I have hardly thought of the matter till now.’ μέχρι δεῦρο is more idiomatic than μέχρι τούτου in this sense, but Xen. Cyr. VIII 8. 9 and Dem. de Cor. 48 are closely analogous instances. The alternative rendering ‘my observation has hardly extended so far’ is (in view of οὔπ ω τοῦτο ἐθαύμασας;) less suitable.

ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφον . ὡς ἀληθῶς indicates that φιλόσοφον is to be taken in its etymological sense: cf. I 343 C note The dog shews ‘a love of knowledge’ because he loves the known, and hates the unknown. Brandt ( Zur Entwick. d. Pl. Lehr. v. d. Seelentheilen p. 10) ingeniously takes φιλόσοφον as= σοφὀν τοὺς φίλους: but the other interpretation is more natural and relevant. There is perhaps an allusion to the Cynics: see Schol. in Arist. ed. Brandis (Berlin 1836) 23^{b} 16 ff. τετάρτη δὲ (SC. αἰτία τοῦ κληθῆναι Κυνικοὺς) ὅτι διακριτικὸν ζᾧον ὁ κύων γνώσει καὶ ἀγνοίᾳ τὸν φίλον καὶ τὸν ἀλλότριον ὁρίζον· ὃν γὰρ γιγνώσκει, νομίζει φίλον εἶναι καὶ εἰ ῥόπαλον ἐπιφέροιτο, ὃν δὲ ἀγνοεῖ ἐχθρόν, καὶ εἰ δέλεαρ ἐπιφερόμενος εἴη. οὕτως οὗν καὶ οὗτοι τοὺς μὲν ἐπιτηδείους πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν φίλους ἐνόμιζον καὶ εὐμενεῖς ἐδέχοντο, τοὺς δὲ ἀνεπιτηδείους ἀπήλαυνον δίκην κυνῶν κατ’ αὐτῶν ὑλακτοῦντες, and Philoponus ib. 35^{a} 5—12. The Cynics were themselves very fond of pointing the moral from the lower animals to man (Dümmler Proleg. p. 58 note 2), and Plato here paints them not unkindly in colours of their own. It should be noted that throughout II—IV Plato uses φιλόσοφος and φιλοσοφία with less of an intellectual than of a moral connotation. In the earlier books the word is for the most part connected with a gentle considerate disposition or character, whether naturally implanted or the result of culture (cf III 410 E, 411 C, 411 E): in 407 C the sense is somewhat different. See Nettleship in Hellenica pp. 77—79, and Krohn Pl. St. p. 71. It is not until the latter part of Book V (473 B ff.) where Plato is proposing to enter on the third and final stage of his ideal city, viz. the κατάστασις τῶν ἀρχόντων, that the intellectual aspect of the word begins to predominate over the moral. Cf. IV 439 D note

φύσει is better taken with φιλόσοφον than with πρᾶος. Cf. 375 B.

ἆρά τι προὔργου κτλ. See on 368 E.

ἵνα μὴ ‐‐ διεξίωμεν . See cr. n. The omission in the text of A may be accidental (see Introd. § 5), but the sentence is certainly a difficult one. If the MSS are right, the meaning must be “For we do not want to be tedious,”— but συχνός is rather ‘lengthy’—“and we do not want to leave unsaid what is required for completeness” (J. and C., comparing for συχνός Theaet. 185 E , Phil. 23 B al.). The conjectures of Teuffel ( Rhein. Mus. 1850 p. 469) and Herwerden ( Mnem. N. S. XI p. 339)— ἵνα ἢ (so q) ἐῶμεν συχνὸν (so v) λόγον ἢ ἱκανὸν (so v) διεξίωμεν and ἵνα μὴ ἢ ἐῶμεν συχνὸν λόγον ἢ οὐχ ἱκανὸν διεξίωμεν— improve the antithesis, but are much too violent. It is safest to retain the MS reading until a thoroughly satisfactory emendation appears. Dr Jackson suggests ἵνα μὴ ἐῶμεν ἱκανὸν λόγον ἢ οὐχ ἱκανὸν διεξίωμεν.

τίς οὖν ἡ παιδεία; κτλ. The educational scheme contained in Books II and III contributes to the purgation of the τρυφῶσα πόλις, and thereby helps to complete Plato's second picture of an ideal city: see on 372 D ff. For the correct understanding of these regulations it is well to bear in mind (1) that Plato's object in this preliminary discipline is to train the character rather than the intellect (cf. IV 430 C note), and (2) that all the guardians have to pass through this curriculum. The higher scheme of education (in Book VII), on the other hand, is confined to those guardians who are to be made Rulers in the State, and its express aim is to educate the intellect rather than the will. See especially VI 502 E, VII 521 D—522 A notes The best discussion on Plato's theory of education in its broader aspects is still, I think, Nettleship's Essay in Hellenica pp. 67—180. Platon's Erziehungstheorie n. s. Schrift. dargestellt von Dr A. Drygas Schneidemühl 1880 is a useful summary. For Plato's criticism of poetry, we may refer in particular to Heine's excellent dissertation De rat. quae Platoni c. poet. Gr. intercedit etc. Vratislaviae 1880, and to Reber's Plato und die Poesie Leipzig, 1864.

ἔστιν δέ που — μουσική . The usual Greek view (see for example Isocr. 15. 180—185), corrected by Plato in III 410 C ff.

εἶπον . Richter ( Fl. Jahrb. 1867 p. 141) revives Muretus' conjecture εἶδος: but εἶπον is alone satisfactory. The confusion of ο and ω occurs in Inscriptions from the third century B.C. onwards (Meisterhans^{3} p. 24 note 128). See also Introd. § 5.

λόγων δὲ ‐‐ ἕτερον . The word ‘lies’ is here used by Plato in its popular sense of that which is false in fact: his own definition of the ‘veritable lie’ is different: see 382 B note ‘Lies’ are necessary—so Plato holds—in education: only they must be moral lies. Under ‘lies’ he includes stories ( μῦθοι) about the gods, about the daemons and heroes long since dead, about a future life—all of them subjects where the alleged facts cannot be verified. The ἀληθεῖς λόγοι are concerned with men, and are passed over by Plato, because he could not state his view without anticipating the conclusion which the Republic is intended to prove (see III 392 A—C). This point is missed by Krohn ( Pl. St. p. 12).

