Plato, Republic, ed. John Burnet, 2.359

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[359]
πεφυκέναι γὰρ δή φασιν τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖσθαι κακόν, πλέονι δὲ κακῷ ὑπερβάλλειν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀγαθῷ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ὥστʼ ἐπειδὰν ἀλλήλους ἀδικῶσί τε καὶ ἀδικῶνται καὶ ἀμφοτέρων γεύωνται, τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις τὸ 359a μὲν ἐκφεύγειν τὸ δὲ αἱρεῖν δοκεῖ λυσιτελεῖν συνθέσθαι ἀλλήλοις μήτʼ ἀδικεῖν μήτʼ ἀδικεῖσθαι· καὶ ἐντεῦθεν δὴ ἄρξασθαι νόμους τίθεσθαι καὶ συνθήκας αὑτῶν, καὶ ὀνομάσαι τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἐπίταγμα νόμιμόν τε καὶ δίκαιον· καὶ εἶναι δὴ ταύτην γένεσίν τε καὶ οὐσίαν δικαιοσύνης, μεταξὺ οὖσαν τοῦ μὲν ἀρίστου ὄντος, ἐὰν ἀδικῶν μὴ διδῷ δίκην, τοῦ δὲ κακίστου, ἐὰν ἀδικούμενος τιμωρεῖσθαι ἀδύνατος ᾖ· τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ἐν μέσῳ ὂν τούτων ἀμφοτέρων ἀγαπᾶσθαι οὐχ ὡς 359b ἀγαθόν, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἀρρωστίᾳ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν τιμώμενον· ἐπεὶ τὸν δυνάμενον αὐτὸ ποιεῖν καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα οὐδʼ ἂν ἑνί ποτε συνθέσθαι τὸ μήτε ἀδικεῖν μήτε ἀδικεῖσθαι· μαίνεσθαι γὰρ ἄν. ἡ μὲν οὖν δὴ φύσις δικαιοσύνης, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὕτη τε καὶ τοιαύτη, καὶ ἐξ ὧν πέφυκε τοιαῦτα, ὡς ὁ λόγος.
ὡς δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἀδυναμίᾳ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν ἄκοντες αὐτὸ ἐπιτηδεύουσι, μάλιστʼ ἂν αἰσθοίμεθα, εἰ τοιόνδε ποιήσαιμεν 359c τῇ διανοίᾳ· δόντες ἐξουσίαν ἑκατέρῳ ποιεῖν ὅτι ἂν βούληται, τῷ τε δικαίῳ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ, εἶτʼ ἐπακολουθήσαιμεν θεώμενοι ποῖ ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἑκάτερον ἄξει. ἐπʼ αὐτοφώρῳ οὖν λάβοιμεν ἂν τὸν δίκαιον τῷ ἀδίκῳ εἰς ταὐτὸν ἰόντα διὰ τὴν πλεονεξίαν, ὃ πᾶσα φύσις διώκειν πέφυκεν ὡς ἀγαθόν, νόμῳ δὲ βίᾳ παράγεται ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἴσου τιμήν. εἴη δʼ ἂν ἡ ἐξουσία ἣν λέγω τοιάδε μάλιστα, εἰ αὐτοῖς γένοιτο οἵαν 359d ποτέ φασιν δύναμιν τῷ Γύγου τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ γενέσθαι. εἶναι μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν ποιμένα θητεύοντα παρὰ τῷ τότε Λυδίας ἄρχοντι, ὄμβρου δὲ πολλοῦ γενομένου καὶ σεισμοῦ ῥαγῆναί τι τῆς γῆς καὶ γενέσθαι χάσμα κατὰ τὸν τόπον ᾗ ἔνεμεν. ἰδόντα δὲ καὶ θαυμάσαντα καταβῆναι καὶ ἰδεῖν ἄλλα τε δὴ ἃ μυθολογοῦσιν θαυμαστὰ καὶ ἵππον χαλκοῦν, κοῖλον, θυρίδας ἔχοντα, καθʼ ἃς ἐγκύψαντα ἰδεῖν ἐνόντα νεκρόν, ὡς φαίνεσθαι μείζω ἢ κατʼ ἄνθρωπον, τοῦτον δὲ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν, περὶ δὲ 359e τῇ χειρὶ χρυσοῦν δακτύλιον ὄν τα περιελόμενον ἐκβῆναι. συλλόγου δὲ γενομένου τοῖς ποιμέσιν εἰωθότος, ἵνʼ ἐξαγγέλλοιεν κατὰ μῆνα τῷ βασιλεῖ τὰ περὶ τὰ ποίμνια, ἀφικέσθαι καὶ ἐκεῖνον ἔχοντα τὸν δακτύλιον·

