Plato Republic 10.606

ναὶ κτλ. It is unreasonable to take pleasure in and praise such exhibitions; for the appetite to which they minister is one which in the case of our own individual misfortunes we are careful to repress. Jackson points out that ναί (“ganz recht” Schneider) assents to what Glauco has just said, viz. οὐκ εὐλόγῳ ἔοικεν, and does not mean ναί, εὐλόγῳ ἔοικεν, as J. and C. suppose, taking ναί as the equivalent of the French si.

κατεχόμενον τότε : viz. ὅταν οἰκεῖόν τινι ἡμῶν κῆδος γένηται (605 D).

τότ’ ἐστὶν τοῦτο κτλ. : ‘is on those occasions the part of our nature which the poets satisfy and please.’ τοῦτο is the subject, and repeats τὸ βίᾳ κατεχόμενον κτλ., while τὸ—χαῖρον is in the predicate. A difficulty has been felt because τότε now refers to poetical exhibitions, whereas the other τότε had a different reference; but the emphatic place of the second adverb seems to place it in opposition to the first, and mistake is made impossible by the presence in the one case of ἐν ταῖς οἰκείαις συμφοραῖς, in the other of ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν. Cf. also the double reference of αὖ—αὖ in 606 C. Madvig conjectures αὔτ’ ἐστι τοῦτο, Richards τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν αὐτό. I once read τοῦτό ἐστιν with q and Flor. U, but there is not sufficient reason for deserting the best MSS. On the theory of Tragedy involved in this sentence see 606 B note

τοῦ θρηνώδους τούτου . See on τὸ ἀγανακτητικόν 604 E.

ἑαυτῷ . “Plato passes from the rational part of soul to the man himself” J. and C. Hence καταφρονήσας below. The antithesis with ἄλλος ἀνήρ makes the meaning clear; and a similar transition occurs, as Schneider points out, in VI 486 A: see also note ad loc.

καταφρονήσας ‐‐ ποιήματος . He cannot bring himself to despise the whole poem: yet that is the only safe thing to do. From this point of view Plato's own καταφρόνησις ὅλης τῆς ποιήσεως is in itself the strongest testimony to the hold which Poetry had on him. See on 595 B.

ἀπολαύειν ‐‐ οἰκεῖα . Cf. III 395 C ff. and Laws 656 B.

θρέψαντα ‐‐ κατέχειν . Plato and Aristotle agree in holding that Pity is one of the principal emotions to which Tragedy ministers. The point at which they part company is where they begin to discuss the effect produced upon human life and conduct by the indulgence of this emotion in the mimicry of the stage. According to Plato, the emotion grows by what it feeds upon, and becomes more and more troublesome and deleterious in real life, the more we indulge it at the theatre: according to Aristotle, tragedy effects the ‘purgation’ of pity and its kindred emotions and tends to free us from their dominion in matters of more serious moment ( Poet. 6. 1449^{b} 27 et al.). Aristotle hopes to effect by means of theatrical stimulation what Plato would attain by starving the emotions even in play. It is obvious that the Aristotelian theory of the drama was in this important respect developed in direct and conscious antagonism to the Platonic, to which, in other particulars, it owes much: see Finsler Platon u. die Arist. Poetik pp. 96 ff. I think it may fairly be argued that Plato's view is not less true to experience than that of Aristotle; for a spectacle which ‘purges’ the ἐλεεινόν in one man may strengthen it in another and make him more than ever inclined to self-pity. On the contrast between the Platonic and Aristotelian views see Butcher Aristotle's Theory of Poetry^{2} etc. pp. 237—268, especially 241 f., and for Aristotle's debt to Plato in his definition of tragedy consult the excellent essay of Siebeck Zur Katharsisfrage in his Unters. zur Phil. d. Gr. pp. 165—180.

ἐλεεινόν . ἐλεεινός and not ἐλεινός is the Platonic form of this word: see Schanz Phaedo p. VII.

ἆρ’ οὐχ κτλ. Cf. III 388 E.