ἀληθῆ : i.e. truths of fact or history, not yet with reference to moral truth, for nothing has been said to change the connotation of ψευδής or its opposite ἀληθής. In Plato's view legend contains some elements of historical truth.

ἀρχὴ ‐‐ μέγιστον : semi - proverbial, with reference to ἀρχὴ ἥμισυ παντός: cf. Laws 753 E, and (for the application of the sentiment) ib. 765 E.

μάλιστα ‐‐ τύπον . See cr. n. To τύπος there are two objections: (1) the subject of πλάττεται and ἐνδύεται should be the same; but the subject of πλάττεται is not τύπος, but the νέῳ καὶ ἁπαλῷ ὁτῳοῦν, cf. πλάττειν τὰς ψυχὰς in C below: (2) it is more natural and correct to say that an object which ‘is being moulded’ ‘puts on’ a τύπος, than to say that the τύπος sinks into it. Reading τύπον we obtain the proper contrast between ἐνδύεται and ἐνσημήνασθαι: the youth puts on whatever impression or type the educator desires to stamp him with. The metaphor becomes more explicit in Plutarch De lib. educ. 3 F καθάπερ γὰρ σφραγῖδες τοῖς ἁπαλοῖς ἐναπομάττονται κηροῖς, οὕτως αἱ μαθήσεις ταῖς τῶν ἔτι παιδίων ψυχαῖς ἐναποτυποῦνται. Cf. also Theaet. 191 D and Hor. Epp. II 2. 8 argilla quidvis imitaberis uda.

ῥᾳδίως οὕτω : ‘carelessly, without more ado’: cf. 378 A and I 331 C. This idiomatic οὕτω is common with adverbs like ῥᾳδίως, εἰκῇ, ἁπλῶς, νῦν, ἐξαίφνης: for examples see Blaydes on Ar. Wasps 461 .

καλὸν : sc. μῦθον, which some MSS (including II) insert. For μῦθον understood from μυθοποιοῖς cf. III 399 D, where τοῦτο i.e. αὐλός is understood from αὐλοποιούς, 410 A, where αὐτοί (i.e. ἰατροί) follows ἰατρική, IV 421 E, and (with Schneider) Laws 886 C θεογονίαν διεξέρχονται, γενόμενοί τε (sc. οἱ θεοὶ) ὡς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὡμίλησαν.

πλάττειν κτλ. Mothers and nurses practised massage on the bodies of infants: cf. Laws 789 E τιθέντες νόμους τὴν μὲν κύουσαν περιπατεῖν, τὸ γενόμενον δὲ πλάττειν τε οἷον κήρινον ἕως ὑγρόν, καὶ μέχρι δυοῖν ἐτοῖν σπαργανᾶν, and Alc. I 121 D. A trace of massage practised for medical purposes appears in Zeno Fr. 180 (ed. Pearson).

ἐλεγέτην . The dual links together Homer and Hesiod as jointly responsible for Greek theology: see on 363 A. Among the first to rebel against their authority were Pythagoras, Xenophanes, and Heraclitus (D. L. VIII 21, IX 18, IX I). Xenophanes' protest was particularly famous in antiquity: see Sext. Emp. adv. Math. I 289 and IX 193 ap. Ritter and Preller Hist. Philos. Gr.^{7} pp. 76, 77. Plato's attack on the Olympian theology in this and the succeeding book was perhaps the severest blow that Paganism received before the Christian era, and pointed the way for those exaggerated diatribes against the heathen gods in which it afterwards became the fashion of early Christian apologists to indulge, beginning with the Apology of Aristides (cc. 8—11). Cf. X 607 B note

ὅπερ ‐‐ ψεύδηται . ὅπερ is τὸ εἰκάζειν κακῶς περἰ θεῶν etc. A distinction is drawn between mere lies and the lie which is in itself οὐ καλόν, unbeautiful and immoral in tendency, e.g. the story of Uranus and Cronus ( ὁ εἰπὼν οὐ καλῶς ἐψεύσατο in E below). Such legends not merely misrepresent the gods, but also corrupt mankind.

τῶν μεγίστων : masculine, not neuter: cf. 378 B.

Ἡσίοδος . Theog. 154—181.

τὰ δὲ δὴ κτλ . δή emphasizes the case of Cronus as the most important (cf. Prot. 311 D , 312 E): it is so because the delinquent is Zeus, the reigning king of gods and men. The example set by Zeus on this occasion was no doubt sometimes used to justify wrong-doing: see for example Aesch. Eum. 640 , 641, Ar. Clouds 904 —906 πῶς δῆτα δίκης οὔσης ὁ Ζεὺς | οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν τὸν πατέρ’ αὑτοῦ | δήσας ; ib. 1079 ff., Eur. H. F. 1317 — 1319, and especially Pl. Euthyph. 5 E — 6 A, where Euthyphro urges the analogy in all seriousness to justify his vexatious prosecution of his own father. The pernicious effect of such legends on human conduct is again pointed out in Laws 886 C, 941 B: cf. also Isocr. Bus. 38—43, Luc. Men. 3, and Grote Plato III p. 194 note

ῥᾳδίως οὕτω : 377 B note

θυσαμένους ‐‐ ἀκοῦσαι . ἀπορρήτων suggests the mysteries, whence the allusion to the ‘mystic pig’ ( Ar. Ach. 764 ). For ἄπορον, ‘unprocurable’ (Jowett), ἄπνρον has been suggested, absurdly enough. ἄπορον is further explained by ὅπως— ἀκοῦσαι. It should be noted that ὅπως with a past tense of the indicative in clauses of this kind is rare in Plato: it occurs again only in Laws 830 B, 959 C (where ἄν should be expunged). Cf. Weber in Schanz's Beiträge zur hist. Synt. d. Gr. Sprache II 2, p. 64.

οὐδ’ αὖ has been needlessly doubted by Richter ( Fl. Jahrb. 1867 p. 142), who suggests οὐδέν. The words ἀδικῶν—ποιοῖ correspond to the conduct of Uranus and Cronus towards their children: οὐδ’ αὖ—τρόπῳ to Cronus' treatment of Uranus, and Zeus' of Cronus. Cf Euthyph. 5 E —6 A. The Euthyphro presents so many parallels to § 378 that some have—erroneously, no doubt—supposed it to be a spurious elaboration of that section: see my edition of the dialogue p. xxix.