Republic. Plato. ed. John Burnet. Oxford. 1905.

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Current edition Perseus

Πολιτεία (Greek) (Platonis Opera Tomus IV: Tetralogia VIII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905.)

Translations (1)

Republic Perseus (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 5-6. Shorey, Paul, translator. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1935-37 (printing).) — 2.359 focus

[359] By nature,¹ they say, to commit injustice is a good and to suffer it is an evil, but that the excess of evil in being wronged is greater than the excess of good in doing wrong. So that when men do wrong and are wronged by one another and taste of both, those who lack the power 359a to avoid the one and take the other determine that it is for their profit to make a compact with one another neither to commit nor to suffer injustice; and that this is the beginning of legislation and covenants between men, and that they name the commandment of the law the lawful and the just, and that this is the genesis and essential nature of justice—a compromise between the best, which is to do wrong with impunity, and the worst, which is to be wronged and be impotent to get one’s revenge. Justice, they tell us, being mid-way between the two, is accepted and approved, 359b not as a real good, but as a thing honored in the lack of vigor to do injustice, since anyone who had the power to do it and was in reality a man would never make a compact with anybody either to wrong nor to be wronged; for he would be mad. The nature, then, of justice is this and such as this, Socrates, and such are the conditions in which it originates, according to the theory.
But as for the second point, that those who practise it do so unwillingly and from want of power to commit injustice—we shall be most likely to apprehend that if we entertain some such supposition as this in thought: 359c if we grant to each, the just and the unjust, licence and power to do whatever he pleases, and then accompany them in imagination and see whither his desire will conduct each. We should then catch the just man in the very act of resorting to the same conduct as the unjust man because of the self-advantage which every creature by its nature pursues as a good, while by the convention of law² it is forcibly diverted to paying honor to equality.³ The licence that I mean would be most nearly such as would result from supposing them to have the power 359d which men say once came to the ancestor of Gyges the Lydian.⁴ They relate that he was a shepherd in the service of the ruler at that time of Lydia , and that after a great deluge of rain and an earthquake the ground opened and a chasm appeared in the place where he was pasturing; and they say that he saw and wondered and went down into the chasm; and the story goes that he beheld other marvels there and a hollow bronze horse with little doors, and that he peeped in and saw a corpse within, as it seemed, of more than mortal stature, 359e and that there was nothing else but a gold ring on its hand, which he took off and went forth. And when the shepherds held their customary assembly to make their monthly report to the king about the flocks, he also attended wearing the ring.

Commentary

Commentary on Plato, Republic (Plato. The Republic, Vol 1-2. Adam, James, editor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902-1903.) focus

ξυνθήκας αὑτῶν : ‘covenants between one another,’ ‘mutual covenants.’ Reading αὐτῶν, Tucker suggests that the meaning is, ‘they established laws and covenants concerning them,’ i.e. concerning matters connected with ἀδικεῖν and ἀδικεῖσθαι—a very improbable view.

νόμιμόν τε καὶ δίκαιον · φημὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ τὸ νόμιμον δίκαιον εἶναι, said Socrates ( Mem. IV 4. 12).

τοῦ μὲν ἀρίστου κτλ. Cf. the reasoning of Philus (whose position in Cicero's work corresponds to that of Glauco here) in Cic. de Rep. III 23 “nam cum de tribus unum esset optandum, aut facere iniuriam nec accipere, aut et facere et accipere, aut neutrum, optimum est facere, impune si possis, secundum nec facere nec pati, miserrimum digladiari semper tum faciendis tum accipiendis iniuriis.” Cicero is following Carneades ( ibid. 8), who may have been thinking of the present passage. ἀγαπᾶσθαι below (as J. and C. observe) “implies acquiescence rather than decided preference.”