ὅτι κτλ. : lit. ‘that whatever jests you would be ashamed to make yourself, but which you are mightily pleased to hear in comic representations, or it may be in private life, and do not hate as bad, you do the same thing’ etc. ‘Whatever’ is treated as equivalent to ‘if any’: see Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 945. I have followed Schneider in writing ἅν or ἃ ἄν instead of ἄν (see cr. n.), although he gives no other instance where ἄν appears to do double duty in this fashion. The usage, however, ought not on that account to be pronounced impossible; for cases in which a single relative pronoun forms, as here, the object of two opposing clauses, one representing a hypothetical, the other an actual situation, are extremely rare. We should also remember that ὅς is occasionally used instead of ὃς ἄν with the subjunctive, even in classical prose, according to the best MSS: e.g. Laws 737 B: see also Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 206. A sentence like the present is made easier by the mere existence of such an exceptional liberty of style. For the corruption of ἅν to ἄν cf. (with Schneider) Gorg. 486 E . All other attempts at emendation—and they are numerous—involve too much change: see App. III.

ἰδίᾳ : i.e. “intra privatos parietes et ab iis, qui artem non profitentur” (Schneider). The word has been held to refer to writings in prose: but see on II 363 E.

αὖ κατεῖχες . αὖ is “item, ut antea θρηνῶδες” (Stallbaum). Madvig's conjecture ἄν should not be adopted. The second αὖ ( τότ’ αὖ) points the contrast between κατεῖχες and ἀνίης: cf. 606 A note

καὶ περὶ ἀφροδισίων κτλ. Cf. III 389 D ff., and (for the psychological theory of this passage) supra 602 C note ὅτι, which depends on ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, is easy enough if we retain ὅτι in C: cf. VI 510 D οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι κτλ. and infra 613 D καὶ αὖ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ὅτι κτλ. Otherwise ὅτι becomes extremely difficult, although Stallbaum and Neukirch (in Pl. Pol. quaest. phil. I p. 49) think that ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστίν may even then be supplied. The word was accordingly suspected by Ast and bracketed by Baiter. Madvig conjectures ἔτι, and Richards would replace ὅτι τοιαῦτα by ἕτερα τοιαῦτα or οὐ τὰ αὐτά (understood interrogatively). The recurrence of ὅτι is, however, the strongest evidence in favour of its genuineness both here and above. See App. III. The pronoun τοιαῦτα takes its meaning from ἀφροδισίων etc. The note of interrogation after ἐργάζεται was added by Schneider. On ἄρδουσα see VIII 550 B note

Ὁμήρου ἐπαινέταις . Dümmler and Stählin suppose that Plato has Antisthenes in his mind: but see on 598 D.

ἄξιος . Campbell was the first to point out that ἄξιος, and not ἄξιον, is the reading of Paris A. There is no MS authority of any kind for ἄξιον, and it is intrinsically much inferior.

πρῶτον τῶν τραγῳδοποιῶν . See on 595 C.

ὕμνους ‐‐ ἀγαθοῖς . In Laws 801 E —802 A the same exceptions are allowed. Even religious hymns would fall under the heading of μίμησις, according to Plato's definition of the term: so that it is once more clear that his real quarrel is not with Imitation as such, but only with Imitation of the false and immoral. See on 595 A. For the construction cf. (with Stallbaum) Symp. 194 D τοῦ ἐγκωμίου τῷ Ἔρωτι. In pp. 55—59 of his Stellung d. Poesie in der plat. Phil. Stählin gives an interesting sketch of the kind of Poetry which Plato would have admitted in the Republic.

ἡδυσμένην . The same word is used by Aristotle in a narrower sense, with specific reference to what he considers the ἡδύσματα or seasoning of poetry, viz. metre and melody: see Butcher Aristotle's Theory of Poetry^{2} etc. p. 146 note 1. Here ἡδυσμένην points the way to ἡδονή; and for that reason ‘pleasurable’ is a more suitable translation than ‘honeyed’ (Jowett) or ‘highlyseasoned’ (D. and V.), although the epithet also suggests a comparison with cookery (cf. ὄψον ἡδῦναι Theaet. 175 E ). For the sentiment cf. III 398 A f. αὐτοὶ δ’ ἂν τῷ αὐστηροτέρῳ καὶ ἀηδεστέρῳ ποιητῇ χρῴμεθα κτλ.