πολλοῦ δεῖ ‐‐ ποικιλτέον . πολλοῦ δεῖ is not adverbial (like ἥκιστα), as J. and C assert: otherwise δεῖ would be δεῖν (so Herwerden would read Mnem. N. S. XI p. 339). The asyndeton is justified by emphasis and the ampliative character of the sentence. The verbals are best explained (with Stallbaum) by supposing an ellipse of εἶναι: cf. Schanz Nov. Comm. Pl. p. 33.

ποικιλτέον . ποικίλλειν is used of depicting in a variety of colours (VIII 557 C), not necessarily by embroidery. Cf. 373 A note There is probably a special reference here to the πέπλος. At the greater, if not also at the lesser, Panathenaic festival, a robe woven by Athenian maidens and representing the triumph of Athena and the Olympians over the giants, together with other celestial fights, was carried in procession to the Acropolis, and presented to the statue of the goddess in the Erechtheum: cf. Euthyph. 6 B , C and Mommsen Feste d. Stadt Athen pp. 107 ff. The subject was depicted on the Parthenon frieze: see Baumeister Denkm. d. kl. Alterth. II p. 1185. The allusion to the ceremony is the more appropriate in this connexion, if, as appears to be probable, the action of the dialogue takes place just before the great Panathenaea of 410 B.C. See Introd. § 3.

ὡς οὐδεὶς κτλ. Plato desires to obtain a religious sanction for his institutions, as in the myth III 414 B ff. The best δημηγόρος, according to Socrates, is ὁ στάσεις τε παύων καὶ ὁμόνοιαν ἐμποιῶν ( Xen. Mem. IV 6. 14 ): and the Platonic State may from this point of view be regarded as “an attempt to determine the ways and means of securing political ὁμόνοια” (Krohn Pl. St. p. 369).

λεκτέα —see cr. n.—cannot be dispensed with. Madvig's suggestion, that μᾶλλον is corrupt for φατέον or ᾀστέον or the like, and Liebhold's μελητέον for μᾶλλον, are much less probable than the accidental omission of λεκτέα in A. See Introd. § 5. Vermehren ( Pl. Stud. p. 92), rejecting λεκτέα, would carry on μυθολογητέον or the like; but this solution is much too difficult.

καὶ πρεσβυτέροις γιγνομένοις . The dative goes with λογοποιεῖν (‘to make tales for them as they grow older’), and καί before τοὺς ποιητάς means etiam. This explanation was proposed by Richter ( Fl. Jahrb. 1867 p. 138) and Vermehren (l. c. p. 91), and is probably right. Cf. Ar. Frogs 1054 f. Others connect the words with καὶ γέρουσι καὶ γραυσί: old men, old women, and the boys themselves as they grow older, must tell such stories πρὸς τὰ παιδία εὐθύς. But it is difficult to understand τοῖς παιδίοις with γιγνομένοις unless πρεσβυτέροις γιγνομένοις is construed with λογοποιεῖν.

ὑέος . Hephaestus. Διός is a false reading derived from a mistaken reference to Il. XV 18 ff. The story (according to Clement ap. Suid. s. vv. Ἥρας δὲ δεσμοὺς ὑπὸ υἱέος) was in Pindar: παρὰ Πινδάρῳ γὰρ ὑπὸ Ἡφαίστου δεσμεύεται ἐν τῷ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ κατασκευασθέντι θρόνῳ—καί φασι δεθῆναι αὐτὴν ἐπιβουλεύσασαν Ἡρακλεῖ. Cf. Paus. I 20. 3.

Ἡφαίστου ῥίψεις . Il. I 586—594.

θεομαχίας ‐‐ οὐ παραδεκτέον . Homer Il. XX 1—74, XXI 385—513. Cf. Xenophanes Fr. 1. 19—22 (Bergk) and Pind. Ol. IX 43, 44 μή νυν λαλάγει τὰ τοιαῦτ’ · ἔα πόλεμον μάχαν τε πᾶσαν χωρὶς ἀθανάτων.

ἐν ὑπονοίαις : adverbial, like ἐν φαρμάκου εἴδει III 389 B (J. and C.). The allegorical interpretation of Homer probably originated in the desire to save his character for piety and morality: πάντη γὰρ ἠσέβησεν (says Heraclides Alleg. Hom. ad init.), εἰ μηδὲν ἠλληγόρησεν. Before the time of Plato it was practised by Theagenes of Rhegium, Anaxagoras, Metrodorus of Lampsacus, Stesimbrotos of Thasos and others: see Wolf Proleg. ad Homerum pp. 161—166 and Jebb's Homer p. 89. In Plato's day the Cynics were the chief exponents of this school of criticism, especially Antisthenes: examples may be found in Winckelmann's Antisth. Frag. pp. 16, 23—28: cf. also Dümmler Antisthenica pp. 16 ff. Dümmler, many of whose combinations are highly speculative, regards the present passage as directed against Antisthenes, whose rivalry with Plato is well known: but there is nothing to suggest any personal reference. The historical Socrates occasionally played with the same weapons, as appears from Xen. Symp. 3. 6, and Mem. I 3. 7: so also does Plato, but seldom, if ever, without irony, e.g. Rep. 1 332 B ἠνίξατο— ὁ Σιμωνίδης ποιητικῶς: cf. also Theaet. 194 C , Alc. II 147 B—D al. Plato's attacks upon Homer lent a great impetus to this method of exegesis—the only method, as it was thought, by which his animadversions could be met: cf. Schow's Heraclides pp. 223—234.

οἷος τυγχάνει ‐‐ ἐν μέλεσιν . τυγχάνει ὤν=‘really is’: cf. I 337 B note On the omission of ἐάν τε ἐν μέλεσιν in A see Introd. § 5.