ἐπεὶ τὸν δυνάμενον κτλ. is further elaborated with much vigour in Gorg. 484 A . With ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα should be compared the emphatic ἀνήρ in that passage ( ἐὰν δέ γε, οἶμαι, φύσιν ἱκανὴν γένηται ἔχων ἀνήρ), and Eur. Phoen. 509 ἀνανδρία γάρ, τὸ πλέον ὅστις ἀπολέσας | τοὔλασσον ἔλαβε.

εἰ τοιόνδε ‐‐ δόντες . δόντες κτλ. explains τοιόνδε. εἰ need not be twice expressed: cf. I 351 C note

νόμῳ ‐‐ παράγεται . The language is perhaps suggested by the lines of Pindar cited in Gorg. 484 B νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων— ἄγει δικαιῶν τὸ βιαιότατον ὑπερτάτᾳ χειρί κτλ. (cf. Prot. 337 D ). but the preposition in παράγεται adds the further notion that equality is not Nature's highway. For βίᾳ i.q. βιαἴως in conjunction with another dative Schneider cites VIII 552 E οὓς ἐπιμελείᾳ βίᾳ κατέχουσιν αἱ ἀρχαί. In the next line it is better to regard τοιάδε as explained by εἰ—γενέσθαι, than as balancing οἴαν, in which case εἰ αὐτοῖς γένοιτο would be superfluous. The opportunity ( ἐξουσία) of working their will comes from the possession ( εἰ αὐτοῖς γένοιτο) of a certain active faculty ( δύναμις) like that of Gyges.

τῷ Γύγου κτλ. Cf. X 612 B τὸν Γύγου δακτύλιον. In Appendix I I have given reasons for believing that the Gyges of the proverbial ‘Gyges' ring’ was not “Gyges the Lydian”—the hero of Herodotus' story (I 7), but a homonymous ancestor of his. If so, we must (on the hypothesis that the text is sound) suppose that Plato here omits the name of the original Gyges either because he wishes tacitly to contradict a prevalent misconception, or (more probably) because his readers might be presumed to know or to be capable of inferring that the ancestor of Gyges the Lydian was also called Gyges. The MS reading is supported by Proclus ( τῷ κατὰ τὸν Γύγου πρόγονον διηγήματι in Schöll Procli Comm. in Remp. Pl. part. ined. p. 60. 30). For other views of this passage see App. I.

ὡς φαίνεσθαι : with νεκρόν, as Schneider saw: “utrum vere mortuus fuerit, an specie, fabula incertum reliquit.” Stallbaum wrongly interprets ‘nimirum videbatur Gyges cernere’ etc.: this would be expressed by δοκεῖν. Ast connects the phrase with μείζω ἢ κατ’ ἄνθρωπον: but this is very weak in point of sense. The words are omitted by Cicero ( De Off. III 38).

ἔχειν . See cr. n. and (for the omission in A) Introd. § 5. ἔχειν in the sense of ‘have on’ ‘wear,’ i.q. φορεῖν, is tolerably frequent in Homer, though rarer in Attic: see Stephanus-Hase Thes. s.v. For the change of subject in ἔχειν—ἐκβῆναι cf. III 414 D note Other views on the text and interpretation of this passage are discussed in App. II.

χειρί . Herwerden's δακτύλῳ is unnecessary, and even unpleasant with δακτύλιον so near. Cf. χρυσόχειρες in Luc. Tim. 20. “Etiamnunc homines ita loquuntur” (Hartman).

ἵν’ ἐξαγγέλλοιεν κτλ. : ‘to report, as was done every month.’ The present expresses the habit (J. and C.).

πλούτου δὲ οὐδέν and Liebhold ( Fl. Jahrb. 1888, p. 107)

κόσμου δὲ ἄλλο μὲν <ἔχοντ)> οὐδέν for τοῦτον δὲ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν. Neither of these proposals has any plausibility, and it is best to regard this as one of the places where we owe the right reading to Π .

Plato Republic 2.359

ed. John Burnet

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