σκύλακος
. A play on
σκύλαξ and
φύλαξ is intended. Analogies from the animal kingdom were freely employed by the historical Socrates: for the dog in particular cf.
Xen.
Mem. IV 1. 3
καὶ τῶν κυνῶν τῶν εὐφυεστάτων, φιλοπόνων τε οὐσῶν καὶ ἐπιθετικῶν τοῖς θηρίοις, τὰς μὲν καλῶς ἀχθείσας ἀρίστας γίγνεσθαι—, ἀναγώγους δὲ γιγνομένας μᾳταίους τε καὶ μανιώδεις καὶ δυσπειθεστάτας. Cf. note on
φύεται 370 A.
αἰσθανόμενον
: ‘the moment he perceives.’ The present (where one might expect the aorist) emphasizes the rapidity with which pursuit follows upon sight.
ἀνδρεῖος
. For
ἀνδρεῖος applied to beasts cf. Isocr. 15. 211
εἰ περὶ τοὺς ἵππους καὶ τοὺς κύνας καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ζῴων ὁρῶντες τέχνας ἔχοντάς τινας, αἷς τὰ μὲν ἀνδρειότερα, τὰ δὲ πραότερα, τὰ δὲ φρονιμώτερα ποιοῦσι, περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσιν μηδεμίαν οἴονται τοιαύτην ηὑρῆσθαι παιδείαν κτλ. See also
Lach. 196 D
— 197 B and Arist.
Eth. Nic. III 11. 1116^{b} 33 ff.
θυμοειδής
. The technical term
θυμοειδής is here for the first time used in the
Republic. Plato probably inherited the word from Socrates (see
Xen.
Mem. IV 1. 3
τῶν τε ἵππων τοὺς εὐφυεστάτους, θυμοειδεῖς τε καὶ σφοδροὺς ὄντας κτλ.): in practice he employs it as the adjective corresponding to
θυμός (see e.g. III 411 A, B), as
ἐπιθυμητικός corresponds to
ἐπιθυμία. The usual translation ‘spirited’ probably expresses the meaning as nearly as can be done by a single word. For a full discussion of the word reference may be made to P. Meyer
ὁ θυμὸς
ap. Arist. Platonemque (1876), whose conclusion (p. 65) is “
τὸν θυμὸν esse eam naturalem vim, qua ductus suam quisque propriam naturam explere studeat, quaque incitatus, quaecunque hanc naturam ipsi propriam tollere vel laedere conentur, fugiat, quae contra perfectiorem reddere possint, adpetat.” See also on IV 439 E.
ἄμαχόν ‐‐ ἀνίκητον
. Ast may be right in supposing that Plato has in view the words of Heraclitus, often referred to in antiquity,
θυμῷ μάχεσθαι χαλεπόν· ὅ τι γὰρ ἂν χρηίζῃ γίνεσθαι, ψυχῆς ὠνέεται (
Fr. 105 B
ywater).
οὗ παρόντος ‐‐ ἀήττητος
. Cf. Arist.
Eth. Nic. III 11. 1116^{b} 26
ἰτητικὠτατον γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους.
ἐναντία γὰρ ‐‐ φύσις
. Plato regarded this opposition as the fundamental antithesis of human character, and thought it a statesman's foremost duty to blend the
θυμοειδές and
πρᾶον harmoniously together: see
Pol. 306 C
— 311 C, infra III 410 B ff., VI 503 C,
Theaet. 144 A
, B.
ταῦτα ‐‐ ἔοικεν
. Van Heusde (
Initia Phil. Plat. p. 471 note 1) somewhat hastily declares these words to be corrupt, and supplies
ἀμφότερα ἔχειν after
ταῦτα δέ. ταῦτα refers like
τούτων simply to the two qualities
πρᾶον and
μεγαλόθυμον: ‘these’—meaning the combination of these as opposed to one of them—‘are apparently unattainable’: cf. VI 499 D
οὐ γὰρ ἀδύνατος γενέσθαι, οὐδ’ ἡμεῖς ἀδύνατα λέγομεν.
ἐνοήσαμεν ‐‐ φύσεις
. ἐνενοήσαμεν (with
q) is read by most of the editors, quite unnecessarily, as Schneider shews.
νοεῖν is not ‘putare,’ nor— I think—‘perpendere,’ but simply ‘animadvertere,’ ‘notice,’ as often. Such a meaning is peculiarly appropriate with
ἴδοι following. Presently
ἄρα is not ‘then’ (J. and C.), but ‘after all.’
τῷ φύλακι
: not
τῷ σκύλακι, as Groen van Prinsterer conjectured (
Plat. Prosop. p. 209).
τῷ φύλακι of course depends on
παρεβάλλομεν, and
ἐν ᾧ is for
ἐν τούτῳ ὃ.
αὐτῶν τὸ ἦθος
. With
αὐτῶν (unnecessary, but welcome, after
τῶν γενναίων κυνῶν) cf. IV 428 A note
πρὸς μὲν ‐‐ τοὐναντίον
. In
Od. XVI 4—10 the dogs of Eumaeus do not bark at Telemachus, and Odysseus remarks (8, 9)
Εὔμαἰ, ἦ μάλα τίς τοι ἐλεύσεται ἐνθάδ’ ἑταῖρος |
ἢ καὶ γνώριμος ἄλλος, ἐπεὶ κύνες οὐχ ὑλάουσιν |
ἀλλὰ περισσαίνουσι. See also
Od. XIV 30, where they bark at the stranger Odysseus, and cf. Heracl. 115 (Bywater)
κύνες καὶ βαύζουσι ὃν ἂν μὴ γινώσκωσι. In Aristotle similar characteristics are attributed to the lion: see
Physiogn. 5. 809^{b} 34—36
μεγαλόψυχον καὶ φιλόνικον, καὶ πραΰ καὶ δίκαιον καὶ φιλόστοργον πρὸς ἃ ἂν ὁμιλήσῃ, and
Hist. An. IX 44. 629^{b} 10—12.
πρὸς τῷ θυμοειδεῖ κτλ.
There seems to be no other example in good Greek of
προσγενέσθαι meaning ‘to become in addition’: but we may compare
προσέσονται II 373 A,
προσέχειν VII 521 D,
προσείπωμεν X 607 B, and similar instances with other verbs. I formerly wrote
φιλόσοφον for
φιλόσοφος (‘that to the element of spirit nature should have added’—
προσγενέσθαι, i.q. accessisse, cf. I 346 D —‘a philosophical temperament’). The accusative with infinitive has however a harsh effect. Herwerden cuts the knot by deleting the
προς‐ of
προσγενέσθαι.
πλούτου
δὲ οὐδέν and Liebhold (
Fl. Jahrb. 1888, p. 107)
κόσμου
δὲ ἄλλο μὲν <ἔχοντ)> οὐδέν for
τοῦτον δὲ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν. Neither of these proposals has any plausibility, and it is best to regard this as one of the places where we owe the right reading to
Π .