ἀλλὰ μὴν κτλ. It is first proved that good is not the cause of evil ( ἀλλὰ μὴν—πῶς γάρ;), and next that good is the cause of εὐπραγία ( τί δέ;— ναί): the conclusions are then stated in the reverse order. The step by which each conclusion is reached—the identification of ἀγαθόν and ὠφέλιμον—is Socratic (cf. Xen. Mem. IV 6. 8 ); but it is doubtful if the historical Socrates ever went so far as to deny that God is sometimes the cause of real evil or adversity to man, in spite of his belief in Providence ( Mem. I 4 and IV 3; yet I 4. 16 οἴει δ’ ἂν τοὺς θεοὺς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δόξαν ἐμφῦσαι, ὡς ἱκανοί εἰσιν εὖ καὶ κακῶς ποιεῖν, εἰ μὴ δυνατοὶ ἦσαν;). The moral goodness of the Deity himself was proclaimed before Socrates and Plato by Xenophanes, Pindar, and the dramatists, but the inference, that God, because He is good, is never the cause of evil, is probably due to Plato. Bacchylides expresses a kindred sentiment in Fr. 29 (Bergk) Ζεὺς ὑψιμέδων, δ(\ς ἅπαντα δέρκεται, | οὐκ αἴτιος θνατοῖς μεγάλων ἀχέων. Read in the light of Book VI, the theology of this and the succeeding chapters gains, no doubt, in significance and depth; yet it is illegitimate to argue on this account (as Susemihl does Genet. Entwick. II p. 121) that the existence of the Idea of Good is already presupposed, unless it is shewn that Plato could not have purified his theology except by metaphysics. In point of fact, Plato might have written the end of Book III even if he had never thought of the Ideas at all.

οὐδ) ἄρα ‐‐ πάντων . Contrast Aesch. Ag. 1485 , 1486 Διὸς παναιτίου πανεργέτα. | τί γὰρ βροτοῖς ἄνευ Διὸς τελεῖται ; Suppl. 822—824 and many other examples in Nägelsbach Hom. Theol. pp. 26, 51 ff., and Nachhom. Theol. pp. 16, 18, 60 ff., 73 ff.

πολὺ γὰρ ‐‐ ἡμῖν . An old saying, as appears from Pind. Pyth. 3. 81 ff. μανθάνων οἶσθα προτέρων· | ἓν παρ’ ἐσλὸν πήματα σύνδυο δαίονται βροτοῖς | ἀθάνατοι, and Eur. Suppl. 196 , 7: cf. also Hom. Il. XXIV 527 ff., Philem. Fr. Inc. 65 (ed. Meineke). Plato and Aristotle make room for it in their philosophies: see e.g. Pol. 273 D , Laws 906 A, and Arist. Probl. X 45. 895^{b} 39 ff. ἡ φύσις φαῦλα μὲν πάντα ποιεῖ, καὶ πλείους καὶ πλείω, σπουδαῖα δ’ ἐλάττω, καὶ οὐ πάντα δύναται. The counterpart in the sphere of morals is Bias's οἱ πολλοὶ κακοί: with which may be compared Rep. IV 428 E, 431 A, 442 A, C, IX 588 D. It is a melancholy cry born of the age of iron: in the golden age—so Plato tells us Pol. 273 C —the balance was the other way.

ἄλλ) ἄττα ‐‐ τὰ αἴτια . The dualism should not be taken too seriously, in spite of the good and evil souls in Laws 896 E. Plato is not now constructing a philosophy, but casting moulds for theology and poetry.

δοιοὶ πίθοι . See Il. XXIV 527—532 δοιοὶ γάρ τε πίθοι κατακείαται ἐν Διὸς οὔδει | δώρων οἷα δίδωσι κακῶν, ἕτερος δὲ ἑαων· | ᾦ μέν κ’ ἀμμίξας δώη Ζεὺς τερπικέραυνος, | ἄλλοτε μέν τε κακῷ ὅ γε κύρεται, ἄλλοτε δ’ ἐσθλῷ· | ᾧ δέ κε τῶν λυγρῶν δώῃ, λωβητὸν ἔθηκεν | καί ἑ κακὴ βούβρωστις ἐπὶ χθόνα δῖαν ἐλαύνει. In our Homer there is apparently only one jar of good to two of evil (see Leaf ad loc. and cf. 379 C note): in Plato there is one of each. So great a difference is not likely to be due to Plato: it is easier to believe that he used a different recension from the Alexandrian. The use of κῆρες unpersonihed was apparently not admitted by the Alexandrian critics. Cf. Wolf Proleg. p. 37, and Howes in Harvard Studies in Cl. Phil. VI p. 204.

ἀγαθῶν ‐‐ τέτυκται is either from a lost line of Homer, or from some other poet (as Schneider inclines to think): note οὔτ’ ἄλλου ποιητοῦ just above. There can hardly be any reference to Il. IV 84 Ζεύς, ὅς τ’ ἀνθρώπων ταμίης πολέμοιο τέτυκται, as Howes imagines (l. c. p. 196). The sentiment is common: cf. e.g. Hes. O. D. 669 and Pind. Isthm. IV 52, 53 Ζεὺς τά τε καὶ τὰ νέμει, Ζεὺς ὁ πάντων κύριος.

σπονδῶν σύγχυσιν . Il. IV 69 ff.

θεῶν ἔριν τε καὶ κρίσιν . This is usually explained as referring to the Theomachy ( Il. XX 1—74), which was caused by Zeus and Themis in the sense that Zeus sent Themis to summon the gods to the council at which it was sanctioned ( v. 4). But (1) Themis' part in causing the Theomachy is very small, (2) the simplest and most natural meaning of κρίσις is not ‘contention,’ but ‘judgment’ or ‘decision,’ and (3) the Theomachy in Homer is not productive of evil to men, but only to the gods themselves: its citation here would therefore be quite irrelevant. W. R. Hardie (in Cl. Rev. IV p. 182) is, I believe, right in supposing that the strife of the goddesses three and Paris' judgment is meant. ἔρις and κρίσις are regularly thus used: e.g. Eur. I. A. 1307 κρίσιν—στυγνὰν ἔριν τε καλλονᾶς; cf. ib. 581, Hel. 708, Troad. 924. Hec. 644 f. Κρίσις was the name of Sophocles' play on the judgment of Paris ( Fr. 330). The poem referred to by Plato is the Cypria (so also Wilamowitz Hom. Unters. p. 367 note 46), which traced the war of Troy to the judgment of Paris, and that to Zeus' deliberations with Themis ( Ζεὺς βουλεύεται μετὰ τῆς Θέμιδος περὶ τοῦ Τρωικοῦ πολέμου Kinkel Epic. Graec. Fr. p. 17. Θέμιδος is Heyne's emendation for Θέτιδος: but it is scarcely open to doubt: for the marriage of Peleus and Thetis, at which the three goddesses quarrelled, was an episode of the poem, and Thetis could hardly therefore have been privy to the plot. See Kinkel l. c. pp. 20, 22 and Jebb's Homer p. 153). Themis was Zeus' ἀρχαία ἄλοχος (Pind. Fr. 30 B ergk), and still appears as one of the Olympians in Il. XV 87. The Cypria is quoted again by Plato in Euthyph. 12 A . We may fairly suppose that θεῶν ἔρις τε καὶ κρίσις was the heading of one of the introductory episodes in the poem: to this also the omission of the article with ἔριν τε καὶ κρίσιν seems to point. Mr Hardie thinks Plato may have attributed the poem to Homer; but Euthyph. l. c. ( ὁ ποιητὴς ὁ ποιήσας) does not favour this view.