τοῦ κοινῇ ‐‐ λόγου : ‘the principle which the community shall in every instance have pronounced to be the best.’ See 604 B—D, where one example of such a λόγος is provided. For λόγος in this sense cf. (with Schneider) Crit. 46 B ἐγὼ—ἀεὶ τοιοῦτος οἷος τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ πείθεσθαι ἢ τῷ λόγῳ, ὃς ἄν μοι λογιζομένῳ βέλτιστος φαίνηται. In his second edition Ast wished to place a comma after βελτίστου (‘that which has ever been judged best by all, viz. reason’). This interpretation lends a certain weight and dignity to the clause; but the other is easier and more natural. Cf. Shorey in A. J. Ph. XIII pp. 364 ff. Plato elsewhere provides against what he takes to be the antinomian tendency of Poetry by enacting that the Poet shall παρὰ τὰ τῆς πόλεως νόμιμα καὶ δίκαια ἢ καλὰ ἢ ἀγαθὰ μηδὲν ποιεῖν ἄλλο, and submit all his works to a state censorship ( Laws 801 C, D), although in a striking passage of the Politicus (299 B, E) he himself insists that freedom is the very life of poetry and every other art. See Reber Platon u. die Poesie p. 71.

ἀπολελογήσθω κτλ. See cr. n. The reading ἀπολελογίσθω— enumerata sunto or, according to Hermann, singulatim exputata sunto—though retained by Hermann and Baiter, is much less appropriate than ἀπολελογήσθω: for the whole of the preceding episode is an ἀπολογία or defence of Plato's attitude towards Poetry in Books II and III (595 A note). ἀπολελογήσθω is also more in accordance with ὅτι εἰκότως ἀπεστέλλομεν: and the words ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἡμᾶς ᾕρει “non tam eorum sunt, qui ius suum exsequi, quam qui excusare se valuerunt” (Schneider). The corruption, which recurs infra 607 D in Π, is by no means rare: see StephanusHase s.v. ἀπολογίζομαι. See also on VI 490 A. On ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἡμᾶς ᾕρει see 604 C note προσείπωμεν δὲ αὐτῇ=‘let us tell her also.’ With this use of προσειπεῖν cf. II 375 E note

παλαιὰ ‐‐ ποιητικῇ . There are few traces of this ‘ancient feud’ in the extant fragments of early Greek poetry. Pindar furnishes one, Fr. 209 ed. Bergk, ἀτελῆ σοφίας καρπὸν δρέπειν (said of the φυσιολογοῦντες: see above on V 457 B). The early philosophers on the other hand were constantly falling foul of Homer, Hesiod and the poets generally on theological and moral grounds: see for example Heraclitus Fr. 35, 43, 111, 119 Bywater, and Xenophanes and Empedocles in RP.^{7} §§ 82, 83, 140 A—140 D. The attitude of Pythagoras was equally hostile, if we may trust Hieronymus ap. D. L. VIII 21. Even those philosophers who defended Homer did not venture to take him at his word, but had resort to the allegorical method of interpretation (II 378 D note). The antagonism between Philosophy and Poetry—the latter “immortalising in imperishable creations the traditional faith, the former, just on account of that faith, condemning those creations” Krohn ( Pl. St. p. 261)—was appreciated in its true historical significance by those Christian apologists who, like Clement, make philosophy a προπαιδεία to Christianity— ἐπαιδαγώγει γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴ τὸ Ἑλληνικόν, ὡς ὁ νόμος τοὺς Ἑβραίους, εἰς Χριστόν. προπαρασκευάζει τοίνυν ἡ φιλοσοφία, προοδοποιοῦσα κτλ. ( Strom. I 5. 718 D, 720 A. Cf. Spiess Logos Spermatikos pp. 3—5).

καὶ γὰρ ‐‐ πένονται . The source of these quotations has not been discovered. They are all from poets, as Schneider holds; but we ought not to take παλαιά too strictly, and infer from it that all of them are very old. Plato's main object is to make out that his quarrel with Poetry is nothing new, for Poetry and Philosophy have quarrelled from the earliest times; and it is therefore inherently probable that the quotations are of very different dates. There is no a priori reason why some of them should not be from the contemporary drama; but some of them should be older; and those who refer them all to comedy, such as Ast, Prantl, and Heine ( de rat. quae Pl. c. poet. Gr. intercedit p. 50 note 4), can hardly be right. Still less is Pfleiderer justified in citing them as expressions of the indignation which, according to his own chorizontic views, Books II and III had aroused in comic poets ( Zur Lösung etc. p. 34).

