ὦ παῖδες ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός
. This curious phrase occurs once again in Plato viz.
Phil. 36 D
, where Protarchus is addressed in the words
ὦ παῖ ἐκείνου τἀνδρός. Philebus has withdrawn from the discussion, his part in which he has bequeathed to Protarchus, who is therefore playfully called his son. That this is the meaning appears from
Phil. 11 A
, B, 11 C
δέχει δὴ τοῦτον τὸν νῦν διδόμενον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, λόγον; Ἀνάγκη δέχεσθαι· Φίληβος γὰρ ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς ἀπείρηκεν, 12 A, 16 B, 19 A: cf. also 15 C and 28 B. In precisely the same way Glauco and Adimantus are the ‘children of Thrasymachus.’ They are
διάδοχοι τοῦ λόγου as appears from 357 A, 358 B (
ἐπανανεώσομαι τὸν Θρασυμάχου λόγον), 367 A and 367 C, as well as from the substance of their arguments. This image is in fact one of the links by means of which Plato binds the dialogue together: as Polemarchus is heir to Cephalus (331 E), so Glauco and Adimantus are heirs to Thrasymachus. In explaining
ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός of Thrasymachus, Stallbaum is therefore not “ridiculous” (as J. and C. assert) but right. See my article in
Cl. Rev. X p. 237.
ὁ Γλαύκωνος ἐραστής
may be Critias, as Schleiermacher supposed; but there is no evidence in support of the conjecture: see Bergk
Poet. Lyr. Gr.^{4} II p. 283.
τὴν Μεγαροῖ μάχην
: perhaps in 409 B.C.: see Diod. Sic. XIII 65. If so, Plato is guilty of a slight anachronism, supposing that the scene of the dialogue is laid in 410. See
Introd. § 3.
παῖδες ‐‐ ἀνδρός
. By
Ἀρίστωνος, the author of the line of course meant Aristo, father of Glauco and Adimantus; but
Ἀρίστων suggests
ἄριστος (cf. IX 580 B) and the pun conveys a friendly, if halfironical, compliment to ‘his excellency’ Thrasymachus, whose
παῖδες (so far as the argument is concerned) Glauco and his brother are: see on
ὦ παῖδες above. In
Symp. 174 B
, when inviting Aristodemus to come as an uninvited guest to sup with Agathon, Socrates indulges in a similarly playful pun:
ἕπου τοίνυν, ἔφη, ἵνα καὶ τὴν παροιμίαν διαφθείρωμεν μεταβάλλοντες, ὡς ἄρα καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐπὶ δαῖτας ἴασιν αὐτόματοι ἀγαθοί. (The
διαφθορά consists in the substitution of
ἀγαθῶν for
δειλῶν, the form of the proverb which Plato had in view being
αὐτόματοι δ’ ἀγαθοὶ δειλῶν ἐπὶ δαῖτας ἴασιν, as the Scholiast remarks. Arnold Hug is ill-advised in adopting Lachmann's suggestion to read
Ἀγάθων) i.e.
Ἀγάθωνι for
ἀγαθῶν: see
Cl. Rev. X p. 238.) Other plays on proper names in Plato are collected by Riddell
Digest pp. 250 f. In
κλεινοῦ Stallbaum finds a ‘lusus facetus’ on
ἐκείνου; but this particular
lusus (if it exists) is accidental and unmeaning.
θεῖον
. The addition of
τι (proposed by Herwerden) is unnecessary: cf. III 388 D note
θεῖος is here used, like
ἔνθεος, of inspiration: if the speaker does not understand or believe what he says, he is, like a rhapsodist or poet, nothing but the mouthpiece of the inspiring deity: cf.
Phaedr. 245 A
,
Ion 533 E, 535 E— 536 D.
τί τέ ἐστιν ‐‐ ἔχει
recalls the conclusion of Book I (354 B, C).
οἵανπερ ἂν
sc.
ἐποιησάμεθα, the verb being omitted as it frequently is with
ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ.
ἕρμαιον ‐‐ τυγχάνει
. I have followed Schneider in printing a colon before
ἕρμαιον: for the sentence
ἕρμαιον— τυγχάνει is not the grammatical apodosis to the
εἰ clause, but a further result. The asyndeton with
ἕρμαιον is the usual asyndeton of ampliative clauses. For the principle underlying the method of inquiry here enunciated, see
Soph. 218 C
ὅσα δ’ αὖ τῶν μεγάλων δεῖ διαπονεῖσθαι καλῶς, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων δέδοκται πᾶσι καὶ πάλαι τὸ πρότερον ἐν σμικροῖς καὶ ῥᾴοσιν αὐτὰ δεῖν μελετᾶν, πρὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς μεγίστοις and
Pol. 286 A
. (Contrast
Phil. 48 B
, where the opposite course is recommended.) In the special case of the State versus the Individual, the words
ἐν σμικροῖς, ἐν ἐλάττοσιν are not applicable, but
ἐν ῥᾴοσιν πρότερον δεῖ μελετᾶν is the essential part of the principle, and Justice in the State is
ῥᾴων καταμαθεῖν (368 E) than in the Individual. Cf. also infra 377 C
ἐν τοῖς μείζοσιν—μύθοις ὀψόμεθα καὶ τοὺς ἐλάττους. Illustrations from letters are tolerably frequent in Plato: cf. e.g. IV 402 A f.,
Theaet. 205 D
—206 A,
Pol. 277 E
ff.
πρῶτον ‐‐ ἐπισκοποῦντες
lays down the method to be pursued in the rest of the treatise, except in books V—VII, which are professedly a ‘digression,’ and X, which is of the nature of an epilogue. At each suc cessive stage in the exposition of his subject, Plato reminds us more or less explicitly of the method which he here proposes to follow:—at the end of the first sketch of a State 371 E; in connexion with the
φλεγμαίνουσα πόλις 372 E; before entering on the theory of education 376 C, D and again in III 392 C, when he has finished the treatment of
λόγοι; at Adimantus' objection IV 420 B, C; at the end of the picture of the just state IV 427 D ff.; in passing to Justice in the Individual IV 434 D ff.; at V 472 B ff., where the question is raised ‘Is this State possible?’; on beginning the account of the degenerate commonwealths and men in VIII 545 B; and finally when the whole argument draws to a head at IX 577 C.
πλούτου
δὲ οὐδέν and Liebhold (
Fl. Jahrb. 1888, p. 107)
κόσμου
δὲ ἄλλο μὲν <ἔχοντ)> οὐδέν for
τοῦτον δὲ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν. Neither of these proposals has any plausibility, and it is best to regard this as one of the places where we owe the right reading to
Π .