θεὸς μὲν ‐‐ θέλῃ : Aesch. Fr. 160 . For other examples of this familiar Greek idea see Nägelsbach Hom. Theol. p. 321 and Nachhom. Theol. pp. 54 ff.

ἐν οἷς ‐‐ ἔνεστιν . I have left these words in the text, although they are certainly open to suspicion, and have been condemned by Platt ( Cl. Rev. III p. 72). The antecedent to οἷς is apparently τὰ τῆς Νιόβης πάθη: but the play was not called ‘The sufferings of Niobe’ but ‘Niobe,’ and the relative can hardly precede its antecedent in sentences of this kind. If οἷς is referred to ταῦτα understood after ποιῇ, then ἐν is difficult: ‘if any one puts into poetry topics in which these iambics occur’ gives no good sense. Unless Plato is writing very inaccurately, we must pronounce the clause a marginal gloss on τὰ—πάθη .

ὠνίναντο κολαζόμενοι . An earlier generation looked upon punishment as retributory— δράσαντι παθεῖν. This view appears in Hes. Fr. 217, ed. Goettling, and especially in Aeschylus, e.g. Ag. 1563 f., Choeph. 309—314, 400 —404, 886, 927: in Sophocles and Euripides it is rarer ( Ant. 1074—1076, El. 1411 f., 1495 f., Andr. 438, Suppl. 614 —616), and Euripides expressly argues against it in Or. 508 ff. Traces of a milder theory were however contained in the doctrine πάθος μάθος ( Ag. 176 ff.), as well as in the use of words like σωφρονίζειν, δικαιοῦν, εὐθύνειν, for ‘punish.’ In Plato punishment is remedial. Ignorance or vice is in the soul what disease is in the body (IV 444 C, cf. IX 591 A, B), and the judge is the soul's physician (III 409 E ff., Gorg. 478 D ): hence ( Gorg. 480 B ff.) the sinner should go before the judge as a patient visits his doctor, and we should even prosecute our guilty friends and relations. See also Laws 854 D, 862 E, 934 A, 944 D τὸν γὰρ κακὸν ἀεὶ δεῖ κολάζειν, ἵν’ ἀμείνων ᾖ. The punishment, again, which awaits the wicked after death is intended to cure their souls, unless they are incurable: and such as are themselves incurable, help to cure others by their deterrent example (X 616 A): so that in its deepest relations this doctrine reaches to the very roots of Plato's philosophy, with all due deference to Mr W. S. Lilly, who with much intemperance of language denounces those who attribute such a view to Plato ( Fortnightly Review N.S. XLVI p. 116).

ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ πόλει : ‘in one's own city,’ with reference to the subject of διαμαχετέον, not to τινα. Plato implies that the preachers of such theology must be suppressed in his ideal city. In all this Teichmüller ( Lit. Fehd. I p. 114) detects an assault upon Isocrates, but his evidence is of the slightest.

μυθολογοῦντα is rejected by Herwerden: Ast suggested μυθολογούμενα. The choice of the participle is determined by λέγειν, which is more important than ἀκούειν: for without saying hearing is impossible. μήτε νεώτερον μήτε πρεσβύτερον belongs both to λέγειν and to ἀκούειν.

νόμων τε καὶ τύπων . All laws are in Plato's view only moulds or outlines, within which our actions should fall. Cf. infra 383 C and especially Pol. 294 A ff.

ἆρα γόητα κτλ. Although the gods are constantly represented as deceivers in Greek poetry and legend, Plato was by no means the first to uphold the opposite view. In Pindar ( Ol. 10. 4) Truth is the daughter of Zeus, and the dramatists often teach a similar doctrine: see Nägelsbach Nachhom. Theol. p. 46. There is a close imitation of Plato's argument throughout this passage in Arist. Fr. 15. 1476^{b} 14 ff. ed. Rose.

αὐτόν is emphatic: the contrast is between actual and apparent transformations of the Deity. After αὐτόν, Herwerden would insert παντοδαπόν, comparing 381 E; before it, Richards adds ἄλλον, by which Benedictus and Ast replace αὐτόν. Hartman proposes <τι> γιγνόμενον. It has apparently escaped notice that γιγνόμενον, as well as ἀλλάττοντα τὸ αὑτοῦ εἶδος, belongs to εἰς πολλὰς μορφάς in the sense of ‘passing into’: cf. Tim. 57 A εἰς ἄλλο τι γιγνόμενον, infra III 400 B εἰς βραχύ τε καὶ μακρὸν γιγνόμενον, IX 588 C, and the frequent idiom γένεσις εἰς e.g. Phaed. 71 B , 71 E, Phil. 26 D , Tim. 49 C , 54 B.

ἁπλοῦν : one of the watchwords of Plato's State (370 B, C, 374 A—D al.): his citizens are to be nothing if not ἁπλοῖ. In making the gods a reflection of the type of human character which he desired to foster, Plato is acting strictly in accordance with the method of Greek theology, whose Olympus is an image of human society. The end of human action is ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν ( Theaet. 176 B ); and Plato's God, changeless and with ‘no shadow of turning,’ furnished the citizens of his ideal city with an abiding standard of human conduct. Cf. 383 C.

τί δὲ τόδε ; Steinhart ( Platon's Werke V p. 680) justly observes that the method of reasoning employed here— the disproof of each of the two members of the opposite alternative—recalls the arguments by which Parmenides established the attributes of Being (see RP.^{7} §§ 95, 98); but the resemblance is not close enough to suggest that Plato was thinking of Parmenides when he wrote this chapter. Although the unchangeableness of God was taught by Xenophanes and the Eleatics, there are few if any traces of such a doctrine outside the philosophers before Plato.