ἡ λακέρυζα ‐‐ κραυγάζουσα . Cf. Laws 967 C, D καὶ δὴ καὶ λοιδορήσεις γε ἐπῆλθον ποιηταῖς, τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας κυσὶ ματαίαις ἀπεικάζοντας χρωμέναισιν ὑλακαῖς. The occasion which provoked this assault upon philosophy was—so Plato tells us—the atheistic teaching of Anaxagoras and his followers about the celestial bodies. Here the λακέρυζα κύων represents of course φιλοσοφία: but (in view of the passage in the Laws) it would be unsafe to identify δεσπόταν with Poetry. Probably the quotation is from some lyric poet.

μέγας ‐‐ κενεαγορίαισι is presumably also a lyrical fragment, directed against some notable philosopher, or less probably against some philosophical figment “cuius modi Δῖνος in Nubibus Aristophanis est” (Schneider).

ὁ ‐‐ κράτων : ‘the rabble-rout of alltoo-sapient heads.’ I have combined Herwerden's conjecture ΛΊΑ— for ΔΊΑ with my own suggestion κράτων (from κράς) instead of κρατῶν ( Cl. Rev. X p. 105). τῶν λίαν σοφῶν ὄχλος | κράτων looks like a tragic fragment, and a comparison with Med. 305 εἰμὶ δ’ οὐκ ἄγαν σοφή and Hipp. 518, El. 296 γνώμην ἐνεῖναι τοῖς σοφοῖς λίαν σοφήν, suggests that the author is Euripides: cf. also VIII 568 A note The head stands for the whole personality, as in the familiar use of κάρα and κεφαλή in Tragedy and elsewhere ( πολλὰς ἰφθίμους κεφαλὰς Ἄιδι προίαψεν Il. 11. 55 ἡ μιαρὰ κεφαλὴ αὕτη Dem. Cor. 153 et al.: see Blaydes on Ar. Ach. 285 ); and a learned poet like Euripides might the more readily have described philosophers by this feature, because the head, and not the heart or midriff, was believed to be the seat of intelligence not only by Hippocrates, but also by many of the philosophers themselves, including Pythagoras, Alcmaeo, Democritus and Plato: see Diels Dox. Gr. pp. 391^{a} 3, 391^{b} 5, 392^{a} 2, 427^{a} 8, Zeller^{5} I p. 448 and Gomperz, Greek Thinkers I pp. 148, 313. There are also, I think, traces of a similar view even in popular beliefs: see for example Ar. Clouds 1275 f. οὐκ ἔσθ’ ὅπως σύ γ’ αὐτὸς ὑγιαίνεις. Τί δαί; | Τὸν ἐγκέφαλον ὥσπερ σεσεῖσθαί μοι δοκεῖς. For other views of this passage see App. IV.

οἱ λεπτῶς ‐‐ πένονται : ‘the subtle thinkers, how that they are beggars after all.’ This quotation is probably from comedy, which abounds in references to μεριμνοφροντισταί, λεπτολόγοι etc. (cf. Ar. Clouds 101 , 153 al.), and constantly ridicules the poverty and destitution of οἱ σοφοί: see the passages quoted in my edition of the Apology, pp. VIII f. There is nothing in the language to justify Schneider in attributing the fragment to a lyrical poet. A MS note in my copy of Schneider cites the proverb λεπτὴν πλέκειν· λεγόμενόν τι ἐπὶ τῶν πενήτων from Photius (p. 215. 12).

καταδεχοίμεθα . καταδέχεσθαι is ‘to receive home from exile’: cf. κατιέναι below. δεχοίμεθα, which Baiter reads on insufficient authority, is much less expressive and appropriate.

ξύνισμέν γε κτλ. See on 595 B.

ἀπολογησαμένη . Plato is hardly likely to let Poetry return on the promise of an ex post facto ἀπολογία: she must surely make good her defence before the decree of banishment can be repealed. Hence ἀπολογησαμένη, which Schneider and the Oxford editors adopt, is right as against the ἀπολογησομένη of A^{2} and a few inferior MSS (followed by Bekker and others).

εἰ δέ γε κτλ. The words from γε μή to φανῆ [ ναι] have been found on one of the Oxyrhynchus Papyri, without any difference from the text of A except οὕτω for οὕτως and ἐνγεγονότα for ἐγγεγονότα (Grenfell and Hunt, Vol. I p. 52).

τῶν καλῶν πολιτειῶν . Ξ has κακῶν for καλῶν, oblivious of the irony.