ὑπὸ μὲν ἄλλου κτλ . μέν has its counterpart in ἀλλ’ ἆρα αὐτὸς αὑτὸν κτλ. 381 B.

κινεῖται : a more general word for change than ἀλλοιοῦται: cf. Theaet. 181 D δύο δὴ—εἴδη κινήσεως, ἀλλοίωσιν, τὴν δὲ περιφοράν. The doctrine of the permanence and immutability of good enunciated here foreshadows, but does not presuppose, the metaphysical predominance of the Good in Book VI.

καὶ ἀμφιέσματα . See cr. n. and Introd. § 5.

ἀνάγκη : sc. ἐστίν. For ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ without ὡς see on I 332 E. Hartman needlessly suggests ἔμοιγε δοκεῖν.

θεοὶ ‐‐ πόληας . Od. XVII 485 f. Cf. Nägelsbach Hom. Theol. pp. 166—168.

Πρωτέως καὶ Θέτιδος . For Proteus see Od. IV 456—458. Aeschylus also wrote a satyric drama called Proteus: Fragg. 208—213. The transformations of Thetis to escape marrying Peleus had been celebrated by Pindar ( Nem. IV 62 ff.), Sophocles ( Fr. 548), perhaps also (as Stallbaum thinks) by Hesiod in his ἐπιθαλάμιον εἰς Πηλέα καὶ Θέτιν (see Goettling's Hesiod pp. XLIX and 304).

ὡς ἱέρειαν ‐‐ βιοδώροις : from Aesch. Ξαντρίαι (Schol. on Ar. Frogs 1344 ). Dindorf ( Aesch. Fr. 170 ) restores as follows: ὀρεσσιγόνοισι | Νύμφαις κρηνιάσιν κυδραῖσι θεαῖσιν ἀγείρω, | Ἰνάχου Ἀργείου ποταμοῦ παισὶν βιοδώροις. Herwerden's βιοδώρου is a wanton change: the sons of the river-god are his tributaries, and lifegiving like himself. It is not clear why Hera was disguised as a priestess. The incident in Inachus' history most suited to dramatic treatment was the persecution of his daughter Io by Hera in consequence of her intrigue with Zeus. As Io was a priestess of Hera, Hera may have disguised herself as another priestess in order to discover her husband's unfaithfulness: see Apollod. Bibl. II 1. 3 φωραθεὶς δὲ (sc. ὁ Ζεὺς) ὑφ’ Ἥρας, τῆς μὲν κόρης ἁψάμενος εἰς βοῦν μετεμόρφωσε λευκήν, αὐτὴν δὲ ἀπωμόσατο μὴ συνελθεῖν. The subject seems to have been treated by Sophocles in his satyric drama Inachus ( Fragg. 255—278). With ὡς ἱέρειαν ἀγείρουσαν cf. ἀγύρται in 364 B and note ad loc.

τοιαῦτα πολλά . For examples see Heyne's Virgil II pp. 146— 152 (cited by Ast on 381 D). πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἀοιδοί. said the proverb.

κακῶς : like οὐ καλῶς 377 E.

ὡς ‐‐ ἰνδαλλόμενοι . ἄρα expresses incredulity (358 C note) and τινες contempt. Plato is thinking, inter alia, of the bugbears of the nursery—Lamia, Mormo, and Empusa, whose power of self-transformation was unlimited: see Blaydes on Ar. Frogs 293 . ξένοις need not here be limited to the masculine gender. Cf. Strab. I 19 παισὶ προσφέρομεν—εἰς ἀποτροπὴν—τοὺς φοβεροὺς ( μύθους). ἥ τε γὰρ Λαμία μῦθός ἐστι καὶ ἡ Γοργὼ καὶ ὁ Ἐφιάλτης καὶ ἡ Μορμολύκη.

φάντασμα is said with reference to φαίνεσθαι just above, and should be taken both with λόγῳ and ἔργῳ. The φάντασμα λόγῳ is the spoken lie: an example of the φάντασμα ἔργῳ is a φαντασία or unreal appearance (382 E). The words ἔργῳ φάντασμα προτείνων must not be understood of actual self-transformations of the gods.

τό γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος κτλ. Cf. τοῦ ἀληθῶς ψεύδους Theaet. 189 C , and (for the sentiment) Laws 730 C.

οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν κτλ. With Plato, as with Socrates, vice is ignorance, and involuntary. The doctrine reappears below in III 413 A, IX 589 C: it is further implied by the entire scheme of education in Books VI and VII. For other assertions of this view in Plato see Simson der Begriff d. Seele bei Pl. p. 125 note 359. Cf. also Soph. Fr. 663 ἡ δὲ μωρία | μάλιστ’ ἀδελφὴ τῆς πονηρίας ἔφυ. The identification of ignorance and vice is in harmony with popular Greek psychology, in which the intellect was not clearly distinguished from the will; it can be traced in the moral connotation of words like ἀμαθής, ἀπαίδευτος, ἀγνώμων. In close connexion with this conception of vice is Plato's view of punishment as remedial: see 380 B note

τὰ ὄντα κτλ. τὰ ὄντα =‘the truth.’ The contrast between the act and state in ψεύδεσθαί τε καὶ ἐψεῦσθαι resembles I 351 B: ἐψεῦσθαι, moreover, suitably bridges the distance between ψεύδεσθαι and ἀμαθῆ εἶναι. ἔχειν τὸ ψεῦδος corresponds to ψεύδεσθαι, κεκτῆσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος to ἐψεῦσθαι: the contrast is between ‘holding, ready for use, that which is already possessed,’ and permanent possession: cf. Soph. Ant. 1278 and Jebb ad loc. The words ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ, ‘in such a case’ (i.e. ἐν τῷ ἐψεῦσθαι τῇ ψυχῇ περὶ τὰ ὄντα), are quite satisfactory (cf. III 393 C), and ought not to have caused Herwerden difficulty.

μίμημά τι ‐‐ ψεῦδος . τοῦ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθήματος must not be explained (with Bosanquet Companion p. 93) as the state of mind of him who tells a lie: for that is knowledge, and the spoken lie certainly is not an imitation of knowledge. They refer to the ‘true lie,’ which is a certain πάθημα in the soul of the ‘true liar,’ viz. ignorance, and of which the spoken lie is an imitation. It is a tolerably accurate definition of a lie to call it ‘an imitation of ignorance in the soul’: cf. IV 443 C note The spoken lie is ‘not a wholly unmixed lie,’ because it implies that the speaker knows the truth: in a certain sense therefore it is mixed with truth. It is ὕστερον γεγονός, because the spoken lie cannot be uttered until the truth is known. Inasmuch as the spoken lie is mixed with truth, it is better than the ‘veritable lie.’ We have here nothing but a special application of the old Socratic paradox ὁ ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνων ἀμείνων (see on I 334 A). I have placed a comma after γεγονός, to mark the antithesis between εἴδωλον and ἄκρατον ψεῦδος, and because εἴδωλον is not so much to be taken with τοῦ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθήματος: rather it stands for εἴδωλον ψεύδους, as οὐ πάνυ ἄκρατον ψεῦδος shews. The distinction between veritable and spoken lies savours, no doubt, of idealism: but it enables Plato to call his ideal archons ideally truthful, even when practically they tell lies, and it is with this object in view that the distinction is introduced. See III 389 B.

πότε ‐‐ μίσους ; τῷ is masculine: it is presently shewn that the spoken lie is useless to God. Plato does not permit a man to lie in his own interest. Ordinary Greek morality, in spite of Achilles' ἐχθρὸς γάρ μοι κεῖνος <*>μῶς Ἀΐδαο πύλῃσιν etc., probably did. The saying of Democritus ἀληθομυθεύειν χρεών, ὅπου λώιον (Stob. Flor. 12. 13) leaves us to infer that we may also lie ὅπου λώιον. Cf. Soph. Fr. 323 καλὸν μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστι τὰ ψεύδη λέγειν· | ὅτῳ δ’ ὄλεθρον δεινὸν ἁλήθεἰ ἄγει, | συγγνωστὸν εἰπεῖν ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ μὴ καλόν. The cynical immorality of Hdt. III 72 exceeds what Greek public opinion would have tolerated: cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. IV ch. 13. See also on III 389 B and Nägelsbach Nachhom. Theol. pp. 240 ff.

ἆῤ οὐ ‐‐ πολεμίους κτλ. Cf. I 331 E— 332 B.

τῶν καλουμένων φίλων depends on ἀποτροπῆς. If ὅταν διὰ μανίαν—τότε had been omitted, the construction would be quite clear: as it is, some difficulty has been felt. Schneider understands τινες as subject to ἐπιχειρῶσι: by Hermann ὅταν is changed to οἳ ἂν: by Herwerden ὅταν to οἳ ἂν and τότε to τοῦτο: while Stallbaum resorts to an anacoluthon, as if Plato had intended to say τῶν καλουμένων φίλων ἕνεκα. None of these expedients is so simple as to connect ἀποτροπῆς with φίλων. The clause ὅταν—πράττειν cancels out with τότε and does not affect the construction. καλουμένων, ‘so-called,’ involves a theory of friendship, viz. that no one who is ἀνόητος καὶ μαινόμενος can be a friend to man (any more than to God: cf. 382 E).

μυθολογίαις κτλ. Plato seems to have supposed that ancient history and mythology could be manufactured to order. Cf. Arist. Pol. B 9. 1269^{b} 28 and Susemihl ad loc. He attempts the task himself in III 414 B ff., Prot. 320 C —322 D (unless this is really an extract from one of Protagoras' own works), Pol. 269 A —274 E, Tim. 21 A — 25 D, Critias, and Laws 676 B—682 D.

εἰδέναι . The omniscience of the gods was no new doctrine: see Nägelsbach Hom. Theol. p. 23, Nachhom. Theol. pp. 23 ff.

ποιητὴς ‐‐ ἔνι . ‘There is nothing of the lying poet in God.’ Cf. 365 C note I can see no point in Stallbaum's notion that there is a play on the two senses of ποιητής—‘poet’ and ‘creator.’

ψεύδοιτο . ἄν is carried on: cf. I 352 E note

μαινομένων . Phaedr. 265 A μανίας δέ γε εἴο=η δύο, τὴν μὲν ὑπὸ νοσημάτων ἀνθρωπίνων, τὴν δὲ ὑπὸ θείας ἐξαλλαγῆς τῶν εἰωθότων νομίμων γιγνομένην. Plato refers here only to the first variety: the second is discussed in Phaedr. 265 B ff.

κομιδῇ ἄρα κτλ. The words ἁπλοῦν, οὔτε αὐτὸς μεθίσταται sum up 380 D—381 E (see on ἁπλοῦν in 380 D), the rest 382 A—D.

οὔτε κατὰ φαντασίας . See cr. n. and Introd. § 5. φαίνεσθαι and ἔργῳ φάντασμα προτείνων in 381 E, 382 A favour the view that these words are genuine.

ὕπαρ οὐδ’ ὄναρ . See cr. n. ὕπαρ οὐδ’ ὄναρ is not co-ordinate with οὔτε κατὰ φαντασίας etc., but subordinate to them: for φαντασίαι, λόγοι, and especially σημείων πομπαί might be vouchsafed either in waking moments or in dreams: see Stengel and Oehmichen in Iwan Müller's Handbuch V 3 pp. 37—47. For the doctrine cf. Xen. Mem. I 3. 4.

παράγειν . παράγοντας (conjectured by Richards) would be easier, but the slip, if such it be, is excusable. ὡς—ὄντας is not the accusative absolute: if it were, ὡς would express the reason, and here it does not. We are defining the τύπος: and the construction is (they must ποιεῖν) ὡς μήτε αὐτοὺς γόητας ὄντας, ‘represent the gods as neither themselves being sorcerers,’ etc. In παράγειν the construction is changed, but the change is natural, for our rule applies both to λόγος and ποίησις ( καὶ λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν), and λέγειν takes the accusative and infinitive. Both λέγειν and ποιεῖν affect the construction, which involves a sort of chiasmus. Cf. III 390 B note

τοῦ ἐνυπνίου πομπήν . Il. II 1— 34.

ἡ Θέτις κτλ. The verses are perhaps, as Schneider conjectures, from Aeschylus' Ὅπλων κρίσις, in which Thetis was one of the characters (Schol. on Ar. Ach. 883 ). Apollo with his harp ( ἔχων φόρμιγγα) appears as present at the marriage of Thetis also in Homer ( Il. XXIV 62, 63). Plato accommodates the beginning of the quotation to his own sentence: in Aeschylus perhaps it ran ὁ δ’ ἐνεδατεῖτο τὰς ἐμὰς εὐπαιδίας (so Butler, quoted by Schneider). ἐνδατεῖσθαι, ‘to dwell upon or emphasize,’ is elsewhere always used in an ominous sense (see Jebb on Soph. O. T. 205 ): and here too, perhaps, it strikes a foreboding note. The words μακραίωνας βίους were doubted by Stephanus, who suggested μακραίωνος βίου (so Euseb. Praep. Ev. XIII 3. 35) or μακραίωνας βίου: but Apollo's prophecies did not refer to Achilles only, so that the plural is justified. ἀπείρους should be taken not with εὐπαιδίας, but with βίους, which is in apposition to εὐπαιδίας. In the next line θεοφιλεῖς ἐμὰς τύχας depends on the compound expression παιῶν’ ἐπηυφήμησεν—a construction frequent in Aeschylus, especially with verbs which denote singing, celebrating, etc. ( Ag. 174, 175 al.): after enumerating all the blessings in store for Thetis ( ξύμπαντά τ’ εἰπών) Apollo raised a paean over her θεοφιλεῖς τύχας. This explanation— Schneider's—is much better than to connect ξύμπαντα adverbially with θεοφιλεῖς.

ἤλπιζον : ‘fancied,’ not ‘hoped’: cf. V 451 A, IX 573 C, and ἐλπίς in VII 517 B. This idiomatic usage is illustrated by Rutherford on Babrius 9. 2.

θεῖοι—οἷόν τε . The object of all worship and all religion, as of human action in general, is assimilation to God: cf. X 613 A note

πλούτου δὲ οὐδέν and Liebhold ( Fl. Jahrb. 1888, p. 107)

κόσμου δὲ ἄλλο μὲν <ἔχοντ)> οὐδέν for τοῦτον δὲ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν. Neither of these proposals has any plausibility, and it is best to regard this as one of the places where we owe the right reading to Π .

τὰ μὲν δὴ περὶ θεοὺς κτλ. Rettig ( Proleg. pp. 61 ff.) and others suppose that the virtue of ὁσιότης is alluded to here—a virtue which in the earlier dialogues is sometimes placed by the side of the four cardinal virtues ( Prot. 329 C , Men. 78 D , Gorg. 507 B ). But ὁσιότης is not specifically named (in spite of II 380 C), and it is clear from the words καὶ γονέας—ποιησομένοις that Plato is thinking at least as much of duty to man as of duty to gods: cf. II 378 B C, 381 E, 383 C. See also App. I.

ἀνδρεῖοι . Plato has in view chiefly courage in war: hence the importance which he attaches to removing the fear of death. Cf. Tyrtaeus 10 ( τεθνάμεναι γὰρ καλὸν κτλ.) and 12. 23 — 32. The poems of Tyrtaeus are not open to Plato's censure in this connexion. Pfleiderer ( Zur Lösung der Pl. Fr. p. 23) wrongly represents the present passage as tantamount (or nearly so) to a denial of the immortality of the soul, which is affirmed in Book X. It is possible to criticise the popular conception of immortality without disbelieving in a higher form of the same doctrine, and this is just what Plato does here.

καὶ περὶ τούτων τῶν μύθων should be taken with ἐπιστατεῖν rather than with λέγειν (sc. αὐτούς, i.e. τοὺς μύθους). Hartman, connecting the words with λέγειν, would expunge τῶν μύθων “cum poetae non de fabulis τὰ ἐν Αἵδου describentibus λέγειν soleant, sed ipsi Orci territamenta narrent”—a just criticism, and conclusive in favour of the construction which Hartman rejects.

λοιδορεῖν . The traditional literary picture of the Greek Hades deserves what Plato says of it (see the quotations in Nägelsbach Hom. Theol. pp. 397 ff., Nachh. Theol. pp. 396—398), although a brighter prospect was held out in the Eleusinian mysteries and the Orphic theology ( Nachh. Theol. pp. 398—407).

ἁπλῶς οὕτως . 11 377 B note

λέγοντας . For the accusative after the dative ἐπιχειροῦσι cf. Euthyph. 5 A , Crito 51 D. Before λέγοντας Ξ^{1} (with a few other MSS) adds ἄν, as if εἰ λοιδοροῖεν should be understood (cf. II 380 C); but we should supply not λοιδοροῖεν, but εἰ λοιδοροῦσι (Schneider).

τοῦδε τοῦ ἔπους κτλ. The singular ἔπος is sometimes used of more than one verse, e.g. Hdt. VII 143. The lines are addressed by the shade of Achilles to Odysseus: Od. XI 489—491. On the omission of ᾧ μὴ βίοτος πολὺς εἴη see Introd. § 5.

οἰκία ‐‐ θεοί περ . Il. XX 64, 65. The words in Homer are under the construction of δείσας—μή.

ὢ πόποι . The exclamation of Achilles when the ghost of Patroclus eludes his embrace: Il. XXIII 103, 104. On φρένες as the “physical basis of life” in Homer see Leaf ad loc.

οἴῳ ‐‐ ἀΐσσουσι . Tiresias retained in the other world something of the physical reality of his earthly existence: Od. X 493—495 τοῦ τε φρένες ἔμπεδοί εἰσιν· | τῷ καὶ τεθνηῶτι νόον πόρε Περσεφόνεια | οἴῳ πεπνῦσθαι· τοὶ δὲ σκιαὶ ἀΐσσουσιν. Plato allows the force of attraction to alter τοί to ταί: cf. Men. 100 A οἶος πέπνυται τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου, αἱ δὲ σκιαὶ ἀΐσσουσι.

ψυχὴ ‐‐ ἥβην . Il. XVI 856, 857. ῥεθέων, explained by the ancients as μέλη τοῦ σώματος (Hesych. s.v.), more probably denotes the mouth (as part of the face): cf. Leaf ad loc. and Il. IX 409. Leaf plausibly suggests that ἀν in ἀνδροτῆτα, ‘manhood’—found in all but two MSS of the Iliad—was only the written sign of the nasalis sonans, and counted as a short vowel.